Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 3 November 1958, at 5 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament [647] (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests [707] (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries [72] (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/58.971. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): A number of representatives have asked for the floor to explain their votes on the draft resolution that was adopted at the last meeting that took place on Friday, and which went over into the early hours of Saturday. I shall, therefore, call on these representatives first.

Mr. ABDOLI (Iran): I take the floor to explain why the Iranian delegation abstained in the voting on the paragraph dealing with the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear tests in the fourteen-Power draft resolution. My delegation saw it fit to abstain, because the above-mentioned paragraph, in our view, failed to make clear what would happen in the event that a control system was not set up following the Geneva Conference or any subsequent conference. To be sure, we had serious doubts as to whether a resolution calling for the discontinuance of tests, irrespective of the establishment of international inspection and control, which is to be discussed at Geneva, would have necessarily brought about the genuine termination of testing.

The Iranian delegation, as a co-sponsor of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, naturally voted in favour of that draft resolution, in the hope that it would encourage the negotiations in Geneva, and pave the way for further progress in the field of disarmament. At the same time, my delegation expresses its sincere regret that, in spite of the strenuous efforts made to reach agreement by many delegations, particularly the delegations of India and Yugoslavia, these initiatives were not crowned with success. Our regret is the more profound because this draft resolution was tentatively accepted by both sides, and yet final understanding was unattainable, due to the fact that the delegation of the Soviet Union pressed for identical statements from both sides regarding its interpretation.
With your permission, since I did not have the opportunity to expound on this matter last week, I should like to dwell for a moment on this particular aspect of the question. If I do take the Committee's time on this matter, it is not with the intent of blaming any side for failure to break the stalemate, but, rather, because I believe that even at this late date it would be appropriate if some agreement could be reached on a unanimous formula before or while the report of the First Committee is discussed in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly; that is to say, it seems to me that a retrospective glance at the arduous efforts toward a compromise solution and the nature of such solution should not be considered outdated, if it would contribute to encouraging further initiative toward reaching agreement before the General Assembly examines the report of this Committee.

It is in a continuing spirit of attempting to secure a meeting of minds on this matter that I should like to make the following remarks:

The Indian and Yugoslav tentative compromise draft resolution, we believe, fully reflected this Assembly's feeling toward an overall discontinuation of nuclear tests, and, while couched in such a way as to avoid being specific on the controversial issue of year-by-year discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, would, nevertheless, have opened the door wide for a continuing and permanent cessation of nuclear tests.

As I said, the tentative draft was not very clear on this latter point, but this lack of precision did not constitute a defect or a disadvantage. On the contrary it was, under the circumstances, the only possible way in which to overcome the main impediment in this matter. Moreover, it would not in any way have prejudiced the position of either side, nor would it prejudice the outcome of the Conference in Geneva. My delegation believes, furthermore, that this draft resolution constituted a good basis for compromise, because any compromise solution must take into account the views of all sides, if it is to succeed. If, on the other hand, one of the parties rigidly maintains its previous position, with little or no display of flexibility, such efforts are doomed to failure.

As we were informed last week by the representative of India, the compromise draft resolution was tentatively accepted, but further progress could not be made
toward reaching an agreement because of the differences regarding the expected joint interpretation to be given to the text of the resolution.

It must be acknowledged, in all fairness, that the United States and the United Kingdom, in tentatively accepting this draft resolution, went a long way toward meeting the other side halfway. To be sure, according to the seventeen-Power resolution which was accepted the other day, the nuclear Powers were called upon not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while the Geneva negotiations were in progress. In the compromise draft resolution however, the nuclear Powers were called upon "immediately to discontinue the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons and to proceed expeditiously with the further action set out in this resolution."

Moreover, it would appear that the United States and the United Kingdom agreed, contrary to their previous position, to consider a separate resolution concerning the discontinuance of tests. This, in our view, was a decided step forward, when we consider the previous situation in which they took the stand that all the various aspects of disarmament should be included in one resolution. Furthermore, the word "discontinuance" was used rather than the word "suspension," which would appear to us to be a step closer to the concept of the Soviet Union in this regard, although it may also be construed as merely a matter of semantics.
Finally, it is to be noted that the draft resolution contained a provision calling upon:
"...all other States to desist from embarking upon the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons pending the completion of the action envisaged in paragraph 1 of this resolution;"
which would appear to us to be a desirable corollary under the circumstances.

As I mentioned a moment ago, it is true that that resolution was vague enough on the point of temporary or permanent suspension of tests to accommodate everybody. But would it not be too much to expect the United States and the United Kingdom to subscribe to an interpretation which would be tantamount to endorsing the position of the other side, all the more so since last year the Soviet Union itself stood for a two or three-year temporary suspension?

We hope that the Soviet Union has not yet said its final word on this subject and that it will be possible for it to reconsider its position before the plenary meeting of the Assembly examines the report of our Committee. The necessity of reaching some agreement is definitely making itself felt if we take into account the statement made by the Soviet delegation the other day to the effect that the resolutions adopted by this Committee will receive scant consideration by the Soviet representative in Geneva, while the general debate of this Committee has demonstrated the world-wide apprehension over the continuation of tests and the necessity of reaching agreement on this matter.

There are encouraging indications, however, which if fostered by unanimous action of the General Assembly will strengthen the chances of success in Geneva. Among other things, we may refer to the fact that the Soviet Union decided to attend the Geneva Conference in spite of some previous pessimistic speculation. We have, moreover, a de facto suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, as of 31 October, in that the United States and the United Kingdom have stated their intent to discontinue testing as of that date, at least for one year, and there has been no statement from the Soviet Union indicating that it intended to continue testing after the beginning of the Geneva Conference.
Finally, the recent final approval of the Soviet Union which extended to the convening of the East-West Conference of Experts to study the possibility of preventing surprise attack is a further promising sign in the field of disarmament, which makes it incumbent upon us to spare no effort to stimulate this trend in the course of the Assembly debate.

For all these considerations, my delegation believes that the arduous conciliatory efforts with a view to reaching agreement should continue. A unity of views here in the Assembly will undoubtedly have a beneficial influence on the course of the negotiations at Geneva, while a lack of unity might well prejudice the successful outcome of the talks.

Incidentally, may I just draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that various draft resolutions have been adopted, of which some, while not appearing inconsistent, nevertheless overlap in terms of covering the same area, and this very redundancy may occasion technical and practical difficulties.

May I say the following in conclusion. In taking into account the serious responsibility which rests with the General Assembly in the field of disarmament and considering the absolute necessity of effecting a step which will increase the chances of success at Geneva, my delegation earnestly hopes that both sides will renew their efforts with a view to reaching agreement.

Among other things, we would be most happy to see the tentative compromise which was attempted on the basis of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution reconsidered, so that unanimity would be achieved in the General Assembly, thus giving momentum to the Geneva Conference and stimulating further effort in the field of disarmament as a whole.

Mr. NIELSEN (Norway): When voting upon the draft resolutions on disarmament, the testing of nuclear weapons and the reduction of defence budgets, the Norwegian delegation naturally was guided by the views expressed in this regard by the Foreign Minister of Norway, Mr. Lange, on 30 September 1958, in the general debate at the plenary meeting.

We co-sponsored and voted for the comprehensive seventeen-Power resolution because it contained all the main viewpoints advanced by Mr. Lange. First, the parties now negotiating in Geneva were strongly urged expeditiously to reach an agreement on discontinuance of nuclear testing under effective control and to put a halt to the testing while these negotiations were in progress.
Secondly, there was a reaffirmation of the clear responsibilities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and a further follow-up of the recent encouraging developments, including openness of information, and the technical approach which in our view may give the political authorities the best basis for concluding agreements, gradually leading to disarmament under effective control.

Thirdly, there was a recognition of the fact that in the prevailing situation broad declarations of disarmament are not likely to further our aim if they are not accompanied by the corresponding control and careful balancing.

The Norwegian delegation has on many occasions emphasized that progress in the field of disarmament is a question of arriving at agreement. We therefore welcomed and supported the endeavours to reach unanimity with regard to nuclear testing, this being clearly the main issue before us this year. We also regret profoundly that the attempts were not crowned with success, but at least we can say that every possibility was tried and explored.

The Norwegian delegation was prepared to accept the compromise draft resolution on testing developed by the Indian and Yugoslav delegations. The Norwegian delegation further hoped that the attempt would also meet with a positive response from the delegation of the Soviet Union without the attachment of the conditions which were made known to us on Friday, so that the delegations of India and Yugoslavia could have been justified in formally introducing their compromise.

With regard to the problem of nuclear testing, the Norwegian delegation based itself on the following assumptions. Firstly, this issue clearly involves vital interests of the security of the major Powers, and their positions must surely be a result of the most careful considerations and evaluations.
Secondly, the task of the United Nations was one of creating the best possible atmosphere and conditions for the negotiations now underway in Geneva. It is there and there only that the agreement to discontinue the tests can be worked out together with the establishment of the control system to observe that the agreement is carried out.

Since one of the parties principally concerned did not find it possible to give the necessary concessions towards reaching the middle ground we had to recognize that unanimity could not be reached.

Surely nobody could expect unanimity in the field of nuclear testing, which is a problem that goes to the very roots of the security interests of the major Powers, if concessions by one party are not matched by similar concessions by the other party, squarely based on the establishment of control machinery at the earliest practicable date and not in the undefined future.

This is also why the Norwegian delegation was unable to vote for the key paragraph in the resolution on testing submitted by India and thirteen other Powers.

The Norwegian delegation has watched the positive development of agreement that further testing might entail increased danger to mankind. In the light of this realization we are confident that the negotiations now underway in Geneva will lead to a situation where no more tests are carried out and that a control system to ensure this situation will be set up.

The Norwegian delegation reserves its right to speak further on the effects of radiation when the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee is taken up by this Committee.

The Norwegian delegation abstained on that part of the Irish draft resolution which was put to the vote. We share the deep anxiety of the Foreign Minister of Ireland with respect to the increased insecurity which may result if more States are to have nuclear weapons under their national control. The Norwegian delegation doubted, however, that the best way of tackling this important problem was to set up a new Committee for that purpose. On the other hand we find ourselves in entire agreement with the latest proposal by the delegation of Ireland that the problem be taken up by the new Disarmament Commission which we hope it will be possible to establish during this session and we hope this will be possible on the basis of a unanimous vote.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN (Denmark): The vote of the Danish delegation on
Friday was closely consistent with our efforts as a whole with respect to the
disarmament problem. A conclusive argument in the Danish decision in respect
of this vote was our desire to contribute to finding a way towards a relaxing
of international tension which might enable a reduction of the armaments burdens
to take place and thus to advance the cause of peace.

