2. With regard to the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, it would be recalled that the Indian delegation had long been associated with that item and had been the first to place it before the Assembly, following a decision by its own Parliament. Finally, as a result of protracted negotiations at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests at Geneva, considerable progress had been made and the areas of disagreement had been appreciably narrowed. However, there were still reasons for apprehension, for whether nuclear tests were carried out in the sky, on the ground, or underground, the fall-out they produced was known to be harmful in varying degrees to man.

3. The main differences of opinion related to the definition of the threshold in relation to underground tests, the composition of the control commission, the apparatus of administration, and identification systems. There was also serious disagreement concerning the duration of the moratorium on underground tests. In view of the advances that had been made, however, there was no justification for a resumption of explosions for purposes of research. The Indian delegation considered that the difficulties in the way of an agreement on the composition of the control commission would not prove insurmountable. However, it did not wish to submit any concrete proposals on the subject, for the matter was one for direct negotiation between the Powers concerned. As for the problem of detection, the principal disagreement was on the number of control posts to be established. Since the matter was one of detail, and not of substance, agreement on it should not be impossible.

4. The dangers resulting from nuclear tests were a matter of universal concern. India had therefore joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.258, which it hoped would win general support. India realized that an ideal agreement was perhaps not immediately attainable; but it believed that any resumption of test explosions would be a great set-back to the cause of peace and, in particular, confidence. Besides, any progress achieved towards the cessation of nuclear tests would be an important step forward in the field of disarmament as a whole.

5. The Indian Government did not subscribe to the view that underground explosions should be permitted as between the members of the "nuclear club". There should be a total cessation of such explosions, for there was no evidence to be found in statements made by Government scientists that the purpose of underground explosions was not to develop weapons but purely to advance science. In a television appearance made on 6 March 1960, the American physicist Dr. Edward Teller had plainly stated that what he had called "nuclear experimentation" should be continued for purposes of national security while no one could

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* Resumed from the 1100th meeting.
take exception to a Government's concern for national security, it should be remembered that the problem in question affected the population of the whole world, and had therefore become an international problem, and not one merely of national defence. And it was plain from a subsequent statement by Dr. Teller that the tests he had in mind were not scientific experiments aimed at advancing human well-being by peaceful means, but part of an essentially military project. Senator Anderson, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress had expressed the opinion in a recent article that during the continued negotiations, and while a ban remained in effect, the United States should continue to develop and improve its nuclear weapons. He had urged the resumption of underground tests, not as a means of advancing technology but as the easiest and surest method of developing new and improved weapons. He had also expressed the opinion that such a ban would be possible at any time to devise an entirely foolproof control system. The most that could be expected would be a control system of such a nature as to induce fear of discovery not merely in regard to a particular explosion but in regard to what went before and after it.

6. Since so much of the work at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had been concerned with elaborating a comprehensive system of control, it was necessary to consider whether it would be possible at any time to devise an entirely foolproof control system. The most that could be expected would be a control system of such a nature as to induce fear of discovery not merely in regard to a particular explosion but in regard to what went before and after it.

7. It seemed to be generally believed that one of the main purposes of disarmament was to release funds for reconstruction. That was a mistaken assumption, for disarmament could not be accomplished cheaply, and its main purpose was not economy but to save mankind from the disastrous consequences of atomic war. In that connexion, it might be noted that the estimated cost of the complete Geneva control system was reported to be $1,000 million, with an annual operating cost of about $250 million. On the other hand, there was evidence that each hole for a single underground explosion would cost the United States as much as $50 million. Surely, the nuclear powers should be satisfied with the fact that there were at present enough weapons available to destroy the world five times over.

