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Chairman: Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73


Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434)

GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. Zorin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Committee ought to work out the basic clauses of a treaty on general and complete disarmament without delay, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). In 1959, the peoples of the entire world had warmly welcomed the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament (A/4219), in which they had seen fresh confirmation of the peaceful and humanitarian foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which by the very nature of its socialist system did not include any class or group interested in starting a war or pursuing the armaments race. That programme, approaching the problem as it did from an entirely new angle, made it possible to overcome the main difficulties that had become evident during the fifteen years of negotiation. Unfortunately, a year had passed without the peoples’ hopes materializing. The United States and its allies had brought the negotiations to a deadlock and had used the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament as a screen for continuing the armaments race. Instead of studying the Soviet plan, they had submitted to that Committee plans for the control of armaments whose actual purpose was to establish an international espionage system. At the same time, the United States was hastening its military preparations, setting up new bases and making preparations for the transfer of nuclear weapons and rockets to West Germany, and was even going to the length of sending military aircraft into the air space of peaceable nations. The recent request (A/4543) of the Cuban Government for the question of aggressive acts committed by the United States to be placed on the agenda showed that it had not given up that policy.

2. What had happened in the Ten-Nation Committee must not be repeated; it was time to carry into effect General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament. The USSR was ready to make yet another attempt to come to an agreement with the Western Powers on disarmament. With that end in view, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had submitted to the General Assembly on 23 September 1960 (609th plenary meeting) a proposal entitled “Basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament” (A/4605). That programme for general and complete disarmament under effective international control took into account all the useful suggestions made by various States and individuals during the past year.

3. It provided for the disbanding of all armed forces and the complete and final abolition of all armaments, in three stages spread over an agreed period of time and under strict international control—which was in complete conformity with the Assembly’s decision at its fourteenth session. During the first stage, Governments would cease to manufacture nuclear weapons and destroy all means of delivering them, would eliminate foreign military bases and would withdraw all their troops from abroad; the armed forces of the USSR and the United States would be fixed at a maximum of 1.7 million men, conventional weapons being reduced correspondingly. Those measures could be taken within a year or eighteen months. They would prevent any surprise nuclear attack and considerably reduce the risks of a conflict breaking out suddenly.

4. But it was impossible to stop there. Once the international control organization and the Security Council were convinced that all States had fulfilled their obligations for the first stage, the second stage could be undertaken. That would involve the complete prohibition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with the cessation of manufacture and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons. At the same time, a further reduction would be made in armed forces and armaments.

5. The third stage would bring the abolition of all armed forces, the destruction of all armaments, the termination of all military production, the abolition of
war ministries, general staffs and military and para-
military establishments and organizations and the
 discontinuance of military appropriations. With that,
the risk of war would have vanished once and for all.

6. The execution of that plan presupposed effective
international control. It had been alleged that the Soviet
Union did not want adequate control. But it was in fact
the Soviet Union which had asserted that if disarm-
ament was to be general and complete, control must also
be complete; it was the Soviet Union, again, that had
worked out a comprehensive programme of control
measures which would ensure that all States fulfilled
their disarmament obligations. From the very first
stage, the USSR proposed that on-site control should be
established over the destruction of vehicles for nuclear
weapons, including rockets; that inspection teams
should be dispatched to places where military bases
were situated and troops stationed on foreign terri-
tories; that control should be established at airfields
and ports, to ensure that they were not used for mili-
tary purposes, and in plants manufacturing rockets,
aircraft and other means of delivering nuclear weapons
(and even that permanent control teams should be
established in such plants); that control teams should
be authorized to supervise rocket-launching sites and
to be present at launchings, to consult documents per-
taining to budgetary allocations for military purposes,
and to take the necessary measures to supervise the
disbanding of troops and the destruction of conventional
armaments. The USSR proposed equally strict control
for the second and third stages. Moreover, the control
system would continue in existence after the comple-
tion of the third stage. If any State had other views on
control, the USSR was ready to accept its proposals,
provided that they called for control of disarmament,
and not of armaments. Mr. Khrushchev had stated
quite clearly that the USSR was ready to sign a treaty
on disarmament and the destruction of armaments, and
would accept any proposals the United States might
make for genuine control of disarmament.

