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Chairman: Mr. Miguel Rafael URQUIA (El Salvador).

AGENDA ITEM 68


CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

1. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey), commenting on the draft resolutions before the Committee, noted that the differences between the Turkish draft (A/C.1/L.223) and the United Kingdom draft (A/C.1/L.221) were mostly of a procedural nature while the Greek draft (A/C.1/ L.223) and the Turkish draft were diametrically opposed in substance.

2. His delegation's draft resolution was an attempt to reconcile the various viewpoints on the Cyprus question and was based on the principles and purposes of the United Nations as well as the letter and spirit of the Charter. Its first objective was to establish conditions in which the problem could be settled peacefully, in accordance with the recommendation made in General Assembly resolution 1013 (X). The first condition for such a peaceful settlement was that terrorism and violence should come to an end, in order to achieve that aim, the incitement and provocations of the Greek Government radio and the Greek Press must cease and Greece must give no more moral and material support to the terrorists in Cyprus. The draft resolution provided for that condition in its operative paragraph 1.

3. The last two paragraphs of the preamble of the Turkish draft resolution, first, emphasized the desire of the Assembly to safeguard the paramount interests of the inhabitants of the island, as well as to restore peaceful conditions and, to further friendly relations in the area, and secondly recorded the fact that, in the case of Cyprus, it was against the explicit desire and the legitimate interests of the Turkish community to be placed under the rule of the Greek community. Placing the Turks under the rule of the Greek community was not in the interest of the Greek community either, because it would perpetuate the tension between the two communities and would not help to improve the present state of relations between Greece and Turkey; on the contrary, it would strain them further.

4. The text, in its operative paragraph 2, invited the three Governments directly concerned to resume and continue their efforts in a spirit of co-operation and with a view to reaching a friendly solution of the matter, in application of the principle of equal rights and self-determination according to the particular circumstances of Cyprus and its peoples, in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

5. In submitting its draft resolution, his delegation was not asking more of the Assembly than to apply the principles of the United Nations to the case of Cyprus, and was inspired by only one motive: the desire to achieve a peaceful solution which would not infringe the rights of any of the parties concerned. His delegation had deliberately refrained from drafting the proposals so as to favour in any way the particular solution desired by Turkey and had submitted a text designed to make possible any solution reached by agreement between the parties. The adoption of the Turkish draft resolution would enable the three countries concerned to reach an agreement and to emerge from the problem as friends, while meticulously safeguarding the paramount interests of the inhabitants of the island.

6. The United Kingdom draft resolution also envisaged no specific solution and was primarily intended to bring the parties together in a conference at which all possible solutions could be discussed in order to reach agreement.

7. The fundamental difference between those two proposals and the Greek draft resolution, which endorsed independence for Cyprus, lay in the fact that the latter represented an attempt by Greece to obtain from the General Assembly a substantive solution to the problem. It gave the impression that all would be well if the inhabitants of the island could be left alone to deal with the United Kingdom and if independence were given to the island. That attempt ignored the fact that the problem was essentially a Greek-Turkish dispute. Moreover the Greek draft resolution endeavoured to impose beforehand, without regard to the opinion of Turkey and of the Turkish community in Cyprus, and thereby committed a serious fault. It was essentially due to the incompatibility between the Turkish and the Greek communities that Greece and Turkey were engaged in a dispute. The solution to the problem lay, not in attempting to ignore one of the parties, but in bringing them together.

8. Moreover, in spite of the Greek representative's statement at the 100th meeting that his Government did not demand the annexation of Cyprus, Turkey could not conceive that operative paragraph 1 of the Greek draft resolution could have any other purpose than to prepare the way for the annexation of the island. Archbishop Makarios had stated that he considered independence to be a stepping stone to enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece). It was presumed that, once the Turkish community had been reduced to the status of a minority, an independent Cyprus with a Greek major-
ity would declare the island's union with Greece. It was again presumed that the United Nations would then have no course but to approve such a union. One thing was forgotten in those presumptions: that the vital interests of nations and the rights of human beings had never been decided in a lasting way by procedural moves or tactical manoeuvres. It was as clear as daylight that the Turkish community would never be resigned to such a fate.

