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Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

AGENDA ITEM 59

Question of Algeria (A/4140, A/C.1/L.246) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued) AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/L.246)

1. Mr. HAKIM (Lebanon) said that at the present session, there appeared to be much better prospects of the question of Algeria being settled in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, since, in his declaration of 16 September 1959, the President of the French Republic had solemnly recognized, on behalf of France, the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. That had been a courageous act of the greatest significance for the future of both Algeria and France, and the United Nations should welcome that decisive declaration, which was a contribution to the cause of freedom and the restoration of peace in Algeria. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, which had been recognized by the Government of Lebanon, had responded favourably to the French recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination which, as it had stated on 28 September, had always been one of its fundamental objectives and constituted a democratic means of achieving national independence. The General Assembly could not but be gratified by the fact that the two parties had accepted the principle of self-determination—which was embodied in the Charter—as a basis for the solution of the Algerian problem. It was also clear, both from discussions at the previous session and from the resolutions adopted by the Assembly at its eleventh and twelfth sessions (resolutions 1012 (XI) and 1164 (XIII)), that the Organization favoured a solution based on the democratic principle of the right of self-determination. However, the application of that principle was still the subject of controversy. The First Committee could, therefore, render a useful service by attempting to clarify the issues involved and to help bring the two parties together so that they might reach agreement on the proper application of the principle of self-determination.

2. He drew attention to the basic terms of the French proposals and pointed out that, according to the declaration of the President of the French Republic, the conditions for the application of the principle of self-determination would be determined, when the time came, by discussions on voting procedure and on the regulations governing the electoral campaign. Any discussion of the conditions for the application of the principle of self-determination with the leaders of the Algerian revolution would thus be ruled out before the cease-fire. It was to be feared that the leaders of the National Liberation Army would have little influence on the course of those discussions, which would take place long after the cessation of hostilities, and that those who participated would not truly represent the Algerian people. That was why the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic called for simultaneous agreement on the cease-fire and on the guarantees needed for the genuine application of the principle of self-determination.

3. The two parties clearly had quite different concepts of the nature and implications of the right of self-determination. A number of questions arose in that connexion. First, what choice did the right of self-determination offer the people of Algeria? The President of the French Republic considered that it would be disastrous if, of the three solutions proposed by France, the Algerian people should choose independence, which, in his view, would entail poverty, political chaos, widespread slaughter and, soon after, warlike dictatorship by the Communists. On the other hand, the Algerian Provisional Government considered that the right of self-determination led naturally to that solution which, as it had stated on 28 September, would not be a source of anarchy and poverty but would, on the contrary, guarantee individual liberty and assure individual security. However, although it had previously insisted on recognition of Algeria’s right to independence, it now declared its willingness to submit to the will of the Algerian people. The contention that the choice of independence would prove disastrous for the Algerians was contrary to the view of all peoples struggling for national independence. In fact, self-determination and independence were used almost synonymous in United Nations discussions.

4. The second question was whether the right of self-determination belonged to the Algerians as a people or as individuals. The President of the French Republic had stated that it was the Algerians as individuals who would be called upon to determine their future, as there had never been any Algerian unity, far less any Algerian sovereignty. Yet there were many modern independent States which had not previously constituted independent States. The United States was a case in point. According to modern theories of democracy and nationalism, the right of self-determination belonged not to individuals, but to peoples, whether or not they had previously had an independent political existence. It was therefore for the people of Algeria to exercise its right of self-determination in accordance with the democratic principle of majority rule and it could not concede this right to individuals or groups, thus enabling them to take conflicting decisions on their respective political futures. That was the position of the Algerian Provisional Government.
5. The third question concerned the territory to which the right of self-determination should apply. Every people had its own territory, which constituted an essential element of sovereignty. Thus, the French thesis that it was for the Algerians as individuals to exercise the right of self-determination severed the existing unity between the Algerian people and its territory and exposed that people to the danger of partition, as was clearly apparent from the French President's declaration of 15 September. As that danger would not exist if the Algerian people chose Francization or self-government and union with France, they were being offered a cruel choice. The Algerian Provisional Government categorically rejected the partition of Algerian territory which, in its view, would constitute a permanent threat to international peace and security.

