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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73 *


CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

1. Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia) said that the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2) had been encouraged by the appreciation of their efforts expressed on both sides. Those efforts had been inspired by their view that the debate on disarmament should be concluded by the adoption of a resolution setting forth agreed directives to serve as a basis for the resumption of disarmament talks; and in striving to achieve that end the sponsors would make further efforts to overcome the remaining differences. The representative of the United States (1110th meeting) and the representative of the United Kingdom (1112th meeting) had raised two major objections to the draft, while the representative of the Soviet Union had stated (1110th meeting) that although it could be improved, the draft resolution in substance represented a minimum acceptable to the USSR.

2. In the view of the Western Powers, there was a lack of balance in the draft resolution between the measures embodied in the concept of general and complete disarmament and the initial measures which could be applied at once. As a result, they felt, the future negotiators might differ in their interpretation of what the General Assembly's directives actually were. But it should be pointed out that general and complete disarmament had been accepted by all Member States as the only effective solution to the disarmament problem, and was recognized as such in both the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.254) and the Western draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250). On the other hand, the twelve-Power draft resolution differed from both those proposals in that it reflected the outcome of recent negotiations, and incorporated many suggestions and amendments made by both sides and by the sponsors themselves.

3. The Assembly was not faced with the task of choosing between the Soviet and Western proposals, or, for that matter, of endorsing the proposal of "neutral countries"; its task was to elaborate directives which would be acceptable to all the parties concerned. The USSR's acceptance of the twelve-Power draft resolution could not be construed as evidence that the draft lacked balance. The sponsors of the draft resolution supported the idea of general and complete disarmament neither for the sole reason that they agreed in principle with the Soviet view on the question nor because the Western Powers too had expressed their adherence to that goal, but because they themselves were convinced that in the atomic age a world without war could not be achieved without the radical elimination of all existing means of war.

4. As to the alleged differences concerning methods, the assertion that the Soviet Union was maintaining an "all or nothing" position had been refuted by statements made by the Soviet representative in the course of the debate. For their part, the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution saw no contradiction between general and complete disarmament and initial measures, as was clear from operative paragraph 3, which offered broad possibilities for the agreed realization of the various initial measures. At the
negotiating table, a start would have to be made somewhere, and the negotiators would have to work in both directions. Even if the objective was general and complete disarmament, the programme would have to have its first phase, and, within that phase, an order of measures corresponding to the most important priorities, provided always that in the process of their implementation the principle of maintaining the balance was rigidly enforced. In that connexion, he recalled the views on initial measures expressed by President Tito of Yugoslavia during the general debate in the Assembly (686th plenary meeting). The Yugoslav view was that each agreed, initial, concrete disarmament measure positively affected the promotion of the process of disarmament as a whole, while at the same time it constituted an integral and essential part of that process. Accordingly, his delegation felt that it was essential that at the current session positive decisions should be adopted with respect to the draft resolutions on the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/C.1/L.255 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1), on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3), on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3), on initial measures in the field of disarmament (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) and on the establishment of a body for studying the consequences of a nuclear war (A/C.1/L.250/Rev.1).

5. With particular reference to draft resolution A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1 on the suspension of nuclear tests, of which Yugoslavia was a sponsor, he observed that all objective conditions for reaching an agreement on that subject had been established, and that the draft resolution expressed the most effective way in which the General Assembly could help to strengthen the efforts being made towards that end.

6. Since initial measures were embodied in the general approach to the problem of disarmament of all groups of countries represented in the Committee, the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution believed that the differences of opinion still remaining with regard to operative paragraph 3 of their draft could be overcome. Disarmament was a matter of urgency; further delay would impair, not improve, the prospects for agreement and Yugoslavia believed that the twelve-Power draft resolution offered the best available way forward.

7. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America) said that his delegation did not agree with the major premise of the Yugoslav representative's statement, and intended to make its reply in due course. At the moment, however, he wished to turn from the question of general and complete disarmament to give an assessment of the Geneva negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

8. His delegation had welcomed the fact that the Indian Government had placed the question of the suspension of nuclear testing on the agenda, for that problem was one of great importance which should receive the Assembly's full attention. He regretted that, as India had observed in document A/4414, no report on the work of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had so far been made either to the Disarmament Commission or to the General Assembly. Since the verbatim records and other documents regularly issued by the conference were too voluminous to take the place of reports, the Assembly might perhaps wish to request the Secretary-General, through his representative at Geneva, to provide brief periodic summaries of developments in the negotiations.

9. His delegation was disappointed that the negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear tests had lasted so long a time, but it had not abandoned hope that they might still be successfully concluded in the near future. The United States had entered the Geneva negotiations in the belief that they offered an opportunity for beginning the process of limiting competition in weapons development, establishing essential control precedents for other measures of disarmament, placing practical restrictions on the spread of nuclear weapons production capabilities, and removing anxiety over the hazards of radioactive fallout. While the banning of nuclear weapons tests would neither eliminate weapons stockpiles nor halt the production of existing types of weapons, the curbing of competition in weapons development and the conclusion of a test-ban treaty accompanied by control arrangements would serve to reduce international suspicion and promote agreement on measures of actual disarmament.

10. As the Committee was aware, the efforts to draft a treaty had so far resulted in the adoption of a preamble, of seventeen of the anticipated twenty-five articles and of two of the three necessary annexes. At the fourteenth session, the United States representative had informed the First Committee (1027th meeting) that agreement had been reached during the first year of negotiations on the principle that the obligation to halt nuclear weapons testing and the establishment of a control system must be embodied in a single treaty and given equal weight; on the principle that the treaty would remain in force indefinitely, provided that its terms were being fulfilled; on the broad outlines of the organizational structure for the control system and the choice of Vienna as its headquarters; on the principle that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be permitted under stipulated conditions; on the specific wording of a number of articles; on the principle that the treaty should be open for adherence by other nations with a view to the ultimate establishment of a world-wide control system; on the principle that the treaty would be reviewed periodically to determine whether action was required to improve the operation of the control system; and on technical conclusions concerning methods of detecting explosions in outer space. Further progress had been made during the past year, although at a slower pace than his delegation would have wished; agreement had been reached, inter alia, on the privileges and immunities to be accorded to representatives of a control system and on provisions designed to extend the treaty's application, by stages, to the entire world.

11. The failure to reach final agreement, however, was due to a basic difference in approach between the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. The Western Powers sought a truly international control system which would be so organized, staffed and equipped as to ensure the effective verification of compliance with the treaty provisions. The Soviet Union accepted in principle the need for effective international control, but it sought to subordinate the measures for implementing that principle to certain politically motivated
limitations. He wished to point out the three most important areas in which disagreements existed, dis- agreements which, if not resolved, might prevent the conclusion of a treaty.

12. The first point of contention related to the need for improving the system for detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions. For nearly a year, the Soviet Union had refused to discuss new United States data indicating that further research was required to bring the control system for underground explosions up to the level of effectiveness recommended in 1958 by the experts. In November 1959, the Soviet Union had finally agreed to a technical conference on the subject, but that conference had failed because of the Soviet participants' refusal to co-operate in appraising the new data.

13. On 3 May 1960, as a result of a major initiative by the United Kingdom and the United States, general agreement had been reached on a phased treaty banning nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere, in the oceans, in outer space up to the greatest height on which agreement could be reached, and underground in the case of explosions above a given size, or threshold. Agreement had also been reached in principle on the necessity of undertaking a vigorous research programme to improve the means of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions below the threshold. At the same time, the United States and the United Kingdom had expressed their readiness to institute a voluntary moratorium on agreed duration on tests below the threshold. That month, a panel of scientists had been convened, and the Western delegations had been most encouraged when the Soviet participants had pledged their full support for a co-operative research programme on underground testing. Some weeks later, however, the Soviet representative in the test-ban negotiations had repudiated the position of the Soviet scientists and had stated that the Soviet Union saw no need for any research on underground testing. The Soviet Union had subsequently agreed to a research programme, but only provided that none of the research was conducted on Soviet territory, that no Soviet nuclear devices were used, that Soviet scientists were given complete blueprints of any United States or United Kingdom nuclear devices used, and that Soviet scientists would be fully in setting up the necessary instrumentation and in analysing the resulting data. The United States and the United Kingdom were preparing to proceed with the necessary research. They felt that it might still be possible to undertake a research programme even under the stringent conditions imposed by the Soviet Union and still hoped that the Soviet Union might be induced to take a co-operative attitude.

