draft resolution which had been tabled, even before it had been formally submitted.

4. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSISIZA (Greece), exercising his right of reply, pointed out that the United Kingdom representative, in his intervention at the previous meeting, had actually threatened the United Nations with the prospect of civil war in Cyprus if the General Assembly decided freely to adopt a resolution demanding that the integrity of Cyprus be preserved. He referred to Mr. Noble's statement that the Committee should weigh the danger that, by formally insisting on integrity now, it might provoke the opponents of integrity to resist its decision by civil war or an even wider conflict. That statement constituted an indirect incitement to conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and to war between Turkey and Greece. It was in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Committee could not be intimidated and should not be subjected to such an affront. By making the integrity of Cyprus a casus belli, the United Kingdom had revealed its true policy in Cyprus and had demonstrated disrespect for the Charter, international law and the role of the United Nations.

5. Greece would never be an aggressor, and it did not fear threats of aggression. It was confident that the United Nations, with the support of all peoples, would preserve peace. The threat made by the United Kingdom indicated the nature of the conference to which Greece was being invited under the Iranian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.226/Rev.1) and was a further warning to Greece not to sit at any conference held outside the framework of the United Nations. The United Kingdom statement regarding the integrity of Cyprus was most serious because it was an attack on the prestige and on the free judgement of the United Nations.

6. Mr. NUÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) noted that the reason for the silence of his delegation on the question of Cyprus during the previous sessions had been its conviction that its participation could not modify the antagonistic situation that existed between the Powers directly concerned. He recalled that those Powers were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and that NATO was probably the most important defensive military alliance designed to deter potential aggressors. A split within NATO would make it easier for such an aggressor to enslave independent peoples.

7. At no time in history had humanity been faced with a catastrophe of such vast proportions as now, when all free States were threatened by the expansionist aims of a certain Power. Greece had been one of the first nations to fall prey to those aims; thousands of its people had lost their lives in a so-called civil war instigated and directed by that Power. Cuba, it would be recalled, had pleaded for the return of the Greek children who were victims of that war. The
same States which had opposed their return were now attempting to set Greece against its NATO allies. Turkey, with its long border with the aggressor State, had also been under a constant threat: its territorial integrity and its freedom were being jeopardized by the military manoeuvres taking place along that border and by the radio broadcasts of the aggressor State predicting its imminent annihilation.

8. There was a striking contrast between the actions of that aggressor State and those of the United Kingdom, which, far from enslaving peoples, had granted independence to a large number of States now Members of the United Nations. It was hardly fitting for the representative of a State whose territory was occupied by foreign troops to accuse the United Kingdom of colonialism. The Committee should be wary of those who utilized the argument of self-determination to set nations against each other and who would do better to apply that principle to the countries which they illegally occupied.

9. Unfortunately, a solution of the question of Cyprus was being sought at a time when the dangers threatening the free world made it very difficult to arrive at total settlements. The United Kingdom, under international treaties, had sovereignty over the island and responsibility for maintaining public order. Greece was understandably anxious to protect the interests of the Greek Cypriots, who represented 80 per cent of the inhabitants of the island, Turkey, for its part, was directly concerned in the Cyprus issue, not only because 20 per cent of the inhabitants of the islands were of Turkish origin, but because the proximity of the island to the Turkish coast made it a vital factor in Turkey’s security. In the circumstances, it was imperative to continue negotiations with a view to reaching at least an interim agreement which would halt the terrorism in the island. If the violence were allowed to continue, not only would future relations between the Greek and Turkish communities be embittered, but the United Kingdom would have to impose order at any cost. Cyprus could not be classified as a Non-Self-Governing Territory under the United Nations Charter and any attempt by the General Assembly to exceed its competence in the question would merely render a solution more remote.

10. Cuba would support those proposals in the Committee which most closely respected the spirit and the letter of the Charter of the United Nations. He appealed to the Powers concerned to explore all possibilities, through negotiation, of reaching a solution. He did not believe that such a solution could be found at the current session of the General Assembly.

11. Mr. SHUKAIREY (Saudi Arabia) said that, as an Arab State of the Middle East, aware of the proximity of the island of Cyprus to Arab shores, Saudi Arabia could not remain indifferent in the Cyprus issue. It was from the British military base of Cyprus that an armed aggression which had brought the world to the brink of war had been committed against a sister Arab State former known as Egypt. Saudi Arabia was therefore anxious that a just and peaceful solution of the question should be achieved. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, as part of the Arab world, had close ties of history and culture with both Greece and Turkey.

