CONTENTS

Agenda items 67, 86, 69 and 73:
Disarmament and the situation with regard to
the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution
1376 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the
question of disarmament (continued)
Report of the Disarmament Commission (con-
tinued)
Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
tests (continued)
Prevention of the wider dissemination of
nuclear weapons (continued)
General debate (continued) .......................... 21

Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73

Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414) (continued)
Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America) said that the primary obstacle standing in the way of disarmament negotiations during the past fifteen years had been the profound difference in purposes between the Soviet Union and the other nations, including the United States, and the resulting distrust. However, because so much was at stake for mankind in those negotiations, the United States had persisted and would continue to persist in its efforts to achieve disarmament.

2. The past year had been a discouraging one for disarmament. Hopes for progress had centred upon the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which had convened in Geneva on 15 March 1960 with the objective of carrying out General Assembly resolution 1376 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 calling for "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control". The five Western nations submitted proposals aimed at that goal at the very outset of the talks.

However, the Soviet Union had insisted that only its own proposals were consistent with the goal of general and complete disarmament. Finally, on 27 June 1960, although fully aware that the United States was about to present new proposals, the five Soviet-bloc representatives had abruptly terminated their participation in the Conference, after a series of speeches bitterly attacking the Western nations to which the Polish presiding officer, in a flagrant breach of parliamentary procedure and common courtesy, had refused to permit the Western representatives to reply. A United States appeal to the Soviet Union on 2 July to resume negotiations (A/4599) had been rejected. On 18 August, the United States had laid the reasons for the failure of the ten-nation talks before the United Nations Disarmament Commission (56th meeting); at the same time, it had called for the resumption of negotiations and made important new proposals for the removal of large quantities of fissileable material from weapons stockpiles and their conversion to peaceful uses. The Soviet Union had immediately rejected those proposals; but, like all others made by the United States since the end of the ten-nation talks, they were still maintained and awaited the Soviet Union's constructive attention.

3. His delegation hoped that the present debate in the First Committee would lead to an earlier resumption of disarmament negotiations among the Powers principally concerned, and would help to give the negotiators the necessary guidance. He wished to set forth once again the basic principles by which his Government was guided in disarmament matters, in the hope of thereby correcting any misapprehensions which might have been caused by the Soviet representative's statement at the previous meeting. The United States maintained armaments and armed forces solely for the purpose of avoiding war by deterring aggression, and not because it had designs on other nations or to bolster up its internal economy. It was convinced, however, that military strength could not provide a final solution to the problem of peace, and that the resources now absorbed by armaments could better be devoted to the construction of hospitals, schools and roads. The swift pace of development in military technology, which created conditions in which a nation possessing a temporary military advantage might decide to commit aggression or that war might result from an accident or miscalculation, made it essential to achieve early progress in bringing about balanced and verified disarmament. That end could not be furthered by the use of slogans or by agreeing on formulas which evaded the issues; the only effective approach was that of patient negotiation.

4. His delegation had joined with those of Italy and the United Kingdom in submitting a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250) designed to lead to general and complete disarmament under international control. He wished to point out that the sponsors of the draft resolution had great respect for the First Committee, which, contrary to certain statements made recently in the General
Assembly, was an important deliberative body which no single country could dominate and no country could afford to ignore. His delegation would not walk out of the Committee under any circumstances, and would not be intimidated by threats on the part of any other delegation to do so.

5. The disarmament goals sought by his Government, as set out in operative paragraph 2 of the three-Power draft resolution, were the reduction of national forces and armaments to levels required only for internal security and for the provision of contingents to a United Nations peace force, the elimination of delivery systems of weapons of mass destruction, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only, the establishment of effective means for verification of the observance of disarmament obligations, and the achievement of a secure, free and open world in which all peoples were protected from surprise attack or from the outbreak of war by miscalculation. The concept of the open society was the ultimate key to a reliable system of arms control.

