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Chairman: Mr. Karel KURKA (Czechoslovakia).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Santiso Gálvez (Guatemala), Rapporteur, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 88


GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. AHMED (United Arab Republic) observed that the inclusion of the present item in the agenda had been requested by the United States (A/4515 and Add.1). His delegation welcomed that initiative, just as the African and Asian delegations had welcomed with enthusiasm the initiative of the Soviet Union, during the first part of the session, which had resulted in the adoption of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)).

2. Mr. Stevenson’s words at the Committee’s 1137th meeting could be interpreted only as a further commitment on the part of the United States to the cause of African independence and development. Africa, like the United States, believed that the initiative in the proposed programme should come from the African States themselves. It was to be hoped, therefore, that the programme submitted to the Committee in document A/C.1/L.271/Rev.1 by the twenty-five Powers would win the support of the United States and of all other freedom-loving and co-operative-minded countries. While it was true that Africa’s needs could be met only by the execution of a programme having both political and economic objectives, the Committee would be wise to confine itself for the time being to the adoption of the two draft resolutions contained in that document which embodied recommendations and general policy directives. No more detailed programme, particularly in the economic field, could be worked out or even envisaged at the present stage.

3. On the other hand, the problem of the continued existence of colonialism in Africa should be faced immediately and honestly, for if the present situation persisted it would jeopardize harmonious race relations on that continent. It would be wise to consider, even at the present time, putting into effect a progressive and peaceful transition programme for those parts of Africa still under colonial rule. For what had happened in the Congo must not be allowed to recur elsewhere. That was the reason behind operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A.

4. With regard to the economic development of Africa, the First Committee could do no more than express hopes and formulate general policy directives; however, such directives would help the Economic and Social Council, the specialized agencies concerned and, more especially, the Economic Commission for Africa, to undertake a detailed study of the economic problems of Africa, in consultation with the competent authorities of the African States and in accordance with the recommendations and decisions adopted by the Economic Commission for Africa at its third session.1

5. It might, however, be useful to indicate even at the present stage the broad outlines of an economic development plan; that was the idea which had prompted the sponsors in preparing draft resolution B. A multilateral economic assistance programme, co-ordinated and carried out by the various United Nations agencies, would in no way limit the right of the African countries to conclude bilateral development agreements with various States. It should be one of the aims of the United Nations programme to promote intra-African trade and to diversify the economies of many African States, in order to raise the levels of living of their peoples and to reduce Africa’s economic dependence on other areas. The achievement of that ambitious goal required the peaceful co-operation of all African States. But peace and harmony could not reign in Africa so long as colonialism remained entrenched on that continent. It was the Committee’s task, therefore, to lay the foundation for a peaceful and harmonious transition which would make possible the fulfilment of a programme based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

6. Mr. PAVICEVIC (Yugoslavia) said that his country had given the African peoples disinterested assistance in freeing themselves from all vestiges of colonialism. Within the limits of its means, the Yugoslav Government was endeavouring to contribute to the national independence and sovereignty of the new independent African States. The feelings of friendship and mutual understanding which bound Yugoslavia to the African States had been particularly evident during President Tito’s recent visit to a number of newly independent African countries.

7. The Yugoslav delegation noted with satisfaction that it was the African countries themselves which had submitted the two draft resolutions in document A/C.1/L.271/Rev.1. It would vote for those draft resolutions

in the confident belief that they would help to strengthen the independence and development of Africa and encourage the efforts of the international community to bring about the complete independence of the African peoples, in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter, through international co-operation. Experience had shown that the opposite method, that of rivalry between military and political blocs, the extension of the cold war and attempts of various kinds to preserve the colonial system, could only imperil peace in Africa and in the world. Draft resolution A fitted positively into the context of the work done by the General Assembly at its fifteenth session. Now that the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514(XV)), had been adopted, the international community should set specific time-limits for the attainment of the goals set forth in it. Draft resolution A submitted by the twenty-five African countries showed the right path to follow in solving Africa's fundamental problem.

8. Many countries in the world were still, at least morally, beholden to the African continent. The material wealth and human resources of Africa had contributed to their enrichment and development. Backwardness in economic development was still one of the main characteristics of Asia and Latin America, but probably nowhere else in the world was there so great a gulf between natural wealth and economic development as in Africa. That was the result of the colonial system imposed over some centuries of foreign domination. The time had come for the international community to pay greater attention to the development of Africa and to grant African countries the maximum possible assistance. Vast new tasks confronted, especially, the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the Special Fund and the Economic Commission for Africa. Draft resolution B clearly indicated the immensity of those tasks. It was absolutely essential that the gap which at present separated the developed from the under-developed countries, a gap which was one of the main causes of conflict and a permanent threat to world peace, should be bridged. It was desirable in particular to accelerate action for the establishment of a United Nations capital development fund.

