Deprive the Soviet Union of its military advantages without giving up the 400 bases which the United States had established around the frontiers of the socialist countries. It was clear that the United States and its allies wanted control over armaments rather than disarmament, and that the United States had been responsible for the break-down of disarmament negotiations. The Western Powers were opposed to disarmament because it would be against the interests of the system of aggressive military blocs they had created and of the monopolies and armaments manufacturers. During the past eight years alone, the United States had spent $340,000 million on its armed forces; the influence of the military was so great in the United States that, according to a report just issued by a private group, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the opposition of the armed services would doom any arms control agreement concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union to defeat in the Senate. Arms expenditure in other members of the Western military blocs was also mounting, and West Germany was entering the arms race to an increasing extent.

2. The draft resolution submitted by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.250) laid down no definite time-limits for disarmament and, in fact, no clear obligation to disarm at all. It provided for the reduction of armaments and armed forces to levels required for internal security but did not specify what those levels should be. It made no mention of an immediate ban on the production and use of nuclear weapons, or of the destruction of existing stockpiles. Yet it called for unlimited control and inspection, which were to precede any decision on specific disarmament measures. It was clear that the three-Power draft resolution was designed to obstruct in every way a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. While posing as a peacemaker, the United States was continuing its policy of aggression and war preparations; it was suppressing the national liberation movement in the countries of Asia and Africa, as for example in the Congo, and was organizing an economic blockade and threatening military intervention against Cuba.

3. In his statement before the First Committee on 19 October (1086th meeting), the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs had urged the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to return to the conference table. But disarmament negotiations had gone on for more than ten years without accomplishing anything, because the Western Powers were using them as a screen behind which to continue the arms race. The Western attitude was evident from the statement made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom that disarmament negotiations might go on for another five or ten years. The Byelorussian delegation believed that future disarmament negotiations could be successful only if the First Committee provided guidance in the form of a resolution setting out the basic principles.
of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; such principles were contained in the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249). The negotiations could be conducted by an expanded disarmament committee including representatives of five neutral countries. If the First Committee worked out constructive proposals on which a treaty of general and complete disarmament might be based, and if the Western Powers showed willingness to adopt such proposals, the Soviet Union would be prepared to study any plan for strict international control over disarmament. Otherwise, as Mr. Krushchev had stated (900th plenary meeting), there would be no point in continuing to participate in the discussion of disarmament in the First Committee.

4. The smaller countries, which would be unable to develop their economies and raise their people's standard of living until the arms race was halted, were in a position to play a particularly constructive part in helping to solve the disarmament problem. Those under-developed countries which had improvidently joined Western military blocs were in a particularly unfortunate position. The representative of Pakistan had recently made a statement (906th meeting) in support of the Western position on disarmament. Far from benefiting from its military alliance with the United States, however, Pakistan had in recent years been obliged to lay out for armaments funds equivalent to 70 per cent of its total administrative expenditure. Turkey, Iran and Thailand were in a similar position. Of the $45,000 million appropriated by the United States during the years 1948-1958 under its mutual security programme, only $2,500 million had been spent on economic and technical assistance, while the remainder had gone for military purposes. The under-developed countries were at present maintaining some 5 million men under arms, and their annual military expenditure totalled approximately $5,000 million.

5. The United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251), which called for the appointment of technical experts to study the problems of inspection and control, was designed to divert the United Nations from the basic political problem of general and complete disarmament and to lead it into a morass of endless talk. Innumerable documents had already been produced on the question of control and inspection, and no technical group would be able to reach agreement unless the main principles for a treaty on general and complete disarmament had been worked out in advance. The United Kingdom proposal, too, emphasized control without disarmament, an idea to which the Soviet Union and the other peace-loving countries rightly objected. The United Kingdom had spent some £14,000 million on armaments during the past decade, and its military expenditure during the past fiscal year had represented about 40 per cent of its total budget. That was why the United Kingdom draft resolution did not call for the destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, renunciation of the use of such weapons, the abolition of armed forces and armaments, or the elimination of military bases in the territory of foreign countries.

