2. Although the Committee was dealing with the disarmament question in conjunction with the related questions of the suspension of nuclear tests and the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, there was no reason why those other problems, as well as the problem of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes, could not be solved before the conclusion of a treaty or treaties on general and complete disarmament. His delegation agreed with the United States representative that the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had been more successful than any previous disarmament negotiations. The final discontinuance of such tests would be an important step towards disarmament; the urgency of reaching an agreement to that effect could not therefore be over-emphasized.

3. Ireland, joined by Japan, Ghana and Mexico, had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-2) on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, which was also praiseworthy. Even if it was not acted on by the nuclear Powers, as had happened in the case of the draft resolution submitted by Ireland at the fourteenth session and adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 1380 (XIV), there was no reason why the small and medium-sized States which opposed the spread of nuclear weapons should not themselves solemnly undertake not to accept such weapons from the nuclear Powers or to manufacture them. If such action were taken, and backed by a resolution submitted for the approval of the General Assembly, it was probable that the nuclear Powers would add their votes to those of other countries.

4. A number of delegations had also proposed the establishment of neutral zones into which neither nuclear nor conventional armaments should be imported. Cambodia and Laos had made such a proposal for their countries, and Ghana and Guinea wished to see all of Africa included in such a zone. Lastly, the Arab States had already established a de facto zone free of nuclear armaments, bases and military alliances in their part of the Middle East, when the seven States which had founded the League of Arab States had, in 1954, publicly expressed their determination not to join any military or political alliances other than those deriving in law from the United Nations Charter, the Pact of the League of Arab States and the Treaty of Mutual Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League. His own country's position reflected that policy. Lebanon maintained and wished to maintain only the forces essential to its own defence, and was determined not to join any organization or alliance other than the United Nations and the League of Arab States. Nor did it wish to have any military bases on its soil.

5. Although the idea of a disarmed zone of peace had had little success in the past, there was no doubt that
it could be useful, pending the achievement of general and complete disarmament. His delegation called upon the uncommitted countries to proclaim their unshakable attachment to the military neutralization of their countries and to ask for United Nations sanction of that policy.

6. Another aspect of neutralization was the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries. The Soviet Union opposed any interference in the affairs of its European allies, and the American Republics in general maintained their adherence to the doctrine of non-intervention, which had recently been reaffirmed at San José, Costa Rica. His delegation would like to see a similar doctrine adopted for Asia, Africa and the Middle East, so as to protect the countries of those areas as the Monroe Doctrine had for more than one hundred years safeguarded American States from any renewal of European colonialism or intervention. The principle of non-intervention did not exclude cooperation, and like military neutralization was one of the basic conditions for a disarmed and peaceful world.

7. With regard to outer space, it was his delegation's conviction that action should be taken to ensure its use for non-military purposes while time remained to do so.

8. Like so many other delegations, the Lebanese delegation was primarily concerned that the nuclear Powers should be persuaded to resume negotiations on disarmament without delay. France, summarizing the position of the Western Powers, had confirmed the willingness of the latter to do so. It was rather disquieting, however, to learn that France would continue to press its own disarmament proposals as the only ones which could arrest man's course to the abyss. Fortunately, the other Western Powers had not adopted so rigid a position; while their draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.250) did state the general principles on which the three sponsors believed that negotiations should be resumed, it did not repeat the terms of the United States disarmament plan submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee on 27 June 1960 (DC/154). Similarly, while the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) set forth a number of principles as a basis for the resumption of negotiations, it did not refer to the Soviet disarmament plan (A/4505) except to propose that it should be transmitted to the negotiating body. Thus, what both sides had done was to suggest the directives by which the negotiating body should be guided in its work. There could be no objection to that, provided that the acceptance of the directives in question was not made a condition for the resumption of negotiations. Such an attitude would be tantamount to refusing to resume negotiations and could not be supported by the Lebanese delegation.

