true that at a time when the world was beset by manifold conflicts, such assistance was likely to be affected by the cold war with the result that countries receiving aid might be treated as pawns in the international game of chess. Nothing could be more disastrous for Africa, and the new nations should stand firmly together and do everything in their power to spare their territories the rigours of the cold war, in particular, by refraining from adopting any policy seeking to gain an advantage from existing international rivalries.

3. In their own interest, the new countries should coordinate their foreign aid policies and strengthen the bonds of co-operation and mutual assistance among themselves. It was in that spirit of equality and mutual assistance that Israel was co-operating with the new States of Africa and Asia. The tremendous tasks with which Israel had had to cope when it was a new country in order to develop a land which was arid and poor in natural resources had led the new countries of Africa and Asia to want to follow the example of the Israel experiment. He reviewed the various fields in which Israel had assisted the newly independent countries—infra-structure and joint ventures, agricultural development and diversification of crops, vocational training and public health—and cited examples indicating the approach towards mutual aid and economic co-operation as practised by Israel. The International Conference on the Role of Science in the Advancement of New States was held in Israel in the summer of 1960 in the same spirit.

4. The Israel delegation shared the view of the representative of Ghana regarding the necessity to establish special organs for the development of Africa, and in particular, an African development bank. It also believed that the Economic Commission for Africa should intensify its efforts to assist the various African countries in specifying their needs, and in planning and co-ordinating the execution of their programmes. There was likewise wide scope for regional co-operation, for owing to the colonial system the African countries had remained cut off from each other and from the greater part of the outside world. They would have to establish an intra-continental network of roads, airlines and telecommunications, develop water power and undertake regional programmes of electric power development; they would also have to change existing patterns of commerce. While Africa was not poor, its wealth depended on the production of a small number of primary commodities, thus placing it at the mercy of world market fluctuations. The Commission on International Commodity Trade would have to formulate constructive proposals for the development of a new pattern of African trade and for the stabilization of primary commodity prices. In any event, the African countries should receive much greater outside assistance, both multilateral and bilateral, than was available at present in ways which could and sometimes should depart from the orthodox approaches.
5. The Israel delegation was gratified to note that some of the trends of thought it had outlined had been embodied in draft resolution B in document A/C.1/L.271/Rev.1, submitted by twenty-five African Powers, on which it would comment at a later stage.

6. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan), noting that there was a tendency to consider not only economic problems but other problems as well on a regional basis, wondered to what extent it would be in the interest of humanity and of bringing nations closer together for the General Assembly eventually to deal with subjects placed before it by regional commissions rather than by individual delegations.

7. The fact that the draft resolutions before the Committee (A/C.1/L.271/Rev.1) had been sponsored by exclusively African countries should not be interpreted to mean that the countries of Asia were not interested in the problem. Draft resolution B contained three important recommendations relating to economic development. The first, concerning the provision of operational and administrative personnel at the request of independent countries was unexceptionable, but it was to be hoped that United Nations technical assistance was attractive to Africa for other reasons besides its anonymity. Pakistan had found great advantages in bilateral aid and was grateful for what it had received.

8. With regard to the establishment of an African development bank, provided for in draft resolution B, it should be borne in mind that it was not easy to establish a new bank. Capital had to be provided by the members, and the African countries were not likely to have convertible funds to finance the bank immediately; it would consequently have to depend on non-African countries. On the other hand, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had been in existence for some time and was operating satisfactorily. With its experience, resources and wise leadership, it would be available to Africa as it was to any country of any other continent.

9. The third important recommendation in draft resolution B was the establishment of an economic development institute for Africa. It was an excellent idea, but such an institute should be set up by the Africans themselves and not by the United Nations. Once it had been established, the African countries could look forward to receiving help from all parts of the world: the services of teachers, scholars, researchers, etc. Asia would be in the best position to provide such assistance because in experience it was closer to Africa than any other continent.

10. Mr. ALVAREZ RESTREPO (Colombia) considered that the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.271/Rev.1 were right in wanting the United Nations to give preferential attention to the political problems of Africa. No economic progress could be made in the absence of political and social stability and no large-scale programme for the future could be envisaged when foreign interference upset the unstinted efforts of the members of a community. The Africans were right to put the emphasis on their freedom and autonomy. But they could rest easy. Just as the wind of freedom swept the American continent in the nineteenth century, so it was now sweeping Africa, and the time was not very far off when all the countries of Africa would be independent.

