GENERAL ASSEMBLY
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Chairman: Mr. Karel KURKA (Czechoslovakia).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Santiso Gálvez (Guatemala), Rapporteur, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 88


GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. PEAL (Liberia) expressed his delegation’s appreciation of the United Nations delegation’s action in proposing the item under consideration, which reflected the noble principles of the Charter of the United Nations and promised not only to bring great benefits to the African continent but also to contribute to the building of a better world. He was pleased to note that equal stress was being placed on political freedom and economic development; the importance of both of those interrelated objectives had been emphasized in the Charter, and had been reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

2. The under-developed countries were grateful for the disinterested and invaluable assistance they had received from the specialized agencies and other United Nations bodies. His delegation would welcome any measures designed to increase the effectiveness of that assistance by making greater financial resources available to the agencies concerned and helping them to coordinate their efforts more efficiently. In that connexion, he urged the vigorous implementation of General Assembly resolution 1515 (XV). In particular, if economic assistance was to be fully effective, it was essential that action should be taken to curb fluctuations in the prices of the commodities on which the economies of the under-developed countries depended. Another problem was that of finding the capital needed to finance development programmes; his delegation had been happy to hear that the United States Government was now prepared to extend assistance over periods of five years or longer, instead of on an annual basis as in the past. The emphasis which the African States had placed on the need for care and patience in preparing a United Nations programme for Africa should not be taken to indicate any lack of enthusiasm; rather, it reflected the knowledge, based on experience, that aid programmes could do more harm than good if they were not based on adequate study.

3. He hoped that all members of the Committee would support the two draft resolutions sponsored by twenty-four African States (A/C.1/L.271 and Add.1). In stressing, in draft resolution B, that Africa’s pressing needs called for an increase in financial and technical assistance, the sponsors were in no sense suggesting that aid to other areas should be reduced. Africa needed expanded assistance both through the United Nations and from individual countries on a bilateral basis. It should be strongly emphasized, however, that such assistance must be provided in a manner consistent with the independence of the recipient countries. His delegation wholeheartedly supported the principle that African States should co-operate on a regional basis in planning their economic development. That idea had been advanced by the President of Liberia as long ago as 1957, and the Liberian Government had now submitted concrete proposals to the Governments of West Africa for regional co-operation in the fields of health, education and economic development.

4. He stressed that it was impossible to plan for African economic development without giving attention to the problem of liberating as rapidly as possible those African States which were still under foreign domination. No African nation would ever be willing to compromise its freedom and dignity for the sake of material progress. In that connexion, he emphasized that vigorous action must be taken against the denial of human rights in South Africa and against the continuing colonial domination of Angola.

5. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) said that African economic development must be regarded as essentially a means of strengthening the independence of the countries of Africa. A primary prerequisite for both the economic development and the political independence of Africa was world peace. The African States would therefore do everything possible to help to reconcile the two major international blocs, and would take no stand on issues connected with the cold war except as the principles of justice and equity dictated.

6. It was also essential to preserve the peace of Africa itself. For that reason, every effort must be made to bring together the various opposing groups in the Congo, to prevent Ruanda-Urundi from becoming a second Congo, and to oppose the efforts of the Union of South Africa to annex South West Africa. Another threat to peace was the retention of colonial possessions, under the cover of a legal fiction, by Portugal and Spain. The other Western States should impress upon Portugal, Spain and the Union of South Africa that friendly re-

* Resumed from the 1142nd meeting

New York

Tuesday, 11 April 1961,
at 3.25 p.m.
A/C.1/SR.1144
7. His delegation wished to commend the Soviet Union and the United States of America for their efforts to assist countries which were striving to free themselves from colonialism. The action of the United States in proposing the item under consideration was the more praiseworthy in that the United States was at present being accused by its allies of failing to maintain solidarity with them on colonial issues.

8. The peace-loving countries of the world must join in guaranteeing the neutrality of Africa. It was on the Western countries, as former colonial Powers, that the greatest responsibility lay in that regard. They must overcome all feelings of superiority and deal with their former colonies on a basis of equality. Furthermore, they must repudiate those Western countries which continued to pursue a policy of colonial exploitation, lest Africa should turn to the other major international bloc.

