of mutual understanding. He agreed with the United Kingdom representative that the chances of resolving the problems of disarmament were greater today than ever before. To be sure, it was not enough merely to hope. It would require a sustained effort and the States would have to show wisdom and a sense of responsibility if the hopes of the peoples were to be fulfilled. Unfortunately, some had already attempted to complicate the problem by emphasizing the ideological divergences which divided the world. Such an attitude could only reduce the chances of attaining disarmament and peace; the Cuban representative would certainly concur on that point.

4. In the relatively recent past, war had been regarded as an evil which inevitably accompanied the evolution of mankind and the question of disarmament had not been seriously considered. The horror of the Second World War had shown that a limit had been reached beyond which nations must not go. Moreover, recent technological and scientific advances, based on the economic power of the most highly developed States, would transform any armed conflict into a total war waged with nuclear weapons and rockets. That was why Mr. Khrushchev had expressed before the Assembly his certainty that the representatives would recognize the need to "direct the collective intelligence of all States, as of the United Nations, towards the search for a new approach to the solution of the disarmament problem" (799th plenary meeting, para. 67).

5. The Ukrainian Government fully supported the programme for general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union (A/4219), which represented just such a new approach. It was prepared to take the measures required in order to destroy utterly the material basis of all wars.

6. Some speakers, convinced of man’s aggressive nature, had felt that disarmament would not be able to ensure peace. His delegation, however, believed that the process of phased general disarmament would itself provide a psychological stimulant capable of creating an atmosphere of trust and friendship among peoples and that, once disarmament had been achieved under a system of effective and comprehensive control, efforts would be directed along constructive lines. Difficulties would unquestionably be encountered, but it would be wrong to attribute to man instincts and characteristics which were merely the result of specific historical conditions. In any event, a disarmed world would offer greater hope of protection than did the present-day world against atavistic warlike tendencies.

7. Though he did not wish to enter into a controversy, he felt he must refer to the praise of military institutions and traditions expressed by the Argentine representative (1028th meeting), who had, moreover, taken the occasion to make some invidious comments about Marxism. Even if it was true that warlike tendencies could be attributed to the traditions of a particular epoch, no effort must henceforth be spared to
wipe out every trace of them. Propaganda on behalf of such anarchistic phenomena was dangerous, for it was directed, in veiled form, against disarmament. In reality, as the French representative, Mr. Moch, had said (1030th meeting), disarmament would afford man more positive means than he had today for developing in himself the noblest qualities. The Committee should not let itself be drawn into a discussion filled with preconceived ideas about a distant future. The refusal of General and complete disarmament was of immediate and special interest. Implementation of the Soviet programme would produce a drastic improvement in the international situation. The mere fact that agreement had been reached on it would furnish conclusive proof that the States had no aggressive intentions, and the removal of the means of making war would provide an exceptionally solid basis for peaceful coexistence and create the necessary conditions for settling the other major international problems still outstanding.

8. It was not a question of "all or nothing". The Soviet Government had made it quite clear that, if the other Powers were unwilling to embark upon general and complete disarmament, it was prepared to agree to partial measures for disarmament and the strengthening of security. The Western Powers held that two conditions must be present in any disarmament measures: the measures must be applied in stages and they must affect equally all elements in the military power of States; the security of every State, they argued, was to be enhanced at each stage. In that connection, he would point out that, first of all, the Soviet proposals provided for disarmament by stages and, secondly, general and complete disarmament differed from all the other proposals in that, once achieved, it prevented inequality and precluded any possibility that a given State would enjoy an advantage in either nuclear or conventional weapons. The vast benefits which such a plan afforded to all peace-loving peoples was readily apparent.

9. It was deplorable that, at a time when the necessary conditions existed for a serious examination of the problem, a powerful propaganda machine was continuing to work for acceleration of the arms race as if nothing had happened. The report published on 14 October 1959 by the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate proposed equipping the United States European allies with nuclear weapons and recommended that the members of NATO should build up nuclear stockpiles. Surely the publication of such a document made evident the need for the "mental demilitarization" of the supporters of the cold war. Perhaps it should be made clear to them that the modern world belonged not to them but to the people.

