Tribute to the memory of Mr. Ernest G. Jansen, Governor-General of the Union of South Africa

Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

Tribute to the memory of Mr. Ernest G. Jansen, Governor-General of the Union of South Africa

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the members of the Committee to observe a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of Mr. Ernest G. Jansen, Governor-General of the Union of South Africa, who had been a member of parliament, a distinguished minister, an outstanding jurist and the author of many books on social and administrative questions.

The members of the Committee observed a minute of silence.

2. Mr. NAUDE (Union of South Africa) thanked the Committee for its gesture of friendly sympathy to his country.

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3. Mr. BRUCAN (Romania), speaking on a point of order, said that the representative of the Republic of Korea had referred in his statement at the previous meeting to "satellites" of the Soviet Union. It was contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter to refer to States Members of the Organization in that way. He requested the Chairman to call the attention of the representative of the Republic of Korea to the fact that under the Charter all Members were equal.

4. The CHAIRMAN said that the First Committee had tried at the present session to debate in a moderate manner. The Romanian representative's remarks were therefore not without justification.

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/L.245) (continued)

5. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that the question of the unification of Korea would have to be solved if conditions favourable to the economic and social development of the country were to be created and the well-being of all Koreans was to be assured; UNCURK held the same view. The United Nations should therefore strive to solve the problem, bearing in mind the present situation and the complete failure, so far, of the policy hitherto followed under pressure from certain circles and certain countries. Moreover, the division of Korea was a source of continuous tension in the Far East. The delegations which believed that no new action was necessary were either unaware of the dangers of such a policy or were seeking deliberately to maintain a threat to the Korean people and to peace and security in the Far East. Unfortunately, many delegations appeared to take that position, although experience had shown the futility of an attitude which had resulted in the adoption of identical resolutions year after year. Such a policy, although favourable to certain interests, was not realistic, constructive or worthy of the United Nations.

6. The report before the Committee (A/4187) sought to give the impression that UNCURK was doing everything in its power to build a united, independent and democratic Korea and to restore peace and security in the area. However, the manoeuvres employed since the beginning of the discussion to prevent the Committee from hearing a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea demonstrated that the same forces were again opposed to any steps towards a solution of the problem. They claimed that they wished to see Korea united, but only one party had been invited to send representatives and that party was the one which appeared least inclined to achieve unification by peaceful means. It was thus easy to attribute the responsibility for failure to the absent party.

7. His delegation would not comment on the distortions of facts and the fallacious explanations given by the United States representative, Mr. Robertson. It would merely point out that the Korean war had enabled certain circles to occupy the Chinese island of Taiwan, in which they had set up military bases and installed a clique that had been driven from its country by the Chinese people. It had also enabled them to establish nuclear weapon bases in Korean territory. Mr. Robertson's statement at the 1061st meeting gave no indication of a desire on the part of his country to adapt its policy to the real situation or to settle the question of unification. Owing to the absence of a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States representative had been spared the embarrassment of a reply to his accusations and appeals, while the presence of a representative of South Korea ensured him the support of a Government that was the creature of certain American circles whose sole aim was to further their own interests in the Far East.

8. The report of UNCURK sought to depict the situation in South Korea and the Syngman Rhee régime in the most favourable light, but it could not fully conceal the truth, particularly the lamentable state of
South Korean economy and the deficit in its balance of trade. Reference had already been made to the millions of unemployed, the poverty of the majority of the population, the fact that American aid was essential to its industries, the inflation and the extraordinary increase in the cost of living south of the 38th parallel. It was well known that the thousands of millions of dollars poured out by the United States were used to maintain an enormous army for the purpose of launching a new aggression.

9. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on the other hand—and the slanders of certain delegations could not conceal the facts—the volume of industrial production had increased fourfold between 1949 and 1958, and agricultural production in 1956 had been 1.4 times as high as in 1949. The industrial goals of the 1957-1961 five-year plan had been achieved by July 1959 and under the seven-year plan which had been drawn up the per capita production of essential industrial products in the Democratic People's Republic was to be raised to the Japanese level.

10. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had initiated many proposals for unification. In December 1954 the Supreme National Assembly had proposed the convening of a conference to be attended by delegates from political parties and public organizations and representatives of the various strata of the population of North and South Korea or, alternatively, a conference of the legislative organs of the two countries, with a view to the speedy solution of the Korean problem. In March 1955 and in April 1956, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had proposed the establishment of a single government on the basis of elections to be held throughout the entire country, contacts between the peoples of the two Koreas and the initiation of talks on a basis of equality. It had also proposed the elimination of all barriers to travel between the two parts of the country, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the cessation of all interference in the internal affairs of Korea. On 5 February 1958 (A/3865, paras. 8 and 10) it had again proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops and the holding of elections under the supervision of representatives of neutral countries, as well as the expansion of economic and cultural exchanges and the reduction of the armed forces of both States. It had also offered South Korea food, industrial products and clothing, scholarships, aid for the unemployed and homeless, etc. The United Nations had been officially informed on 28 October 1958 (A/C.1/810 and Add.1) of the complete withdrawal of the remaining Chinese troops in North Korea and on 10 November 1958 it had been advised of the proposal made by the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to hold all-Korean elections once all foreign troops had been withdrawn (A/C.1/ 813).

11. It had been claimed that withdrawal of United States forces was impossible in view of the great distance between Korea and the United States. However, as those forces had come so far, they obviously had to make the return journey. There was no other solution to the Korean problem and it was time that those who disliked the idea of withdrawing their troops from foreign territories became accustomed to the idea.

12. Several countries, which had an interest in maintenance of the dictatorial police régime of Syngman Rhee, had consistently adopted a negative position with regard to proposals made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The question was what position the United Nations should take in the matter. Was it merely going to maintain a Commission which served interests alien to the Korean people and to adopt a draft resolution designed to perpetuate the division of the peninsula? The time had come to face the facts. Only the proposals and initiatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea provided a means of solving the problem, and an independent, democratic and prosperous Korean State could be established only through contact between the two parties. It was the responsibility of the United Nations to promote such contacts and to establish conditions favourable for the unification of the country.

13. Mr. ROBERTSON (United States of America) said that he had been pleased to hear the Romanian representative acknowledge that all the representatives in the Assembly were there on an equal basis. Perhaps he would like to request the President of the Assembly to bring that fact to the attention of the representative of the Soviet Union, who at the 843rd plenary meeting had again attacked the representative of the Republic of China by saying that he represented nobody.

14. Mr. TUGARINOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the United States representative did not hesitate to omit the debate. His remark was quite irrelevant to the item under discussion. He was apparently trying to find any pretext to prevent constructive consideration of the Korean question in the First Committee.

15. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) said that he regretted to note in the report before the Committee that the communist authorities did not seem disposed to respond to the call made by the General Assembly in resolution 1264 (XIII). In those conditions, the prospects of unification remained remote. The position taken by the communist authorities that the United Nations was not competent to deal with the Korean question because it had been a belligerent in the Korean war and that any resolution on the Korean question adopted by the United Nations was null and void (A/4187, para. 11) made it doubtful that a useful contribution to the discussions could be brought by a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. For that reason his delegation had voted against the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.243).

16. A unified Korea was an essential condition for peace in the Far East. Japan concurred in the objective of the United Nations in Korea and in the fundamental principles set forth in many resolutions of the Assembly. Provided those principles were respected, any peaceful means of solving the problem, including negotiations or good offices, should not be excluded. As his delegation had consistently maintained, the Assembly might adopt a flexible position on the implementation of those principles, so that it would be able to meet changing circumstances whenever it seemed necessary and proper to do so.

17. Unification was necessary if Korea was to attain stability and economic progress. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the UNCURK report mentioned the fact that the Republic of Korea had made progress in various fields, such as general economic conditions, capital formation, the repair of war damage and
the construction of new buildings, and the effectiveness of the civil service. The efforts of the Korean Government and people were handicapped by the division of the country, as had been shown at the 1063rd meeting by Mr. Cho’s brilliant statement. His delegation wished to call upon the communist authorities to accept the objective of Korean unification. It was in that spirit that his delegation would vote in favour of the fourteen-power draft resolution.

18. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that if, as at previous sessions, the Committee, after examining the misleading report of UNCURK, again adopted a draft resolution asking UNCURK to continue its work against the interests of the Korean people, no progress would be made towards the peaceful unification of Korea.

19. In view of the favourable development of relations between States with different social structures, it might have been hoped that the question of Korea would be considered with the seriousness and objectivity which it demanded. However, the Committee had begun by allowing representatives of one of the parties to be present at its discussions and refusing the same right to the other party (1061st meeting). Yet the solution to the Korean problem was essentially a matter for the Korean people itself, and it would be useless to hope to impose the corrupt régime of South Korea on the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. At the present time there were two States with different social structures in Korea. The United Nations should therefore endeavour to facilitate understanding and direct contacts between the two parties and help them to reach agreement on the measures to be taken for the eventual establishment of national unity on a democratic and peaceful basis. The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had repeatedly made realistic proposals to achieve that aim. On 5 February 1958 it had proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops from all of Korea, free elections at the national level, negotiations with a view to the promotion of economic and cultural exchanges between North and South Korea, and the reduction of the armed forces of both States to the minimum.

20. The People’s Republic of China, which, together with all the socialist and other peace-loving countries, had warmly supported those proposals, had unilaterally withdrawn the Chinese People’s Volunteers from North Korean territory in October 1958 (A/C.1/810 and Add.1). Unfortunately, the United States had not followed that example.

21. On 27 October 1959, the Supreme National Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had addressed a declaration to all the parliaments of the world, appealing once again for the unification of the country by means of genuinely free elections throughout Korea and stressing the need for the previous withdrawal of American troops. The North Korean Government had frequently proposed to the South Korean Government various practical measures which would help to create understanding, such as the establishment of a standing committee comprising representatives of the two parliaments, of the two Governments or of political parties and social organizations of North and South Korea, the establishment of commercial and cultural relations, the organization of postal and telegraphic communications between North and South, and the provision of electricity to South Korean towns. The Government of South Korea had not accepted any of those proposals.

22. The United States had not withdrawn its forces from South Korea and, through the American command of the United Nations forces, had constantly violated the Armistice Agreement. It had kept away from South Korean territory the inspection teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; it had unilaterally abolished paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement, which prohibited the introduction into Korea of new arms and had brought into South Korean large quantities of modern weapons. The South Korean Army had grown from sixteen divisions at the end of the war to thirty-one divisions at the end of 1958. As a result of the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed immediately after the conclusion of the armistice, the United States had transformed South Korea into a military base and was using the country as a colony and exploiting its mineral wealth.

23. Contrary to the claim in the report of UNCURK, the Syngman Rhee régime was unpopular and only kept in power by repression and terror, and with the backing of American armed forces. Freedom of speech, freedom of the Press and freedom of assembly did not exist: an example was the banning of the newspaper Kyunghyang Shinmun. The prisons were full and the people were living in poverty. Industry was declining and the area of land under cultivation was being steadily reduced. Over 6 million people were wholly or partially unemployed.

24. The situation was completely different in North Korea. The Government had not only repaired the destruction caused by war, but had created modern industries and was steadily developing agriculture. The standard of living of the people had been substantially improved by a variety of measures, such as successive price reductions, the construction of housing and the allocation of funds for social insurance, education and public health. Since 1 November 1958 school attendance had been compulsory at the intermediate level, and education was free at all levels, as in all the socialist countries.

25. The division of Korea was greatly hindering the harmonious development of the whole country which, with its 30 million inhabitants and its natural riches, was capable of developing an intensive foreign trade, taking an active part in international affairs, and becoming an important factor for peace in the Far East.

26. It was essential that the United Nations should encourage understanding between the two Korean States with a view to the reunification of Korea, and that the United States should make the gesture long awaited by all the peaceful peoples of Asia and the world and withdraw its forces from Korea.

27. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.245, which was identical with those adopted by the Committee at previous sessions and which renewed the terms of reference of UNCURK without taking into account the experience of the past, could only serve to perpetuate the division of Korea. His delegation would vote against the draft resolution.

