4. Neither the referendum of September 1958 on the new French Constitution nor the elections of November to the French National Assembly, both of which had been carried out in Algeria with the "participation" of French troops, could convince anyone that the Algerian people intended to renounce its right to self-determination, freedom and independence. Only by helping the Algerian people realize that right, which was embodied in the United Nations Charter, could the United Nations solve the Algerian problem and put an end to the fighting. The primary responsibility rested with France, which must begin to place its relations with Algeria on a new foundation by entering into negotiations with the real representatives of the Algerian people. His delegation would support any draft resolution which contributed to the attainment of that end.

5. Mr. MISSALATI (Libya) said he hoped that the Algerian question, which was now before the Committee for the third time, would be settled in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and in such a manner as to satisfy the Algerian people's aspirations for self-determination and independence. He regretted that the French delegation had refused to participate in the Committee's discussion of the question.

6. Despite the unanimous adoption of General Assembly resolution 1184 (XII) on 10 December 1957, the war in Algeria was continuing, and a peaceful solution was nowhere in sight. The French Government, acting in a manner completely contrary to the spirit of the resolution, had staged a referendum in Algeria in an effort to prove that the latter was part of France and that the Algerian people had abandoned its struggle for independence. It had also held elections in Algeria to the French National Assembly, in which the only candidates had been persons who favoured the maintenance of French rule in Algeria. Although the French Government asserted that the elections had been conducted for the first time on the basis of equal representation, the Moslem inhabitants of Algeria were to have only forty-six representatives in the French Parliament as compared with twenty-one for the European inhabitants, even though they were nine times as numerous as the latter. Various newspapers in France and the United States, French liberals in Algeria, and such leading French political figures as Mr. Pierre Mendès-France, a former Prime Minister, and Mr. Gaston Defferre, the former Minister for Overseas France, had condemned the undemocratic nature of the Algerian referendum and elections; and the African-Asian group at the United Nations had stated on 9 September 1958 that the extension of the French constitutional referendum to Algeria was contrary to the wishes of the General Assembly and would not promote a solution of the Algerian problem.

7. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had repeatedly declared its willingness to nego-
tiate a solution of the problem, provided that the French Government agreed to discuss the political issues and to take into account the Algerian people's desire for independence; it had also stated that Algerian independence would not be an obstacle to the establishment of a new relationship between France and Algeria based on mutual respect for the sovereignty of both countries. However, France had rejected the Provisional Government's proposal; it was continuing to wage war not only in Algeria, but on the territory of neighbouring countries, as was attested by the bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef in February 1958 and of the Libyan village of Esin in 1957 and 1958.

8. The General Assembly must be guided in its deliberations on the Algerian question by the principles of the Charter, and its decisions must be worthy of those principles.

9. Mr. ISMAIL (Federation of Malaya) said that his Government had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, but considered that it was its duty to use its influence, in conjunction with other Member States, to remove all causes of strife and injustice. That attitude underlay its wish that an amicable solution should be found to the Algerian problem.

10. The Federation of Malaya associated itself with the peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples of the world in voicing support for the rights of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence, and regretted that the French delegation had not seen fit to join the Committee in its sincere efforts to seek a peaceful solution to the Algerian problem. It did not accept the French contention that the problem was one essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of France. Algeria had its own geographical and historical identity and personality, and neither its annexation by France and French efforts to assimilate it, nor the recent talk of integration with metropolitan France could make it a part of France or turn Algerians into Frenchmen. What was taking place in Algeria was not civil war, but a war for independence.

11. That war, which was now in its fifth year, was a matter of great concern to the peace-loving peoples of the world, and must be brought to an end. The French Government must recognize the existence in Algeria of a genuine nationalist movement which expressed the national aspirations of the people of Algeria, and must realize that sooner or later France would have to come to terms with the forces of nationalism in North Africa and regularize its relationship with the proposed Maghreb federation of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, with which it could continue close association on a basis of equality and mutual benefit. France might well profit from the magnanimous example of the United Kingdom, which had yielded to the legitimate national aspirations of its colonial territories and had thus helped to create a family of free and sovereign nations with which it continued to be associated.