6. The basic principles by which efforts to achieve those disarmament goals should be guided were set out in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. Those principles could be summed up in three propositions which coincided largely with those enunciated by the Soviet representative at the previous meeting.

7. The first principle was that a programme of disarmament must be so balanced as to give no country or group of countries a significant military advantage. The record of Soviet expansion during the first years after the Second World War, when the United States had had only 1.4 million men under arms, made it clear that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to make use of a military advantage in order to impose its system on other countries.

8. The second essential principle was that a system of adequate international inspection and control must be set up. Although the Soviet Union had long since accepted the words "inspection and control", its delegation was not yet convinced that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept really effective controls, for those words evidently meant different things to the Western and to the Soviet bloc nations. It was perhaps understandable that the United States and the other democratic countries were more willing than the Soviet Union to submit to international inspection and control. The United States was an essentially open country in which all were free to travel about as they wished, in which there was no censorship of the Press and military policies and plans were publicly debated. On the other hand, a great part of the world was composed of essentially closed societies in which the movements of both citizens and foreign visitors were restricted, the Press were rigidly controlled by the State, and military information and economic data were State secrets. However, international inspection and control could not be dispensed with merely because it posed difficulties for the leaders of certain nations, for a disarmament agreement not subject to verification could not inspire confidence. The Soviet Union had asserted many times that it would accept any system of controls if the Western nations would first agree to the Soviet Union's disarming proposal. But the experience of nearly two years of negotiation at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests at Geneva showed that as soon as one passed from words to concrete details, the Soviet Union's willingness to accept effective international control became less apparent. The Geneva negotiations would long have been successfully concluded had the USSR been willing to accept the inspection measures unmistakably necessary to provide proof that tests had ended. The rock on which they might still founder was the varying interpretation of what was meant by effective international control. The United States did not seek control for its own sake, or for purposes of espionage, as the Soviet Union had repeatedly charged. It had included adequate safeguards against that possibility in its various proposals, and had never asked the Soviet Union to agree to any measure of inspection or control which it was not itself prepared to accept. Its aim was solely to ensure that disarmament measures were not used as a means of acquiring military advantage by deceit.

9. The last of the three principles referred to was that progress towards general and complete disarmament could most effectively be made step by step. That approach was supported by General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), which called for disarmament measures to be "worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time".

10. Contrary to the Soviet Union's contention that it alone believed in general disarmament, the United States was prepared to proceed towards genuine total disarmament under proper controls as rapidly as possible. The question was how that aim could best be achieved. The United States delegation believed that the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) was intended to forestall rather than promote genuine disarmament, and that it placed two fundamental obstacles in the way of negotiation. In the first place, it insisted on a reorganization of the Secretariat and the Security Council; the aim was clearly to cripple the administrative machinery of the United Nations as well as the United Nations organ primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, thereby critically impairing the ability of the United Nations to prevent aggression in either an armed, a partially disarmed or an unarmed world. Secondly, it insisted that progress towards disarmament could be made only through a single treaty setting out a complete disarmament programme in which all disarmament measures were set forth for all time.

11. The words "general and complete disarmament", as used by the Soviet Union, implied that nothing could be done in the field of disarmament until everything could be done; thus, the phrase had become a propaganda slogan and an obstacle to real progress in disarmament. It was evident from the general state of international relations and from the behaviour of Mr. Khrushchev in the General Assembly that the negotiation of a single agreement covering all disarmament measures would be a long and arduous process. The United States delegation did not agree that no steps could be taken towards disarmament until all the technical problems of complete disarmament had been worked out. Rather, the first purpose of negotiations should be to mark out those areas in which immediate agreement would clearly serve the interests of both sides and would bring the world closer to the ultimate goal. The Soviet Union had supported that approach in the past, as, for example, in its willingness to negotiate on the cessation of nuclear tests before the whole process of general and complete disarmament had been worked out.
12. The desire for the earliest possible agreement on specific disarmament measures had inspired the proposals made at Geneva by the Western Powers on 16 March 1960 and by the United States on 27 June 1960.