8. On the main subject of disarmament, the Indian delegation had already pointed out (109th meeting) that the disarmament problem must now be viewed from an entirely new angle. It was necessary to discard the idea that a balanced reduction of armaments could afford any solution, for even if the world arms level were to be reduced to, say, the 1870 level, the major Powers would within a very short time again be in possession of all modern weapons, since the necessary experts and material resources would still be available, and fear and suspicion would not have disappeared. And India was not alone in that belief. The representative of the United States, at the 109th meeting, had stressed the need for a world in which nations would no longer have the power to settle differences by force of arms—in other words, the need for total disarmament under law. He had also expressed the opinion that disarmament could be achieved in a space of five or six years. There were very many scientists in the United States who advocated the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Chairman of the Federation of American Scientists had said that the tragedy of ultimate failure to control armaments would be so great that survival must be the first order of business and all talents and resources must be devoted generously to the study of disarmament. So far as the United Kingdom was concerned, public opinion in that country had indicated that its entire population would be killed by 2 per cent of the bombs in either the United States or the Russian stockpile, and that 1 per cent of those bombs would kill 55 per cent of the population. Another responsible authority, Viscount Hailsham, had said that when he contemplated the hideous weapons on both sides, he regarded either a world authority or total disarmament as the only rational objective.

9. In the United States, Senator Kennedy had said in June 1960 that no issue was of more vital concern to the United States than disarmament. He had admitted that there were risks inherent in disarmament programmes, but had pointed out that the risk entailed in possessing nuclear weapons was even greater. There was, he had said, no greater defence against total nuclear destruction than total nuclear disarmament.

10. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, according to Mr. Khrushchev, was producing rockets like sausages (900th plenary meeting). It was a pity that the vast stores of knowledge in the world could not be put to better use; but that statement showed that the power of destruction now available was so vast that it put into effect it would annihilate every form of life. Clearly, the reason for the intense arms drive was fear, and the stronger the nation, the greater its fear. Ultimately, disarmament would have to be achieved for reasons of self-interest, for no nation would wish to be annihilated.

11. In the circumstances, it could only be hoped that the present debate, in which all Members of the United Nations could express their views, would lead to an early resumption of the disarmament negotiations, and that it would provide the necessary guidance for the negotiators. The United Kingdom representative had said at the 109th meeting that if the Assembly could agree on a resolution embodying the basic principles for a disarmament agreement, that in itself would be a great stimulus to the negotiations. So far as the uncommitted nations were concerned, the Mexican representative, among others, had stressed, at the 109th meeting, the need to formulate directives which were acceptable to both groups of Powers and could serve as a point of departure for the immediate renewal of negotiations. The representative of Brazil had suggested (109th meeting) that the smaller Powers were possibly in a better position to lay down the main principles that should govern general and complete disarmament under effective international control. While the Indian delegation could not agree with that view, since the smaller nations lacked the weapons in question and the necessary knowledge, it could certainly confirm that they shared the general concern over the present situation and the risks it entailed. The representative of Peru had stated (109th meeting) that the General Assembly must create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations and must determine the principles that should guide them.

12. The United States had set forth its position frankly. The United States representative had said...
(1093rd meeting) that the United States was genuinely anxious to see a change in the world situation that would enable it to lay down the heavy burden of armaments; but he had wondered whether it was possible to obtain agreements that would actually be carried out. The Soviet representative's statements seemed to the representative of the United States to indicate that the Soviet Union was asking for all or nothing.

13. On the other hand, the Soviet delegation, so far as could be judged from its statements, appeared to hold the view that negotiations could take place, so that the alternative of "all or nothing" did not seem to arise. The Soviet Union, its representative had said at the 1090th meeting, fully shared and understood the desire of many States that even before a treaty on general disarmament was concluded some measures should be carried out which would contribute to promoting confidence between States. Similar views had been expressed by the Romanian representative at the 1092nd meeting.

14. There thus seemed to be much common ground in the positions of the two great Powers which bore the primary responsibility in matters of disarmament. The Indian Government believed that both the United States and the Soviet Union were anxious to achieve disarmament and to establish peace in the world, for they knew better than anyone else what would be the consequences of failure to do so.