12. His delegation earnestly hoped that, under the leadership of General de Gaulle, France would face the realities of the situation in North Africa as it had done in Indo-China, and would once again demonstrate to the world its fidelity to its great tradition of freedom.

13. It was encouraging to note that General de Gaulle had on 23 October 1958 spoken of a "brave men's peace" in Algeria. However, his delegation agreed that the French Prime Minister's recent offer of negotiations to end the hostilities in Algeria had been no more than an invitation to the representatives of the Algerian people to surrender. In its view, that was not the way to end the war in Algeria. The French Government must realize that the starting point of any fruitful negotiations to end the hostilities in Algeria would have to be some form of recognition of Algerian nationalism and of the legitimate desire of the Algerian people for independence. Negotiations would have to be entered into with the acknowledged leaders of the nationalist movement which was carrying on the struggle for Algerian independence and had the support of the Algerian people. Those leaders had expressed their willingness to enter into negotiations with France. His delegation welcomed the conciliatory spirit they had displayed, and hoped negotiations would soon be held so as to put an early end to the bloodshed in Algeria, to restore normal and friendly relations between France and North Africa, and to reach an amicable solution of the problem in conformity with the United Nations Charter.

14. Mr. ESIN (Turkey), referring to the union of Algeria and Turkey which had existed within the Ottoman Empire for more than 300 years, and the bonds of kinship, common faith and culture which linked the two countries, said that Turkey shared the concern of many nations over the situation in Algeria. At the same time, Turkey also had strong cultural and political ties with France. His Government was therefore anxious to see the suffering of the Algerian people brought to an end through a just solution acceptable to both sides.

15. Since the General Assembly's last resolution on the subject (resolution 1184 (XIII)), new Governments had been formed both in France and by the men of fighting Algeria. Those changes should be an incentive to the United Nations to continue and intensify its endeavours to clear the way for any conciliatory move which might bring the opposing viewpoints closer. His delegation believed in the virtue of good offices, and hoped that they might be used to bring about direct contacts between the parties.

16. The very complexity of the Algerian question might also be considered an encouraging factor, because it made possible a wide variety of solutions. His delegation had been particularly impressed by the Pakistan representative's plea to both sides to link their ideals and interests in a new interdependence based on the free consent and sovereign equality of the peoples of France and the Maghreb (1019th meeting). But other solutions might also meet the legitimate interests involved, and his delegation did not think that at the present stage the possibilities should be limited by specific directives. Therefore, a resolution appealing to both parties to engage in negotiations with a firm desire to reach a solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter would at present be the best service the United Nations could render to the cause of peace in Algeria and to humanity as a whole.

17. Mr. BOLLAI (Hungary) said that the General Assembly had at its twelfth session adopted a non-commital resolution on Algeria because the forces primarily interested in upholding colonial rule over Al-
geria had been able to carry the day. Since that time, the situation had in one respect changed for the worse: in France, extremist military elements had been gaining strength. However, there had also been a change for the better: the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had been set up which was eager to find an opportunity to settle the question of Algeria, including its future relations with France, through negotiations rather than warfare. That Government enjoyed the full support, not only of the Arab peoples, but of the whole of progressive mankind.

18. The claim that the war in Algeria was a domestic French dispute was obviously untenable; Algeria was a formerly independent country which had been forcibly occupied by France. So long as any French Government regarded Algeria as a part of France, it would be unable to deal peacefully with the Algerian people and its representatives.