9. The principle of national independence could be applied to Cyprus, which was a territory inhabited by segments of two nations, only through the unification of its peoples with their respective motherlands. The General Assembly should be extremely careful not to allow an abuse of that principle to cover other ambitions which were contrary to the principles of justice and international law. The Greek Government's proposals up to the present were intended to secure only one end: to place the Turkish community in Cyprus under Greek domination against its will. He believed, however, that the rights and aspirations of the Turkish and the Greek communities would not be irreconcilable if each community were directed to seek its own welfare and improve its own status without infringing the rights of the other community. Such a peaceful, just and happy solution could be reached only by taking into account all those realities. He hoped the General Assembly would consider the Greek draft resolution entirely inappropriate.

10. The changes made in the ten-Power draft resolution had not altered its substance, which was to pave the way for Greek domination of the island. The entire conception of that draft (A/C.1/L.228/Rev.1) was to emphasize a new idea of the "united personality" or integrity of Cyprus. The draft resolution did not appear to start from the particular circumstances of the case under discussion in order to arrive at a solution. On the contrary, a specific concept seemed to have been adopted and the case of Cyprus was used to illustrate that concept. Since Cyprus was neither a nation nor a State, and since it did not yet have a constitution accepted by its inhabitants, its juridical personality had not yet been formed. In those circumstances, the emphasis on "integrity and "united personality" appeared to denote a new concept: that geographic entities were to be considered as units. There was no such concept in the United Nations Charter.

11. The Charter in its preamble referred to "peoples" and to the equal rights of large and small nations. Article 73 referred to the "particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples". Therefore, the fundamental conceptions of the Charter were based on "peoples", "nations" and "States". Geographical entities did not always coincide with unified personalities in the sense of statehood or nationhood, as illustrated in the cases of the Indian sub-continent, the Iberian and the Scandinavian peninsulas, and others.

12. The scope of the draft resolution was therefore much larger than the Cyprus question itself. The General Assembly was being asked to establish a precedent by legalizing a concept which was not clearly defined and which did not exist in the Charter, and one could not know to what ends that concept might be used in different parts of the world. In brief, by refusing even to recognize Turkey's right to participate in negotiations, by emphasizing the vague, novel and dangerous concept of "united personality", and by attempting to impose a preconceived status on the peoples of the island, the draft resolution's effect was to deny the legitimate rights of Turkey and of the Turkish community on the island. The draft aimed at prejudging the future of Cyprus and the status of its peoples in contravention of international practice and the right of self-determination. There was no difference between it and the Greek draft. His delegation was therefore unable to accept it either in whole or in part.

13. The Colombian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.225) was a sincere effort to solve the dispute. He had already stated (1001st meeting) his views on that draft. His delegation believed, however, that it would be more fruitful at the present stage to bring the parties together and leave them alone, or to prepare the ground for negotiations by them with other participants of their own choosing.

14. The Iranian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.226/Rev.1) was also an effort to achieve a compromise. But by attempting to define the scope of the negotiations, it went to the extreme limit of what was feasible and thus carried in itself the danger of failure, because any deviation from its defined scope might defeat its own purpose and might put the participants in the peculiar position of having to accept the conclusion to be reached through negotiations even before the negotiations were begun. Nevertheless, it had the virtue of offering the greatest possibility for holding a conference among the parties concerned.

15. His delegation also welcomed the Belgian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.229), which was constructive because its purpose, too, was to bring about negotiations between the parties.

16. Mr. O'BRIEN (Ireland), replying to the observations of the Turkish representative on his previous statement (1002nd meeting), said that, in suggesting that compensation should be provided for any Turkish Cypriots who might choose to leave an independent Cyprus, he had in no sense meant to propose the expulsion of the Turkish minority; such a proposal would be abhorrent to his delegation. His proposal had been that all possible guarantees should be provided for the Turkish minority, but that those who voluntarily decided to leave should receive adequate compensation.

17. The present troubles in Cyprus arose precisely from prolonged failure to take necessary fundamental decisions of principle regarding the island's future. He did not agree with the contention that the United Nations should confine itself to urging a peaceful, democratic, and just solution of the Cyprus problem, as it had done two years earlier (resolution 1015 (XI)), and should refrain from making specific recommendations concerning the island's political future. A refusal to take a definite stand on the question would not serve to provide a "cooling-off" period; it would merely prolong the agony of the people of Cyprus and indicate that the United Nations was unable to find a solution to the problem.