It must be admitted that we live in a world where the relations between
States and groups of States suffer from a lack of confidence. Faced with this
regrettable fact, the conclusion that must be drawn is that only such measures of
disarmament as are subject to effective control will have any possibility of
being realized. Fortunately the recent technical conference at Geneva indicated
that it is possible to carry out effective measures of control as regards nuclear
tests.

The Danish delegation considers it to be of the utmost importance that as
a next step a system of control based upon these technical studies should be
agreed upon. It is from this point of view that the Danish delegation
co-sponsored the seventeen-Power resolution, which resolution calls for suspension
of nuclear tests under effective control. With the help of the technical
preparatory work of the expert committee last summer it will be possible in the
course of the coming year to agree upon an international control system which
will secure continued suspension of nuclear tests and thus forever stop all
nuclear tests. Thereby an important forward step will have been taken.

The seventeen-Power resolution points to the next step towards disarmament
and that is agreement on measures against the possibility of surprise attacks.
It also points to the steps we must take leading to a balanced and effectively
controlled world-wide system of disarmament.

By indicating solution by stages and through the technical approach
the seventeen-Power resolution is based upon a realistic and clear estimate
of the present international situation. As a co-sponsor of this resolution
we were guided, just as we were guided in all our efforts in this respect and
will be guided at the time of the forthcoming vote on the draft resolution on
the eighty-one-Member disarmament commission, by the desire to reach an agreement
to stop forever, under effective international control, all nuclear tests.
(Mr. Christiansen, Denmark)

Thus the way would be clear for agreement on a total halt of the production and use of nuclear weapons and on effectively controlled general disarmament. I would like to stress that general disarmament covering all kinds of arms is the main objective.

We welcomed the adoption of the seventeen-Power draft resolution but it was with deep regret that we witnessed the failure of the efforts to reach a unanimous vote in the United Nations on this situation. The adoption of the Austrian-Japanese-Swedish resolution reflects the hope that at the Geneva Conference we shall surmount the obstacles which will lead to a constructive result and that the United Nations in the future will co-operate in this vital field in full conformity with the noble principles of the Charter.

Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo (Indonesia): At this stage of our deliberations I would like to explain very briefly the votes passed by my delegation on the various resolutions with respect to the items which this Committee has been considering. The debates over the past three weeks have clearly shown that the questions relating to the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests have been foremost in the minds of members of this Committee and this is the subject to which members have devoted most of their time and efforts. I would therefore like to deal first of all with the resolutions relating to this question and in doing so I do not intend to reiterate the position of my delegation on this question which I stated in my intervention on 21 October last.

It is with regret that my delegation has observed the developments in this matter, especially during the last days of our deliberations. The strenuous efforts made by a number of delegations, particularly those of India and Yugoslavia, to bring about a unanimously acceptable resolution which may have resulted in the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, have unfortunately failed. Agreement on the part of the nuclear powers or the wording of such a draft resolution is of course indispensable and we regret that all efforts to obtain such agreement have remained fruitless.
Having thus failed to produce a single resolution acceptable to all members, this Committee at its last meeting was left with four draft resolutions on the same subject. In the opinion of my delegation the draft resolution of which Indonesia has the honour of being a co-sponsor, namely document A/C.1/522/Rev.1, reflects the desire of the peoples of the world for an immediate discontinuance of tests while urging the States concerned to reach agreement on the technical arrangements and necessary control to ensure the observance of this discontinuance.
It is this principle that guided my delegation in abstaining on the seventeen-Power resolution.

My delegation certainly appreciates the efforts of the delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden to draft a resolution which was intended to get the unanimous support of this Committee. My delegation abstained on this resolution, however, since we believe that in addition to merely expressing the hope that the Geneva Conference will be successful, this Assembly should make more positive and concrete recommendations to the nuclear Powers concerned.

We regret that draft resolution A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 had to be withdrawn from voting since its main operative paragraph failed to obtain the support of this Committee.

We still entertain the hope that the discontinuance of tests can immediately be brought about and the necessary controls established so as to give peoples all over the world the sense of being secure from the hazards of atomic radiation.

An agreement among the nuclear Powers is imperative, and we hope that the negotiations in Geneva may bear fruitful results.

We also regret that the second preambular paragraph of the resolution submitted by the delegation of Ireland in document A/C.1/L.206 did not obtain the necessary support of this Committee so that this resolution had to be withdrawn by its sponsor. My delegation voted in favour of this paragraph since we believe that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons may aggravate international tension. The setting up of a Committee to study the dangers in the further dissemination of these weapons is an idea which warrants the support of this Committee.

As regards resolution A/C.1/L.211, concerning the question of surprise attack, my delegation voted in favour of it. A further explanation is not called for since the resolution itself is self-explanatory.

As for the Soviet resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.204, we certainly welcome the thoughts expressed in this draft resolution. We voted in favour of it since this resolution could have served as a basis for further study and negotiation in the context of the general disarmament problem.
Mr. ALEMAYEHOU (Ethiopia): I should like to say a few words about the votes cast by my delegation on the various resolutions regarding the questions of disarmament, the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers.

The First Committee, after a long and mainly constructive debate of over three weeks, has taken action on a number of resolutions and amendments submitted to it by individuals as well as groups of delegations.

It has adopted some of these resolutions and amendments and rejected others, which actions might have naturally given satisfaction to some delegations while causing some disappointment to others.

But whatever the results of the voting on these various resolutions, a most constructive and dispassionate debate in the Committee has clearly revealed complete unanimity among all delegations that the testing of nuclear weapons is fraught with dangerous consequences; that their production and stockpiling should be done away with; and that the use of nuclear weapons for war purposes means complete annihilation of mankind and his civilization from this planet.

We were unanimous in saying so, but we were not unanimous in so acting.

My delegation earnestly hopes, therefore, that the great Powers' conference which is now in session in Geneva, will take into account in their negotiations not only the resolutions adopted by the First Committee, but also the deep apprehension and anxiety of all the peoples of the world as reflected in the general debate in this First Committee.

In casting its votes on the various resolutions, my delegation was guided by its sincere belief that the questions of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and that of general disarmament in this nuclear age were questions affecting the entire human race, and as such far beyond political disputes based on ideological or bloc differences.

With this fundamental idea in mind, we co-sponsored the fourteen-Power resolution, which we thought would respond to the demand of the United Nations of the world to stop the testing of nuclear weapons; secondly, we abstained on the seventeen-Power resolution because we believe that it falls short in showing the positive stand of the United Nations to the three-Power conference in Geneva on this vital question and because its recommendation with regard to the suspension of nuclear tests does not cover any potential manufacturing and testing powers.
Thirdly, we abstained on the resolution submitted by the delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden because, as this draft does not touch upon the substance of the grave problems facing the world, we thought that the adoption of such a very mild resolution would represent the General Assembly as being passive in this all important question.

Fourthly, we abstained on the Soviet resolution regarding the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers not because we do not agree with it in principle but because, since we are recipients and not givers in matters of this nature, the agreement of the Powers concerned seems to be necessary.

Fifthly, my delegation voted in favour of the second preambular paragraph of the Irish draft resolution because, in the opinion of my delegation, the provision in that paragraph would have limited nuclear weapons from being widely disseminated had the draft resolution been adopted. It is to be regretted that this draft resolution was not adopted.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about a suggestion I made during the general debate in this Committee.

From the reports of scientists and all those having an intimate knowledge of nuclear and thermonuclear power, it seems that man cannot live together with the horrible monster he has created. Either he will have to eliminate it as a war weapon or he will have to face elimination by the same monster he has created.

It was with this consideration in mind that my delegation suggested a declaration of principle to ban nuclear weapons for war purposes. But since there was very little response on the part of other members to our appeal, we concluded that the members of the Assembly are not ready to accept such a provision as this, and therefore my delegation decided to postpone this question and to bring it up again at a more appropriate time.
Mr. FERRDCHO (Honduras) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation wishes to explain why it supported the seventeen-Power draft resolution in view of the slanderous statements made by the Soviet Union which appeared in yesterday's New York Times. Although the seventeen-Power draft resolution does not entirely reflect the feeling of humanity, it was the only draft which offered the possibility of reaching an adequate solution of the problems under discussion. We favour the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, but with guarantees of international control. If this were not done, the Powers acting in good faith would be leaving their national security at the mercy of those who negotiate in bad faith. We must have effective guarantees, and this is the only reasonable position to take. This draft also calls attention to the importance and urgency of achieving agreement in the forthcoming study of the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack. It expresses the need for a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament.

The fourteen-Power draft resolution calls for the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to the technical arrangements and controls considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of such tests. But this provision lays down the fact that these Powers will agree on a system of controls, and this is where the flaw lies. The suspension of tests would be indefinite without any international control and would remain so if one party refused to come to an agreement. We believe that international control is indispensable and must be included in any agreement on suspension.

The Soviet draft resolution, following the old pattern of trying to impress by propaganda, calls for the immediate and unconditional cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests for an indefinite period. Although it recommends that the States should come to an agreement, it does not subordinate the cessation to the results of the negotiations. If an agreement is not arrived at and the suspension has been achieved, there will be no guarantee of the controls.

None of the draft resolutions referred to the stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Some representatives stated that there are enough stockpiles to wipe out all life on earth. We also feel that mention should be made of the fact that no further bombs should be manufactured. We would hardly
be helping humanity merely by suspending tests, because we would not be eliminating existing stockpiles.

We also voted against the Soviet draft on the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers by 10 to 15 per cent, because we felt that the seventeen-Power draft resolution already stressed this matter. We felt that the Soviet draft was a propaganda effort to stress one aspect of the question. It would have been ridiculous to vote in favour of this draft without carefully considering the budgets of the States concerned and establishing a system of control for the reduction of the budgets.

My delegation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution submitted by Ireland. Although we believe that the distribution of these weapons may increase the danger, we do not feel that this danger can be avoided while the manufacture of nuclear weapons continues. This might create a monopoly in the hands of the nuclear Powers, and that, of course, would be a mistake. All countries have the same rights, and to act in that manner would be to discriminate against some countries.

As regards the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden, we voted in favour of it because it expresses the hope that the negotiations in Geneva will be successful, and this is an expression of the views of all peace-loving countries.