28. Mr. Sosa Rodriguez (Venezuela) regretted that the Committee should once again have to consider a question that owed its origin to the artificial division of a country into two parts which were today antagonistic because of the imposition of a communist regime upon the northern part.

29. All attempts at reconciliation since the conclusion of the armistice in 1953 had been in vain. The United Nations resolutions continued to be regarded as a dead letter by the North Korean authorities, which persisted in viewing the supreme international Organization, not as the impartial organ of world opinion, but as the instrument of certain Powers which opposed the communist system.

30. Nevertheless, the failure to comply with the United Nations resolutions did not undermine the Organization’s authority, which was essentially a moral authority, for the truth continued to be the truth, even though it was not acknowledged. On the other hand, that moral authority would be destroyed if the United Nations abandoned its principles because a State systematically refused to heed its resolutions.

31. The cause served by the General Assembly’s numerous resolutions on Korea was still just and necessary: to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. Even if the goal still seemed distant, the United Nations must continue to work towards it by following the only possible course, which was to keep the question on the agenda, keep UNCURK functioning, and keep United Nations forces in Korea, although reduced in strength.

32. The North Korean authorities claimed that the presence of United Nations forces in South Korea was the principal obstacle to the peaceful unification of Korea and called for their complete withdrawal as a prerequisite for the holding of free elections in both parts of the country. That contention, however, was inadmissible, for it was based on two equally false premises: that the aggressor had been South Korea and not North Korea, and that the United Nations forces were forces of the United States and its allies. Everyone knew—for the fact had been amply verified—that it had been North Korean troops which had invaded South Korea in the summer of 1950 and that, without immediate United Nations intervention, South Korea would have been destroyed. It was also well known that the forces which had defended South Korea consisted of contingents from several nations assembled under the United Nations flag. Since the reduced forces which were still in South Korea could not be considered as potential aggressors, their presence could not be an obstacle to the holding of free elections throughout all Korea; on the contrary, it was a guarantee of order and impartiality. The withdrawal of these forces, on the other hand, could lead to further aggression, similar to that of 1950, for the intentions of the North Korean authorities did not appear to have changed.

33. For all those reasons, the United Nations must remind the North Korean authorities of the requests and recommendations contained in its previous resolutions, in the hope that the apparent improvement in relations between the Powers which represented the ideologies dividing the world would cause the North Korean authorities to heed its appeal and thus pave the way for a final solution of the Korean question.

34. His delegation would accordingly vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.245).

35. Mr. Turkmen (Turkey) believed that the important question of Korea was an example of the great injustice done to some nations in the post-war era through the division of their country. In the case of Korea, the United Nations had a special responsibility, since it was under the Organization’s auspices that South Korea had become an independent and democratic country. It had been the United Nations which had undertaken, successfully, to repel the aggression committed against the Republic of Korea. Finally, the United Nations, through the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and UNCURK, had assisted in that country’s reconstruction and maintained its interest in the unification of Korea on a just and democratic basis.

36. Unfortunately, the task of the United Nations had not yet come to an end and, owing to the communist authorities’ refusal to comply with the United Nations resolutions, its objectives had not yet been achieved. The last attempt made in 1958 by the Governments of the countries which had contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea had failed, for the North Korean authorities had shown that their position had not changed since the Korean Political Conference, which had been held at Geneva in 1954, and that they still rejected the principle of free elections in Korea under United Nations supervision.

37. His country was particularly interested in the Korean question because the action of the United Nations in Korea was a symbol of the Organization’s solidarity in the maintenance of peace and security, to which Turkey was ardently devoted. It had contributed forces to the United Nations Command because it believed that world peace and security were indivisible and that it was the duty of every United Nations Member to do its share in upholding the principles of the Charter.

38. For those reasons, his country was co-sponsoring the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.245). Although it was possible that that new draft resolution would not be implemented either, the United Nations was nevertheless bound to reaffirm the principles it professed on the Korean question.