14. The second important unresolved issue was that of on-site inspection. The United States recognized that it was not feasible to inspect all unidentified underground disturbances. It agreed with the conclusion of the experts in 1958 that the inspection of a reasonable percentage of such disturbances would be sufficient to deter potential violators of the agreement. His delegation felt that an annual quota of twenty inspections in the territory of the Soviet Union and a comparable number in the territories of the United States and the United Kingdom would be adequate. Such a quota could be reviewed periodically in the light of the actual operation of the control system, or a self-adjusting formula could be established under which the number of inspections would be raised or lowered in accordance with the number of disturbances recorded. The Soviet Union, however, insisted that inspection was a political rather than a technical question. In August 1960, it had proposed that only three on-site inspections should be conducted annually in the territory of each of the three negotiating Powers; moreover, those three inspections were to apply to disturbances below as well as above the agreed threshold. On that basis, in an average year, far less than 1 per cent of the suspicious disturbances recorded would be inspected.

15. He hoped that the Soviet Union would recognize the contradiction between its inadequate proposal concerning on-site inspection and its professions of willingness to accept any controls required to guarantee strict observance of a test-ban treaty. The Soviet record in the Geneva negotiations also cast considerable doubt on the USSR's repeated assertion that if the West agreed in principle to general and complete disarmament, it would accept any desired controls. Moreover, the Soviet Union was now taking the position that for technical reasons on-site inspection could not begin until four years after the signature of a test-ban treaty. It was curious that the Soviet Union had suddenly discovered the existence of technical obstacles to inspection, whereas for more than a year and a half it had refused even to discuss the technical problems involved. That latest Soviet stand also contrasted strangely with the Soviet Union's contention that fully controlled general and complete disarmament could be achieved within four years. It should be added that Soviet objections to adequate inspection could not be based on fear of espionage, since agreement had already been reached on carefully-worded treaty provisions authorizing observers from the host country to accompany inspection teams for the purpose of guarding against any abuses.

16. The third important unresolved issue in the Geneva negotiations was the structure and staff of the international control organization. As the United States and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union was unwilling to entrust the operation of the control system to an international force of technical experts selected and headed by a neutral administrator acceptable to the three original treaty signatories. Although it had finally consented to the participation of experts from other countries, the Soviet Union proposed a rigid system for the appointment of the entire control staff by the three nuclear Powers, and sought to limit the authority of the neutral administrator to such an extent that innumerable problems would have to be settled by bargaining among the nuclear Powers. The administrator would also be denied any part in the selection of his immediate subordinates. The Soviet Union wished to see only one uncommitted country represented on the seven-man control commission, which would supervise the entire control organization, and it proposed that responsible positions at the organization's headquarters should be divided between nationals of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and of the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other. The two Western Powers, by contrast, believed that the uncommitted States should have greater representation on the control commission and that their nationals should participate in all sections of the control organization; and they also wished to give the administrator considerable discretionary power in the selection of
staff. Their objective was an impartial, efficient control system free of any trace of self-inspection. His delegation had welcomed the Soviet Union’s abandonment of its earlier position, which would have meant virtually complete self-inspection and veto power over all but the most minor procedural issues. However, the Soviet Union still sought to give the country being controlled the decisive voice in inspection and control measures in its territory; and its proposals still called for the chief of every control post and inspection team to be a citizen of the country affected and for two-thirds of the inspection staff in most countries to be citizens of the given country or its allies.