9. An independent Africa could profit from the advanced technologies of both West and East in solving its problems, problems which must be solved rapidly, for the peace of Africa might well be threatened if the newly independent peoples were disappointed in their hopes of achieving a higher standard of living. Since Africa had neither local capital nor abundant manpower, it could develop its resources only with the aid of foreign capital. The 750 million people of the advanced countries should be able to make a substantial contribution to the economic development of the 200 million people of Africa at very little sacrifice to themselves. It was essential, however, that foreign capital should be made available in accordance with an economic development plan drawn up by the Africans themselves; otherwise, economic assistance might open the door to political influence. African economic planning must be carried out on a regional basis, in order to prevent economic rivalry among African States and promote the creation of an African market that would foster economic growth. Twelve African States had already laid the foundations of a regional organization, which would promote those objectives, as well as that of African industrialization. The advanced countries must make sacrifices not only by providing capital but also by encouraging the growth of African industry, so that African raw materials would have a local market.

10. The economically advanced countries should make capital available, first of all, by means of bilateral agreements between Governments, and secondly, by encouraging and, if necessary, guaranteeing capital investment by their nationals. It was through the African States rather than private African individuals that all foreign capital should be channeled. In those young countries, only the State possessed the efficiency necessary for participation in national economic development.

11. It might be advisable for all Members of the United Nations to join in concluding an international convention which could serve as the basis for bilateral negotiations on economic assistance. Such a convention should contain safeguards against any kind of interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries and should deal with such problems as the transfer of profits and local investment. Consideration should also be given to the establishment of an international fund for Africa which could concentrate its efforts in such fields as health and education and could extend loans to regional organizations engaged in economic planning.

12. Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria) said that all African States were grateful to the two major Powers, whose initiatives had served to make the fifteenth session of the General Assembly a memorable one. The Soviet Union had sponsored the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)), while the United States had proposed the item now under consideration, which aimed at reinforcing political independence with economic development.

13. Noting that draft resolution A in document A/C.1/L.271 and Add.1, which he now proposed to introduce, dealt with the political aspects of the item, he emphasized that no form of development was possible unless the country concerned was absolute master of its own affairs and free to join the United Nations. Since it was recognized that in granting independence to dependent territories certain factors had to be considered, operative paragraph 3 directed the Fourth Committee to work out the relevant details. He was confident that draft resolution A reflected the views of all members of the General Assembly and would be unanimously approved.

14. With regard to draft resolution B, which dealt with development, he observed that the experience of the Congo showed what could result from the inadequate preparation of independence. The draft resolution placed great stress on United Nations bodies, especially the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Economic Commission for Africa, whose specialized knowledge and experience particularly qualified them to deal with the problems of assistance to Africa. After the reports of those two bodies had been submitted to the Assembly at its sixteenth session, it would be possible to work out a detailed programme of African development. An essential component of such a programme would be educational development. The sponsors of the draft resolution also attached great importance to the recommendations by the Economic Commission for Africa for the establishment of an African development bank, to which reference was made in operative paragraph 3 (2) of draft resolution B.

15. Inasmuch as draft resolution B merely brought into sharper focus various decisions already taken by the Assembly and related them specifically to the problems of Africa, it should receive the support of all members of the Committee.

16. The CHAIRMAN suggested that as there were no further speakers on his list, the Committee should turn to the Korean question.

AGENDA ITEM 21


17. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that he had received a letter from the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Ko‘ea (UNCURK) reporting the Commission’s decision that its Chairman should attend the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, in order
to be available for consultation during the discussion of the Korean question. The Chairman of UNCURK, Mr. Arreglado (Philippines), was accordingly at the Committee’s disposal and was prepared to make a statement.

18. Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria) said that in keeping with his country’s policy, and in order that a fair hearing be given to all parties concerned in the Korean question, his delegation would support the Indonesia amendment (A/C.1/L.272) to the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.268). As amended, the draft resolution would invite representatives of both parts of Korea to make their views known before the Committee.

19. Mr. DIALLO TELLI (Guinea) said his delegation had hoped that the negotiations which had taken place between the United States and the Soviet Union prior to the resumption of the fifteenth session, which had resulted in agreement to defer consideration of the disarmament question, might also have had the effect of removing the Korean question from the agenda. Its discussion could only hamper the Assembly’s work and damage the prestige of the United Nations.