39. If the desire for the relaxation of tension which had been constantly expressed at the current session was to be translated into reality, the problems which lay at the root of the present tension, including the problem of Korea, could not be ignored. It must be hoped, therefore, that the appeal of the United Nations would have a greater impact now than in the past, in order that a just and democratic settlement of that problem might help to increase international confidence.

40. Mr. Michalowski (Poland) noted with regret that the discussion had disregarded both the needs of the actual situation in Korea and the real interests of the Korean people, which were the same on both sides of the armistice line. Poland’s membership in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea had enabled it to view those problems at close range, realistically and impartially. That Commission had contributed substantially to the preservation of peace
until its activities had been virtually halted by the South Korean authorities.

41. The basic reality in Korea was the existence of two States. Whether it pleased everyone or not, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did exist and from year to year made important political, economic and social progress. If the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula were truly desired, the two Korean States should be encouraged to establish and develop contacts in all fields-economic, social, cultural and others. Co-operation in the development of Korea's material resources would be especially conducive towards achieving that objective. His delegation deplored the fact that representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not been invited to the discussion, since that would have enabled the Committee to get a more impartial picture of the situation.

42. He regretted that the improvement in the international atmosphere had not inspired a greater number of representatives to adopt a more flexible attitude which could help in achieving a settlement satisfactory to both sides. Tension in the Korean peninsula must be reduced, and, despite the geographical arguments to the contrary, the best way to do so was to withdraw all foreign troops from South Korea, as had been done in North Korea a year before. It was impossible to accept the line of reasoning that negotiations between the two States could begin only after North Korea had capitulated by accepting the conditions dictated by the other side. On the contrary, the time had come to try a new approach to the Korean question and to open negotiations between the two States aimed at their ultimate unification. Foreign troops must be withdrawn from South Korea. The work of UNCURK should be terminated, and an impartial and neutral body should be called upon to assist in bringing about the unification of the country and in restoring peace and stability.

43. Mr. DAYAL (India) said that he would begin by giving information on the eighty-eight former prisoners who had been brought from Korea to India because they had wished to settle in neutral countries. Seventy-four of them had been nationals of North Korea, two of South Korea and twelve of China. In accordance with their wishes, fifty-five of them had been sent to Brazil, two to China, six to North Korea and fourteen to Argentina. Eleven were still in India; five of those who had opted to remain there, and had been given employment. The remaining six had not been accepted by the country to which they had wished to go. Five of them were being resettled with the financial and other assistance of the Government of India. The remaining one was mentally deranged and was being looked after by the Indian authorities. As the disposal of the ex-prisoners had thus been completed, the camp set up for them had been closed in September 1959.

44. His delegation was bound to say, with regret, that nothing in the report of UNCURK or in the present debate had caused it to hope that the lines on which the United Nations was proceeding would lead to an early reunification of Korea under a government based on the freely expressed will of all the people of Korea. It regretted that the Committee had once again refused to hear a representative of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea while inviting a representative of the other part of the country, the Republic of Korea. The future of Korea could not be effectively discussed, nor could solutions for present difficulties be found, in the absence of the Government responsible for more than half the area and nearly a third of the population of Korea. Moreover, the United Nations had previously negotiated with the North Korean authorities for the conclusion of an armistice and for the disposal of prisoners of war.

45. No solution would come out of a simple reiteration of previous resolutions of the General Assembly. There was no doubt that the United Nations had the responsibility for the reunification and rehabilitation of Korea, but one could not ignore the difficulties that had arisen from the fact that the North Korean Government had been at war with United Nations forces in Korea and had refused to co-operate with the Commission composed of representatives of countries which had contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea. To escape from the present deadlock, there had to be a step forward from the present fixed positions; for instance, some form of international supervision of elections other than that currently proposed could be devised.

46. There was also the matter of the presence of foreign troops in Korea. After the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers, of which his delegation had learned with satisfaction, the withdrawal of the forces under the United Nations flag from the southern part of the country might be helpful to a political solution. There were other ways of maintaining the armistice: the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had already played a useful role in that connexion. There were also other instances of similar supervision elsewhere.

