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CONTENTS
Agenda items 67, 86, 69 and 73:
Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfillment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament (continued)
Report of the Disarmament Commission (continued)
Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (continued)
Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (continued)
General debate (continued) .......... 51

Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73
Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)
Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4334, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)
1. Mr. UMAÑA BERNAL (Colombia) said that an agreement on disarmament would remove the danger of a new world war and put an end to the cold war. Colombia was a virtually unarmed country which had never had any reason to maintain large armed forces, for it had no fear of being attacked, still less any intention of attacking other countries. However, it had recently uncovered alarming indications of subversive foreign interference in its domestic political life which compelled it to be vigilant.

2. The views of the small, militarily weak countries must be taken into consideration, for those countries were able to take a disinterested position. He recalled in that connection the statement made by the Colombian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 860th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, during the general debate.

3. The small countries were deeply disappointed at the failure of the participants in the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva to reach agreement, even if only on the basic principles of a disarmament treaty, although nearly a year had passed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). He noted that it was not the representatives of the Western countries who had broken off the talks, left the conference hall and refused to listen to new proposals aimed at finding a basis for agreement.

4. That attitude appeared to have undergone no change, judging from the peremptory statements made at plenary meetings of the Assembly and in the First Committee by the representatives of the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc countries, who had announced that, unless the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament (A/4505) submitted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, were accepted, their delegations would see no point in continuing to participate in the consideration of that question by the First Committee or another, smaller body. His delegation feared that those threats, which greatly resembled an ultimatum, might lead the Committee into an impasse.

5. It had also been asserted that agreement on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament should precede any new negotiations. However, since those provisions constituted the core of the projected treaty, to require their approval in advance would mean insisting an agreement before negotiations were held.

6. His delegation also failed to see why it would be more advantageous to deal with the problem of disarmament in the General Assembly or in a committee with ninety-nine members than in a smaller committee. It had always been recognized that the task of negotiation and conciliation was much easier in a smaller body than in a large one. Neither the General Assembly nor the First Committee would be able to agree on all the details of the basic provisions of the treaty. All they could do was take decisions designed to facilitate the resumption of negotiations and indicate the lines along which those negotiations should proceed.

7. The greatest obstacle to a disarmament agreement remained, as before, the divergence of views on inspection and international control, although the different positions no longer appeared to be diametrically opposed. Control and inspection could not come after disarmament. The control and inspection organs must start exercising their functions as soon as the treaty began to be applied. They must therefore be set up in advance at the places where they were to maintain supervision and provided with the means of making it effective. The objective must be neither disarmament without control nor control without disarmament, but controlled disarmament. The concept of gradual disarmament carried out in stages, which everyone now
appeared to accept, had the advantage of making it possible to organize control and inspection gradually.

8. The controversy aroused by the issue of control and inspection showed once again that the main obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty was the distrust that existed among the great military Powers. That distrust would not vanish until there was a disarmament of the mind. For that, all thought of achieving world domination by force or internal subversion had to be abandoned. Unfortunately, there were ideologies whose basic principle was to endeavour by every possible means to establish a new type of colonialism that was surely no better than those of the past. His delegation also found alarming the inclusion in the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) of a proposal to change the structure of the United Nations Secretariat. The triumvirate proposed by the Soviet Union would make it completely impossible for the Secretariat to function.

9. For all the reasons he had cited, his delegation would vote against the Soviet draft resolution and for the draft resolutions submitted by the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.261) and by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.250). It was, however, prepared to give sympathetic consideration to any draft resolution designed to reconcile the opposing views. The conciliatory remarks of the representatives of Canada (1086th meeting), Pakistan (1085th meeting) and Yugoslavia (1089th meeting), and the noble sentiments expressed by the representatives of Mexico (1086th meeting), Brazil (1090th meeting) and Peru (1091st meeting) encouraged him to retain the hope that the Assembly would be able to bring about at least the resumption of negotiations.

10. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said that the historic importance of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) lay in the fact that general and complete disarmament had been recognized as the most important problem facing the world today. Nevertheless, subsequent events and the experience of the Geneva Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament had shown how precarious was the unanimity achieved at the previous session. It seemed clear that the United States and the other Western Powers believing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been obliged to vote for partial and complete disarmament against their will, because of the powerful sentiment in favour of eliminating war from international relations. The United States and the other NATO Powers had regarded, and apparently still regarded, disarmament negotiations as a smoke-screen behind which they could continue the arms race and military preparations for a war of aggression. They had in fact increased their military budgets—the United States by $1,280 million, the United Kingdom by £115 million and France by NF900 million—during the year that had passed since they had voted in favour of general and complete disarmament, and the United States was continuing to keep its armed forces and its strategic air force in a state of alert at the risk of setting off a nuclear war at any moment. The network of air and naval bases in the territory of other countries had been strengthened, inter alia, by the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the installation of launching platforms for rockets and guided missiles; the rearmament of West Germany was proceeding at an accelerated pace, and the process of equipping the German Army with nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them had begun. Finally, the United States had led the world to the brink of the precipice of nuclear war by sending its military aircraft to carry out aggressive incursions into the air space of the Soviet Union. At the same time, after blocking the Geneva negotiations by their refusal to examine the new proposals submitted by the socialist countries, the United States and its NATO allies had prevented the General Assembly from considering the disarmament question in plenary meeting; they had insisted on the need for thorough discussion in the First Committee, but they were virtually refusing to consider the proposals put forward by the socialist countries.

11. The Soviet proposal concerning the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament (A/4505) provided the necessary basis for negotiations looking to the achievement of such disarmament. It contained a clear description of the operations designed to eliminate the material means by which States could wage war, a statement of the principles by which States should be guided in carrying out those operations, a detailed description of the machinery and methods of control and inspection, and a statement of the principles and the machinery required to ensure the maintenance of peace once general and complete disarmament had been achieved. It also set forth a three-stage programme for the complete general and complete disarmament. That programme was supported by all the socialist States. Its implementation would, in the very first stage, serve to reduce considerably if not eliminate the dangers of surprise attack or accidental war and to halt the arms race.

12. The representative of the United States had proclaimed the peaceful intentions of his Government, but the noble ideas which abounded in his statement (1086th meeting) had not been reflected in concrete proposals by the United States Government or its allies. While making great play with the need to resume negotiations on disarmament, he had not made known the views of his Government on the new proposals submitted by the socialist countries for general and complete disarmament nor had he put forward any counter-proposals. At the outset of the Geneva negotiations, the Western Powers had sought to hide their aversion for general and complete disarmament behind the confused wording and complex mechanics of a plan which went no further than the first two stages, and of which the purpose was to establish control over armaments. That plan had been hastily re-circulated by the United States Government after the work of the Ten-Nation Committee had been suspended. However, since the United States had not submitted those proposals to the General Assembly, it evidently did not consider them worth taking seriously. Thus, it would indeed be expecting too much of the First Committee to require it to deplore the fact that the representatives of the socialist countries had not awaited the end of the difficult period of labour which was to have brought the proposals into the world at Geneva.

13. In deciding to discontinue its participation in the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Romanian Government had taken into account not only the negative and obstructive attitude of the United States delegation and the other Western delegations in that Committee but also United States policy as a whole, the statements made by the most authoritative representatives of the United States Government
and, particularly, the measures taken by that Government to intensify the arms race and to increase international tension and the risk of war at the very time when disarmament negotiations were taking place at Geneva.

14. In its policy, the United States Government was continuing to place emphasis on increasing United States military power, in the hope that that would change the balance of forces in the world and would enable it to impose its own solutions to the matters at issue, instead of negotiating mutually acceptable compromise solutions. No public figure had mentioned the problems of general and complete disarmament as one of the problems with which the United States Government should be concerned. Instead, responsible circles were calling for a resumption of nuclear tests, for the development and perfection of new weapons of mass destruction and for further appropriations for military purposes. Moreover, the representative of the United States had invited the United Nations, even more categorically than in the past, virtually to abandon all attempts to find a constructive solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament and to concentrate on measures of control over armaments and armed forces. He had first reiterated the proposal for the transfer of 30 tons of enriched uranium for peaceful uses and the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes. But at the present stage with respect to nuclear weapons, it was not the quantities eliminated from military stockpiles that counted, but the quantities which remained. It would be a meagre consolation for mankind to know that after the "nuclear disarmament" operation proposed by the United States, the great Powers would only have the means to destroy the world three times over instead of four. Moreover, although the United States and the United Kingdom had maintained, at Geneva, that negotiations should be preceded by technical studies, the United States representative had nevertheless submitted a proposal for the control of outer space activities and particularly of installations for launching space vehicles and intercontinental missiles. That eloquently showed the futility of preliminary technical studies, which were advocated only in order to cover up the lack of any desire to negotiate and adopt genuine disarmament measures. It was not difficult, of course, to see why the United States had shifted its stand in that respect. If the United States representative had had some justification for referring to the reduction of the danger of war by miscalculation which would result from the adoption of the measures he had proposed, that was because their adoption would increase so greatly the danger of a nuclear war being started deliberately that the danger of war by miscalculation would become secondary.

