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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73


Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414; A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that before continuing the discussion on the disarmament question he wished to ask the members of the Committee to reflect on the gravity of their responsibility to the peoples of the world and to help the Committee to formulate, if not an agreement on disarmament, at least a number of generally accepted principles which might serve as a basis for such an agreement or for progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament laid down by the General Assembly at its fourteenth session.

2. Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia) said that the problem of disarmament was intrinsically bound up with political realities. Urgent measures to solve it were an absolute necessity; yet a profound crisis, both substantive and procedural, still existed. The Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva had been unable to resolve it; the summit conference, which might have contributed to a solution, had not even been held; and increased tensions between East and West had led to a serious deterioration in international relations. It was the task of the General Assembly at its fifteenth session to prevent any further deterioration, and by promoting better understanding among nations regardless of differences in their political and economic systems to help to solve the urgent problems of maintaining world peace and ensuring the progress of all peoples.

3. The question at issue, therefore, was not whether there were satisfactory disarmament plans, whether there were enough such plans or whether they provided a sound basis for successful negotiations; it was rather how to find a way out of the crisis in international relations.

4. The profound social and political changes taking place in the world: in particular, the emancipation of the colonial peoples, the social struggles within Western society and the rapid material development made possible by the great revolution in technology—such were the events constituting the background against which the actions of peoples and Governments fell into place. Resistance to those changes, or their exploitation for selfish purposes, had brought about the "cold war", one of the most dangerous features of which was the arms race. Yet, historical change and the technological revolution should cause no alarm, for they were the result of steady social and economic progress. What should cause concern was the utilization of advances in technology for the development of increasingly effective means of annihilation. It was essential, therefore, to abandon worn-out and obsolete ideas: there could be no victory in the "cold war": the arms race was bound to lead to real war, and only disarmament could open the way to the development of technology in the interest of human progress. The "cold war" must be overcome by application of the historically essential concept of co-operation among nations, and by a policy of active coexistence among all States. Since no nation enjoyed a monopoly of military techniques, it was no longer possible, without jeopardizing the very existence of mankind, to solve outstanding international problems by resort to war, by building up positions of strength or by exacerbating international relations.

5. Unfortunately, although that view was steadily gaining support in the world it had not yet fully prevailed, and the difficulties in achieving a solution of the problem of disarmament arose from the fact that the realities of the situation had not been recognized in all quarters. Although it was a generally accepted fact that the means of mass destruction at the disposal of the nuclear Powers could annihilate all life on earth, leading personalities of various countries continued to advocate further increases in the relative and absolute military power of their States through increased military expenditure, the development of so-called "absolute" weapons and "an absolute nuclear deterrent", and the discontinuance of the present moratorium on nuclear tests. Theories were being advanced
on the subject of local wars and the need to perfect
tactical nuclear weapons in order to "limit" war, and
plans were being made for the retreat of whole popula-
tions underground as a measure of survival. Such
policies could be explained only by the view that global
and limited wars could be waged in the future for the
purpose of achieving political aims; however, attempts
were also made to justify them by arguments concern-
ing the need for national security in a world in
which a potential aggressor might launch an attack.

6. The Yugoslav delegation, on the other hand, main-
tained that in a world which had undergone a profound
change, the problem of war and peace must be ap-
proached from a new angle, and that the objective of all
States must be to live in a world without armaments
and without war. While it recognized the difficulties in
the way of achieving that objective, in particular, mis-
trust between nations and justified fears derived from
erlier experience, it believed that modern social and
 technological developments and the increased aware-
ness of the peoples made it imperative to lay down new
 international foundations for ensuring peace in the
atomic age. Two principles must gain universal ac-
ceptance: that of active peaceful coexistence and that
of general and complete disarmament. Those prin-
ciples had in fact been the basis of resolution 1495
(XV) on co-operation of Member States adopted unani-
mously by the Assembly on 17 October 1960, which had
called for immediate and constructive steps to solve
urgent problems affecting the peace of the world and
the advancement of its peoples.