15. However, there remained the question of suspicion. In some quarters, a resumption of tests was advocated on the ground that the Russians might still be cheating. Yet the only reason given for assuming that the Russians were conducting tests in secret was that the Soviet Union had developed rockets secretly, and must therefore be able to conduct explosions secretly. Dr. Teller had asserted that disarmament would not automatically guarantee peace, for in a disarmed world in which, say, only machine-guns remained, there would still be the possibility of war breaking out in disturbed areas; and in the event of a war, atomic bombs would again be produced, since it was impossible to eliminate the knowledge of how to make them. The remedy, he had said, would be to give the United Nations tactical nuclear weapons. Personally, the opinion of Dr. Teller thus seemed to advocate as a guarantee of peace the very wider distribution of atomic destructive power throughout the world. Fortunately, however, there were only individual opinions, and there was hope that Governments would realize the futility of expending vast resources on weapons that were too dangerous to be used and could consequently not be regarded as a deterrent. Besides, it was more and more being realized that there was no protection against nuclear weapons, and that no civil defence measures could possibly be effective. Thus, those who aspired to a world in which war would become an impossibility had not only sentimental pacifist reasons but also purely practical and realistic considerations on their side.

16. In view of the need to approach the disarmament problem from a new angle, India had joined other sponsors in submitting a draft resolution (A/C.1/ L.259) which sought to place upon the General Assembly the responsibility of laying down explicit directives. The preamble of the draft resolution set forth certain agreed principles, such as the need for balance and phases. In its operative paragraphs the sponsors had tried to specify precisely what was meant by general and complete disarmament. Thus, sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of operative paragraph 1 made it clear that inspection and control, once established, must not be abandoned. In fact, the text more than once referred to the need, first, for general and complete disarmament, and second, for the maintenance of effective machinery under international control. But while the Indian Government had repeatedly stated that there could be no disarmament in the present state of the world without effective control, it none the less did not consider that control could be substituted for disarmament. Sub-paragraph (g) of operative paragraph 1 specified what general and complete disarmament should consist of, and provided for measures to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. That raised the question of the organization of the United Nations. In order to create confidence and to ensure that whatever machinery was at the disposal of the United Nations would be used properly, the United Nations would have to undergo certain agreed changes; unfortunately, that provision was necessary because of the present division of the world into power blocs. Sub-paragraph (e) provided for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, with time-limits and schedules for the implementation of successive disarmament steps. Operative paragraph 2 urged that negotiations should be resumed with a view to the earliest conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, while operative paragraph 3 specified that the possibility of putting into effect either agreed or unilateral measures which would create more favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament was not precluded. The measures envisaged would include the suspension of nuclear tests, agreements not to pass on weapons to other countries, and agreements on the balanced reduction of weapons. At the same time, paragraph 3 ensured that such measures would be without prejudice to the directives on general and complete disarmament. The paragraph should thus allay all the legitimate suspicions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Paragraph 3 did not exclude proposals for nuclear-free zones such as had been made by Poland, Cambodia and Ghana. On the contrary, such proposals would be greatly welcomed if they could be put into effect.

17. The Indian delegation had repeatedly stated in the First Committee that attempts to pass resolutions by mobilizing votes would not achieve disarmament. The fact that India was an uncommitted nation, suffering as much as others from the armaments race, and the reception which a number of representatives had given to the broad outlines of the proposed text, had encouraged the Indian delegation to join in sponsoring the draft resolution, which it submitted on behalf of all the sponsors. The Indian delegation was confident that once the dire alternatives to disarmament were realized the Assembly would be able to bring about a further improvement in the situation in a comparatively short time. The sponsors of the draft resolution were not seeking a majority decision, which would merely add further confusion to the problem; they hoped that it would be possible to settle the various points in the draft. No resolution or decision of the Assembly on disarmament would ultimately have any effect unless it
was adopted with the consent of those primarily concerned.

18. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) said that his delegation had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution originally submitted by Ireland (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-2. As his country, despite the fairly advanced stage it had reached in nuclear research, had renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and as moreover it had experienced something of the horror of nuclear war, he felt that his delegation's sponsorship might add significance to the draft resolution. He was aware of the difficulties involved in control and inspection, but in view of the dangers which would result from any wider dissemination of nuclear weapons he earnestly hoped the draft resolution would receive wide support.