We must reject the false statement that the United States has exercised pressure on some delegations to vote in favour of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, and we must repudiate such accusations. As far as we are concerned, we did not receive even the slightest hints, and as far as the Latin American countries are concerned, it is foolish to say that they obeyed orders from any country. We are not at all colonies of the United States. We are linked to the United States geographically and juridically through treaties and conventions which have been signed, but they were all signed on an equal basis. In all these conventions there was respect for our sovereignty and our territorial integrity. We find a very different story, however, when we refer to the Soviet Union and its satellites. It is quite logical and reasonable for the countries of Latin America and the United States, owing to their geographical links and their juridical ties, to be interested in the mutual defence of the continent. This should not lead to the thought that
the Latin American countries are subordinated to the United States, not even ideologically speaking. The United States does not aspire to that position, which would be tantamount to reflecting the activities of the Soviet Union itself.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Since no other delegation wishes to explain the votes which it cast at our previous meeting, I wish to make the following statement. At our last meeting, which ended during the early hours of 1 November, the representative of India proposed, and the Committee agreed, to leave for today the voting on the draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1) and also on the draft resolution submitted by Mexico (A/C.1/L.203). The delegation of France has submitted amendments (A/C.1/L.212) to the India-Yugoslavia draft. Members may explain their votes before or after the voting takes place.

I understand that the representative of the United States wishes to present an amendment.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): I simply want to say that the United States supports the amendments submitted by France. We wish to propose, with the United Kingdom, an amendment adding a new paragraph 5, which would read as follows:

"5. Decides that the Commission shall be governed by rule 162 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure and that its first meeting shall be convened by the Secretary-General after consultation with the Members."
For the information of the Committee, I shall read out rule 162:

"The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. The rules relating to the procedure of committees of the General Assembly, as well as rules 45 and 62, shall apply to the procedure of any subsidiary organ, unless the General Assembly or the subsidiary organ decides otherwise."

In other words, this new body would be perfectly free to adopt its own rules after it had come into existence.

I should like to say, briefly, that our reason for offering this amendment is that obviously the rules which governed the Disarmament Commission of twelve members are not applicable to a Commission of eighty-one members. What we are contemplating (doing here is bringing all the Members of the United Nations into this disarmament activity. Therefore, it is only common sense for us to apply the general practice of the General Assembly to this new activity.

If this amendment is adopted, the United States will vote in favour of the draft resolution proposed by India and Yugoslavia.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The amendment to which the representative of the United States has just referred has been handed to the Secretariat and will be distributed as soon as possible. According to rule 121 of the rules of procedure, the Chairmen may permit discussion and consideration of such an amendment, as well as of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated or have only been circulated the same day. Therefore, there can be no objection to the discussion of this amendment today.

We shall now proceed to explanations of votes on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 submitted by India and Yugoslavia and the amendments submitted by France on the one hand and those submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on the other hand.

Mr. VEGA GOMEZ (El Salvador) (interpretation from Spanish): For reasons which have already been given by the representative of El Salvador, Mr. Brannon, in his statement in the general debate, the delegation of El Salvador will vote in favour of the revised draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia in
document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 and the United States amendment to it. However, in view of this amendment, which my delegation considers extremely appropriate and useful, my delegation believes that it might be advisable to delete from paragraph 1 of the operative part the words "as a Committee of the General Assembly". If this is a Committee of the General Assembly, it means that it would work only until 31 December 1959, but I do not believe that this is the meaning of the amendment submitted by the United States, which says that the Committee shall be governed by rule 162 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Mr. NUNEZ-PORLUENDO (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): I asked for the floor to make a brief statement to explain the vote of Cuba on the draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 and on the draft resolution submitted by Mexico in document A/C.1/L.208. These are the two drafts upon which we are now going to vote. Naturally we wish to make known our views on these documents. We have carefully studied the draft resolutions, and we believe that certain facts should be kept in mind, since they constitute important background elements for any decision taken regarding these draft resolutions.

When the Disarmament Commission had twelve members, we cannot say that it was outstandingly successful in the tasks with which it was entrusted; nor can we deny that it did meet periodically and that its meetings did allow the views of the main Powers to be heard with regard to the important question of disarmament. Now more than ever we hold to our view that the general question of disarmament affects all peoples equally but can only be solved by the great Powers. It is only the great Powers that have the material capacity to unleash world war.

The Disarmament Commission is a body that appears very clearly in all the documents before us as one that exists. It was unable even to achieve relative success, because of the tenacious opposition of the Soviet Union to any just solution providing ample reciprocal guarantees. The stand taken by the Soviet Union and its overt and covert friends and allies has been to try to force the Western Powers to disarm unilaterally while the former kept their own preponderance of conventional weapons and manpower. We might add that in the Disarmament Commission the Soviet Union has never accepted adequate control because obviously the Soviet Union never intended to disarm. It was all a great propaganda move to impress the unwary who prefer not to remember recent history and who prefer to see angels' wings on those who are not angels.
Last year a suggestion was made that seemed to us completely illogical. It was suggested that, if a twelve-member Commission could not come to an agreement, a twenty-five-member Commission could do so. When faced with this idea, we say: "As regards the Indian draft resolution, according to which the Disarmament Commission would be expanded, we believe, as other speakers have already pointed out, that the problem does not depend on the composition of the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee. Unfortunately, it depends on other, deeper causes. Perhaps the greater the number of members on these bodies the more difficult it will be to come to a unanimous solution".

As was to be expected, the facts have proved us right. The Disarmament Commission of twelve members held periodical meetings; the twenty-five member Commission has not held even one meeting.

Now an idea has been submitted to us by India and Yugoslavia. It would seem logical that the composition of the Disarmament Commission should be narrowed down still more, because the twenty-five-member Commission has never met once. But what is now proposed to us is to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission to eighty-one members -- and all this after we have seen during three weeks of debate that this First Committee, which is also composed of eighty-one members, has been completely unable to reach a satisfactory solution of the problems before us. I prophesy that this measure will fail. For these reasons, we shall not vote in favour of it.

The Government of Cuba has very carefully studied the proposal submitted by the Government of Mexico. We believe it to be more in keeping with the rules of logic and we believe that it may be successful in its aim and achieve favourable results. At least, it does no harm. It will once again give proof that the Soviet Union is the country that does not want a disarmament agreement that would give the results we all desire.

We repeat that we are pessimistic, but we have never felt, as some others do, that we are the only possessors of the truth.
If the Governments directly concerned will vote in favour of the Mexican draft resolution, which would be proof that it would be put into practice immediately, the Cuban delegation will do so too. But if this be not the case, Cuba will abstain as a tribute to the obvious good faith of the Mexican delegation in submitting its important draft resolution.

Regarding the amendments submitted by France and the United States, since they improve to a certain extent the Indian and Yugoslav draft resolution, we shall support them.

We should like to ask in accordance with the rules of procedure that, when a vote is taken on the draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia, a separate vote be taken on paragraph 1 of the operative part, which says:

"Decides that the Disarmament Commission shall, for 1959 on an ad hoc basis and as a Committee of the General Assembly, be composed of all the Members of the United Nations;" (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1)

We ask for a separate vote on this paragraph because the Cuban delegation will not vote in favour of this paragraph.

Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom): I wish to explain the views of my delegation regarding the revised draft resolution on the United Nations machinery for disarmament which has been submitted by India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1).

As I have already made clear to the Committee, I think that no delegation has regretted more than mine the inability of the existing United Nations machinery for disarmament to function over the past year. I have also clearly stated the desire of Her Majesty’s Government to see the United Nations placed once more in a position to discharge effectively its overall responsibility for disarmament.

When the proposal for an eighty-one member disarmament commission was first put forward last year, my delegation argued against it. We did so on the grounds that such a body would be too large and cumbersome for effective work on the detailed and practical aspect of disarmament which falls properly within the sphere of the Disarmament Commission. We still believe that detailed and practical work requires a much more smaller and more intimate forum than a body composed of eighty-one members. And I think this view is generally shared by Members of this Committee, including indeed the sponsors of the draft resolution now before us.
But in the light of the past year’s experience, we recognize the difficulties in any other solution. We also recognize the need for some action now. We have therefore come to the conclusion that it may now be necessary to give the idea of an eighty-one member commission a trial. We are ready to support the proposal for an eighty-one member commission for next year, on an ad hoc basis, as a committee of the General Assembly, as is stated in the draft resolution. This means that the General Assembly will be under a definite obligation at its next plenary session to review the situation and to ask for other arrangements if the ones now proposed have not proved satisfactory.

Secondly, my delegation has noted the assurances of the sponsors of this proposal that they definitely envisage the establishment of smaller sub-committees, and doubtless also groups of experts as may be considered necessary by the eighty-one member commission in order to deal with more practical and detailed matters. We certainly believe that this will be essential, and it is only on this understanding that we feel able to support the establishment of an eighty-one member commission. My delegation, therefore, supports the French amendment on this point.

Thirdly, there is the question of the procedure in the new commission. The existing rules of procedure of the Disarmament Commission are the same as those of the old Atomic Energy Commission which derived from the rules of the Security Council, that is to say, they are rules appropriate to a small body of twelve members. There are a number of points in these rules which are clearly quite inappropriate to a large body of eighty-one members. It is for this reason that my delegation has joined with the United States in proposing the amendment which has just been read out by Mr. Lodge. If this amendment is adopted, and subject to the understandings which I have just explained, my delegation will be able to vote for the draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1.

Mr. Winiwicz (Poland): The attention of all delegations taking part in the present discussion has concentrated mainly on the question of cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Such an attitude was undoubtedly due to the importance of that issue. But apart from this, we should not give up our endeavours concerning
general disarmament. The delegation of Poland considers that this problem requires a serious effort on our part, especially in order to break the impasse on the machinery for disarmament discussions -- existing since the last General Assembly session.

The delegation of Poland does not wish to reopen now a discussion on the causes of that deadlock, all the more so as the curtailment of our debate permits only an explanation of our vote. We wish, however, to mention that many delegations were right when pointing out last year that the setting up of a United Nations machinery, which could be used for out-voting one of the major Powers and the minority of Member States on the problems of disarmament, could serve no useful purpose. That is why we are glad to state that in the proposal presented to us now, -- I am referring to the Yugoslav-Indian draft -- an attempt is now being made to solve this question, taking due account of the past year's experience of the United Nations. And, last year's experience should also guide us in our appraisal of the amendments submitted to the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution.