7. The main objective of the Committee should be to
provide an appropriate basis of principles for further
negotiations, and an acceptable solution with regard to
the negotiating machinery. It would be futile and mis-
taken to attempt to detect mechanical similarities
between the various plans, since there were actually
profound differences in the approach of the parties to
solving the disarmament problem. On the other hand,
the Committee should not conclude that a "rappro-
chement" of views was beyond reach, for to do that
would be to accept the development of a dangerous
trend which must be arrested. As the President of
Yugoslavia had said in the General Assembly (56th
plenary meeting), the only positive alternative to nega-
developments in the disarmament field was the
achievement of general and complete disarmament, as
proposed by the Soviet Union at the fourteenth session
of the Assembly (A/4219). It would however be in-
advisable to renounce in advance such measures as
might be likely, as part of the process leading to
general and complete disarmament, to stimulate by
their very nature further agreements on the disarma-
ment problem in its entirety. Among them, President
Tito had cited the discontinuance of nuclear tests; the
reduction of military expenditure and the utilization of
savings thus effected for assistance to under-developed
countries; the conversion of fissionable materials to
peaceful uses; and disengagement in Central Europe.

8. At its fourteenth session the General Assembly had
unanimously endorsed the goal of general and complete
disarmament, in its resolution 1378 (XIV), and it
should confirm that goal. That did not mean that ac-
ceptable gradual solutions could not be found within
that framework; and from that point of view the fact
that there was a certain similarity between the general
principles embodied in the various disarmament plans
was of considerable value. The Yugoslav delegation,
however, wished to make clear its view that world
peace, to the extent that it depended on the situation in
the field of armaments, could be secured only through
disarmament, and not through control of armaments
or any controlled or uncontrolled "balance of terror".

9. The various plans on disarmament reflected simi-
larities with regard to the principle of balance, al-
though difficulties were caused by subjectivity of ap-
proach and by the tendency to give the concept an
abstract absolute value. In practice, global balance
between East and West had already been achieved.
That should facilitate the implementation of agreed
measures aimed at general and complete disarmament,
provided a proper relationship was established
between those measures, and appropriate control was
ensured over their implementation. The indispens-
ability of control had also been recognized by both sides,
although the position of the Soviet Union on the ques-
tion had been inaccurately presented. Control, how-
ever, must be a function of disarmament; "control of
armaments" was a distortion of the function of control
during the process of disarmament, and would actually
lead to the perpetuation of the arms race. Moreover,
the development of military techniques would render
"control of armaments" impossible; and even if it
could be established, the arms race would continue
and membership in the "nuclear club" would continue to
expand. The risks arising from the possible imper-
fec tion of instruments of control were far smaller than
the risks threatening world peace from the continued
arms race. The United Nations provided the best
framework for the future control apparatus, and the
lesser Powers could play a very useful role in it.

10. Another important question was the time factor.
The accumulation of instruments of war and the de-
velopment of military technology made it imperative that
disarmament should be achieved in the shortest pos-
sible time, though within realistic time-limits. Undue
delay in reaching a solution unavoidably created new
problems. For example, despite the progress made at
the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapons Tests, a larger number of countries would
soon be in a position to produce atomic weapons. That
could be prevented by the timely conclusion of an
agreement.

11. The time factor must also be borne in mind in
connexion with the question of stages. Unfortunately,
the existence of three stages in the most recent pro-
aposals of East and West did not in itself demonstrate
the similarity of the proposals. It was much more
important that the plans should embody an agreed order
of measures which would satisfy the basic principles of
the process of disarmament already referred to. Such
an order could be established only through negotiations.

12. Turning to the subject of the disarmament
measures themselves, he said that Yugoslavia favoured
the early conclusion of an agreement on the suspension
of tests. It felt that the establishment of a proper link
between the liquidation of the means of delivery of
nuclear weapons and the parallel measures for a
radical reduction of conventional forces and arma-
m ents was a significant step forward; the disagree-
ments which still persisted on that point could be
removed by future negotiations. However, it con-
considered that, at a certain stage in the liquidation of
the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the stock-
plies of such weapons should be eliminated and their
use prohibited. Finally, decisive action should be taken
with respect to Central Europe, where the danger of a clash of arms was greatest because it was there that the armed forces of the two great military alliances confronted each other. In addition, Central Europe was being increasingly drawn into the arms race owing to the danger of the West German Army being equipped with rockets and nuclear weapons. The proposals that had been made with a view to preventing that development in Central Europe should be examined, and an agreement reached for the purpose of eliminating tensions in the area.

13. With regard to the role of experts in the negotiations, Yugoslavia considered that disarmament negotiations were primarily political. It therefore feared that however usefully they might assist the political negotiators, the interposition of experts would tend to detract from the essentially political nature of disarmament talks and might render solutions more difficult.