19. With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.258, his delegation's views were, firstly, that the voluntary suspension of nuclear tests should continue during the Geneva negotiations. The present temporary discontinuance of tests had already assisted the progress of the negotiations. Secondly, agreement must be reached on an effective international control system. Such agreement would be an important step towards a solution of the problem of control as a whole, a field in which the United Nations could play an important part. Thirdly, while the discontinuance of tests might well assist agreement on disarmament measures, it was most important that it should be agreed upon independently of other disarmament measures, including general and complete disarmament. The same was true of the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

20. Finally, he wished to suggest a possible improvement in draft resolution A/C.1/L.258. General Assembly resolution 1402 (XIV) requested the States concerned to report the results of their negotiations to the General Assembly. No such report had yet been received, and his delegation wished to modify operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution to provide that the States concerned should be requested to report on the progress of their negotiations periodically, preferably monthly, in an appropriate form, to the Disarmament Commission, and to report the results of their negotiations to the General Assembly. The purpose of the proposed change was to bring the Geneva negotiations into closer relationship with the discussions in the United Nations.

21. U THANT (Burma) said four weeks of debate on disarmament had revealed general agreement that no attempt should be made to press to the vote any draft resolution which was not acceptable to the great Powers concerned. The United Nations could take action on major issues only if the United States and the Soviet Union were in agreement. It must be admitted that the differences between the Western and the Soviet plans before the Committee far outweighed the areas of agreement, as his delegation had discovered in its attempts to reach a compromise solution. But it was important to remember that the task of the United Nations was to settle disputes without war and to reconcile differing viewpoints; the General Assembly had a responsibility to formulate a definite course of action for future negotiations, for that was the only way to break the existing deadlock.

22. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.259, of which Burma was a sponsor, endeavoured to set forth such a course of action. It was submitted by a number of small, uncommitted States which had no axe to grind and which only wished to contribute towards the progress of negotiations. Those States hoped that the directives they had set forth, which were clear, comprehensive and balanced, could serve as a basis for an agreement on general and complete disarmament. In view of the urgency of the situation and the constant accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, it was imperative that the Assembly should do more than express pious hopes for resumed negotiations.

23. Burma was also a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.258, which would urge the States concerned to make every effort to reach an early agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests under international control. The present voluntary suspension of tests had given immense relief to humanity and his delegation urged that it should be continued until full agreement had been reached. The dangers of fall-out were well known, but he wished to draw attention to a report published in Four years ago, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, which had revealed that although Britain was 2,500 miles from the nearest hydrogen-bomb testing base, a 60 per cent increase had been noted in the amount of strontium in the bones of babies and young children. It was an established fact that strontium-90 caused leukaemia and bone cancer. The maximum safe level was agreed to be about ten units per person, and one child recently examined had been found to have 5.9 units in its bones. The last series of tests had thus stopped only just in time to prevent world-wide contamination from reaching dangerous levels.

24. He wished to draw attention to certain undisputed facts concerning the destructive power of the hydrogen bomb. A 15-megaton hydrogen bomb had a destructive power equal to five times that of all the bombs dropped on Germany during the last war, while a 15-megaton bomb would be three thousand times as destructive as the heaviest of the German air raids on London. Four years ago, the United States Federal Civil Defense Administration had estimated that on the first day of a nuclear attack on America 36 million people would be killed and 57 million injured, and more recently a Congressional Committee had put the estimated deaths in one attack at 49 million. As a result of the comparatively small atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 200 people were still dying every year, 10,000 survivors still needed regular medical treatment and 140,000 periodical medical attention. Finally, the American scientist Dr. Linus Pauling had calculated that continued hydrogen-bomb tests could cause 200,000 defective births a year and 420,000 per-natal deaths.

25. It was clear that the brandishing of the nuclear deterrent must be replaced by peaceful negotiations as the normal means of settling disputes between States. He hoped that draft resolution A/C.1/L.258, which aimed at the final abandonment of nuclear weapons, would receive wide support. His delegation would also vote in favour of the draft resolution on the same item submitted by Austria, India and Sweden (A/C.1/L.256).

26. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he wished to begin by summarizing recent developments with regard to the disarmament problem. The question had been brought before the General Assembly at its present session by the Soviet Union,
as a result of the failure of the negotiations undertaken in response to General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament. The negotiations of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament had yielded no positive results, owing to the negative position of the United States and other Western Powers. The socialist Powers, bearing in mind the urgency of a radical solution to the disarmament problem, had felt compelled to discontinue the talks.

