of acceptable conditions. Thus, the future offered the bleak prospect of endless war—for it was hardly conceivable that a movement representing the yearning of the Algerian people for freedom could be completely vanquished.

3. The French population of Algeria feared that a referendum which was not held in the presence of the French Army would not be impartial, because the terror imposed by the National Liberation Front (FLN) would prevent the Moslem population from expressing itself freely. On the other hand, the Algerian liberation movement feared that the presence of the French Army would effectively stifle all freedom of expression. The logical solution was to hold a referendum of all the people of Algeria under United Nations auspices.

4. Accordingly, and in keeping with its anti-colonialist tradition, Venezuela would support the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.265 and Add. 1-3). However, it suggested that the word "Decides" in operative paragraph 4 should be replaced by "Recommends", for under Article 10 of the United Nations Charter the General Assembly could only make recommendations; it could not impose decisions.

5. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) pointed out that the friends of France in the United Nations were divided not on their desire to achieve a just solution in Algeria on the basis of the right of self-determination of the Algerian people, but on the means of achieving that objective at any given time. Similarly were to be found on both sides those who wanted to further the interests of the people of Algeria. The same considerations which had prompted many delegations to oppose the adoption of a resolution at the General Assembly's fourteenth session now caused them to reserve their positions with respect to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, now before the First Committee. Just as they had considered in 1959 that the adoption of a resolution would not contribute to a settlement, and might in fact impede it, they now felt that the adoption by the First Committee of a specific plan of action would be a mistake. Many adjustments had to be made and public opinion prepared in France and in Algeria to accept the eventual solution. Considerable progress had already been made in that direction in the past few months, despite many regrettable incidents and after what had appeared to be a drastic set-back.

6. In the opinion of the Australian delegation, President de Gaulle was the key to all hopes for a solution. During the previous year, he had consistently and courageously demonstrated his determination to solve the Algerian problem, and had sought to create a political atmosphere in France and Algeria which would make possible a sequence of events leading to the free expression of the will of the Algerian people regarding their future. He had made unpopular deci-
sions and statements; he had dealt summarily with some of his earlier supporters, and he had shown great physical and moral courage and sought to curb extremists on both sides. His good faith and sincerity were beyond all question.

7. The general sentiments stated in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution were mostly matched by General de Gaulle’s own statements. There was not much difference in the Committee on them. But Australia did not consider it wise to recommend a definite plan of action. Moreover, some of the language of the draft tended to prejudice the issue: the reference to the "two parties", for example, raised political problems. In addition, the recommendation that the United Nations should conduct and supervise a referendum was unwise. France would not accept it and the recommendation might thus create an obstacle to the achievement of the universally desired objective. Furthermore that was not the only acceptable way of ensuring that the people of Algeria had the right to self-determination. Australia’s opposition to the draft resolution should in no event be interpreted as opposition to the interests of the Algerians. Australia could not speak for France or guarantee the outcome of its policies. However, Australia considered that in view of his record, President de Gaulle should be given a further opportunity to work out a just and equitable solution.

8. Mr. MENEMENCIIOGLU (Turkey) said his Government was convinced that an early resumption of negotiations offered the realistic approach to the termination of the conflict in Algeria and the prompt implementation of the principle of self-determination under peaceful conditions. The events of the past week had underlined the determination of the Algerian people to fulfill their legitimate aspirations and had demonstrated that President de Gaulle, with increasing support from the French people, was sincerely seeking to bridge the differences still outstanding between the parties. Those differences related solely to the choice of ways and means of implementing agreed principles. In the circumstances, Turkey regretted that the Algerian conflict still continued, and hoped that an eventual settlement would safeguard the interests, honour and dignity of both sides. Its hope was based as much on its sympathy for the Algerian people as on its friendship with France. The fact that both sides recognized the right of the Algerians to self-determination should pave the way for the early restoration of peace and justice in a free and independent Algeria.

9. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that the people of his country fully supported the cause of the Algerian people in their struggle for liberation, and felt that drastic action should be taken to prevent the prolongation of the conflict. As the record showed, the United Nations had not properly understood its responsibilities with respect to the problem, and had not contributed to an effective solution.

