were strong in the dignity of their fight for freedom and their national identity. Those who sought to suppress them for mere plunder were no better than mercenaries, and had gained nothing from the ever-increasing number of men and arms they had thrown into the battle.

2. It had been hoped that with the coming to power of General de Gaulle a new era would open for Algeria. After General de Gaulle's declaration of 16 September 1959 and the conditional acceptance of his offer by the Provisional Government of Algeria, it had seemed that the principle of self-determination had been accepted by both sides, and that the problem was nearing solution. The Algerians had only later discovered how illusory that impression was. It had become clear that to the French, self-determination meant a referendum controlled by them, under conditions of war, and subject to reservations which would mean destroying the unity of the Algerian people and the territorial integrity of their country. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had taken due note of that warning: it now knew that it must obtain from the French Government precise guarantees as to the manner in which a free popular referendum would be organized. No referendum could be considered free while the French army remained in control; and the Algerian people would not be persuaded to lay down their arms by vague promises of self-determination.

3. That was the impasse which events in Algeria had reached. Meanwhile, General de Gaulle continued to make speeches and offer new proposals; but they served merely to confuse the situation, since it was obvious that there was no intention to apply the true principle of self-determination. The promise of self-determination, as one of the accused in the "barricades trial" following the insurrection in Algeria of January 1960 had revealed, had been not so much a new policy as a move to improve France's position in the United Nations. Accordingly, the Algerian Provisional Government had proposed, on 22 August 1960, that the consultation of the Algerian people should be effected by means of a referendum organized, controlled and supervised by the United Nations. The Algerians knew that direct negotiation was useless: they had attempted during 1960, despite the General Assembly's failure to adopt a resolution at its fourteenth session, to engage in "pourparlers" with the French Government, and it had not been their fault that the preliminary talks had collapsed. They also knew that the organization of the referendum in Algeria could not be left to France alone, for the French civilian and military authorities in Algeria were too deeply involved in the issue to be capable of conducting such a referendum fairly and honestly. The sole alternative, then, was the United Nations: only effective international control under United Nations auspices could ensure the free exercise by the Algerian people of their right of self-determination. It was for that reason that his delega-
tion, together with the delegations of many other
Asian and African States, had sponsored the draft
resolution now before the Committee (A/C.1/L.285
and Add.1-2).

4. He felt it was appropriate to consider the attitude
of the newly independent States, particularly those
from Africa, towards the Algerian question and its
settlement. Those new States were as yet to a large
extent an unknown quantity in the United Nations. The
Algerian issue would be a testing ground for them; it
would reveal to what extent they were prepared to use
their newly-won freedom to help the liberation of other
peoples still in subjection. It was gratifying to note,
therefore, that some of the new African States, in-
cluding even some friends of France, had voiced con-
cern at France’s policy in Algeria. In so doing, they
had aligned themselves with that group of African and
Asian countries which had been defending the cause
of Algeria for six years, and of the colonial territories
in general since the inception of the United Nations.
Indeed, it was not too much to say that the States in
question had done much to hasten the liberation of the
new African States. In using their own freedom to help
win freedom for others, they had set them an example.
As free Members of the international community, the
new States had many obligations under the United
Nations Charter; they also had moral obligations
towards peoples not yet free. The war against Algeria
was a war against Africa. If the new States supported
France on the Algerian issue they would be striking a
blow at the heart of their own continent—and they
would incidentally be rendering France itself a dis-
service, for France was destroying itself in its re-

t lentless struggle to retain control over Algeria. If they
supported Algeria, they would demonstrate the full
measure of their independence and their deep sense of
responsibility.