15. There was one sure criterion for judging the value and sincerity of disarmament proposals: that was the effect their adoption would have on the armaments race and on international security. Whereas the adoption of the measures proposed by the Soviet Government for the first stage of the programme would make the arms race pointless, the measures advocated by the United States would have no significant effect, for even if the production of fissionable materials for military purposes were to end completely, the armaments race would still go on. The nuclear Powers had more than sufficient quantities of fissionable materials, and the stakes in the nuclear weapons race were now the perfection of those weapons and of the methods of delivering them. Besides, the establishment of control over armaments and armed forces, which would enable the great military Powers to obtain information they lacked, would be used not to halt the arms race, but to direct military efforts more effectively.

16. The adoption of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) would constitute a significant advance by comparison with resolution 1378 (XIV), which had been adopted in 1959. The failure to define the goal of negotiations as general and complete disarmament had caused the Powers negotiating at Geneva to waste a good deal of time. By adopting the Soviet draft resolution, which embodied some of the most important principles of general and complete disarmament, the General Assembly would furnish constructive guidance for future negotiations. The differences between the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250) and the Soviet Union draft lay not so much in the principles of general and complete disarmament as in the possibilities of and the need for achieving an agreement on the subject. The United States representative considered that the conclusion of a treaty which would enable general and complete disarmament to be carried out in an agreed sequence, by stages and within a specified period, constituted an insuperable obstacle to disarmament. Yet it was not by separately negotiated agreements, but by the conclusion of such a treaty that it would be possible to ensure, once the process had begun, that States would be obliged, under the most rigorous international control, to complete that process.

17. As for the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251), it proposed that the problem of disarmament should be approached as if there was still some doubt about the need for general and complete disarmament and hence about the possibility of achieving it and controlling its implementation. It reflected the refusal of the Western Powers to enter into genuine negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

18. The Romanian delegation did not want "all or nothing". It wanted general and complete disarmament. It would not rule out any steps that might help to improve the international climate. To that end it was necessary not, as proposed by the representative of Italy (108th meeting), that the nuclear Powers should agree to a reduction of their military stockpiles of fissionable materials but that they should solemnly undertake, before the General Assembly and the whole world, not to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons. By asserting that such an undertaking could not possibly be effective, the Western nuclear Powers showed that they doubted their ability to abide by it. Also, because the Romanian delegation favoured any effort to create a climate conducive to constructive negotiations, it would support the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.239/Rev.1).

19. It was in order to contribute to the development of good neighbourly relations and to the elimination of causes of tension and distrust at the regional level, and thus to the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war breaking out because of tensions existing at the regional level, that his Government had requested the inclusion in the agenda of the fifteenth session of an item entitled "Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems" (A/4440).
20. His delegation was confident that the adoption of adequate measures at the regional level, which it intended to propose at the appropriate time, could contribute significantly to strengthening peace not only in the various regions of Europe but also throughout the world.

21. The Committee's main task was to lay down directives on the principles of general and complete disarmament for the body which would be called upon to conduct the negotiations.

22. Mr. PLIMSDOLL (Australia) considered that one of the main problems was the difficulty of reaching an understanding, if only on the meaning of the terms used in the different draft resolutions, so as to achieve agreement in substance as well as agreement on a form of words.

23. Moreover, while there had to be agreement on general principles, an attempt had also to be made to avoid creating obstacles with the manner of applying those principles. It was therefore necessary to proceed with caution and not to try prematurely to draft a too comprehensive treaty which might limit future negotiations between those who would have to work out concrete proposals for disarmament.