9. The Yugoslav delegation hoped that the two draft resolutions in document A/C.1/L.271/Rev.1 would be adopted unanimously.

**AGENDA ITEM 21**


10. Mr. Wirjopranoto (Indonesia) said that his delegation's amendment (A/C.1/L.272) to the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.268) had been prompted by its concern at the turn which the debate on the Korean question appeared once again to have taken. Yet, important changes had taken place in Korea, and in the United Nations itself; and those changes ought to be reflected in the Committee's deliberations and to spur it on to new efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement; for what was necessary was to promote the interests of the Korean people as a whole and not simply those of one or another régime or authority.

11. The United States sub-amendment (A/C.1/L.273) was without precedent. In past years the Committee had unconditionally invited a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate, without vote, in its discussions. If it now wished to attach conditions to the invitation to be addressed to a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that could hardly have any other meaning than that he was not welcome, and the chances of bringing peace to Korea would be markedly reduced, for peace could not be imposed. Moreover, to address a conditional invitation to one of the parties would place the United Nations in an untenable position. The Organization was competent to deal with international problems of the kind in question. It ought not to seek recognition of its competence either in principle or in practice. His delegation would therefore be unable to vote for the United States sub-amendment.

12. Mr. Jha (India) said that under the terms of Article 32 of the United Nations Charter the Security Council could lay down such conditions as it thought proper for the participation of a non-member State which it invited to participate, without vote, in a discussion relating to a dispute. But the General Assembly had never made the participation of a non-member State in a debate subject to conditions. A conditional invitation might be justified in special cases, but that raised the whole question of the principle under which non-member States could participate without the right to vote in a General Assembly debate. The point needed to be studied carefully, if an unfortunate precedent was to be avoided. Furthermore, it was as much to the interest of the Assembly as of the North Korean Government that the latter should be represented, since the Assembly was based on the concept of diplomacy by conference.

13. If the United States maintained its sub-amendment, there would have to be a general discussion on all the issues it raised. The Indian delegation would need a certain amount of time to study them in all their implications. If, moreover, the sub-amendment was adopted, the Committee would have to ask the Government of North Korea, before inviting it, whether it was ready to accept the competence and the authority of the United Nations. The reply would no doubt take some time; but the Assembly had only seven or eight days left to finish its work and there were still many questions to be discussed. Nothing should be done at the fifteenth session which might prejudice the important discussions to take place in the near future. The spectre of the cold war must not be revived.

14. It would therefore be wise to postpone the debate on the Korean question until the sixteenth session of the Assembly. The discussion would then take place under more favourable conditions and the chances of reaching a solution would be greater. If there was enough support for the idea of adjournment, his delegation would make a formal proposal under rule 117 of the rules of procedure.

15. Mr. Kadi (Iraq) supported the Indian representative's suggestion.

16. Mr. Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) thought that the Committee might profitably accept the Indian representative's suggestion. The Korean question was very important, and the views of both parties should be heard. But it did seem to be reviving cold war issues,
and as it was essential that the matter should be settled calmly, the Ghanaian delegation would want to study it carefully before reaching a decision. In particular, it would like some further explanation of the United States sub-amendment. In any case, it would be a good thing to postpone the item until the next session so that it might be discussed in a calmer atmosphere, and his delegation would support any motion to that effect.

17. Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria) said that his delegation supported the Indonesian amendment. The United States sub-amendment, on the other hand, required careful study, since it had far-reaching implications. It would therefore be preferable to defer consideration of the question.

18. Mr. STEVENSON (United States) said he was surprised to find that some representatives, for reasons of alleged impartiality, wanted to take North Korea to part in the debate, whereas any impartial person must recognize that while the Government of the Republic of Korea had respected United Nations decisions, the North Korean régime had disregarded them. The Government of the Republic of Korea was the legal representative of the majority of the people, as was recognized by the United Nations and had declared itself ready to comply with United Nations decisions on Korea. On the other hand, the regime in North Korea had tried to unify the country by force. Having failed to do so, as a result of collective action by the United Nations, it had contested the latter's authority and rejected its resolutions. In those circumstances there scarcely seemed to be any point in inviting its representatives to put their views to the Assembly. His delegation was, however, prepared to agree to such an invitation, provided that North Korea first accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question, as had already been done by the Republic of Korea. The Organization could not carry out its task effectively if a group of States disputed its authority in advance. In resisting aggression against the Republic of Korea, the United Nations had acted in conformity with the Charter. Once the armistice had been signed, it had obviously been the Organization's responsibility to settle the problem. To allow an aggressor which denied the authority of the United Nations in matters of collective security to take part in the Assembly's debate would infringe a fundamental principle of the Charter. The United States was not trying to arouse controversy over Korea; it wanted to settle a dangerous situation. That was why it had submitted a sub-amendment (A/C.1/L.273) to the Indonesian amendment (A/C.1/L.272). It hoped that the Commission would not postpone consideration of the problem, would show indecision on an important question of principle and would support the sub-amendment. In any event, his delegation urged that a vote should be taken on the proposals before the Committee.