6. There were increasingly frequent indications in the Western Press of the Western Powers' unwillingness to disarm. Thus, a Washington newspaper, The Evening Star, of 23 April 1960 had referred to the secret report prepared at the direction of the United States Government by a committee headed by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, a former Assistant Secretary of Defence, which had recommended that the United States should refuse to negotiate a disarmament agreement until it had built up larger and less vulnerable nuclear forces. The Evening Star had gone on to say that if the recommendations embodied in the report had been adopted, then any meaningful disarmament negotiations would have been out of the question for years. The continued existence of nuclear weapons was particularly dangerous because certain of the nuclear Powers openly pursued a policy of "brinkmanship"; it also posed the threat of an accidental outbreak of war. The United States proposal to convert a certain number of tons of fissile material to peaceful uses would accomplish nothing, since the vast stockpiles which would remain could be used for the continued production and development of nuclear weapons.

7. Some idea of the consequences of a nuclear war could be obtained from the immense devastation wrought by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; indeed 230,000 Japanese were still suffering from radiation sickness caused by those bombs. The loss of life in the Second World War had been tremendous; in a thermo-nuclear war, such losses would be counted in the hundreds of millions. His Government would do everything possible to avert such a catastrophe, and the most effective way to do so was through general and complete disarmament, as proposed by the Soviet Union.

8. He reviewed the various steps taken by the Soviet Union towards unilateral disarmament and the various constructive proposals it had made for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and for the destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. On almost every occasion, as soon as the Soviet Union had advanced a Western proposal, the Western Powers had disavowed it. The United States was continuing the nuclear arms race, increasing its military expenditure and accumulating vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom was engaged in the same feverish race. Moreover, the United States was planning to equip other countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with nuclear weapons, the most recent step in that direction being the plan for setting up a NATO nuclear striking force. The West German army was being equipped with rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads, notwithstanding the aggressive intentions of German militarist groups. France, too, was building a nuclear force; it had carried out two nuclear test explosions in the Sahara and was appropriating huge sums to finance those activities.

9. At the same time, scientific discoveries were being utilized for the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. In particular, the low-cost method of producing uranium-235 by the process known as centrifuge would make it possible for a number of countries to produce their own atomic bombs. As Mr. Krushchev had told the General Assembly (900th plenary meeting), the more countries there were capable of producing atomic weapons, the more difficult it would be to reach agreement on disarmament.

10. Many representatives in the Committee had expressed justifiable alarm at the fact that the United Nations should have done nothing so far to reduce the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. Byelorussia fully agreed with those who had urged the Committee to adopt a declaration calling upon all States to renounce the use of nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union had already made a similar proposal. There were many
military and political aspects of peace must therefore be examined and resolved concurrently. The security which States at present sought to secure by arming themselves individually or collectively must ultimately be guaranteed by the international community as such. Any differences between nations which could not be settled by negotiation should be subject to a specific settlement procedure. Compulsory international arbitration and its recourse to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice should be encouraged. Finally, thought should be given to the establishment of a permanent international police force under the United Nations.

18. Any agreement on disarmament would have to be world-wide. Regional disarmament would create zones which would be at the mercy of any outside Power strategically interested in occupying them. Their vulnerability to attack would tend to encourage the spread of a war.

19. The Committee's discussion on disarmament should be carried on with moderation, restraint and respect for the truth; the use of unreliable information should be avoided. Referring to the statement made by the representative of Albania at the 109th meeting, he said it was not true that Greece, one of Albania's neighbours, was armed out of all proportion to its needs. Greece had been a victim of fascist and communist aggression, both of which had had their supply bases in Albania; accordingly, it was forced to ensure its adequate defence, but it could not be said to be armed out of all proportion to its needs. It was also untrue that Greece was a member of an aggressive alliance; NATO was a purely defensive alliance. Finally, there were no atomic bases in Greece, and the decision whether there should be such bases would be taken by Greece alone, in the light of its defence needs.

20. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America) said that the United States delegation was somewhat reluctant to exercise its right of reply, as it had no wish to turn the discussions into an East-West exchange of sterile recriminations. It did, however, consider it necessary to correct certain misconceptions that had arisen concerning the United States position and, in that connection, hoped that there would be no further attempts to impugn the motives or the integrity of delegations or their Governments, so that attention could be devoted to the substance of the discussions and so that the views of all delegations could be heard on the subject of disarmament.

21. The United States delegation hoped that it was correct in interpreting certain remarks made by the USSR representative at the 109th meeting as indicating a more favourable development in the Soviet position. He now appeared to accept the proposition that even before a treaty on general and complete disarmament was concluded, some measures should be carried out with a view to strengthening confidence between States and creating a more favourable atmosphere for the practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. As examples, he had cited the cessation of nuclear tests, undertakings by States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and the establishment of atomic-free and rocket-free zones in various regions of the world. Leaving aside for the moment the question of the relative merits of the partial measures proposed by the United States and the USSR respectively, the United States fully realized that there was an urgent need to start negotiating on such measures, and had consistently voiced that opinion. There accordingly seemed to be no reason why negotiations should not be resumed.

22. However, the Soviet representative did not seem to have drawn the logical conclusions from his remarks. Despite his acknowledgment of the need for preliminary partial measures as a first step in disarmament, he had reverted to the proposition that the only useful work the First Committee could do was to agree on the basic principles for a single treaty on general and complete disarmament proposed by the USSR (A/4605). That would certainly be useful work, but it was not the only useful work the Committee could do; and while the United States was quite willing to discuss the early measures proposed by the Soviet Union, it hoped that the Soviet delegation would reciprocate and be willing to discuss the early measures proposed by the United States.

23. The USSR representative had alleged that the Western Powers were trying to evade general and complete disarmament; that they were interested in control over armaments—not over disarmament—as a means of international espionage. He had also stated that the Soviet Union was ready to accept any controls that might be necessary.

24. No country would welcome more wholeheartedly than the United States a change in the world situation that would make it possible to lay down the heavy burden imposed by armaments. It wished to see a more secure world, free from the fear of war, in which international order would prevail. In short, it would like to see the total disarmament of all nations under law. His personal belief was that if a start were made promptly, the step-by-step process towards that goal could be completed in five or six years. Thus, any disbelief as to the sincerity of the United States Government's desire to achieve disarmament could spring not from knowledge, but only from totally unjustified suspicion. The Soviet representative had completely ignored the fact that the United States plan, submitted to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 27 June (DC/154), outlined a programme for achieving total disarmament. That plan provided for a treaty of general and complete disarmament and made it clear that the objective of disarmament should be a world without war.

25. It had also been said that the United States had failed to present its proposals of 27 June to the General Assembly, thereby indicating a lack of serious intent in the proposals. A glance at document A/4463, transmitting the General Assembly the documents and records of the Disarmament Commission, including the United States proposals, should suffice to correct that misapprehension.

26. The essential difference between the Western and the Soviet positions lay in the method of achieving the goal of total disarmament. The United States did not believe that initial, easily practicable and verifiable steps should be postponed until all the details of disarmament had been negotiated and all the technical studies completed. From the USSR representative's latest statement, it appeared possible that the Soviet Union no longer wished to postpone those steps either. The Ten-Nation Committee, or any other suitable forum, should therefore negotiate an agreement or series of agreements on measures which could be taken immediately, either separately or together and
other partial measures which would also be useful; they had been discussed by the representative of Cambodia at the 1091st meeting and by other representatives.

