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### AGENDA ITEM 71

**Question of Algeria (A/4418 and Add.1) (continued)**

#### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. BOUCCETTA (Morocco) said that only United Nations intervention could put an end to the Algerian war—to whose horrors he drew attention—and give the Algerian people independence and sovereignty. It was inconceivable and illogical that, at a time when peoples were gaining their freedom and the United Nations was solemnly proclaiming the end of colonialism, Algeria should remain colonized and that, at a time when peace was becoming the theme of every nation, war should rage in Algeria.

2. Following the Viet-Nam war and the dogged struggle of the Moroccan people, the Algerian war had been the decisive factor in speeding the process of decolonization throughout the African continent and had assisted in the liberation of many African peoples now represented in the United Nations. The Algerian war was neither a police operation nor a French domestic operation; it had long since ceased to be even a Franco-Algerian war. On the one side were the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, whose members were genuine patriots and had demonstrated their political maturity; the Army of National Liberation which had proved its courage to the world; and a whole people struggling to win their place in the ranks of the free and independent nations. However, all peoples who loved freedom and justice were supporting the Algerian people and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic by sending them money, medicaments, arms and ammunition, quite apart from the volunteers who were arriving from all parts of the world. On the other side France had the aid of its allies in its colonial war, and much of the stock of arms and ammunition it was using in Algeria had been supplied through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover not all the soldiers making war on Algeria were Frenchmen. Besides the legionaries—who, incidentally, were deserting in increasing numbers—there were still African soldiers on Algerian soil. In that connexion, Heads of State and Heads of Government of independent African countries had demanded that their nationals should leave Algerian territory; for example, since Guinea had attained independence, 9,000 Guinean soldiers operating in Algeria had been withdrawn and placed at their Government's disposal.

3. Thus, the Algerian war, far from being a Franco-Algerian war, had become in every respect an international war, which was of concern to every chancellory in the world and which had been a topic at every conference, from the Asian–African Conference held at Bandung in 1955 to the Conference of Independent African States held at Leopoldville in 1960. Since the conflict was international, only an international settlement could end it. Morocco had made every effort to bring about a settlement by direct negotiation between the parties concerned, but its efforts had been in vain. Moreover the state of war prevailing in Algeria showed an increasing tendency to spread, for the Moroccan frontiers, like those of Tunisia, were subject to daily attacks.

4. At the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, many delegations had urged the United Nations to avoid taking any position on the Algerian problem, on the ground that the French Government was about to solve it. That had disturbed the Moroccan delegation, which had expressed a feeling that the chance of peace had perhaps been let slip in that way. Since those fears had unfortunately proved to be well-founded, it was essential that the United Nations should intervene, vigorously if necessary, to bring the war to an end.

5. In 1960 a master idea had been finally recognized: that of self-determination. That idea had been accepted by France and by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic; it was, moreover, a fundamental principle laid down in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations. When that master idea had been accepted by both the parties directly concerned, it had raised the hopes of the world. In the course of the past year or so, the policy instituted by the Head of the French State had done something to clarify the problem; since his statement of 15 September 1960, both the French Government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had been in agreement at any rate on one principle: the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. As to the implementation of that principle, however, the difference was found to be as great as ever.

6. Generally speaking, the statement made by President de Gaulle on 14 June 1960 and the communiqué issued by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on 11 June could be said to have represented a step forward and to have had positive features. The fiction of French Algeria had been abandoned, and the Algerian personality recognized. In that connexion the Head of the French State had acknowledged that self-determination was "the only possible solution" and had declared himself ready to receive the Algerian leaders in order to join with them in seeking "an honourable end to the fighting". Moreover General de Gaulle had
made no further reference to the role of the army in directing and supervising the popular consultations. Consequently, although those statements had not met in full the legitimate demands which had a sound legal basis in the principle of the Charter, they had constituted a significant overture for negotiations, which might have proved decisive, on the prospects for peace in Algeria. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, with the encouragement of Morocco, had therefore decided to send emissaries to France for conversations with representatives of the French Government, with a view to proposing that a delegation from the Provisional Government should go to Paris to negotiate with the French representatives.