24. One of the main issues that had to be solved was undoubtedly the question of control. Some speakers had said that one of the two groups was obsessed by the idea of control. A picture had been built up of control being in some way unworkable or undesirable or an unnecessary element in the situation. The Australian delegation felt that the distinction was not between control and disarmament, but between control and the reduction of armaments, both of which were elements in total disarmament. In certain cases, control itself might be a positive form of disarmament. For example, during the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests it had seemed that the common objective, at least for the initial stage, was control without reduction of armaments. What mattered was to reach general agreement on ending nuclear tests without insisting that agreement must also be reached immediately on what action or what action had to be taken in the meantime, whether the result was to be by unilateral or bilateral action. In other words, everyone was agreed on the need for establishing some control without a reduction of armaments.

25. His delegation accordingly felt that it was necessary to avoid being too dogmatic, and demanding that in all situations and in all spheres of disarmament, control and reduction must go hand in hand. In certain circumstances, control could give a feeling of security; it could offer some guard against surprise attack and give some evidence of the good faith of all the parties concerned. While it was true that the United States and the United Kingdom had given great weight to control, the Soviet Union was equally obsessed with the problem of control, and that was only to be expected. The USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) contained provisions for control, and the specific mention of the Security Council and of the structure of the Secretariat related to the question of control. The USSR draft resolution, like the three-Power draft resolution, and like every other proposal that was submitted, considered an essential element to be a decision on the plans for, and the purpose, the methods and the organs of control. Those genuine preoccupations raised questions, such as whether it would be possible for one of the parties to a treaty to exercise, through some voting arrangement, the power of veto on inspection, control or enforcement, or such as the composition of inspection teams.

26. The Australian Government could not accept the changes in the structure of the Secretariat of the United Nations proposed by the Soviet Union, but the proposals raised questions to which an answer could probably be found in some of the detailed negotiations which would precede the conclusion of a treaty. No one imagined that total or partial control of disarmament would be conducted by the Secretariat without the closest preliminary study, by all the countries concerned, of the ways in which control would be exercised. In fact, the machinery of control would be so complicated that it would have to be worked out very carefully, and the part to be played by the Secretariat would have to be defined.

27. The Australian delegation considered that, for the time being, agreement should be sought not on a comprehensive treaty but on partial measures, and that, in deciding what those measures should be, it was important to avoid any kind of doctrinaire attitude. Consideration must be given to what political accommodations were made possible or desirable in the light of the further progress of scientific research. Indeed many representatives, even from countries advocating an early comprehensive treaty, had gone on to propose what were in effect partial measures. A list of proposals which were in fact partial measures had been summarized to the Committee that morning by the representative of Cambodia. The attempt to reach agreement on the ending of nuclear explosions was also a partial measure. Again, during the past year Australia and certain other countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, had signed the Antarctic Treaty, under which that region would not be an area of military operations and would not be used for nuclear explosions. That limited agreement was, without doubt, a contribution to the security of the whole world and, in particular, of the countries bordering on the Indian, the Southern Atlantic and the South Pacific oceans. It was possible, moreover, that a number of partial measures of that kind could be taken simultaneously.

28. The Soviet representative's criticism of proposals for photographic reconnaissance from the air had been of great interest to the Australian delegation, which, however, wondered whether his objections were valid, and, if so, whether the answer was to do nothing or, preferably, to look for other parallel steps to make the suggested measures generally acceptable.

29. There were obviously steps which were generally desirable but were not acceptable to all for a number of reasons; for instance, one of the parties might feel that it was giving up certain advantages without receiving any benefit in return. If, however, several partial agreements could be simultaneously agreed on, there was a possibility that they might all be carried out.

30. The representative of the United Kingdom had referred—very weightily in the opinion of the Australian delegation—to the difficulties that countries with foreign bases would be confronted with if they should have to give up those bases except as part of a wider agreement between a number of countries covering several disarmament measures. It might well
be that neither photographic reconnaissance by overflights nor elimination of foreign bases offered the highest priorities in practical terms when tackling disarmament.

31. Progress would certainly be very slow if when a start was made on a particular subject, the argument was advanced that no progress could be made unless agreement was reached simultaneously and in advance on all questions. Regardless of what might be said of the draft resolutions before the Committee, there was, it would seem, a tacit admission that progress in disarmament would not be made on a broad front but that, by concessions here and concessions there, an effort would have to be made to take advantage of any openings that might appear.