5. The attitude of other nations, too, called for com-
ment, in particular that of certain members of NATO,
and especially the United States. No one could pretend
any longer that France had not been encouraged and in
many ways actively supported by them in its war
against Algeria. The time had come for the United
Nations to recognize that one of the important pre-
requisites for a settlement of the Algerian issue was
to terminate the role of those Powers. The impact
of United States arms had been decisive in prolonging
the war in Algeria; the American public were perhaps
ignorant of that fact, but it was time that they became
aware of it. The indirect responsibility of the United
States for countless acts of aggression and for the
blood of many Algerian nationalists could not but
damage its prestige. Now, when a new Administration
was entering upon its duties, was the time to start
a new chapter in United States foreign policy, one
worthy of the great American tradition. His delega-
tion’s criticism of the United States was prompted
not by animosity but by disappointment in a country
which had made its name as a champion of liberty.

6. With the material assistance offered to the Pro-
visional Government of Algeria by the Government
of the People’s Republic of China, the acceptance of
that offer by the Provisional Government, and the
Soviet Union’s recognition of the Algerian Republic,
the Algerian problem had entered a new phase. For
more than six years, the Algerians had carried on
the struggle with their own resources and the little
they had been able to get from their Arab brothers,
in the belief that the world community would use its
moral pressure to obtain justice for their cause. But
with the world divided into two camps and the Western
camp helping their opponents to continue the war, the
Algerians had been compelled to ask the other camp,
to which the People’s Republic of China, the socialist
States and a number of African and Asian countries
belonged, for material aid. In reply to those who had
criticized the Algerians for accepting help from the
People’s Republic of China, he would merely say that the
only difference between the arms supplied to France by the NATO Powers and the arms supplied
to Algeria by the People’s Republic of China lay in the
purposes for which those arms were used. Chinese
arms would be used to liberate a nation, while NATO
and United States arms had been employed to subjugate
the Algerian people.

7. The Algerian war was being waged by a combina-
tion of imperialist forces which was determined to
keep Algeria under NATO control. There was a tacit
understanding among the NATO Powers that Algeria
must be kept under French domination because of its
strategic importance in the over-all NATO military
plan. The Powers in question intended to play for
time by deferring the settlement of the Algerian
problem for as long as possible; they had apparently
chosen the United Nations as the instrument for their
defraying tactics, while President de Gaulle’s policies
were to be used to keep public opinion in France and
elsewhere occupied in the search for a solution. Today,
the prospect of a negotiated settlement was more
distant than at any time in the past; the imperialist
Powers would yield their control only to force. The
United Nations believed in persuasion rather than
coercion; it could exercise effective persuasion, if all
the peace-loving nations insisted on taking the
matter into their hands through the various peaceful
methods available to them under the Charter.

8. The sincerity of the Algerian Provisional Govern-
ment and its desire for a peaceful settlement could
not be doubted. At the very start of the revolution,
in 1954, the Algerian National Liberation Front
(FLN) had sought a peaceful settlement. It had asked
for the recognition of Algerian nationality, for nego-
tiations between France and the authorized spokes-
men of the Algerian people on the basis of the
recognition of an indivisible Algerian sovereignty,
and for the creation of a climate of trust by the
liberation of political prisoners and other measures;
and in return it had pledged itself to respect honestly-
aquired French cultural and economic interests, to
offer all Frenchmen wishing to remain in Algeria an
option between French and Algerian nationality, and
to settle the future relationship between France and
Algeria on the basis of agreement. The spirit which
had inspired that position had guided the leaders of
the FLN throughout their struggle. They had vainly
edevoured to persuade their adversaries to enter
into negotiations, and had appealed to the United
Nations, though without success. In view of France’s
persistent refusal to negotiate a settlement of the
Algerian war, it was imperative that the United Nations
should itself undertake to apply the principle of self-
determination in Algeria by organizing, controlling
and supervising a referendum in which the Algerian
people would freely decide the future of their country.

9. To those who still believed that General de Gaulle
would be able to achieve a settlement of the Algerian
question, he would point out that the General was apparently no longer master of the situation. Other political forces were at work, and if General de Gaulle were to decide alone to end the war and to recognize the independence of Algeria, it would mean the end of the Fifth Republic. The proposal for a referendum organized, controlled and supervised by the United Nations was the only way to save President de Gaulle and France from ruin.