7. However, the Melun conversations had failed, for every request and every proposal put forward by the Algerian emissaries had been answered in the negative. The French Government had categorically refused to regard the representatives of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic even as plenipotentiaries empowered to negotiate with the French Government military and political terms for a cease-fire in Algeria. It had refused to specify a date on which Mr. Ferhat Abbas, the head of the Provisional Government, might have an interview with General de Gaulle. What was more, the Algerian emissaries had been faced with conditions laid down by the French Government, which had proposed to dictate unilaterally the terms for the meeting between the two delegations. Furthermore the Algerian delegation had been accorded no right to make contact, in any manner whatsoever, with anyone, either in France, or outside France, apart from telegraphic communication with Tunisia. In short, there had been no sign of that atmosphere of understanding and calm which was essential to negotiations of such importance.

8. In spite of everything, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had refrained from saying that the negotiations had been broken off and had left the door open for their possible resumption. However, events on the other side had made it clear that the talks had in fact been abruptly halted. The French had begun setting up "commissions d'élus" as a way of informing the Provisional Government that Algeria's future could be decided without its assistance. Just recently, moreover, an elaborate scheme had taken shape for a French referendum which, it was already clear, foreshadowed the partition of Algeria and during which the French authorities would be responsible for law and order and would supervise the ballot. That was why the war was continuing and hope was steadily waning.

9. It was therefore essential to take a clear-sighted second look at the problem; to condemn the war in Algeria; to give substance to the idea of self-determination; and to implement it, in order to bring the war to an end. However, in the face of over 800,000 troops, so-called psychological warfare units, extremists who would stop at nothing, and an administration whose authority was challenged, to say the least, and which was in the habit of rigging elections, it would be a political and practical impossibility to entrust the implementation of that principle to the existing administration of Algeria. Hence the United Nations must organize and supervise the referendum in order to ensure an honest, genuine vote that would not be challenged now or in the future. Such action by the United Nations was essential and would be decisive, whereas procrastination or evasion would be criminal. His delegation was therefore certain that the United Nations would take action, in accordance with its principles, to restore peace in Algeria.

10. Mr. AW (Mali) said that the Algerian problem affected all African countries and particularly the Republic of Mali, for the latter had a common frontier 1,500 kilometres long with the Algerian Sahara, which was increasingly the object of colonial greed. France was already considering the partition of Algeria as a means, inter alia, of retaining the Sahara—a course which would unquestionably mean that war would continue to be waged along Mali's borders against a sister nation. Settlement of the Algerian question could therefore be postponed no longer. The General Assembly must recognize that any delay would be a crime, for human lives were being lost under frightful conditions every day.

11. Since the end of the Second World War, the colonial Powers had trained world opinion to watch thorough-going wars without blenching. In Indochina, Korea, Indonesia and Algeria alike, measures of colonial repression, carried out by mercenary armies employing vast means of destruction and often actively supported by military allies, had set off one war after another without giving the world at large the feeling that war was in progress. There was no general mobilization; life continued normally not far from the battlefields; and the outcome, in many cases, was something of an economic boom which prompted in cynics a desire to "institutionalize" small-scale war. The horror inspired by the development of nuclear techniques of mass destruction was gradually leading the world to reserve the term "war" exclusively for the apocalyptic clash of East and West accompanied by general mobilization. However, a war was under way in Algeria which was growing in scale from day to day and which France was waging with the support of its NATO allies.

12. At the beginning, the United Nations had accepted the French view that the Algerian question was a domestic affair of France, but nearly all Member States had ultimately come to see it as a colonial war of the traditional type.

13. The thesis of the French extremists was that France had been established in Algeria for more than 130 years; that the French settlers had developed Algeria with the financial support of metropolitan France; that morality and France's civilizing mission forbade the abandonment of Algeria to chaos and anarchy; and that France's departure would encourage communist expansion in Algeria. Lastly, the extremists maintained that the Moilems wished to remain French, as though they already were. However, French public opinion had shown signs of weariness as military operations in Algeria had dragged on. The French people had then been told that France's very existence depended on the preservation of French Algeria, and that 134 the joint development of the Saharan regions, under the Organisation commune des régions sahariennes, been speeded up so that the popular imagination would be stirred by the vast sums being invested in order to strengthen the pre-emptive right to which France was clinging.