6. The fourth question concerned the extent to which the Algerian people would be really free to choose its own future. For that choice to be free, there would have to be, on the one hand, freedom of the Press, freedom of assembly, freedom to organize political parties, freedom of movement inside the country, the release of all political prisoners and prisoners of war, and the return of all those who had been forced into exile; on the other hand, there would have to be an assurance that the military and civil authorities would be impartial and would not exercise direct or indirect pressure on the voters. But the French authorities in Algeria were not impartial, because they were opposed to the independence of the Algerian people, as was clear from the statement made by the French Prime Minister on 13 October 1959, and from the directive he had issued on 26 October to the Delegate General of the French Government in Algeria. Other statements by French leaders also showed that the military and civil authorities would be expected to persuade the Algerians to decide against independence. In view of the strong influence which the administration and the army might exercise in that respect, it was not surprising that the Algerian Provisional Government had pressed for guarantees that consultations would be general and free, especially during the four years preceding the referendum France would have ample time to persuade the Algerian people to reject independence and opt for union with France.

7. The fifth and last question concerning the right of self-determination was whether the choice of the Algerian people would be final. According to General de Gaulle, the answer was in the negative. The choice of the Algerians would have to be endorsed by the French people. On 13 October, Mr. Debré had given some information on that strange right of veto reserved to the French people. According to him, there was not and never had been any Algerian sovereignty; Algeria, as such, had come into existence thanks to France, and the Algerians had no unity except in so far as it had been created by France. That attitude was exactly the opposite of the position taken by the Algerian Provisional Government, which maintained that the self-determination provided for in the Charter of the United Nations restored to the Algerian people the exercise of their national sovereignty of which they had been temporarily deprived by military conquest. To subordinate the free choice of the Algerian people to the decision of the French people would be the very negation of self-determination and democracy. In the United Nations the right of self-determination was considered absolute. Thus, the choice of the Algerian people must be final. Only the constitutional ties between France and Algeria could be determined by agreement between the two Governments. The right of the Algerian people to self-determination was an inalienable right of the kind proclaimed by the United States Declaration of Independence. It was a right that could be recognized but not granted, for it was the birthright of all peoples.

8. It was on account of that fundamental difference between the conceptions held by France and by the Algerian nationalists that the leaders of the Algerian Provisional Government were unwilling to give up their struggle without prior agreement on the conditions and guarantees for the genuine application of the principle of self-determination. In order to ensure that that principle was genuinely applied in Algeria, discussions should be held between the two parties with a view to reaching agreement on the following questions:

(1) The definition of the choices which would be presented to the Algerian people, on the understanding that those choices would be final and not subject to the veto of the French people;

(2) The maintenance of the territorial integrity of Algeria in case of a vote for independence by the majority of Algerians;

(3) An orderly transition to independence if that was the choice of the Algerian people;

(4) The eventual establishment of close co-operation between an independent Algeria and France, including the exploitation of Sahara oil in the interests of both countries;

(5) The release of all prisoners of war and of political prisoners;

(6) The institution of civil liberties and democratic freedoms, including freedom of the Press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement inside Algeria, and the return to their homes of those who had been exiled or displaced;

(7) Freedom to organize political parties and to campaign for any of the choices to be presented to the Algerian people;

(8) The establishment of an impartial civil and military administration in Algeria and the reduction of armed forces to normal levels;

(9) The institution of voting procedures ensuring secrecy of the ballot and the prevention of voting frauds;

(10) The fixing of the date of the vote as early as possible after the cease-fire.

9. All those conditions were in the interests of both France and Algeria. There should be no possible doubt as to the Algerian people's freedom of choice. As long as the normal conditions of freedom and democratic government did not exist in Algeria, the Algerian people could not be sure that they would be allowed freely to exercise their right of self-determination. The men of the Algerian revolution, who were undefeated after five years of fighting, could not be expected to lay down their arms before they had secured all the necessary guarantees.

10. The General Assembly should call upon the two parties to reach agreement, not only on the conditions of a cease-fire, but also on the conditions and guarantees for the exercise by the Algerian people of the
right of self-determination. There were two parties to the conflict. The French Government could not solve the problem unilaterally by granting the right of self-determination to Algeria, and reserving the right to determine, at a time of its own choosing, the conditions for the exercise of that right. It could not be considered an impartial arbiter when it proclaimed its opposition to Algerian independence and its desire to influence the decision of the Algerian people by persuasion and by the granting of economic and social benefits.

