AGENDA ITEM 67

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4125, A/C.1/L.235/Rev.3) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.3) (continued)

1. Mr. PATHAK (India) said that the item under discussion was one in which India had long been interested, within the wider context of disarmament. At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly the Irish delegation had introduced a draft resolution on the subject (A/C.1/L.206); the second paragraph of the preamble of the draft had been voted on and adopted. India had voted in favour of that paragraph, now embodied in the present draft resolution (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.3), because it agreed with the principles underlying it.

2. India was therefore in sympathy with the objectives which had prompted Ireland to take a further initiative in the matter, although it did not feel that the proposals went far enough, in view of recent developments.

3. In 1956, stating India's views before the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Krishna Menon had expressed the feeling that the transfer of atomic weapons to a large number of countries would spread the danger of war. \(^1\) At that time, India had submitted certain proposals to the Disarmament Commission for initial steps towards nuclear disarmament. \(^2\) One such proposal was that there should be no export or conveying of nuclear weapons to other countries by the countries at present manufacturing such weapons. The General Assembly, at its eleventh session, had, by resolution 1011 (XI), referred the Indian and other proposals to the Disarmament Commission for prompt attention but, to India's regret, the Commission had not considered the Indian proposals in detail. However, in 1957 the Soviet Union had submitted a proposal to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that States possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to allow such weapons to be stationed outside their national frontiers. \(^3\) In turn, the Western Powers had presented proposals for partial measures of disarmament, one of which provided that each party should undertake not to transfer or accept the transfer of nuclear weapons except where their use would be confined to individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack. The United States representative on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission had specifically stated that, under United States law, the transfer of nuclear weapons to other States was prohibited. \(^4\) Moreover, agreements between the United States and other countries, regarding co-operation in the use of atomic energy for defence purposes, provided that no transfers would be made of atomic weapons or their parts. Furthermore, the United States State Department, replying to a question put by the Senate Sub-Committee on Disarmament, had made it clear that the United States would like to see the spread of nuclear weapons production capability curtailed.

4. The nuclear Powers were thus aware of the dangers of a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, had also pointed out those dangers and had said that, if an agreement on the subject was not reached, a number of other countries which had the technical ability to manufacture nuclear weapons but lacked the resources would eventually acquire them, thus rendering a final settlement of the problem increasingly difficult. Furthermore, in a recent study by United States scientists, a dozen countries, including India, had been listed as potential nuclear Powers. India, however, had made it clear that its work in the field of atomic energy was devoted entirely to peaceful ends.

5. The representative of Ireland had explained (1054th meeting) that the terms "States possessing nuclear weapons" and "Powers producing nuclear weapons" in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.3) would include all the Powers producing or possessing nuclear weapons at the time when the suggested agreements were ready for signature. It was to be hoped, however, that that would not be construed as an invitation to any State not possessing nuclear weapons to join the three nuclear Powers before the agreement came into force.

6. With regard to the draft resolution before the Committee, it was implied in operative paragraph 1 that the danger of disseminating nuclear weapons lay in the ability of the present nuclear Powers to hand over control of nuclear weapons to nations which did not possess them. But a nation could also become a nuclear Power through the transfer to it of the processes, skills and capital needed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The suggestion made by Mr. Krishna Menon earlier that there should be a ban on the export of capital, equipment and technicians from one country to another should be examined in this light.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, 58th meeting, para. 84.
\(^2\) Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1956, document DC/98.
\(^3\) Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1957, document DC/112, annex 1.
\(^4\) Ibid., document DC/113, annex 5.
\(^5\) DC/SC.1/PV.139.
another for the purpose of establishing armament industries in the latter (1042nd meeting) should be borne in mind in any study of the subject.

7. Moreover, while India entirely endorsed the injunction that the draft resolution placed on the non-nuclear Powers not to manufacture nuclear weapons, it would not wish the United Nations thereby to sanction the continued manufacture or retention of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear Powers. India had always maintained that there could be no effective disarmament unless the nuclear Powers ceased the manufacture, testing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons or unless the use of fissionable materials for military purposes was prohibited altogether.

8. Undoubtedly, the solution of problems concerning nuclear disarmament would become extremely complicated if an increasing number of countries acquired nuclear weapons and the dangers of nuclear war would be correspondingly aggravated. While India felt that more comprehensive measures than those proposed in the draft resolution were called for, it would favour any step towards the common objective of a warless world.

9. Mr. BISBE (Cuba) pointed out that the draft resolution submitted by Ireland was in complete accord with the atmosphere created by the unanimous adoption of the draft resolution on general and complete disarmament (1042nd meeting) and with the majority vote in support of the proposal to request France to refrain from carrying out a nuclear test in the Sahara (1053rd meeting). The Cuban delegation believed that, in the efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament, priority should be given to the destruction of existing nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and the prohibition of the production of such weapons under a coordinated system of international inspection. It therefore supported the Irish draft resolution as a forward step. It also believed that a ban on nuclear tests, by restricting the membership of the so-called "nuclear club", would be an effective step towards preventing the wider dissemination of existing nuclear weapons or types which might be developed in future. However, none of those partial measures was sufficient: the three nuclear Powers must fulfill their major responsibility for reaching agreement on total nuclear disarmament. If they failed to do so, the number of nuclear Powers was bound to increase, especially since the stage of atomic secrecy had been passed and it was now possible to produce fissionable materials far more cheaply than in the past. The equality of States would become increasingly a function of their relative nuclear strength and the ideal of genuine equality would recede into an even more remote future.

