Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

AGENDA ITEM 59

Question of Algeria (A/4140, A/C.1/L.246 and Add.1) (concluded)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/L.246 AND ADD.1) (concluded)

1. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) recalled that, on 22 October 1956, the seizure by French authorities of a Moroccan aircraft carrying five Algerian leaders had bitterly disappointed the hopes that had been raised by a series of favourable developments which had indicated a French willingness to work towards a fair solution of the Algerian problem. Whatever the reason for that action, the fact remained that the French Government had subsequently rallied to the extremist position of the military authorities, who considered that the enemy should be destroyed at all costs, irrespective of the serious political consequences entailed. Two conclusions were to be drawn from those events: first, that at one stage of the Algerian war there had been a serious desire to restore peace which had been shared to some extent by the French Government, but had been undermined by a section of French officialdom at Algiers or even in Paris; secondly, that the French Government's surrender before the military chiefs had proved a turning-point for the initiation of a political and military conspiracy designed to continue the Algerian war until the Algerian resistance movement capitulated.

2. Successive French Governments had turned the situation to their advantage and, while declaring their wish for peace, had claimed that they could not impose it without great risk to France.

3. In reviewing the course of developments in the Algerian problem, certain constant factors could be discerned. At the time of the arrest of the five Algerian leaders—now appointed as Algerian representatives in the contemplated "pourparlers"—statements not only in the French Press but by responsible official spokesmen had acknowledged the importance and authority of the Algerians in question as resistance leaders and had concluded that their arrest had struck a death-blow to the liberation movement. After the attack on Suez, the same sources had intimated that the defeat of a nation which was lending considerable backing to the Algerians would completely inca-

pacitate the Algerian resistance movement. There had even been talk of reconquering Tunisia and Morocco.

4. In spite of those predictions, the Algerian resistance had continued unabated and the Arab world was still lending its support to its Algerian brothers. In spite of special powers, reinforcements and improved equipment, the French Army had been unable to bring about the predicted surrender. Tunisia and Morocco had been blamed for France's failure; they had been accused of contributing weapons and volunteers to the Algerian resistance movement. France had claimed the right of pursuit and had committed acts of aggression against Morocco and Tunisia, whose prudence and restraint alone had succeeded in averting a widespread conflict throughout North Africa. The realization that the war could not continue indefinitely and a reluctance to jeopardize future good relations and cooperation with France had counselled that prudence.

5. Acting within the framework of the Charter, a number of countries that wished to see justice done had brought the matter before the United Nations. It should be pointed out to those who now claimed that the Organization had no competence to deal with the matter that the question of Algeria had, for four years, been one of the most important items on its agenda. Moreover, it was due to the United Nations that the question had now reached a stage which gave grounds for optimism.

6. It was Morocco's view that the parallel development of the conflict on the military, political and international planes explained the nature of the changes which had occurred in France, culminating in the coming to power of General de Gaulle—a man who could not fail to realize the international implications of the war.

7. Between the events of 6 February 1958 and those of May 1958, French political life had been entirely conditioned by developments in Algeria and Governments had assumed power or fallen according to their Algerian policy. It was significant that, on taking office, General de Gaulle's first announcement had been on the subject of restoring peace in Algeria. That had given rise to considerable hopes but, while President de Gaulle's interest in the problem had remained undiminished, his attitude towards it was none the less equivocal on certain basic points.

8. His actions were undoubtedly inspired by a sense of responsibility in the matter, but they also seemed to stem from an attitude compounded of metaphysics, paternalism and authoritarianism. While not differing substantially in tone from earlier statements, General de Gaulle's declaration of 16 September 1958 contained a new element which entirely altered the nature of the problem and opened up undisputed prospects of a solution. It clearly showed his desire to
settle the problem and his specific reference to the free choice of the Algerians in determining their future had aroused unprecedented hopes. Morocco was unwilling to believe that the statement was a calculated diplomatic move designed to coincide with the opening of the General Assembly and preferred to regard it as the outcome of a realistic appraisal of the situation by a truly great man. On 1 November 1954, the Algerian leaders had stated that one of the basic objectives of their revolution was the recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. Having been forced to take up arms to achieve that aim, they had continued to fight with a conviction and determination which had finally shown the French Government the futility of the use of force.