20. If the Organization’s prestige was to be enhanced, and if the wishes of the Korean people were to be respected, the Korean item must be dealt with impartially and in terms of the realities of the Korean situation. One of those realities was the fact that there were two Korean Governments in existence, and that the unification of the two parts of the country could not be achieved without consulting both of them. Moreover, the United Nations could not reject one of the parties to the dispute in Korea out of hand or prejudice its guilt. The delegation of Guinea would not subscribe to a mock trial; nor would international opinion respect a procedure viated by the tribunal’s refusal to hear one of the parties or attach any value to the decision which might eventually be taken in those circumstances. Moreover, such a procedure would render meaningless any appeal to the North Korean authorities to abide by the General Assembly’s decision.

21. For all those reasons, he supported the Indonesian amendment (A/C.1/L.272). If it was adopted, he would vote for the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.268), and also for the draft resolution of the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.270). If not, he would support the Soviet draft and vote against the United States draft. As a non-aligned country pursuing a policy of positive neutralism, Guinea considered that irrespective of the sympathies of Member States towards the two parties to the Korean dispute, there could be no constructive and properly informed debate unless both sides were heard. Any other course would be politically unrealistic.

22. Mr. SKURKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that in including the Korean question in its agenda year after year and discussing it without the participation of representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Assembly was violating the legitimate rights of a people. Moreover, it had learned nothing from its previous attempts to solve the problem of the unification of the country in disregard of the will of the Korean people. In a matter of such vital importance to the whole population, to exclude the representatives of one of its parts from the discussion was a flagrant injustice. A discussion held in their absence could not be constructive; nor could it advance the peaceful unification of the country which the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic had consistently advocated. Only those who, while giving lip-service to the idea of unification, actually favoured the continued occupation of South Korea for an indefinite period, could object to hearing that Government’s representatives. Since it was convinced that representatives of both parts of Korea should take part in the Committee’s discussion, the Byelorussian SSR would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union and for the Indonesian amendment to the United States draft resolution.

23. Mr. PISA (Italy) said that his delegation regarded the Government of the Republic of Korea as the only Government representative of the Korean people. That Government had consistently co-operated with the United Nations and upheld the principles of the Charter; accordingly, its representatives and no others should be heard by the Committee. Moreover, it was illogical to hear the views of representatives of the North Korean régime when that régime had explicitly urged the United Nations, in its recent memorandum (A/C.1/833), to refrain from discussing the Korean question altogether. In the circumstances, Italy would vote for the United States draft resolution and against the USSR proposal and the Indonesian amendment.

24. Mr. JHA (India) said that the three proposals before the Committee involved a question of substance and might have a direct bearing on progress towards a solution of the Korean problem. It was essential that Member States should abandon any previous rigidly held positions, for unless that was done there could be no movement towards putting an end to the unnatural division of Korea and bringing about its peaceful unification. The United States proposal to invite only representatives of the Republic of Korea to the Committee’s debate would not contribute to such a solution. On the other hand, if representatives from both parts of the country were invited, without prejudice to the positions of Member States with regard to the recognition of either Government, the Committee might be enabled to come to grips with realities and to find common ground for a solution. For those reasons, India supported the Indonesian amendment to the United States draft resolution.

25. Mr. QUINTEIRO (Philippines) said that although his delegation saw merit in the general proposition that on a question which vitally affected the whole population of Korea it would be wise to hear the views of people from all parts of the country, it could not agree that representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should be invited to take part in the Committee’s discussion.

26. He reviewed the history of the Korean question from the Japanese surrender and Korea’s occupation by United States and Soviet troops to the signing of the Armistice Agreement following the Korean war. Special emphasis had to be placed on the fact that the forces of North Korea had waged war against the United Nations, and that the Democratic People’s Republic had never recognized the United Nations, had fought its decisions, and had never allowed United Nations representatives to enter North Korea for the purpose of observing conditions there.

27. The Philippine delegation did not believe that the participation of representatives of North Korea in the

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1 Official Records of the Security Council Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3819, appendix A.
Committee's debate would serve a useful purpose; moreover, it doubted whether they would really represent the masses of the Korean people. Most important of all, however, the Philippines opposed any recognition of North Korea because it had waged war against the United Nations.