47. As to the economic aspect of the Korean problem, it was unfortunate that even in that field the operations of the United Nations had to be restricted to only one part of the country. Whatever the merits of the conflicting statements made in the Committee on social and economic conditions in the two parts of the country, real progress in all fields required that the problems of Korea should be treated as a whole, that the unnatural division of the country should be eliminated, and that all assistance from abroad should be applied to purely productive purposes.

48. Hence his delegation would not be able to support the fourteen-Power draft resolution or any other proposal which might freeze the present division of Korea. However, the varied parts played by India in Korea since the second session of the General Assembly proved conclusively that his delegation's abstention would not be based on indifference or detachment, but rather on the belief that a solution of the Korean problem would emerge only when Korea had ceased to be an item in the general complex of great-Power disagreements in East Asia and throughout the world. At least there was no disagreement on the objective—a unified, democratic and prosperous Korea; and that objective could be achieved if the Korean people was assisted to work out its own solutions.

49. Mr. UMAÑA BERNAL (Colombia) said that Colombia, as in previous years, was a co-sponsor of the draft resolution on the Korean question (A/C.1/1 L.245) submitted by the States which had come to the aid of that country in accordance with their obli-
gations under the Charter of the United Nations and with the resolutions adopted by the competent United Nations organs. He regretted that the authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea denied the competence of the United Nations and considered the General Assembly an unworthy organ which had acted in the Korean question as the tool of foreign imperialism. In sponsoring the new draft resolution, Colombia had wished particularly to reaffirm its support for certain basic objectives—the establishment by peaceful means of a united, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. It also felt that the Assembly could not fail to note the negative attitude of the authorities in North Korea, which had consistently rejected the proposals of the countries represented in the United Nations Command for a peaceful and democratic resolution of the fundamental problem of Korean unification. It was necessary once again to call upon those authorities to accept the principles set forth by the General Assembly and by the Korean Political Conference held in 1954. Since it had done meritorious work and could still achieve better results, UNCURK must be continued. Lastly, the Korean question must remain on the General Assembly's agenda until a satisfactory solution had been found, either in the Assembly or outside it.

50. While he did not want to go back over the history of the question, he wished to point out that it had originated in a typical case of armed aggression, which conformed to all the proposed definitions of acts of aggression, and that the problem still persisted because the General Assembly's recommendations had been disregarded. Although the present improved international atmosphere had unfortunately not yet reached the distant areas of the Far East, his delegation hoped that it would prove possible to unify Korea while at the same time respecting fundamental principles and making no concession to excessive and unjustified demands. The withdrawal, mentioned in the draft resolution, of forces sent by virtue of legal decisions of the United Nations could be completed once the conditions laid down by the General Assembly had been fulfilled. That might provide a basis for negotiation and perhaps lead to the conclusion of an agreement which would permit the Korean people to live out its own national life and to find its own destiny, as the Korean representative had said. In that connexion, his delegation wished to express serious reservations regarding the manner in which the Government headed by Mr. Syngman Rhee was applying the system of representative democracy. The existence of a totalitarian one-party régime in North Korea did not justify the questionable authoritarian measures which were being applied in South Korea. His delegation was opposed to intervention in the domestic affairs of States and referred to the question only because other representatives had raised it. In any event, it hoped that by the next session of the General Assembly a form of agreement would have been found which would permit the unification of the Korean nation by means of free elections.

51. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) recalled the principal landmarks in the evolution of the Korean question: the agreement concluded by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to set up a provisional democratic Government in Korea, the partition of Korea, the North Korean aggression, the failure of the 1954 Korean Political Conference at Geneva and the subsequent proposals of the North Korean Government. While the chances for reaching a settlement at the present session were slight, the withdrawal of the Chinese Volunteers and the acceptance, at least in principle, by the North Korean authorities of free elections under the supervision of a group of neutral nations, held out the hope that a solution in keeping with the objective of the United Nations, namely, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea through free, fair and impartial elections, might be achieved. His delegation felt that, as long as means for creating a free atmosphere could be found, it did not really matter whether the elections were held under the auspices of the United Nations or under any other impartial international commission.