7. Such a measure would guarantee all States real
security. Nevertheless, as there were some who
doubted whether it would be sufficient to remove all
danger, the USSR proposed that a disarmament treaty
should make provision for additional security mea-
sures, for example, placing police (militia) units at the
disposal of the Security Council. Of course, so long as
the executive organ of the United Nations was con-
trolled by a single individual, the danger existed that
the international armed forces would be used to serve
the interests of a single group of Powers, as in the
Congo at the present time. The structure of the Secre-
tariat and the Security Council must accordingly be
changed to ensure that the three groups of States—the
socialist countries, the Western Powers and the neutral
States—had equal representation in those organs.

8. In its present proposals the Soviet Union had taken
into account the views expressed by the Western
Powers on a number of subjects. Thus, provision for
the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear
weapons was now made at the very first stage in ac-
cordance with the views expressed by the President
of the French Republic, General de Gaulle. As the Western
Powers had advocated at the Conference of the Ten-
Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva that there
should be a reduction in armed forces and conventional
weapons as early as the first stage, the USSR had taken
that wish into account. The same applied to the pro-
hibition of the placing into orbit or stationing in outer
space of any special devices capable of carrying
weapons of mass destruction, the obligation not to
launch rockets except for peaceful purposes and under
suitable international control, including the inspec-
tion of launching sites, the details of the organization and
operation of the control system, and the utilization of
international police or militia units.

9. The adoption of the Soviet proposals would permit
not only the abolition of war but also the allocation of
tremendous funds for the economic development of all
States. That would lead to extraordinary progress
throughout the world in a very short space of time. For
that reason, the Soviet Government had included special
provision for the utilization of such resources in its
programme for complete and general disarmament.
The Soviet Union's realistic plan had been widely sup-
ported in all countries, and such distinguished states-
men as the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, the
President of Indonesia, Mr. Sukarno, and the President
of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Nasser, had ex-
pressed approval of it.

10. The Soviet proposals were not simply to be
adopted or rejected; instead, they should be carefully
examined and any useful suggestions that might be
made should be turned to good account. If the First
Committee could agree on the basic provisions of a
treaty, that would be a great step forward. To give
specific instructions to the negotiating body on dis-
armament would in itself represent considerable pro-
gress, provided that those instructions were aimed at
the formulation of a treaty for general and complete
disarmament. The general debate had shown that many
States had realized the necessity of such a step.

11. The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) submitted
to the General Assembly by Mr. Khrushchev on 13 October
(904th plenary meeting) provided such instructions; it
contained all the fundamental principles on which a
disarmament treaty ought to be based: none of them
could be rejected without jeopardizing the whole cause
of disarmament. Naturally, the Soviet delegation would
give the most careful consideration to any observations
aimed at improving those instructions which would not
delay the conclusion of a treaty for general and com-
plete disarmament. Once the General Assembly had
approved those principles, it would have to decide the
membership of the body to be assigned the task of
drawing up the treaty. In that connexion the Soviet
delegation had submitted a proposal (A/4509) designed
to broaden the membership of the Ten-Nation Com-
mittee on Disarmament. Then, at an appropriate stage,
specialists would have to be called in to work out
measures of disarmament and control in detail. But it
would be absurd from the point of view of disarmament
and dangerous from the point of view of peace to start
by studying technical details. Without political instruc-
tions or an agreement in principle on the basis for a
disarmament programme, the experts would merely
produce an accumulation of documents, and create the
illusion that negotiations were proceeding while the
armaments race actually continued. The peoples of the
world had already had that experience: the negotiations
of experts under the League of Nations had ended with
the Second World War.

12. With its present membership, the Ten-Nation
Committee could not be entrusted with the negotiation
of a treaty for general and complete disarmament
since it did not include representatives of States uncommitted to any bloc; yet the solution of the problem was a matter of concern to them too, and their opinion could carry much weight. The USSR proposal of 26 September that the membership of the present Ten-Nation Committee should be enlarged by the addition of India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Ghana and Mexico (A/4509) would be in line with the principle of fair representation of the three groups of States existing in the world and that of geographical distribution.