11. The question could not be settled by unilateral "pacification": the myth of "pacification", like the myth of "French Algeria", should be discarded. The Algerian people were supported by world opinion and by freedom-loving peoples everywhere. In the end they would be bound to triumph, as the majority of Asian and African States had triumphed. Algeria had paid a high price for its freedom; it deserved to join the ranks of the newly independent States in the United Nations. The lesson of history was clear: the movement towards independence was irreversible.

12. In those circumstances, France, which had recognized the Algerian people's right to self-determination, should be faithful to its traditions of liberty and democracy and should embark on discussions with the true representatives of the Algerian people with a view to negotiating conditions for a cease-fire and for the exercise by the Algerians of their right of self-determination.

13. It had been suggested that a resolution might be harmful in the present circumstances. But the resolutions that had been adopted hitherto had helped to clarify the issues and to convince the two parties of the need for a peaceful and democratic solution. Recognition of the Algerian people's right of self-determination was due at least in part to the debates in the Assembly. It would be unwise, when the two parties had moved closer towards agreement, and the issues had been clarified, for the Assembly to refrain from adopting a resolution requesting the two parties to reach a negotiated settlement of the question. A resolution to that effect, expressed in moderate terms, would help to restore peace and to bring about an early settlement.

14. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) explained that, so far as the legal aspect of the question was concerned, his delegation could only restate the view it had expressed at the thirteenth session (1022nd meeting), namely, that the United Nations was not competent to discuss the question, because Algeria was an integral part of French national territory. Being fully aware of the tragic situation in Algeria, from which the principal sufferers were the Algerian people, the Belgian public had welcomed France's proclamation of the right of Algeria to self-determination, a concept which included the right to independence. The struggle had since become pointless, because there was agreement on the fundamental issue at stake and the right of self-determination could not be exercised until hostilities had ceased. France was known to be prepared to enter into "pourparlers" on the military conditions for the cessation of hostilities with the men responsible for the political organization of the uprising. The President of the Republic had given a guarantee that the conditions would be honourable and would respect the liberty and dignity of all parties, that the "pourparlers" might be either secret or public, and that the negotiators would enjoy complete liberty and would be given facilities for returning home so that they would be able to break off negotiations whenever they wished to do so.

15. Such "pourparlers", entered into with a sincere desire for success, might well bring about a cessation of hostilities. Arrangements could then be made to consult the people. In that connection, the President of the French Republic had explained that all Algerians would take part not only in the referendum but also in the preliminary discussions on voting procedure and on the campaign which would precede the elections. All opinions could accordingly be freely expressed. Moreover, observers from all over the world were to be invited to watch the referendum without let or hindrance. The referendum would be held not more than four years after order might be considered to have been restored.

16. That plan, which safeguarded the legitimate rights of the Algerians, provided a basis for a peaceful, democratic and just solution. The representative of Tunisia had rightly described it as marking a decisive change in French policy with respect to Algeria. The plan was not the outcome of any United Nations resolution. As was known, no resolution had been adopted at the previous session and the draft resolution submitted at that time by seventeen African and Asian countries (A/C.1/L.232) had been much less far-reaching than the offers now being made by the French Government. The President of the French Republic had set time limits and suggested the procedure: free consultation of the people.

17. According to the representative of Tunisia, there should be agreement between the French Government and the Algerian Provisional Government on both the military arrangements for a cease-fire and the political guarantees for consultation of the people. The Belgian Government, for its part, had never recognized the Algerian Provisional Government, which had been set up outside Algerian territory in circumstances of which it had no knowledge. He thought that to recognize that Government as representative would be to prejudge the will of the Algerian people as a whole.

18. By offering its Non-Self-Governing Territories in Africa, in the 1958 referendum, the choice between association and independence—Guinea had voted for the latter alternative—France had proved itself worthy of trust. The Algerian problem was a problem of the progress of the peoples of the Territory towards exercise of the right of self-determination, a process the complexity of which was only faintly reflected in the United Nations debates. That was why, quite apart from the question of competence, it was inadvisable for the Assembly to issue directives to the parties jointly involved in that process, namely, the French Government and the inhabitants of Algeria. Any intervention by the United Nations in that process could only have the effect of hardening certain attitudes and arousing animosities. That would frustrate the efforts of those men of good will who were trying to guide the political development of Algeria towards a peaceful, democratic and just solution.