14. Now that independence had been achieved by all the countries of black Africa formerly under French
rule, France could no longer trade on the fact that it had been in Algeria for 130 years. France had gone into some of those countries before it had occupied Algeria. The constitutional argument that Algeria was an integral part of the French Republic was absurd, for all the former French overseas territories which were now independent had been constitutionally an integral part of the French Republic. If General de Gaulle offered the French people a referendum for the purpose of amending their Constitution so that Algeria would no longer be regarded as an integral part of France, he would obtain an affirmative vote of more than 80 per cent.

15. The hypocrisy of the slogan that there were 9 million fully-fledged Frenchmen in Algeria was exposed when events like that of 24 January 1950 led some colonialists to say that Frenchmen had fired on Frenchmen for the first time. They were thus admitting that the tens of thousands of Algerians slaughtered and tortured over the past six years had not been Frenchmen. Thus, the half million of French soldier who were settled in Algeria were specially privileged in that they could call to their aid, in defending their Algerian homeland, the army of their second homeland—France.

16. As Premier Ferhat Abbas had said, it was infinitely easier to turn 1 million French settlers in Algeria into Algerians than to transform 8 million Algerians into Frenchmen against their will. The fact that a few hundred thousand French settlers had lived in Algeria for four or five generations could not deprive millions of Algerians of their right to self-determination. Moreover, Premier Ferhat Abbas in his appeal of 17 February 1960 to the European population of Algeria, had pointed out that the Algerians had never demanded the departure of the settlers, and that the war in Algeria was not a war of Arabs against Europeans or of Moslems against Christians. He had emphasized, however, that continued colonial rule and racial discrimination would doom Algeria to endless war, and that the French regime would enable the Algerians and the French to live together. Algeria, he had added, belonged to all, and no one sought to deny Algerian status to Frenchmen who had been living in Algeria for several generations. Becoming the country of those Frenchmen, however, Algeria had not ceased to be the country of the Algerians, for whom it was the only homeland possible.

17. The French achievements which, as General de Gaulle had admitted, had failed to provide the Algerians with minimum welfare, could not be invoked as an argument for keeping the Algerian people under colonial domination. As for the allegedly moral argument, according to which France should protect the Algerian people against itself, it was a case of invoking the fallacious pretext of the immaturity of peoples in order to justify foreign rule. The Algerians would know how to profit by their independence because they knew better than any settler what suited their people, even assuming that their concept of happiness might suggest tyranny to others.

18. The Algerian problem as it now stood could be stated in very simple terms. The French Government had admitted at long last that Algeria was not France and had recognized the Algerian people's right to self-determination. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, for its part, had admitted that principle as a basis for settling the conflict. The two parties were, therefore, at one on the essential issue, even though they did not seem to ascribe the same meaning to the word "self-determination". Consequently, it was the task of the United Nations to provide an exact definition of the term.