10. Notwithstanding the objections of certain delegations, the First Committee should express its view of the Soviet Government's declaration in the form of a resolution. Otherwise, as the Romanian representative had observed (1030th meeting), the Committee would merely be acting as a post office which transmitted letters to their addressees. In a resolution of the kind to which he had referred, the General Assembly should endorse the principle of general and complete disarmament and recognize the tremendous importance attaching to that question in the present cir-

1/ Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, United States Foreign Policy in Western Europe (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959).
disarmament, the United Kingdom had put forward a plan the ultimate objective of which was comprehensive disarmament by all Powers. For its part, the French delegation had submitted a number of new ideas which were very stimulating. Moreover, the head of the Soviet delegation had said at the 1026th meeting that the Soviet programme of disarmament envisaged that the extent of control exercised should correspond to the particular stage reached in the process of disarmament. Thus, if there were no mental reservations, there was a degree of agreement in principle on that point.

18. The delegation of the Union of South Africa was also glad to learn that some progress had been made at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, a matter which could well be dealt with separately from a general scheme of disarmament, whether partial or complete, and on which agreement could shortly be reached. It was assumed that in due course negotiations would be undertaken with Governments which had not taken part in those discussions, but whose interests were involved in the arrangements contemplated. However, the extremely complex question of disarmament could not be ultimately settled unless very clear answers were given to the three questions put by the United States representative at the close of the statement he had made at the 1027th meeting, and to the fourth and very valid question put by the Netherlands representative at the 1031st meeting.

19. He had also been impressed by the observations made at the 1031st meeting by the representatives of Yugoslavia and Italy on the effects successful disarmament might have on the United Nations Charter.

20. It was to be hoped that the United Nations would grasp the fresh opportunity offered it to fulfill the hopes of mankind with firm resolve and humility. Since the present debate was merely preparatory in nature, there was no need to take a stand, but rather to seek common ground and to formulate new ideas as a contribution to the further undertaking of turning swords into ploughshares. While it endorsed the study of the question of disarmament to be made in Geneva by the ten-Power committee, the delegation of the Union of South Africa did not, of course, feel that the whole problem should simply be turned over to that committee, and it liked to think that suitable procedures would be worked out to enable the United Nations not only to be kept informed of the negotiations, but also to discharge the responsibilities laid upon it by the Charter in the field of disarmament.

21. Mr. MATSUaida (Japan) noted that life under the arms race was precarious and intolerable; not only did the armaments race lead to a waste of talent, energy and material resources, but it offered no solution to the basic problem confronting the modern world. His delegation therefore eagerly supported any constructive proposal which might bring the world nearer to the goal of disarmament. It would be illogical to suppose, however, that complete, total and universal disarmament could be achieved without a serious improvement in international relations and a restoration of mutual confidence.

22. The creation of a climate of confidence depended, among other things, upon the settlement of certain political problems and the elaboration of a more effective system for the peaceful settlement of all disputes, a prerequisite for abandoning the use of force.

23. Mr. Kuznetsov had referred (1026th meeting) to the role of the United Nations in the event of a violation of the disarmament treaty. It was essential to study ways and means of making the organs of the United Nations more effective for the maintenance of international peace and security. In particular, the machinery provided in the Charter for the peaceful settlement of international disputes should be perfected and strengthened and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice should be extended and made compulsory in more cases.

24. Furthermore, the creation of a climate of confidence depended on the organization of an institution to preserve international peace order and to promote the rule of law. The establishment of an international police system would be logical and indispensable following complete and world-wide disarmament, but it would be feasible only if disarmament was really world-wide, that is, if it was achieved by all countries, irrespective of whether or not they were Members of the United Nations. The international police order would also have to command the confidence and respect of all peoples.

25. Nevertheless, even in present circumstances, efforts towards total, complete and universal disarmament were not without significance. On the contrary, negotiations should be entered into and concrete initial measures taken without delay. At the same time, every effort should be made, both in the United Nations and outside it, to create a climate of confidence. From the outset, an effective system of international control and inspection was an indispensable minimum condition and the organ responsible for establishing it should be endowed, from the first stage, with the necessary authority to exercise its powers unhindered. It was also essential gradually to widen the scope of the functions and powers of such an organ in accordance with the degree of disarmament achieved and to ensure that no new stage of disarmament was begun until the previous stage had been completed. In that respect, the United Kingdom proposal deserved consideration.

26. Moreover, there were statements in the speech made by Mr. Khrushchev to the General Assembly and in the declaration of the Soviet Government on general and complete disarmament (A/4219) in which the basic principle of control and inspection appeared to be accepted as a preliminary measure for disarmament.

27. The question of control and inspection was a fundamental one. It was the key to disarmament, total or partial. The Japanese delegation therefore hoped that the ten-Power Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission would not lose sight of the role which the United Nations could play in that regard. The Japanese delegation also hoped that the ten-Power negotiations would deal with the whole range of disarmament problems, but that they would not delay a solution of those problems which were on the verge of being solved, in particular, that of the suspension of nuclear weapons tests.

