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3. The difference between the two disarmament plans was primarily one of approach. The Soviet plan was a bold one which called for the elimination of missiles at the very first stage, while the United States plan was more cautious, and did not provide for massive measures of disarmament until the final stage. The difference between the two might be described as that between the visionary and the practical. In any event, it was essential to bear in mind that the absence of confidence between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers was an inescapable fact, and that disarmament measures must go hand in hand with the growth of confidence between the two sides.

4. The United States and its allies urged that disarmament should begin with measures which could easily be verified, such as the discontinuance of the production of fissionable materials, the conversion of certain quantities of such materials to peaceful uses, and the reduction of the armed forces of each of the two major Powers to 2.5 million men together with a corresponding reduction in armaments; once greater confidence was built up between the two sides, more ambitious disarmament measures could be undertaken. They also insisted that the control system should apply not only to actual disarmament measures but also to the armaments remaining at the completion of each stage. The Eastern Powers regarded the United States disarmament plan as inadequate and described the United States control proposals as control of armaments rather than of disarmament, and as legalized espionage. He appealed to the Eastern Powers to reconsider the Western proposals, to negotiate on the features they opposed, and to recognize that the West's cautious approach resulted from distrust and from its fear that a misstep in the process of disarmament would upset the balance of power and plunge the world into war.

5. If the Eastern Powers refused to reconsider the United States proposals, the alternative would be to take a second look at the Soviet plan, which provided in the very first stage for the elimination of the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the liquidation of military bases in foreign countries, and the reduction of the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union to 1.7 million men together with...
9. The task of the General Assembly at its current session was to prepare the basis for a resumption of disarmament negotiations. In the view of his delegation, there was enough common ground in the Soviet draft resolution (A.C.1/L.249) and the draft resolution submitted by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.250) to permit a single text to be fashioned from them which could be adopted unanimously. He suggested that at the end of the general debate on disarmament the Committee should set up a three-man sub-committee, consisting of a neutral chairman and the United States and Soviet representatives, to work out a compromise resolution of that kind.

10. His delegation wholeheartedly supported the Canadian proposal (1059th meeting) that the negotiating committee should be given a neutral chairman; his delegation had made a similar proposal in the First Committee (824th meeting) as early as the eleventh session of the Assembly.

11. Mr. HERRARTE (Guatemala) said that his country had no aggressive designs on any other nation, and that it condemned the squandering on armaments of resources and resources which could be utilized for the economic development of the less developed countries. It regarded disarmament as a means towards the higher goal of peace and collective security.

12. Since the great Powers agreed on the objective of general and complete disarmament, and the differences dividing them were of a purely procedural nature, it was to be regretted that the disarmament negotiations had been abruptly broken off, and that the ideological conflict had become sharper. Ideological infiltration and subversion were spreading to areas remote from the conflict of interests, thus rendering more difficult the attainment of peaceful coexistence between nations. The only remedy was to resume negotiations.

13. Since disarmament and control were complementary, he shared the view of the Western Powers that no agreement could be reached on a disarmament treaty unless agreement was reached at the same time on all the necessary measures of control. He further agreed that each measure of disarmament would have to be accompanied by appropriate controls, so that at no stage of the disarmament process would any Power or group of Powers gain a military advantage. Those were elementary precautions which States were bound to take, if they were not to fall victims to their own defencelessness. On the other hand, he could not subscribe to the Soviet view that disarmament would be achieved only through the conclusion of a general treaty, and that nothing was to be expected from negotiations. Such negotiations had already taken place, though they had been interrupted for long periods, had produced some areas of agreement. Those areas of agreement should be embodied in preliminary measures which should be put into effect without awaiting agreement on all the complex problems of disarmament and control. That would restore confidence, and make possible further progress. He supported the three-Power draft resolution (A.C.1/L.250), which was based on those principles, and the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251) calling for studies by experts.

14. Guatemala was opposed to the proposal in the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) for a reorganiz...
zation of the structure of the Security Council and the Secretariat. Such a reorganization would not only weaken those organs, but would give formal sanction to a division of the world which did not correspond to reality and failed to take account of the changing nature of human society.

15. On the other hand, Guatemala supported the proposal for altering the composition of the negotiating body by the appointment of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission as its chairman, and of representatives of Asian and African countries as its vice-chairman and rapporteur. The Guatemalan delegation also supported the Canadian suggestion (199th meeting) that an ad hoc committee of the Disarmament Commission consisting of States which did not possess nuclear weapons should be set up to assist the disarmament negotiators. Finally, it endorsed the view, expressed by the representative of Mexico at the 199th meeting, that draft resolutions which were not supported by both sides should not be put to the vote.

16. Mr. TSIAHNG (China) said it was to be assumed that the terrors of a war fought with the new weapons of mass destruction, and the economic burdens of the armaments race, were appreciated by all nations. No nation would engage in an armaments race for its own sake; study of the development of the arms race since the Second World War showed that political conflicts were at the root of the problem. Fear of aggression and the desire for national security had led the free peoples of the world to accept the burden of armaments of their own free will. It was unrealistic to hope that the armaments race could be ended without a simultaneous solution of political conflicts.