For these reasons we are inclined to give our support to the India and Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1) proposing that the Disarmament Commission be composed of all Members of the United Nations. We want also to acknowledge the political prudence of the authors who do not impose upon the Commission limitations and unnecessary precisions on its organization, procedure and conduct of work.

There exists the fully recognized principle in all the major bodies of our organization that each of them is the master of its own proceedings. That is why the Polish delegation sees no reason to depart from that principle in the case of the important Disarmament Commission. We see therefore no uselessness in the American amendment, suggested a few moments ago, and we particularly oppose the French amendment contained in the first paragraph of A/C.1/L.212, which says, "... set up a small working committee and that groups of experts may be convened whenever that seems advisable;"

In our opinion the adoption of this amendment would contradict not only the aforementioned principle, it could create the impression that there exists a desire on the part of the United Nations to forward all disarmament problems to various and numerous technical groups where they could be subjected to endless arguments. Meanwhile the armaments race would go on.
Thus, we are likely to follow the not reassuring example of the League of Nations, as has been stressed in our debate by several speakers.

The Polish delegation is pleased to give its full support to the request addressed to the Disarmament Commission, as contained in paragraph 2 of the operative part of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution. We think it most appropriate that the Political Committee should express its opinion as to the necessity and advisability of endeavours to reach partial solutions in disarmament problems if, for the present at least, general agreement is not feasible.

No change in the formulation of this request is necessary, unless the change of its meaning. This is the reason why we oppose the French amendments to this paragraph. The formula proposed in these amendments, particularly through the use of the phrase "balanced disarmament", limits considerably and prejudges the work of the Commission. It could, if applied, bar efforts in the most constructive approach towards partial solutions.

We are also opposed to the limitation of the life of the Disarmament Committee. Since it is to be a disarmament body and disarmament is one of the main tasks of the United Nations, it should not be established for one year only. All the Disarmament Commissions we have had in the past were in fact established on a permanent basis. Now, when we are called upon to break the deadlock which weighs so heavily upon our work in this field, we ought not to create the impression that it is a provisional body we are setting up. That is why the Polish delegation is opposed to any limitation in time of the proposed Commission, and we do support the request to have a separate vote on the words, "for 1959 on an ad hoc basis and as a committee of the General Assembly" (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1) in the first operative paragraph of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution. I think that problem can be solved by a separate vote.

With these reservations, the Polish delegation strongly urges that the Indian-Yugoslav proposal be approved without the French and United States amendments, which can only complicate the work of the Commission and the reaching of an agreement on establishing this Commission here.
Mr. BELLIVE (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): It is quite obvious that the discussion of the question of disarmament had to bring in the question of the composition of the Disarmament Commission. In the past, the Disarmament Commission was composed of members of the Security Council plus Canada. Last year, another solution was tried. The idea of having the membership of the Disarmament Commission consist of the Security Council members plus Canada as a nuclear Power was in keeping with Article 51 of the Charter, which considers that disarmament is one of the questions that falls within the purview of the Security Council.

We in this Committee were torn between two decisions: either we had to base our Disarmament Commission on the membership of the Security Council, which apparently was not palatable to the Soviet Union because it considered itself in a minority in the Council; or else we had to set up the Commission with an arbitrary number of members chosen at random to try to come closer to the Soviet viewpoint. The only solution was to turn the Political Committee into the Disarmament Commission, or, rather, constitute a Disarmament Commission wherein all Members of the United Nations would be represented.

It is obvious that a committee composed of too many members finds its work difficult to do because if the committee is difficult to control, it is difficult to work with the committee. The collective bodies have to control and supervise; the small bodies and individual countries have to act. There is an adage by the Spanish statesman, C. M. van del Castilla, who said: "When I want something done, I nominate a man. When I want nothing done, I set up a committee." There is a grain of truth and a bucketful of exaggeration in this adage.

Experience has shown that the large committees are useful to control, to supervise, to encourage. On the other hand, for work, for negotiation, for agreements to be arrived at, for the institutional tasks, for defining and drawing up terms of reference, more restricted groups are required. Both logic and experience should lead us to understand this today. Since we cannot just pick at random a number of members of the Committee in keeping with the whims of one Power, the obvious and logical solution is that the body that
has to control and supervise has to be the embodiment of the jurisdiction of
the General Assembly over the question of disarmament. In the absence of the
Assembly, this body must be composed of all Members of the United Nations
because all Members of the United Nations are concerned with the question of
disarmament.

Disarmament is obviously the responsibility of the great Powers, but we,
the smaller countries, are as interested, if not more so. We want to follow
step by step, day by day and hour by hour what progress is achieved in the
question of disarmament. After all, the function of the Assembly is to
establish before world public opinion the responsibility of the countries who
place obstacles in the path of the effective fulfilment of disarmament. When
I speak of obstacles, I am not referring to verbal comments, because verbally
expressed views do not matter in this case. Countries are not wrong because
they may be more or less emphatic in their theoretical statements. Countries
are going to be responsible when they refuse to accept or to co-operate with
the setting up of pragmatic methods, practical measures and technical
provisions that will lead to disarmament.

It is obvious that it would be extremely appropriate and only right to
recognize the interest of all countries in disarmament. There are many
countries which know this problem well, because it has been shown in previous
debates that the most unexpected countries know most about this subject. These
countries, therefore, and all countries concerned should follow step by step
everything that is done in disarmament — in the cessation or discontinuance
of tests, in the avoidance of or defence against surprise attack, in the
cessation of the manufacture and production of fissile material and the
conversion of stockpiles.

For all these reasons, my delegation feels that the idea of the
Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution is a good one. As I said in an earlier
remark, it merely fulfils the principles of the Charter.

This year, we could not finish our discussion on the question of
disarmament without passing on the composition of the Disarmament Commission.
The Charter of the United Nations very clearly establishes the obligation of
the Security Council to deal with the question of disarmament, and also grants
powers to the General Assembly in the matter according to the interpretation of the amendment accepted at San Francisco that once the Security Council, in any functions granted to it by the Charter, was not dealing with a subject, that subject could be considered by the General Assembly. It is obvious that since the Assembly has already recognized that the Disarmament Commission made up of the members of the Security Council plus one has not been able to function, we are obliged, according to the interpretation given to the Charter at San Francisco, to take up again the question of disarmament in the most important pragmatic aspects, which are the setting up of a Disarmament Commission.
Therefore, sir, as far as I am concerned the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution has the following three advantages: one, it affirms the jurisdiction of the Assembly. It shows our decision and our desire to fulfill the precepts of the Charter. Secondly, it sets up a body, an entity of moral authority on the question of disarmament, and what is more, also on the question of supervising, controlling, and pointing out the responsibilities which the Powers assume in any negotiations which they may carry out.

It may be said that a large committee is exposed to what we could call propaganda manoeuvres. I do not fear this; I do not fear this for one reason: because we have all been forewarned. The problem of disarmament is a problem which has been studied deeply by the Assembly, and we all know how to distinguish perfectly between what in each proposal is the propaganda element and what is the element designed constructively and in good faith to bring about a solution. The discussions in the General Assembly recently have given a death blow to all propagandistic proposals, and at the same time have provided the possibility for all constructive measures to prosper.

Now finally, there remains the matter of how we can co-ordinate the idea of control in a large body with the need to do something of a technical nature in smaller groups. How can these two ideas be merged? On this question there is an amendment, and I must say I do not like that amendment. It is the first amendment presented by the delegation from France. This amendment is to the effect that a small working committee be set up, and that, furthermore, groups of experts may be convened whenever it seems advisable.

Obviously, Mr. Lall considered this amendment at the time it was submitted, and Mr. Lall, as co-sponsor of the draft resolution, said that it was not necessary to tell the Committee what it ought to do, because the Committee, according to the norms and usage of the United Nations, could set up a working group and could also call for the use of experts.

In line with the categorical statement of one of the authors of the draft resolution, I would abstain from voting on this amendment because I would feel it to be unnecessary in view of the authoritative interpretation given by one of the authors of the draft resolution itself.
Regarding the second amendment of France, I think it does define the meaning of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia, because it is worded in this manner:

"2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to make every effort to reach an agreement or agreements in the field of disarmament commencing with those aspects of the problem which seem to offer the best immediate possibilities;"

I believe that the wording has been improved. In the first place, I see no reason for saying that the phrase "of effective and balanced disarmament" would be inappropriate, because obviously, a system of disarmament has to be balanced. If a system of disarmament is not balanced it could be extremely dangerous.

Secondly, what is put in is, after the words "aspects of the problem which," the phrase "in the opinion of the Powers directly concerned," which could be said to be self-evident, because in disarmament negotiations it is naturally the Powers concerned which have the last word. Therefore, I have no objection to having this amendment put to a vote, and the delegation of Peru will vote in favour of it.

Now, there remains the suggestion of the representative from El Salvador to delete from paragraph 1 the words "for 1959 and on an ad hoc basis," which apparently has not been formalized as an amendment. In the event that it is suggested as a formal amendment, the delegation of Peru would vote to support it.

And the same goes for the very important additional amendment of the United States of America, which reads as follows:

"5. Decides that the Disarmament Commission shall be governed rule 16 of the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure and that its first meeting shall be convened by the Secretary-General after consultation with the members." (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1)

The argument of the Ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. Lodge, supported by the representative of the United Kingdom, appears to me incontestable. The rules of procedure of the Disarmament Commission cannot apply to this new disarmament commission, because of the composition of this disarmament commission.

So the delegation of Peru will also vote in favour of the amendment of the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The Chairman has always listened with great interest and pleasure to the statements made by the delegates, especially when they are made in the Chairman's own language. But I should like to remind you that the debate on the draft resolutions and the amendments was closed on the evening of our last meeting. Now we are occupied merely in explaining our votes on the draft resolution proposed by India and Yugoslavia. I therefore must beg the delegates to make an effort to be as brief as possible in their statements.

Mr. LORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 concerning the Disarmament Commission is acceptable basically to the Soviet delegation. I say "basically" because I do intend to make some comments.

As for the amendments to this draft resolution, I may say right away that none of the French amendments are acceptable to the Soviet Union, and I shall explain why in a moment.