12. In approaching the question of Cyprus, the Committee should first concern itself with two of its vital aspects: it must determine the exact nature of the problem and the parties to the problem. In essence, the problem of Cyprus was one of British colonialism. While it was undoubtedly complicated by the dispute between Greece and Turkey, it originated in the British occupation of the island and in the policy formulated and pursued there by the United Kingdom Government. The assertion by the United Kingdom representative that the problem was not simply a colonial one (996th meeting) was merely an alibi offered by the guilty party. That representative’s further assertion that his country did not believe in repression and had practised liberalism was a distortion of the truth. The British had never given freedom; they had been forced to yield to the forces of freedom; only when a territory had ceased to be a market or a source of raw materials or of strategic advantage had they surrendered it. The colonial record of the United Kingdom conclusively proved the colonial nature of the Cyprus question.

13. It was not true, as the United Kingdom representative had affirmed, that the United Kingdom bore the practical and moral responsibility for the welfare of all the inhabitants of Cyprus. The welfare of the people of Cyprus was the sole responsibility of the people themselves, and when it became an issue or a subject of special concern, it was for the United Nations collectively to assume that responsibility. No single State or group of States could undertake that task. It was equally untrue that the United Kingdom had lawful sovereignty over Cyprus and could therefore, as the United Kingdom representative had maintained (996th meeting), make such dispositions concerning Cyprus as might at any time seem desirable in the general interest of the inhabitants. That was a misrepresentation of law. Until the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne,1/ sovereignty over Cyprus had belonged to the Ottoman Empire. The Republic of Turkey was not the successor of the Ottoman Empire; it was an entirely different modern State constituting only a fraction of the old Ottoman Empire in territory and population. The modern State of Turkey could not legally transfer sovereignty over Cyprus to the United Kingdom because it had not been vested with the right to do so. Thus, the transfer claimed by the United Kingdom was void. The position of the United Kingdom in Cyprus was that of a State occupying the island militarily; it had no legal sovereignty there.

14. That unjustified claim of sovereignty over, and assumption of responsibility for, the island had led to the failure of all the United Kingdom’s attempts to solve the Cyprus problem since 1946. The United Kingdom could not decide on the future of the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of Cyprus. The principle of self-determination could be exercised only by the two communities of Cyprus. The United Nations could not act on their behalf by bestowing its approval on the United Kingdom’s latest plan for Cyprus.2/ Even to express confidence in the United Kingdom’s intentions, as its representative had asked the United Nations to do (996th meeting), was impossible, not only because it was not a mean accomplishment, but also because the General Assembly could not endorse a plan which represented merely the effort of a co-

15. His delegation concurred in the condemnation of violence expressed by the United Kingdom representative, although it could not whole-heartedly support his appeal because it came from a State which had itself committed violence against colonial territories.

16. Saudi Arabia would support any solution of the Cyprus problem based, not on the will and interests of the United Kingdom, the Western world or NATO, but on the will of all the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of the island. The attempt to find a solution to the Cyprus question within the framework of NATO was entirely inadmissible and could not be supported by the United Nations, for it was an attempt to inject the "cold war" into the Middle East. It was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and not of NATO, who should be engaged in any attempt to find a solution of the problem by conciliation.

17. Those were the considerations by which his delegation would judge the draft resolutions before the Committee.

18. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) said it was clear that the people of Cyprus wished to free itself of foreign domination in order to decide its own fate. Any resolution adopted by the General Assembly must therefore recognize the individual identity of Cyprus and its right to self-determination. Although the situation was complicated by the fact that the island's population was composed of two different communities, his delegation felt that it would be a grave error to encourage any attempt to solve the problem by separating them. No differences of religion or national origin could justify a dismemberment of the island, which would gravely prejudice not only its own security and future, but the security of the whole area as well. Moreover, experience had shown that partition of a territory on the basis of race or religion always had pernicious consequences.

19. It must be recognized, however, that, in attempting to find a solution to the Cyprus problem based on its right to self-determination as an indivisible entity, the problem of the security of foreign States, particularly Turkey, must be taken into consideration. But, in his delegation's opinion, both that problem and the problem of guaranteeing the rights and future security of the Turkish Cypriots could be solved. Thus, the Tunisian delegation could not approve partition as a solution. A solution must be based on the principle of recognition of the right of the peoples of Cyprus as a whole to determine their own destiny with adequate guarantees for the minority.

20. At the present stage of the dispute, and despite the fact that there could be no question of imposing a solution on the parties, his delegation considered that the United Nations should not merely recommend negotiations between them, but also indicate the direction in which cooperation should be sought. Those were the considerations which would determine his delegation's vote.

21. Prince Aly KHAN (Pakistan) said that any lasting settlement of the question of Cyprus must depend upon the particular circumstances of that Non-Self-Governing Territory and particularly on how the two peoples could be assisted towards self-government and the progressive development of free political institutions.