18. Accordingly, his delegation could not support the draft resolutions of the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.221), Iran (A/C.1/L.226/Rev.1), Belgium (A/C.1/L.229) or Colombia (A/C.1/L.225), since they refused to point the way along which a solution should be sought. Nor would it vote for the Turkish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.223), which, since it essentially called for the partition of Cyprus, would be a destructive resolution as
far as the people of Cyprus were concerned and could not contribute to better relations between Greece and Turkey. He found the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.222) satisfactory but would not discuss it for the present since its sponsor had yielded priority to another draft.

19. The ten-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.228/Rev.1), of which his delegation was a sponsor, possessed the supreme merit that it called upon Member States to respect the integrity of Cyprus and pointed towards the future of the island as a self-governing unit. It was true that some time must elapse before that objective could be achieved, but the objective must nevertheless be clearly stated now in order to satist the Cypriot people's fears and antagonisms. While his delegation would welcome a suitable compromise draft resolution which could command the support of the entire General Assembly, a compromise draft should not be obtained by sacrificing the basic principle in the ten-Power draft resolution—the fact that it pointed in a definite direction, which, since it was desired by the majority of Cypriots, could alone restore peace in Cyprus.

20. Mr. HERRARTE (Guatemala) said that the Cypriots, as a civilized people with an ancient heritage of culture, should not be under the domination of a foreign Power. His delegation could support neither the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.221), which would merely perpetuate the colonial rule of Cyprus, nor the Turkish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.223), which envisaged the partition of the island. The rights of the Turkish minority must be properly protected, but Cyprus' geographical and historical unity, and the uneven distribution of the Turkish population throughout the island, combined to make partition neither desirable nor feasible.

21. His delegation would vote for the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.222), which envisaged a transitional period of self-government for Cyprus, prior to the granting of independence, while urging adequate guarantees for the protection of the Turkish minority and for its participation in the administration of the island. His delegation would also vote for the ten-Power draft resolution, which recognized the need to preserve the integrity of Cyprus, to grant self-government to its people, and to provide for the protection of all legitimate minority interests. It would abstain from the vote on the Colombian, Iranian and Belgian draft resolutions, which did not provide a suitable solution of the problem.

22. Mr. HAYMERLE (Austria) said he hoped a compromise draft resolution acceptable to all parties concerned might still be worked out, since none of the drafts at present before the Committee was entirely satisfactory. The Iranian draft resolution, if amended to stress the right of the Cypriot people to self-government, as suggested at the 1006th meeting by the Mexican representative, might prove acceptable. On the other hand, the revised ten-Power draft resolution might be further amended so as to be acceptable to all. In any event, the resolution finally adopted by the Committee should embody the principle of the right of the Cypriots to self-government; it should make certain specific recommendations for future negotiations on Cyprus and at the same time should not place undue emphasis on controversial issues.

23. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) expressed pleasure at the Turkish representative’s statement that he had taken careful note of the Greek proposal for guaranteed independence for Cyprus; the statement had indicated that only certain questions of detail and the problem of creating an atmosphere of trust now stood in the way of agreement. However, he denied that the Greek draft resolution would, as the Turkish representative had contended, place the Turkish Cypriot minority under Greek domination; on the contrary, it recommended adequate guarantees for the protection of the Turkish minority and for its participation in the administration of the island.

24. It was not in a spirit of fanaticism that his delegation urged that partition should be excluded a priori as a solution to the Cyprus problem. If partition was not ruled out in advance, the Turkish minority on Cyprus would, in order to bring about eventual partition, refuse to co-operate during the transitional period of self-government envisaged in the Greek draft resolution. At the same time, the Greek Cypriots, who had accepted with great reluctance the idea of guaranteed independence instead of enosis, might well return to the idea of enosis: if one extreme solution, partition, was not excluded, it would be impossible to exclude the other, enosis.

25. While he continued to be opposed to the Iranian draft resolution, he thought that the Colombian draft resolution contained some constructive elements, and his delegation might find it acceptable if certain minor changes were made. However, he could not accept the thesis that the Cyprus question should be settled exclusively by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey; the responsibility should rest primarily with the people of the island.

26. He denied the Turkish representative’s assertion that Greece had given material aid to the Cypriot rebels. He could furnish irrefutable proof that the accusation was false; he proposed once again that it should be examined by a neutral commission of investigation. Violence must cease on both sides, but above all the cause of the violence must be eliminated.