13. He reviewed the most important measures which the United States believed could be taken in the very first stage of the disarmament process. It proposed that all production of fissionable materials for use in weapons be stopped and that, as an initial step, the USSR and the United States each transfer more than 30 tons of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium from weapons stockpiles to peaceful uses. The United States was thereby offering to remove from its arsenals a quantity of explosive material greater than that used in all past wars; and it was prepared to take that step without making it contingent upon any other disarmament measures. The Soviet representative, speaking in the General Assembly, had described that offer as insignificant—in fact it was an offer of the greatest magnitude. If it were accepted it would be the largest disarmament measure ever carried out. If the Soviet Union was unwilling to agree to a complete shut-down of its uranium and plutonium production centres, the United States was prepared to close its plants one by one, under international inspection, on a reciprocal basis.

14. A second proposal called for a group of experts to be set up to study the problem of verifying the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. That would be an important contribution to progress, since one of the major obstacles to nuclear disarmament had been the difficulty of detecting existing stockpiles.

15. His delegation also wished to recall the proposal on outer space made to the General Assembly on 22 September by the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhoower (588th plenary meeting). Under that proposal, States would agree (1) that celestial bodies were not subject to national appropriation by any claims of sovereignty; (2) that the nations of the world should not engage in warlike activities on such bodies, (3) that no nation should place in orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction, and (4) that all launchings of space craft should be inspected in advance by the United Nations. It would be noted that these points coincided in some respects with the ones made at the previous meeting by the Soviet representative. It was essential to act as promptly as possible to prevent the use of outer space for military purposes, for given the present rate of technological advance it would not be long before bombardment satellites and military space vehicles were developed. Fifteen years earlier, while still the sole possessor of atomic power, the United States had proposed that all atomic energy should be placed under full international control, but that offer had been rejected by the Soviet Union. It was essential that the same history of failure should not be repeated now with regard to outer space.

16. The United States also proposed that the following measures should be taken to reduce the danger of surprise attack or war by miscalculation: (1) zones of serial and ground inspection should be established in agreed regions, including regions in the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) observers should be exchanged at agreed military installations, including missile and air bases at home and overseas; (3) prior notification should be given to the United Nations of all proposed launchings of space vehicles and missiles and of their planned tracks; and (4) a United Nations verification body should be established which would be available to any nation desirous of proving its peaceful intentions and allaying the anxieties of other nations.

17. His Government also favoured the elimination not only of all weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, biological or chemical, but also of delivery systems for such weapons. It was prepared to undertake early technical studies of the measures which would be necessary to verify the control over reduction and elimination of agreed categories of such delivery systems, including missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery. It supported the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251), which dealt with that problem. When other confidence-building steps had been taken and verification procedures had been agreed on, the United States would reduce reciprocally with the USSR, and then eliminate all such systems in conjunction with other disarmament and peace-building measures of similar far-reaching consequences. The United States also supported the immediate setting of a ceiling of 2.5 million for the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. It further proposed the early conclusion of an agreement, to be acceded to by the militarily significant States, to reduce Soviet and United States forces to 2.1 million and establish force levels for other States. The United States also proposed, as a second step, that the Soviet and United States forces should be further reduced to 1.7 million.

18. The proposals he had just set forth should make apparent the baselessness of the Soviet charge that the West favoured "control without disarmament".

19. The United States believed that the First Committee should ensure that resumed negotiations would give priority to concrete agreements moving towards the ultimate goal of general, complete and verified disarmament. It was of course necessary to work towards the broadest disarmament treaty possible; but the better should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good.

20. His delegation agreed with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, that only a madman would think of resorting to war as a means of settling differences. That might represent a rather small area of agreement; but it was a vital one which could be built upon in future negotiations.