Last year when the same question was discussed there was a fairly lengthy debate as to the machinery to be set up for the United Nations work in the disarmament field. The Soviet delegation explained in detail why the machinery that had been used hitherto was unsuitable for the work. The experience of the work of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee was used by the Soviet delegation to show that those bodies were not properly set up, that they were not suitable for the work assigned to them. We adhere to that same view. We think, with that experience of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and of the Disarmament Commission itself, consisting in its majority of representatives of states which are members of military blocs, especially aggressive military blocs, that it is not suitable, and is not suitable for the future.
What the delegations if India and Yugoslavia have proposed is basically acceptable to the Soviet Union since what is proposed is the establishment of a broad Commission with all the Members of the United Nations participating. This will allow the views of States, large and small, to be taken into account -- and these latter are playing an increasing role in the solution of all questions, especially those of disarmament, since such questions affect the small Powers in no lesser degree than the great ones. That is why we feel that the principles underlying this draft resolution are well advised and we wish to support them.

As the representative of Poland has already done, however, we also would like to clarify the first paragraph of the draft resolution.

It seems to us that there is no need now to speak of this eighty-one-member Commission being only for 1959 and a Committee of the General Assembly. We feel that this will cause confusion in the structure and deliberations of the Commission. If it is a Disarmament Commission, let it be a Disarmament Commission. Let it be an autonomous body within the framework of the United Nations. We believe, therefore, that El Salvador's proposal to delete the words "and as a Committee of the General Assembly" would be acceptable. If the representative of El Salvador has not introduced it formally, we are prepared to do so. In fact, we are doing so.

As for the words "for 1959 on an ad hoc basis", we would endorse the request of the representative of Poland that these words be voted on separately. We think that it is not advisable to limit this Commission to 1959 and on an ad hoc basis. We shall vote against that.

As far as the French amendments are concerned, it seems to us that they are designed to predetermine or prejudge the question of the contents and nature and method of the Commission's activities. This is ill-advised and incorrect. The General Assembly is now about to set up a broad Commission composed of all eighty-one Members of the United Nations. Why should the Assembly predetermine that there shall be a small sub-committee within that Commission, that there shall be groups of experts, etc.? We understood the comments of the delegations of India and Yugoslavia and their explanations to the effect that, within the framework of the Commission, working parties and other organs could be set up on that Commission's decision if it deemed fit. That is quite reasonable. But to decide by anticipation, before the Commission has met, that there shall be groups of experts,
working committees, etc. -- that, I think, is ill-advised. It would be ill-advised for the Assembly to do that.

In this connexion I should like to state that, since the sad experience of the establishment of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in the past, which proved inappropriate and unhelpful, the Soviet Union delegation wishes to announce in advance that if such decision were adopted it could not participate in the work of such a sub-committee. We do not wish to doom the Commission to failure in advance by predetermining the establishment of such an organ. Since the establishment of such a Sub-Committee -- as a number of delegations have pointed out -- is contemplated to be on the same lines as the Sub-Committee which met in London, we think that it would be an erroneous decision. The whole experience of our work so far militates against it. If we wish to do real work in the Commission, delegations should take that circumstance into account and not create difficulties for the work of the Commission.

We are prepared to participate in the Commission and, in the Commission, decide how that Commission shall work, how it shall approach its work, what committees or sub-committees or expert groups are to be established. It is up to the Commission to decide these things, depending on its programme of work and on the direct needs which will be revealed by the work of the Commission itself. To decide in advance would be incorrect. Therefore, we shall vote against this amendment.

As regards the French amendment to the second paragraph, which would spell out the meaning of disarmament as effective and balanced disarmament, and which then goes on to add, after the words "aspects of the problem which", the phrase "in the opinion of the Powers directly concerned" and to replace the words "seem to offer the best immediate possibilities" by "offer the best possibilities for rapid agreement" -- this, we think, is likewise incorrect. We think that this amendment is an unfortunate one. If we were to start spelling out things, the Soviet delegation could present a host of amendments touching on the substance of the Commission's work; and I am afraid that, in that event, we should be unable to complete consideration of this item, not just today, but for days to come, since the debate would then be open as to the aspects of the disarmament question which the Commission would be expected to deal with. That is a vast problem and
the French amendments by themselves could not cover it -- let alone the fact that these amendments, in our opinion, would orient incorrectly to the work of the Commission. The phrase "effective and balanced disarmament" is, after all, the Western point of view on the matter and we are not prepared to work only on the basis of one point of view. The Commission is supposed to be an organ of agreement to compose the differences between the Powers which are members of the Commission and we are not prepared to accept one point of view only. If agreement is sought, all points of view should be represented. We do not wish to adopt one point of view as the basis of the Commission's work. The Commission, with eighty-one members, will itself be able to decide the basis on which it will work. That is why the amendments to paragraph 2 are ill-advised and we shall vote against them.

As for the amendment proposed by the United States, I am prepared to agree with what the representative of Poland said, that this amendment surely worsens the draft resolution as a whole. The addition of a fifth paragraph makes the draft resolution worse. It is moreover, in our opinion, entirely unnecessary to accept this; to decide in advance what rules of procedure shall be applicable in the Commission is entirely inappropriate. The Commission will meet by itself and will determine its rules of procedure, as does any other commission set up by either the General Assembly or the Security Council.

However, I do not wish to give the impression that we object absolutely to all amendments. Just because we consider that the Commission is an organ of agreement, I think that a compromise in the solution of this question must be sought, and if the United States deems it imperative to introduce this amendment as a new paragraph numbered 5, I do not wish to reject it out of hand.
Apparently the United States has its own notions on this matter. These we surely are taking into account. By the same token, the United States should take into account the views of other members of the United Nations and of the Soviet Union, in particular. Consequently, guided by the spirit of compromise, I would submit a sub-amendment to this amendment as follows, paragraph 5 to read as follows:

"Decides that the first meeting of the Disarmament Commission shall be convened by the Secretary-General, after consultation with the Member States, and that the Commission, taking into account rule 162 of the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure, shall elaborate its own rules of procedure."

In other words, since the United States and the United Kingdom, which has also sponsored this amendment, feel that some guidance should be furnished to the Commission as to the rules of procedure to work out, we could tell it that it should take into account rule 162 of the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure. It is clear, however, that a commission, which meets under the decision of the General Assembly, has a right to work out its own rules; and this, in my opinion, would be entirely in harmony with the text of rule 162. I would think that the United States should not object to this amendment to the American amendment, that is, if the United States is likewise guided by the spirit of compromise.

Lastly, in the draft resolution itself, there is a fourth paragraph which says:

"That the Assembly requests the Disarmament Commission to convene as appropriate and to submit to the General Assembly, at a special session if necessary, constructive proposals and recommendations in the field of disarmament." (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1)

I think that a slight amendment would be called for here. After the words "requests the Disarmament Commission to convene as appropriate and to submit," insert the words "to the Security Council," to read "to submit to the Security Council and the General Assembly."
Why do we propose that the words "to the Security Council" should be added? Because, if you take all the decisions so far of the General Assembly on the Disarmament Commission, you will find that all of these decisions invariably state that the Commission shall report its conclusions and decisions and recommendations both to the Security Council and to the General Assembly. Now that is a fact, and it is obvious why: because, under the Charter, the Security Council have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the solution of disarmament problems. Consequently, it is natural that the Disarmament Commission should report to the Security Council. Since we understand today that this Commission is set up on such a broad basis, with eighty-one members, it is natural that they should report not only to the Security Council, but also to the General Assembly.

I should imagine that there will be no objection from any quarters to this amendment, since this will only bring the draft resolution in line with the procedure hitherto invariably followed on this matter. This is in line with the rules of procedure and with the status of the Commission itself.

With these amendments, and on condition that the French amendments are rejected, the Soviet delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution and will participate in the work of the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): On a point of order, the representative of El Salvador has asked for the floor.

Mr. VEGA GOMEZ (El Salvador) (interpretation from Spanish): In view of the fact that the representative of Peru took up the El Salvadorian suggestion, but in a wider way than the one I had voiced, may I repeat that my suggestion was merely the deletion in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the India-Yugoslav draft resolution, the words "and as a Committee of the General Assembly". My delegation believes that the text of rule 162 itself of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, which would govern the Disarmament Commission in 1959, if we adopt the United States-United Kingdom draft amendment (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1), shows that the Disarmament Commission would be a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, but it would not be a Committee of the General Assembly as provided in rules 98 and 115 and other pertinent rules of the
rules of procedure. Therefore, the delegation of El Salvador wishes formally to propose a deletion of the words "and as a Committee of the General Assembly" in paragraph 1 of document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1.

Mr. LALL (India): In listening to the debate, which, as you have said, consists really of explanations of votes but which, anyway, has become somewhat of a debate on the draft resolution before us in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1, the delegation of India has been heartened by the fact that from all parts of this house agreement has been expressed on the principle enunciated in the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution. It would be something constructive, something positive, if, at the end of its consideration of the disarmament problem, this Committee could adopt a resolution which would be acceptable to the various elements in this room.

Taking into account many of the remarks that have been made around this table today, and taking into account the results of other conversations which the representative of Yugoslavia and I have had the privilege of having with some of the delegations who might be regarded as being primarily concerned with this issue, Yugoslavia and India have submitted to the Secretariat a revision of our draft resolution, which I suppose will appear in a few minutes, as revision 2 of document A/C.1/L.210. This revision takes into account, for example, the amendment which has just been proposed by the representative of El Salvador. Those words which he seeks to omit from our previous draft have been omitted from the revision which we have handed in. So, in fact, he will find that his amendment has been incorporated into our draft text. This draft text will appear with three operative paragraphs only. Paragraph 2 of revision 1, to which there were numerous French amendments, we have dropped. Therefore it will be unnecessary, we trust, to consider further those French amendments.

So far as the French amendment to paragraph 1 is concerned I am most grateful for the view expressed by the representative of Peru. It is abundantly clear to all members of this house that it will be open to the Disarmament Commission to establish any body which it thinks would advance the progress of consideration or the progress of achieving unanimous agreement among its Members.
Therefore it seems to us that it would be redundant, unnecessary, and rather rigid to adopt any amendment to paragraph 1 of the text other than the amendment which has been proposed by the representative of El Salvador, and which he will find incorporated in the new text which we have submitted.