11. The Colombian delegation hailed the movement of African emancipation because it was only when that great continent was composed of independent and economically strong States that the world balance could be restored. Latin America knew by experience that the road to freedom was long and difficult and that political independence did not immediately result in economic independence. The peoples of Africa would have to go through a difficult period of internal readjustment and rivalry between political parties; they would have to develop legal standards to ensure peace and public order, but with goodwill and perseverance, they could attain that objective.

12. Then came the economic process. For 130 years, the countries of Latin America had made many mistakes, but they had not then enjoyed the benefits of the modern scientific advances which were now available to the Africans.

13. Moreover, although there was no definite formula and no perfect programme which applied in all cases, the countries of Africa, with the help of the United Nations, could advance much more rapidly and succeed in creating internal balance in their economies. As the representative of Pakistan had pointed out, the Africans should seek foreign capital for major ventures. They could obtain that capital in three ways: public loans, private investments and United Nations investments. In the next ten years, they would probably resort to the last-named method, but there were so many African States that the capital available to the United Nations would be inadequate. However, as much assistance as possible should be provided by the United Nations so that those States should not fear that outside interference might jeopardize the independent nature of their political development.

14. Moreover, loans by the Governments of industrialized countries had played an important part in the economic development of the under-developed countries and were not the monopoly of any particular political group. In that connexion, it had been gratifying to hear the representative of Ghana say, at the 1142nd meeting, that the African States were prepared to accept assistance from any Member States which wished to help them because, ideologically, their needs were neutral.

15. The Colombian delegation fully supported the recommendation in draft resolution B (A/C.1/L.271/Rev.1) for the establishment of an African development bank. True, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development could meet certain vital needs; with its assistance, for example, Colombia had succeeded in developing its network of electric power plants. However, a regional bank became specialized and got to know the needs of the region in minute detail; thus it was better equipped to carry out the undertakings of the various Governments.

16. He was pleased to note that draft resolution B mentioned the services which could be rendered to the African countries by the Economic Commission for Africa, UNESCO and other specialized agencies. However, the small countries were the ones from whose experience the African States could learn most. Latin America, for example, had an economic structure which somewhat resembled that of the African countries. It would welcome the African students and technicians who chose to benefit from that similarity.

17. His delegation fully supported the twenty-five-Power draft resolutions.
AGENDA ITEM 21


18. Mr. YOST (United States of America) recalled that his delegation had suggested that the Committee continue its discussion of the Korean question on Monday, 17 April, in order to allow time for the North Korean authorities to reply to the invitation extended to them. If necessary, he would introduce a formal proposal to that effect.

19. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) did not consider it desirable to set a date for the Committee's discussion of the substance of the Korean question. It was better to leave it to the Chairman to convene the Committee either upon receipt of the reply from the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or whenever he thought it necessary. In any event, his delegation would vote against any formal proposal that the Committee should start discussion of the Korean question on 17 April.

20. Mr. YOST (United States of America) pointed out that the Assembly had decided to end its work on 21 April. In the circumstances, a specific date should be set for the Committee to resume consideration of the Korean question. The decision should not be made contingent upon the reply which might be forthcoming from the North Korean authorities. The United States delegation therefore formally proposed that the Committee decide to continue the discussion on Monday, 17 April.

21. Mr. PAZHWA (Afghanistan) asked what the situation would be in respect of the other two items of the agenda if the United States proposal were adopted.

22. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would continue to have three items before it, and that the decision should be made contingent upon the reply which might be forthcoming from the North Korean authorities. The United States delegation therefore formally proposed that the Committee decide to continue the discussion of the Korean question, there did not seem to be any point in introducing a formal proposal concerning consideration of that item.

23. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan) asked whether the proposal taken by the Committee at the previous meeting had been communicated to the North Korean authorities.

24. At the request of the CHAIRMAN, Mr. WIERSCHOFF (Secretary of the Committee) read out the telegram from the Secretary-General that had been sent on 12 April to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The telegram read as follows:

"I have the honour to inform you that the First Committee of the General Assembly has adopted, at its 1146th meeting, the following resolution:

"The First Committee decides to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea as well as a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, provided that the latter first unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question, as has already been done by the Republic of Korea, to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the Korean question."

"I shall be glad to receive your reply for transmission to the First Committee."

25. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan) noted that the telegram did not mention a time-limit within which the North Korean authorities had to reply. It was only fair to allow a reasonable period of time, and the date of 17 April seemed too soon.

26. Mr. YOST (United States of America) emphasized that in view of the date set for the end of the Assembly's work, the time allowed was adequate.

27. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) agreed with the representative of the Sudan. Moreover, the Committee had decided to discuss the various items in the following order: first, the question relating to Africa, then the complaint of the Government of Cuba and finally, the Korean question. If the United States proposal was adopted, it would have the effect of changing that order and would require a decision by two-thirds majority.

28. Mr. KADI (Iraq) wanted to know the exact wording of the United States proposal.

29. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) pointed out that the Committee had not anticipated the possibility that the North Korean authorities might request clarification before deciding whether to accept the invitation extended to them. In that event, it would be the duty of the Assembly to provide them with the desired information.

30. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that since the Committee had decided to invite the representatives of both Korean Governments, the best thing to do was to await their replies. After all, there were still three items before the Committee, including the Korean question; at its meeting of 17 April, it would decide whether to start the discussion on Korea. But if a decision were taken now, it might have to be reconsidered on 17 April. In the circumstances, his delegation requested the United States representative not to press for a vote on his proposal.

31. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia) agreed that the discussion should be adjourned until 17 April, but he did not think that the Committee should necessarily resume consideration of the Korean question on that day.

32. Mr. YOST (United States of America) said that the purpose of his proposal was to allow time for the North Korean authorities to reply. However, the Committee's work should not be made to depend on the decision they might adopt. Therefore, the date for the resumption of the discussion on Korea should now be set at 17 April. The United States delegation requested that its proposal be put to the vote.

33. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) did not consider it well advised to present another ultimatum to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic by establishing a deadline for the start of the discussion.

34. Mr. PAZHWA (Afghanistan) recalled that the United Nations had invited North Korea subject to certain conditions. Taking into account all the factors in the situation, the time had come to decide whether the discussion on Korea should be deferred until the
next session, at which time the Assembly would know the attitude of the North Koreans. Accordingly, the Afghan delegation formally proposed that the discussion should be postponed until the sixteenth session.

36. Mr. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon) suggested that, in view of the circumstances, the Committee would not be able to take a decision on the Korean question in a few days unless it set aside the other two items on its agenda. It would be better to postpone the discussion until the next session. The Ceylonese delegation therefore supported the Afghan representative's proposal.

37. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan) also supported that proposal.

38. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) supported the United States proposal and was against the Afghan proposal. At the previous meeting, his delegation had voted in favour of the amended draft resolution on the understanding that the Committee would continue the discussion without necessarily awaiting a reply from North Korea. The fact was that the United Nations had for a long time been trying to establish contact with the North Korean authorities, but the latter refused to co-operate. It would be logical to start the discussion on 17 April and to hear the representative of the Republic of Korea and then the representative of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

39. Mr. CHORFI (Morocco) supported the Afghan proposal. Since the resolution adopted at the previous meeting represented a step forward and the problem was not especially urgent, it would be better to adjourn the discussion of the Korean question until the next session in order not to aggravate the international situation.

40. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) noted that North Korea might agree to take part in the discussion during the current session, in which case it would hardly be advisable to decide now to postpone consideration of the question until the next session. The United States proposal, on the other hand, would not compel the Committee to start the substantive discussion necessarily on 17 April. It was better to be flexible in the matter.

41. Mr. CAMPBELL (United Kingdom) said that it was his understanding that the purpose of the Afghan proposal was identical with that of the proposal made by India at the previous meeting, namely, postponement of the whole item to the sixteenth session. If that was the case, rule 124 of the rules of procedure applied and a decision would require a two-thirds majority.

42. Mr. LY (Mali) supported the Afghan proposal because it took into account the dignity of peoples. Once the situation did not require urgent action, it was better to avoid presenting a virtual ultimatum to one of the parties.

43. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan) made it clear that he had introduced his proposal because the situation was no longer the same as at the previous meeting. The Committee had adopted a resolution. It was its duty to comply with the decision that had been taken and to consider how to proceed. A further consideration was the importance of the African item. Many representatives wanted to speak on it, but what would be possible in practice? He therefore hoped that the United Kingdom representative would not press for a two-thirds majority vote on the Afghan proposal. If the United Kingdom representative insisted, he would suggest that the Committee decide by a simple majority whether a two-thirds majority was necessary.

44. If the United States delegation did not insist on a vote on its proposal at that meeting, the Afghan delegation would not revert to its own proposal until 17 April. However, it maintained that proposal and did not consider that it required a two-thirds majority.

45. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) thought that the Committee should have more time to ponder the whole question. He therefore moved the adjournment of the meeting under rule 119 of the rules of procedure.

The motion was adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.