13. The USSR was doing everything in its power to hasten the conclusion of a treaty. Thus, in January 1960 it had decided to reduce its armed forces unilaterally by a third (i.e. by 1,200,000 men); it had already reduced those forces by 2,140,000 men in preceding years. The Assembly had very recently adopted, by an unanimous vote, resolution 1455 (XV) urging that "immediate and constructive steps be adopted in regard to the urgent problem concerning the peace of the world and the advancement of its peoples" and recognizing the need "to contribute towards greater harmony among nations irrespective of the differences in their political and economic systems". Surely an agreement on the basic principles of a treaty for general and complete disarmament would meet those requirements perfectly.

14. On the other hand, if the Western Powers made use of negotiations to deceive the peoples of the world, as they had been doing ever since 1946, then the Soviet delegation would be unable to associate itself with them. As Mr. Khrushchev had told the Assembly: if that happened, the Soviet delegation would consider it pointless to participate in the proceedings of the First Committee or of any other organ dealing with the question. Yet no sooner had the USSR submitted its proposals than the Western Powers had hastened to present two draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.250 and A/C.1/L.251). The speed with which they had acted was in itself suspicious: why did they not first make a careful study of the Soviet proposals? If they disagreed over certain points, their views could always be taken into account. If, however, they considered the Soviet proposals unacceptable in principle, it could only be because they were opposed to general and complete disarmament and to the working out of a treaty to that effect.

15. The Western proposals would lead to delay in working out a treaty and to endless and pointless discussion on the technical details of armaments control, without any real measure of disarmament. The United Kingdom draft resolution (A.C.1/L.251), for example, recommended the appointment of a group of experts to study the problems of inspection and control. But it had long been well known that no agreement could be reached by starting with a discussion of technical details in the absence of any political foundation—in the form of the general principles of a treaty—and of an integral programme of general and complete disarmament.

16. As for the draft resolution submitted by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (A/C.1/L.250), its terms seemed positive at first sight, but it provided for no programme of general and complete disarmament and did not even mention the need to conclude a treaty on that subject. Even at Geneva the Western Powers had repeated that agreement should be reached, not on a programme of general and complete disarmament, but on various separate measures, namely measures for controlling existing armaments, rockets in particular. To be sure, the three-Power draft resolution mentioned the elimination of the delivery systems of all weapons of mass destruction and of all those weapons themselves. But when the Soviet delegation put forward the same proposals, it was in the form of specific measures to be implemented under strict international control during the first and second stages of general and complete disarmament, whereas the West regarded that as a distant goal and gave no indication of when or how it could be reached. Moreover, the draft resolution said nothing about the disbandment of all armed forces, the abolition of ministries of war, general staffs and military institutions and the discontinuance of arms production and military appropriations. Nor was there any mention in it of bases on foreign soil, just as if that question did not exist. Yet in the General Assembly the representatives of many States had called for the early liquidation of military bases.

17. In short, the Soviet proposal was for a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament under international control, whereas the three-Power draft resolution stopped short at abstract formulae and vague expressions of desire regarding disarmament, while emphatically pressing for control over armaments. Thus the policy of the Western Powers was still to protract and disrupt negotiations on disarmament, to intensify the armaments race and to aggravate international tension. If they maintained that negative position, the First Committee would be unable to accomplish any fruitful work, and the USSR would not waste its time in such idle discussions. What was needed was not a document to be filed away, or an exercise in eloquence, but a concrete means of solving the gravest problem of current international relations, the problem on which the lives and well-being of 3,000 million human beings depended.

18. Mr. BHUTTO (Pakistan) noted that for fifteen years world leaders had lacked the political and moral courage to lead the world towards disarmament and to deliver it from the fear of war. In the present state of technology, an arms race was the most unstable of all forms of security, for the equilibrium could be upset at any moment by an unexpected break-through in technology which would give the advantage to one side. The smaller nations took it that the great Powers were seeking a more permanent and secure basis for peace than that of the present precarious balance of terror. It was now for all Member States to give earnest consideration to the proposals for general and complete disarmament which had been submitted and to the results of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Pakistani delegation would not enter into a discussion of technical details, for the First Committee was not an appropriate body for such discussions. It would confine itself to an objective and non-partisan consideration of the political aspects of the problem.