17. The three issues which he had discussed were basic ones, whose settlement was essential to the achievement of a meaningful agreement. The Western Powers were prepared to explore any new approach which the Soviet Union might suggest. However, the United States Government would not accept the shadow of effective control for its substance; to do so would endanger its security and would merely increase international distrust. He hoped that the Soviet Union would reflect upon its policy, for failure to reach agreement on the suspension of nuclear testing would make the prospects for progress on other questions of disarmament darker than ever.

18. Mr. MARTINO (Italy) said that the results of the Geneva Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament had not been entirely negative, and had resulted in a measure of agreement between the parties. The Italian delegation fully shared the general view that the First Committee should endeavour, by exerting a conciliatory influence, to bring about a resumption of the negotiations. It had been particularly impressed by the observations made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, at the 1099th meeting, and agreed with him that although the Disarmament Commission was too unwieldy an organ for technical negotiation, it could elaborate directives which would serve as a basis for the work of a future negotiating body. Inasmuch as the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.259 and Add. 1-2) had sought to achieve the same end, the Italian delegation fully appreciated their efforts.

19. Their task had been the difficult one of drawing up directives which were absolutely clear and could in no circumstances be interpreted differently by the two sides. For the primary obstacle to the negotiations at Geneva had been the fact that the negotiators had been unable to agree on the interpretation of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). The representatives of the Soviet bloc had interpreted that resolution as implying the Assembly’s virtual acceptance of the Soviet proposals, and had consequently wished to impose the latter on the Ten-Nation Committee as a basis for its work. In the light of that experience, it was essential to avoid any possibility of the proposed new directives’ being open to varying interpretations; for the result could only be another deadlock.

20. The sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution had not succeeded, in certain of its parts, in elaborating principles which were absolutely unambiguous; Italy supported the criticisms already voiced in that connexion by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, it felt that sub-paragraph (g) of operative paragraph 1, particularly as it had been interpreted by the USSR representative, was not satisfactory. Italy had never been wholly convinced by the Soviet Union’s explanations of its views on the problem of control. The problem of the proper relationship between control and disarmament had been summed up in the three essential questions put by the French representative on 14 June 1960 at a meeting of the Ten-Nation Committee at Geneva, questions to which the Soviet Union had never given adequate replies. The French representative had asked whether the Eastern delegations agreed, firstly, that control procedures should be discussed before the signature of the disarmament treaty, and that they should be embodied in the treaty and put into effect to the full extent required for the first stage as soon as the treaty came into force and to the extent required for the other stages when they were begun; secondly, that the control authorities should be able to observe not only what equipment had been eliminated, but also the quantities remaining after such elimination, to the full extent necessary to verify their conformity with obligations under the treaty; and thirdly, that the control authorities should be able to verify not only the accuracy of the declarations made by the Governments accepting control, but also their honesty, by making certain, in accordance with procedures to be discussed, that there were no clandestine stocks. Those preliminary questions were not adequately covered in operative paragraph 1 (g) of the draft resolution; the problems of control and implementation and of the functioning of the control organization should be elaborated in greater detail and in more precise terms if the intentions of the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution were not to be distorted. Such clarification was the more essential in that the USSR representative’s most recent remarks appeared to indicate that the Soviet Union would continue to interpret resolutions of the General Assembly in its own way, notwithstanding the expressed views of the great majority of Members. The intention of the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution was obviously to prevent the middle-of-the-road solution from being consummated; it was not to identify themselves with the position of either side. Yet the USSR representative had already made clear his view that certain aspects of the draft were a repetition of the Soviet disarmament principles.