11. The Byelorussian delegation fully supported the new proposals for general and complete disarmament presented at the Assembly's current session by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It therefore urged the adoption of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249), and of the USSR proposal for expanding the membership of the Ten-Nation Committee (A/4609). It also supported the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1). The draft resolutions submitted by the Western Powers were unacceptable because they sought to achieve not disarmament but control over armaments, and to prolong debate on the subject indefinitely. Moreover, the discussion in the First Committee had demonstrated that the United States was not at present in a position to engage in productive negotiations. The widest course therefore be to convene a special session of the General Assembly in the spring of 1961. At such a session, attended by heads of Government and other responsible government leaders, the Assembly would seek a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, and would elaborate fundamental principles and issue specific directives to a negotiating body.

12. He appealed to all members of the Committee, in particular the small countries and those which had recently achieved independence, to insist that efforts should be made to achieve a solution of the disarmament problem. In the struggle for peace there could be no neutrality.

13. Mr. TSATSOS (Greece) said that no State was opposed to the principle of general and complete disarmament, which alone could ensure world peace. But the implementation of that principle raised many vital problems, problems of such complexity and scope that it would be unrealistic and misleading to seek to minimize their importance or to impugn the sincerity of those who recognized it. Caution was therefore justified. No State was prepared to expose itself to the danger of attack while the process of disarmament was under way, when the implementation of a disarmament treaty had already rendered its defences ineffectual. Disarmament measures must be so balanced that no one State or group of States could obtain a military advantage; thus, there must be a detailed disarmament plan, with effective control over its implementation. Such a plan could be formulated only on the basis of agreement concerning the technical basis of disarmament. For example, it must be agreed by both sides that disarmament meant the destruction of all weapons except those required for the maintenance of internal security and for the needs of an international peace force. The destruction of weapons must be carried out by stages, in accordance with an agreed timetable. That was an essential prerequisite of disarmament.

14. Another vital element of any disarmament plan, particularly for those countries which could not depend on their own resources to organize an effective system of self-defence, was confidence. The specific measures of disarmament must by their nature generate confidence. While the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) recognized that security must be ensured for all in equal measure, it went on to propose measures which would have the effect of destroying the sense of security of many States. The USSR proposed, for example, that within twelve to eighteen months after the signing of a treaty on disarmament, all military bases on foreign territory should be dismantled and armed forces removed from foreign soil. On the other hand, it did not provide adequate guarantees to ensure that when the bases on their territories were dismantled, countries whose defence at present depended on treaties with their allies would still be secure from attack. The USSR draft resolution further provided that only "under conditions of general and complete disarmament" would the necessary measures be taken for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. But nations could not wait until the whole process of disarmament had been completed; they sought security at all stages of that process, and the measures to ensure their security must be as specific and vigorous as those proposed for the dismantling of bases. Disarmament could be effective only if no weapon which had been destroyed could be replaced; it would therefore be necessary not only to reduce, but in some cases to destroy completely, the ability of each State to produce weapons of war.

15. But once an agreement had been concluded on those points, control would be necessary to ensure the implementation of all its clauses, not only those relating to disarmament, i.e., the destruction of weapons, but those relating to remaining stockpiles and production potential. The representatives of States belonging to the Eastern group were apparently opposed to the second type of control. Indeed, the Polish representative had said (1087th meeting) that a weaker party knowing the state of armaments of a stronger potential enemy would try to bring its armaments up to the latter's level, thereby accelerating the arms race. More probably, however, the weaker party, aided by the whole international community, would first exhaust every means to induce the stronger party to restore the balance; and the stronger party, if it genuinely wished to safeguard the disarmament agreement, would not hesitate to do so. Only if those efforts failed would the arms race continue, and at that point the disarmament agreement itself would have proved to be a failure. Absolute control over armaments and for ensuring a balance of armaments would act as a stimulus to the arms race.

16. The practical problems of control, such as the appointment of inspection teams, the functioning of the control organization and the settlement of disputes with the control body, could not be settled in a committee of ninety-nine members. They should be referred to a smaller body whose composition would reflect the various political and geographical groups in the Assembly. Concurrently, the technical problems of disarmament should be examined by experts.