10. Following the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, the Algerian people, like many other peoples of Asia and Africa, had legitimately asked for their independence. The French argument that Algeria was part of France and that the question of its political future was therefore a matter of domestic jurisdiction had proved untenable, and the Algerian question had been placed on the General Assembly’s agenda at the tenth session, in 1955, and at each subsequent session. At its tenth session the Assembly had decided, after some discussion, not to consider the question further. That decision had been conducive either to peace in Algeria or to progress towards a solution of the problem; like a similar resolution adopted with respect to Cyprus in 1954 (resolution 814 (IX)), it had failed to ease tensions or to prevent the outbreak of open conflict. At its eleventh session, the Assembly had adopted a mild resolution expressing hope for a peaceful, democratic and just solution (resolution 1012 (XII)). It had negated, however, to indicate how such a solution was to be achieved; and in the meantime, the war in Algeria had continued. At the twelfth session, in 1958, the Assembly had adopted resolution 1184 (XIII) in which it had expressed no longer a hope, but a wish for a peaceful solution, and had urged "pourparlers" between the parties. However, it had failed to indicate a basis for such "pourparlers", and the resolution had had no effect. In 1958 and 1959, the draft resolutions on the Algerian item had failed to obtain the required majority in plenary session.

11. The policy of President de Gaulle had been characterized by vision and foresight. He had realized that self-determination was not only a right of the dependent peoples but an inevitable historical necessity, and had voluntarily agreed to the emancipation of almost all the former French dependent territories. In his statement of 16 September 1959, he had indicated his intention of adopting a more imaginative position on the question of Algeria, and had recognized the Algerian people’s right of self-determination. Yet, a few weeks later, at the General Assembly’s fourteenth session, the United Nations had done nothing to promote that policy. The main obstacle to a solution of the problem was the uncompromising attitude of the right-wing extremists in Algeria. While there was no difference of substance between President de Gaulle’s policy and the aims of the Algerian people, the difference between that policy and the position of the French right-wing extremists and the "colonos" was decidedly one of substance. It was the duty of the United Nations to strengthen President de Gaulle, so that by united effort an imaginative move forward might be made towards the restoration of peace in Algeria and of friendly relations between Algeria and France. Moreover, a just solution in Algeria would restore France to the place it deserved among freedom-loving nations, for it should not be forgotten that it was the French Revolution which had set in motion the process of emancipation which had brought so many peoples to freedom, an historical process now unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. If President de Gaulle’s position was to be strengthened, and if the intransigence which stood in the way of a peaceful solution in Algeria was to be discouraged, the Assembly must adopt a more constructive resolution than those previously adopted. Accordingly, Cyprus would support the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

12. Clearly, the rights of the French minority in Algeria would have to be fully protected; however, minority rights could not be allowed to interfere with the right to freedom of the majority of the Algerian population.
13. The African States of the French Community and the Arab States in Africa should work with France and Algeria, as the representative of Senegal had suggested, to create a new atmosphere of co-operation. They should play an important role in the implementation of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. However, any action taken in that direction should be carried out within and under the United Nations.

14. Mr. EL-KHATIB (Yemen) said that his country deplored the terrible loss of life caused by the Algerian war and the inhumane acts committed against the Algerian people in violation of the rules of war laid down in the Geneva Conventions of August 1949. Responsibility for the conflict rested not only with France but with the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which had rendered France substantial material and financial assistance. Indeed, the whole question of Algeria was international in scope; though it was a problem which especially affected the African and Asian countries, since Algeria was geographically and ethnically an integral part of Africa, and French military action in the Algerian war had extended to the territory of Tunsia, Morocco and Libya.

15. The hopes encouraged by President de Gaulle's recognition of the Algerians' right of self-determination and his offer to negotiate with the Algerian Provisional Government had been shattered when it had become apparent that the French Government sought a settlement of the Algerian conflict on its own terms, terms which would mean the virtual capitulation of the liberation forces. President de Gaulle's statement of 4 November 1960 indicated that he was preparing a new manoeuvre which threatened to bring about the partition of Algeria. Those who held that the United Nations should do nothing to prejudice forthcoming developments should bear in mind, first, the referendum to be held on 8 January 1961 was entirely a domestic affair of France, and should therefore not influence any resolution which the Committee might adopt, and secondly, that elections in Algeria had notoriously been falsified by various means of official and military pressure. In the circumstances, Yemen had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the Committee, which recommended that a referendum on self-determination in Algeria should be organized, controlled, and supervised by the United Nations. Proposals for a resumption of negotiations such as that put forward at the 1132nd meeting by the representative of Ireland had always in the past proved futile, and could only result in the prolongation of the war. The deteriorating situation in Algeria demanded immediate and effective action, such as that proposed by the twenty-four Powers which had submitted the draft resolution.

Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) took the Chair.

16. Mr. D'ARBOUSSIER (Senegal), exercising his right of reply, said that the views he had expressed at the 1129th meeting had represented not only his personal thinking, but the considered opinion of the democratically elected Government of Senegal and of the Governments of several other African States. He presented the Tunisian representative's insinuation that he had pleaded the cause of the French Government. Senegal was a spokesman neither for the Algerian Provisional Government nor for the French Government; its views were inspired by deep friendship for both the Algerian and French peoples.

17. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) said that in his statement at the 1131st meeting he had not intended any insinuations regarding the personal conduct of the representative of Senegal, or meant to offend him in any way. He regretted, however, that the position taken by the delegation of Senegal had not been in keeping with what Tunisia would have expected from a newly-independent country of Africa.

18. As the debate on the question of Algeria drew to a close, Tunisia wished to reiterate its regret that France had refused to participate. All those who had spoken had emphasized the concern of their Governments that the war in Algeria should be terminated in justice and equity. Nobody had disputed the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence, and nobody had challenged the principle that the parties should agree on guarantees for a free and impartial referendum. The Tunisian delegation had sought to explain the actual situation as it had emerged after six years of war in Algeria, and to avoid falling into the trap of either sterile extremism or excessive moderation.

19. The agreement reached in principle that the Algerian people should decide their own future implied that the referendum by which they would make their decision should be held in an atmosphere of tranquillity. Indeed, both sides agreed that measures should be taken to ensure that the referendum would be free and authentic. Further progress was being blocked by France's insistence that there must be a cease-fire before it would discuss the conditions for the referendum, and by its refusal to negotiate the guarantees for the referendum with the nationalists. The intransigence of the French Government left no alternative, if there was to be an impartial referendum, but direct intervention by the United Nations. The United Nations had successfully performed a similar task in the Togo plebiscite, and unless it was to abdicate its responsibility for the maintenance of peace, it could not refuse to come to the assistance of the Algerians. As France's friend, Tunisia had exerted every effort to help it out of the existing deadlock, but it could not continue its efforts at the expense of the Algerian people. It considered that the war must be stopped at any cost, and by the most honest means available, namely, through United Nations intervention.

20. Mr. AMADO (Argentina), speaking on the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-3), said that his delegation reaffirmed its unconditional adherence to the principle of self-determination, and had voted in favour of the African-Asian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.246 and Add.1) at the General Assembly's fourteenth session. So far as Argentina was concerned, that issue could now be regarded as settled, Argentina also recognized the right of the Algerian people to independence as a possible—and indeed desirable—corollary of the principle of self-determination. It also considered that the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria should be respected, and that the principle of self-determination could not be interpreted to imply the partition of a well-defined historical entity. The example of Cyprus showed that different ethnic groups could live together without the need for such a measure.

21. Argentina agreed that the Algerian people had the right to express their wishes by means of a popular referendum attended by effective guarantees, and
that the United Nations had a responsibility to facilitate the exercise of that right. Nevertheless, it considered that United Nations action could be carried into effect only through freely accepted collaboration, and could not be imposed unilaterally.

22. The Argentine delegation felt that the reference in the draft resolution to "two" parties was inappropriate; it believed that no section of the Algerian people could claim to represent the country as a whole until the matter of representation had been settled by decision of the people.

23. Argentina considered that the General Assembly was not authorized by the Charter of the United Nations to exercise sovereign powers in the territory of Member States or elsewhere, and that accordingly any decision to hold a referendum in Algeria under United Nations control and supervision would be void. In view of that fundamental legal objection, the Argentine delegation would be obliged to vote against the draft resolution as a whole, and if a separate vote was taken on each paragraph, it would vote against operative paragraph 4.

24. Argentina had been deeply distressed by the loss of life suffered during the recent incidents in Algeria, which strengthened its conviction that a peaceful and freely negotiated solution was imperative. It therefore reiterated the hope that, whatever the United Nations decided, the Algerian people would be allowed to decide their future freely and take their place among the independent nations of the world.

