3. In the third place, General de Gaulle had said that secession would entail appalling poverty and political chaos, all-out slaughter, and the warlike dictatorship of the Communists. Could there be any chance of a free choice under such intimidation?

4. In the fourth place, President de Gaulle had stated that those Algerians of all origins who wished to remain French would be regrouped and resettled. That dangerous idea indicated an intention to partition Algeria between those choosing independence and those choosing to remain French, that was to say, the "colonies". The Provisional Government of Algeria had reacted to that unacceptable suggestion by stating on 28 September 1959 that any application of self-determination which aimed at breaking up the national entity of Algeria into racial or religious communities was illusory, and that the Algerian people was determined to oppose any attempt at partition.

5. In the fifth place, in his declaration of 18 September, General de Gaulle had made some tempting offers to those Algerians who chose to remain French. On 28 October 1959, he directed the administration and the armed forces in Algeria to give Algerians of the various communities every moral and material reason to want to be united with France. A vote obtained in that way could not be described as free.

6. In the sixth place, General de Gaulle had made it clear that he himself would fix the date of the referendum within four years after the actual restoration of peace. But under present circumstances, peace could be restored only by complete pacification— which would mean greater loss of human life and more human suffering without solving the basic problem, the political future of the Algerian nation—or by a cease-fire, which could not be achieved without a simultaneous agreement regarding conditions and guarantees for the implementation of the right of self-determination.

7. In the seventh place, whatever choice the Algerians made, it had to be endorsed by all Frenchmen.

8. Besides those conditions, restrictions and flaws, there were others, more alarming, contained in the statements of the French Prime Minister, the Minister of the Armed Forces and the Delegate General of the French Government in Algeria, which had not yet been invalidated by the President of France. The Delegate General, for instance, had stated at Montagne on 30 October 1959 that the French were fighting in Algeria first of all for France, but also for Europe and the West, in a territory which was included in the North Atlantic Treaty. It was for the members of NATO to say whether that organization was a defensive alliance for the maintenance of peace and the defence of freedom, or a system intended to perpetuate colonialism.

9. The Provisional Government of Algeria had adopted a very simple and straightforward attitude. By its statement of 28 September 1959 it had demon-
strated that it had no intention of establishing a totalitarian dictatorship by force and terror. First it agreed with the French Government that the right of self-determination, contained in the proclamation of the National Liberation Front (FLN) of 1 November 1954, should be the basis for the solution of the Algerian problem. Secondly, it agreed with President de Gaulle that recourse to universal suffrage could not take place without the return of peace. Thirdly, it maintained that the free choice of the Algerian people could not be exercised under the pressure of a large occupation army and of an administrative structure with a well-known tradition of electoral fraud.

10. Fourthly, the Provisional Government declared that it was only the trustee and guarantor of the interests of the Algerian people until the people had freely pronounced itself. Unlike most revolutionaries, who usually seized power first and then tried to discover the will of the people, the leaders of the Algerian revolution proclaimed that they would first submit to the will of the people, provided that that will was expressed in complete freedom. Nothing could be more democratic or better reflect peaceful intentions.

11. Fifthly, the Provisional Government had declared its readiness to enter into "pourparlers" with the French Government to discuss the political and military conditions of the cease-fire, and the conditions and guarantees for the application of self-determination. It was the latter point which seemed to have caused difficulties. By conceding the right of self-determination, General de Gaulle had recognized that the crux of the Algerian problem was political and not military. It necessarily followed that, to be equitable and effective, a military solution must be accompanied by an agreement on the conditions and guarantees for the solution of the underlying political problem.

12. The Provisional Government of Algeria was not laying down any pre-conditions regarding the political future of Algeria. Its demand that the conditions that would guarantee the freedom and impartiality of the referendum should be discussed was legitimate in view of the fundamental conditions and restrictions placed by General de Gaulle upon his offer.

13. The General Assembly's immediate objective should be to impress upon the two parties the necessity of entering into immediate discussions in order to confirm the points on which they were in agreement and to overcome the one difficulty that still separated them. As Mr. Ferhat Abbas had said on 19 October 1959, the problems raised by five years of war and the problems involved in the organization of a referendum could not be settled by public declarations; contacts and "pourparlers" were necessary. General de Gaulle's constructive and bold step forward was to be welcomed, but the international community was surely entitled to expect him to take a further and certainly less difficult step.

14. Unlike some delegations, he believed that if the General Assembly adopted no resolution on the Algerian question, it would be displaying an attitude of passivity that was unthinkable in the face of the appalling tragedy which was disturbing world peace and ruining thousands of Frenchmen and Algerians. No one would wish the United Nations to show symptoms of the malady that had destroyed the League of Nations and to suffer a similar fate. The responsibility of the United Nations had not ended with the auspicious trends that had become apparent on both sides. It could only end when real peace returned to Algeria. In the light of those considerations, his delegation and twenty-one other delegations had deemed it proper to submit a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.246 and Add.1), which simply stated a few incontrovertible facts and which would not, if adopted, in any way jeopardize the present prospect for a settlement.

15. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) said that, like other representatives, he regretted the French delegation's decision not to participate in the debate. His country had consistently maintained that the United Nations was competent to consider questions relating to the exercise of fundamental human rights and it considered that the resolutions adopted on those questions were legally valid. However, even if Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations had been applicable, the recognition of the Algerian right to self-determination would have placed the question on a new legal plane and confirmed the position previously taken by the General Assembly. The recognition of that right was the most significant development of the year in regard to the Algerian question, and the Assembly should pay a tribute to General de Gaulle for his statement of 10 November, in which he had stressed that the choice of the Algerians would be absolutely free. The Latin American nations, which had themselves had to fight for their right to self-determination, viewed General de Gaulle's statement with particular satisfaction since it had given virtually all the guarantees necessary to ensure that all opinions could be freely expressed. Further clarification was of course necessary, but the main point was that the principle of self-determination had been recognized and that, since the parties were agreed on the fundamental issue, there was no longer any major obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the question.

16. In the circumstances, the question arose whether any form of United Nations intervention, other than the expression of the general earnest desire to see the bloodshed cease, would facilitate a solution. If the United Nations decided against such intervention, it would not be shirking its responsibilities or failing to discharge its obligations under the Charter. The exercise of competence was justified only in attaining the ends for which that competence had been established. Any action which exacerbated passions or tended to divide peoples who appeared to be drawing closer together would be irreparable. No one could be in doubt as to the Assembly's feelings in the matter. Its membership of free peoples could not but support the cause of peoples seeking freedom. The object should be to prepare the way for the establishment of freedom. Every member of the Committee should therefore make certain that his vote was a vote for peace.

17. Mr. MENA SOLORZANO (Nicaragua) observed that France, whatever might be said to the contrary, was still the mother of democracy, honest in its political action and faithful to its doctrine of respect for the rights of others. That fact had been abundantly proved. Conciliation, which had long seemed impossible, had recently become a possibility. In the present situation, the Assembly bore a particularly
heavy burden of responsibility: would it encourage the existing favourable tendencies or create fresh obstacles? It was clear that the first objective must be to bring the fighting to an end and to ensure that nothing was done that might destroy the climate of good will which appeared to be developing. Any resol-
ution, however moderate in tone, would certainly be dangerous. It was essential that nothing should be done to hinder the referendum which General de Gaulle had so generously proposed. France, which had never failed to respond to the call of democracy and free-
dom, could be trusted.

18. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said that he wished to clarify certain points in order to put matters into their proper perspective. A number of Western countries had suggested, no doubt after con-
sulting one another, that the Committee should adopt no resolution at the present session. But it was the non-adoption, rather than the adoption, of a resolu-
tion, which invited danger, and if a hasty word might adversely affect the present situation, as the United Kingdom representative had pointed out at the 1069th meeting, there was all the more reason to adopt a substantive resolution, while of course avoiding any resolution that would prejudice a solution of the Algerian question. The restraint urged by the United States representative at the conclusion of the same meeting should not be an excuse for inaction. Because the statement of the President of France should, as the United States representative had said, be read as a whole, it was necessary to adopt a resolution applying the principles of the Charter to the question under consideration. The need for a resolution was underlined by the French Prime Min-
ister’s statement made on 6 December, on the occasion of the opening of the Bougie pipeline, that it was impossible to separate France and Algeria politically. It would therefore be dangerous to leave France a free hand in the matter.

19. The Australian representative, in his state-
ment at the 1069th meeting, spoken of the dangers of trying to be too precise. But too much precision in resolutions had never been a cause for alarm in the United Nations. The Australian delegation also main-
tained that a resolution which was not acceptable to France would not be helpful. But it was usual in any international question that one party should resist United Nations action, and that was no reason for abstaining from a decision. There had been many cases of the sort. The Soviet delegation’s protests had not prevented the United Nations from adopting resolutions against the USSR; there was no reason to make an exception in the case of France. More-
ever, the position advocated by the United Kingdom and the United States would only create a precedent detrimental to the United Nations. When a question came before the United Nations, the Organization was in duty bound to conclude its examination by adopting a resolution. The resolution was in fact an integral part of the debate. If certain Western countries had spoken against the adoption of the resolution it was doubtless out of deference to the feelings of the President of France, who on 21 October had agreed to take part in a summit conference on condition that the debates in the United Nations gave evidence of favourable signs. Certainly, every care should be taken not to offend France so that the summit conference might proceed in a propitious atmosphere. But that was no reason to humiliate the people of Algeria or to injure their cause by failing to adopt a resolution. The Soviet Union, for instance, which had shown great moderation towards France, was nevertheless in favour of adopting a resolution. It was regrettable, on the other hand, that the prin-
cipal Western Powers had taken up the position of defenders of colonialism.