32. The proposal in the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251) for studies by experts, for example, offered promise as part of a larger programme. It had, moreover, received rather wide support among members of the Committee, as evidenced by the statement of the representative of Peru at the 1091st meeting. The Australian delegation would be happy to examine any constructive suggestions in connexion with that proposal. The representative of the United Kingdom had made it clear that he was not putting his proposal forward as a means of delaying or as a substitute for other talks.

33. It was essential that negotiations should be resumed between the military Powers principally concerned, and the United Kingdom draft resolution was a step in that direction. There would, in any case, be greater likelihood of progress if it was frankly recognized that the difficulties being met with were products of the problems themselves.

34. The representative of Romania had claimed that the group of countries headed by the Soviet Union genuinely wanted disarmament, whereas the group of Powers headed by the United States talked disarmament but was in fact building up its arms. The Soviet Union itself, however, had announced that it was producing rockets in great numbers, had launched atomic submarines and was preparing fantastic new weapons. The fact was that so long as countries could not agree on disarmament, all the great Powers would feel obliged to maintain and build up their defences. It was that arms race which was the great danger and which gave such urgency to the efforts to remedy it. Yet there was still some hope if the nature of the problem was generally recognized even despite a lack of agreement on the solutions.

35. The Committee’s debates had given some indication of the views of the peoples of the world and of their Governments, but the time had come for a more detailed examination, which was not possible in a body of ninety-nine members. In particular, concrete problems should be studied by experts, as proposed by the United Kingdom; negotiations should be resumed between the major power groups; and all such studies and negotiations should be linked in some way with the United Nations, which had a clear responsibility in this field of disarmament. The Australian delegation was not rigid in its views on the form of the machinery to be set up. It was sure, however, that the members of the Committee still believed in the necessity of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and that they would strive to reach that objective.

36. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia) said that he would confine his remarks to agenda item 67. At previous sessions the First Committee had adopted resolutions defining the principles to be applied in a disarmament programme. However, it was no longer sufficient to lay down principles or to emphasize points of agreement; the exact nature of the obstacles in the way of the adoption of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be determined and a course for their removal must be decided upon.

37. All delegations were in agreement on three fundamental points: first, that disarmament was the most important problem facing the world today, as stated in resolution 1378 (XIV), which had been unanimously adopted by the General Assembly; secondly, that the ultimate goal was general and complete disarmament as proclaimed by the same resolution; and thirdly, that disarmament must be carried out under effective international control. The statements made to the Assembly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev (900th plenary meeting), and by the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower (865th plenary meeting), left no doubt on the matter. In other words there could be no disarmament without control and no control without disarmament. One could not be exclusive of the other, nor could one have priority over the other. It had been extraordinary, as the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, had pointed out to the General Assembly (882nd plenary meeting), that great nations should argue about priorities and make that a reason for not going ahead with negotiations. The inescapable conclusion was that disarmament and control must go together; they must be accepted concurrently and applied concurrently.

38. The only question, therefore, was the exact nature of the disarmament and control measures to be adopted. In that connexion it had been suggested that the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament and the Western proposals on inspection and control should be adopted simultaneously. Mr. Khrushchev had explicitly stated that if the Soviet proposals on disarmament were accepted, his Government was ready to accept any Western proposals on international control (882nd plenary meeting). Such a statement might be regarded as pure propaganda, but that would in no way detract from its value. The idea of a ban on nuclear weapons tests had also been labelled as propaganda but had finally triumphed on its own merits, and in that case propaganda had achieved valuable results.

39. In any event the Soviet declaration could not be lightly dismissed. One very simple method of proving its worth would be for the Western Powers to put it to the test, and to formulate specific control proposals for general and complete disarmament while at the same time declaring that they would accept the Soviet proposals on disarmament if their own proposals were accepted. In that way, negotiations would take a definite shape and would quickly lead to the adoption of concrete proposals on disarmament and control which could then be incorporated in treaty stipulations. If on the other hand no progress was made, all the peoples of the world would clearly see who was to blame.