19. While the search for a solution had scarcely made any headway at all, the difficulty of controlling the new weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery was increasing owing to the rate of scientific progress. It was tragic that there had been so much delay in eliminating nuclear weapons—so that detection was now more difficult—and in taking measures to check the missiles race. The lost opportunities
demonstrated that there was a critical point in the development of any weapon after which control became impossible or extremely intricate. The rejection, at Geneva, of the Western proposal to discuss the prohibition, under effective control, of earth satellites armed with nuclear weapons foreboded the extension of the arms race to outer space. According to an article in The New York Times of 12 October 1960, a technique for the separation of enriched uranium had been developed in Germany and the Netherlands which would make it possible for any technologically advanced nation to produce atomic weapons without large financial expenditures and thus become a nuclear power in a few years. It was high time therefore, to reach agreement on the prohibition, under international control, of nuclear weapon tests and on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. To the technical difficulties had now been added a formidable political obstacle. At the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, the Pakistan representative in the First Committee (1036th meeting) had expressed satisfaction that the Western Powers had at last abandoned their insistence on linking progress in disarmament to the solution of certain political problems. But now, at the current session, it was the Soviet Union which was insisting on linking disarmament to changes in the composition of two of the principal organs of the United Nations: the Security Council and the Secretariat. Those facts underscored the dangers of wasting time in finding a solution.

20. In spite of the unanimous adoption of resolution 1378 (XIV), the positions of the East and the West had remained too far apart to permit the drafting of a treaty of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The members of the Ten-Nation Committee had not even been able to agree on the question whether the discussion of a specific measure should begin with the aspect of disarmament or that of control. Negotiations had been confined to exchanges of views on certain principles of disarmament and control.

21. It was true that discussions in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the Western proposals of 16 March 1960 and the Soviet proposals of 2 June 1960 had led to a significant measure of "rapprochement" on certain basic principles, in particular those relating to the chronology of control measures. Nevertheless, agreement had not proved possible on all points. The Soviet Union had not gone to the point of agreeing to the verification of armed forces and armaments of all types remaining at the disposal of States after reduction. In the view of the Pakistan delegation, such verification could not be characterized as "control of armaments"; it might in fact become an essential condition for effective control over at least certain measures of disarmament. Any disagreement between the parties on such questions needed careful examination by experts before the General Assembly could express itself on the merits of the conflicting arguments.

22. The Ten-Nation Committee had not been able to agree on a time-limit for implementing the programme of general and complete disarmament or on the quantum of reduction of armed forces and armaments at each of the three stages. Nevertheless, even on those questions a certain flexibility could be observed on both sides: the Eastern Powers were prepared to relax their stand on a four-year time-table if the Western Powers agreed to fix a time-limit for each of the three stages envisaged and for the disarmament programme as a whole, while the Western Powers showed willingness to fix a reasonable time-limit for the first stage, while rejecting as impracticable the idea of a final time-limit for the two succeeding stages.

23. On the question of the quantum of reduction of armed forces and armaments, conventional and nuclear, no real common ground had been found. In view of the existing tension and distrust between East and West, the disarmament measures envisaged in the first two stages by the Soviet proposals of 2 June 1960 (A/4374/Rev.1) had been too drastic. The proposals had also gone too far in asking for the complete elimination of all means of delivery, the withdrawal of foreign troops and other such measures from the very beginning of the first stage, and the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the beginning of the second stage. The Western Powers, on the other hand, had always maintained that the final elimination of such weapons and the means of their delivery should take place only in the third and last stage of any programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

24. It was not only fear and distrust that constituted obstacles to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the first stage. The two camps had acknowledged that there was as yet no known scientific method of detecting clandestine stockpiles of nuclear devices. That was why the General Assembly had changed its approach to the problem of disarmament and, in resolution 1148 (XII) of 14 November 1957, had recommended instead of comprehensive measures the adoption of partial measures "as a step towards a scientific break-through which would make a more effective detection system possible. The Soviet Union maintained that, with the elimination of all means of delivering nuclear devices, difficulties of control and detection would disappear. The Pakistan delegation was in no position to express any opinion on that argument but, having regard to the importance of control, it felt that if the world was to be disarmed as soon as possible, the question should be referred without delay to scientific, military and administrative experts.