21. Mr. GREEN (Canada) said that in view of the seriousness of the situation, the primary responsibility of the First Committee at the present time was not to debate the merits of the principles and plans presented by the two sides, but to concentrate on bringing about a resumption of negotiations between them. It should be guided in that task by the terms of resolution 1495 (XV) adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 17 October, which called for immediate and constructive steps to be adopted in regard to the urgent problems of world peace. Unless both sides recognized that successful negotiations would involve genuine compromise, and were prepared to make balanced concessions, there could be no return to serious negotiations. The USSR representative had asserted that unless the Assembly agreed on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament, a resumption of negotiations would not advance the cause of disarmament. Canada believed, on the contrary, that the pur-
pose of negotiations was first to reach a basis for agreement and then to develop that agreement; consequently, the central problem was the resumption of negotiations, whether or not agreement was reached in the Committee on basic principles.

22. In any renewed negotiations on disarmament, the Powers concerned should surely capitalize on the progress made at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva rather than start again from the beginning. For its part, Canada was prepared to resume work in that Committee immediately. It was an appropriate negotiating forum, in that it brought face to face the Powers possessing the most powerful weapons and having the most experience in disarmament negotiations. There had been a tendency in the Ten-Nation Committee, however, for the two sides to talk at cross-purposes. In order to counteract that tendency and to focus the discussion on substantive measures, the Canadian representative at Geneva had suggested that proposals of comparable significance from the plans of each side should be discussed in conjunction, with a view to reaching agreement. That suggestion should not be construed as indicating that Canada sought only partial disarmament; it was merely a practical method of work. As a further practical step, Canada had suggested, at the 66th meeting of the Disarmament Commission, that the negotiating committee should have a neutral chairman, selected on the basis of personal qualities rather than nationality. He might be a national of one of the middle or smaller Powers—for example the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission—or a citizen of a non-member nation, such as Switzerland.

23. The problem of disarmament was growing in complexity, and it was essential to make a start on actual measures, without prejudice to the more comprehensive plans related to ultimate goals. One way to progress might be through joint technical studies. It was already agreed that in many fields of disarmament and verification such studies would be needed before actual measures could be agreed on and carried out; moreover, the Soviet Union had actually applied that method in connexion with the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests at Geneva. The United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251), which followed the suggestion made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, in the Assembly's general debate (877th plenary meeting), contained a useful, though not necessarily exhaustive list of possible technical studies. The Canadian Government favoured that approach, and believed it could be extended beyond the limits envisaged by the United Kingdom. Studies should be undertaken at the earliest possible date and continued regardless of any interruption in the political negotiations on disarmament. They would be conducted primarily by experts from the countries directly concerned in the negotiations, with the participation of qualified experts from other countries whose contribution would be based on technical competence rather than on political viewpoint. As the Foreign Minister of Sweden had pointed out (901st plenary meeting), more than one technical study group would be needed. The conclusions of the experts would not affect the political bargaining; but the negotiating nations would benefit from having at their disposal a qualified presentation of the technical problems involved.

24. The negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, which had shown more promise of serious intent than any others relating to disarmament, had begun with a preliminary joint scientific and technical study participated in by experts not only from the three negotiating Powers but from five other countries, who had produced a set of agreed conclusions greatly facilitating subsequent political negotiations. Moreover, the three Powers had from time to time referred other problems to their technical experts, acting jointly, for scientific study. The same method could usefully be applied to the technical problems arising with regard to various disarmament measures. In that connection, he reaffirmed Canada's opposition to further nuclear testing and its gratification at the fact that such testing had been unilaterally discontinued by the three Powers negotiating at Geneva. Canada hoped that a treaty would be concluded banning tests for all time and that many other Powers would accede to it. The General Assembly should adopt a resolution on the subject which would underline the urgency of reaching agreement on the remaining problems involved in the three-Power negotiations.