19. The maintenance of French rule in Algeria benefited only the French capitalists, whose profits from Algeria had risen steadily, and other foreign interests. It did not correspond with the interests of either the French or the Algerian people. The failure of the United Nations to take more effective action to oblige France to negotiate with representatives of the Algerian people had been due to the desire of the Western Powers to exploit the oil resources of Algeria and to subordinate the rights of the Algerian people to the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

20. The Hungarian delegation considered that the time had come for the General Assembly to take a forthright stand and to recognize that a foreign Power was waging a colonial war against the Algerian people. That war jeopardized the security of the Mediterranean and the Middle East and of the Arab peoples, and was a threat to world peace. It was therefore the duty of the United Nations to take a position in the matter. Hungary recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and sovereignty, and therefore considered that the General Assembly should do its best to see that France began negotiations as soon as possible with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on the question of Algerian independence and on all military and political problems outstanding between the two countries.

21. Lastly, his delegation protested against the tactics that had been employed in the United Nations by the colonial Powers, which had attempted to divert the attention of the Assembly and of world public opinion from the important problem of Algeria by forcing the General Assembly a simultaneous discussion of the spurious "question of Hungary".

22. Mr. NINICIC (Yugoslavia) expressed regret that the hope of a peaceful settlement of the Algerian conflict remained unfulfilled, and that the French delegation had again decided not to take part in the Committee's discussion of the question. The reasons why the matter had been placed on the Assembly's agenda for the third time were, unfortunately, only too obvious. The war that had been ravaging Algeria for more than four years, the war conducted by half of France's entire armed forces against the Algerian Liberation Army, was still going on and still exacting its daily toll of suffering and misery. The strain placed on the wider texture of international relations, especially in the highly sensitive North African area, had far from diminished. Two practically unanimous General Assembly resolutions, which had called for a peaceful, democratic and just solution through negotiations or pourparlers, had not been carried out. There had been no solution and no negotiations, nor had the other "adequate means" referred to in resolution 1164 (XII) been resorted to.

23. His delegation's disappointment was the greater because there had recently been signs that France was becoming increasingly aware of the futility of continuing to seek a military solution in Algeria and of the need for negotiating a political solution with the representatives of the liberation movement to which the Algerian people had given their unequivocal support. On the Algerian side, too, the new Provisional Government had signified its readiness to begin negotiations at any time.

24. The negotiations for which the stage had thus been set had not, however, taken place, chiefly because of the French Government's insistence on divorcing the military from the political aspects of the problem and its refusal to recognize the representatives of the Algerian liberation movement as the authorized political spokesmen of the Algerian people.

25. That attitude was hardly realistic, for a war which had been fought for political objectives could surely not be brought to an end in an artificial political vacuum. The question, therefore, was not whether the negotiations should be given a political context, but whether that political context should be based on the realities of the situation or on certain untenable assumptions. There could be no realistic approach to the Algerian situation without the recognition of the right of the Algerian people to shape its own destinies in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and thus of its right to independence. His delegation could see no valid reason for France's denial of that right to the Algerians, particularly when it had begun granting the right to other dependent peoples under its rule.

26. It should be noted, however, that the Algerian leaders were not now setting the previous recognition by France of Algeria's right to independence as a condition for negotiations. In a similar spirit of conciliation, the other side should now do its part to remove the obstacles still blocking progress towards a negotiated settlement; such a settlement was clearly in the interests of all concerned and of international peace.

27. It was essential that the General Assembly should once again speak out in favour of a peaceful negotiated settlement in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. His delegation considered that the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.232) met the most pressing requirements of the situation, and would therefore vote in favour of it.

28. After a procedural discussion in which the CHAIRMAN, Mr. ABDOH (Iran), Mr. LALL (India), Mr. BEELEY (United Kingdom), Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon), Mr. NISOT (Belgium) and Mr. de LEQUERICA (Spain) took part, the CHAIRMAN suggested that the General Assembly should be requested to extend the term of its thirteenth session to Saturday, 13 December 1958, inclusive.

It was so decided.
29. Mr. SIMPSON (Liberia) regretted that nothing constructive had been done to improve the unhappy situation in Algeria. The four-year-old conflict that caused untold suffering and had seriously endangered relations between France on the one hand and the neighbouring countries of Morocco and Tunisia on the other was of vital concern to the United Nations, which had an obligation to propose positive measures for the easing of tensions wherever they arose. For that reason his delegation could not agree that, under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the charter, the United Nations was not competent to discuss the Algerian question.

