AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73


Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) observed that the Committee, in opening its discussion on disarmament, had inherited from the past no single tangible achievement on which to build. In fact, the passage of time had markedly complicated the task of disarming, since weapons technology had steadily advanced. Thus, if no agreement were reached on disarmament, still more destructive weapons would be developed and disarmament would be rendered even more difficult. Moreover, the greater the number of nuclear Powers, the more disagreement there was bound to be on the subject of disarmament.

2. Some encouragement was to be derived from the fact that the major Powers now admitted that national aims could no longer be attained by war, and that an agreement on disarmament was necessary. Yet although there was tangible evidence, in the form of concrete proposals, of a general desire for disarmament, long-standing distrust and suspicion still frustrated all attempts to solve the problem. Any sober effort to achieve the desired goal must take that factor into account, and a realistic appraisal of disarmament proposals must be made, not in the abstract, but in the light of existing world conditions.

3. The Western proposals provided for general and balanced disarmament in three stages, with step-by-step verification, and provision for detailed control and supervision machinery at each stage. The Soviet programme also provided for three stages but was bolder in scope, envisaging general and complete disarmament within four years. It proposed a single agreement on disarmament with machinery for general control and inspection.

4. The main difference between the two sets of proposals lay in their varying emphasis on control. If the world were at present in a happier state, the Soviet proposal might well justifiably claim precedence over the Western proposal; but the realities of the present international situation ill accorded with such a bold plan. It might therefore be preferable to start with easily controlled measures and then, gradually, extend the dimensions of the work of disarmament. Such a programme, while ensuring progress towards the ultimate goal, would also serve as a training process and would promote trust and cooperation. Since disarmament had to be viewed within the context of East-West relations, which called for sustained negotiation in a spirit of compromise, all encouraging trends, however modest, should be taken into account as means of achieving progress. It was encouraging that attempts had been made on both sides to narrow the divergencies of views on certain points. Moreover, the progress made at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests showed that agreement on matters of disarmament was possible; and an agreement in that specific sphere might well lead to further understanding and help to create the necessary confidence for dealing with disarmament as a whole.

5. It was to be hoped that the First Committee's discussions would pave the way for an early resumption of disarmament talks. The disruption of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament had shown that what was important was not so much the composition of the negotiating body but the spirit which animated it. The appointment of a permanent chairman, of unquestioned impartiality and fully conversant with the complexities of the disarmament problem, might well do much to help the proceedings forward.

6. The question of disarmament was too important to be considered just another political problem, and the adoption of a given proposal must not be construed as a victory for one or another group. Disarmament must be a victory for all; real progress could be made only if the Committee as a whole declared itself in favour of a single definitive approach to the question. The
fact that the only alternative to a disarmament agree-
ment was too terrifying even to contemplate gave hope
that the discussion would result in a wise decision.

7. Mr. SON SANN (Cambodia) said that it was a
matter for regret that the question of general and
complete disarmament had not already been settled,
but that since the great Powers had so far been unable
to come to a direct agreement, Cambodia favoured the
resumption of discussions with a view to bringing about
a constructive and generally acceptable solution.

8. The Khmer people could not regard as Utopian the
hope that the scientists of the world would one day
unite in their efforts to relieve human suffering and
poverty. Thus, any effort to reach an international
understanding that would ensure peace through general
and controlled disarmament would have the complete
support of Cambodia, which had already contributed to
the achievement of that goal by adopting a policy of
neutrality and peaceful coexistence. In that spirit, the
Cambodian delegation would support any proposal that
would help to bring about general and controlled dis-
armament as quickly as possible.

9. Substantial progress had been made since the pre-
vious year. From the proposals submitted to the First
Committee and from the statements made in the
General Assembly by the President of the United
States (868th plenary meeting) and the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR (895th plenary meet-
ing) it would now seem that the two divergent positions
comprised a number of common elements. Both called
for a plan, for initial steps to implement that plan and
for safeguards to guarantee its execution. There was
good reason to believe that mutually acceptable
guarantees could be agreed upon. The unanimous
adoption at the fourteenth session of General Assembly
resolution 1378 (XIV) showed that the final renunciation
of armed forces and armaments was the common goal.
The outstanding differences seemed to be based on
fears that the measures proposed might give one or the
other side a military advantage or that arms control
prior to disarmament might prove to be a legalized
form of international espionage. Moreover, the Soviet
Union doubted the sincerity of the Western Powers and
had announced its intention to cease participating in the
negotiations if they failed to work for an agreement on
general and complete disarmament.