17. While the abolition and destruction of armaments would undoubtedly restore a large measure of confidence in international relations, it would not automatically eliminate disputes between States. It represented no more than a foundation for the construction of world peace. Upon it, the world would have to build a system for maintaining security without resort to arms. Until a satisfactory solution to questions of security was found, no nation, great or small, could renounce armaments. General and complete disarmament was conditional upon a general and complete guarantee of the security of every nation, and the
under acceptable controls. The United States insisted only that, in such a process, those measures be verified, that the verification machinery be a part and parcel of the agreement to carry out the measures, and that no State gain a significant military advantage over the others by taking them. Such measures could not only halt the expansion of armed forces and nuclear stockpiles, but also actually reduce forces and armaments and prevent the militarization of outer space. They would increase security against surprise attacks, stop the spread of nuclear weapons production throughout the world, and reduce significantly the amount of fissionable material in weapons arsenals. Ideally, that could all be done in one treaty. All the measures suggested were known to be technically verifiable and were equally in the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. They would therefore greatly decrease tension and create the necessary confidence to achieve the ultimate goal.

27. While those agreements were being negotiated, technical studies could be conducted to elaborate effective controls for subsequent measures under the over-all plan, for a disarmament treaty which did not incorporate detailed control provisions would be meaningless. Then, since the measures provided for at subsequent stages of disarmament would have to be world-wide in application, the agreement would have to be submitted to a world disarmament conference. That, however, was no pretext for delaying the first-stage measures which could be put into effect immediately after agreement had been reached between the members of the Ten-Nation Committee.

28. In the past the Soviet Union had criticized the United States and its allies for advocating a "package approach". Yet, it was precisely such an approach, carried to the extreme, that was now being used by the Soviet Union.

29. The representative of the Soviet Union seemed to suggest that there was something reprehensible in the idea of control over armaments. The United States believed that controls were essential in order to give assurance to both sides and increase the security of all States. Control over remaining armaments, as well as controls over the process of disarmament, must be an integral part of any agreement, particularly one which could best be achieved by stages. It was for that reason that the Three-Power treaty resolution (A/C.1/L.250), of which the United States was a sponsor, provided that verification should be capable of ascertaining "that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage". Even if control were to extend to the police forces or militia remaining at the end of the disarmament process, it would be fully justified. Some of the initial measures proposed for the easing of tensions would involve arm control and might not involve reducing armaments. Even so, that was surely a step forward. The negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests similarly dealt with controls and not disarmament, yet the USSR had not refused to participate in them.

30. In the first stage of the Soviet plan (A/4505), it was provided that the control organization would have the right to inspect all enterprises, plants, factories and shipyards previously engaged in the manufacture of delivery systems. But the words "previously engaged" seemed to imply that inspection would be allowed only of those places which the Soviet Union or the United States indicated as having previously been used for basing or launching systems. The control authorities would have no right to investigate other factories and ensure that they were not engaged in the manufacture of weapons or that new ones were not being built. Under that type of control, one country could obtain a decisive military advantage without fear of discovery, and a small number of powerful weapons, manufactured in secret or hidden prior to the agreement, could be used to overwhelm other States. The Soviet proposal thus provided for insufficient guarantees only upon the completion of the entire programme, which might take six or more years, by which time a destructive weapon might already have been used.

31. The Soviet Union's control provisions for the second stage were even more inadequate. They provided only for on-site inspection of the actual process of destruction of the various weapons. During the progress of disarmament the control organization would have no right to look elsewhere to ascertain that no secret stockpiles existed. In criticizing the Soviet proposals, the United States was not casting any suspicion on the Soviet Union but merely pointing out that it would be possible for any Power to elude that type of control.