27. The Soviet Government had decided to appoint Mr. Nikita Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to head the Soviet delegation at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, and had called upon other countries also to send authoritative spokesmen in order that binding decisions on disarmament might be adopted. Many countries from every continent, had responded to that call. During the general debate in the plenary meetings it had become clear that there was widespread concern at the present impasse, and anxiety to reach a solution. However, it had also been evident that the Western Powers, especially the United States, were still unwilling to conduct any constructive negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and continued to put the main emphasis on control over armaments. They had also opposed the Soviet suggestions that the problem of general and complete disarmament should be discussed by the General Assembly in plenary session. A majority of States, not realizing that the object of the Western Powers was to prevent the discussion from achieving any positive results, had agreed to its being held in the First Committee. The Soviet delegation had agreed to take part in such a discussion, hoping that it would provide all States, and especially the new Member States, with a true picture of the situation, and thus reduce the resistance to disarmament being offered by certain Powers.

28. Throughout the discussions, the Soviet delegation had expressed its readiness to enter into constructive negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and had urged the formulation of a number of minimum steps for such negotiations. At the same time the Soviet delegation, like the other delegations, had made it clear that it would withdraw from the discussion if the Western Powers again obstructed progress by endless talk about control over armaments.

29. Four weeks of debate in the First Committee had revealed agreement among the great majority of States that at the present stage of military technology, and in the present world situation, nothing short of general and complete disarmament would be sufficient. Several representatives had expressed the view that the Soviet proposals for the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament were the most far-reaching suggestions yet put forward, while many others had criticized the Western plans for control over armaments and the individual and partial measures which the Western countries had proposed. A system of control over armaments which would enable a potential aggressor to obtain full information on his opponent's side would not stop the threat of war. Nor would the continuance of the armaments race, coupled with a costly system of international control without disarmament, release material and monetary resources for economic assistance to under-developed countries. Such proposals could not expect support from Governments interested in peace and economic development.

30. It had also become clear that most States believed that if renewed negotiations were to be worthwhile, the negotiating body would have to be given clear-cut directives for the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Directives of that kind, designed to ensure genuine and complete disarmament, had been proposed in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) submitted by Mr. Khrushchev at the 904th plenary meeting of the Assembly. In the face of the urgent appeals of peace-loving Governments for the conclusion of a disarmament treaty, the Western Powers had not been able openly to oppose the idea of general and complete disarmament itself, as they had done at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament; instead, they had submitted to the First Committee their own draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250), which appeared to suggest principles for general and complete disarmament but in reality represented an attempt to introduce control over armaments in a disguised form. Again, the United States representative had said in his second statement (1093rd meeting) that the United States Government was also in favour of general and complete disarmament, of the formulation of directives for such disarmament, and indeed in favour—almost of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament to be implemented within set time-limits. However, his practical proposals had been for control over armaments; he had called for control over the use of fissionable material for military purposes, over satellites, rockets, armed forces, and so forth. He had proposed certain measures which would allegedly further the goal of complete disarmament, such as the reduction of armed forces to a minimum level and the elimination of nuclear weapons, but he had not said when those stages were to come into effect. The fact that the United States Government continued to oppose the actual elaboration of a draft treaty on complete disarmament proved that it did not really accept the necessity for such disarmament. The fact that the true object of the Western Powers was to achieve military advantage over other states had been clearly demonstrated and for all by the Spanish representative, who had frankly stated that if Spain had her way the Western world alone would remain armed.

31. However, despite the negative attitude of the Western Powers, the discussions in the First Committee had had the positive result of prompting a group of neutralist States to submit a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.259) containing a number of directives for the earliest possible achievement of complete disarmament. The Soviet delegation considered that that resolution, although it lacked clarity on some points, and although it omitted certain desirable provisions, met the minimum requirements for such directives. In operative paragraph 1 (g) it laid down that the treaty should include time-limits and schedules for the implementation of each successive step and phase of general and complete disarmament. The draft resolution also provided that such disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces and armaments and of armaments production, the total prohibition of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons, the elimination of military training establishments, of equipment for delivering weapons of
mass destruction, and of all foreign military bases; it further provided for the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the maintenance by each State only of the security units necessary for internal security and for placing at the disposal of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter. The draft resolution further specified that the United Nations should undergo certain changes that would exclude the possibility of the international police force being used for purposes inconsistent with the Charter. Furthermore, it contained provisions for control and for equal security for all States at all stages of disarmament.