19. It followed from the statements which President de Gaulle and Premier Ferhat Abbas had made since 16 September 1959 that the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had proposed holding talks to discuss the principle of self-determination and the conditions and guarantees of its application. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had pointed out that the Algerian people could not exercise a free choice under the pressure of an occupation army and an administrative apparatus which had a long tradition of perpetrating electoral frauds. Until the Algerian people had freely expressed its will, its interests were represented and guaranteed by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, which was recognized by numerous States. There could consequently be no return to peace except with its consent, but peace could ensue immediately. On 20 November 1959, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had announced that five responsible Algerian representatives had been designated to begin talks with the French Government; President de Gaulle, however, had immediately made it known that he refused to negotiate with those responsible representatives who were detained in French prisons. After the riots in Algiers, President de Gaulle had stated that when the time came to go ahead with the consultation, the French army would be entrusted with the task of ensuring its complete and genuine freedom. On 29 February 1960, Premier Ferhat Abbas had stated that, in order to ensure that the self-determination procedure was in reality genuine and fair, it would be necessary to discuss the matter further, because a principle was one thing and its application another. Immediately afterwards, on 4 March 1960, had come the "tour of the field kitchens", in the course of which General de Gaulle had in a few sentences dashed all the hopes for a peaceful settlement by maintaining that military success in Algeria must be absolute and that France must remain in Algeria. The French Ministry of Information, in its communiqué of 7 March 1960, had confirmed that statement, adding that in case of secession a major regrouping of the population would have to be effected. On 14 March 1960, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had taken note of the French Government's attitude and had concluded that the Head of the French State had closed the door to negotiation and peace, and that the word "self-determination" had been deprived of all meaning. In two successive statements, on 4 July and 22 August 1960, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had announced that two envoys who had been sent to the French Government in order to prepare for the journey of a delegation headed by Mr. Ferhat Abbas had been unable to carry out their mission because the French Government had dismissed all their proposals, however conciliatory. The Provisional Government had pointed out that a meeting between a French Government delegation and a delegation of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic could not be fruitful unless its conditions and details had been agreed by the two parties and not imposed. By its refusal to negotiate regarding the conditions and guarantees for freely consulting the
Algerian people, the French Government had deprived the word "self-determination" of all democratic content and had demonstrated its wish to impose by force a status designed to balkanize Algeria. In those circumstances, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had expressed the view that the Algerian people should be consulted by means of a referendum organized and supervised by the United Nations.

20. The negotiations which the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was requesting would not be concerned with Algeria's future, which would be left to the Algerian people to decide. The French Government, however, was offering to discuss only the military conditions for a cease-fire, and arrangements regarding the disposal of weapons and the fate of the combatants—which would be tantamount to surrender by the Algerian fighting forces, pure and simple. That might be followed by consultations with different sections of the Algerian people and, at a date to be fixed by France unilaterally, by a referendum organized under the supervision of the French occupation army.

21. In the presence of that tragedy, the time had come for the United Nations finally to shoulder its responsibilities. What the Malian delegation was requesting was not a denunciation, but a gesture that would consist in taking responsible French statesmen at their word. If President de Gaulle sincerely wished to see the Algerian people decide its future by means of self-determination, he could not seriously think that the French army was qualified to organize and supervise the consultation. The Algerian people should therefore voice its aspirations in a consultation the freedom and good faith of which would be guaranteed by the presence of the United Nations.

22. One hundred years ago, Napoleon III had told the Algerians that France, which was sympathetic to ideas of nationhood, was not entitled to turn the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa into Frenchmen. Assimilation was no more practicable today. Indeed, the only way in which an end could be put to war in Algeria was by giving the Algerian people the right to speak. It was, however, out of the question that the French army should organize and supervise the consultation. The only practical solution was to instruct the United Nations to see to it that the results of the referendum fully reflected the will of the majority of the Algerian people.

23. The Africans, particularly, should shoulder their responsibilities. The regrettable attitude of African countries over the Congo was perhaps due to the fact that the question was of too recent an origin, so that errors of judgement could be made in good faith. In Algeria, on the other hand, the fact that a colonialist war was in progress was no longer in doubt. Taking a clear-cut stand would be the best service that the Africans could render to France, because General de Gaulle would either take advantage of their advice in dealing with the extremists, or he would show that he had no use for the opinions of his African friends. Far from complicating the problem, such a clear-cut attitude would help General de Gaulle. For the Africans the time of self-denial was over. General de Gaulle had never agreed to the Algerian problem being raised in the Executive Council of the Community, even though it had weighed heavily on the Community as a whole.

Before independence, the States of the Community could permit themselves to speak of negotiations and to dwell on the need for talks, playing the role of go-betweens, powerless, because of their dependent status, to assume any responsibility. But the heads of sovereign and independent States could no longer behave in that manner. They should take care to avoid placing the desire to please General de Gaulle above their most profound convictions, since the future of Africa, and perhaps of the world, was at stake.

24. It was no longer enough simply to declare oneself in favour of Algerian independence; African solidarity must now be demonstrated in action. The General Assembly could not wait for France to invite it to arrange a referendum which was requested not in France but in Algeria. After the vain attempts made in the past, it would by hypocritical to talk of negotiations.