28. Mr. IGNACIO-PINTO (Dahomey) said that his country, like many other African States, felt that in considering the Korean question an effort should be made to rise above the political tensions dividing the world into two camps and to deal with the question of hearing the representatives of the Korean people in a spirit of equity. Accordingly, without taking any position on the substance of the Korean problem or expressing support for either side, Dahomey favoured hearing representatives of both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

29. The Committee's purpose should not be to judge either side, but rather to assemble the facts objectively, in the interest of establishing peaceful relations between nations. Moreover, if the North Korean authorities should once again demonstrate their defiance of the United Nations, the Committee would then be at liberty to express its disapproval. In supporting the United States draft resolution as amended by Indonesia, Dahomey would not be taking sides in the Korean dispute; it would be acting according to its conscience and to its belief that the divided countries should not remain divided and become the pawns of the great Powers.

30. Mr. CROWE (United Kingdom) said his delegation was concerned to find that a controversy had arisen with regard to a simple procedural point which had been settled without difficulty on previous occasions. The United Kingdom believed that the representatives of the Republic of Korea should be heard, but that those from North Korea should not be invited to take part in the Committee's debate. There was absolutely no justification for equating the North Korean authorities with the Government of the Republic of Korea.

31. The Government of the Republic of Korea was the only Government in Korea recognized by the United Nations. The North Korean authorities, on the other hand, had not been democratically elected, and enjoyed no international recognition except from groups of Governments which shared their political ideology. That testified amply to the doubts entertained throughout the world as to their claim to represent anybody. Indeed, the North Korean authorities appeared to be doubtful of their own standing, since they steadfastly refused to join with the Government of the Republic of Korea in holding country-wide elections. In contrast, the United Nations had been able to observe elections held in the Republic of Korea, and had reported favourably on them. Moreover, not only had the North Korean authorities been guilty of aggression in 1950, but they had since then refused to acknowledge the competence of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question, and refused to respect United Nations decisions. To suggest that equity demanded giving them an equal hearing with that given to the Government of the Republic of Korea was to distort the meaning of the word "equity". Finally, since the United Nations was deeply committed by its past actions to support of the Republic of Korea, it would be great folly to take a decision in the Committee which would undermine the position of the legitimate Government of that Republic and reinforce the position of the North Korean authorities which had flouted United Nations resolutions. He appealed to members of the Committee not to allow themselves to be swept along into committing that error.

32. The United Kingdom would therefore vote in favour of the United States draft resolution and against the Indonesian amendment and the Soviet draft resolution.

33. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) questioned the thesis that the debate on Korea was comparable to a judicial proceeding, with its corollary that both parties had a right to be heard. The Republic of Korea had a freely elected Government, representing two-thirds of the Korean people, which had clearly expressed its support of the United Nations and the United Nations resolutions on Korea, as was shown by its memorandum (A/C.1/835) and the supplementary report of UNCURK (A/4466/Add.1). The North Korean régime, on the other hand, had repeatedly rejected the United Nations. It had done so at the Korean Political Conference in 1954, refusing to consider any reasonable basis for unification. In its memorandum (A/C.1/835) it noted that the United Nations had not shown authority under the Charter to consider the Korean question, and that the inclusion of the item in the agenda was illegal. The memorandum stated further that the Organization had lost even moral authority to deal with the question, since it had been "reduced to a belligerent". It must be recalled that the North Korean régime, after having rejected for over two years all United Nations efforts to bring about peaceful unification, had launched a surprise attack at the very time when it was advancing proposals for peaceful unification similar to those it had recently put forward. That attack had been repelled by the forces of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea at enormous cost and with heavy loss of life. An armistice had been signed in 1953, but no final settlement had been reached. In the circumstances there was little to be gained by hearing North Korea, which would merely deny United Nations authority once more.

34. The Korean people earnestly desired the peaceful unification of their nation in freedom. Like all the other peoples of the world, they looked to the United Nations for the solution not only of the Korean problem, but of all problems involving international peace and security. Until, therefore, the North Korean régime clearly acknowledged the competence of the United Nations to deal with the question and demonstrated it willingness to abide by United Nations resolutions on the subject, as the Republic of Korea had done, there would be no purpose in inviting it to take part in the debate. When it had done so, the matter could be reconsidered.

