In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73


CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

1. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) said that he could not accept the Indian amendment to the procedural motion which his delegation had introduced at the 1134th meeting. While it was true that operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the nineteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.255/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-5) could be discussed and put to the vote at a later date—at the resumed session, for instance—the recommendation embodied in paragraph 4 of that draft was intended to go into force immediately and would be meaningless if the paragraph was not discussed until the resumed session. In view of the fact that the international situation in the field of disarmament had deteriorated, and might get even worse between the present date and 7 March 1961, it was particularly desirable that the First Committee's documents and records should be laid before the Disarmament Commission. Furthermore, it was quite likely that the main Powers concerned would decide to meet before 7 March. In that event, the Disarmament Commission might again perform a valuable function in facilitating the arrangements for such a meeting. The nineteen-Power draft resolution, which was procedural in character, should therefore be put to the vote at once.

2. With reference to the remarks made by the Ethiopian representative at the 1134th meeting, the Canadian delegation, far from seeking to avoid a debate on the remaining draft resolutions, wished those important texts, particularly the ones sponsored by the Ethiopian delegation, to be discussed more thoroughly at the resumed session, or, indeed, by the Disarmament Commission itself.

3. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the Indian amendment to the procedural motion introduced by Canada. The amendment called for the deletion of paragraph (c) and the inclusion of the nineteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.255/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-5) among those listed in paragraph (b) of the Canadian motion.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Venezuela, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.


Against: Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Guatemala, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Togo.
The amendment was adopted by 29 votes to 17, with 26 abstentions.

4. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the Canadian procedural motion, as amended.

5. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) pointed out that had draft resolution A/C.1/L.264/Rev.1 been formally introduced, it would probably have been listed among the texts which were to be put to the vote under the terms of the Canadian motion. The Committee should therefore take cognizance of that draft resolution.

6. The CHAIRMAN asked the representative of Ghana to introduce the draft resolution formally after the vote on the Canadian motion.

7. Mr. ALEMAYEHU (Ethiopia) asked for separate votes on paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Canadian motion.

8. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph (a) of the Canadian procedural motion to the vote.

Paragraph (a) was adopted by 69 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

9. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on paragraph (b) of the Canadian motion.

10. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana), speaking on a point of order, said that, since draft resolution A/C.1/L.264/Rev.1 had not been formally introduced, it could not be set aside on the ground of its being controversial. Consequently, it should not be listed in paragraph (b) of the Canadian motion.

11. The CHAIRMAN said that he was prepared, if there was no objection, to allow the representative of Ghana to introduce the draft resolution before the vote on paragraph (b) of the Canadian motion.

12. Mr. LOVEDAY (Australia) said that the Canadian motion was a package arrangement whereby the Committee would vote on certain draft resolutions and not on others. If the representative of Ghana introduced the draft resolution at the present juncture, the Australian delegation would like to reserve the right to request separate votes on other portions of paragraph (b).

13. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) explained that he had not requested a separate vote on the inclusion of draft resolution A/C.1/L.264/Rev.1 in paragraph (b). He merely thought that the draft resolution in question should be included in paragraph (b) since it had not been formally introduced.

14. The CHAIRMAN said that the draft resolution was officially before the Committee, although it had not been formally introduced by a delegation.

15. He put to the vote paragraph (b) of the Canadian motion, as amended, and the motion as a whole.

Paragraph (b), as amended, was adopted by 50 votes to 2, with 21 abstentions.

The Canadian motion as a whole, as amended, was adopted without objection.

16. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) introduced draft resolution A/C.1/L.264/Rev.1, submitted by Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic, and informed the Committee that the Sudan had now joined the sponsors. It was the danger inherent in nuclear tests that had prompted them to submit the draft resolution. It was in that same spirit that the President of Ghana had proposed to the General Assembly on 23 September (856th plenary meeting) that nuclear-free zones should be established, starting perhaps with Africa. While the sponsors were opposed to nuclear tests in general, wherever they might be carried out, they believed that they would be making a useful contribution to the discussion by proposing a ban on nuclear tests in Africa. The draft resolution was not controversial, since it had nothing to do with the fundamental disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union; indeed, it would contribute to the discussions between the great Powers on the subject. The Committee should therefore be able to approve the draft resolution, and the sponsors hoped that it would be put to the vote.