25. Several times during the current session the Assembly's final decision had been determined not by law and justice but by voting discipline. The African States would do well to remember that on the only occasion when they had voted unanimously together with the Asian countries—for the equitable representation of Africa and Asia on the Security Council and on the Economic and Social Council—France had not supported them. And, if there was one vote in which France could not be supported for sentimental reasons, it was undoubtedly the vote on Algeria.

26. General de Gaulle had to be told that he could achieve nothing lasting in Algeria without the National Liberation Front (FLN). The proposed measures, for the sake of which the Assembly was being asked to put off any decisive solution, could accomplish nothing positive. The proponents of a provisional government for Algeria based on a "loi-cadre" voted in Paris, following the formula that had been successfully applied in Africa south of the Sahara, forgot that the 1958 "loi-cadre" of the overseas territories had been introduced in a calm atmosphere after overseas depu ties had taken part in the preliminary discussion in the French National Assembly, whereas in Algeria the war was entering upon its seventh year. A provisional government of Algeria in the present circumstances would actually be a puppet government, just as a so-called Algerian national army would be the present French expeditionary force placed under the command of an Algerian general who would be responsible to the puppet government in question. He asked whether Bao-Dai had already been forgotten.

27. Trickery had to be abandoned, for it could not prevail against an entire people in armed revolt. That great strategist and nationalist, General de Gaulle, ought to know better than anyone that opponents of that sort could not be conquered. If there were fewer than 200 killed—the condition laid down by General de Gaulle—in 1961, that would not mean a victory for France, but only a respite planned by the FLN. The war in Algeria had to stop, in the interest of world peace and in the interest of the French people. And that depended now on the United Nations, whose task was all the easier because both the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and President de Gaulle recognized the unavoidable necessity of self-determination and the need for a referendum. But, by offering a bounty to French soldiers choosing
to be demobilized in Algeria so as to swell the ranks of the electors, the French Government showed what little confidence it had in those who believed that the Algerians wished to be French. It was that profound unnessiness that led General de Gaulle to express his faith in NATO, which was an instrument of war, and his hostility to the United Nations, the instrument of peace.

28. The Malian delegation, which favoured peaceful solutions, was convinced that the African States would not wish to go down to history as having shown an unjustifiable lack of confidence in the United Nations, which had welcomed them enthusiastically and unanimously. No independent State would agree to hold back the freedom of a valiant people. The United Nations should assume responsibility for the referendum and thus save two peoples from a fratricidal war.

29. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) considered Algeria's independence inevitable, after seven years of war against a greater Power armed with all the modern weapons. The whole world, except for some die-hards in France, realized that Algeria could never be integrated with France. Some Frenchmen were the only people who still imagined that the FLN represented a mere minority and therefore could not speak for the Algerians. If that was so, how could it hold an army of over 800,000 men? Neither the whip nor the sword, neither prison nor hunger could make a conquered people care less for freedom, as the Nazis had shown. Some Algerian Moslems supported the claims of France, but every country had its quislings.

30. The world was divided into two blocs. If the young nations of Asia and Africa had to choose between them, the choice would depend upon their attitude to the peoples of Asia and African States continued to apply colonialist principles. First, France was attempting by conquest to make Algeria a part of France, against the wishes of the Algerians and in direct opposition to every independent Asian and African State, on the principle that might was right. Secondly, France regarded the Algerians as Frenchmen, despite their ethnic, racial and cultural differences, on the principle that the spoils belonged to the victor. Thirdly, France claimed that there was no such thing as an Algerian identity and that the country was divided up according to race, culture and religion, on the principle of "divide and rule". Fourthly, France asserted that the French had special rights in Algeria, based on the principles of racial superiority and right of conquest. Fifthly, France claimed the right to rule Algeria because it had established local governments, built roads, railways and bridges, drained swamps, tapped the country's mineral wealth, built schools and hospitals etc., on the principle that he who paid the piper called the tune. Sixthly, France maintained that, except for a handful of rebels, the Algerian people was grateful to France for all the blessings it had brought; that was a well-known colonialist principle. Seventhly, France was prepared to grant self-determination to the Algerians, not under the supervision of an outmoded organisation like the United Nations, but under that of French arms and according to French ideas, in pursuance of the principle that a people whose country had been colonized did not have the right to decide what was best for it. Thus the French attitude was perfectly reasonable—

according to colonialist ideas. But from the point of view of democracy, France's claims were untenable.