35. He therefore urged that the representatives of the Republic of Korea, and they alone, should be allowed to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote.

36. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the representative of the Philippines had seen merit in the general proposition that representatives of all parts of Korea should have a hearing, that the United Kingdom representative had thought it fair that both parties to a dispute should be heard and that the United States representative had recognized that such a procedure was usual in legal matters. Yet all three representatives had opposed hearing both parties to the present dispute. The contradiction showed that their position was shabby.

37. The representative of the Philippines had argued that an invitation to North Korea would serve no
purpose. But such a judgement could not be made until the representative in question had been heard, and then only by the General Assembly. The United Kingdom representative had said that the Governments of South Korea and North Korea could not be placed on an equal footing, since the United Nations did not recognize the latter. That was illogical; for example, the United Kingdom recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China, which the United Nations did not. United Nations recognition of a particular Government or leader did not indicate that the Government or leader in question had real authority, as the fate of the Syngman Rhee régime in South Korea had clearly demonstrated. Recognition was irrelevant when a Government exercised power in practice and had the support of the people. The United Nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom, had had dealings with the North Korean Government in the Military Armistice Commission and at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva in 1954; that showed the unreality of their present stand.

38. The very fact that the Committee was discussing the unification of Korea indicated that the country was disunited: it ipso facto implied the existence of two Governments. If the members of the Committee sincerely wished to reunify the country, they could not possibly ignore the existence of one side or the other, but must hear the views of both. That was not a procedural question, but a substantive one.

39. His delegation had always advocated inviting representatives of both sides, despite reservations about the régime in South Korea, since it believed that a solution could be achieved only by recognizing reality. Those who shared its views would vote in favor of the Soviet draft resolution or the Indonesian amendment to the United States draft resolution.

40. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) said that the Soviet representative had misrepresented him. His view was that when a party denied the jurisdiction of a court and denounced it as a law-breaker, it was useless for it to appear before that court in a dispute with another party which acknowledged the court’s competence. With that fact in mind, and in order to accommodate those who wished to hear both sides, he proposed the addition of the following words to the Indonesian amendment (A/C.1/L.272):

“provided that the latter first unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question, as has already been done by the Republic of Korea.”*3

41. Mr. PAZHWA (Afghanistan) said that none of the proposals before the Committee was purely procedural. All affected the substance of the matter. His delegation would vote for the Indonesian amendment, since it agreed with the reasons for which the amendment had been submitted. In that connexion it shared the views of the representatives of Burma, Iraq and India. The amendment invited a party to the Korean dispute to take part, at a time when it was willing to do so, in United Nations negotiations for a solution to the problem. The adoption of the amendment might lead to greater recognition of United Nations authority by North Korea, whose willingness to negotiate should not be discouraged. If the amendment was rejected, his delegation would not support the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.268), which would merely prolong an undesirable situation. It would vote for the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.270), for the same reasons as for the Indonesian amendment.

42. Mr. ROSSI (Cyprus) said that his delegation believed in the principles of equality before the law and equal opportunity for hearing. Those principles, however, could not apply unless both parties to the dispute recognized the competence of the court. There was no point in the Committee seating a delegation which denied its competence, as North Korea had done in its memorandum (A/C.1/833). Indeed, North Korea had called upon the United Nations to desist from discussing the matter, so that it was juridically impossible to invite its representatives to participate in the debate. If, however, the country was to be unified, there must be cooperation between North and South Korea and between them and the United Nations. He therefore appealed to the representatives of North Korea to state unequivocally that they would recognize the competence of the United Nations in the matter, as the representatives of the Republic of Korea had done.

43. Mr. JHA (India) said that the sub-amendment proposed by the United States representative raised important issues. Although States which were not members of the United Nations had on occasion been invited to participate without vote in its debates, he did not recall any instance of conditions such as that contained in the sub-amendment being laid down. He therefore suggested that the Committee should adjourn to consider its implications.

44. Mr. BEN ABOUD (Morocco) and Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) supported the suggestion.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5:45 p.m.