25. Mr. Quaison-Sacky (Ghana) said that it was an understatement to speak of the "question" of Algeria. It would be more appropriate to speak of the "war" in Algeria, for in fact a full-scale war was being waged there in which some half a million French troops were fighting, on African soil, against some 130,000 Africans whose only crime was to seek freedom for their native land.

26. The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-3) had to be viewed against the whole background of the Algerian situation. Since 1957, when the General Assembly had, in its resolution 1012 (XI), expressed the hope that a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be found, two distinguished personalities had emerged. On the one hand, there was President de Gaulle, who since May 1958 had sincerely striven for a solution of the Algerian problem. He alone, among political leaders in France, had realized that Algeria could never be a province of France. But owing to pressure from certain quarters, he had been unable to concede that there was a great force on the other side—a force represented by the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Algeria, Mr. Ferhat Abbas, with whom he would have to come to terms. Thus, contrary to the view expressed by the representative of Argentina, there were two sides to the present conflict. It was idle to dismiss the Algerian combatants as "rebels" or to pretend that the conflict was only a local one, for it was being fought on such a scale as to constitute an increasing threat to international peace and security. It was, in fact, surprising that the matter had not been taken up by the Security Council. In any case, the United Nations had a responsibility to settle the question peacefully.

27. Unfortunately, as events since 1959 should have made clear to everyone, the French Government had never fully accepted the practical implications of its recognition of the Algerian people's right of self-determination. Indeed, the French Government's terms for negotiations made a mockery of its own declarations.

28. Recent events in Algeria had dramatically emphasized the basic element of the situation—the desire of the Algerian people to attain independence now enjoyed by other African countries. But how were they to decide their future in conditions of freedom and security? If General de Gaulle's proposals were to be carried out, the choice of the Algerian people would be conditioned by a referendum to be held in France. That was most regrettable, especially as the Algerian Provisional Government had not insisted that independence should be granted outright, but had indicated its readiness to abide by the verdict of the Algerian people.

29. The responsibility of the United Nations was surely to help both sides to meet on common ground. Yet some delegations seemed unwilling to recognize the existence of one of the sides to the dispute, and wished the United Nations to refrain from any action, so that President de Gaulle could settle the matter alone. So far as Ghana was concerned, a solution of the Algerian problem would be possible only when it had been acknowledged that there was a Provisional Government in Algeria, represented by Ferhat Abbas, with whom the French Government must negotiate. The responsibility of the United Nations, therefore, was to recognize the imperative need for effective guarantees to ensure the just implementation of the right of self-determination on a basis of respect for the territorial integrity of Algeria. The referendum should be held under the auspices of the United Nations. It was not that Ghana doubted the sincerity of President de Gaulle; but since the Algerian leaders were suspicious of France's intentions, the United Nations should provide an impartial team to organize, control and supervise the referendum. There was no reason why President de Gaulle should oppose such an approach; in fact, he needed United Nations assistance, since the army and the "ultras" were making it difficult for him to pursue his sane Algerian policy.

30. Certain delegations had objected to the use of the word "Decides" rather than "Recommends" in operative paragraph 4. Since all decisions of the General Assembly were in fact recommendations, he suggested that those delegations might find it possible to reconsider their position.

31. Lastly, Ghana could not consider that the French plan of establishing committees of a few selected persons could offer a solution to the problem. The plan would merely ensure that the implementation of the principle of self-determination led, first to an autonomous Algeria associated with and controlled by France, and secondly, to the installation of a pro-French group in power, to the exclusion of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. Such a course could only lead to further bloodshed.

32. Mr. Astrom (Sweden) said that his delegation's position was based on the conviction that the main concern of the United Nations should be to safeguard the rights and interests of the Algerian people, whose whole future was at stake. Sweden felt obliged to protest strongly against the acts of brutality recently committed on Algerian soil in violation of the Uni-

33. There was no disputing that the first duty of the United Nations was to recognize the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence. While there was no disagreement on that subject, it must be emphasized that the popular referendum must be held under conditions ensuring its democratic character and authenticity. The parties directly concerned agreed that international observers should provide the necessary guarantees. Sweden considered that if a plebiscite were held under United Nations auspices, its validity would be beyond dispute. Moreover, if the responsibility for a solution of the Algerian problem was assumed by the United Nations, those who sought to turn the difficulties of the Algerian people to their own account might have less opportunity of doing so.

34. But it must be realized that however the draft resolution was worded, the General Assembly had the power only to make recommendations, which, whatever their moral influence might be, could not be binding on Member States.