20. There was nothing in the twenty-two-Power draft resolution which could offend anybody. The three main ideas—the cease-fire, the "pourparlers" and the principle of self-determination—were all to be found in the statement of General de Gaulle and they were based on the declared policy of France. Some delegations, including that of Argentina (1073rd meeting), had expressed doubts concerning the reference to the two parties. Certainly, the Algerian Provisional Government did not represent all the people of Algeria, but then neither did any of the Governments of Member States represent all the people on whose behalf they spoke. The fact that a delegation did not represent all opinions was no stumbling-block as long as the parties concerned possessed real authority with regard to the situation which gave rise to negotiations. Moreover, the issue for the proposed negotiations was not the political future of Algeria, but the cease-fire; accordingly, only those who were involved in the struggle could conduct them.

21. He regretted the absence of the French delega-
tion from the debate. The French delegation had, however, stated that France found the twenty-two-
Power draft resolution unacceptable because it would be tantamount to recognizing the Algerian Provi-
sional Government and linking the cease-fire with the political conditions for the future status of Algeria. The Algerian Provisional Government was by no means seeking recognition from the United Nations or France, and, on behalf of sponsors of the draft resolution, he felt that he must point out that a vote in favour of that text would in no way be con-
strued as recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government. Moreover, the Government had no wish to discuss with the French Government the political future of Algeria, which would be decided only by the Algerian people; it wanted only to discuss the guarantees which would enable the Algerians to de-
termine their future freely.

22. The twenty-two-Power draft resolution had been prepared without bias: it was equally fair to both France and Algeria. It stated principles and avoided details or disputed facts; it represented a meeting point between the Charter, the position of France and the position of Algeria; it represented the only chance for a cease-fire, "pourparlers" and a just and honourable settlement. It represented the meet-
ing point between the declaration of the President of France and the provisions of the Charter and offered the greatest concession which the Algerian Provisional Government could make. Provisional, though it might be, that Government represented a country which had once been sovereign. In that capacity, it had been among the first to recognize the independence of the United States, with which it had signed three treaties; it had been represented in England by an ambassador; France itself, between 1619 and 1830, had concluded fifty-seven agreements with Algeria, a sovereign and Independent State. That was some gauge of the degree of moderation shown by the Algerian Provisional Government in
its desire to restore the sovereignty of its country. If the Committee did not adopt the resolution, it would be a defeat for peace: there would be neither "pourparlers" nor a cease-fire, and the war would continue. The resolution on which the Committee would take its decision was a message of hope, and bore a promise of peace based on justice and liberty.

23. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) expressed his delegation's sympathy for the Algerians, whose legitimate aspirations to self-determination were worthy of respect, and also for the Head of the French State, who was honourably endeavouring to find an acceptable solution to a problem of extreme complexity. Under present circumstances, there was need for wise statesmanship: the Committee could not afford to fall in its responsibilities when it was discussing the question for perhaps the last time. Japan, which had favoured the inclusion of the question in the agenda, regretted the absence of the French representative. In his statement at the 1067th meeting, the Tunisian representative had described General de Gaulle's declaration of 16 September 1959 as "a decisive turning-point in French policy concerning Algeria".

24. The Japanese delegation, which had been one of the principal authors of the two draft resolutions previously adopted on the subject, was aware that inopportune decisions might upset or destroy the results of the efforts being made to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution to the Algerian problem. The future of Algeria must be built in the spirit of resolutions 1012 (XI) and 1194 (XII), adopted at the eleventh and twelfth sessions.

25. He welcomed General de Gaulle's courageous statement, from which he quoted several passages. He agreed with the Tunisian representative that there was no disagreement as to substance. The divergencies of view were rather as to the best method of demonstrating political wisdom at that particular moment. The Algerian problem was extremely complex, having regard to the racial factors at stake, the juridical and economic questions raised, and the political aspirations involved. The basic problem was to build an Algeria that was politically stable—both internally and internationally—and economically prosperous. The problem would have to be settled on the basis of self-determination in such a way as to ensure harmonious relationships between Algeria and neighbouring nations.

26. One aspect of the question was of particular concern to the Japanese delegation—the loss of human life, particularly among young people, which was depriving Algeria of the men and women it would need for the huge task it would have to face after the solution of the problem. He wished to express his deep admiration for the valour and selfless devotion of the youth of Algeria. He welcomed General de Gaulle's statement that the restoration of peaceful conditions was more important than anything else, and also the statement of the FLN which had said that it would not neglect any occasion which might improve the chances for peace.

27. It was in the light of those considerations that the Japanese delegation was ready to weigh the political wisdom of any draft resolution; it would look for elements that would promote the cause of Algeria, the legitimate interests of all parties concerned and most especially the higher interests of world order.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.