9. The recognition of the Algerians' right to self-determination was the result, not only of the struggle that had led to France's new realistic attitude, but also of the concern shown by the United Nations, which was committed to upholding that right. The positive stand taken by the Organization had contributed to the present encouraging trend, whereas indifference would have had disastrous consequences. Thus, while much of the credit justly went to General de Gaulle, the determination of the Algerians and the sense of responsibility of the United Nations were also factors that had led to the recognition of the right to self-determination.

10. In its reply of 28 September 1959, the Algerian Provisional Government had stated that it would neglect no opportunities of achieving peace, but at the same time it had pointed to the need for clarifying certain contradictions in General de Gaulle's statements. It could not, for instance, contemplate a self-determination which took no account of Algeria's territorial integrity or sociological unity. It had also felt bound to point out that subordination of the Algerians' choice to French approval was the very negation of self-determination. It could not overlook the incompatibility between the assurance of a free choice and the restrictions governing the alternatives offered. General de Gaulle himself had virtually ruled out one such alternative—Independence—on the grounds that it would prove disastrous. The Algerians were thus left to choose between a solution whereby Algeria would be integrated with France and another whereby it would be arbitrarily partitioned. Either alternative meant the disappearance of Algeria and the destruction of its people's identity.

11. However, in pointing out those contradictions, the Algerian Provisional Government was not prejudging the solution. It was merely adhering to the legal interpretation of self-determination, which entailed the true exercise of sovereignty by a people and, while insisting that there should be no ambiguity with regard to that essential condition, it reaffirmed its willingness to enter into "pourparlers" on the conditions necessary for the application of the right of self-determination, including the conditions for a cease-fire. After five years of heroic struggle, the Algerian people could not be expected to lay down their arms merely because their right to self-determination had been solemnly recognized, especially as that right had been interpreted by certain influential French spokesmen in a manner which raised serious doubts and which actually ran counter to previous statements made by General de Gaulle.

The French Prime Minister, Mr. Debré, himself had stated in October that the President's declaration was not a basis for discussion or a subject for negotiation, and had even gone so far as to say that the conference would be confined strictly to military questions concerning the cessation of hostilities. The statement that only the French would be responsible for the conduct of elections in Algeria had also caused considerable concern in Algeria. Moreover, the French Army had officially stated that peace through negotiations was definitely ruled out and that France was now free to determine Algeria's future after restoring public order and wiping out the insurrection. More alarming still were Mr. Debré's latest statements in which he had virtually excluded the possibility of an independent future for Algeria, thus completely annulling the statement of 16 September. The Delegate-General of the French Government in Algeria seemed to have an equally strange concept of the right to self-determination as he did not admit the possibility that the Algerians would choose Independence.

12. It was thus quite clear that the extremists wished to turn to their advantage the contradictions in General de Gaulle's statements with a view to discouraging any show of good will and eliminating any attempts at negotiation. Yet those were the very persons who, by their authority, should have ensured the implementation of General de Gaulle's peace plan.

13. In all revolutions, the most inexcusable error was an excess of confidence. After their long-endured sacrifices, the Algerian leaders could not assume the responsibility of asking the National Liberation Army to lay down arms unless they genuinely considered that there were sufficient guarantees to safeguard Algeria's future. While the right to self-determination had been irrefutably recognized, the path between its proclamation and application was long and beset with hazards. Past experience and, especially, present attitudes in some French circles were far from calculated to inspire confidence. All those considerations explained the attitude taken by the Algerian Provisional Government in its statements of 28 September and 20 November and made necessary a clarification of the conditions governing the cease-fire and the guarantees of free consultation.

14. It was also surprising that, although the French Government had three years earlier recognized the Algerians now appointed as representatives of the Provisional Government as genuine leaders of the insurrection, General de Gaulle now declared them to be disqualified. Revolutionary combat was not confined to the battlefield, but extended to all spheres of activity and included imprisonment and exile. The five appointed leaders had all gone through the traditional stages in the life of a revolutionary fighter and had irrevocably identified themselves with the cause of freedom. They had, in fact, been arrested in combat because, at the time, they were travelling on a mission at the request of their fellow combatants. Moreover, it was rare that such military leaders enjoyed so much confidence and popular support. France had therefore no grounds for disputing the representative nature of the delegation appointed by the Algerian Provisional Government and, by persisting in its negative attitude, it could seriously jeopardize all chances of peace.