35. It was the fervent hope of the Swedish Government and people that once peace was restored, close ties of co-operation would be established between France and Algeria on a basis of equality. Any United Nations action must be directed towards that ultimate goal. In the light of those considerations, the Swedish delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution if it was put to the vote as a whole. However, Sweden would be unable to support paragraph 4 if it was put to the vote separately.

36. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) said that the draft resolution set forth a number of unexceptionable principles which had been ratified in the General Assembly on several occasions. Uruguay, for one, had no hesitation in upholding the principle of self-determination since its own independence had been born of the exercise of that principle.

37. The Uruguayan delegation therefore fully concurred with operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, which recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence. However, the Uruguayan delegation considered that while the draft resolution contained all the essential elements needed to give expression to the principle of self-determination, it could usefully have included some reference to the statements and policies of President de Gaulle as offering the opportunity of fruitful United Nations co-operation with a view to guaranteeing the Algerian people's free exercise of its right of self-determination. The Uruguayan delegation felt that operative paragraph 4 also should have been phrased along those lines. Uruguay's vote on the draft resolution would be guided by those considerations.

38. Mr. SKAUG (Norway) said that his delegation still hoped for a just solution of the Algerian problem on the basis of the principle of self-determination. It understood the strong desire of the parties to settle the conflict peacefully, and appreciated the patience with which the President of the French Republic was pursuing that goal, despite countless difficulties.

39. As at the Assembly's previous session, Norway was anxious not to encourage any action which might jeopardize the prospects of a speedy solution. It could not, however, fail to recognize the international implications of the conflict and the danger of its spreading to other parts of Africa. The presence of so many new States from that continent further increased the responsibility of the United Nations in the matter. It would be recalled that the Norwegian Foreign Minister, in his statement in the Assembly's general debate (590th plenary meeting), had stressed the importance of limiting conflicts and the need to consider anew what realistic assistance the United Nations could render in the tragic situation in Algeria.

40. In the present situation, the Norwegian Government felt that its views could best be expressed by voting for all the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution and for operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. As for operative paragraph 4 as it stood, the Norwegian delegation felt that it would not be in keeping with political realities to declare that the referendum in Algeria should be not only supervised, but organized and controlled by the United Nations. It did, however, believe that the United Nations might be able to render assistance in connexion with the referendum, and would accordingly support any wording which would suggest its being held under United Nations auspices. It could not accept the use of the word "Decides" in operative paragraph 4, for the General Assembly's function under the United Nations Charter could only be to recommend. If, therefore, that paragraph was retained in its present form, Norway would have to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

41. Mr. BENITES VINUEZA (Ecuador) said that in view of the critical nature of the decision which was about to be taken, and which would determine the future of an entire people, very careful consideration was called for. The Ecuadorian delegation would have no difficulty in supporting any text which strengthened the principle of self-determination, one which Ecuador had consistently upheld in the United Nations. Moreover, as was recognized in the preamble to the draft resolution, both the Algerian people and the French Government were at one on that point. The Government of Ecuador had the highest regard and admiration for the Head of the French State, who had done his utmost, in the face of considerable opposition and incomprehension, to achieve a solution of the Algerian problem. At the same time the Algerian people, in its valiant struggle for independence, deserved equal respect.

42. The delegation of Ecuador harboured certain doubts, not as to principle, but on the legal aspects of operative paragraph 4. Under Article 14 of the Charter the General Assembly was authorized only to make recommendations; the power of decision lay exclusively with the Security Council, under the provisions of Chapter VII. Ecuador could only hope that a just and peaceful solution would be found for the problem now engaging the Assembly's attention.

43. Mr. ENCKELL (Finland) said that Finland was profoundly disturbed by the violence, the extent and the duration of the Algerian tragedy. A sincere friend of both Algeria and France, and conscious of its international responsibilities, Finland could only regret that despite the courageous efforts that had been made to settle the Algerian problem, fratricidal war still continued.
44. The draft resolution before the Committee had undoubtedly been drawn up with the best of intentions. After the long years of conflict, there was an obvious need for effective guarantees to ensure the genuine exercise by the Algerian people of their right of self-determination. However, it was not for the United Nations to decide to organize a referendum in Algeria. Finland fully agreed with the representative of Ghana that all Assembly resolutions were, in effect, recommendations. But it would none the less prefer operative paragraph 4 to be suitably amended. As it stood, Finland would be unable to vote for it in the event of a separate vote.