19. Mr. TOURE Imaâl (Guinea) observed that, when on 28 September 1958 his country had decided in favour of independence, the other African territories participating in the referendum had not made a final choice. Two of the States of the Community had already tabled with the President of the French Republic a request
for accession to independence. In the opinion even of the President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, Mr. Houphouët-Boigny, all the other States of the Community were preparing to join the free community of independent nations at some early date.

20. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) said that he appreciated the reinforcement of his own argument by the representative of Guinea, and hence his confirmation that France could be trusted.

21. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) emphasized the importance of the statement made on 16 September by the President of the French Republic. Canada had every confidence that General de Gaulle would carry through his declared policy, which was a further reflection of his liberal views. Indeed, it was already possible to see signs that a new movement towards the final solution of the problem had begun, and he hoped that full advantage would be taken of that encouraging situation at the earliest possible opportunity.

22. In those circumstances, the Canadian delegation was very concerned lest some action, no matter how well-intentioned, might be taken by the General Assembly which would hamper the chances of a peaceful solution. It recognized the sincere desire of many of its members to devise a formula which would give expression to the concern of the United Nations and would serve to bring a solution of the problem nearer; but it had serious doubts whether such an approach was advisable. The principles for a settlement in Algeria had been generally accepted as just and equitable, and it seemed to be generally agreed that nothing should be done which might interfere with those developments. It was the habitual practice of the Committee to conclude consideration of problems by a vote on a draft resolution. The best contribution which the United Nations could make to the settlement of the question might well be found in the general expressions of concern and hopes for a solution which had been voiced on all sides. It would not be desirable to take a decision now to return to a solution which would divide the Assembly and hinder a solution; the United Nations should exercise self-restraint rather than adopt a formal resolution.

23. U THANT (Burma) said that developments in Algeria since the thirteenth session had been heartening. Against overwhelming odds, President de Gaulle had recognized that the hostilities in Algeria had been generated by political factors, that the cessation of such hostilities depended on the solution of all outstanding problems involving both the French Government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, and that any attempt to tackle only the military problem was bound to fail, the crux of the whole question being political.

24. Before General de Gaulle had assumed power, French policy in Algeria had been marked by uncertainty, controversy, and a profuse shedding of blood. Although unfortunately blood still flowed in Algeria, French policy was now characterized by certainty and positive action. President de Gaulle's historic statement of 19 September 1959 had heralded the dawn of Algerian peace and freedom. Only a free, friendly and peaceful Algeria would correspond to France's interests. When independence was too long postponed, a mood of frustration and desperation supervened which not only hindered free development in all spheres but engendered bitterness, hatred and rigidity. Such a development certainly did not help the cause of democracy and world peace.

25. Drawing a parallel between Burma's struggle for independence prior to 1948 and the present struggle of the Algerian people, he paid a tribute to the foresight and magnanimity of the United Kingdom Government which had then agreed to negotiate with the leaders of the Burmese independence movement. Today the people of Burma had harboured at the slightest bitterness against the United Kingdom, and relations between the two countries were very friendly.

26. To ensure that similar relations were established between France and the Algerian people, who were now struggling for their birthright of independence, his delegation appealed to France not to shut its eyes to realities in Algeria. It was vital that the Algerian problem should now be handled with a view not only to the cessation of hostilities but also to a political reconciliation between France and North African nationalism. The recognition, in some form, of Algerian nationalism and the legitimacy of Algerian aspirations to independence was an indispensable starting-point for negotiations. President de Gaulle's statement of 16 September 1959 and the Algerian leader's declaration of 28 September 1959 had set the trend of developments in the right direction.

27. The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.246) sponsored by the Burmese delegation and twenty other delegations was aimed at achieving those objectives which alone could restore peace in Algeria, satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Algerian people, restore warm and sincere friendship between France and North Africa, raise France in the estimation of the whole world, and extricate France's allies from the embarrassing predicament in which they had for many years found themselves. It was hardly necessary to explain the significance of every paragraph in the draft resolution, which was self-explanatory. The prime concern of its sponsors was to help France by helping the Algerian cause.