We are not touching on the amendment which has been moved by the representative of the United States, and the reason is as follows: We agree with the representative of the United States, who has said that, even under rule 162 of the General Assembly rules of procedure, it will be open to the Disarmament Commission to formulate its own rules of procedure. In fact, it seems to be the position which will, in our view, arise. It will be for the Disarmament Commission to formulate its own rules of procedure. However, there is some analogy between a Commission of eighty-one Members of the General Assembly and a Committee of the General Assembly, and we do not ourselves think that the idea of rule 162 is entirely out of place. Nevertheless, we have not incorporated any wording on that particular matter, particularly as we find, from the statement which has just been made by the representative of the USSR, that the position of his delegation is not far removed from that of the United States.
Both Yugoslavia and India very much hope that it will be possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on wording regarding this new paragraph which has been introduced by the representative of the United States on behalf of his delegation and the delegation of the United Kingdom. Should that happen -- and as our new text incorporates the suggestion made by the representative of El Salvador, and since we believe that the other amendments submitted by the representative of France will no longer be necessary, as we are in fact deleting paragraph 2 from the revised text, and as has been so ably explained by other representatives -- it will be open to the Disarmament Commission to set up, not one but several bodies, if it so desires.

In view of that, and in view of the thought in rule 162 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, which also touches upon this particular aspect of the amendments of the representative of France, we trust that those amendments will not be necessary, and that after general agreement is reached between the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and USSR on this new wording introduced by Mr. Lodge, a generally acceptable draft resolution will be before the Committee.

We have given the text to the Secretariat and it will be before the Committee in a little while. I would leave it to the Chairman as to whether he would wish to continue with the meeting. I know that there are more speakers on the list and the Chairman would probably wish to listen to them. As a new text has been introduced which does take into account some of the amendments that have been moved, and which leaves room, as it were, for an additional paragraph, by agreement between the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR, we hope that in their remarks they might feel disposed to take into account the statement which I have made and the fact that another text is about to be placed before us.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I think that we could continue to hear other speakers who are on the list while awaiting distribution of the revised text of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.210.
Mr. ILLUEMA (Panama) (Interpretation from Spanish): My delegation is of the opinion that the draft resolution of Yugoslavia and India, even with the amendments proposed by France and the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as that of El Salvador, is still not the ideal formula, as some representatives have very judiciously pointed out. However, in order to make the position of my delegation perfectly clear, I would like to state that the draft resolution and the amendments which were submitted -- although, they are not, as I said earlier, an ideal solution -- might nevertheless serve as a bridge leading us towards a satisfactory formula, as long as it is linked to the proposal submitted to the Committee by the delegation of Mexico.

That is why I felt that the Chairman was quite correct in allowing this debate to continue. The debate seems to be running along in an atmosphere of harmony, and we would insist, as I am urging upon the Committee now, that a flexible draft resolution should be adopted which would not deal too much with meticulous details, but which would at the same time allow the Members of the Committee, and especially the nuclear Powers, by taking up the Mexican draft resolution, to arrive at certain understandings in order to resume conversations on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations.

I shall touch very briefly upon a number of the questions that have been raised in the course of this afternoon's debate. First of all, with regard to the French amendments, I have certain objections to paragraph 1 which refers to the setting up of a small working committee and groups of experts which may be convened whenever it seems advisable. I shall refer to this more specifically in a few moments. But what I would like to point out, with regard to the objections raised by the representative of Poland, especially with regard to paragraph 2(b) of the French amendments, is that some of the objections raised in this matter are due to a misunderstanding.

The representative of Poland felt that the French proposal might be prejudging the entire question of disarmament, because in paragraph 2(a) the French amendment uses the words "of effective and balanced disarmament". However, may I also point out that in this same paragraph of the French amendments
mention is made of starting with those aspects of the problem which offer the best possibility for rapid agreement. If these are the aspects referred to, there is no need to express fear that the French proposal may be a global prejudging of the problem inasmuch as -- and here is where the objections made earlier lose their validity -- it stresses the fact that the examination can begin with some aspects of the problem and then go on from there to the problem itself.
I do believe in respect of the French amendment -- and this might be taken into account by the Indian delegation with respect to the preparation of the revised text, and in fact this may have been considered by them -- the following is the feeling of my delegation. We feel that we might delete from the French amendment the phrase "in the opinion of the Powers directly concerned", because if you are setting up a commission of eighty-one members it is obvious that due and equal account must be given to the opinion of all the members of that commission since this is the basic reason for which the larger commission is to be set up. We might therefore sidetrack some of the objections which have been made by deleting that phrase from the French amendment, which incidentally is contained in paragraph 2 (b) thereof.

I now go on to the amendment submitted this afternoon by the United States and the United Kingdom and also the amendment suggested by the Soviet Union with regard to the rules of procedure which should govern the work and the debates of the commission. I believe the fears expressed by the delegation of the United States and the delegation of the United Kingdom on one hand and the fears expressed by the delegation of the Soviet Union on the other hand are unjustified because these are subjects which are provided for in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly in such a way as to leave no shadow of doubt whatsoever. May I interject here that we might wish all the problems which give rise to differences between the western and eastern Powers could be reduced to a question such as that of rules of procedure. Were this so the world would enjoy far more pleasant prospects for the future; after all a few moments ago we did hear the representative of the Soviet Union use the word "compromise". This was a very pleasant sound in our ears and I believe that with goodwill we can arrive at a formula which will be flexible, will be acceptable to all and will, if implemented in accordance with the Mexican draft resolution, allow the problems of disarmament to be considered systematically, carefully and calmly, as is required in the consideration of any of these complex problems which take so long to discuss and to solve.

To return to what I was saying earlier, it is my belief that these amendments embody unjustified fears and I would like to read to the Committee rule 162 which was invoked by the delegation of the United States. This rule reads in part as follows:
"The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions ..."

Thus far this is all in the rules of procedure and this rule virtually reproduces the provisions of the Charter. Rule 162 goes on to say:

"... The rules relating to the procedure of committees of the General Assembly, as well as rules 45 and 62, shall apply to the procedure of any subsidiary organ, unless the General Assembly or the subsidiary organ decides otherwise."

Rule 162 gives the General Assembly full powers, which powers are also given to the subsidiary organ to be set up, to decide on the rules of procedure. This is perfectly clear and although these amendments may try to avoid certain difficulties if the General Assembly is to set up a disarmament commission, and since we know that this body is going to be a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, rule 162 would automatically apply.

I would like to press home this point. The amendment to paragraph 1 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia, which amendment was submitted by the delegation of France, is to a certain extent unnecessary for a number of reasons. Firstly, my delegation considers that these are details which can be decided upon by the commission itself and in view of the wise proposal of the representative of Mexico, they are details which could be subject for conversation and discussion. We have to avoid here a situation where any of the great Powers represented might take an a priori stand which could not be changed later.

I beg the representatives of France and India to take into account various other rules of procedures which refer to this point and which might help to avoid this difficulty. May I for example invoke rule 102 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly which would be applicable to the committee and which reads as follows:

"Each member may be represented by one person on each Main Committee and on any other committee that may be constituted upon which all Members have the right to be represented. It may also assign to these committees advisers, technical advisers, experts or persons of similar status."
Surely therefore there is no obstacle or restriction placed upon the nomination of advisers, technical advisers, experts or persons of similar status.

Furthermore, rule 104 is extremely clear on this point and it reads:

"Each committee may set up sub-committees, which shall elect their own officers."

These therefore are details; they are the minutiae which could well be postponed until the commission meets because on that commission will be represented all countries represented here. It could well decide, therefore, on this sort of question in its meetings.

May I very humbly repeat that the fears voiced are not justified because the rules of procedure of the General Assembly have made wide provisions for any of these difficulties. Finally, may I refer to remarks made by the representative of the USSR when he referred to the report mentioned in the last paragraph of the joint draft resolution. According to what the representative of the Soviet Union said, we ought to say in the draft resolution that the disarmament commission should submit to the Security Council and to the General Assembly constructive proposals, recommendations or reports on disarmament.

In point of fact, the way the Charter provides for this question of disarmament and regulation of armaments, is to give powers and functions both to the Security Council and to the General Assembly. Article 26 of the Charter which has already been cited here by our teacher, Professor Belaunde, sets forth that the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, shall be responsible for formulating plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.
Article 11 of the Charter, which refers to the General Assembly, makes mention of the fact that:

"1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both."

Therefore, even among the powers and functions of the General Assembly on the question of disarmament and the regulation of armaments, specific provision is made for the role to be played by the Security Council.

Thus what the representative of the Soviet Union said -- if he is speaking because of fears regarding this point -- is provided for in the United Nations Charter. This is a point which could easily be taken account of in the revised draft, and I hope it would be satisfactory to all the States represented here.

In conclusion, what I wish to stress is that both the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of procedure of the General Assembly have adequately anticipated the problems that were mentioned here by the representatives who spoke before me. However, fundamentally speaking, details should be left to be thrashed out later. I believe that a draft resolution should be adopted here that would set forth the general ideas voiced in the Committee in a full and flexible manner and that then, according to the proposal presented by Mexico, meetings could be held presided over by our Chairman, with the presence of the Secretary-General and the participation of the countries fundamentally and basically concerned with these matters, so that directives could be given the Disarmament Commission, which would in the last instance have the final word to say because, I repeat, it will be composed of the representatives who are present here meeting in this room; they themselves will decide these problems. Thus there is no room for the doubts or fears which were expressed by some delegations. I appeal to the delegations concerned to try to find a formula acceptable to all.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of the United States on a point of order.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): As a matter of orderly procedure, I thought I should respond to what the representative of the Soviet Union has said about amendments. Let me say that the United States, in proposing the amendment which is here under our name and that of the United Kingdom, always implied, as I believe I made clear in my original statement, that the original Commission would have to elaborate its own rules of procedure in accordance with rule 162.

Our amendment had as its purpose to make clear that the old rule, applicable to the old twelve-member Disarmament Commission, would no longer apply to the new Commission. So we would be willing to change our amendment in order to meet the views of the Soviet Union, and suggest modifying his draft in this way. I will read it out, the new paragraph 4 to be added to the second revision of the draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia, contained in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.2. This is the new paragraph 4:

"Decides that the first meeting of the Disarmament Commission shall be convened by the Secretary-General after consultation with the States Members and that the Commission, having begun its activities under rule 162 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and taking that rule into account, shall adopt its own rules of procedure."

If that is agreeable, we would also be willing to accept the words "to the Security Council" in paragraph 3, which the Soviet representative desired to have inserted. We assume that paragraph 1 reads as follows:

"Decides that the Disarmament Commission shall, for 1959 and on an ad hoc basis, be composed of all the Members of the United Nations;"

We understand that that language embodies the amendment proposed by the representative of El Salvador, and we are glad to accept it as it stands in the second revision of the Indian and Yugoslav draft resolution, although we would be opposed to taking out the words "for 1959 and on an ad hoc basis".