15. The Moroccan delegation did not question General de Gaulle's intentions, but in view of France's
negative attitude it was obliged to disagree with those representatives who had discouraged a discussion of the question at the present session. While agreeing that General de Gaulle's statement was an important contribution to the cause of peace, it could not share the view that an examination of its implications and an assessment of its scope could serve no useful purpose. Moreover, the present situation was determined not solely by General de Gaulle's statement, but also by the statements of other French leaders, in the context of which it should be viewed. The complexity of the issue and the incontestable fact that no concrete action had yet been taken called for both a clarification of the situation and a definition of the role to be played by the United Nations. It was claimed that a discussion at the international level might antagonize France and hamper General de Gaulle's actions. But General de Gaulle had, on a number of occasions, viewed the matter in an international context, and discussed it with several of his NATO allies. It might be wondered whether the heads of individual Governments were in a better position than the United Nations to discuss Algeria's future with France while the latter refused to participate in the Committee's attempts to achieve a just, peaceful and democratic solution. The Moroccan delegation still believed that the question could be far better settled by discussion within the United Nations and still hoped for an early and peaceful solution with United Nations support. While not underestimating the important role of General de Gaulle, it should not be forgotten that a solution to the problem depended, in the final analysis, on the Algerian leaders, who would shape the future Algeria.

16. Some members contended that the draft resolution (A/C.1/1/L.246 and Add.1), of which Morocco was a sponsor, would prove either dangerous or useless. It was hard to understand how an invitation by the United Nations to the two parties to clarify the statements made by them with a view to initiating contacts could be ineffectual. If, as the representative of Argentina had suggested (1073rd meeting), the most important part of the draft resolution should be deleted so that the United Nations merely invited the parties to enter into contact for the purpose of discussion, due account would not be taken of General de Gaulle's own admission that the National Liberation Front (FLN) was a party to the discussion. Surely France had nothing to gain by seeking to solve the problem with only the participation of representatives of certain favoured groups, for if such representatives had been capable of contributing to a solution, France would have reached a settlement with them long ago to the exclusion of the Algerian Provisional Government. It was to safeguard the interests of all parties, to avoid any unnecessary prolongation of the Algerian problem, Morocco would support the draft resolution and oppose any attempt to alter its substance and scope.

17. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) said that, since both sides had recognized the principle of the Algerian people's right to self-determination and had expressed a willingness to negotiate, they should be left to work out the details themselves without being committed to advance to any particular course of action. His delegation would therefore vote against the twenty-two-Power draft resolution.

18. Mr. SHANAHAN (New Zealand) said that his delegation would vote against the twenty-two-Power draft resolution, which might, by seeking to exert pressure on France, delay the implementation of President de Gaulle's proposal and would in no way improve its terms.

19. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) said that he would vote for the first, second, third and sixth paragraphs of the preamble of the twenty-two-Power draft resolution, since the broad sentiments expressed in them were acceptable to his delegation. He would vote against the fourth paragraph, because it appeared to imply that any community, group or people, even one which was part of a larger political entity, enjoyed the right of self-determination; in the view of his delegation, that right was reserved to the peoples of sovereign States. Although his delegation favoured a solution of the Algerian problem based on recognition of the Algerian people's right to self-determination, inasmuch as France had accepted that principle, he would abstain on the fifth preambular paragraph because it was in a sense linked to the preceding paragraph. He was unable to support the seventh preambular paragraph, because it would justify United Nations intervention in the Algerian question in violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. He would vote against the final preambular paragraph and the operative paragraph, because they in effect gave international status to a group which could not be recognized by the United Nations and because the operative paragraph would completely annul Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter by dictating to a Member State the course it must follow in political negotiations to which it had not agreed.

20. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) recalled that Poland had always believed that the Algerian problem should be solved on the basis of the principle of self-determination. History had proved that it was folly to negate that principle. His delegation had therefore welcomed the agreement in principle reached between the parties on the application of self-determination to the political future of Algeria. Although the period between the declaration of intention by President de Gaulle and the conclusion of a cease-fire was bound to be fraught with many difficulties, that agreement had created a sound basis for a peaceful solution taking into account the interests of France and Algeria, the principles of the Charter and the desire of the whole world. The draft resolution (A/C.1/1/L.246 and Add.1) was an expression of concern for the safeguard of those interests and an appeal to apply the principles of justice in the spirit of the times. In voting for previous resolutions on Algeria, Poland had experienced misgivings that they might not be implemented; for the first time, it would cast its vote for the draft resolution with real confidence that Algeria would soon cease to be an outstanding international problem hindering lasting peace.

21. Mr. DAVIS (Canada) said that, at a time when there was clear evidence that those directly concerned in the Algerian conflict were earnestly seeking a peaceful solution which would protect their legitimate interests, it would be tragic for the United Nations to take any action which might complicate or prevent progress towards that end. The adoption of a resolution on the Algerian question would add nothing to the determination of the two sides to continue their search for a mutually satisfactory formula and might disturb the delicate balance of interests which they must seek to preserve. The end of the Algerian con-
flict and the political development of the situation in Algeria were matters for the judgement of those directly concerned. By adopting a resolution, the United Nations would be intentionally or unwittingly favouring one side or the other and assuming the responsibility for judgement which it was neither authorized nor competent to exercise. A resolution could have the effect of increasing the practical difficulties of detail which must still be removed before effective consultations could take place between the two sides. Since the aim of the United Nations should be to accelerate the solution already in sight, Canada would vote against the draft resolution.

22. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) did not share the view of some representatives that, now that there were real prospects for a peaceful solution of the Algerian question and an end of the conflict, the United Nations should let matters take their course. The United Nations had a great responsibility in that solution and it would gain nothing by refusing to take action, especially since many difficulties remained to be overcome before the hopes aroused by recent developments could be transformed into a practical reality.

23. The delegation of El Salvador regarded the draft resolution as generally acceptable. It had some misgivings, however, regarding the last paragraph of the preamble and the operative paragraph. In particular, it considered it unwise to refer specifically in those paragraphs to the "two" parties, that is, France on the one hand and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on the other. The problem could not be solved by referring to the other two sectors of the population of Algeria directly concerned in the end of the conflict, namely, the French minority and the Algerians desiring union with France; their interests were identical with those of France and they would therefore be represented by the French delegation for the "pourparlers". Moreover, the end of the military conflict could be brought about only between the military adversaries, namely, France and the Algerian rebels. In the circumstances, the General Assembly should adopt a resolution which would appeal to the parties concerned without specifying their number. He would also prefer the use of the word "talks" to the more diplomatic term "pourparlers".

24. The Algerian rebels were justified in refusing to lay down their arms merely on the promise that their political future would be settled by referendum. They were justified in seeking to introduce in the proposed talks on the conditions of a cease-fire certain considerations which were not strictly military, without prejudicing the free choice of the whole population regarding the ultimate political solution. They were right in insisting on prior planning to ensure that the referendum would be carried out to the satisfaction of all parties; in effect, they were seeking, and quite properly, not merely a military truce, but a political armistice. Since all those points raised doubts for the delegation of El Salvador from a political, juridical and technical point of view, it could not vote for the last preamble and the operative paragraph of the draft resolution.

25. Mr. GARIN (Portugal) said that he could not support the draft resolution because Portugal could not countenance any departure from the specific Charter prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States, and because adoption of a resolution might result in an intensification of the Algerian war and might prejudice the prospects of a peaceful solution created by the generous offer of the French Government.

26. Mr. FOURIE (Union of South Africa), basing his position solely on Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, said that the Algerian situation was a matter within the exclusive competence of the French Government. He would vote against the draft resolution.

27. Mr. CHRISTIANSEN (Denmark) said that, although his country ardently supported the principle of self-determination and had been gratified by President de Gaulle's recognition that it was applicable to the Algerian situation, the United Nations should not adopt a resolution on the subject at the present juncture. If a vote was taken on the draft resolution before the Committee, Denmark would vote in favour of the fifth preambular paragraph, recognizing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination, but would vote against the draft as a whole in the conviction that its adoption might interfere with the prospects of a negotiated, peaceful solution. However, the Danish people sincerely hoped that cease-fire negotiations would be initiated at an early date as a first step towards a settlement of the military conflict.