28. The Algerian problem was complicated by the fact that there were more than a million Frenchmen in Algeria; obviously they could not be abandoned by the mother country, particularly as they had been there for almost four generations. The issue therefore consisted, not merely in granting the right of self-determination to the Algerian people as soon as possible, but in finding a solution whereby 1 million white settlers and 8 million Arab Moslems could co-exist in peace and confidence. In any future form taken by Algeria, harmonious relations between those two races were imperative. They could be achieved only in a spirit of conciliation on both sides. The Burmese delegation again appealed to the conscience of the Committee and hoped that it would unanimously approve the twenty-one-Power draft resolution.

29. Mr. ULLOA (Peru) said that in certain respects the Algerian question came within the still sketchily defined field of human rights, and even involved the basic welfare needs of a community. It was mainly a question of political and moral principles, which the Peruvian delegation wished to discuss with complete calm and impartiality.

30. On the one side stood France, whose spiritual qualities were loved by all humanity and made that country a pride of the Latin world and a cultural leader of the first order. French thought in the eighteenth century, brought partly to fruition by the 1789 revolu-
tion, had inspired the American independence movement, while French ideas had done much to shape the jurisdictional organization of the American nations. France still exerted a profound influence on Latin-American minds.

31. On the other side stood the African peoples, who themselves, with their entry into political and international life and their efforts to achieve economic and cultural progress in a framework of democratic coexistence, were the object of the Latin-American peoples' interest and sympathy. Peru had never had colonies, or engaged in economic exploitation of that kind; nor had it ever indulged in racial discrimination, or dominated others. On the contrary, it had been the victim, not the operator, of those processes.

32. In Algeria, France exercised sovereignty as a result of an occupation sanctioned by international law which, throughout modern history, had admitted that kind of juridical and territorial acquisition. At the time of France's occupation of Algeria, the idea of self-determination, today embodied in international law, had not yet become generally accepted. American independence had objectively imposed the principle of self-determination; but that principle had to a large extent been opposed by States, both great and small; and for roughly a century, despite the juridical equality of nations, Latin America had been excluded from the international community.

33. It was, moreover, wrong to confuse independence with self-determination. The latter was one of the ways in which a people could express its national will and, while it could lead to independence, it did not necessarily mean independence itself. It could lead to other solutions as well.

34. In that sense, the French proposal that the Algerian people should choose between several solutions, through recourse of self-determination expressed by suffrage, was admissible. If the Algerians sought complete independence, they would be making a legitimate choice, since it was admitted in public law. But they could also choose, by a majority vote, to become part of a community of nations. The admirable example of the British Commonwealth proved, among the vicissitudes of contemporary history, that independence was compatible with membership of such a community.

35. Yet if the majority will of the Algerian people was reflected by those who were waging an armed battle for complete independence, it would be doing France an injustice to say or to suppose that it would not respect that will. Respect for the ideological and philosophical evolution of history was so much a part of France's glorious tradition that the process of democratic development had not remained confined within its frontiers. The far-reaching influence of its principles and its example made France the country which could with best reason be said to have inspired freedom.

36. France's sincerity was demonstrated by its formal offer of self-determination to the Algerians, by the recent holding of referendums which had determined by majority vote the composition of the French Community, and by its recognition of the Algerian's desire to become an independent State. France's wish to see peace restored in Algeria as a first step was also proof of its sincerity. A plebiscite held in the midst of fighting and acts of violence would be subject to the disturbing effects of passions, threats and fears. On the other hand, a vote held after violence had ended, and had been participated in, on an equal basis, by all citizens—including the present rebels, whom General de Gaulle had described as brave men—would be an act of self-determination that no prejudice or passion would mar.

37. Admittedly many peoples had secured their independence by force, imposing a rough-and-ready kind of self-determination in which the will of the people was taken for granted and no plebiscite was held. However, revolution was not necessarily the only method of obtaining independence. It was the one which those unfortunate peoples that had had to purchase freedom with their blood had been obliged to use because no other means of liberation was available to them. In Algeria, however, there was no reason for self-determination to be imposed by force when the opportunity had been offered to achieve it by peaceful means.