That is our position on the proposed amendments.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.
Mr. ZOHRIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): It seems to me that we are reaching the happy end of our deliberations. What Mr. Lodge has now proposed, while it does not altogether satisfy us, is nevertheless acceptable. In the circumstances, I think there is no need for us to submit any additional amendments, and if all the delegations will likewise agree, then the second revision of the draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia, with a new paragraph 4, in the wording proposed by Mr. Lodge, could be accepted. I think that that will be the first time in this Committee that we have gained complete unanimity on this question.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of India on a point of order.

Mr. HALL (India): On behalf of the delegation of Yugoslavia and my own delegation, we accept this amendment as read out to the Committee by Mr. Lodge to be incorporated as paragraph 4 of our draft resolution. We trust now that the draft resolution will be unanimously acceptable.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): It is extremely pleasant to see that we are coming to a vote that may well turn out to be unanimous. But I must say that one of the French amendments still stands. It has not been incorporated in the second revised version of the Indian and Yugoslav draft resolution. It is contained in document A/C.1/L.212. Paragraph 1 of that document reads as follows:

"Add the following phrase at the end of operative paragraph 1: 'that it will (the Disarmament Commission) set up a small working committee and that groups of experts may be convened whenever that seems advisable.'"

The rest of the French amendments have no reason to be discussed and voted on because the entire paragraph to which the amendment refers was deleted from the original draft. But this French amendment still stands. I do not know what the Committee feels we should do with this amendment.
Mr. GEORGES-PIGOUT (France): In presenting the French amendments, Mr. Jules Hoch spoke in the following terms: "I am convinced that Mr. Lall will agree to add the words 'that it will set up a working committee' and I think that no one can oppose this since surely everyone will agree with me that it is impossible to do effective work in preparing a treaty in a body of eighty-one."

I regret to note that this appeal was not heeded by the sponsors of the draft resolution. This refusal to make these necessary clarifications is not a good omen for the future. The representatives of Peru and India have told us that nothing excludes the possibility of setting up working committees or technical groups once the Commission has met. We could have thought so before the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union a while ago when he said that if such a committee were set up the Soviet Union would not participate in the Commission's work. We are therefore confronted with an ultimatum from the Soviet Union, which gives reason to fear that once the Commission has met it will be virtually impossible to set up working committees or groups, unless, of course, the Soviet delegation should change its mind. We hope that the members of the Commission will have an opportunity to set up working committees and groups of experts as may be required.

As regards the amendments to paragraph 2, with the dropping of that paragraph our amendments to it are necessarily dropped also. But again the fact that there would be no agreement on this paragraph and on the amendments is no good augury for the future of the Commission. In fact, I may state that it causes us considerable misgivings. We have taken note of the assurances of the sponsors of the draft resolution and of the representative of Peru, and will therefore not press our amendments to the vote. The position of the French delegation was to make an appeal to the sponsors to accept these amendments. There was no question at the time of pressing for a vote.

In these circumstances, however, the French delegation will find itself unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution because, in our opinion, it is illusory. Just as the stopping of nuclear tests is not disarmament, the setting up of another Plenary Commission of the General Assembly will not be a meeting of the Disarmament Commission, no matter what name is given it. To try to convince public opinion that it is so is tantamount to trying to delude public opinion.
Mr. JORDAN (Union of South Africa): The South African delegation will vote in favour of the India-Yugoslav draft resolution as it has now been amended, but we shall do so with some considerable reluctance. There are quite a few of us still sitting round this table who remember the experiences we have had with the old Interim Committee, also called at that time the Little Assembly. It also was composed of all the then Members of the United Nations. It also set up working groups and bodies, and it did not function. As we know, the Interim Committee after about three of four years just faded away.

I find it possible to vote in favour of this draft resolution because the Commission is set up on an ad hoc basis for one year. Therefore, since there is no alternative before us, we shall go along with the idea of giving it a try for the one year. On this point, of course, I disagree with the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland, who wish the unwieldy body of eighty-one set up on a permanent basis.

I do not have to address myself to any of the other amendments. I only wish to say that I am glad that paragraph 2 of the India-Yugoslav draft resolution was dropped, because that provision simply duplicated a provision that was already contained in paragraph 1, section C, of the Seventeen-Power resolution.

Finally, I am very glad to see that the three nuclear Powers have now agreed on a common amendment, which the Indian and Yugoslav delegations have accepted. This, I think, is a good omen for the future.

Hn. de LEQUERICA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): I apologize for delaying the agreement which is about to be arrived at, but I wish to speak very briefly and say that the Spanish delegation will vote in favour of the India-Yugoslav draft resolution. I wish to state that even without the amendments, we would have voted in favour of it because we believe that it constitutes a very good step forward in our debates. It is sufficient to read in its preamble the paragraph: "Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for seeking a solution of the disarmament problem." We have therefore returned to the disarmament problem. We have had a rather stubborn dispute here between those who wished to separate the question of atomic explosions from the question of disarmament and those who wished to include the question of atomic tests in the question of disarmament. I therefore believe that this paragraph represents
a considerable victory of common sense, goodwill and understanding of the subject. I am very happy to see that the Soviet delegation has also accepted this general idea. The Soviet Union previously had wanted to separate the problem of atomic explosions from the problem of disarmament. We are now proceeding towards the type of disarmament which I trust will be effective and balanced disarmament, as the French amendment calls it. The world will therefore be able to awaken from the nightmares of substituting for techniques and policies and understanding a pseudo-humanitarian and tempting idea of stopping tests, an idea which carries within it immense dangers to humanity. The joint principle is thus safeguarded in this text, and I believe we ought to congratulate ourselves.

The representative of the United Kingdom has said that this was the Khrushchev doctrine of security over and above all, and it is that doctrine that we support.

I do not wish to delay the vote, but I shall say that the Commission with a representation of all the Members does not seem to us to be a bad idea. There are three decisive nations in the matter, but why should not the rest of us be allowed to participate on this all important question? We opposed the proposal of Ireland to prohibit the distribution of nuclear armaments to the smaller countries because we felt that it was unfair to do so. Let all of us shoulder our responsibilities. Let us go to the Commission. Let us accept the United States amendment. Let us believe that the Members of the Commission will have positive methods of advancing their work. Furthermore, let us believe that after this lengthy debate we shall be in agreement and that we shall vote on the problem of disarmament. We shall vote in favour of the India-Yugoslav revised draft resolution.
Mr. **LOUTFI** (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I should like to raise a point of order. I should like the Committee to avail itself of the agreement that has emerged here in order to proceed to the vote.

**The CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from Spanish): Fortunately, since no other representative has asked for the floor, we can accede to the justifiable request of the representative of the United Arab Republic and proceed to a vote on the joint draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.2.

Mr. **NUÑEZ-PORTRUINDO** (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I trust you will remember what I asked you to do.

**The CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from Spanish): I shall bear in mind the request of the representative of Cuba.

The situation is as follows. The only remaining French amendment has now been withdrawn by the representative of France. The amendment submitted by El Salvador and one of the amendments submitted by the Soviet Union have been accepted and have been incorporated in the new revision of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution.

With regard to the amendment submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, this was later further amended by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet amendment was accepted by the initial co-sponsors. The new wording was acceptable to the Soviet Union and was in turn incorporated in the original text by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution. Therefore I need merely remind you that the document we are going to vote upon is A/C.1/L.210/Rev.2, which was distributed this afternoon. This contains three operative paragraphs. However, to these must be added a paragraph 4, which is the addition proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States as amended by the Soviet Union. This paragraph reads as follows:

"4. Decides that the first meeting of the Disarmament Commission shall be convened by the Secretary-General after consultation with the members and that the Commission, having begun its activities under rule 162 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and taking that rule into account, shall adopt its own rules of procedure."
I take it that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution and the sponsors of the amendment agree with this wording. I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote. The representative of Cuba has requested that a separate vote be taken on paragraph 1 of the operative part, which reads as follows:

"1. Decides that the Disarmament Commission shall, for 1959 and on an ad hoc basis, be composed of all the Members of the United Nations;"

Paragraph 1 was adopted by 78 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution as a whole (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.2) as amended.

The draft resolution was adopted by 78 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If there are no objections, we shall now proceed to the last draft resolution before us, which is that submitted by the delegation of Mexico in document A/C.1/L.208.

Mr. de la COLINA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to make a brief clarification of the revised text which my delegation has just handed to the Secretariat and to which I referred in my statement on Friday evening. In view of the fact that a favourable vote has been cast on the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution, it is necessary that the Mexican draft resolution be consequentially amended in its formal aspects, although the basic contents of the Mexican draft are in no way changed. I should like to read out the changes that we have introduced into our draft.

The first paragraph of the preamble would read:

"The First Committee,

"Noting the agreement arrived at regarding the composition of the Disarmament Commission, which shall be composed of representatives of all Members of the United Nations".

The second paragraph of the preamble would read:

"Convinced that, for the efficient functioning of the Commission, the full co-operation of the great Powers is indispensable".
We have now added a third preambular paragraph reading as follows:

"Desirous of facilitating the initial work of the Disarmament Commission".

In paragraph 1 of the operative part, the last two lines would be changed to read:

"... purpose of considering the procedures best indicated for the resumption of negotiations on disarmament within the framework of the Disarmament Commission".

The last paragraph would be unchanged.

The entire draft resolution would now read as follows:

"The First Committee,

"Noting the agreement arrived at regarding the composition of the Disarmament Commission, which shall be composed of representatives of all Members of the United Nations,

"Convinced that, for the efficient functioning of the Commission, the full co-operation of the great Powers is indispensable,

"Desirous of facilitating the initial work of the Disarmament Commission,

"1. Invites the representatives of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, upon the conclusion of the consideration of items 64, 70 and 72 allocated to the First Committee, to meet informally under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the First Committee and with the assistance of the Secretary-General, for the purpose of considering the procedures best indicated for the resumption of negotiations on disarmament within the framework of the Disarmament Commission;

"2. Requests the Chairman of the First Committee to report to the Committee in due course on the results of the informal conversations referred to in the preceding paragraph."
May I repeat what I said earlier: the Mexican idea is a purely procedural one. It does not prejudge any substantive solutions. It sets no deadlines. It lays down no methods of work. With the impartial help that you will give it, and the efficient assistance that the Secretary-General will give it, it leaves to the parties to find the ways that will permit a resumption of conversations that have been suspended for over a year.

Mr. Noble (United Kingdom): I will not keep the Committee for more than a moment, but I should like to explain, for one moment, my vote on the India and Yugoslav resolution.