25. In view of the uncertain outlook for an effective system of international control, his delegation was not surprised that the Western proposals, including the United States programme of 27 June 1960 (DC/154), envisaged a rather modest measure of disarmament in the earlier stages. So far as the reluctance of the Western Powers to agree in advance to any definite time-limit for the implementation of the entire programme of general and complete disarmament was concerned, the best solution would be to examine that question in the light of the conclusions of experts on the feasibility of devising an effective inspection system to guard against any concealment of nuclear weapons. The parties to the disarmament negotiations were still deeply divided in their approach to the serious problem of disarmament. The Eastern Powers were insisting that the programme of general and complete disarmament had to be negotiated as a whole, from the first stage to the last, before anything concrete could be done about specific disarmament measures. They showed no disposition to consider any formula, such as that suggested by the Western Powers, which would mean the adoption of certain partial or
initial measures, not in isolation, but as integral parts of a continuous programme of general and complete disarmament.

26. From a comparison of the United States proposals of 27 June 1960 and the Soviet proposals of 2 June 1960 as presented in their revised form by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, at the 803rd plenary meeting, it appeared to the Pakistani delegation that the following measures would offer the most hopeful prospects of early implementation as parts of a programme of general and complete disarmament: (1) prohibition against the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction; (2) cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the transfer of agreed quantities of such material from past production to non-military uses; (3) prior notification of proposed launchings of missiles; (4) appropriate measures to give greater protection against surprise attack; (5) measures to prevent a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

27. His delegation felt that the immediate implementation of those initial measures would in no sense prevent the parties from continuing to negotiate on the more important measures which were basic to the proposals for general and complete disarmament. It believed that, in the prevailing climate of fear and distrust between East and West, a modest approach would have more chance of success if initial agreements on peripheral issues would help to restore mutual confidence and would thereby improve the prospects for wider agreement on the fundamental problems. If, on the other hand, that approach were rejected at a time when the two sides had failed to find an agreed basis for further negotiations, the process of disarmament would be unlikely even to get started.

28. In addition to the initial steps referred to above, certain measures could be taken to reduce armed forces and conventional armaments. Greater substance could be given to the first stage in the United States proposal of 27 June 1960. His delegation therefore urged both sides to find a basis for compromise between their respective proposals. The Soviet Union now proposed that the armed forces of each of the two Powers should be reduced to 1.7 million in the first stage. The United States had agreed to that figure for the second stage. Since the Western Powers regarded the first two stages in their disarmament plan as a continuing process, it would surely not be too much to ask that a figure between 2.5 and 1.7 million should be agreed upon by the two sides so as to achieve a measure of real disarmament at the very outset.

29. His delegation had consistently maintained since 1955 that for all the Member States, except perhaps the three nuclear Powers, meaningful disarmament must entail a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments which would enable them to reduce their military expenditure and to employ the greater part of their financial resources for productive purposes. The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in particular, had no prospect of improving the living standards of their peoples unless the resources utilized for armaments were diverted to economic development. That was why his delegation had joined with those of Mexico and Costa Rica, at the tenth session of the General Assembly, in introducing an amendment which was embodied in paragraph 3 of resolution 914 (X).

30. In proposing that general and complete disarmament should begin with measures which were capable of early implementation under effective international control, his delegation was not reverting to previous Assembly resolutions, notably resolution 1148 (XII), which had envisaged partial rather than general disarmament measures. His delegation held that, while negotiations were under way with a view to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, measures which could be implemented at once should not be delayed until complete agreement had been reached on all the measures falling within the scope of the treaty. During the general debate in the Assembly, his delegation had been impressed by the consensus which had emerged in favour of conducting negotiations on disarmament measures progressively, depending on how rapidly they could be implemented.