32. The draft resolution did not mention the establishment of a special body to work out a disarmament treaty. There appeared, however, to be wide agreement that such a body would have to include uncommitted States as well as those belonging to the two military groups.

33. The Soviet delegation still believed that the directives for the elaboration of a disarmament treaty set forth in the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) were more clearly formulated, particularly with regard to the reorganization of the United Nations Secretariat and of the Security Council, the elimination of foreign bases and the setting up of an international police force. However, since draft resolution A/C.1/L.259 did set forth the minimum provisions for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet delegation would support it. The resumption of negotiations therefore now depended entirely on the United States and its allies. Some members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, especially Canada, had endeavored to divert the discussion from the question of the directives to be given to a disarmament negotiating body by proposing the establishment of an ad hoc committee composed of small and medium-sized countries, designed to clear the ground for the resumption of negotiations. But draft resolution A/C.1/L.259 would create conditions for agreement in a less artificial way.

34. In view of the dangers resulting from the present arms race, the Soviet delegation hoped that the incoming United States Administration, with other interested States, would agree to take part in constructive negotiations for general and complete disarmament.

35. Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia) said that the statements made by the Soviet, United States and United Kingdom representatives had shown that it was possible for the General Assembly to reach agreement on a set of directives for general and complete disarmament which would promote the resumption of disarmament negotiations. His delegation had therefore joined with a number of other delegations in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.259, which it hoped would provide a basis for agreement. His delegation felt that operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution represented a generally acceptable approach to the question of partial disarmament measures, which at present constituted the main bone of contention between East and West. As the Indian representative had stated, the sponsors of the draft resolution did not wish to press a vote, since a crucial problem like disarmament could not be solved by means of majority votes. He hoped, however, that the draft would be acceptable to the members of the Committee, particularly the representatives of the great Powers.

36. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America) said that he wished to explain why, even though his delegation was in agreement with many parts of draft resolution A/C.1/L.259, it found the resolution unacceptable in its present form. His delegation felt that the prospects for success in any future disarmament negotiations would be reduced if the negotiators received directives from the General Assembly confining them to a single approach to the problem. The Soviet Union had consistently sought a resolution which would commit the negotiators to work towards a single treaty on disarmament. His Government, on the other hand, rejected the "all or nothing" approach to disarmament and considered that early steps could be taken to strengthen world peace before the many problems involved in total disarmament were solved. His delegation agreed that general and complete disarmament must be the final objective, and it had no objection to those portions of the draft resolution which set forth general guide-lines pointing in that direction. Unfortunately, however, the draft resolution did not provide clearly enough for the possibility of taking individual disarmament measures which could be readily agreed upon and would clear the way towards the ultimate goal. He noted that operative paragraphs 1 and 2 both referred to "an agreement" on general and complete disarmament, thus implying that future disarmament negotiations would be required to work out a single treaty, though in fact more than one might be necessary; those words should be either deleted or changed from the singular to the plural. Moreover, sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of operative paragraph 1 contained a lengthy description of general and complete disarmament, but made no reference whatever to specific disarmament measures which could be taken at the present time. Operative paragraph 3, which dealt with the heart of the problem, while it referred to the possibility of partial measures, was not sufficiently emphatic and would permit the Soviet bloc to maintain in any future disarmament negotiations that the General Assembly's directives did not address the question of partial measures and called only for a single treaty on general and complete disarmament.

37. His criticisms of the resolution should not be taken to indicate that his delegation did not appreciate the sponsors' patient efforts to reconcile conflicting views on an extremely difficult problem which remained unsolved after nearly fifteen years of negotiation. Indeed, his delegation would be prepared to support the draft resolution, in spite of the unsatisfactory features to which he had referred, if it was amended so as to achieve the necessary balance in the emphasis it placed on the various points at issue. He hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to such amendments; in particular, since the Soviet representative had seemed to agree in his statement at the 1090th meeting that initial measures of partial disarmament could be helpful, he should be willing to accept more explicit language to that effect in the draft resolution.

38. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) said that his delegation had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.259 in the conviction that the General Assembly must provide future disarmament negotiators with directives which, while not detailed, were neutral. The sponsors of the draft resolution had sought to incorporate the points on which the two sides seemed to be in agreement and
to add other points which would promote the achievement of general and complete disarmament. It was imperative that the resolution should be supported by the States that had taken part in the work of the Ten-Nation Committee and that it should be unanimously adopted by the First Committee, for majority votes on the question of disarmament tended merely to produce a hardening of positions. The most difficult question was that of partial measures; his delegation trusted however that contacts would be renewed and that agreement would finally be reached.

39. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, said that the United States representative's statement showed that since the United States could no longer openly oppose the idea of general and complete disarmament, it now wanted the draft resolution A/C.1/L.259 to incorporate a provision calling for negotiations on partial disarmament measures, which it wished to substitute for negotiations on a treaty of general and complete disarmament. If the draft resolution was rewritten in the manner proposed by the United States representative, the United States and its allies would be in a position to prevent any progress towards the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The partial measures referred to by the United States representative were the same measures of control over armaments which the Western Powers had long sought in order to obtain military advantages for themselves. The United States had wrecked the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament by pursuing that policy, in defiance of General Assembly resolution 1376 (XIV), which called for the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

40. The United States representative had suggested the possibility of reaching a compromise with the Soviet Union on a more balanced version of draft resolution A/C.1/L.259. However, there could be no compromise between those who favoured general and complete disarmament and those who opposed it. On the other hand, it was possible for those who supported a treaty on general and complete disarmament to arrive at a compromise on the directives for future negotiations; that was what had taken place in the talks on draft resolution A/C.1/L.259, where the Soviet Union had refrained from insisting that the language of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) should be incorporated into the new draft resolution. In the statement at the 1090th meeting to which the United States representative had referred the Soviet representative had agreed that it was desirable to adopt measures likely to promote confidence, provided that they did not divert attention from the problem of general and complete disarmament. Indeed, he had gone on to propose specific measures of partial disarmament which the Soviet Union had long advocated, such as the conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons test, an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and the establishment of atom-free and missile-free zones in various parts of the world. Those and other measures were embodied in draft resolution A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, in draft resolution A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-2 and in draft resolution A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-2, all of which his delegation supported. If the Western Powers were seeking measures which would create a more favourable atmosphere for negotiations on general and complete disarmament, they had only to vote for these draft resolutions.

41. It was in fact measures of that kind which were referred to in operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.259. Yet the United States objected to that paragraph because it was also opposed to operative paragraph 2, which called for the earliest conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. If the United States was not prepared to negotiate on general and complete disarmament, however, there would be no negotiations at all. Those who favoured general and complete disarmament were supporting draft resolution A/C.1/L.259; on the other side stood a handful of imperialist States led by the United States, which were pitting themselves against the entire world. If, because of the stand taken by the United States, the First Committee was unable to reach agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament, there would be nothing to prevent the United Nations from debating procedural resolutions or in referring the problem to a special body, as proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.255, or to the Disarmament Commission. To do that would merely serve to create the impression that constructive action was being taken on the disarmament question and to conceal the fact that the United States had brought matters to a hopeless impasse. His delegation felt that the only way to break the present deadlock was to convene in March or April 1961 a special session of the General Assembly, attended by Heads of State or Government, for the purpose of considering the question of general and complete disarmament as a whole. He hoped that the new United States Administration would reflect seriously upon the situation brought about by its predecessor and would contribute to the achievement of positive results at such special session.

42. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, said that the Soviet representative had confirmed his delegation's worst fears concerning the way in which the Soviet Union would exploit draft resolution A/C.1/L.259 in future disarmament negotiations; the Soviet representative's statements had illustrated the Soviet practice of diplomacy by ultimatum. Nothing in the position taken by the United States in the Ten-Nation Committee and in the First Committee could justify the assumption that because it disagreed with the Soviet approach to the achievement of general and complete disarmament, the United States was opposed to general and complete disarmament as such and was using diversionary tactics to camouflage its opposition. It had, moreover, been improper of the Soviet representative to speculate on the possible policies of the incoming United States Administration and to imply that it was impossible to do business with the United States until that Administration took office.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.