52. The withdrawal of the United Nations forces could not be effected immediately without risking a breach of the peace in Korea. In addition, the United Nations was responsible for the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. It was to be hoped that the new international spirit which recent events seemed to foreshadow would contribute to a solution of the Far Eastern question, as also to that of the Korean question, which was an element of the former. A settlement of the Korean question would not be reached by deciding one way or the other on the draft resolution, but by improving international relations. Until the United Nations objective was achieved, it could only be hoped that peace would be maintained in the area under the supervision of the United Nations.

53. He commended UNCURK for having helped to promote political and economic stability in the Republic of Korea, despite the difficulties caused by the country's partition. He was pleased to note that rapid strides had been made in the social field, particularly in education and health, and that there had been a rise in the level of living. His delegation hoped that the strong and determined Korean people would achieve the unity which alone could lead to the fulfillment of their aspirations.

54. Mr. BISBE (Cuba) said that he was opposed to the systematic postponement of certain questions, a procedure which perpetuated the existence of dangerous areas of tension, and called upon the United Nations to find a speedy and appropriate solution to the Korean question. If progress towards disarmament and peace was genuinely desired, the ambiguous foreign policies hitherto pursued must be altered and States must prove by deeds that they sincerely wanted to move ahead in the examination of problems left by the Second World War and by the cold war—which had also led in some cases, as in Korea, to bloodshed. The objective stated in General Assembly resolution 1264 (XIII) was unexceptionable. The Assembly called for the establishment, by peaceful means, of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. But the necessary steps to achieve that objective were yet to be taken.

55. The withdrawal of Chinese troops and of United Nations forces, referred to in resolution 1264 (XIII), was an essential condition for free elections in the two Koreas, held under United Nations supervision and in accordance with the principles endorsed by the
General Assembly. He could not agree that the proposed elections should be supervised by a group of neutral Powers for the alleged reason that the United Nations had acted as a belligerent by taking a military part in the conflict. The Charter laid down specifically that the United Nations must take effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression. Furthermore, the Organization as a whole could not be less neutral than a group made up of some of its Members.

56. As the General Assembly had affirmed at preceding sessions, seats in the National Assembly of a reunified Korea should be allocated by means of elections based on the proportional representation of the inhabitants of each of the two Koreas. A system of parity would impede the country's genuine and democratic reunification. The separate election proposed by South Korea was also unacceptable; only elections in which all Koreans simultaneously took part could permit the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea.

57. In view of the more favourable international atmosphere which now prevailed, he wondered whether a new and decisive effort could not be made in order, at long last, to reach a solution. The Korean question could not be settled unilaterally or in an atmosphere of resentment and prejudice. First consideration must be given to the Koreans themselves and their varying political ideas; and if Korean reunification was sincerely desired, both sides in the dispute would have to be taken into account. His delegation favoured the reunification of all nations divided as a result of the two world wars or of the cold war, be it the Cameroons, Germany or Korea. It was for the peoples themselves to decide their destinies; and if they desired reunification the United Nations had the duty of helping them to achieve that objective as quickly and effectively as possible. If the Korean question still remained unsettled after twelve years of effort, it was not the United Nations or UNCURK—which had done commendable work—that bore the blame, but the rival Powers which confronted each other in the world and in the United Nations. A united Korea could not be a threat to the Western Powers or to the communists. Moreover, another act of aggression need not be feared, in view of the increasing influence of world public opinion and of the authority of the United Nations, which was based on that public opinion. A people could not be prevented by coercion from shaping its own destinies, and since it had been the rivalry between the great Powers that had caused the partition of Korea, the best way to ensure the country's reunification would be to put an end to that rivalry. The United Nations should therefore leave it to the Koreans to settle their own problems, without taking sides. His delegation was convinced that if it acted impartially and retained faith in the justice of its cause the United Nations would finally reach a solution to the Korean question.

58. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands), supported by Mr. GIBSON BARBOZA (Brazil) and Mr. ROBERTSON (United States), proposed that the afternoon meeting should be cancelled as a courtesy to the host country, which was today celebrating an important national holiday.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.