10. U THANT (Burma), speaking as one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.263 and Add.1-2, said that the proposal for an Algerian referendum organized, controlled and supervised by the United Nations was motivated, not by lack of esteem and friendship for the French Government and people, but by the sponsors' sincere conviction that in the prevailing circumstances such a referendum was the only way to a just and peaceful solution of the Algerian problem. While it had consistently espoused the cause of Algerian self-determination and independence, his delegation had always wished to see a friendly relationship established between France and an independent Algeria. Its earnest desire to support France, whenever support was merited, had been exemplified by the statement it had made in the Fourth Committee (865th meeting) on the question of the Cameroons at the resumed thirteenth session of the General Assembly, in which it had expressed the hope that France's ready response to the demands of nationalism and independence would assure Franco-African amity and goodwill in the years to come.

11. His delegation had been associated with all past United Nations endeavours to bring about negotiations between the French Government and the Algerian nationalists fighting for independence. To those who asserted that those nationalists could not be regarded as representative of the Algerian people, he would point out that there had been many instances in colonial history of power having been transferred to the nationalist forces which had struggled for independence; the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League of Burma, the All India National Congress, and the Moslem League of Pakistan were cases in point. For the past four years, his delegation had been convinced that France could not end the war in Algeria without political negotiations with the Algerian nationalists. An indication of the way the wind was blowing could be found in the recent vote in the Algiers Municipal Council on a motion affirming a strong desire to remain inside the French Republic: seventeen of the forty-five members of the Council had voted against the motion. Perhaps the French Government was attempting a repetition of the Bao Dai experiment, in which France had granted Viet-Nam independence without ending the war in Indo-China; the consequences of that experiment were well known. As for the argument that the Algerian situation was different in that there were over a million Frenchmen in Algeria, he would submit that the domination which had been exercised for years in Algeria by a minority of settlers representing 10 per cent of the population was a fundamental and legitimate grievance of the Algerian nationalists. France asserted that the Algerian issue involved working out a solution which would not only satisfy the Algerian nationalists but also safeguard fully the legitimate rights and interests of the settlers. But the Algerian nationalists had repeatedly given assurances that once Algeria had gained independence, French settlers would be accorded all rights enjoyed by minorities elsewhere, provided that they observed the laws of the land. However, a harmonious relationship between the two communities depended on the absence of such passions as had been generated by the bitter struggle of the past six years; indeed, that was one reason why peace had to be restored immediately.

12. Ever since the tenth session in 1955, when the question of Algeria had first been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, his delegation had associated itself with all moves to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem. In February 1957, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1012 (XII), expressing the hope that a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be found. In December 1957, it had adopted resolution 1184 (XII), expressing the wish that 'pourparlers' would be entered into, and other appropriate means utilized, with a view to a solution in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations. At the thirteenth session in 1958, the French Government having made no attempt to enter into "pourparlers" with the Algerian nationalists, the Algerian question had again been placed on the General Assembly's agenda, at the request of twenty-four Asian and African countries. A draft resolution (A/C.1/L.232) urging negotiations between the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and the Government of France had been approved by the First Committee, but had failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, thirty-five Members having voted for the resolution and eighteen against, and twenty-eight Members, including the United States of America, having abstained from the vote. Thereafter, hostilities had continued unabated, with intensified suffering and loss of life. On 16 September 1958, just before the opening of the General Assembly's fourteenth session, President de Gaulle had pledged himself to allow the Algerians freely to determine their own future within four years after the restoration of peace in Algeria; but at the same time he had indicated that the choice of independence rather than integration or autonomy in association with France might mean partition, and that France would in any case retain control of the Sahara oilfields. At the fourteenth session, the First Committee had approved a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.248 and Add.1) urging the two parties to enter into "pourparlers" to determine the conditions necessary for the implementation of the right of self-determination of the Algerian people. A milder version, submitted by Pakistan (A/L.276) when it had become apparent that the original draft resolution could not command a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, had been rejected by the Assembly. Thereafter, in response to a more conciliatory offer by President de Gaulle, the Algerian Provisional Government had, in June 1960, sent representatives to France for talks preparatory to cease-fire negotiations; but those talks, for reasons which were well known, had broken down.