14. The Assembly's basic task at its current session was to explore all possibilities for the agreed resumption of negotiations at the earliest date. While it had had some reservations concerning the composition of the Ten-Nation Committee as a negotiating body, Yugoslavia had raised no objection to its establishment, hoping that it might break the then existing deadlock. As President Trabucchi had stated, however, Yugoslavia believed that the small countries which were not committed to military blocs should participate in decisions affecting the fate of the world. Those countries would be an important political and moral factor in any disarmament talks. The argument that they did not possess adequate "technical" qualifications was irrelevant; only the political representatives of nations, expressing the general will of all peoples for peace and international co-operation, could solve the disarmament problem in the interests of present and future generations. Lastly, Yugoslavia felt that while the closest possible link should be retained between the negotiating body and the United Nations, it was wrong to adopt a rigid position in that respect. Any recommendations taking account of past experience in that connexion and designed to promote a successful solution would be acceptable to the Yugoslav delegation.

15. Mr. ORMOSBY-GORE (United Kingdom) felt that despite the discouragement engendered by some of the sharp exchanges which had taken place during the current session of the Assembly, it was the first duty of all Members to endeavour to create a better atmosphere; and for its part, the United Kingdom was as determined as ever to find the basis of an agreement with the Soviet Union and its allies. The complexities of the disarmament question could be solved only if there was a sincere determination on all sides to grapple with the difficulties involved. For that reason, the events of the past year could not but cause a sense of deep disappointment. The United Kingdom Government had been considerably puzzled by the impatience shown by its Eastern colleagues at Geneva. Nevertheless, it would continue to assume that the Soviet Government and its allies were anxious to make progress in disarmament, and would address itself to the main task of reviving negotiations. The composition of the negotiating body had certainly not been responsible for the break-down, and with the formidable task that lay ahead, impatience would not help.

16. The views reflected in the two sets of documents presented at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva had at first been widely different. But there was no doubt that the discussions had greatly helped to clarify the reasons underlying those differences, and it had been possible to extend the area of common ground. Nevertheless, there were still important differences to be bridged between the Eastern and Western positions as they had emerged at Geneva, some of which were reflected in the papers before the First Committee.

17. In the first place, the Western plan allowed for an earlier start to be made on the actual process of disarmament, as distinct from negotiation. It was based on the principle that disarmament must start with the steps which could be accomplished and verified most easily, even while mutual confidence was non-existent. Such practicable measures would have the immediate effect of halting the accumulation of armaments and the discovery of even more destructive weapons. Equally, the Western plan would from the outset provide all States with security from surprise attack and ensure against the risk of war by miscalculation, until the present level of armaments could be reduced and national military might finally eliminated. There would be no long delay pending agreement in a world conference on a treaty covering the whole process of transition from a fully armed to a totally disarmed world. Under the Western plan, negotiations and execution could be hand in hand at all stages.

18. Although also providing for implementation by stages, the Soviet plan, by contrast, made no provision for any concrete action until detailed agreement had been reached on how everything was to be done. The Soviet proposals for the first stage of disarmament were so sweeping that no allowance was made for the gradual growth of international confidence and experience permitting more difficult and extreme measures to be taken. Thus, although there was little dispute concerning the final goal, the roads recommended for reaching it differed substantially. The Western side considered its route more realistic and less likely to deceive the hopes of mankind.

19. The fact that the Soviet Union had accepted the essential principle that provisions for international control should be written into a disarmament treaty seemed an additional reason why the start of the disarmament process should not await the signature of a treaty covering the whole process. Such an approach would make certain that no disarmament would take place in forty years, let alone four.

20. Again, under the Western plans nuclear and conventional disarmament would advance pari passu. Regardless of the stage of nuclear disarmament reached short of the elimination of the means of war altogether, if war broke out it would be a nuclear war within a year at most, for even if nuclear weapons were destroyed the knowledge of how to make them would remain.