10. Thus, despite some narrowing of the difference
between the two positions, distrust continued to exist
on both sides because each country wished to preserve
its present military advantages. That lack of confidence
was the main obstacle to any understanding, and only a
direct prior agreement between the nuclear Powers
could remove the question of disarmament from its
present impasse.

11. The Indian representative had asked the United
Nations to lay down directives for the negotiators, and
the representative of Canada had urged the middle and
smaller Powers to voice their opinions. In response to
that invitation, the Cambodian delegation had a number
of suggestions to offer.

12. In the first place, disarmament negotiations
should be resumed as soon as possible, if not within
the United Nations at least under its auspices, for the
United Nations alone was capable of ensuring impartial
supervision and acceptable control, through its smaller
and uncommitted members.

13. Secondly, disarmament would be effective and
lasting only if applied to all countries. That observa-
tion was also relevant to the question of the suspension
of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and of the pre-
vention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.
Mainland China, whose military potential was far from
negligible, could not be excluded from disarmament
negotiations, and like other Powers would have to
provide its guarantee that disarmament, once agreed
upon, would be truly viable and universal.

14. Thirdly, the sooner negotiations for general and
controlled disarmament were resumed and concluded
the better, for before long many countries would be in
a position to test and even manufacture and distribute
nuclear weapons. That would only render agreement
more difficult.

15. Fourthly, it was to be hoped that in the forth-
coming negotiations the representatives of the great
Powers would meet in a spirit of conciliation and with
firm determination to ensure world peace by arriving at
an agreement on substitute measures for general and
complete disarmament. It was particularly important
that the great Powers should not complicate the task
of negotiation by adhering to unrealistic and even
untimely conditions, such as the refusal to include
mainland China in the discussions or the demand that
the United Nations Secretariat should be reorganized.

16. Fifth, there would have to be control not only over
disarmament but also over remaining armaments,
since the balance of forces must be scrupulously
maintained at the different stages of disarmament—
which must not be unduly protracted if a recrudescence
of the entire disarmament problem was to be avoided.
Control would also have to be exercised over stocks of
nuclear and conventional weapons to be destroyed, to
prevent their distribution to allied or other countries.

17. Sixth, in view of the technical complexities of the
problem, provision must be made for successive stages
in the road to the final objective. Each disarmament
step would provide experience which would be useful
in proceeding to the succeeding step. At the very least,
successive measures of that kind would help to extend
the "detente" and create a favourable climate for
general and controlled disarmament. However, dis-
armament would not be general and complete unless
conventional disarmament went hand in hand with
nuclear disarmament. In formulating disarmament
plans, the parties must agree on callings for conven-
tional weapons, taking into account the size and
geographical situation of each country; only adequate
security and police forces should remain, for self-
defence, not aggression against weaker neighbours. So
far, however, there had been a tendency to speak only
of disarmament by the great Powers, overlooking an
equally important aspect of the problem—disarmament
of smaller countries which were heavily armed with
conventional weapons and constituted a threat to neigh-
bouring countries.

18. Seventh, regional measures, such as the proposal
made to the General Assembly by the chairman of the
Cambodian delegation (677th plenary meeting) for a
neutralized zone comprising Laos and Cambodia, would
help in strengthening peace, particularly in sensitive
areas. Such a measure would pave the way for other
neutral zones and, ultimately, for general disar-
armament, by achieving the moral disarmament which
was a necessary prelude to that goal. Cambodia had also
noted with interest the reference made by the chairman of the Polish delegation at the 874th plenary meeting to the earlier Polish proposal for an atom-free zone in Central Europe, the Romanian proposal for a similar zone in the Balkans which had been renewed by the chairman of the Romanian delegation at the 873rd plenary meeting, a more recent proposal concerning the Far East and the Pacific which had been made by the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China on 3 August 1960, and, last, the proposal for the neutralization of Africa put forward by the President of Ghana at the 889th plenary meeting. All those proposals deserved serious consideration.

19. Finally, the Cambodian delegation appealed to all States, and particularly to the great Powers, to set aside all ulterior motives and thoughts of gaining tactical advantages, so that the Committee's discussions might proceed in an atmosphere free from ideological overtones. In the present crucial times, mutual recriminations and accusations should be eschewed.

20. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that although the United States and the other Western Powers had, for fear of alienating world public opinion, voted for General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), they remained firm in their opposition to general and complete disarmament. During the deliberations of the Ten-Nation Committee they had sought to bar any reference to the General Assembly resolution, and in the discussion in the First Committee of the order of consideration of agenda items they had tried to minimize the urgency of the disarmament problem. The United States, Canadian, Italian and United Kingdom representatives in the First Committee supported disarmament in principle, but it was clear that they hoped to prevent it from ever advancing beyond the stage of discussion.

21. The Canadian representative had declared that in view of the complexity of the disarmament problem, the only hope of achieving progress lay in technical studies. The implication of that proposal, which overlooked the fact that military technology was advancing at tremendous speed, was that the First Committee could take no practical steps towards a solution of the disarmament problem.

22. The Canadian representative had said (1068th meeting) that his Government was concentrating its efforts on improving the negotiating machinery, and that the task of the General Assembly at its current session was to support the Disarmament Commission's appeal for the earliest possible resumption of disarmament talks. However, the Soviet Union had proposed the inclusion of the question of disarmament in the agenda of the fifteenth session precisely because previous negotiations had accomplished nothing. The vital question was what the objectives and content of such negotiations should be, and the Assembly should adopt a resolution giving a clear and precise answer to that question. If some of the participants were working for disarmament while others were working against it, negotiations would obviously be doomed to failure.

23. The United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251) calling for the establishment of technical groups to study systems of inspection and control recalled the unhappy experience of the League of Nations, where, because of the unwillingness of Governments to make the political decision to disarm, innumerable technical studies had been carried out without bringing the disarmament problem any nearer solution. It was the General Assembly's responsibility to agree on the fundamental principles for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, so that future negotiations would have a concrete directive to guide them.

24. The true aims of the Western Powers were revealed by the draft resolution submitted by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.250) which, while calling for measures leading to the goal of general and complete disarmament, presented no programme for such disarmament. As in the Ten-Nation Committee, the Western Powers were striving in the First Committee not for disarmament but for control over armaments, which meant continuing the arms race.

25. It was significant that the three-Power draft resolution spoke only of reducing armed forces, and did not refer to their complete elimination even as an ultimate goal. Nor did it make any reference to the abolition of war ministries, general staffs, military schools and similar institutions. The draft resolution also ignored the question of the liquidation of military bases in the territory of foreign countries, even though—as the provocative actions of the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union had demonstrated—those bases constituted, together with the various means of delivering nuclear weapons, the main potential source of aggression. The existence, thousands of miles from the United States, of American military bases directed against the Soviet Union and other countries was a situation unprecedented in international relations, particularly in time of peace. The countries which had made their territory available for such bases must recognize that they were participating in provocation or aggression and were exposing themselves to terrible retaliation.

26. Speaking in plenary session, the representatives of many African and Asian States had supported the demand for the elimination of foreign military bases. The peoples of Africa were becoming aware that the colonialists hoped to use such bases to hamper the liberation of Africa and retain as much of their influence on that continent as possible. The proposal made by President Nkrumah of Ghana (889th plenary meeting) that the nuclear Powers should recognize Africa as a nuclear-free zone had evoked a particularly wide response.

27. With regard to the problem of preventing surprise attack, the United States had proposed that an international control organization should be informed in advance of all projected launchings of cosmic devices and of their proposed orbits, and that an agreed zone of aerial inspection should be established. But advance notification of launchings could not be relied upon as a means of preventing surprise attack while aerial inspection, besides being ineffective, would constitute legalized espionage and endanger the security of States. The practical solution to the problem would be the destruction of all military missiles and means of delivering them, and the elimination of military bases in foreign countries. The sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution refused to acknowledge the connexion between those two measures, even though the bases in question were obviously part of the machinery for delivering nuclear weapons. The objective of the Western Powers was clearly to gain a military advantage by securing the prohibition of long-
range missiles, in the development of which they lagged behind the Soviet Union, while retaining their military bases.

28. The real aims of the Western Powers were shown by the fact that United States military appropriations were continuing to rise, that nuclear striking forces were being developed along the shores of the Atlantic and the English Channel, and that the Pentagon had recently been directed to prepare a list of potential nuclear targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, militarist elements were gaining the upper hand in West Germany, which was now asking for nuclear weapons.