38. Moreover, the objectives of the United Nations included, not merely self-determination, but peace. The United Nations Charter was based on the principle of evolutionary change, not violence. It was unthinkable to reject the opportunity of employing peaceful means when the same results could be achieved by those means and the alternative was violence. France was offering peace so that the Algerians could freely decide their destiny. It also promised to accept their decision, even if that decision called for complete independence and, consequently, for the severance of those political ties which at present united Algeria and France.

39. The United Nations Charter stated certain purposes and principles with regard to self-determination, but it prescribed no solutions. What it required was that the objective should be attained by peaceful means in accordance with justice and international law. It called for the development among nations of friendly relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Application of the Charter's provisions could lead only to peace.

40. The Charter constituted strictly a system of relations among States; but it suggested no means for regulating relations between States and political groups within them, nor did it endow the latter with any international status. In theory, the Charter could be invoked in connexion with the Algerian question, in so far as that question involved application of the principle of self-determination; however, it was possible to challenge even that interpretation, as France had previously challenged it, by citing the principle of domestic jurisdiction on the ground that the rebellion was an internal matter. With a view to investing the rebellion with the international aspect which relations between France and Algeria did not possess, a provisional government had been set up whose intransigence, designed to give it a status out of proportion to its resources, had not contributed to the restoration of peace in Algeria. It was only France which, in the series of statements by General de Gaulle, had offered peace—not a peace of the victors, nor even a peace based on the status quo, but a peace which placed wholly in the hands of the Algerian people the right freely to decide their destiny. Therefore, even if the spirit of the United Nations Charter was interpreted in the most liberal manner possible, it could be said that France was remaining faithful to the Charter.
41. The Algerian rebels, whose deeply rooted nationalist spirit and ideals were worthy of admiration and respect, could not claim any international status under the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The latter accorded legal standing only to States and to bodies set up by States. By extension, it accorded certain rights to groups of individuals and to the individual himself, but not within the context of nationality. The Charter did not give revolutionary factions the legal right to represent groups or individuals. Hence the United Nations could not, whether directly or indirectly, by statements or by resolutions, grant the Algerian rebels legal parity with a State. The State in question had, moreover, exercised legitimate sovereignty in Algeria by the methods and in the manner recognized by nineteenth-century international law. There was therefore no former, organic Algerian nationality, nor an Algerian sovereignty, that had been forcibly suppressed by France. The authority which the Provisional Government claimed to exercise by virtue of Algeria's sovereignty was thus non-existent, in terms both of the past and of the present. The United Nations could not take it into consideration or agree that the Provisional Government should negotiate, on behalf of Algeria, the conditions for exercising the right of self-determination.

42. No one could desire to see the continuation, in suffering and bloodshed, of a rebellion which had not much prospect of success. Moreover, progress had been made, in recent years, in building a future for Algeria. The French Government had gone on, from purely repressive action against the rebellion, to promise and carry out measures for gradual political improvement, starting with local self-government and representative institutions and proceeding to self-determination. But self-determination would be an empty word unless it extended to all the inhabitants of Algeria—unless, in other words, the Frenchmen, and their descendants, of Algeria were permitted to take part, on equal terms, in the decision that would determine the future of the land which they had made wealthy by their stubborn efforts. The French inhabitants of Algeria were the true representatives of what France had meant and could continue to mean for that country, even if the latter achieve complete independence by means of self-determination exercised in an orderly, peaceful manner.

43. France had offered to permit the exiles and the fighters to resume their place in the Algerian community while peace was being restored and so to exercise their political influence on the plebiscite. That attitude was the reverse of interfering with the will of the people, which had been alleged to be France's intention. The people's will must be expressed freely, with neither France nor the rebels attempting to dictate to the Algerian people as a whole the nature of their future régime.

44. The French Government had stated that the popular vote could be freely observed by anyone wishing to watch it. To demand that such observation should be international in character and that the United Nations should participate would imply a measure of distrust which no great nation could tolerate when it had given its word of honour. What France very reasonably asked, with a logic which should be convincing to any dispassionate mind, was that peace should be restored before the popular vote was held, since the latter could not be genuine and honest except in normal conditions of peace and emotional tranquillity.

45. His delegation, faithful to the principle of self-determination which was the very basis of Peru's existence as a nation, was opposed to any attitude and any draft resolution that might prejudice the peaceful solution of the Algerian problem in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Algerian people.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.