17. Much had been said in the debate about foreign military bases. However, the bases in question were a necessary part of existing defence treaties, all of which had been concluded with a view to averting a specific threat of aggression. Indeed, many of the uncommitted nations which decried the inequity of military blocs were indirect beneficiaries of defence treaties and military bases. They should realize that the committed nations had no choice but to enter into collective defence treaties; and the existence of bases showed the intimate connexion between political conflict and armaments. Before military bases could be abolished, therefore, there would have to be parallel advances in solving political problems and problems relating to armaments.

18. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that it was socially, morally and constitutionally impossible for the responsible Government of a free country to launch a surprise attack or wage an aggressive war. That was still more true of an alliance of free countries. Surprise attacks and aggressive wars were possible only with totalitarian Governments.

19. Since political conflicts and the armaments race reacted upon each other, any step in disarmament, however small, would help towards a relaxation of political tension, as well as facilitating further steps in disarmament.

20. Far from being Utopian, the goal of general and complete disarmament was no more than a restatement of the ideals and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. However, to attempt to achieve general and complete disarmament by means of one treaty or one agreement would be unrealistic, for progress from the present state of the world to a disarmed and warless world would entail a long process of growth. It was the task of the General Assembly to assist that growth. The only practical way to the final goal lay on the road of step-by-step agreements, both in matters of disarmament and in the political field. An attempt should therefore be made to achieve a series of agreements.

21. It was universally agreed that there could be no disarmament without control, and that there should be no control without disarmament. In many cases, control would have to apply both to measures of disarmament and to retained armaments; otherwise it would be almost meaningless. Since certain types of modern armaments were more difficult to control than others, the United Kingdom proposal to appoint a group of experts to study the technical and administrative aspects of the problem (A/C.1/L.251) should be welcomed. Such a group should be non-political in nature and composed entirely of experts. Since it could meet simultaneously with the negotiating committee, it need not delay the process of disarmament; in fact, its findings would indirectly help disarmament negotiations. Moreover, since technical and administrative studies on inspection and control would have to be made eventually, the immediate implementation of the United Kingdom proposal would ultimately save time.

22. It seemed to be agreed that the First Committee's objective in the current discussion should be to bring about a propitious atmosphere for disarmament negotiations. It might also be useful for the Committee to lay down a number of directives to facilitate negotiations between the Powers principally concerned. The Chinese delegation wished to join other delegations in urging those Powers to resume negotiations as soon as possible, for without negotiations neither total nor partial disarmament could be achieved. For that reason, the sudden disruption of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament could only be condemned as an act of sabotage. Melodramatic gestures could not promote progress in disarmament.

23. The Chinese delegation had always favoured organs of limited membership for negotiation, for the larger the body was, the greater would be the opportunities it afforded for propaganda. Since disarmament could be started only through agreement among the Powers chiefly concerned, the principle of parity was irrelevant to the process of negotiation, and the Ten-Nation Committee could thus not be considered the most suitable organ for the purpose in view. However, the proposal that the negotiating committee should be presided over by a neutral chairman was useful, since such a chairman could enforce orderly parliamentary procedure and might be able to help to overcome any deadlock. As for the proposal that the chairman should be assisted by an advisory committee, it would serve a useful purpose so long as it was understood that that committee would merely proffer advice to the chairman, without participating in the negotiations. It would be inadvisable, however, if it should mean the enlargement of the negotiating body.

24. Finally, the Chinese delegation could not accept the Soviet proposal for the reorganization of the United Nations Secretariat as part of the scheme of
disarmament. The proposed reorganization was not acceptable in any context, and to link it with disarmament could only impede further progress.

25. Mr. ENCKELL (Finland) said the debate had clearly shown the unanimity that prevailed not only concerning the urgency of reaching agreement on disarmament but also concerning the purposes of the Committee's work, purposes laid down in General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) calling for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which represented an unequivocal and universal commitment. The debate had also reflected the widespread concern caused by the breakdown in the disarmament negotiations between the great Powers. It was a source of encouragement that the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests was continuing, and that in the meantime no tests were being conducted. In view of the progress achieved in those negotiations, the delegation of Finland felt that it should be possible to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests under appropriate control. However, while such an agreement would help to establish confidence it would not in itself be a disarmament measure. There was therefore an urgent need to bring about a resumption of actual disarmament negotiations. That had been emphasized by the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 18 August 1960 (DC/182/Corr.1) and by General Assembly resolution 1485 (XV) of 18 October 1960, both of which had been adopted unanimously.