40. The fact that no detailed proposal on control appeared in Mr. Khrushchev’s statements was no real obstacle to the adoption of the Soviet proposals, since the USSR admitted the need for complete and thorough control. It was clear, however, from the draft resolu-
tion submitted by the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.251) that in the opinion of the Western Powers the working out of the required control measures, in whole or in part, might present certain difficulties. If that was the case, the problems should be examined and solved one by one in resumed negotiations. There was no reason why experts should not be consulted in the course of the political negotiations.

41. Other difficulties arose from the fact that States, although in agreement on the final goal, had a different approach to the problem. The USSR plan (A/4505) called for bold measures from the first and second stages onward, whereas the Western Powers advocated a more cautious method. The United States proposals of 27 June 1960 (DC/154) called, in the first stage, for measures designed merely to halt the armaments race rather than to reverse it, and only in the third stage did those proposals call for real disarmament measures and become comparable with the USSR proposals. That difference in approach had a direct bearing on the question of what was to be controlled. It was obvious that the problem of control could only be approached after agreement had been reached on the measures to be taken in the first stage.

42. The time-table of a disarmament programme was also dependent upon the approach to disarmament. If the first and second stages were to include bold measures of disarmament, the three stages would have to follow each other according to a strict time-table, and the programme would have to be agreed upon in its entirety before implementation. In the opposite case, strict time limits would be less necessary, and the first measures could be implemented before agreement had been reached on the succeeding measures.

43. As, in those circumstances, it was scarcely likely that one side would voluntarily adopt the approach of the other, a common approach would have to be sought, especially as the problem also had a psychological aspect. The two sides were both seeking to eliminate mistrust, but by different methods: the Soviet Union by bold measures, and the Western Powers by a cautious approach. Their efforts to dispel mistrust were for that reason doomed to failure, and their opposition only served to increase that mistrust. The primary aim of the negotiations must therefore be to achieve a common approach, and the First Committee could provide useful guidance in that respect.

44. The first obstacle to such an approach arose from the principle that disarmament should be so balanced as to ensure the security of all States in equal measure. The Western Powers considered that the Soviet proposals disregarded that principle from the first stage onward. Thus, in the view of the representative of the United Kingdom, the liquidation of foreign bases would be a minimal sacrifice to the Soviet Union, whereas it would be totally crippling to the Western Powers and would deprive their less powerful allies of their only protection. In advancing that argument at the 1089th meeting, however, the United Kingdom representative had isolated one measure of disarmament from the many measures proposed for the first stage in the USSR plan. In the matter of destruction of all means for delivering nuclear weapons, a measure which might, in view of geographic realities, appear balanced to the USSR would appear as unbalanced to the United Kingdom. Thus, the principle of balanced disarmament became a source of controversy, although in fact it was only the approach to the whole problem that was different and not the concept of balanced disarmament.

45. The United Kingdom and some other delegations seemed to be insisting on the need for a balance defined in terms of preserving the status quo in Europe. Such an unrealistic attitude would make any solution impossible. The three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L. 250) started from the principle that nuclear and conventional measures of disarmament must be balanced. The Indonesian delegation believed that insistence on each disarmament measure being balanced in one way or another was tantamount to closing all doors to disarmament. On the other hand, the proposals of the Soviet Union and the United States, which rightly interpreted the principle of balance as meaning the balance of nuclear and conventional measures of disarmament, left some hope of achieving success in negotiations. In order to arrive at a common approach, the First Committee should give a specific directive so that resumed negotiations might be directed to clearly defined and agreed objectives.

46. His delegation was convinced that the participation of non-aligned countries in resumed negotiations would assist greatly in finding the necessary common approach and would prevent the harsh and abrasive encounters which had led to the disruption of negotiations in the past. If practical negotiations were to take place in an enlarged committee, it would seem appropriate that the over-all decision for general disarmament under international control should be adopted at a special session of the General Assembly, which could be held in April or May 1961 in a neutral country such as Switzerland. At such a session the Assembly could prepare the way for the actual implementation under effective control of a programme for general and complete disarmament.

47. If disarmament was achieved, an international peace force would have to be set up, and if that force was to be justly employed, changes might be necessary in the structure of the United Nations, which had been devised to meet the needs of the world in 1945 and should now be adapted to present-day needs. Disarmament was therefore an added reason for changes in United Nations structure.

48. His delegation proposed to speak again at a later stage in order to make known its views on the other questions relating to disarmament, namely, agenda items 86, 69 and 73.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.