29. The Soviet proposals now before the Committee provided the basis for a workable plan of general and complete disarmament. In the absence of a clear directive of that kind, any future disarmament negotiations would be not only futile but also harmful, for they would delude the peoples of the world. If the Western Powers continued to use the discussion of disarmament to camouflage the continuance of the arms race, his delegation, like the Soviet delegation, would have no choice but to cease participating in the consideration of the disarmament problem in the First Committee.

30. Mr. BEAUNE (Peru) deplored the fact that no progress had been made towards a political solution of the disarmament problem, and that the great technological revolution of the present age had served only to increase the number, range, power and precision of leval weapons, and missiles, to raise the level of radiation to dangerous proportions and to accelerate the arms race. The policy of positions of strength had been justified as a means of defence, but it had made agreement difficult and had brought the world to the brink of war. Unless a radical change came soon, humanity was doomed to destruction.

31. In such a situation, the moral competence of the United Nations, and particularly of the General Assembly, must be recognized. But it was not a matter of moral competence alone. Under Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, the Assembly was authorized to make recommendations with regard to "the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments". It could not shirk that moral and legal responsibility. Indeed, disarmament began and ended in the Assembly. The Assembly should start, even before negotiations were resumed, by making recommendations regarding principles and creating an atmosphere for fruitful negotiations. The details of the agreements, however, could only be worked out between the parties.

32. But while the discussion of specific measures of disarmament was a matter for the negotiating body, that body could not work outside the United Nations. By its resolution 1378 (XIV), the Assembly might be said to have recognized the Ten-Nation Committee; that Committee should report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Peru supported Pakistan’s proposal (1085th meeting) that the Ten-Nation Committee should be presided over by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, who would guarantee impartiality and would be a moral and legal link between the Committee and the Assembly. It also supported the Brazilian proposal (1090th meeting) that the Ten-Nation Committee should have a vice-chairman from a neutral African country and a rapporteur from a neutral country.

33. Peru warmly endorsed the proposal in the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.231) that experts should be appointed to examine various technical aspects of disarmament. A group of neutral experts should be set up immediately, so that it could report to the Ten-Nation Committee and to the Assembly in good time. Such a group would prove extremely useful in the negotiations, for it could prevent protracted debate on technical matters which might be impeding progress towards a political solution. It would report any deadlocks on such matters to the General Assembly.

34. On the basis of the reports it received from the neutral rapporteur of the Ten-Nation Committee and from the technical study group, the Assembly could debate the issues fully and could make recommendations for breaking deadlocks and reconciling conflicting positions. The ideal solution would be for the nuclear Powers to agree to abide by those recommendations; but in any event, the problems of disarmament could no longer be attacked purely at the political level, for that would mean placing the fate of all mankind in the hands of a single Power. They must be dealt with at three levels. At the political-legal level, the parties would attempt to reconcile their positions in the spirit of understanding created by a basic will to agree; at the technical level, impartial experts free from political pressures would endeavour to resolve technical difficulties; and at the moral level, the last word would rest with the Assembly, which would speak on behalf of mankind either to confirm agreement or to fix responsibility for its absence.

35. The mistrust between the great Powers, which was fostering the arms race, could best be dissipated by some such first step towards disarmament as the adoption of measures to prevent surprise attack. That would be sufficient to restore confidence and to give hope to the world and to create a favourable climate for further negotiation. It was the duty of the Assembly, and particularly of the small and medium Powers, to offer the great Powers every co-operation in creating such a climate. They should strive to find areas of agreement in the various proposals, and to counteract the atmosphere of belligerency which frequently characterized the debate. The great Powers should be made to understand that the small Powers actually represented the most impartial control machinery.

36. The Peruvian delegation was still hopeful that a draft resolution outlining a minimum programme in very brief form would win approval in the Committee. Such a draft resolution should appeal to the great Powers to refrain from any action, attitude, declaration or position likely to increase international tensions, that is, any position which would have irreversible consequences. It should appeal to them to agree on measures to prevent surprise attack. It should call for the immediate resumption of negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee under the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, with the neutral vice-chairman and the neutral rapporteur suggested by Brazil. It should recommend the immediate establishment of a technical study group, consisting mainly of impartial experts, to examine the problems of control and inspection and the nature and organization of the control body. Finally, the draft resolution should require the Ten-Nation Committee to report to the Assembly on the results of the negotiations and should call upon the parties to undertake to abide by whatever recommendations the Assembly might make.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.