21. Unfortunately, therefore, the effort at concilia
tion made by the Indian delegation and the other sponso rs of the twelve-Power draft resolution appeared for the moment to have been unsuccessful. The Italian delegation deeply appreciated that effort, and regretted the outcome. Italy believed that total disarmament was necessary and urgent, and was prepared to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, it also believed that immediate agreements should be concluded on initial, concrete, balanced and controlled measures which could be rapidly implemented by the major Powers pending the conclusion of a treaty. Such agreements would constitute the first step in the process and should subsequently be embodied in the treaty for general and complete disarmament as an integral first phase. Italy advocated the early resumption of negotiations on disarmament. While it regarded the Ten-Nation Committee as the logical framework for such negotiations, it would be prepared to accept any formula which would expedite their resumption.
22. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said it appeared from the Italian representative's remarks that the Western Powers had realized the advisability of adopting a more flexible attitude towards the twelve-Power draft resolution, since it had met with such wide acceptance among Members and represented the aspirations of the people. Thus, according to the representative of Italy, the Western Powers were by no means opposed to the fundamental provisions of the draft resolution, and it was actually the Soviet Union's interpretation of it that was at fault.

23. The Italian representative had also raised the question of negotiations on initial disarmament measures. His statement had seemed to indicate a slight change in the Western position, for he had said that such initial measures could be regarded as the first stage in a comprehensive plan of general disarmament. In the past, the Western Powers had made it plain that they had no wish to take any urgent initial steps for the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In fact, they had avoided any reference to the word "treaty" in the documents they had submitted to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Finally, however, they had realized the need to adopt a more flexible approach, and after a year of negotiations had said that they were in favour of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

24. But if the Western Powers were now in favour of such a treaty, the logical procedure would be to begin its elaboration by considering the first stage of disarmament. Naturally, that first stage would provide for the necessary initial measures. However, the Western Powers appeared to have special reservations on the subject of the initial measures, and there was some suggestion that they should be discussed "simultaneously" with the elaboration of a treaty. The use of the word "simultaneously" seemed to imply that such measures would not be considered within the context of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, but would be the subject of separate, supplementary discussions. It would be noticed that that was not the position advocated by the draft resolution which the Western delegations were now almost supporting. For the draft resolution called for a treaty on complete disarmament, and in its operative paragraph 3 referred to certain initial measures which "would create more favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament". That was not what the Western Powers were proposing.

25. Since, however, the Western attitude to the draft resolution might be interpreted unfavourably by the public, the representative of Italy had once again resorted to the time-worn argument of control, containing that the Soviet Union had not made its position sufficiently clear and that it had never answered the various questions put to it. That was merely an excuse for refusing to work out a treaty. The Soviet Union was willing to consider any Western proposals for control over general and complete disarmament, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had recently reaffirmed (A/C.1/828). The Soviet Union was only too ready to start work on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, starting with the first stage and concluding with the last, and would gladly examine any proposal for suitable controls at each stage of disarmament. The Soviet views on the principles of such controls had been set forth in Soviet statements and documents, and had met with no objections from the West.

26. In answer to points raised by the representative of the United States, the Soviet delegation would now make clear its position concerning the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. The question was a most important one, since its speedy solution would do much to create favourable conditions for progress towards general and complete disarmament. Moreover, it was precisely in connexion with that question that the Western Powers, while ostensibly advocating so-called initial measures, were in actual fact placing one obstacle after another in the way of such measures.