17. Mr. SHUKAIRDY (Saudi Arabia) wished to explain his delegation's vote on the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

18. The dissemination of nuclear weapons not only increased the number of States possessing nuclear devices, but also created international tension and made a general disarmament agreement more difficult to achieve. The danger became particularly acute when nuclear weapons were produced in areas of great tension. Thus, according to The New York Times of 19 December 1960, United States officials were studying with concern recent evidence indicating that Israel, with the assistance of France, might be developing the capacity to produce atomic weapons. The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy had been informed of the matter. According to information received, Israel was building a fairly large atomic reactor near Beersheba.

19. In the light of that most serious information, the Committee should not hesitate to adopt the five-Power draft resolution. Moreover, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine must avert the new threat introduced by France and Israel into the Middle East.

20. The adoption of the five-Power draft resolution, apart from its general application, would involve certain responsibilities in the case he had mentioned. First, it would be the responsibility of the United States to withhold immediately all economic assistance to Israel and to prohibit all fund-raising campaigns organized in the United States for Israel, since such assistance released funds in Israel for military operations or aggression. Secondly, the Secretary-General would be expected to ascertain as early as possible how far Israel and France had advanced in their dangerous venture. Thirdly, the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament would no doubt give the matter its earnest consideration. The Committee could recommend the necessary action to prevent France and Israel from introducing the most terrible weapons of mass destruction into the Holy Land.

21. Saudi Arabia would therefore vote in favour of the five-Power draft resolution.

22. Mr. ESHELE (Israel), exercising his right of reply, said that Israel was not engaged in the manufacture of atomic weapons. Atomic research in Israel was dedicated exclusively to peaceful uses such as the development of radioisotopes for agricultural and medical progress.
23. Mr. Wilcox (United States of America) said that his Government appreciated the high motives which had prompted the submission of the two draft resolutions concerning nuclear tests, the three-Power draft (A/C.1/L.255) and the twenty-six-Power draft (A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1), and shared the sense of urgency reflected in the appeal to the States concerned that an agreement on the controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests should be achieved at an early date. However, the United States Government had serious reservations concerning the tests of the two drafts, and would have to abstain from voting on operative paragraph 2 of the twenty-six-Power draft resolution and on both draft resolutions as a whole. Those reservations, which the United States delegation had already voiced at the fourteenth session, were even stronger now that a year had gone by without the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

24. Operative paragraph 1 of the three-Power draft resolution implied that only a few points remained to be settled before an agreement could be achieved on the cessation of tests. But many of the problems involved were more than mere side issues which could easily be settled by compromise; they were fundamental questions, affecting the security of all countries, and the success of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests depended upon their solution.

25. With regard to operative paragraph 2 of the twenty-six-Power draft resolution, it would be recalled that the United States had agreed to a voluntary suspension of tests, and that his delegation had supported a similar resolution at the fourteenth session (resolution 1493 (XIV)). When President Eisenhower had announced that the voluntary suspension would end on 31 December 1959, he had added that the United States would not resume tests without previously announcing its intention of doing so. That was still the policy of the United States Government.

26. The United States Government was afraid, however, that an indefinite voluntary suspension of tests might come to be regarded as an acceptable alternative to a safeguarded agreement on nuclear tests. Such a belief should not be encouraged, for it would reduce the chances of concluding an agreement and would only increase the risks of a resumption of testing.

27. The Geneva negotiations would not succeed if only one of the two sides was interested in building up a reasonable system of control, which was an indispensable prerequisite for the permanent cessation of tests. The mere stationing of a delegation in Geneva was no substitute for control. Furthermore, Soviet secrecy made it impossible for anyone to have a clear idea of what was going on in the USSR. The United States was therefore not prepared to accept indefinite, self-imposed restraints which might be systematically violated. Hitherto, the United States had not taken any decision to resume nuclear weapons tests. As the United States representative had stated at the fourteenth session (1059th meeting), the United States would continue to do everything in its power to enhance the prospects of success at Geneva.

28. For those reasons, the United States delegation would like those two draft resolutions to be put to the vote paragraph by paragraph.