27. Mr. AEOOH (Iran), introducing the second revision of his draft resolution (A/C.1/L.226/Rev.2), said that he had redrafted his proposal in order to take account of various views expressed in the course of the debate and in particular of the position of those who wanted the idea of self-government explicitly inserted in order to bring the draft closer to the letter and spirit of the Charter. The second revised draft represented a further effort to bring about a rapprochement between divergent positions and had been offered in the same spirit of compromise as the earlier Iranian proposals (A/C.1/L.226, A/C.1/L.226/Rev.1).

28. He assured the representative of Greece of Iran's sincerity in seeking a compromise. He had endeavoured to be as impartial as humanly possible and to use his full powers of persuasion to induce the United Kingdom and Turkey to make concessions which would narrow the area of disagreement with Greece. His efforts had been guided by two main considerations: the merits of the case and the interests of the United Nations, to which he was deeply devoted. Nothing in his statements could be interpreted as contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, which Iran considered to be the cornerstone of its foreign policy, or as prejudicial to good-
relations with other States. He was confident that the Greek representative would appreciate the conciliatory nature of his efforts.

29. It was not correct, as Mr. Averoff-Tossizza had contended, that Iran was supporting partition. The Iranian representative had said nothing to dispose that thesis; he had merely said that if the Greek and Turkish communities learned to live together in harmony, and if confidence was restored, the concept of an independent Cyprus might develop. The insertion in the revised Iranian draft resolution of the paragraph referring to self-government and free institutions should dispel any doubts which Mr. Averoff-Tossizza might still entertain regarding Iran's sincerity. It could not be deduced from the text that Iran favoured partition; the proposal reflected the Iranian view that it was for the people of Cyprus themselves, in accordance with the Charter, to decide their future, free of interference from any extraneous forces.

30. Iran had never harboured extremist feelings or advocated extremist solutions. Its revised draft, although admittedly of a substantive nature, contained nothing which was not in strict conformity with the Charter. In view of the conciliatory turn taken by the debate in the past few days, he hoped that the representative of Greece would make a new effort to understand the Iranian position and the nature and scope of the newly revised Iranian draft resolution.

31. He looked forward to a resumption of the negotiations between the parties and the representatives of the Cypriots, which would lead to an equitable solution in the best interests of Cyprus, the States concerned and world peace.

32. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece), speaking on a point of order, said that he would give further study to the Iranian statements, but that, on first view, the newly revised Iranian draft did not, in his opinion, have the constructive elements he considered essential.

33. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) expressed gratification that the representative of Greece had recognized the conciliatory attitude taken by Turkey in its sincere desire to settle the dispute over Cyprus. Nevertheless, he wished to emphasize that the Turkish position on the various questions—independence, the rights and aspirations of the Turkish community, etc.—had been clearly and explicitly defined on several occasions; he therefore saw no need to repeat it. Moreover, neither in its draft resolution nor in the statements made by its delegation had Turkey ever asserted that it wanted a conference at which it could impose its wishes. The parties should go to that conference without prejudice and with a willingness to reconcile their views.

34. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) again stressed that the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.221) was based on moderate and fundamental principles, that it was realistic, that it recognized the complexity of the Cyprus question and gave prominence to its international nature and to the danger it presented for world peace. On that basis, it called for an end to violence and asked the United Kingdom to continue its efforts internationally and in Cyprus for a peaceful and just solution. There was nothing controversial or provocative in its appeal for an end to violence. It would be denying basic United Nations principles to condone the violence being perpetrated in Cyprus by a band of desperadoes seeking to enforce their wishes on their neighbours.

35. The United Kingdom draft called for a continuance of that Government's past efforts towards a solution. The partnership plan put forward as an interim arrangement for the next seven years was designed to restore peace and prosperity to Cyprus, to make progress possible towards democratic self-government, and to ensure that the future would not in any way be prejudiced: all possible long-term solutions would remain open. It was not true, as the representative of Greece had asserted (1001st meeting), that consultation by the Governor, under the plan, with the representatives of Greece and Turkey, would diminish or impair United Kingdom sovereignty in Cyprus. Consultation with the foreign interests concerned was the cornerstone of government in the contemporary world; it implied, not an abdication of sovereignty, but a recognition of the importance of partnership and international interdependence. It was designed to reassure Greece and Turkey that the plan was not operating to the disadvantage of their interests or of those of the two communities in Cyprus. If, as Mr. Averoff-Tossizza had stated (998th meeting), he feared that the plan would work to the disadvantage of Greece or the Greek community, it would be illogical not to appoint a representative who could reassure him on that score.