28. Mr. ENCKELL (Finland) expressed the earnest hopes of his delegation for an early end to the hostilities in Algeria and the establishment of a peaceful and democratic Algeria through the application of the principle of self-determination. At the present stage, however, intervention in the Algerian question by the United Nations would not advance the prospects of a solution. Nobody but the parties directly concerned could decide what was to be discussed at the "pourparlers". Consequently, although Finland would vote in favour of certain passages of the twenty-two-Power draft, it would abstain on it as a whole.

29. U THAN (Burma) recalled that the purposes of the twenty-two-Power draft resolution, which he had introduced on behalf of the sponsors (1070th meeting), were to accelerate a restoration of peace in Algeria, to help satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Algerians, to create good relations between France and North Africa, to enhance the prestige of France and to relieve its allies from the embarrassing predicament in which they had been placed by the Algerian situation. The principal objections to the draft resolution related to the procedures to be followed to bring the Algerian conflict to an end without delay. It had been argued that the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic should be a party with France to "pourparlers" designed exclusively to bring about a cease-fire and that, once that objective had been achieved, the conditions for the free exercise of self-determination in the proposed referendum should be fixed in political discussions at which all sectors of Algerian opinion would be represented. That contention was divorced from reality and ignored the lessons of history. Historically, there had been no third parties in military and political negotiations between those who ruled and those who were fighting for freedom. Moreover, the FLN or the Provisional Government was the only party in Algeria which could assume responsibility for enforcing a cease-fire and which had requested guarantees for the free and fair implementation of the Algerian right to self-determination. If every shade of Algerian opinion were to be
represented at the "pourparlers", the problem of recognizing innumerable groups might arise and
would inevitably result in a deadlock. Moreover, a cease-fire was only one aspect of what was primarily a political
problem. As the Arab and non-Arab States of North Africa and the newly independent States of Asia had
recognized, it could not be discussed separately from the guarantees of self-determination. On
the other hand, there was no suggestion that the substance of the political problem should be dealt with
at the "pourparlers".

30. The moderate and conciliatory tone of the twenty-two-Power draft resolution should reassure those
who feared that its adoption might delay or complicate the proposed "pourparlers". It was imperative
for the General Assembly, in such a constructive, unambiguous and conciliatory recommendation, to
give guidance to the parties directly concerned regarding the best means of ending the conflict and
ensuring an early implementation of the principle of self-determination. Failure to do so would mean that
the situation would continue to be confused, particularly in the light of recent statements of French
leaders which tended to nullify President de Gaulle's generous offer. The French Prime Minister, for
example, had asserted on 6 December 1959 that, despite President de Gaulle's proposal for a cease-
fire and regardless of the Algerian maps in the referendum, the French Army would be maintained
in Algeria. He had further stated that it was impossible to separate France and Algeria politically. There
was therefore some reason to fear that President de Gaulle's assurances regarding the free choice of the
Algerian people were being revoked. In any event, the United Nations, as an organ with primary responsi-
bility for the peaceful settlement of disputes, should express its views on the Algerian problem. It could
best be done by adopting the draft resolution.

31. Mr. Mongi SLIM (Tunisia) said that, despite the hesitations expressed by some delegations regarding the
advisability of adopting a resolution and the apparent desire of certain words in the twenty-two-Power draft,
it was clear that all members of the Committee were anxious for an early start of direct talks with a view
to an honourable settlement on conditions capable of ensuring lasting peace in Algeria. Bearing that fact
in mind, and having reappraised the positions of Algeria and France, he had concluded that the adoption
of the draft resolution was the most moderate and timely means of encouraging the parties to achieve that
objective.

32. The most recent statements of the French Prime Minister showed once again that the Algerians must
secure clear guarantees regarding the implementation of their right to self-determination without which no
cease-fire agreement could be expected to become permanent. The draft resolution recognized that
necessity, and he was opposed to any alteration of its text. Its adoption would strengthen, in particular,
those in France who were sincerely working towards peaceful co-operation between France and Algeria.

33. Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) requested a separate vote on the word "two" in the eighth paragraph of the
preamble and in the operative paragraph.

34. Mr. CHANG (China) suggested a separate vote on the first three paragraphs of the preamble taken
together, followed by a separate vote on each of the remaining paragraphs of the draft resolution.

35. The CHAIRMAN requested the Committee to vote on the draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan,
Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, the Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and
Yemen (A/C.1/L.246 and Add.1).

36. In accordance with the suggestions made, he called for a vote on the first three paragraphs of the
preamble.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Japan, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland.

Against: Peru, Union of South Africa, Colombia, Dominican Republic.

Abstaining: Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Italy.

The paragraphs were adopted by 59 votes to 4, with 18 abstentions.

37. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the fourth paragraph of the preamble.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

El Salvador, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Nicaragua, Peru, Union of South Africa.

Abstaining: Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador.

The paragraph was adopted by 59 votes to 3, with 19 abstentions.
36. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the fifth paragraph of the preamble.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Against: Union of South Africa.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Spain.

The paragraph was adopted by 61 votes to 1, with 19 abstentions.

39. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the sixth paragraph of the preamble.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Iraq, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland.

Against: Spain, Sweden, Union of South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Iceland, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay.

Abstaining: Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Portugal.

The word was adopted by 36 votes to 14, with 31 abstentions.

41. The CHAIRMAN called for a separate vote on the word "two" in the eighth paragraph of the preamble.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Romania, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.


Against: Peru, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua.

Abstaining: Paraguay, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Japan, Laos, Mexico, Norway, Panama.

The paragraph was adopted by 38 votes to 22, with 21 abstentions.

42. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the eighth paragraph of the preamble as it stood.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Jordan, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.


Against: Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Union of
South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Italy.

Abstaining: Laos, Norway, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Japan.

The paragraph was adopted by 38 votes to 23, with 20 abstentions.

43. Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) said that he would not press for a vote on the word "two" in the operative paragraph.

44. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the operative paragraph of the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Hungary, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.


Against: Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras.

Abstaining: Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Laos, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti.

The paragraph was adopted by 38 votes to 26, with 17 abstentions.

45. The CHAIRMAN then put to the vote the draft resolution as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Ethiopia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.


Against: Honduras, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador.

Abstaining: Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Laos, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 38 votes to 26, with 17 abstentions.

46. Mr. SANDLER (Sweden) said that his delegation had not voted for the draft resolution because, in view of the greatly changed situation, it would not effectively promote a just, democratic and peaceful solution of the Algerian problem; fixing conditions was not always an adequate substitute for a spirit of confidence. His country was gratified at the formal recognition of the Algerian people's right to self-determination and was in favour of its implementation.

47. Mr. FUCHS (Austria) said that President de Gaulle's statement of 18 September, recognizing the Algerian people's right to self-determination, proposing that that right should be exercised in a free referendum, and offering to negotiate a cease-fire with the Algerian nationalists had completely altered the nature of the Algerian problem and was a decisive step towards a peaceful, just and democratic solution. His delegation would have preferred to see the unanimous adoption of a resolution embodying that view of the situation. It had been unable to vote for the twenty-two-power draft resolution because it had felt that the draft might retard rather than promote progress towards a settlement; it was essential to preserve the present hopeful atmosphere and to avoid any action that might drive the two parties apart. His delegation was confident that President de Gaulle would fulfill the promise he had made to the Algerian people.

48. Mr. CHANG (China) said that the Republic of China, which had always championed the principle of national independence and freedom, supported the Algerian people's right to self-determination. As a result of President de Gaulle's offer to self-determination and the FLN's acceptance of that offer, Algerian freedom was now in sight; the attainment of that freedom could best be promoted, however, by avoiding any action that might undermine President de Gaulle's ability to implement his Algerian proposal in the face of strong political opposition in France. His delegation had therefore been unable to support the draft resolution.

49. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said that his delegation had abstained from the final vote on the draft resolution because, in view of the large measure of agreement already achieved between France and the Algerian nationalist leaders, a General Assembly resolution was not the appropriate means of bringing about a final solution. His delegation continued to support the Algerian people's right to self-determination.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.