28. In that connexion, he recalled the proposal he had submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth session for a suspension of nuclear tests (A/C.1/L.174). Although it had not been adopted at the time, his delegation was glad to note that world public opinion and the understanding of the great Powers had fully vindicated the Japanese view. His delegation unre-
servedly shared the view expressed by the United States representative that further negotiations on the suspension of nuclear tests would demonstrate whether it was possible to deal effectively and realistically with the problem of arms control.

28. In view of the vicissitudes that had attended disarmament negotiations in the past, the Japanese delegation viewed as a heartening coincidence the fact that the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had both proposed complete disarmament, an objective which had been virtually renounced since 1957. It hoped that the new proposals were the outcome of the conversations which had taken place between the Heads of Government of the United States and the Soviet Union and that they marked a new determination by the parties to attain the ideal of disarmament. It sincerely hoped that the new developments would be translated into deeds through fruitful negotiations, even if they did not necessarily result in complete, total and universal disarmament. If the parties concerned could reach agreement on some kind of balanced disarmament measures and effective international control and inspection, and if the implementation of the agreement thus reached could bring about a climate of confidence and trust, it would be no mean contribution toward the easing of international tension. In that way disarmament would be an effective way to achieve new world peace and order. In the light of what was said, the early conclusion of the negotiations on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests seemed to be most important.

29. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) said that it was gratifying that the General Assembly had decided to place the Soviet Union disarmament proposal on its agenda, as all proposals of that kind should be given due consideration. Undoubtedly, the goal envisaged by that proposal was the one that humanity had always been seeking, especially since nuclear weapons had threatened it with total destruction. However, the more disarmament had been discussed, the greater had been the efforts to rearm, in the continually frustrated hope of avoiding war. On the other hand, disarmament would not ensure peace and security unless there was recognition of the need for settling disputes, not by force of arms, but through negotiations based on the principle of right and justice.

30. The Soviet proposal could be divided into two parts: first, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and, second, the regulation and control of conventional weapons. The solution proposed was, admittedly, entirely new; but it was for that very reason that doubts had arisen in the minds of some, who observed that even the limited proposals which had been considered over the past fourteen years had not led to an agreement on disarmament. It was not a matter of deliberate bias, but simply that the persons concerned wondered how the Soviet proposals would be carried out. There was no doubt that the Soviet Union had presented specific proposals for establishing what it considered effective control over nuclear as well as conventional armaments. However, anything could be interpreted in different ways according to the angle from which it was viewed. Happily, East and West, as it appeared from recent statements by the Soviet Union and the United States, were beginning to appreciate that fact and were no longer proposing "take-it-or-leave-it" solutions.

31. The Liberian delegation considered that, if a reasonable and understanding attitude were main-
tained, the discussions of the ten-Power committee would make some progress towards world disarmament possible. Accordingly, as the Argentine representative (1028th meeting) and a number of others had stated, there should be no attempt to pass a substantive resolution on disarmament.

32. It was satisfactory to note that some limited progress had already been made, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons tests, as had been confirmed by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. In that respect, efforts should be directed to finding points on which an agreement was possible, and, accordingly, to removing the obstacles standing in the way of a solution to the disarmament problem, which could only be done by direct contacts. The Liberian delegation therefore saw encouragement in the meetings held between Mr. Eisenhower, the President of the United States and Mr. Khrushchev and their public statement of 27 September 1959 that all questions, as well as violations of the parting visit of President Eisenhower to the Soviet Union. An agreement on disarmament could only be reached step by step, as the representative of France had pointed out, the distrust which had existed for so long could not be dissipated in four years.

33. The statements made by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union showed that positions on disarmament had become more flexible and that there was now a new desire to reach an agreement. The three questions which, in the view of the United States representative, should form the basis for any disarmament agreement required careful study and it would be preferable for that study, as well as consideration of the Soviet and United Kingdom proposals, to be undertaken by the ten-Power disarmament committee. However, any agreement on disarmament would have to include provisions dealing with the interpretation as violations, of the terms of such an agreement. The Security Council would have been the appropriate body to consider controversies arising in that connexion, but, as the representative of Argentina had pointed out, the great Powers would first have to arrive at an understanding on the matters which were to a large extent impeding the functioning of the United Nations. The agreement preceding disarmament would, above all, have to instil new life into the Security Council and endow it with means of establishing, with vigour and impartiality, an international force that would guarantee respect for a disarmament agreement. That would necessitate a revision of the United Nations Charter, in order to change the voting arrangements in the Security Council, or the establishment of a new and separate body in which the veto would not be applicable in the case of a disarmament agreement. It would be absurd—and disadvisable for mankind—if a country which violated the agreement could reject or prevent the execution of a judgement against it.