25. The Canadian Government believed that only by mobilizing world demand for action on disarmament could sufficient pressure be developed to induce the nuclear Powers to negotiate seriously at the earliest possible date, as recommended in the resolution (DC/182/Corr.1) unanimously adopted on 18 August by the Disarmament Commission, on which all the Members of the United Nations were represented. It was true that all countries in the world had an interest in disarmament; but obviously, the contribution which could be made by the great Powers was different from that which could be made by others—a fact which should be taken into account in setting up any machinery for examining the question of disarmament. Nevertheless, the middle and smaller Powers had a vital role to play in the broad field of principles, proposals and new ideas. Canada therefore proposed the establishment of a non-technical advisory or "watchdog" committee, consisting of representatives of middle or smaller Powers, to advise and encourage the negotiators.

26. The "watchdog" committee, which might be composed of some ten or twelve members representing the main geographical areas, would be established by the Disarmament Commission. It could receive reports and suggestions from the negotiating body, from technical study groups or from other members of the Disarmament Commission, and it could report directly to the negotiators—but the Disarmament Commission would be kept informed and consulted. It could consider the various sets of principles advanced by the two sides; it could discuss specific proposals such as that put forward by the representative of Ireland (896th plenary meeting) for the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons; it could consider how best to deal with weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; it could examine the problems of peace-keeping machinery in relation to the programme of disarmament; it could explore the relationship between that machinery and the disarmament control organization and the relationship of both to the United Nations; and, finally, it could discuss new ideas and suggest them to the negotiating body.

27. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) said that since all nations, great and small, were equally exposed to the increasing danger of total war, it was their duty to combine their efforts to find a solution to the disarmament problem. The combined and co-ordinated
contributions of all countries would constitute a formidable political and moral force.

28. It was essential, at the outset, to create a favourable atmosphere in the Committee for discussion of the various proposals, of the procedure for a resumption of negotiations, and of the areas of agreement already reached. The Mexican Government strongly hoped that the debate would proceed in a calm and orderly manner, free from the thunder and lightning of cold war, and that the Committee would not be blinded by dialectical pyrotechnics to the permanent goals all nations wished to achieve. It considered, despite the general disappointment felt when the Geneva talks were broken off and what now appeared to be an atmosphere unpropitious for further progress, that the negotiations which had thus far been held had not been wholly unsuccessful. Any exchanges of views on the complex questions of disarmament represented a further step, however small, towards the common objective, and there were more areas of understanding and agreement among the great Powers than were generally appreciated. Moreover, the resolutions unanimously adopted in the Disarmament Commission (DC/152/Corr.1) and in the General Assembly (resolution 1495 XV) should set the tone for the Committee's debate.

29. He wished to utter a solemn warning against the acceptance of three ideas which he regarded as extremely dangerous: that a limited war could be fought with small atomic weapons of limited destructive power; that the danger to mankind would be reduced if "clean" atomic weapons could be devised or the hydrogen bomb could be "tamed"; and that many people and even States could survive a nuclear war if the people could be trained to provide for adequate civil defence, to organize subterranean life efficiently, and to evacuate the cities. Those ideas were wrong. Nations and peoples should not blind themselves to the real danger: with increasingly destructive weapons and the addition of more and more nations to the "atomic club", there was no escape for any nation, irrespective of its political or economic system, from nuclear annihilation.

30. The various disarmament plans or proposals should not be used as weapons in the cold war, or as a means of testing, by sterile votes, the partisan fervour of delegations. The workability of a plan could not be measured by a majority vote; it depended on mutual confidence and agreement. The Mexican delegation urged representatives to refrain from repeating previous attacks and from engaging in a contest of arrogance and insincerity. It was easier to make agreement remote by adopting irreconcilable positions than to work slowly and quietly towards agreement.

31. The Committee should content itself at the present stage with examining the different views on the general principles which should govern disarmament and considering whether it might be possible for the parties directly concerned to agree on certain basic, minimum directives. In particular, the Committee should strive for agreement between those parties on the negotiating body in which talks would be resumed and on the working documents to be transmitted to the negotiators. The main objective should be the resumption of negotiations. The draft resolution before the Committee (A/C. 1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251) had been submitted in good faith, and they indicated that the existing areas of agreement were not inconsiderable. For its part, Mexico would examine all the proposals and suggestions made to the Committee, regardless of their source, in a constructive spirit.