21. Although the Soviet Government accepted the principle that at no stage should a programme of disarmament give any significant military advantage to any side, its proposals were far from being in harmony with that principle. Unlike the Western allies, which were divided by continents and oceans, the Soviet Union and its allies lived in close proximity, with land communications, and had military installations and bases situated on their own metropolitan territory. The suggestion that disarmament should begin with the
liquidation of all bases on non-metropolitan soil, and that all warships and military aircraft should be confined to their own territorial waters and air space from the first day of execution, entailed a minimal sacrifice for the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it would deprive the Western allies of all possibility of protecting their smaller partners, since they were dependent on sea and air communications and on the use of each other's territory for the disposition of their defensive forces. Under the Soviet proposal, the Soviet bases at home would remain substantially intact until a later stage in the programme.

23. Naturally, under both plans, when forces had been reduced to the levels needed for internal security purposes and for supplying contingents to an international peace force, the whole question of military bases on foreign territory would find its solution along with that of national military bases. For similar reasons, Western plans did not include the same provisions as those of the Soviet Union with regard to the total elimination of military budgets and military training. That was largely a matter of definition. Basically, there was probably little difference between what the Soviet Union termed "militia" and what the Western Powers called "internal security forces", and it would no doubt be agreed that both needed training and financing.

24. Although the Soviet Union seemed to have made a considerable advance towards the Western position on the subject of control, there was still a gap of unknown width. From the negotiations at Geneva, it was apparent that the Soviet Union was opposed to the idea that international inspectors, in addition to verifying the actual reductions in armaments and manpower, should be allowed to verify remaining quantities. The Soviet Union appeared to regard such verification as a mere pretext for an extension of intelligence activities and control of armaments. Admittedly, if such international inspection were to be attempted without the consent of the State concerned, it would be infringement of sovereignty. But there was no question of that. Every international treaty involved some voluntary abrogation of sovereignty for its signatories. The same applied with regard to control. The Western Powers were not asking anything of the Soviet Union that they were not ready to accept themselves. Unfortunately, in view of the present mutual distrust, mere declarations were not sufficient and both sides were entitled to insist on proof.

25. Finally, with regard to the staffing of teams to investigate suspicious events, the Western Powers considered it essential that none of the inspectors should be nationals of the country undergoing inspection; nevertheless, the Soviet Union insisted that one-third of the inspectors should be citizens of the country concerned. That could not be justified by fear of espionage, for the West had offered to allow the Soviet Union to attach to the team as many observers as it wished, to ensure that no unauthorized activities were engaged in.

26. Practical experience in such matters had led to the conviction that general undertakings as to control were not enough. Before disarmament measures could be undertaken, it was necessary to agree on details of control related to them which would reassure both sides from the standpoint of their own national security.

27. There were also differences in the views of East and West on the means of ensuring peace in a disarmed world. Since it was the possibility of war itself which had to be eliminated, it was encouraging that the Soviet Union had accepted the need for some peace-keeping machinery within the framework of the United Nations. But it was doubtful whether the Soviet proposal that such forces should operate only at the request of the Security Council would be adequate. If an international force was to be an effective deterrent to aggression, it would have to be so managed that no one State alone could place an embargo on its use in the event of conflict. An illustration had been provided by the fate of the Military Staff Committee, which had been reduced to impotence by the actions of one member of the Security Council. The building up of peace-keeping machinery might well require modifications of the existing United Nations organization: but the subject would require profound study and detailed negotiations, since a peace force was only part of the machinery needed for maintaining peace. A code of international law and an effective system of justice would have an equally important part to play. In any case, the proposals set out in the Soviet draft resolution (A/6.1/L.249) would clearly not be acceptable to the great majority of the Members of the United Nations.

28. His delegation believed, as, he thought, did Mr. Khrushchev, that the General Assembly could promote the early resumption of disarmament negotiations by agreeing on a resolution embodying the basic principles with which any disarmament agreement must comply. A body as large as the First Committee could not discuss the detailed procedures for translating those principles into measures, or how those measures should be divided into stages. Nor would it be helpful for the General Assembly to give its approval to one disarmament plan to the exclusion of others.

29. It was encouraging to note that in its draft resolution the Soviet Union had taken into account many of the comments made by the Western delegations at Geneva on the earlier Soviet proposal, and that many points in the Soviet draft paralleled those in the draft resolution submitted by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/6.1/L.250). That suggested that it might be possible to reconcile the existing points of difference. The main differences between the two drafts were the following.

First of all, the phrase "shall correspond to the scope and nature of the disarmament measures" in the USSR draft resolution was obscure, and appeared to
Indicate reluctance to accept complete and effective verification and control. He would like the Soviet representative's assurance that his Government had no fundamental objection to the wording of operative paragraph 3 (d) of the three-Power draft resolution.