29. So far as concerned the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3), the United States, as was confirmed by its legislation and by the efforts it had made in disarmament negotiations, did not wish to see a proliferation of national nuclear weapons production and ownership. If the Baruch plan and General Assembly resolution 191 (III) had been implemented, the nuclear weapons race could have been halted at the very outset. The more recent United States proposals had been designed to bring the race to a halt and begin the reduction of existing nuclear weapons stocks. If the number of nuclear Powers grew, it would become even more difficult to check the nuclear race, and the risk of a nuclear war starting by accident, by miscalculation or even by design would be correspondingly increased. Besides, the already precarious military balance in the world would be even further imperilled.

30. Only if the nuclear Powers refused to accumulate nuclear weapons and began to destroy those they already possessed could they expect other nations to refrain indefinitely from manufacturing them. One reason for the misgivings the United States felt concerning the five-Power draft resolution was the fact that it did not recognize the central responsibility of the nuclear Powers. In the collective defence arrangements it had concluded with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States had sought to give expression to that policy; the NATO defence forces had atomic weapons available for their protection. The United States forces as well as allied forces had the vehicles for those weapons; the weapons themselves were maintained in a stockpile under United States custody, in accordance with existing United States policy and law. That system provided the alliance with effective resources to defend itself against an antagonist possessing the most modern and destructive weapons.

31. The best protection against nuclear war was an adequate defence system. Ultimately, the only reliable protection against nuclear war lay in disarmament agreements with effective international control provisions.

32. A further feature of the five-Power draft resolution was that it called for unverified commitments of indefinite duration. Such commitments were not acceptable substitutes for verified agreements. Unlike the United States, where democratic institutions ensured full public discussion, certain areas of the world were closed societies, and without control arrangements, suspicions of violations were likely to result. Such arrangements reduced confidence and increased suspicion, and were thus detrimental to the cause of disarmament.

33. The United States fully understood the motives underlying the five-Power draft resolution, and would not vote against it. For the reasons stated, however, it would not be able to support it and would therefore abstain from voting.

34. Mr. Gibson Barboza (Brazil), explaining his vote on the five-Power draft resolution, said that he seriously doubted, in view of the mistrust prevailing in international relations, whether the provisions of operative paragraphs 2 and 3 would be capable of un-
universal implementation. But if their implementation was not universal, the resolution would defeat its own ends. He would greatly have preferred to have assurances on that point, assurances which the draft resolution, unfortunately, did not provide. Consequently, his delegation moved that operative paragraphs 2 and 3 should be voted on separately, and would abstain in the vote on those two paragraphs.

35. Mr. PLAJA (Italy), explaining his vote on the five-Power draft resolution, said that at the fourteenth session his country had voted for an Irish draft resolution (adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 1380 (XIV)) which had suggested that the Ten-Nation Committee should consider the same problem within the framework of disarmament, because of its conviction that anything dealing with disarmament should fall within the purview of a single committee. Unfortunately, the Ten-Nation Committee had not had time to consider the question, and the First Committee now had before it a new draft resolution which envisaged a permanent ad hoc agreement on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, and, pending the negotiation of such an agreement, called on the Powers concerned to refrain, on a temporary and voluntary basis, from any action likely to encourage the dissemination of such weapons.

36. But an agreement which was limited to that problem, outside the general context of disarmament and control, might give rise to illusions in the minds of the public. The security of peoples against the nuclear danger must be based on technical considerations which did not permit an artificial separation of the various elements of the nuclear problem. The Italian delegation had always expressed reservations regarding any purely declaratory solution of the technical problems of disarmament, as also regarding temporary de facto moratoria unaccompanied by controls. Such solutions were incompatible with the desired ultimate objectives, and might increase the chances of potential aggressors.