32. The progress achieved in the efforts to reach an agreement outlawing nuclear weapons tests augured well for the future. All nations should continue to press for a successful conclusion of those negotiations, and should reaffirm the need for specific actions reflecting the common desire for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

33. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania), exercising his right of reply, pointed out that, contrary to the assertion made by the United States representative, he had never described the United States offer to convert 30 tons of fissionable material from military to peaceful purposes as insignificant. What he had said at the 900th plenary meeting was that even after that amount was removed from the stockpile, the fissionable material remaining would be sufficient to annihilate the world. The United States representative had not denied that statement.

34. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, said that he wished to comment on a number of remarks made by the representative of the United States in his statement to the Committee. The Soviet delegation could not agree with the United States representative's observations on Soviet society as compared with the "open society" of the United States; the heads of many delegations had had the opportunity to see for themselves just what was meant by the "open society" of the United States.

35. Mr. Wadsworth had opened his statement by a reference to the profound differences of purpose between the Soviet Union and the United States in regard to questions of disarmament, and the resulting mistrust. In that, Mr. Wadsworth was quite correct: profound differences as to aims did exist. Mr. Wadsworth, quoting President Eisenhower, had said that the concept of an open society was the ultimate key to a reliable system of arms control. Mr. Wadsworth had thus confirmed that the main purpose of the United States was to build a society in which control over armaments would be ensured. Unfortunately, therefore, the United States position on the important subject of disarmament furnished no basis for any kind of agreement. The Soviet Union had repeatedly stated that it would agree to disarmament under controls but that it could not consider mere control over armaments. It was quite clear from Mr. Wadsworth's statement that the philosophy of the United States was confined to the latter of the two propositions.

36. Unfortunately, there was also a difference in the positions of the two sides on the question of negotiations for general and complete disarmament. As in past statements, the representative of the United States had again expressed eagerness to bring about the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, but an illustration of the United States interpretation of that concept had been provided by the negotiations at Geneva. At the third meeting of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, Mr. Moch of France, in stating the purpose of the discussions, had referred not to General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament unanimously adopted on 20 November 1959, but to a communiqué of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four Powers of September 1959 (DC/144) as the fundamental basis
for that Committee's discussions. Moreover, he had spoken of the formulation of agreements on and recommendations for the limitation and reduction of all forms of armaments and armed forces, rather than general and complete disarmament, as the Committee's only task.

37. In response to subsequent Soviet demands for clarification of their position on general and complete disarmament, the Western Powers had implied that they were abiding by General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) concerning general and complete disarmament. Yet their references to that resolution had been confined to its paragraph 3. At the present meeting, the United States representative, again, had mentioned only that paragraph. He seemed to have no interest in paragraph 1, which called upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament. He was thus reverting to the position adopted by the Western Powers at the beginning of the negotiations, in March.

38. The United States delegation was downing General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) and seeking to distract attention from a programme for general and complete disarmament by discussing separate, partial measures, on the grounds that they were easier to effect. Yet the Soviet Union had met with no success in its proposals for partial measures, whether on a small scale or in the form of package deals; that was why it had approached the problem from an entirely new angle, in the hope of avoiding the difficulties arising in connexion with partial solutions. In the light of the distrust referred to by the United States representative, it was hardly possible to expect a solution of individual problems, such as control over the launching of rockets, which would result in an advantage to the United States. It had been in order to avoid any suspicion of seeking advantages for itself that the Soviet Union had suggested large-scale measures to reduce the military potential of all Powers in a uniform fashion. Nine-tenths of the measures proposed by the United States representative involved control over existing armaments. The only genuine disarmament measure was that relating to a reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces from 2.5 million to 2.1 million. Although the actual wording of the Western draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250) was similar to that of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249), therefore, the two differed substantially, and any attempt to reconcile the two could only be explained by inadequate examination of the two texts.

39. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada had stressed the need for technical preparations, by experts, as a basis for agreement. In emphasizing that need, they had drawn attention to the experience of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The United States representative had said that, although it need not take long to agree upon what was to be done, considerable difficulties arose concerning a system of control and inspection. He had indicated that if the Soviet Union had agreed to the necessary inspection and control, all tests could have been halted. Unfortunately, that statement did not take sufficient account of the true facts of the situation. In the first place, before the start of the negotiations it had been agreed that talks should be held with a view to reaching agreement on the cessation of tests. The very labelling of the talks indicated that it had been agreed that tests should be stopped. Secondly, after the technical discussions, in which the experts had established what the Soviet Union had always maintained, that a system of controls was quite feasible, and had even outlined plans for such a system, the United States had—six months later—announced that the control system devised by the experts, including United States and United Kingdom experts, had become obsolete. The failure was due not to the experts but to the fact that the Pentagon wished underground tests to be carried out for the purpose of perfecting tactical weapons. From that experience it could only be concluded that no amount of technical discussion could assist in the conclusion of an agreement in the absence of a firm political intention to conclude an agreement.

40. From what had already been said, it was clear that the United States had no wish to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament, and merely wished to propose measures for partial disarmament. Therein lay the difference in objectives and approach between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States representative's statement had been of valuable assistance in confirming that point.

41. The representative of Canada seemed to advocate the speedy resumption of talks even though no clear basis for agreement existed. The Soviet Union, having participated in talks for fifteen years, could not agree with that view, and had no intention of engaging in pointless talks designed only to deceive the peoples of the world. The representative of Canada had said that it was impossible to establish conditions for holding negotiations, since negotiations, in his view, were designed precisely to develop conditions for ultimate agreement. But long experience of negotiations proved that that was not so. In view of the unanimous adoption of resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament, it should surely not be necessary at the present stage to meet again in a ten-nation or a fifteen-nation or any other committee in order to formulate a basis for further negotiations.

42. The Soviet Union could fully agree with the conclusion drawn by the representative of Mexico, that it was not a majority of votes in the First Committee that would determine whether or not there would be agreement on disarmament—in short, whether there would be war or peace—but that it was necessary instead to find a basis for an honest and sincere agreement. He hoped, therefore, that all representatives would give careful consideration to the statements made by the Soviet and other delegations, with a view to forming a correct judgement of the situation, liberating themselves from illusions and understanding why the Soviet Union could not be expected to take part in any discussions which lacked a basis for agreement. He also hoped that the United States, the United Kingdom and other States desiring to participate in negotiations would seek a genuine basis for fruitful discussions.

43. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland), exercising his right of reply, referred to the United States representative's allegation that the representative of Poland, acting on 27 June 1950 as the Chairman of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, had denied the floor to the representatives of Western Powers. That allegation was quite unfounded. After the statements by the five representatives of the socialist States announcing the discontinuance of their participation in the work of the Committee, the office of the Chairman had been terminated with the termination of the work of the
Committee itself. There had thus no longer been a quorum in the Committee for further debate, and since the Chairman, who represented a country whose Government had decided to discontinue its participation, had relinquished the Chair, the Polish representative could neither give nor refuse the floor to anyone.

44. Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom), replying to the representative of Poland, said that he had been present at the meeting in question and that before the meeting the French and United States representatives had asked the Chairman to be allowed to speak. Instead of recognizing either of those representatives, the Chairman had recognized the five communist representatives in succession, and after declaring the Committee's business concluded, had left the room. The Ten-Nation Committee had been set up by an agreement (DC/144) signed by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and it was not possible to close the Committee's work by the unilateral action of one party to the agreement. Reference to the records of the meeting in question would enable any member of the Committee to ascertain the true facts of the matter.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.