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problem, or even an Algerian problem. No African Government, however much it desired good relations with France, would be able to maintain even official neutrality much longer. The only way out of the impasse was to apply the principle of self-determination, through the United Nations.

14. World opinion had increasingly come to support a referendum on self-determination, organized and supervised by the United Nations. Only the United Nations could save the situation. The tragic events of the preceding few days in Algeria, in which more casualties had been recorded than there had been in the Congo since the start of the United Nations operations in that country, had shown conclusively that free and fair elections could not take place in Algeria under the control and supervision of French armed forces. After that unprecedented demonstration of Moslem nationalism and the classical colonial measures taken to suppress it, President de Gaulle's plan for a French-controlled referendum could not be regarded as possible or desirable.

15. The French Government under President de Gaulle had earned the plaudits of the world for the realistic and statesmanlike manner in which it had granted independence to many African States. It was deeply disturbing, therefore, that the same Government which had had the courage and authority to come to terms with nationalist forces all over Africa could not see that the far more politically-conscious Algerian nationalists could not be expected, after a six-year struggle for independence, to lay down their arms and count on French generosity. President de Gaulle's speech at Bled on 16 December 1958, in which he had referred to an Algerian Algeria which would continue to grow even more Algerian with each passing day, had demonstrated his breadth of vision and his understanding of the problem. The Burmese delegation believed that President de Gaulle had the vision and wisdom to realize that the Algerian problem could be peacefully solved only with the cooperation of the United Nations.

16. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said that the war in Algeria, which had continued unabated for more than six years, had brought untold suffering to Algerians and Frenchmen alike, and had poisoned relations between two peoples bound by many common ties. Starting as a small nationalist rebellion, it had expanded into a widespread and popular guerrilla campaign. The National Liberation Army had grown to such a size, and had proved so effective, that by 1957, according to reliable French estimates, it had kept 800,000 French troops engaged in combat. Heavy losses had been sustained on both sides: by November 1959, according to the latest French figures published, there had been 145,000 Algerian and 12,000 French deaths. Thus, it should by now have been clear to the French Government that the Algerian problem could not be solved by a "war of pacification".

17. Apart from the human and material losses caused by the war, scant regard had been shown for the elementary principles normally governing the treatment of prisoners and relations between belligerents. Hundreds of thousands of Algerians had been forced to leave their homes, and had either been resettled or had taken refuge in neighbouring countries. Nor could the international character of the Algerian war be minimized. Neighbouring countries had suffered bombing attacks, and the war had embittered relations between France and the North African countries with which it had always had a close association. If the conflict continued, it might have the gravest consequences for international peace and security.

18. The French Government had always taken refuge in the plea of domestic jurisdiction, and even now, after General de Gaulle had to some extent abandoned the French argument that Algeria was part of metropolitan France, France's representatives had absented themselves from the discussion of the item. But it was too late in the day for the French Government to argue that the discussion of the question in the United Nations amounted to intervention in its domestic affairs, for the Assembly had debated the subject at every session since 1956 and had even passed resolutions on it.

19. In the past, the French Government's approach to the Algerian problem had always been based on the assumption that Algeria was an integral part of France; and it had merely proposed various political and administrative reforms which would not in any way affect that status. The General Assembly's recommendations had gone unheeded, and France had not availed itself of the friendly offers of good offices made by Tunisia and Morocco.