10. In order to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, it was essential to revise the system of pacts or alliances among nations. Notwithstanding international agreements providing for inspection procedures, it would be difficult to prevent the nuclear Powers from delivering nuclear arms secretly to their allies or from accumulating arsenals of such arms under their own control in strategic bases on the territory of their allies. Indeed, under the prevailing system of alliances, there were first-class and second-class allies: the former were entitled to possess atomic secrets, while the latter merely provided bases where weapons were accumulated. The nuclear Powers in the ten-Power disarmament committee should take account of the incentives created by that discriminatory system. That committee should further bear in mind the impressive fact revealed by the representative of Ireland (1054th meeting) concerning the extraction of plutonium as a by-product of certain types of nuclear power stations and the growing number of such nuclear reactors in countries which were not yet capable of producing nuclear weapons.

11. Cuba supported the Irish draft resolution as a step towards disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons.

12. Mr. SASTROAMIDJOJO (Indonesia) recalled that at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly (957th meeting) he had pointed out that the widening of the nuclear arms race was an urgent problem and that Indonesia had voted in favour of the second paragraph of the preamble of the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/1/L.266), which had now been incorporated in the present draft (A/C.1/1/L.235/Rev.3). Indonesia regretted the withdrawal of the remainder of that earlier draft resolution and was gratified that the matter had been reintroduced at the present session. Another view expressed by the Indonesian delegation at the previous session of the General Assembly had been that the countries which did not possess nuclear weapons also had a responsibility to end the arms race and relieve mankind of its fears. As for the means of discharging that common responsibility, while the nuclear Powers had atomic weapons, the non-nuclear countries had the force of moral persuasion. While there were doubts about the relative strength of the two means, it was within the capacity of the non-nuclear countries to take the positive measure of refusing to accept the transfer of nuclear weapons to their control by the existing nuclear Powers. Those countries thus had the ultimate power of decision in the matter and if they all made the necessary act of self-denial, the danger inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons would be automatically removed. Thus, in contrast to other aspects of disarmament, in matters concerning the dissemination of nuclear weapons the countries which did not possess nuclear weapons could make a positive contribution.

13. It augured well that Ireland, a non-nuclear country, had brought the present item to the attention of the United Nations (A/4125). It was also to be hoped that, in the ten-Power disarmament committee, the countries which did not possess nuclear weapons would take an active part in studying the problem.

14. The Indonesian delegation had consistently favoured the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons in view of the great dangers of their use as a result of irresponsible or ill-considered action. The urgency of the problem was generally recognized and, in fact, a survey made on behalf of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences revealed that a number of countries were now technically capable of entering the nuclear arms race. In that connexion he noted from recent Press reports that the Government of Sweden appeared to be ready to begin research on atomic weapons. He felt bound to express the hope that that Government would never decide to manufacture those weapons. While Indonesia entirely agreed as to the necessity of applying a reliable system of international control to any measures for the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, it could not share the view expressed by one member of the Committee that that aim should not be achieved at the cost of any weakening in the relative strength of defences. Such an attitude was scarcely in keeping with the responsibilities of the United Nations. Moreover, until the stage of general
and complete disarmament was reached, the maintenance of the existing precarious balance of destructive weapons and forces, through the prevention of the transfer of nuclear weapons to nations not possessing them, could surely not disturb the relative strength of the world’s defences. An attempt was being made to apply preventive measures, rather than to reduce the present supply of weapons of any nation. It was on the attainment of the goal of achieving greater security for the entire world—and not for any one nation—that all efforts should be concentrated. The Indonesian delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution presented by the delegation of Ireland.

15. Dato’ KAMIL (Federation of Malaya) recalled that, although at its previous session the General Assembly had not adopted a resolution on the question of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, the First Committee had, at its 970th meeting, approved by 37 votes to none the paragraph in the draft resolution then submitted by Ireland which had called attention to the danger of an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons; his delegation had been among those casting affirmative votes.

16. Like other disarmament measures, measures to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons must provide for effective inspection and control in order to safeguard the security of States; as other representatives had pointed out, particular study must be given to the problem of controlling the export and import of nuclear weapons, which might prove more difficult than controlling their manufacture. Consideration of the matter was well within the scope and capacity of the ten-Power disarmament committee. Although the ten-Power committee was already scheduled to take up the subject of general and complete disarmament, an early agreement in that field was unlikely and it was desirable to consider, in the meantime, possible measures for preventing the wider disseminations of nuclear weapons and the further complications to which it would give rise in the general area of disarmament. His delegation would therefore support the Irish draft resolution.

17. Mr. PALAMAS (Greece) said that his delegation would vote for the Irish draft resolution. It was supporting the draft because of its procedural character and on the understanding that the ten-Power disarmament committee was being requested to examine the problem at hand in a broad context and in all its implications.