19. Mr. PLIMSOUL (Australia), reviewing the history of the Korean question, said that it showed why the United Nations each year invited only one of the two parties concerned to discuss the situation. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea set up in 1947 to report on the Korean situation had been able to carry out its task perfectly well in the Southern part of the country; but it had not been allowed to enter North Korea. The United Nations had helped to bring about the establishment in South Korea of a Government based on free elections. In 1950, North Korea had committed and act of aggression, and the United Nations had come to the aid of the victim. At the end of the hostilities the Government of the Republic of Korea had continued to co-operate with the United Nations, and it was quite natural that it should have been invited to each year to the Assembly debates.

20. North Korea obviously had to be taken into account, and Indonesia had submitted an amendment which would allow that part of the country to be represented in the Assembly during the debate on the same basis as the Republic of Korea. The United States sub-amendment represented the right reaction to that proposal, by providing that the "same basis" would be in two directions, involving not only participation in the discussion but also willingness to co-operate with the United Nations, which so far North Korea had consistently refused to do.

21. Contrary to what the Indian representative thought, it would not be necessary, if the United States sub-amendment was adopted, to wait for the North Korea Government's reply before starting to discuss the item. Since that Government had clearly indicated its view that the United Nations was not competent in the matter, the Assembly could proceed with the discussion. The Committee would not be justified in postponing consideration of the problem on the pretext that there was still a procedural question to be decided. It would be better to put to the draft resolutions before the Committee to the vote and then debate the substance of the problem.

22. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he wondered why the United States delegation had submitted its sub-amendment. According to the Australian representative, if the sub-amendment was adopted it would not be necessary to wait for the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reply to the question put to it: the Committee could simply decide in advance that it did not fulfil the conditions laid down in the sub-amendment. If that was so, the purpose of the sub-amendment was merely to allay the misgivings of those representatives who thought that the problem could not be debated without hearing the views of both the United Nations and a manoeuvre by the United States. Moreover, as several representatives had already pointed out, it was not the custom for the General Assembly to impose preliminary conditions on any Government which it invited to take part in a discussion without the right to vote. No self-respecting Government could accept such an invitation. The United States sub-amendment was thus discriminatory, and the Committee could not give it its support.

23. The delegations which were in favour of an immediate debate had adopted an attitude which could not fail to arouse strong reactions. The United States representative had described the Government of the Democratic People's Republic as an aggressor, and the Australian representative had given his own version of the facts. It would be easy to put things straight, but the Soviet delegation did not want to embark on that course, which would tend to revive the cold war. It would be wiser to follow those delegations which thought it best to put off consideration of the item until the sixteenth session. That would give everyone time to ponder the matter; and it was hardly probable that the situation would compel the General Assembly to take up the item again before its next session.

24. As far as the proposals before the Committee were concerned, they could not change anything, as they were
based on a one-sided conception of the problem. At the next session a new solution might be found which would take account of the realities of the situation and would serve as a basis for a settlement.

25. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) pointed out that the Government of the Republic of Korea was recognized by the United Nations, whereas the latter had been denied access to the territory controlled by the Government of North Korea. Some representatives had contended that it was unfair to invite only one of the two Korean Governments to send a representative. While that was a logical point, it was known that the North Korean Government had never accepted United Nations resolutions; it would be unfair if two delegations were invited but one of them did not undertake to abide by United Nations resolutions. Thus, the United States sub-amendment did not complicate matters. If it was feared that consideration of the Korean question would stir up the cold war, the question of extending an invitation to the two delegations could be settled at once and discussion of the Korean question itself could then be postponed until the next session. In any event, his delegation would vote for the United States sub-amendment.

26. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom) said that he did not agree with the Indian representative that the implications of the United States sub-amendment were so far-reaching as to justify postponement of the discussion until the sixteenth session. The sub-amendment was, in fact, a very simple one and merely asked North Korea to agree in advance to accept obligations which had already been accepted by all Members of the United Nations. It was not only a question of fairness. The two sides in Korea could not be regarded as of equal standing, and, until that inequality of standing was rectified by the North Korean authorities themselves, it would be wrong to delay proceeding with the discussion on the same basis as in the past.

27. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) observed that, since the period when the North Korean authorities had defied the United Nations and the latter had, in turn, barred them from its deliberations, some progress had been made towards co-operation and understanding since it was now possible for North Korea to take part in the discussion if it accepted one condition. While it was true that there was no precedent for setting such a condition, the present situation was an unprecedented one which had resulted not only from the past attitude of the North Korean Government but also from a recent statement by that Government denying the competence and authority of the United Nations. The North Korean Government could make a contribution to co-operation and understanding by following the example of the Government of the Republic of Korea and stating officially, once the sub-amendment had been adopted by the Committee, that it recognized the authority and competence of the United Nations.