27. Appreciating the importance of taking early measures to halt the armaments race and to pave the way for general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union had long endeavoured to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests; yet despite lengthy negotiations and the adoption of resolutions by the General Assembly, the problem still awaited a practical solution. The real obstacle to such a solution had been the unwillingness of the United States to end nuclear weapon tests once and for all. For a number of years it had claimed that nuclear explosions were not detrimental to human health. When, in March 1958, the Soviet Union had unilaterally discontinued testing, the United States had replied with a new series of tests on an unprecedented scale. Finally, towards the end of 1958, the United States had been obliged to enter into negotiations for the cessation of nuclear tests. But there had been much debate, in the First Committee, on whether the objective was "cessation" or merely "suspension". The United States had been opposed to the complete cessation of tests, and had agreed at that time only to a temporary suspension. At the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, the same problem had arisen. After considerable persuasion, the United States had finally been induced to abandon its demand that tests should be suspended only for ten or twelve months; and even though there had been no tests now for twenty-four months, the United States was still arguing whether tests should be merely suspended or should be discontinued altogether. It was quite clear from the records of the Geneva negotiations that the United States wished to continue the armaments race and to perfect its nuclear weapons. Throughout the entire course of the negotiations, the United States had not once ceased its preparations for a resumption of nuclear tests and in recent months responsible Government spokesmen had openly advocated a yearly resumption of tests. The fact that the United States was anxious to resume its experiments, with a view to testing new weapons, had not been officially denied; indeed, the United States representative at the Geneva Conference had frankly stated that the United States Government would be remiss in its duty to the American people if it continued to delay developments in so important a military field as that of nuclear weapons.

28. But the United States Government well knew that its attitude ran counter to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations and could hardly be reconciled with the actions adopted at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly (resolutions 1402 A and B (XIV)). It therefore
sought to cover up its true position by allegations that the Soviet Union was preventing a solution of the problem of nuclear tests.

29. Despite the recommendations made in 1958 by the Geneva Conference of experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests—which had included United States and United Kingdom experts—the United States had insisted on the need for a research programme, on the ground that it was impossible at present to control certain types of underground nuclear explosions. The United States had stated that it would not sign a treaty on the discontinuance of tests unless the Soviet Union agreed that such a treaty should not prohibit underground explosions below a certain threshold, pending the completion of a programme to devise methods of control over such explosions. Although the Soviet Union, having accepted the experts' recommendations, considered such research quite unnecessary, it had agreed to the United States demands in order to overcome the deadlock. By doing so, it had made only one condition, namely, that while the research programme was being carried out all the parties to the treaty should voluntarily refrain from conducting even such tests as were not prohibited under the treaty.

30. Despite that concession, agreement on the research programme had still not been achieved. The reason was that the United States, which constantly accused the Soviet Union of opposing effective international control, was reluctant to place the research explosions which it proposed to carry out under the programme under international control. On 15 June 1959 the Soviet Union had submitted specific proposals for the control of nuclear research explosions. The need for such control, to ensure that research explosions were not used for perfecting new weapons, should be obvious to all. But the United States still refused to accept the Soviet proposals, arguing that it could not place the facilities which would be used for research explosions under international control because United States legislation forbade the publication of information concerning its nuclear facilities. While the legislation of the United States was that country's own affair, it was clear that the possibility of conducting secret weapons tests under the guise of scientific research should on no account be allowed. On that point, the Soviet Government had made it plain that if the United States and the United Kingdom were to carry out test explosions without control organized in agreement with the Soviet Union, then the latter would regard those explosions as a resumed type of tests for perfecting nuclear weapons. Surely, if the Soviet Union were to conduct test explosions, the United States position would be the same. If the United States questioned the reliability of the control methods devised by the experts for the control of underground tests and insisted on further research, then it should conduct the necessary research on its own territory, using its own nuclear facilities, under effective international control.

31. Similar difficulties had been encountered in discussing the duration of the moratorium on small-scale underground tests. For a long time the United States had refused even to discuss that question, although the Soviet Union had proposed a moratorium of four to five years or, at least, one coinciding with the duration of the research programme. Finally, the United States had proposed that the moratorium should last for twenty-seven months. That was certainly an advance over the earlier United States position. It was true that that period might prove inadequate, since the research programme might not have been completed in twenty-seven months' time. More important, however, was the fact that the United States wished to reserve the right, in the agreement, to resume underground tests after the conclusion of the moratorium.