32. In essence, the Soviet conception of control seemed to be limited to a certain amount of self-inspection. It would therefore be vain to seek to distinguish between the Soviet Union's recent offer to agree to any controls over general and complete disarmament and its earlier position in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. At an early stage in those discussions, the Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, had made a similar offer; but when the details had been discussed, Mr. Tsarapkin had proposed that all control posts in the USSR should be manned by Soviet citizens. Even now, while the United States agreed that control posts in the United States should be headed by Soviet nationals, the Soviet Union insisted that its own citizens should head the control posts in its territory. Examples such as those made the United States somewhat sceptical of the Soviet Union's declaration of readiness to accept any controls necessary. The Western approach, on the other hand, would give assurance not only to the Soviet Union or the other great Powers, but to every State in the world. However, the United States was willing to examine all those problems with the Soviet Union, and felt sure, in view of the progress made in discussing the cessation of nuclear tests, that it would be possible to find areas of agreement in the wider field of disarmament. Moreover, it would not insist that the negotiations should be conducted only according to the rules laid down by the United States. It hoped that the Soviet Union would be equally accommodating.

33. Mr. SHYLLA (Albania), exercising his right of reply, said the representative of Greece had alleged that Albania had served as a springboard for fascist and communist aggression against Greece. That statement was entirely inaccurate; it was well known that Albania had been the first country to fall a victim to aggression from Fascist Italy, on 7 April 1939. After the Italian occupation it had had to combat occupation by Nazi Germany. It was true that Greece had also fallen a victim to Italian aggression, but the people of Albania and Greece had fought side by side against the Italian and German invaders. Italy had only been able to attack Greece from Albanian territory because it
had occupied that territory. As for allegations of communist aggression, anyone who was conversant with history would know that there had been no foreign aggression against Greece since the Second World War. The civil war in Greece had been a purely internal affair; other countries had had nothing to do with it. To be sure, ruling circles in the capitalist countries tended to label any democratic or liberation movement as communist-inspired. But if communism was synonymous with democracy and freedom, that fact could only give communists cause for pride. Albania had never intervened in the domestic affairs of Greece or any other country. On the contrary, it had granted refuge to Greek citizens who had left their country, and had recently discussed their repatriation with the Greek Government.

34. As to the question of missile bases in Greece, it would be interesting to know whether the representative of Greece would contradict the statement made by the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of Greece in April 1960, to the effect that the Greek Government, at the request of NATO and under the obligations assumed towards its allies, had approved of the establishment of missile training centres for NATO forces on the island of Crete. At the same time, the Greek right-wing newspaper To Vima had reported that the decision to establish missile bases in Greece had been taken at the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers held at Paris on 31 March and 1 April 1960 and was in accord with the general decision to establish defence bases in the various allied countries. That should be sufficient reply to the statement that the establishment of such bases depended on the Greek Government.

35. The Greek representative had said that NATO was non-aggressive. Suffice it to point out that not only had that alliance been formed with a view to aggression against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, but it was being used to carry out an aggressive policy against other countries as well. It would be recalled that armed forces of the NATO countries, equipped with NATO weapons, had been used to attack Egypt in 1956, and NATO forces and arms were still being used to kill Algerians.

36. In essence, the statement by the representative of Greece had been a plea against general and complete disarmament, on the ground that no country could relinquish its weapons. Such an attitude fully accorded with the uncalled-for attacks and insinuations he had made against neighbouring countries such as Albania. For its part, Albania was in favour of general and complete disarmament, and would continue to advocate that the Balkans and the Adriatic should become an atom-free zone, as an important contribution to peace and to general, as well as regional, security.

37. Albania was in favour of peaceful coexistence with all countries, including Greece, and rejected any hostile insinuations, which were consonant neither with the spirit of the United Nations Charter nor with the task confronting the Committee.

38. Mr. Tsatsos (Greece) said that the difference of opinion between Greece and Albania as to the existence of military bases in Greece was in itself a striking example of the need for control.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.