45. Mr. FOURIE (Union of South Africa) said that his delegation’s position on the question of Algeria had been stated in the past and had remained unchanged. South Africa considered that under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter the General Assembly was debarred from dealing with the question of Algeria. The adoption of any resolution on the subject would therefore be a violation of the Charter. In those circumstances, it would serve no purpose for the South African delegation to participate in the vote on amendments to any individual paragraphs of the draft resolution. It would, of course, vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

46. Mr. WILCOX (United States of America) observed that very recently steps had been taken which offered hope of progress towards a solution of the Algerian problem. President de Gaulle’s statement of 4 November 1960, in which he had spoken of an Algerian referendum, the referendum to be held on 8 January 1961, and the French President’s recent visit to Algeria, were further evidence of France’s intention to apply the fundamental policy of self-determination. The United States had every confidence in the sincerity of President de Gaulle’s efforts to solve the problem, and believed that he was in a unique position to do so, despite the formidable obstacles in his path. It would therefore be unwise to do anything that might impede his efforts. Moreover, recent events gave the United Nations a responsibility to refrain from any action that might aggravate the present explosive situation and increase tensions either in France or Algeria. The United States continued to believe that a peaceful solution of the Algerian problem was imperative, and could best be achieved through negotiations between the parties principally concerned. The Assembly could make a positive contribution by making it clear that the road to real progress lay in a renewal of discussions. The United States delegation therefore hoped that the voices of reason and moderation in the Assembly would be heeded.

47. It was unfortunate that the good intentions which undoubtedly motivated the sponsors of the draft resolution could not be attributed to the Soviet Union, whose prime objective was to sow discord and mistrust in Algeria. The Algerian question was difficult enough without the Soviet delegation’s injection of inflammatory falsehoods into the discussions.

48. In considering the draft resolution before the Committee, the criterion to be applied should be whether or not its adoption would contribute constructively to a solution of the tragic Algerian problem. In view of the difficulties presented by some of the operative paragraphs, particularly paragraph 4, as well as by the seventh and ninth preambular paragra-
Those hopes had been bitterly disappointed, and it was sad to see Algeria still compelled to make heavy sacrifices in its fight for independence, with little prospect in sight of the friendly relations which should eventually replace the colonial regime. It was also saddening to see a great statesman caught between his own personal convictions and the pressures of certain reactionary political groups. But those factors could not reverse the course of history; nor could they alter the belief of those who held that peoples as well as individuals had certain inherent rights. Haidi wished to see the Algerian people, after so many sacrifices, enjoy the rights of independence and freedom that had so long been denied them; it would therefore vote for the draft resolution as a whole, while reserving its position on operative paragraph 4.

55. Mr. WODAK (Austria) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution. It was a matter of principle for the Austrian Government to recognize the right of every nation to self-determination and to assist it towards that goal by legal and peaceful means. Since the right of self-determination of the people of Algeria had been solemnly recognized by the French Government, the only question at issue was the manner in which that principle should be implemented. It would be recalled that according to French spokesmen, France would have no objection to the presence of neutral observers at the coming referendum. The draft resolution went further, by providing that the referendum should be organized, controlled and supervised by the United Nations. For its part, Austria interpreted the word "organized" only to mean that there should be outside participation in the organization of the referendum.

56. In voting for the draft resolution, however, the Austrian delegation would have serious misgivings concerning the use of the word "Decides" in operative paragraph 4. It believed that in using that word, the resolution went beyond the spirit of the Charter, and that since the United Nations would have no power to carry out such a decision it would be better to replace the word "Decides" by "Recommends".

57. Austria did not overlook the considerable difficulties facing the French Government and people in taking a decision. It was convinced that they were striving sincerely to find an acceptable solution, and hoped that they would accept the resolution in the spirit in which it had been intended, namely, as suggesting one of the possibilities that would enable an end to be put to the present serious situation.