28. The United States sub-amendment represented a step towards understanding, and it would receive the support of his delegation.

29. Mr. JHA (India) said that his proposal for postponement of the discussion had been prompted by various considerations and not merely by the questions of principle raised by the United States sub-amendment. However it might have offended, the North Korean Government did exist, and, without its consent, there could be no unification of Korea however many resolutions were adopted. It was not surprising that that Government, which had always been denied the right to speak, should denounce in advance any discussion held without its participation. Many other countries had criticized the United Nations, at times in an abusive manner; the Organization should rise above such considerations and extend an invitation to North Korea, reserving the right, if it wished, to ask it whether it accepted a particular resolution. It would not be in keeping with the dignity of the United Nations to ask a duly constituted authority to appear before it as a penitent. In view of the difficult questions raised by the sub-amendment, his delegation would have to consult its Government; if the sub-amendment was put to the vote at once, his delegation would not be able to take part in the voting.

30. The Korean question was undoubtedly a cold war issue in which the interests of the Korean people took second place to the question whether one of the opposing sides should be condemned as an aggressor. Resolutions of that kind did not help to solve the problem of re-unifying Korea. The interests of the United Nations and of Korea would be served by postponing the discussion until the sixteenth session.

31. Adoption of the United States sub-amendment would, instead of contributing to a solution of the Korean problem, make participation by the North Korean Government even more unlikely. That Government had unquestionably used rather harsh language with regard to the United Nations, but its strident language had been directed mainly against the resolutions that had been adopted without its participation. If it was permitted to take part in the discussion without being subjected to humiliation, it might become more amenable to persuasion.

32. The smaller countries, which had done their best to see that cold war issues were avoided, were entitled to be spared from suffering the effects of rivalry between the great Powers.

33. He formally moved the adjournment of the debate under rule 117 of the rules of procedure.

34. Mr. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon) said that before the Committee treated one of the parties to a dispute as an outlaw it should have all the relevant facts. Moreover, the unification of Korea could not be achieved by a mere majority decision of the Committee.

35. His delegation could not accept the United States sub-amendment. He saw no reason why conditions should be imposed on North Korea when a number of Member States violated United Nations decisions or criticized the Organization in very severe terms without losing their membership as a result. At a time when a spirit of conciliation was abroad, discussion of the Korean question might exacerbate feelings and place obstacles in the way of reconciliation.

36. He therefore supported the motion for adjournment.

37. Mr. QUAISSON-SACKEY (Ghana) said that North Korea might well modify its recalcitrant attitude; its refusal to co-operate with the United Nations was merely a further reason for inviting it to participate in the discussion. The United States sub-amendment could be transmitted to the North Koreans, and, in view of the change of attitude discernible on all sides, the several months intervening before the sixteenth session could be utilized in an effort to find a new approach to the problem.
38. His delegation would vote for the Indian motion.

39. Mr. SHANAHAN (New Zealand) said that he was opposed to the motion for adjournment. He did not agree with the Indian representative that adoption of the United States proposal would be tantamount to inviting the North Korean authorities to appear as penitents. To expect an authority that did not belong to the United Nations at least to recognize the latter’s competence was not unreasonable nor was it humiliating to that authority. Indeed, in view of the North Koreans’ past attitude towards the United Nations, it would be more humiliating for the Committee to allow them to participate in the debate without requiring them to accept at least that condition. The Government of the Republic of Korea and the North Korean authorities must not be placed on the same footing. The position of the North Koreans was given further confirmation by the document dated 6 March 1961 which had been circulated on their behalf to the Committee (A/C.1/633). The Government of the Republic of Korea, on the other hand, had fully acknowledged the authority and competence of the United Nations.

40. Since any discussion of even the most difficult problems was useful and the United States proposal, far from fanning the cold war, would serve the cause of reconciliation by making it possible to hold a discussion with the participation of the North Korean authorities, his delegation was opposed to the motion for adjournment.

41. Mr. MENEMENCIOGLU (Turkey), recalling that his country had taken part in the United Nations action in Korea, said that it must be borne in mind that, of the two opposing sides, one had complied with the decisions and recommendations of the United Nations while the other had disregarded them completely.

42. His delegation would therefore vote against the motion for adjournment.

43. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the motion for adjournment.

_At the request of the United States, a vote was taken by roll-call._

_Haiti, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first._

_In favour: Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea._

_Against: Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Italy, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, Federation of Malay, France, Greece, Guatemala._

_Abstaining: Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Austria, Cambodia, Chad, Dominican Republic, Ecuador._

_The motion was rejected by 49 votes to 30, with 17 abstentions._

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.