26. Much had been said about the difficulties encountered in the Ten-Nation Committee at Geneva and the need to increase areas of understanding. However, the difficulties in question could not be solved in the First Committee, and since the only negotiating body which dealt specifically with disarmament had ceased to function, the Committee's main concern should be to make possible a resumption of negotiations and to consider what machinery would be most suitable for that purpose.

27. The Finnish delegation did not propose to express an opinion on the relative merits of the various proposals dealing with the subject-matter of a future disarmament agreement. It was convinced that no statement should be made which might complicate the task of the Powers principally concerned in seeking a basis for continuing negotiations. The contribution which Members of the United Nations could make was one of conciliation rather than of arbitration. What was required was not resolutions adopted by majority vote, but agreement; only proposals which the interested Powers could find acceptable could make a practical contribution to the cause of disarmament. The Finnish delegation was prepared to support proposals dealing with isolated aspects of the disarmament problem, provided that they were designed to achieve genuine progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

28. Mr. CHORFI (Morocco) said that if the United Nations was to survive, it must divorce itself entirely from the conflict between the two world power blocs. He deplored the arms race, the accentuation of ideological antagonisms, the continuing division of certain countries in Europe and Asia and the cold war which was delaying their unification. Morocco welcomed the fact that both sides had expressed their desire for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and reaffirmed its pledge, under the Charter of the United Nations, to endeavour to safeguard peace whenever it was threatened, and to ensure the independence and integrity of all States. The presence of Moroccan troops in the Congo demonstrated its faithfulness to those principles.

29. Differences concerning methods of control, time-limits and the means by which general and complete disarmament could be achieved should not stand in the way of an agreement; the adoption of rigid procedural positions was tantamount to an abandonment of the ultimate objective. Disarmament was above all a problem of confidence. The small and medium Powers could assist the parties in narrowing the areas of disagreement between them and in bringing about a relaxation of tension. The disarmament negotiations should be resumed in the Ten-Nation Committee, to which a number of uncommitted nations should be added. The First Committee should confine itself to elaborating basic principles for the guidance of the negotiators. Such principles might include the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the permanent discontinuance of tests and the renunciation of surprise attack—or, in general, of resort to war as a means of settling disputes.

30. Once an agreement on general and complete disarmament had been achieved, the United Nations would face new responsibilities. In order to discharge them, it would have to have at its disposal an international force; and that force would have to be used in such a way as to inspire confidence in all Member States. That was one of the reasons why some revision of the United Nations Charter was necessary.

31. Morocco deplored the fact that the example of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in voluntarily suspending nuclear tests had not been followed by France. France continued to turn a deaf ear to world demand for a permanent test ban; and having already exploded an atomic bomb in the Sahara, in defiance of General Assembly resolution 1379 (XIV), it was now planning underground tests in the same area. Those plans could only result in a deterioration of France's relations with Africa and Asia.

32. Convinced that the maintenance of peace and the promotion of world progress should be the responsibility of all nations, Morocco believed that the United Nations should be a genuinely universal organization, and that it could not be fully effective while the People's Republic of China remained unrepresented. It regretted that the Assembly was persisting in its unrealistic position of excluding that major Power from representation.

33. An agreement on general and complete disarmament should be accompanied by an agreement to raise living standards in under-developed countries and to abolish colonialism in all its forms, for colonialism was one of the root causes of war. Consequently, it was a matter of gratification for the Moroccan delegation that the Assembly was currently considering the adoption of a declaration condemning colonialism and proclaiming the basic right of all peoples to self-determination. While some colonial Powers, to their credit, had granted independence to their former territories, others still ignored, or appeared to ignore, pledges of self-determination they had made.
to peoples under their rule. Colonialism had not yet been disarmed: although nominally independent, cer-
tain countries were still being subjected to colonial
domination. A case in point was the Congo, where,
despite its professed intention to give that country
its freedom, the colonial Power was still in control
of the Katanga mines. Moreover, while Algeria was
being denied its rights of freedom and independence,
France was granting those rights to Mauritania, a
province of Morocco, for the sole purpose of exploit-
ing its natural wealth and converting it into a military
base within the Atlantic defence system. World public
opinion would not be deceived by colonial Powers
which granted peoples token political independence
while retaining control over them for either economic
or strategic reasons, thus drawing neutral nations
into the cold war.

34. The newly independent States could not presume
to be arbiters on questions of disarmament, but it
was their duty to help to ease international tensions
by offering practical suggestions to the disarmament
negotiators and by refraining from committing them-
selves in the cold war. Morocco had been guided by
that principle in settling the question of the foreign
bases remaining on its territory by peaceful means.
The major military Powers should agree that the
continent of Africa should be insulated from the cold
war and the arms race, and that, as the United States
had suggested, all assistance to the countries of
Africa should be channelled through the United Na-
tions. In addition, they should solemnly pledge them-
selves not to establish any military or strategic
bases in Africa; and the African countries, for their
part, should agree to reject such initiatives and to
keep nuclear weapons out of Africa. In that way, an
effective beginning would have been made to the pro-
cess of world disarmament.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.