The Cyprus question would not be regarded as simply a colonial problem between the United Kingdom and the population of Cyprus where neither Greece nor Turkey had any legitimate interests in the political future of the island. Even if such a contention were valid, the problem could not be solved by a simple transfer of power by the United Kingdom to an elected majority of Cypriots which would be exclusively Greek. Its domination would be challenged, and probably resisted violently, by an inflamed Turkish population. The outcome might well plunge the island into even greater violence, if not civil war, and cause a conflict between Greece and Turkey and thereby endanger the peace of the entire area. It was not possible to maintain that the future of Cyprus could be isolated as a simple colonial problem. Nor could the problem be solved by the withdrawal of the British from the island. Its wider international ramifications could not be totally ignored in the procedures to be adopted to achieve a settlement.

22. He disagreed with the Greek representative's assertion that the United Kingdom had artificially injected Cyprus into the Cyprus problem (59th meeting). Article 74 of the United Nations Charter provided that Member States should base their policy in respect of Non-Self-Governing Territories on "the general principle of good neighbourliness"; since Cyprus was situated only forty miles from the Turkish mainland and contained a large Turkish population, it was essential that Turkey's attitude should be taken into account in dealing with the problem. The United Kingdom was acting properly in treating the Cyprus question as one which involved the interests of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, as well as of the two ethnic communities. It was neither just nor helpful to describe Turkey's interests in the future of Cyprus as motivated by expansionist ambitions. The United Nations should treat the problem as a practical one pertaining to relations and rights. Statistics should not be overemphasized as much as the exact number of each community was not very relevant. The inhabitants were all individuals whose human rights should be respected.

23. The main obstacle to a peaceful solution of the Cyprus question was not the policy pursued by the United Kingdom, for the latter had declared its willingness to accept any one of possible solutions—including enosis, (union with Greece), self-determination, guaranteed independence, condominium and partition—provided that it was acceptable to the two Cypriot communities and to Greece and Turkey. The difficulty lay, rather, in the conflicting aspirations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and in the espousal of those aspirations by Greece and Turkey. It could not be denied that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots represented two distinct communities and that each of them wished to be united with its mother country. Despite centuries of living together, the two communities had failed to acquire the common traditions and the sense of shared destiny which characterized nationhood.

24. In view of the foregoing circumstances, his delegation fully understood Turkey's contention that the principle of self-determination should be applied separately to the two Cypriot communities and not to the situation of Cyprus as a whole (937th meeting). In an instance like the present, self-determination should be accorded to the peoples concerned rather
25. The new Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.222) seemed essentially the same as that put forward at the twelfth session (A/C.1/L.197); the proposal calling for self-determination for Cyprus would have subjected the Turkish minority to domination by the Greek mainland, whereas the new proposal for independence would subject them to domination by the Greek Cypriots. Constitutional safeguards of the minority's rights would prove ineffective in the absence of confidence between the two Cypriot communities, and past experience indicated that international guarantees would be equally inadequate. Since the United Nations lacked the machinery for enforcement, the Turkish Cypriots could not be blamed if they considered that the moral force of the United Nations was not enough.

26. Accordingly, his delegation did not feel that the granting of independence would constitute a just and peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. Independence was as far from the aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots as enosis had been. Moreover, independence would not only fail to meet the aspiration of the Turkish minority, but would also preclude the Greek majority from deciding to unite with Greece or another country if it chose. Hence, Greece's present draft resolution in fact represented a step backward from its earlier proposal calling for self-determination for Cyprus. It should also be pointed out that, if Cyprus should be given independence, the United Nations would be unable to prevent the Greek majority on the island from bringing about union with Greece at some later date against the wishes of the Turkish minority.

27. The "partnership" plan for Cyprus proposed by the United Kingdom Prime Minister would provide time in which harmony could be restored on the island and an ultimate solution worked out; at the same time, while it did not require any of the parties concerned to abandon their long-term aspirations, it provided for a considerable measure of self-government to both communities. The Turkish Government was to be commended for having agreed to co-operate in the implementation of the plan, even though the plan had been substantially modified in order to make it more acceptable to the Greek Cypriot community and the Greek Government. It was highly regrettable that the Greek Government had declined to co-operate in the examination of the plan and that it had rejected the recent proposal of the NATO Council that a special conference should be held on the Cyprus question.