34. Countries which, like Liberia, had never been armed could only offer advice and suggestions on disarmament. However, the destinies of all nations, large or small, were linked, and those countries experienced the same anxiety as the armed countries. What a different world it would be if the thousands of millions of dollars spent on the manufacture of means of destruction were devoted to relieving hardship and suffering throughout the world. It was ironical that the
poor countries also contributed raw materials which might be used for the final destruction of the human race. None the less, the Liberian delegation was convinced that the discussions in the First Committee would be fruitful and that the resolution it adopted would not only urge but also help the ten-Power committee to reach an agreement on disarmament.

35. Mr. ORTIZ MARTIN (Costa Rica) pointed out that in the world of today, in which distances had been eliminated by scientific progress in nuclear weapons, all countries, large and small, ran the same risks. Thus, although they had no weapons, the smaller countries had the right to play at least a passive, if not an active part, by making their views heard in the discussions on disarmament.

36. Inspired by scepticism but by profound convictions rooted in Christian civilization, his delegation considered that the true solution lay, not in material disarmament, but in the improvement of mankind itself, which should lay aside its desire for domination and no longer seek to settle questions and the destinies of other nations along ideological lines. At the present time, to subject the weak, the strong had at their disposal not only military but also economic weapons, such as blockades and control over markets, and weapons of moral penetration which perverted man's minds. If mankind and the heads of States which possessed weapons were not guided by the words of Christ, he did not substitute love for hatred, anything that might be said or done in connexon with disarmament would be without positive results.

37. The delegation of Costa Rica was certainly not criticizing the efforts made towards disarmament. They undoubtedly constituted an advance and an abatement of the desire to dominate. Moreover, they were certainly enormous difficulties in the way of a solution and it was logical to refer the problem to the ten-Power disarmament committee which would work in association with the United Nations, mankind's only hope.

38. There was one aspect of the question which called for an urgent solution, namely, the immediate and complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests. No head of State could repeat the mistakes of Hitler and go so far as to believe that his country would survive the cataclysm which the use of such weapons would cause and that it could thus dominate the world. Everyone must be convinced that in a nuclear war there would be no victors. Therefore, why not cease manufacturing nuclear weapons once and for all?

39. The small and economically under-developed countries, although highly civilized, were unable to develop their natural resources for lack of the necessary economic means. They thus depended economically on the group of countries to which they belonged. People in such countries were in a constant state of resentment and tension which, combined with poverty, sometimes drove them to justifiable actions which only paved the way for ideologies of a type likely to endanger democracy.

40. The delegation of Costa Rica was glad to have succeeded, along with other Latin-American delegations, in bringing about the adoption of a resolution requesting that the funds being spent on armaments should be used to help the under-developed countries (resolution 1232 A (XIII)). It whole-heartedly supported the Secretary-General in his efforts to solve that problem, which was the main obstacle to peace. There could be no question of waiting for disarmament to be achieved before remedying intolerable poverty.

41. As to the ten-Power disarmament committee, it must remain in close contact with the United Nations Disarmament Commission. While it was the countries which possessed weapons which had to begin direct disarmament negotiations, in the world of today all countries must make its contribution towards the immediate prohibition of nuclear weapons and at the same time seek to eliminate economic inequalities and the poverty which engendered wars. If all peoples of the world could share equally in the progress of civilization, some would not seek to destroy what others possessed. On the contrary, the whole world would seek to establish an increasingly better life, free from the grim prospect which now confronted it.

42. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that disarmament was no longer an academic question and there was now a feeling in the United Nations that some action could be taken in the matter. Disarmament was not something that would proceed in an unchanging environment. Disarmament itself was going to create changes. The most important perhaps would be changes in the state of mind of the peoples of the world, while it would make it possible for nations to accept things they now rejected and to establish procedures which at present seemed too idealistic to be contemplated. There would be changes in what were regarded as national interests, and other independent changes might be brought about through scientific and technological progress, as had been shown fairly recently, for example, by the emergence of intercontinental missiles. There would be changes, too, in social structures, as well as in political attitudes, forms and organizations, and that would give some hope of progress towards the establishment of a system of inspection and control. Indeed, a Government which at present regarded a particular form of control as too much like espionage might well come round to the view, on seeing how the disarmament programmes were being carried out and their effects on the country's social and political structure, and after gaining confidence in the way in which its people reacted, that systems of control and inspection which now seemed quite unacceptable could in fact be accepted. Those changes would of course be reflected in economic development, but it would be premature at the present stage to examine the consequences of disarmament for economic assistance to the under-developed countries. It would be better to allow the question of general economic development to be tackled by the existing machinery for examining such problems, because a disarmed world would be so different from the world of today that it would probably not be profitable to look into that question in a detailed or practical way at the moment.