20. In 1958, the advent of General de Gaulle to power had raised hopes of a solution of the Algerian question. But the referendum held in September 1958, in which members of the French Community had had the opportunity of voting for independence, had not been applied in full to Algeria, which had been treated as one of the French "départements" and given the alternative only of approving or rejecting the proposed constitution. If the referendum had been applied in Algeria as elsewhere in French Africa, and fair voting procedures had been guaranteed, it was just possible that a peaceful solution might have been achieved. Unfortunately, however, that had not been done.

21. At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, the First Committee had approved a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.232) on the Algerian question which had failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority in the Assembly. However, it was interesting to note that the paragraph of the draft resolution recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence had obtained more than the necessary two-thirds majority. A further encouraging development had been General de Gaulle's universally acclaimed speech of 16 September 1959, in which the Algerian people had been promised the right to choose their future freely. That bold initiative had been matched by the equally courageous statement of the Provisional Government of Algeria on 26 September 1959 that it was prepared to accept the test of a free referendum. There had thus been agreement in principle on the basis for a solution of the question, namely, the right of self-determination.

22. In the light of that promising development, the First Committee, at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, had approved a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.246 and Add.1), urging the two parties concerned to enter into "pourparlers" with a view to the speedy implementation of the Algerian people's right of self-determination and to settling the conditions for a cease-fire. Although the individual par-
graphs of that resolution had obtained more than a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the draft resolution had not been adopted as a whole, mainly because many delegations had wished to refrain from any action which might jeopardize the prospects of an over-all solution of the question.

23. Unfortunately, subsequent events in Algeria had shown that the General Assembly’s avoidance of a decision, instead of discouraging colonialist activities, had actually encouraged them. The treatment accorded to the emissaries sent by the Provisional Government of Algeria to France, at the invitation of the French Head of State, had been far from conducive to the establishment of the contacts envisaged by General de Gaulle, and the leaders of the Algerian Provisional Government could hardly be blamed for interpreting it as a refusal on France’s part to negotiate. The Algerian representatives had been asked to accept all the conditions laid down by the French Government, and had been allowed less freedom even than political prisoners.

24. During the summer of 1960, the French Government had set up “missions d’élus” to draft a new statute for Algeria; but to those concerned for a solution of the Algerian question, that move seemed to be merely a matter of diversionary tactics.

25. It was true that President de Gaulle, in his speech of 4 November 1960, had upheld the Algerian people’s right of self-determination; but he had introduced a disturbing new element by hinting at the possibility of partitioning Algeria—a measure that would certainly plunge the country into even greater chaos. In the opinion of the Nepalese delegation, the principle of self-determination must be applied to the Algerian people as a whole, Algeria being regarded as an indivisible unit.

26. Historical analysis of the Algerian problem suggested certain logical conclusions. First, in view of the present anti-colonial trend throughout the world and of the anti-colonial role of the United Nations, France’s claim that Algeria was a French internal problem was no longer tenable. Any solution proposed must accordingly reflect that fact. Secondly, the strength, determination and maturity of the Algerian independence movement showed that Algeria was quite ready for independence; it had, in fact, abundantly proved that it was capable of governing itself. Finally, France was by now deeply committed to the principle of self-determination. Many former French colonies had been allowed to attain independence; moreover, President de Gaulle himself had declared self-determination to be the goal for Algeria.

27. The logical solution of the Algerian problem therefore seemed to lie in a free plebiscite under United Nations supervision. Nepal had therefore joined the sponsors of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-2).

28. The tragic events of the past few days lent particular urgency to the problem, for reports received from reliable Western sources showed that the French police and army had stood by while Algerian civilians had been slaughtered. By failing in its elementary duty to safeguard the lives of Algerians, the French Government had forfeited its right to stay a moment longer in Algeria. The peoples of Africa and Asia, in particular, looked to the United Nations for a speedy solution. If the express wishes of the United Nations continued to be disregarded by the French Government, the leaders of Algeria could not be blamed if they looked elsewhere for support and effective action.

29. Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria), speaking as one of the sponsors of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-2), said that all the necessary evidence had been adduced to justify the view that the United Nations should intervene to stop the carnage in Algeria by organizing and supervising a referendum in that country. That was necessary because if such a referendum were organized and supervised by France, the French army would control the entire proceedings and would produce the result they desired. Accordingly, the African and Asian nations believed that the United Nations, a neutral body which enjoyed respect throughout the world, should be appointed to act as an impartial judge.

30. He wished to state Nigeria’s position on the question of Algeria without any ambiguity. Since Nigeria was committed to the liberation of the whole of Africa, and was opposed to any form of colonialism or imperialism, it had no alternative but to support the Algerian nationalists in their struggle for freedom. Nigeria did not accept the legal fiction that Algeria was a part of metropolitan France—a fiction that had been devised by European jurists in order to justify colonial activities in Africa during the period of capitulations. Now that the situation had changed, the outworn arguments advanced by France in respect of Algeria—like those of Portugal concerning Angola—could not command acceptance anywhere.

31. No solution that entailed the partition of Algeria would be regarded as satisfactory by Nigeria; one million Algerian inhabitants of French origin had no right to demand that an entire nation should be partitioned for their convenience. The territory of Africa was well defined geographically by the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and could not by the mere wave of a wand be made part of France. Only strife, with an endless waste of resources on both sides, could ensue from such a measure. Surely, two peoples that had lived together for so long would do better to cooperate than to commit joint suicide.

32. Nigeria appealed to the United States and the United Kingdom to take a firm stand, and to make it clear to France that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was purely a defence arrangement, could not be used to perpetuate colonialism and that France’s present practices were incompatible with the ideals of the United Nations Charter. The United States, which had begun its history as a colony but had eventually won its independence, had a special responsibility in that respect, since colonialism was contrary to its Constitution.

33. France should realize that its attempts to subjugate the Algerian nationalists by force of arms would inevitably fail, since history showed that once a nationalist movement had gained momentum it could never be suppressed. Moreover, France should remember its own subjugation during the Second World War, and should be grateful to the African continent, since its salvation had come from that quarter.
34. It was true that General de Gaulle's new policy, although belated, offered a measure of encouragement. However, his recent address to the French army had been disquieting, and it was for that reason that the sponsors of the draft resolution were proposing that the referendum should be held under impartial United Nations supervision.

35. It had been suggested that the Algerian nationalists were an unrepresentative minority with which the French Government need not condescend to negotiate. But the recent demonstrations in Algiers had shown that assertion to be far from the truth; even the New York Herald Tribune, which was not noted for its radical views, had concluded, on 12 December 1960, that the nationalists were not a dissident minority, that Algeria could not be partitioned with success and that any settlement must involve peaceful coexistence between the French and Algerian peoples.

36. It would indeed be a tragedy if, after its long association with Algeria, France were to leave that territory under the shadow of Algerian hatred. A lesson was perhaps to be learnt in that respect from the United Kingdom, which had found that the policy of decolonization had paid greater dividends than the forcible retention of power in its dependent territories. France should hearken to the plea of the African and Asian nations; it should stop thinking in terms of the natural resources of the Sahara and should remember instead the ten million Algerians and what their future could mean to France.

37. For its part, Nigeria would never rest content until the whole of Africa was freed from all forms of foreign domination, and would continue to help the Algerians in every way. He urged the adoption of the draft resolution, and hoped that it would cause France to realize that its interests could best be served by retaining the goodwill of the Algerians, and that its true greatness would be found not in the possession of nuclear weapons but in generosity such as it had shown in freeing a number of African countries which had now become Members of the United Nations. If instead of continuing that policy, France now stopped short, it would reap only bitterness and hostility, and would lose the very economic advantages that it was seeking to retain.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.