58. Mr. N'GOUA (Gabon) said that while the United Nations had a contribution to make in bringing the Algerian war to an end, it could not solve the problem alone. The General Assembly should take a forthright stand on the principle of self-determination and on measures for ending hostilities. However, the sponsors of the twenty-four-power draft resolution were unrealistic in failing to recognize that a referendum could not possibly be held in Algeria without the active cooperation of the French Government. France would not agree to a referendum organized by the United Nations, and it would probably be unwilling to accept even United Nations supervision. There seemed no advantage in adopting a resolution that had no chance of being implemented. Furthermore, even if France permitted United Nations personnel to supervise a referendum, the European extremists in Algeria would unquestionably provoke incidents, and the result would only be to complicate the situation further. President de Gaulle was the voice of reason and justice in France, and an honest referendum could be held if he enjoyed unchallenged authority in Algeria; hence, nothing should be done to weaken his authority or to strengthen the influence of the extremists over the European population in Algeria. It would, however, be desirable for an international commission to go to Algeria to ensure that the referendum was properly conducted; indeed, President de Gaulle had offered to admit observers from all over the world.

59. Although the United Nations could take no action on Algeria without the agreement of the parties concerned, it could employ its moral authority by calling upon the French Government and the Algerian Provisional Government to resume negotiations; a resolution along the lines indicated by the Senegalese representative might be appropriate. As a realist, President de Gaulle would undoubtedly be unwilling to make further concessions in any new negotiations, and an appeal by the United Nations for the resumption of negotiations would assist him in making the European population of Algeria heed the counsels of reason. At the same time, while the Algerian Provisional Government might feel that past experience had demonstrated that negotiation with the French Government was futile, it must recognize that there was no other way to achieve a solution of the problem. The Provisional Government would have to abandon some of its demands, particularly with regard to special privileges in a future referendum. It could not claim to be the exclusive representative of the Algerian people, and would need an electoral mandate to be entitled to take part in the administration of the country.

60. In the light of the considerations he had just set forth, his delegation would not vote for operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution.

Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

61. Mr. SHANAHAN (New Zealand) said that while many problems remained to be solved before peace could be restored in Algeria, substantial progress had been made. There was general recognition of the Algerian people's right to self-determination and of the fact that Algeria had its own national character and could not be regarded as part of France. It should therefore be possible to find a basis for ending hostilities and holding a referendum in which the Algerians could exercise their right of self-determination. However, the United Nations could not solve the Algerian problem through its own efforts and without cooperating with France; and it was clear that President de Gaulle was at the present time the only man capable of guiding the French and Algerian peoples to a peaceful settlement. While it was essential that the Algerian people should be able to exercise its right of self-determination in complete freedom, to entrust the United Nations with full responsibility for a referendum would not be the most effective way to achieve that objective; it would be both improper and impracticable for the United Nations to decide unilaterally to take the conduct of the referendum out of France's hands. Any resolution adopted by the Assembly should express full support
of the Algerian people's right to self-determination, but it should do so in such a way as to carry the greatest possible weight with the people and Government of France. His delegation would therefore be unable to vote for the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

62. Mr. AKAPO (Togo) said that President de Gaulle, who represented France's great traditions of freedom and who sincerely wished to grant Algeria its independence, must be aided in his struggle with the French colonialists who were dishonouring France's name. That aid should take the form of United Nations intervention to ensure the genuineness of the proposed referendum in Algeria. Togo, which had called upon the United Nations to organize and supervise the elections of 1958 after having unfortunate experiences with past elections and referendums conducted by the French authorities, could testify to the beneficial effects of United Nations intervention. It was clear that if a referendum in Algeria was conducted by France alone, the French police and military forces would not permit the Algerian people to make a free choice. His delegation therefore supported the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

63. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that his Government regarded the principle of self-determination, by which the twenty-four-Power draft resolution was inspired, as the very foundation of its foreign policy. However, the essential question was how the implementation of that principle could best be achieved in the present case. In the view of his delegation, the only hope for a solution in Algeria lay in the widest possible French support of the efforts now being made by President de Gaulle, and in the Algerian people's recognition that President de Gaulle's policies offered them the prospect of complete independence and national unity.

64. His delegation would vote for the preamble of the draft resolution and for operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. However, it would vote against operative paragraph 4, which called for the United Nations to exceed its authority under the Charter by attempting to impose a solution against the wishes of a Member State, and which would not help to create a spirit of reconciliation between France and Algeria.

65. Mr. LIU (China) said that his delegation had at all times supported the Algerian people's right of self-determination, and continued to do so despite the fact that some Algerian leaders had sought certain alliances which, in the view of his delegation, were extremely unwise and would ultimately prove contrary to their own interests. His delegation would therefore vote for those paragraphs in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution which affirmed the principle of self-determination. However, it would be unable to vote for operative paragraph 4, which could serve no purpose so long as it was unacceptable to the French Government, and which might in fact complicate the task of finding a solution to the Algerian problem.