9. The Lebanese delegation was convinced that agreement could be reached on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, and that both sides could be persuaded not to cling obstinately to their respective plans, but to transmit them for detailed examination to the negotiating body, which should work in close cooperation with the United Nations. Effective cooperation could be ensured either by setting up a "watchdog" committee, as suggested by the representative of Canada (1086th meeting), or by providing that the negotiating body should submit regular reports to the Disarmament Commission. As a preliminary measure, the United Nations could usefully undertake to produce a text harmonizing the two sets of basic principles proposed—an idea which had already been given general approval by both sides. The directives thus given to the negotiators would have to be more comprehensive than those laid down by the General Assembly in its resolution 1373 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, and they should reflect the major areas of agreement between the parties. They would be drafted by a sub-committee of the First Committee composed of the sponsors of the two major draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.249 and A/C.1/L.250) and representatives of a number of other delegations, or by the proposed advisory committee to which reference had been made many times during the debate, or finally, by the ad hoc committee proposed by the representative of Canada at the 1098th meeting. The new text would take as its point of departure the two major draft resolutions before the Committee.

10. Although it would not be an easy task to reconcile those two draft resolutions, the areas of disagreement between the parties had been substantially reduced in the past year, and while the actual terms of the USSR draft resolution differed from those of the three-Power draft, the content of the two proposals had many points in common. It was encouraging, moreover, to note that neither party had set political conditions, such as the solution of some of the political conflicts at present dividing them, for a resumption of talks. They had thus removed some of the obstacles to fruitful negotiation. The other obstacles which must be removed were fear and mutual distrust.

11. It was a hopeful sign that both sides had discussed the composition of the negotiating body, and were considering means of rendering the machinery more effective. For its part, the Soviet Union had suggested enlarging the membership of the Ten-Nation Committee by five uncommitted nations, and had named the nations it had in mind (A/4509). Judging from the remarks of the representative of Italy (1088th meeting), the West was prepared to accept such an enlargement of the negotiating body, subject to the proviso that the five uncommitted nations should be designated by all States from the main geographical regions of the world. Lebanon hoped that the Soviet Union would accept that amendment, which would ensure the absolute neutrality of the new members of the negotiating body. That was a legitimate concern of both sides; the mere fact that one party had selected certain States, however impartial they might be, was enough to create mistrust in the other party. There were various other methods by which the selection might be made.

12. It had also been suggested that the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission should be appointed to serve as the neutral chairman, without the right to vote, of the negotiating body, where his presence would ensure close and effective co-operation with the United Nations. Another possible candidate for the post was a representative of Japan, that country having already experienced the effects of atomic war. The Lebanese delegation felt that Japan should be represented, in any event, either in the proposed advisory committee or in the negotiating committee itself. But regardless of its composition the essential thing was that the negotiating body should not begin
work until the First Committee could place before it a set of general guiding principles on which both sides agreed. Accordingly, the Lebanese delegation agreed that the Western and Soviet draft resolutions should not be put to a vote.

13. Although, however, there could be no objection to changes being made in the structure of the negotiating body, that of the Secretariat should not be tampered with. Negotiations necessarily had to take place between two or more parties, but any decisions arrived at could be carried out only by a single authority. It was the Congo situation, the first United Nations undertaking of its kind, which had touched off the Soviet attack on the Secretariat; yet the Security Council had earlier, by its resolution of 22 July 1960, unanimously commended the Secretary-General for the conscientious manner in which he had discharged his responsibilities in that situation. Indeed, even the African States, those most directly affected, had not supported the Soviet condemnation of the Secretary-General. In any event, the question of a change in the executive organ of the United Nations was not relevant to the disarmament negotiations, and should not be allowed to stand in the way of their resumption. Both sides had solicited the opinions of the other Members of the United Nations, and had pledged themselves to consider them on their merits; the consensus of those opinions was that negotiations should be resumed as early as possible. The Lebanese delegation suggested that when the general debate had been completed the Committee should suspend consideration of the question of disarmament and go on to the next item on its agenda, pending the outcome of the informal consultations at present being held between the parties.

14. Mr. LEGENDRE (France), exercising his right of reply, said that he wished to correct the slight misunderstanding which had been revealed in the Lebanese representative’s reference to the French delegation’s statement on disarmament in the Committee (1094th meeting). The Soviet Union had accused France of having retracted from its position after the submission of the Soviet plan (A/4374/Rev.1) on 2 June 1950. France had therefore made it clear that it would continue in any future negotiations to advocate the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as a priority measure; and it considered that that clarification would facilitate negotiations, since the Soviet Union now viewed the proposed measure with favour. What France proposed was that the manufacture of rockets, satellites, aircraft and ships specially constructed for launching nuclear bombs should be prohibited and that those already manufactured should be destroyed.

15. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that his country, having only recently become independent, had no special knowledge of the subject under discussion; but as a member of the world community it was fully aware of the compelling need for disarmament. For if the scientific development of destructive weapons was not arrested before new members were added to the "nuclear club", the problem of saving mankind from self-annihilation might become too complicated to solve.

16. While the Cypriot delegation agreed with those who had advocated the resumption of negotiations, it considered that if negotiations were to be successful there must be a radical change in the psychological climate. The real obstacle to disarmament was not the absence of negotiations; recent history had shown that negotiations alone were not enough. Before fruitful results could be achieved, both sides would have to shake off antagonism and distrust and to deal with the problem of disarmament in an entirely new spirit, recognizing that the common enemy was nuclear war and unity in a common determination to defeat war and save mankind. Only then would mutual concessions and sacrifices be forthcoming and agreement be made possible.

17. He welcomed the Canadian suggestion (1098th meeting) that a committee of small and middle Powers should be appointed to consider principles and make recommendations to the main negotiating body. The composition of the proposed committee should be such as to ensure impartiality and to command the confidence of both sides. The Indian suggestion that the General Assembly should appeal for the suspension of nuclear tests (A/4414) was also worthy of support; such an appeal would be in line with the growing world demand for the cessation of such tests, with their increasingly noxious effects. Cyprus also supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-2 on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The tendency for nuclear weapons to spread entailed grave dangers, and should be reversed, with a view to reducing the areas in which such weapons were located. Only recently, the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, had voiced the grave concern of the people of Cyprus on that subject, and their opposition to the island’s being used for storing nuclear weapons. In that connexion, Cyprus joined other delegations in supporting the suggestion made by the President of Ghana at the 869th plenary meeting of the General Assembly that Africa should be regarded as a nuclear-free zone.

18. With regard to the Western draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250) and the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249), Cyprus inclined to the view that neither should be put to the vote, since there seemed no possibility of agreement on them and sterile disputes could not bring about the necessary climate of confidence.

19. As for the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251), while many aspects of the disarmament problem could profitably be approached from a scientific standpoint, the present moment did not seem psychologically right for the proposed study. For the current deadlock was of a political rather than a technical nature, and no significant headway could be made by experts until political negotiations had been resumed.

20. The differences on substance between the two sides were more psychological than real and it was heartening to note that both sides had accepted a number of basic principles of disarmament. One of those agreed basic principles was that after the achievement of general and complete disarmament, international machinery should be established for the maintenance of peace. Cyprus was wholeheartedly in favour of that idea. It would suggest, however, that such machinery should be established before and not after the final achievement of disarmament, for the
establishment of an international security force would in itself greatly facilitate disarmament; it was unrealistic to suppose that one could merely get rid of arms and leave a vacuum. Therefore, concurrently with phased disarmament, there must also be phased steps to establish an international security force. The intervention of United Nations contingents in recent critical situations had proved beneficial to world peace, and the need for fully developing such an international security force was becoming increasingly apparent. It was to be hoped that that subject would be dealt with in any resolution which the Committee might adopt concerning the directives to be given to the negotiators.

Order of discussion of agenda items (A/C.1/825 and Add.1) (continued)*

21. The CHAIRMAN recalled that in considering the letter dated 2 November 1960 from the President of the General Assembly (A/C.1/825/Add.1), the Committee had decided at the 1100th meeting that the priority to be accorded to the item proposed by Cuba (agenda item 90) should be considered at the end of the general debate on disarmament. He therefore invited the Committee to take up that question.

22. Mr. BISBE (Cuba) said that, while the Cuban item was extremely urgent, his delegation was also aware of the urgency of the three items concerning Africa. He wondered therefore whether it would be possible for the Committee to discuss the Cuban item next, but at alternate meetings, so that the present order of priority could remain unchanged.

23. The CHAIRMAN felt that it might be preferable to proceed with the discussion of the African items, on the understanding that it could be suspended at any point, if the Cuban delegation considered that there were pressing reasons for doing so, to permit discussion of the Cuban item.

24. Mr. BISBE (Cuba) said that his delegation would not object to that procedure, provided that in the event of an emergency the Cuban item could be considered immediately.

25. Mr. OBEID (Sudan) suggested that a decision should be postponed until the following meeting so as to enable delegations to give the matter due consideration.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.