32. Another important question was that of on-site inspection. While the Soviet Union had proposed that there should be up to three inspections a year on Soviet, United States and United Kingdom territory, the Western Powers had demanded the right to conduct no less than twenty inspections a year in the Soviet Union and other countries. They had alleged that such quota was based on scientific considerations, but of course there could be no possible scientific criteria for determining the number of annual inspections, and the agreement to fix a quota in advance had merely been the outcome of a political decision between the parties to the negotiations. On his visit to Moscow early in 1959, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, had raised the question of an inspection quota—from reports in the Western Press it would appear that he had thereby incurred the displeasure of the United States—and the Soviet Union had supported the idea.

33. Actually, there was no need whatsoever for a large number of inspections. The mere possibility of the unhindered verification of suspicious phenomena would have an inhibiting effect on any State seeking to violate the agreement on the cessation of tests; the State concerned would not know in advance which incidents would be inspected, for each side would be entitled to select, from the total number of such incidents, those which it wished to investigate. The demand for a large number of outside inspections inevitably prompted the suspicion that those made it were concerned not with the effectiveness of control but with the opportunity of engaging in intelligence activities: as the representative of Denmark had remarked (1103rd meeting), the establishment of international control would make espionage unnecessary. The realism and flexibility of the Soviet approach could be gauged from the fact that the Soviet Union did not propose the establishment of a definitive quota of inspections, suggesting instead that in the light of the experience gained by the control organization, the inspection quota should be reviewed two years after the treaty for the cessation of tests had entered into force. For two years now there had been no tests, although there was no verification at all, and no one seemed to doubt that no tests had in fact been conducted. It was hard to understand why that state of affairs could not continue when in addition the opportunity would be available of conducting three outside inspections a year.

34. Another problem which the United States representative had touched on in his statement was that of the staffing of control posts. It was quite incorrect to suggest that the Soviet Union had demanded that two-thirds of the staff of such posts on its own or allied territory should be made up of its own nationals or nationals of allied countries. The Soviet Union had agreed to the Western proposal that in control posts situated in the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, one-third of the staff should be nationals of
the country in which the post was situated, another third, nationals of the other side, while the remaining third would consist of nationals of the other States parties to the treaty on the cessation of tests. The deadlock had arisen because of the Western objection to the Soviet proposal that the last third should be recruited in equal numbers from among nationals of States allied with the United States, nationals of neutral countries and nationals of States allied with the USSR. That was a perfectly reasonable proposal, and it was thus wrong to assert that the Soviet Union was demanding that two-thirds of the staff be its own or allied nationals.

35. The United States position on the subject of the composition of the control commission was equally inconsistent. On that point, too, the United States representative had made a number of inaccurate statements. The fact was that the United States claimed three seats on the commission for representatives of the Western Powers, conceding two seats to the neutral States and only two to the Socialist countries. It was hard to see on what grounds the Western Powers were entitled to more seats on the control commission than the socialist countries. The United States representative had alleged that the Soviet Union was unwilling to have two neutral representatives on the commission, and would only allow one, the rest of the seats to be divided equally between East and West. It was perfectly true that the Soviet Union believed that there should be three representatives of the East and three of the West, but it would certainly not raise any objections to the representation of neutral countries. The attitude of the United States was the more curious in that it had agreed that there should be five representatives from each side on the Ten-Nation Committee. Partly between the socialist and the Western Powers had become a universally recognized principle in international relations. Such parity would prevent any possibility of one group of States dominating the control commission. The Soviet Union had advocated the same principle in regard to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, but had encountered similar opposition from the United States. It was quite clear that the United States was seeking to prevent equal representation on the control commission, and wished to gain an advantage for itself.

36. The records of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests clearly showed that the Soviet Union had done everything in its power to promote a speedy solution of the problem of nuclear weapons tests. The Western Powers, on the other hand, had been holding back the negotiations, with a view to resuming tests. Thus a solution of the problem depended entirely on the United States and the United Kingdom. For its part, the Soviet delegation supported both the draft resolutions on the subject that were before the Committee (A/C.1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1).

37. However, it was hard to understand why two draft resolutions should be submitted on the same subject, especially when one of the two was considerably weaker than the other. In that connection, he wished to state that the USSR shared the feelings of those who had condemned the French nuclear tests in the Sahara.