31. Since much remained to be done in solving the administrative and technical problems connected with the implementation of those measures under effective international control, the time had come to appoint panels of experts to study them and report to an appropriate organ of the United Nations. In particular, it was essential to know whether the effectiveness of control would be impaired if verification did not extend to the armed forces and armaments which would remain at the disposal of States after reductions had been carried out. Moreover, even in regard to measures which did not, strictly speaking, involve reductions—for example, the prevention of surprise attack—technical and military studies should be resumed at the point where they had been discontinued, on 18 December 1958, at the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack. It was essential for the General Assembly to be provided with authoritative findings by competent experts on the feasibility of taking initial measures within the framework of a programme of general disarmament. He recalled in that connexion the amendment presented jointly by Norway and Pakistan at the twelfth session, which now constituted paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1148 (XII). He also recalled a suggestion his delegation had made at the fourteenth session that the technical approach should be extended to the problems involved in the possible reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. That idea had been incorporated into resolution 1252 (XIII). It was regrettable that the deadlock which had gripped negotiations since 1957 had prevented the implementation of the General Assembly's recommendations concerning the creation of panels of experts and the need for technical study of the technical aspects of disarmament.

32. The General Assembly should urge the two sides to resume negotiations forthwith on the proposals for general and complete disarmament under effective international control with a view to achieving a constructive solution as soon as possible. No delegation had the moral right to make its participation in such negotiations conditional on the acceptance of its demands, for that would be incompatible with its special responsibility under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of world peace. Moreover, a start should be made with those measures which were capable of early implementation under effective international control without upsetting the balance of forces among the various countries or groups of countries, even before complete agreement was reached on all aspects
of general and complete disarmament. The Ten-Nation Committee should give priority to measures of that kind.

33. The present crisis was not one of procedure; it was a crisis of confidence. Nevertheless, if the First Committee wished to enlarge the membership of the Ten-Nation Committee so as to make it more fully representative of the various areas of the world and shades of political opinion, his delegation would support any proposal to that end. On the other hand, as the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs had pointed out at the 86th meeting of the Disarmament Commission, the Ten-Nation Committee might benefit from having a neutral Chairman. His delegation felt certain that the Mexican representative, Mr. Padilla Nervo, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, would be the most suitable choice for that position.

34. Disarmament could not be achieved unless the great armed Powers had the will to reach agreement. That was why a special session of the General Assembly with the participation of Heads of States and Governments could only be fruitful when the great Powers had achieved a sufficient measure of reconciliation in their conflicting positions. Similarly, it was premature to demand a change in the structure of the Secretariat before having taken a single step to disarm.

35. The United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L. 251) represented a constructive initiative. In particular, it called for a study of the technical feasibility of control to ensure the progressive reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, and to prevent, as was indispensable for general and complete disarmament, the clandestine stockpiling of nuclear weapons. It also called for a study of the problems of control which had arisen in connexion with such measures of disarmament as were capable of early implementation. The United Kingdom proposal was thus in line with the views of the Pakistan delegation. Moreover, the United Kingdom draft resolution included four provisions which should commend themselves to the Committee. First, the resumption of political negotiations would not have to await the results of the technical studies, and the Ten-Nation Committee would be able to proceed with its work simultaneously with the experts. Secondly, the experts would have to submit a report within six months to ensure that the talks were not indefinitely prolonged. Thirdly, the experts would have to submit their report to the Disarmament Commission, thus bringing the discussion back into the framework of the United Nations and enabling the Disarmament Commission to play a more active part than it had done in the past. Fourthly, the question of inspection and control was brought back to its true proportions and placed in proper perspective, since the experts were to confine their study to the scientific, technical and administrative aspects of control. It was thus recognized that technical talks were no substitute for political negotiations, which alone could bring about agreement on disarmament between East and West. The Pakistan delegation would therefore vote in favour of the United Kingdom draft resolution.

36. A comparison between the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) and the three-Power draft (A/C.1/L.250) showed that the positions of the sides had come somewhat closer, particularly with respect to the specified time-limits for the implementation of disarmament measures and to the definition of the goal of general and complete disarmament. However, the differences of approach to the common goal still persisted. The Soviet Union placed its emphasis on the conclusion of a treaty which would include a detailed programme for general and complete disarmament, whereas the Western Powers wanted a start to be made on those measures which were capable of early implementation under effective international control. Although they had many points in common, the two parties still had very different views on the general principles which should govern the negotiations. They disagreed particularly with regard to the verification of armed forces and armaments remaining at the disposal of States and with regard to the change in the structure of the Secretariat. Moreover, the Soviet Union wanted participation in the international control organisation and in the international armed forces to be open to all States, while the Western Powers considered that they should remain within the framework of the United Nations. The three-Power draft resolution was in accord with the substance of the views of the Pakistan delegation. However, the negotiations would have a greater chance of success if both sides worked out, as they had done at the previous session, a joint draft resolution which the Assembly could adopt unanimously.