43. The tremendous changes that could be foreseen meant that countries should not be too static in their approach to the question of disarmament and should have a very flexible attitude towards it. They should be prepared to consider the various possible solutions which would arise as the situation developed and as progress was made. Thus, while the plan proposed by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom (70th plenary meeting) seemed practicable and workmanlike and had Australian support, his delegation, like the United Kingdom delegation no doubt, did not think that that and no other plan could be considered. It was one of the plans put before the ten-Power committee.
and, in spite of the support which it would certainly receive, it would not perhaps be the order of priority or particular details of the plan which would be approved, but rather the United Kingdom idea that particular problems should be tackled, not necessarily in the way laid down in the plan. Accordingly, countries outside the ten-Power committee should not be too specific in their demands and should allow the committee to examine carefully the plans submitted to it and what was possible. Many delegations had put forward useful observations, for example concerning the gaps in the various plans, which enabled the First Committee and public opinion to see more of the complexities of the problem, such as the question of coercive measures to be used against possible offenders and matters of inspection and control. These matters would undoubtedly be examined by the ten-Power committee, which would probably pay particular attention to the question of priorities, since the various plans put forward differed mostly on priorities and the emphasis to be given to various items. But the First Committee could not be dogmatic on those matters. It could only recommend that the ten-Power committee should examine those problems as thoroughly and as quickly as possible and ask it for guidance on those points either for the First Committee at the next session of the General Assembly or for the Disarmament Commission.

44. His delegation would not deal in detail with the proposals before the First Committee, but wished to underline the importance it attached to inspection, verification and control, which were essential in any programme of disarmament. It hoped the present discussion would show to those who doubted the necessity for such measures, the widespread degree of feeling that those safeguards would be indispensable and also the reasons for that feeling. It would be wrong to see in that view a desire to sabotage the disarmament talks, and indeed the countries which insisted on the necessity for inspection and control wished more than any for those talks to succeed. It was simply that those countries were convinced that no considerable progress towards disarmament could be made without some safeguard enabling each country disarming to satisfy itself that other countries were doing likewise. A country which at present felt itself able to defend itself would not abandon that position unless the country it regarded as a potential aggressor agreed to put itself in a position where it could not launch an attack—or of course be attacked. In that connexion, it would perhaps be helpful if the ten-Power committee, instead of discussing an item entitled "Inspection and Control", asked itself the simple question how a country which was disarming could know what the other countries were doing. He was sure that all members of the First Committee hoped that the ten-Power committee would try to find an answer to that question. In addition, as the Italian representative had suggested, it might be useful if some technical studies on various means of inspection and control were undertaken, without prejudice to any political decision.

45. His delegation had already welcomed Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion that a comprehensive approach could be made to disarmament in which disarmament with respect to conventional weapons would not be dependent upon prior agreement on nuclear disarmament. As other representatives had pointed out, no disarmament programme could win acceptance which would reduce the strength of one Power or one group of Powers without some corresponding diminution in the strength of others and therefore there could be no nuclear disarmament before real progress had been made in the field of conventional armaments. It seemed therefore that in the last few months the great Powers had come closer together on that matter than they had ever been before.

46. The ten-Power committee was composed essentially of European and North Atlantic countries, which was justified in view of the fact that all nuclear weapons were concentrated in that region of the world. Sooner or later, however, it would be necessary to consider other regions of the world, whose security was affected to a large extent by what happened in Europe and the North Atlantic, but which nevertheless had problems of their own. There was no need to insist further on that point, because it was at present the ten-Power committee that was looking to a real impetus in the practical field. In that connexion, his delegation welcomed the new possibilities which had been opened up in the sphere of disarmament. Everyone hoped that the stage of full disarmament would be reached. The Australian delegation wished the ten-Power committee success and was confident that it would take note of the discussions in the General Assembly and would keep in mind the responsibility of the United Nations in the matter of disarmament and for promoting the political conditions in the world which would make disarmament possible.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.