30. Secondly, the proposed Soviet measures for maintaining peace in a disarmed world seemed subject to paralysis and hence wholly inadequate.

31. Thirdly, the Soviet Union had unfortunately introduced into its draft resolution proposals for the reorganization of the United Nations Secretariat which were unacceptable to a large majority of the Member States. He hoped that they would not be pressed.

32. In addition, the USSR draft resolution made no mention of four important points dealt with in the three-Power draft: the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only, the need to promote greater confidence between States by proceeding with measures which could be implemented at an early date, procedures governing the transition from one stage of disarmament to the next, and the principle that provisions on control should form an integral part of any disarmament agreement. Since the last two points had appeared in earlier Soviet drafts and the third had been mentioned by the Soviet representative in his statement of 19 October (1085th meeting), it was possible that they had been omitted by oversight.

33. With reference to the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251), he wished to make it clear in proposing the immediate establishment of technical groups to study the capabilities and limitations of systems of inspection and control, his Government was not putting control before disarmament. The matters involved were highly technical ones and could be studied without prejudice to such questions as the sequence of implementation of the various disarmament measures, which were matters for political negotiation; nor, as the resolution itself pointed out, need political negotiations on disarmament await the outcome of the technical studies. In the Ten-Nation Committee neither side would have been able to say, if pressed, what its proposals involved in terms of detailed practical arrangements. A great deal of scientific and technical work was required to devise effective means of controlling the elimination of modern armaments, whose destructive power was so great that even a small gap in a control system would make it possible for a violator to build up a position of decisive military strength within a comparatively short period. Inasmuch as no State would be willing to commit itself to any disarmament scheme until it knew what was involved and to what extent its security was safeguarded, preliminary technical studies of a detailed nature were clearly essential. Since it was his understanding that the Soviet Union agreed that appropriate control measures should form an integral part of any disarmament agreement, the need for such studies should be apparent to the Soviet Union as well. His delegation had no set view on the composition of the proposed technical groups, although they must obviously include representatives of the two principal military alliances. He recognized the validity of the Yugoslav representative's observation that other countries were also deeply concerned and wished to make a contribution.

34. In conclusion, he suggested that the Assembly might be able to agree on the goal of general and complete disarmament and on certain principles applicable to any disarmament plan which would help the parties in later negotiations. It must also pave the way for the resumption of negotiations. He hoped that the Assembly might yet prove that it could make a constructive contribution to disarmament.

35. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, said that the United Kingdom representative had asked how Mr. Khrushchev's assertion on 9 October that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept any control system proposed by the United States could be reconciled with the position taken by the Soviet Union in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. But the United Kingdom representative had omitted Mr. Khrushchev's immediately preceding sentence, in which he had stated that the Soviet Union was ready to sign a treaty on disarmament and the destruction of armaments. If the Western Powers would sign a treaty providing for disarmament and the destruction of weapons, then the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept any forms of control. But the Western Powers evidently wanted the Soviet Union to accept their control proposals without the signature of a treaty. At Geneva, moreover, the West was asking the Soviet Union to accept the United States control proposals even though the negotiations there were not even concerned with disarmament, but with the single question of discontinuing nuclear weapons tests.

36. The United Kingdom representative had also said that inspection measures in the territory of States should be carried out under an international treaty, since to inspect a State's territory against its will would obviously constitute a violation of its sovereignty. If that was the United Kingdom's position, however, he wondered why it had not joined the Soviet Union in protesting against the flight of a United States U-2 aircraft over Soviet territory, which had surely been a case of inspecting a State's territory against its will.

37. Mr. ORMESBY-GORE (United Kingdom) said that since the object of the Geneva conference was to bring about the cessation of nuclear tests under effective international control, it had seemed to him that Mr. Khrushchev's observations on the subject of control were relevant to the Geneva negotiations. In view of the statement just made by the Soviet representative, however, it seemed that the Soviet concept of effective international control might still mean that a control post in the Soviet Union would be manned by twenty-nine Russians and one foreigner, as the Soviet Union had originally proposed at Geneva.

38. He did not intend to enter into a discussion of the U-2 incident. In protesting against the U-2 flights, however, the Soviet Union had registered its disapproval of violations of State sovereignty, which was the point he had touched on in his statement.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.