28. The Greek representative had criticized the Macmillan plan on the ground that it would prejudice the ultimate solution of the Cyprus problem by driving the island along the road leading to partition (996th meeting). On the contrary, there were indications that its effect would be to exclude partition as a possible solution, thereby prejudging the future in a manner detrimental to the interests of the Turkish Cypriot population. The statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom expressing hope for the formation of a combined Greco-Turkish Cypriot assembly to represent the island as a whole and his remarks on partition (996th meeting) had not served to allay the Pakistan delegation's doubts on this matter. The United Kingdom Government should maintain complete neutrality on the question of whether the island was ultimately to be preserved as a unit or divided. The pro-

vision in the plan establishing two separate houses of representatives to deal with communal affairs could not be regarded as a scheme for partition. During the seven-year interim period envisaged in the plan, the Greek Cypriots, as the larger and more powerful of the two communities on the island, should take the initiative in allaying the fears of the Turkish minority; the latter might thus be persuaded to desist from its advocacy of partition. He also hoped that the Greek Government would yet agree to co-operate with the United Kingdom and Turkey and to use its influence with the Greek Cypriot community in support of the Macmillan plan and thus help to bring about a just and peaceful solution.

29. The virtue of the plan was not only that it provided a substantial measure of self-government for Cyprus but also that it left the details to be worked out in consultation with representatives of the two island communities and of the Greek and Turkish Governments. However, the proposed seven-year interim period should perhaps be reduced to three or four years; it was too long a postponement of a final solution should try the patience of the parties concerned.

30. The task of applying the Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples to Cyprus in such a manner as to safeguard the fundamental rights of both of the island's communities was one which could best be carried out by the parties directly concerned. The General Assembly should therefore call upon the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey to resume negotiations, with the participation of representatives of the two Cypriot communities, with a view to reaching an agreed and friendly solution in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

31. Mr. DINKE (Ethiopia) said it seemed to his delegation that the positions of the three Governments concerned in the Cyprus question were now closer than ever before. All three had modified their previous positions and now agreed to the institution of interim measures which would enable the inhabitants of Cyprus to participate in the administration of their own affairs. That was a significant step forward which offered the Cypriots an opportunity to co-operate to their mutual advantage and could serve as a starting point for calm negotiations between the three Governments. It could also be utilized by the General Assembly in its endeavour to assist the parties concerned to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement.

32. His delegation could not agree with the argument that the principle of self-determination was inapplicable to Cyprus because it could affect only peoples and not territories. A people or nation could be composed of more than one racial, linguistic or religious group, as indeed many nations were. Moreover, the inhabitants of Cyprus possessed one of the essential characteristics of a nation or people, which was to live within a given country or territory. His delegation believed that Cypriots of both Greek and Turkish origin could learn to live together and co-operate for their mutual benefit if they were assisted to do so.

33. His delegation would be guided by those considerations in voting on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

34. Mr. BARUSIKHO (Byelorussian Soviet Republic) said that he disagreed with the United Kingdom's con-
tention that the Cyprus question did not involve the issue of colonialism. The people of Cyprus were struggling for freedom and self-determination against foreign colonial oppression, and they were being subjected to brutal mistreatment by the United Kingdom authorities. In that connexion, he cited the letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 12 September 1958 by the permanent representative of Greece to the United Nations (A/3874/Add.1), which had stated that thousands of Greek Cypriots were being held in concentration camps without being brought to trial. He wondered why the Turkish representative, in his statement of 25 November (697th meeting), had ignored the fact that the Turkish Cypriot population was also suffering under the colonial yoke of the United Kingdom. One of the tactics employed by the United Kingdom authorities in order to maintain their control of Cyprus was to incite the two ethnic communities on the island against each other.

35. The Cyprus question was closely bound up with the problem of maintaining peace and security in that part of the world. The aggressive acts carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom against Lebanon and Jordan in the summer of 1958 had highlighted the danger of permitting the continued use of Cyprus as a military base from which aggression could be launched against neighbouring countries. The statement made in the General Assembly by Mr. Lloyd, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (758th plenary meeting), and those made by the United Kingdom representative in the Committee had made it clear that the United Kingdom was guided solely by strategic and military considerations in its approach to the Cyprus question.

36. The Macmillan plan for the solution of the Cyprus question, which the ruling circles of the United Kingdom were acclaiming as a bold experiment in cooperation, was actually designed to maintain the island's present colonial status unaltered; it said nothing about granting freedom and self-determination to the people of Cyprus and was therefore repudiated by them.

37. The United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/ L.221) was intended to prevent the United Nations from solving the Cyprus problem and to leave the United Kingdom a free hand on the island.

38. The negotiations which the United Kingdom and Greece had conducted on the Cyprus question within the framework of NATO had collapsed because the United Kingdom had attempted to dictate its own terms and because the people whose destiny was being decided had not been represented. The negotiations had, furthermore, provided new evidence of NATO's role in opposing the liberation struggle of peoples.

39. The United Nations should take a resolute stand in favour of granting the Cypriot people the opportunity to exercise their right to freedom and self-determination.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.