I voted in favour of the draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia, as amended, because of my desire to contribute to the near unanimity which we have been able to obtain on this question of machinery, and also to enable the United Nations to carry out its responsibilities in connexion with the problem of disarmament. As I said in my earlier intervention today, we believe that the detailed and practical work of disarmament requires a much smaller and more intimate forum than a body composed of eighty-one members. But as I also said, we are prepared to give this new body a trial but on a strictly ad hoc basis. We do not read the perambular paragraph,

"Expressing its determination that all Members of the United Nations should be in a position to contribute to a solution of this problem on a continuing basis," (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.2)
as implying any commitment to continue these ad hoc arrangements after 1959.

Mr. Zorin (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to say a few words about the Mexican draft resolution which has just been read out in somewhat modified form.

I have already had occasion to explain to the representative of Mexico, and I think it is only proper that I should tell the Committee, that in our opinion the adoption of a draft resolution of this nature would not be justifiable in the present circumstances. The fact is that we have all unanimously adopted a
decision on the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament Commission of eighty-one Members. The resolution, as adopted, indicates that the Commission is to meet at the request of the Secretary-General, and set its own rules of procedure and its own programme of work.

This being so, the establishment of any additional machinery designed to provide additional impetus for the Disarmament Commission's work would, in our opinion, be superfluous and altogether unjustified, all the more so as the composition of this additional machinery would involve the four great Powers plus the Chairman of our Committee and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The representative of Mexico said that his proposal set no time-limit for the work or methods of work. But the Mexican draft resolution does say that the Chairman of the First Committee is to report to the Committee in due course on the results of the informal conversations of what I might call this ad hoc Committee. Consequently, the time-limit for the work is implicit in the text. I suppose it cannot be later than the end of the work of the First Committee.

So what is the result? We have set up an eighty-one-member Disarmament Commission, and now we would be setting up some sort of directorate, composed of the four great Powers plus the Chairman of the Committee, plus the Secretary-General. And they would be expected to work out suitable procedures for the preparation of the work of the Disarmament Commission. It would seem to me that this would be out of keeping with the character and tasks of the Commission which we have just elected to set up.

The other Members of the Commission will scarcely be happy at the prospect that behind their backs a smaller Committee consisting of representatives of the great Powers, mainly, will be setting itself up as a steering body for the work of the Commission itself. I think this would be quite improper. Moreover, the experience of the work of Committees and sub-committees of this kind, as I have already suggested before, has shown that their establishment was not justifiable. So far from helping the work of the Commission, this, in our opinion, would only hamper it. By anticipation, before the Commission even met, this group would predetermine how the Commission would work and what it would do, and at the same time the Chairman of this Committee would have to inform the Committee.
If he informs the Committee and reports to it, presumably there will be debates on his report in the Committee. So the result would be what? Instead of the Commission itself examining its future and deciding upon its future work, we would be doing so in the First Committee. What is the sense of that? I find it really difficult to understand what useful purpose would be served.

It is indicated that there is an attempt to predetermine the methods and character of the work of the Commission before the Commission starts on its deliberations through some sort of agreement or compact by a small fraction of the Committee's membership. To this I cannot agree. I must say that the Soviet delegation for its part will not be able to participate in the proceedings of such a Committee. The Soviet delegation will regard this as an attempt to supplant the Commission by some sort of a narrow Committee which would seek to predetermine the nature and contents of the work of the Commission itself.
In addition, I must say that the Soviet delegation does not object to informal negotiations relating to the work of the Commission and to disarmament problems at large with any membership, not excluding the membership suggested here. However, a decision by this Committee on such a matter would automatically set up a formal group with a specific task assigned to it and would thus compel all participants in such a group to engage in deliberations and report on them formally to the Committee.

In Russian, there is a proverb which says, "You cannot force anybody to fall in love with somebody else." To get together by constraint in a forced match is not the same thing as getting together at one's own will. I do not say that we are not willing to get together with the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France or other representatives informally for suitable exchanges of views on questions relating to disarmament work. We do not refuse to do this, we have not refused to do this, and we do not propose to refuse to do this. But as soon as an attempt is made to set up a formal committee and to have certain principles guide the work of such a committee and to say that only four great Powers shall participate in it -- this we think is incorrect and we will not be in a position to participate in the work of such a committee.

I am rather sorry that we cannot support the Mexican initiative on this matter. I think the Committee should take into account the real situation in which we find ourselves now. One cannot forcibly compel people to meet who so far have no grounds for so meeting.

We will therefore vote against this proposal if the representative of Mexico deems it appropriate to press his proposal to a vote and, what is more, we will not be in a position to take part in the proceedings of such a committee.

Mr. ABDOM (Iran) (interpretation from French): I fully understand the reasons that impelled the representative of Mexico to submit his draft resolution, but I should like to make some comments.
I could not quite follow the amended draft resolution which the representative of Mexico read out. That being the case, it is not possible for me to vote on an amended draft resolution without being able to read the amendments carefully.

Secondly, if my memory serves me, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have also not given as yet their views on this draft resolution, and it is these two representatives who, with the representative of the Soviet Union, are the most interested parties. The representative of the Soviet Union has just told us that he will be unable to participate in a formal meeting that may take place pursuant to the adoption of such a draft resolution. He went even further -- he officially stated that he would vote against this draft resolution. This being the case, I wonder whether the representative of Mexico could not see his way clear to ponder the practical results of the adoption of such a draft resolution, if adoption were possible.

I highly respect the motives involved in the submission of the draft resolution, but I think that perhaps the representative of Mexico might consider not pressing this draft resolution to a vote. However, if it is to be put to a vote tonight, I believe that my delegation, among others, will be unable to vote in favour of it because we do not really know the changes that have been wrought in the text by the representative of Mexico.

Mr. FAZHWAK (Afghanistan): With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to explain the vote of my delegation on the Mexican draft resolution. The reason for this explanation is that we have stated in the general debate that we would vote for that draft resolution. Now, we find ourselves in a different position as a result of the adoption of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution and also of the statement made by the representative of the USSR.

We think that at this stage and in the light of the clear statement by the representative of the USSR that he will not participate in these informal negotiations the good intentions that the representative of Mexico had in mind would not serve the purpose he had in view. Therefore, my delegation will abstain on the draft resolution and will not be able to vote for it, as we had suggested before.
Mr. Aiken (Ireland): I should like to state to the representative of Mexico that his purpose in putting forward this draft resolution has been served. The representative of the Soviet Union, while rejecting a formal committee, has stated here that his delegation would be prepared to have informal conversations of the kind which the Mexican draft resolution demands. I am glad to note that the tentative offer of conversations has not been rejected either by the United States or by the United Kingdom or by France, which are mentioned. So I think that the representative of Mexico would be well-advised, in the interest of future co-operation of the great Powers, without which this Assembly or the world cannot progress, to withdraw the draft resolution, knowing that the purpose that he had in mind in putting it forward has been served.

Mr. Illueca (Panama) (interpretation from Spanish): According to what the representative of Ireland has said, it would appear that there seems to be an interpretation that the representative of the Soviet Union said that he was ready to enter conversations of an informal nature with the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. I think it would be highly illuminating for the Committee if the delegation of the Soviet Union ratified that statement to show that we have correctly understood him. If that is the case, then the purposes sought by the Mexican draft resolution have been achieved. This is basic.

With all due respect to Mr. Zorin, may I say that it is difficult for us to understand, if a draft resolution of this nature is adopted by the Committee, that the Soviet Union would be the supreme arbiter of the United Nations destiny, stating that it would not participate in this or that or the other moves decided upon by a committee. May I say that this is extremely grave, and we will appreciate it if the representative of the Soviet Union clarifies his position. I believe that if the United Nations exists it is because States believe in certain juridical norms of an international import that are efficient and can govern relations between nations. Therefore, I would very much appreciate that position being clarified for us. Once this has been done, then I will have to consider certain other aspects of the problem, and I would appreciate it if you, Mr. Chairman, could call upon me at that time.
Mr. de la COLINA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): If I may be allowed to invoke rule 116, I should like to exercise the right of reply not really to reply but rather to clarify matters.

It was with sorrow in my heart that I heard the words of the representative of the Soviet Union, confirming what he had kindly told me earlier, turning down the invitation contained in the draft resolution of my delegation. For the time being, he closes the door to possible negotiations between the great Powers that might overcome the impasse that has lasted for over a year. The only reason for which the Mexican draft resolution was submitted was to bring together the representatives of those States who have to bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security because of their tremendous military and economic power. At the same time, we wanted to reaffirm the true responsibility of the fully representative organ of the United Nations, the General Assembly, so that in the new Disarmament Commission, the negotiating parties could meet, and it is basically only the great Powers that are qualified to arrange practical and effective agreements on disarmament. It is only they who can truly guarantee the implementation of certain agreements.
This draft resolution does not, as I said earlier, lay down conditions or set lines, nor does it set forth any measures. The General Assembly would exhort the great Powers to meet merely to consider how they can best resume their negotiations. This is a desire shared by the entire world. Approval of this in the First Committee would give body to this desire of the world.

There was one point mentioned, however, by the representative of Iran. He said that as yet the amended or revised draft resolution of Mexico had not been distributed, and, that being the case, he would not be in a position, with adequate and full knowledge of the facts, to be able to vote on the draft resolution; and this, he said, might also be the case with other delegations.

I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, whether it might not be possible either to postpone the vote until tomorrow morning, or else to give us a recess of a half-hour or an hour during which time the delegates could take full cognizance of the import of our proposal. In either case I would appreciate it immensely, sir, because I think that it might help in the consideration of the draft resolution.

Mr. ABDollah (Iran)(interpretation from French): I should like to move adjournment under rule 119 of the rules of procedure. I think that will be in the interest of the Committee, and all the Members, so that the revised text of the Mexican draft resolution can be distributed before we are asked to pronounce ourselves on that draft resolution. I think that in view of the late hour it might be best to adjourn this meeting and have texts distributed between now and tomorrow, so that we will have a chance to ponder the matter and pronounce ourselves on the draft resolution in a knowledgeable way.

Since I am speaking, I should like again to appeal to the representative of Mexico to reconsider, to ponder whether in the present circumstances and conditions it might not be the better part of wisdom not to press his draft resolution, even in its revised form.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of Iran has made a procedural motion to adjourn the meeting. Pursuant to rule 119 which he invoked I shall put this motion to the vote immediately.
The motion for adjournment was adopted by 72 votes to none, with 6 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.