38. In any case, it was to be hoped that both these draft resolutions, as also draft resolutions A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1 submitted by Poland, draft resolution A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3, and the draft declaration in document A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3, would be adopted, for any positive decision adopted at the fifteenth session of the Assembly would be a substantial step towards halting the armaments race and creating favourable conditions for the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If the United States and its allies tried to prevent the adoption of the various important draft resolutions before the Committee on the subject of disarmament, they would show that they were opposed to the very initial measures that they professed to support.

39. The representative of the United Kingdom had said at the 1112th meeting that his Government was prepared to consider, in the course of negotiations, all proposals for first-stage measures, including those proposed by Poland in draft resolution A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1. Since that draft covered four points, on each of which negotiations had been in progress for a considerable time, it was hard to see what sort of further negotiations the United Kingdom representative had in mind. Apparently, he was trying to put off indefinitely any decision on the Polish proposals, and, under the pretext of studying them to involve the Soviet Union in negotiations on measures of the kind favoured by the United Kingdom, that is, measures relating exclusively to control over armaments. In the course of such negotiations the Polish proposals could easily be lost sight of. They surely deserved a better fate, namely, immediate adoption by the Assembly.

40. The United Kingdom representative had also said that his country was prepared to conduct negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That statement suggested that the United Kingdom position had come a long way since the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament; but it was hard to reconcile it with the United Kingdom's opposition to the very paragraph in the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2) which referred to the necessity for the earliest conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. If the United Kingdom was unwilling to conclude such a treaty, it would be better if its representative said so outright. The Soviet delegation also considered it necessary to emphasise its opposition to the view that decisions on disarmament should be postponed, referred to the Disarmament Commission, or considered at a resumed session of the General Assembly. Such a course would have the effect of postponing the question indefinitely. There was no reason why decisions should not be taken immediately on the various draft resolutions relating to the cessation of nuclear tests and the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Those draft resolutions should accordingly be put to the vote as soon as possible. The Soviet delegation was equally convinced that there was no need to delay further a decision on the main question—that of laying down directives for the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Everything, however, depended on the United States and its allies.

41. Mr. MARTINO (Italy), exercising his right of reply, said that there were three points on which he had either been misquoted, misinterpreted or misunderstood by the USSR representative. For example,
he had not said, as the USSR representative had asserted, that the initial stages of disarmament should be put into effect simultaneously with the programme of general and complete disarmament; he had said that initial measures which could be rapidly implemented by the principal Powers should be effected pending the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Furthermore, it had been astonishing to hear the USSR representative say that the Italian statement marked the first time he had ever heard the Western Powers speak in favour of general and complete disarmament, when that idea had been endorsed time and again by the various Western representatives and had been specifically laid down as the objective of the Western plans submitted to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. Finally, the USSR representative had cited the remarks of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the subject of control; but nowhere in those remarks had any answer been given to the crucial preliminary questions put by the representative of France in the Ten-Nation Committee, nor had the USSR representative himself replied to those questions.

42. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), replying to the representative of Italy, said that on the subject of initial measures of disarmament the Italian representative had first ascribed to him a statement which he had not made, and then proceeded to refute it. What the Italian representative had said was that negotiations on such measures should be carried out simultaneously with the negotiations on a treaty for general and complete disarmament. But if he regarded those initial measures as merely the first stage of the treaty, it was not clear why they should require separate negotiations. Similarly, the Soviet Union was not disputing that the Western Powers advocated general and complete disarmament; its complaint was that they had not wanted to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and had not referred to such a treaty in the Western plans submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee. The plan submitted by the United States on 27 June 1960 (DC/154) had been entitled "Programme for general and complete disarmament un^d^": effective international control", but had not referred in its text to the task of drafting a treaty on the subject. The USSR delegation considered that it was the outstanding achievement of the past year that in the document now submitted by the Western Powers it was stated explicitly that the task was to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.