30. The fact that France had entered Algeria in 1830 was no justification of the present situation if that original entry had been by force of arms. Nor was the situation justified by the fact that Algeria had been integrated into the French Republic in 1848, since it had not been shown that that integration was anything other than a merely unilateral action by France. The truth was that in defiance of the irresistible trends in the modern world towards self-determination and independence, 1 million people under French sponsorship in Algeria were attempting to keep down 9 million other people. How could the Algerian people be content to be a part of France when its sister countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya had gained freedom and independent States? The fact that General de Gaulle had invited the Algerians to send representatives to France for negotiations showed that France was fully aware that the Algerian leaders and people were opposed to French rule. The Algerian leaders were reluctant to negotiate elsewhere than on neutral soil, remembering their comrades who had been imprisoned in France. They had come to the United Nations to plead for the same justice that had been granted to other peoples seeking self-determination. According to the Press, 96 per cent of the people of Algeria had voted in favour of General de Gaulle’s programme and the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic, but it was strange that an army of 500,000 men was needed to keep down the remaining 4 per cent of the electorate, and it was also significant that few prominent Algerians had been willing to come forward for election to the National Assembly.

31. The mutually beneficial relations that had formerly existed between France and the Arab peoples had been gravely jeopardized by the situation in Algeria, and the results might be regrettable for the Moslem world as well as for France and its allies. It was to be hoped that the spirit of magnanimity France had shown in allowing its colonial territories to decide on their own freedom and independence by means of a plebiscite would also guide it in its settlement of the Algerian question.

32. Liberia had taken an active part in the Conference of Independent African States, held at Accra in April 1959, at which a unanimous resolution had called for the end of hostilities in Algeria and proclaimed Algeria’s right to independence. Liberia was determined to support that position in the United Nations until the objectives of that resolution had been achieved.

33. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) reviewed the new developments that had taken place with regard to the Algerian situation since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1184 (XII). That moderate resolution had in no way altered the attitude of France, which was still determined to bring about the forcible and unilateral integration of Algeria, and to oppose the ineluctable movement of the Algerian people towards independence. It was surprising that the Assembly’s competence to deal with the matter was again being questioned; the Algerian question was obviously covered by Article 1, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, and as such could not be regarded as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of France. The General Assembly had set several precedents in that respect in the decisions it had taken with regard to Indonesia, the Union of South Africa, West New Guinea, Tunisia and Morocco; the applicable text was Article 14 of the Charter, which provided that the Assembly might recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deemed likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. There could be no doubt that that applied to the Algerian situation.

34. Resolution 1184 (XII) took note of the offer of good offices from Morocco and Tunisia, but the French Government had decided to reject that offer and had pursued its policy of force. He cited communiqués and reports which gave some of the casualty figures and showed that, instead of co-operating and negotiating with a view to finding a solution in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter, France was intensifying hostilities. In their request for the inclusion of the item on the agenda of the current session (A/3853), the African and Asian countries had drawn attention to certain dangerous signs that hostilities might spread even beyond the frontiers of Algeria. Moreover, France’s absence from the debate showed that the French authorities still had not awakened to the realities of the Algerian situation.

35. Turning to the principal provisions and regulations concerning Algeria adopted by France in the past year, he observed that the new Constitution of September 1956 had disregarded the individuality of Algeria and in fact ignored its existence, although it provided for a liberal policy with regard to other African territories. He quoted a passage from Mr. Pierre Mendès-France’s book La Politique et la vérité: "pointing to the effect that the rights and liberties extended to other African peoples had had on Algeria, whose indigenous inhabitants could not understand why something which was granted to others living on the same continent should be denied to them.