66. Mr. RITCHIE (Canada) said that his delegation fully supported the Algerian people's right of self-determination, and felt that it would be most unfortunate if the United Nations took any action which might tend to slow the progress which had undeniably been made towards the implementation of that right. Whatever its shortcomings might be, President de Gaulle's policy offered the best hope for a solution of the Algerian problem in conformity with the United Nations Charter. If it sought to conduct a referendum in Algeria, the United Nations would be not only exceeding its competence but also complicating the efforts that were being made to solve the Algerian problem. His delegation would therefore vote against the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

67. Mr. IGNACIO-PINTO (Dahomey) said that his delegation had not participated in the general debate but wished to associate itself with the entire statement made by the representative of Senegal. While he fully supported the Algerian cause, he did not feel that the intransigent stand of the Algerian Provisional Government was contributing to a just solution of the problem. It would be well to emulate the conciliatory approach which had led to a solution of the difficult problem of Cyprus. The Committee should also be mindful of the courageous efforts which President de Gaulle was making, despite the opposition of many of his former supporters, to settle the Algerian conflict on the basis of the principle of self-determination.

68. If the Assembly adopted the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, it would be exceeding the bounds of practical possibilities and presenting the problem in distorted form. His delegation would therefore abstain from the vote unless a change was made in operative paragraph 4.

69. Mr. BOUCETTA (Morocco) said past experience had shown that the French Government's primary aim in entering into negotiations with the Algerian nationalist leaders had always been to mislead the United Nations while it was considering the Algerian problem. Two events had taken place since the opening of the present Committee debate. First of all, hundreds of people had been shot down while demonstrating in Algerian towns and villages on behalf of the National Liberation Front and the Algerian Provisional Government. Secondly, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution solemnly proclaiming the end of colonialism (resolution 1514 (XV)). He appealed to those Member States which had voted for that resolution, particularly those which had once been colonies, not to betray the African cause by abstaining or absenting themselves when the twenty-four-Power draft resolution was put to the vote. Algeria would soon be independent, and history would judge each State by the way it cast its vote on the resolution now before the Committee.

70. Mr. COULIBALY (Ivory Coast) did not feel that operative paragraph 4 of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution would contribute to an early and effective solution of the Algerian problem, and he proposed that a separate vote should be taken on that paragraph.

71. Mr. UMAÑA BERNAL (Colombia) proposed that a separate vote should be taken on the preamble as a whole and on each of the operative paragraphs.

72. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-3).

73. He invited the Committee to vote first on the preamble to the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Finland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.
The preamble was adopted by 60 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.

74. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

In favour: Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Dominican Republic, El Salvador.

Present and not voting: Union of South Africa.

76. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Ethiopia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippine Islands, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark.

Against: Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia.

Abstaining: Japan, Laos, Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, United States of America, Cambodia, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador.

Present and not voting: Union of South Africa.

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by 76 votes to 10, with 14 abstentions.

77. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution.
A vote was taken by roll-call.

Paraguay, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.


Against: Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway.

Abstaining: Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, Japan, Laos, Madagascar, Mexico, Panama.

Present and not voting: Union of South Africa.

Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by 38 votes to 33, with 23 abstentions.

78. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the draft resolution as a whole (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-3).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Finland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya.

Against: Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador.

Abstaining: Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Iran, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Madagascar, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 47 votes to 20, with 28 abstentions.

79. Mr. GHURMA (Upper Volta) said that his delegation reserved the right to explain its vote in plenary session. He wished to say, however, that it had abstained from the vote on operative paragraph 4 not because it objected to United Nations intervention in the Algerian question but because it did not feel that the type of intervention proposed in that paragraph would prove effective.

80. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said that his delegation, which, with other African and Asian delegations had proposed the inclusion of the Algerian item in the General Assembly's agenda, continued to adhere to the position on Algeria which he had set forth at the 1123rd meeting, and had therefore voted for all but one of the paragraphs in the draft resolution. It had abstained in the votes on operative paragraph 4 and, consequently, on the resolution as a whole because it had felt that paragraph 4 called for the General Assembly to exceed its authority under the Charter of the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 8.25 p.m.