18. An agreement on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was conceivable only in the framework of general disarmament measures. If the nuclear Powers agreed to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons to other countries and the latter agreed to refrain from manufacturing such weapons, the effect would be to transform the present de facto monopoly into a de jure monopoly; the non-nuclear States could not accept such a situation of inequality. Furthermore, as long as collective security remained the foundation of peace, the production and the distribution of all armaments, including nuclear weapons, should be governed by the interests of common defence. Once agreements were reached on the cessation of nuclear weapons testing, and the suspension of their production was envisaged, measures to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons and their manufacture by additional Powers would become more practicable.

19. The procedural character of the Irish draft resolution made it more generally acceptable; the draft requested the ten-Power committee to report to the Disarmament Commission on the question under discussion and involved no commitments on matters of substance.

20. In the view of his delegation, partial nuclear disarmament or regional disarmament of any kind could be achieved only as part of a scheme for general and complete disarmament with respect to both nuclear and conventional weapons.

21. Mr. SHANAHAN (New Zealand) said that, unless effective disarmament measures were taken, additional States might be prompted by considerations of security to acquire nuclear weapons, thus further complicating the problem of disarmament; even the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests might not prevent such a development. His delegation therefore welcomed the suggestion in the Irish draft resolution that the ten-Power committee should examine the entire question of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons; the problem should be studied within the framework of general disarmament negotiations, and any control measures must be applicable to all parts of the world. Since it would apparently be easier to control an agreement banning the production of nuclear weapons than one banning the transfer of such weapons, his delegation favoured an arrangement whereby non-nuclear States would undertake to refrain from producing nuclear weapons; consideration should also be given to measures to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons from one country to another, although it must be recognized that the nuclear Powers might not be prepared to agree to such an undertaking until better methods than those now available were devised for detecting the existence of stockpiles. But that was no reason for not examining the problem raised by the Irish draft resolution, which his delegation would support, in the context of comprehensive disarmament.

22. Mr. FEKINI (Libya) said that, in a world divided into hostile alliances, the fears generated by the nuclear arms race had been intensified by the danger that weapons of mass destruction might be transferred to non-nuclear Powers, might ultimately become conventional weapons and might even be used in localized regional clashes. Possession of nuclear weapons was likely to spread because States would either attempt to manufacture them through their own resources or seek to obtain them from their allies. The increased danger to peace resulting from that development made it imperative for the United Nations to seek to prevent a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons as a first step towards the prohibition of such arms and the destruction of existing stockpiles. Appropriate measures should include an Assembly recommendation to the Disarmament Commission to consider means of averting that danger as soon as possible, and a recommendation from the Disarmament Commission to the ten-Power disarmament committee to endeavour to work out a solution of the problem within the framework of general and complete disarmament. Accordingly, the Libyan delegation would vote for the Irish draft resolution.

23. Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation was convinced of the need of finding means of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake, however, to reduce the whole prob-
lem to one of quantity, that is, to see it only in terms of the number of nuclear Powers and the amounts of nuclear weapons available. The problems relating to the various aspects of disarmament could not be separated from the whole complex of international relations and the necessity of ensuring peaceful coexistence between nations with different social and political systems.

24. Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear arms should not constitute an aim in itself; instead, all efforts should be brought to bear on solving the basic problem of the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear Powers. Within that context, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear arms could be only a transitory measure. Moreover, since it was possible that nuclear arms would be distributed among the members of the various power alliances in accordance with their military strategic plans, it was in the interest of peace to prevent that process. For that reason, Yugoslavia had been consistently opposed to the establishment of nuclear and missile bases, or for that matter any other bases, on the territory of other States, and had supported "atom-free" zones in areas where the main forces of existing power blocs were confronting each other, particularly in central Europe.

25. The Committee's debate on the question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara had demonstrated unanimity of opinion on the need to end the arms race and to achieve the effective disarmament of the nuclear Powers, with which the main responsibility for the wider dissemination of nuclear arms rested for the time being. Nuclear armament could be prevented on a permanent basis only by banning tests, prohibiting and ending production of nuclear weapons, destroying existing stockpiles, and prohibiting the use of such weapons. Indeed, those measures were an essential part of the plans for general and complete disarmament transmitted to the ten-Power disarmament committee. Viewed in that context, the Irish proposal was a useful one and Yugoslavia would vote for it.

26. Mr. PAZHWAJ (Afghanistan) supported the Irish draft resolution and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously. He would suggest, for the consideration of the Irish representative, a slight drafting change in the first paragraph of the preamble, namely, the substitution of the word "by" for the words "and thus" in the final phrase. The paragraph would then clearly state that the elimination of international tension and the maintenance of world peace were the ultimate goals of disarmament negotiations.

27. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) said that he would vote in favour of the Irish draft resolution in the conviction that the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons represented a real danger. The entire question required careful study, particularly as there were bound to be certain objections of principle so long as the General Assembly or bodies outside the United Nations had not reached agreement on general and complete disarmament. However, since the draft resolution merely suggested a procedure for the study of the question and did not recommend substantive measures, Uruguay was prepared to support it.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.