The United Kingdom was convinced that its plan for a seven-year "cooling-off" period was the best way to ensure that, when the time came for a final settlement, none of the parties would press their extreme demands to the detriment of the general interest; confidence had to be restored if moderation was to prevail.

36. The United Kingdom based its objection to the ten-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.226/Rev.1) on principle: the proposal was dangerous because it sought to prejudice the future; it would have the General Assembly, at the present juncture, register its desire that Cyprus should be preserved as a political unit in the ultimate solution. In his opening speech (996th meeting), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece had stated that the temporary régime should not prejudice the future. If the future was not to be prejudiced, it must not be prejudiced in any direction. The Assembly should not encourage one community on the island to believe that the United Nations wished to prejudice its long-term aspirations. In view of the inter-communal fighting which had already occurred and the continuing tension in Cyprus, such a move would be highly dangerous. The United Kingdom was not in favour of partition, but the fact that partition was a solution advocated by some had to be taken into account. If an attempt were made to steer Cyprus away from partition, it might in fact precipitate that development in disastrous circumstances. On all those grounds, the United Kingdom was compelled strongly to oppose the ten-Power draft resolution.

37. The Iranian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.226/Rev.1) stood somewhere between the United Kingdom proposal and the ten-Power draft. It safeguarded the essential minimum of United Kingdom requirements. Above all, it did not prejudice the future. Its appeal for negotiations between the parties was unobjectionable. It specified that both interim arrangements and a final solution would be considered at a conference at which the three Governments and representatives of the two communities on Cyprus would be present. The United Kingdom

was prepared to accept those terms of reference. When the interim settlement was under discussion, the United Kingdom would be ready also to consider any modifications or amendments to its plan which any of the parties might put forward. It was likewise prepared to accept the assistance of other Governments or personalities acceptable to the parties concerned, as specified in the draft.

38. It was clear from the text of the Iranian proposal that representatives of Cyprus would be present at the proposed conference. It was therefore erroneous to argue, as Mr. Averoff-Tossizza had done, that the draft ignored the interests of the Cypriots, or that it implied that the future of the island would be dictated by the three Powers, or that it encouraged partition. Although it did not wholly satisfy any of the parties, the draft avoided any suggestion which might compromise the long-term aspirations of any party, and it aimed at the resumption of negotiations. It was difficult therefore to believe that it would not prove generally acceptable.

39. The new revised draft (A/C.1/L.226/Rev.2) also indicated the Assembly's desire to see the development of the free institutions in Cyprus to which the inhabitants aspired: that was acceptable to the United Kingdom. Free institutions were an essential aim of United Kingdom policy. The Iranian proposal, in its present form, was a good basis for a genuine compromise and the United Kingdom would accordingly be willing to withdraw its own draft in favour of the Iranian draft if Greece and Turkey did likewise.

40. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece), referring to the United Kingdom representative's statement that the participation of representatives of Greece and Turkey in the administration of Cyprus did not imply participation in United Kingdom sovereignty over the island, pointed out that under the Macmillan plan for partnership, the Governor would be under an obligation to ask the advice of the Government representatives on defence, foreign affairs and security. That would surely mean de facto participation of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in sovereignty over the island.

41. Mr. Noble's statements concerning the nature of the proposed conference between the parties had raised new doubts in the mind of the Greek delegation. The partnership plan was one of collaboration under which 80 per cent of the population of Cyprus would not collaborate. It was a partnership plan without partners. The separatist institutions for which the plan provided would inevitably lead to partition. With such an interim régime, there was a real danger of prejudging the future. In an effort to reach agreement, if one side made a concession, the other should follow suit.

42. Mr. ABDOH (Iran) regretted that the Greek representative had rejected the second revised draft of Iran's proposal after so cursory a study. He hoped that was not a final decision.

43. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) said that, in the circumstances and for the reasons given by the representative of the United Kingdom, he would not press for a vote on the Turkish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.223) and would vote in favour of the new Iranian draft, which possessed the virtue of being a real compromise.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.