36. The policy of integration to which the French Government was committed caused its exporters to try to prove that Algeria had no separate identity. Mr. Gelinet, a member of the Conseil d’Etat, stated in a French weekly publication that the only positive measures that had been taken were those of full integration. Those included the division of Algeria into French departments, French municipal organization, French postal services, suppression of representation of Algeria as an entity, election of French deputies to the French Parliament, integration of Moslems into the civil service in France, the projected merger of Algerian railways with the French railway system, levying taxes in France in order to carry out Moslem economic integration, etc. To those measures should be added the suppression of the Algerian Journal officiel, which had been published since 1900, when the personality of Algeria had been recognized for the establishment of Algerian assemblies.

1/ Paris, Julliard, 1959.
37. The referendum organized by the French authorities at the end of September 1958 might be regarded as the only example in history of a popular consultation held in a war-torn country, under the control of a foreign occupation army. It had been severely criticized on that score in many quarters. The November elections could not be regarded as valid for the same reasons. Mr. Alain Savary, former Secretary of State for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, had written that conditions for the exercise of democracy were not met in Algeria and had advised postponing the elections; Mr. Mendès-France had written that General de Gaulle's instructions had been disregarded and his intentions betrayed and that no solution could ever emerge from such a deception of the Algerian people. Many people had refused to stand for elections, and the lists consisted almost entirely of supporters of integration, who had, of course, carried the day. Moreover, the representation of the Europeans in Algeria was out of all proportion to their numbers.

38. The conclusions to be drawn from all those events were, first, that the unilateral measures foisted by France on Algeria could not be regarded as "appropriate means" under General Assembly resolution 1184 (XII) and, secondly, that the newly constituted French National Assembly was dominated by the right wing, which upheld integration.

39. The war, which had been localized, now covered all Algeria and even overflowed its frontiers; it had serious repercussions in Morocco, Tunisia and elsewhere. The ever-increasing numbers of men and material that were being poured into Algeria were imposing a heavy burden on France's finances, for the annual cost of the war was estimated at $600 million. As for the National Liberation Front (FLN), it was continuing the struggle in order to realize its legitimate aspirations. There was no longer any doubt as to the representative character of the movement; that had been recognized by the Conference of North African Nationalist Parties on Maghreb Unity, held at Tanger in April 1958, the Conference of Independent African States, held at Accra in April 1958, large sectors of the French and foreign Press and an increasing number of French politicians, who could not conceive of a negotiated solution of the problem without consultation with the FLN. Moreover, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, which was recognized by a number of States, had shown great political maturity and moderation. It had repeatedly emphasized its desire for a negotiated solution, and only the obstinate refusal of French Governments to accept negotiation was prolonging the war. If the Government headed by General de Gaulle would show the same willingness as the Provisional Government, a meeting could take place shortly and would probably lead to a solution. If it did not show such willingness, the responsibility for dragging on the hostilities would rest on its shoulders. General de Gaulle's statement of 23 October 1958 was tantamount to a call for surrender and a refusal to negotiate. It was surprising that the General should expect the Algerian nationalist to abandon the struggle at a word from him.

40. The United Nations could not allow the Algerian war to continue after year. It was in duty bound under the Charter to try to stop the bloodshed that was making the positions of the parties more and more rigid and the attainment of an adequate solution increasingly difficult. His delegation hoped that General de Gaulle would take the initiative in negotiating with the Algerian Government, which was certainly a valid spokesman for the Algerian people.

41. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) said that two significant events had taken place since the twelfth session of the General Assembly which might make a solution easier. One was the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. The recent elections to the French National Assembly had shown that the Algerians were not willing to accept the proposed settlement, and hence that the Provisional Government had the support of a large section of the Algerian people. The existence of a single unit which demonstrably represented the Algerian people should facilitate negotiations.