31. The Algerian side of the picture also deserved to be studied. First, there was the Provisional Government of Algeria, which claimed the right of Algeria to be free and independent under the principle of self-determination set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, in the eyes of the French, that Government was illegal, since the right of freedom was the prerogative of a few, to be given or withheld, as those few might think fit. Secondly, the Provisional Government asserted that Algeria, which formed part of the African continent, could not be a part of France; the French, however, would not accept that, since in every territory where the conqueror had planted his flag belonged to him alone. Thirdly, the FLN maintained that the rights and aspirations of the 9 million persons whom it represented could not be subjected to the whims of the French minority; France disagreed, for it was the divine right of the conqueror to dominate, regardless of numbers. Fourthly, the FLN regarded its struggle in Algeria as a just and sacred war and would not cease to resist until all Algeria had become independent; in the eyes of the colonialists, such resistance was treason and should be suppressed, by death if necessary, since the right to freedom was the prerogative of the superior race. Fifthly, the FLN asked for no more than what France had granted to its other colonial possessions in Africa, many of which were less developed and less heavily populated; but it was presumptuous on the part of a vassal to claim any right that his lord did not care to give. Sixthly, the FLN, which was waging a just war unaided against a powerful army, had appealed to all freedom-loving peoples, and the communist States had responded by giving concrete aid; to France, where the Communist Party was free to exist and propagate its doctrine, and where it had at one time had the largest number of seats in Parliament, the FLN was thus a communist movement and an instrument of tyranny and oppression. But a drowning man did not refuse the hand of the rescuer on account of its colour.

32. A free and independent Algeria had for seven years resisted the claims of a colonial Power. Only a conquered and subdued Algeria would submit to French rule. The facts of the Algerian problem were well known. The Assembly had to choose between a colonial France and a democratic France which would grant the Algerians the same privileges that it itself enjoyed. The Asian and African countries had made their choice and shown it in the forty-two-Power draft declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples submitted under agenda item 87,}\(^J\) their conscience would be clear, irrespective of whether they were branded as imperialist stooges or communist lackeys.

33. The Liberian delegation did not believe that a divided France could find a solution to the Algerian problem without outside aid. The United Nations therefore had a part to play. All attempts by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic to enter into negotiation with the French Government had failed, owing to France's intransigent attitude, but it was inconceivable that the Algerians should pay

\(^J\) Subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 1514 (XIV).
down their arms without any political guarantees. The United Nations, which had inscribed the principle of self-determination in its Charter, had the obligation to ensure the application of that principle. By its recognition of the Algerian people's right of self-determination, France had acknowledged the competence of the United Nations. The United Nations could not refuse the request of Mr. Ferhat Abbas, head of the Provisional Government, that it should intervene in a concrete manner to guarantee Algeria the exercise of that right.

34. Mr. PAZHWAk (Afghanistan) said that his delegation, which had always firmly supported Algeria's undeniable right to independence, was more convinced than ever that the United Nations should take effective steps at the current session with a view to Algeria's accession to independence in accordance with the will of the Algerian people. Not only had the war dragged on for yet another year, but it was unthinkable that the present situation should be allowed to continue at a time when the Assembly was determined to abolish domination and colonialism, even if only by a declaration. The Afghan delegation therefore associated itself with the arguments that had been presented, particularly by the delegations of Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Morocco, in favour of the independence of Algeria on the basis of the right of self-determination of the Algerian people which even France had admitted. The imperative need was for effective guarantees to ensure the successful and just implementation of that right, with full respect for the territorial integrity and the unity of Algeria. Past events had shown that that could not be achieved except through the United Nations, and his delegation therefore supported the demand of the Algerian people's rightful leaders for such guarantees, which could be secured only through a free referendum organized, supervised and controlled by the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.