37. For those reasons, the Italian delegation, while appreciating the lofty motives which had inspired the Irish delegation, would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

38. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that he would vote for the five-Power draft resolution on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) and for the two draft resolutions on the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/C.1/1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1). It was of urgent importance that measures should be adopted to prevent the dissemination of nuclear devices, especially in view of the latest developments in that sphere, mentioned by the representative of Saudi Arabia, and the developments taking place among the NATO Powers. The statement made by the United States representative was most disquieting; the United States clearly wished to have a free hand to supply nuclear weapons to those of its allies which did not yet possess them, more particularly to the Federal Republic of Germany. The Polish delegation wished to stress that its vote on the five-Power draft resolution did not imply acceptance of the idea that the great Powers should possess nuclear weapons indefinitely. The adoption of the draft resolution should be regarded as a first step, which might facilitate an agreement on the abolition of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, more far-reaching and more precise measures than those proposed by Ireland and the other four sponsors could be adopted even now in order to create conditions conducive to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. Measures of that kind were envisaged in the draft resolution submitted by Poland (A/C.1/1/L.252/Rev.1).

39. The position of the Polish delegation on the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests was well known. It was because of the importance of the problem that Poland had proposed, in that draft resolution, that a specific date should be set for the conclusion of the Geneva negotiations on the subject, so that the General Assembly could consider the matter at a special session should there be no prospect of agreement by that time. The United States representative’s statement was hardly encouraging in that respect. He would vote for the draft resolutions on the cessation of tests, but reserved his delegation’s right to revert to the question in the spring, if the Geneva talks did not produce the results hoped for.

40. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) said that as the Polish representative had observed, the five-Power draft resolution could not be considered an end in itself; rather it was an attempt to prevent matters from getting worse. The resolution would lay on the nuclear Powers the responsibility not to supply nuclear weapons to other countries or to give them the necessary information for making such weapons. He welcomed the Israel representative’s statement that his Government intended to devote its attention in the nuclear field to the applications of nuclear energy to agriculture and other similar activities. The fact that Israel was under suspicion was an indication that other countries too might wrongly be suspected of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Everything possible must be done to reduce such suspicions.

41. The draft resolution called on the non-nuclear Powers not to accept nuclear weapons, and his delegation hoped that they would agree to United Nations inspection to ensure that none of them were engaged in making a nuclear bomb. The draft resolution before the Committee asked no more of the United States than the representatives of the American people had already asked of their Government, for the United States Government was at present forbidden by law to supply nuclear arms to any other Power. He urged the United States to make every effort to see that other nuclear Powers acted similarly and did not give nuclear weapons or the knowledge of how to make them to any other State. He trusted that the draft resolution would receive the greatest possible support and that those who felt compelled, for one reason or another, to abstain, would nevertheless act in its spirit.

42. The CHAIRMAN invited the Commission to vote on the draft resolution submitted by Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Mexico and Morocco (A/C.1/1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3). Separate votes having been requested on operative paragraphs 2 and 3, he first put to the vote the preamble and operative paragraph 1.

The preamble and operative paragraph 1 were adopted by 65 votes to none, with 11 abstentions.

43. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote separately operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution.
Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 57 votes to none, with 20 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by 56 votes to none, with 22 abstentions.

44. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Yugoslavia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 58 votes to none, with 20 abstentions.

45. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by Austria, India and Sweden (A/C.1/L.256). A separate vote had been requested on each operative paragraph.

Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 76 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 70 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by 76 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 72 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

46. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the twenty-six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.256/Rev.1). A request had been made for a separate vote on each operative paragraph.

Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 75 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 67 votes to none, with 11 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by 76 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

47. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Senegal, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Spain, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Belgium, China, France, Greece, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 67 votes to none, with 11 abstentions.

48. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) said that he had voted in favour of the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) because his country considered the dissemination of nuclear weapons a grave threat to mankind. The only way to avert that danger was by agreeing on a comprehensive and carefully verified system of disarmament. He was therefore happy to note that the draft resolution emphasized the necessity of achieving "permanent" agreement. The fears now shared by all States could be dispelled only by a permanent agreement that applied to all countries, in the absence of such an agreement, less satisfactory measures certainly merited encouragement. In that connexion the time factor was vital. The threat of the further spread of nuclear weapons was an additional reason for resuming disarmament negotiations. No country could expect that the good will of Governments alone would prevent the dissemination of those weapons, Canada, for its part, would continue its efforts to achieve an agreement on disarmament which would deal inter alia with the problem of nuclear weapons. If no progress in that direction was made in the near future, Canada might reconsider its position on the temporary measures proposed in the draft resolution which the Committee had just adopted.

49. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had voted in favour of the two draft resolutions on the suspension of nuclear tests (A/C.1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1) and the draft resolution on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3), which were certainly useful measures. It was, however, a highly significant political fact that the adoption of those proposals was the only action the Committee had been able to take after two months of debate on the most burning question of the day. The disparity between the task and the results achieved was extremely serious. None the less, the discussion had shown that the overwhelming majority of States fully appreciated the imperative need for general and complete disarmament. The basic idea of the Soviet proposals on disarmament—namely, that all armed forces and armaments, and thus the means of making war, should be eliminated—had made headway and had won over the hearts and minds of men and women throughout the world. That was a source
of gratification to his delegation. Moreover, it had emerged from the discussion that most States recognized the need for a body of limited membership to undertake, without delay, the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and for the Assembly to work out precise instructions for that working body, in order to guide its labours and to spare it the pointless discussions that had taken place at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament as a result of the negative attitude of the Western Powers.

50. That constructive and realistic approach showed that many States were resolved to settle the problem of general and complete disarmament as soon as possible. In that connexion his delegation appreciated the efforts of India, the United Arab Republic, Burma and the other sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2), which contained the requisite directives for the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The USSR supported that proposal which, despite some vagueness in wording and the absence of essential provisions, afforded the necessary minimum for the successful resumption of negotiations. It remained convinced, however, that the basic principles set forth in the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) offered the best foundation on which to draft a treaty.

51. It was, in any event, deplorable that the First Committee had not yet taken any decision on the directives to be laid down with regard to disarmament, and had thus failed to fulfil the hopes reposed in it by the peoples of the world. That had happened because a handful of imperialist Powers, led by the United States, persisted in their negative attitude and obstructionism. The United States and its allies, which had voted against the twelve-Power draft resolution, had clearly shown that they proposed to intensify the nuclear weapons race. That was borne out by the communiqué published after the session of the NATO Council held at Paris on 16-18 December 1960, which showed that the Western Powers wished to speed up the arms race and to establish nuclear forces in which West Germany's revanchist Bundeswehr would have a major role.

52. The United States and the other Western Powers claimed that those who advocated the immediate drafting of a treaty were in fact seeking to postpone any specific action until that instrument had been worked out in every detail. But work had not yet begun, and it was merely a matter of reaching agreement in broad outline. In the circumstances he did not see why it was necessary to lay such stress on the details. The First Committee's discussion had shown that the United States and its allies were blocking the adoption of a whole series of draft resolutions providing for specific and positive measures designed to halt the arms race and to create favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament.

53. Draft resolutions A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3 and A/C.1/L.264/Rev.1 had not been put to the vote for the simple reason that the present Government of the United States wanted nothing to do with them. The refusal of the United States to support the draft resolutions on the suspension of nuclear tests and the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons testified to the desire felt in some United States circles to resume nuclear tests, which contaminated the atmosphere, and to supply nuclear weapons to the revanchists of West Germany. The negative attitude of the United States thus blocked all progress. The agreement of the United States of America, militarily one of the strongest powers, was essential to the solution of the problem. It was important to continue making that point, for if the United States went over to a constructive attitude, there was no doubt that its allies would follow suit.

54. The Soviet Union was not asking the United States to grant it disarmament. Solving that problem was as much the concern of the American people as of the Soviet people. The USSR was ready to disarm and, for that purpose, to establish the necessary effective control. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had gone so far as to propose that a special session of the General Assembly, at the Head of State or Head of Government level, should be convened to re-examine that problem in the spring of 1961.

55. Mr. Kerley (United States of America) observed that the USSR representative's statement had gone far beyond the scope of an explanation of vote. He would not reply to it, for that representative had merely repeated well-known arguments which the United States delegation had had many opportunities to refute. He would note, however, that the Soviet Union had not objected to the decision taken with regard to the voting procedure. The Western Powers were just as convinced as the Soviet Union of the need for general and complete disarmament. Opinions differed regarding the means to that end. That should be the focus of future efforts, and there was no doubt that better progress would be made if propaganda statements were abandoned.

56. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would resume consideration of its agenda at the resumed fifteenth session of the General Assembly in March 1961. He expressed on the Committee's behalf good wishes for the prompt recovery of the Chairman, Sir Claude Corea. He thanked the members of the Committee for their co-operation and understanding.

The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.