37. Although the problem of disarmament had been discussed for fifteen years, the various organs which had dealt with it had concerned themselves exclusively with the political and military aspects and had neglected the economic and social consequences. And yet, the impact of disarmament might be such as to revolutionize the world economic situation. For example, nations disbanding their armed forces and halting the production of weapons and implements of war would have to maintain demand at its former level by means of public and private expenditure which could theoretically replace defence expenditure. The underdeveloped countries might have to bear an even greater economic burden as a result of a decline in the demand for their raw materials. Compensatory measures would have to be taken in the form of tax reductions, and it would become imperative to provide international economic development in order to protect national economies as well as the world economy. The human and material resources which had been absorbed by a war economy would have to be integrated in an economy of stable peace. The nature and scope of the problem would be different for countries with a free economy and those with a centrally planned economy. The difficulties would be greater for the countries which devoted a large proportion of their resources to maintaining armed forces. Those were some of the basic economic problems which would arise from disarmament.

38. Furthermore, a scientific and objective analysis of the economic and social effects of disarmament was urgent and imperative, because many people feared that an end of the arms race might lead to a world economic crisis and those fears influenced the policies of Governments to varying degrees and held back the growth of public opinion in favour of disarmament. The Pakistan delegation firmly believed that the time was ripe for a study of those economic and social consequences, because time-limits were now being proposed for implementing measures of partial or complete disarmament. The study would not deal with the utilization of the savings released by disarmament for
the economic development of the under-developed countries, for that question could only be considered when the amount of such savings and the time when they would be available were known; it would deal with the much broader and more detailed question of the adjustment of all countries to the economic situation resulting from disarmament. Nor was the suggested study expected to present a blue-print, but only general conclusions. A study of that kind could undoubtedly best be undertaken by the Secretariat and would be very useful to Governments and non-governmental organizations. The Secretariat should of course invite Governments to co-operate by providing it with the necessary information on military expenditure and on the industries and projects related to defence. It might also recruit consultants representative of the main schools of economic thought. True, the Secretariat's resources were at present absorbed by existing work programmes and by the emergency operations in the Congo. However, in view of the vital importance and urgency of the suggested study, it should be undertaken as a matter of priority with the assurance, if necessary, of the required budgetary support.

39. Mr. ORMSEY-GORE (United Kingdom) noted that the representative of the Soviet Union appeared to be under some misapprehension regarding the motives which had led the United Kingdom to submit its draft resolution. Contrary to what he seemed to think, there was nothing sinister in them. The United Kingdom draft logically followed from the address made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the General Assembly (577th plenary meeting). When Mr. Macmillan had suggested that a meeting of experts might be called to examine the various aspects of the disarmament problem, with particular reference to the verification of disarmament measures, he had recalled that the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had been preceded by a meeting of experts from the Eastern and Western Powers. The experts had drawn up a report and political negotiations had then started in October 1958. The United Kingdom delegation still believed that a treaty could be concluded on the discontinuance of nuclear tests and indeed the continuation of negotiations on that particular subject was in many respects the only bright spot at the present time on the disarmament horizon. It was in the light of that encouraging precedent that the United Kingdom delegation had decided to introduce its draft resolution, which reproduced in a more specific form the suggestion made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. There was nothing in the draft resolution which might imply that the United Kingdom wanted to delay negotiations on disarmament. On the contrary, its sole purpose was to establish machinery which would provide the negotiators with the technical information they would need, in other words, to expedite progress towards disarmament.

40. Furthermore, the United Kingdom draft resolution did not say that the appointment of experts was the most urgent measure to be taken. In fact, the last paragraph of the preamble merely stated that the resumption of negotiations on disarmament measures need not await the outcome of an examination of the problems of verification.

41. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) wanted to know what precisely would be the task of the group of experts suggested in the United Kingdom draft resolution and whether its work would take the place of negotiations or aid negotiations between statesmen.

42. Mr. ORMSEY-GORE (United Kingdom) said that he would prefer to reply to that question in the course of his statement to the Committee.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.