42. The other significant development was the establishment of a new Government in France under General de Gaulle. Although he had not taken any positive step to solve the Algerian problem, there had been encouraging events that related to the problem. France had conceded the right of option with regard to freedom to the peoples within its colonial empire, and the fact that the new independent country of Guinea was now being admitted as a Member of the United Nations was proof that France had stood by its offer of freedom. Clearly there was a liberal process going on in France, and it was now led by a man who was prepared to entertain and undertake liberal measures regarding the political rights of peoples in the French empire. There were difficulties in his path. He could not take action without the support of a large section of his people, and it was not known whether or not delay in adopting a more liberal approach to the Algerian problem would contribute to winning that support.

43. The problem could be solved only through good will and understanding. The United Nations could not enforce independence for Algeria, which must be brought about either by the good will of France or by the strength of the Algerian people, in other words by peaceful means or by force of arms. It was not in the true interests of France to attempt to settle the question the second way, since not all the might of France could subjugate a people dedicated to the cause of winning their own freedom. Therefore, both France and the United Nations must seek a peaceful settlement in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

44. That was the reasoning underlying the seventeen-power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.232) of which Ceylon was a sponsor. The draft resolution did no more than state the position as it was: it said that independence was a right, a Provisional Government had been formed, much distress had been caused and there was grave danger to international peace and security, and it urged negotiations between the parties concerned.

45. He thought that the difficulties that some representatives had had in accepting certain parts of the draft resolution were based on misunderstanding. The fourth paragraph of the preamble, which recognized the right of the Algerian people to independence, had been criticized on the grounds that that right should be discussed in the course of negotiations. But that paragraph merely stated a fact to which all Members of the United Nations were dedicated because it was recognized by the Charter. All members of the Com-
mittee represented countries which enjoyed independence, and therefore had no moral right to deny to the people of Algeria one of the fundamental human rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

46. The last paragraph of the preamble, which referred to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, had been objected to on the grounds that, whereas many countries had not yet recognized that Government, the adoption of that paragraph might constitute such a recognition. Ceylon, being one of the countries that had not recognized the Provisional Government, had considered that paragraph very closely, and had come to the conclusion that its acceptance would in no way commit anyone to recognition of the Provisional Government. That Government existed and would continue to exist whether or not it was recognized by any other country. The paragraph therefore did no more than to record an undeniable fact.

47. He did not believe that France, the home of the spirit of patriotism and revolt, would remain deaf to the appeal of the resolution. The United Kingdom had performed a great act of statesmanship not long ago in granting independence to Ceylon, although it would have been fully capable of holding Ceylon in subjection for many more years by pure strength of arms. By that act, the spirit of independence in others had been recognized by those who had won and established their own freedom. In the past the French people had asserted their own rights, and he believed that they would heed the appeal to allow others to follow their example. In that belief he commended the draft resolution to the Committee, hoping that it would help to bring to an end an unsatisfactory chapter in the lives of two countries and two peoples, and a chapter which was also a reflection on the United Nations itself.

48. Mr. Yacoub OSMAN (Sudan) regretted that France was not participating in the Committee's consideration of the Algerian question. He rejected the French contention that the Algerian question was an internal French matter which the General Assembly was not competent to discuss. The people of Algeria had governed themselves centuries before French rule had been imposed on them by force.

49. An independent Algeria would surely foster amicable relations between the French and the Algerian peoples. However, France was continuing to wage war in Algeria, thereby flouting General Assembly resolution 1164 (XII) and the purposes and principles of the United Nations. He hoped that, under the leadership of General de Gaulle, France would reconsider its position and assist the General Assembly in finding a just solution of the Algerian problem and ending the threat to international peace and security which the latter presented. The establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic offered France an opportunity to enter into negotiations with the real representatives of the Algerian people. Moreover, the Provisional Government had made it clear in its statement of 26 September 1958 that it was sincerely desirous of ending the present conflict and establishing a new relationship between France and Algeria on the basis of equality.

50. He hoped the Committee would adopt the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.232), of which his delegation was a sponsor.

51. He suggested that, pending a solution of the Algerian problem, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 should be applied to the Algerian war in order to humanize the conditions in which it was being fought.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.