Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament [64] (continued)

2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests [70] (continued)

3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries [72] (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.970. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): In connexion with the consideration of items 64, 70 and 72, there were submitted to the First Committee a number of draft resolutions, out of which those concerning the immediate and unconditional cessation of nuclear test explosions concentrated upon themselves the greatest attention. In our debate on the question of disarmament, which was wound up a few days ago, it was equally confirmed that the cessation of test explosions of nuclear weapons is the most urgent partial problem of disarmament which calls for immediate and final solution.

As our debate has clearly shown, the settlement, without delay, of the universal and lasting cessation of nuclear tests has been gaining ever broader and stronger support of Members of the United Nations. This fact is clear evidence of how powerful and irrevocable even today is the call of nations for an immediate realization of this measure. Very appropriately, this situation was characterized by the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, when he declared in his statement on 9 October, and I quote:
"The overwhelming opinion in any country, irrespective of the views of the representatives who are here, is demonstrably, overwhelmingly and urgently in favour of the abandonment of these dangerous tests which are so inimical to the progress of mankind and in the face of which no disarmament is possible." (A/C.1/Rev.244, pages 18, 19-20)

This year's developments on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, as already pointed out by the Czechoslovak delegation in the general debate, means that today no manoeuvring and excuses can convince anyone of the fact that these measures cannot be effected as a separate step, immediately, unconditionally and with a final validity. On the contrary, it is absolutely clear today that the experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs can be ended throughout the world once and for all. It is not only the delegations of the socialist States which have stood for such a solution of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, but also a number of other delegations, particularly of Asian and African countries.

The urgency of the cessation of nuclear explosions was emphasized not only by representatives of countries pursuing a policy of neutrality, but even by representatives of some countries members of Western military blocs. It is to this end, that is, to an immediate cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons, that the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203/Rev.1) submitted by the delegation of the USSR is directed, and according to which the General Assembly should call upon States carrying out atomic and hydrogen weapons tests immediately to stop such tests and recommend to States possessing nuclear weapons to enter into negotiations with a view to concluding an appropriate agreement.

As the Chairman of the USSR delegation again expressly stressed in the Political Committee, such an agreement would also include appropriate control measures according to the recommendation of the Geneva Conference of Experts of eight countries. Agreement on an immediate and permanent cessation of nuclear weapons tests would have far-reaching positive consequences. In the first place, it would prevent further development and perfecting of the production of ever more destructive types of nuclear weapons and would render more difficult any expansion of the atomic armament race to additional States so far not manufacturing atomic weapons.
The permanent cessation of nuclear explosions would put an end to a further increase in levels of radioactive radiation in the atmosphere and would make it possible to devote the means used for nuclear weapons tests to that of peaceful purposes. The reaching of an agreement on this question could constitute the first step on the way towards the solution of further issues, especially as regards the question of a complete ban on atomic weapons. It would contribute to the strengthening of confidence among States and to a general recovery of the international situation.

The Czechoslovak delegation therefore fully supports the draft resolution (A/C.1/Rev.1) submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union and wishes to express its conviction that this draft resolution will find support among all the delegations which are taking a real interest in the complete and permanent stopping of nuclear explosions. The adoption of this draft resolution by the thirteenth session of the General Assembly would constitute a concrete and constructive contribution to the long overdue solution of one of the most pressing and vital problems of our time.

Against the clear-cut and comprehensive draft resolution of the delegation of the Soviet Union, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have submitted draft resolutions of their own, evidencing the fact that they are still seeking ways of evading a real cessation of nuclear tests. The United States and the United Kingdom have proposed a temporary "suspension of tests" for one year and a further prolongation of this "suspension" made contingent upon various conditions, to serve only as a possibility for resuming tests whenever it is convenient for them.
The suspension and not cessation of tests would mean a measure, always temporary and provisional, which would not justify the hopes maintained by the peoples of all countries with regard to a permanent cessation of nuclear weapons tests, as rightly expressed here by the representative of Ghana, Mr. Ako-Adei, in his statement on 17 October:

"... the mere suspension of nuclear tests is not enough to allay the growing apprehension of millions of people throughout the world who are appealing for the discontinuance of these nuclear tests". (A/C.1/PV.952, page 7)

There is a big movement for the immediate and permanent cessation of test explosions that is growing in all countries, including the United States itself, disregarding the position that the delegation of the United States takes here. Today, for example, there was a message published in the daily Press addressed to the participants of the Geneva negotiations and signed by prominent personalities from a number of countries including the United States. In this declaration there is a call for the permanent ending of nuclear weapons tests -- and I would repeat "permanent ending". A mere suspension and not a permanent cessation of tests would mean first and foremost that the jeopardy of a resumption of nuclear explosions, with all its dangerous and harmful consequences, would always continue to exist. Suspension of tests for one year thus could not contribute either to a reduction of the atomic arms races because the possibility of the resumption of tests by one party would force the other party to do all in its power to be in a position to face such an eventuality.

The only acceptable and effective solution of the question of atomic and hydrogen weapons test explosions, therefore, is not their suspension but their cessation once and for all.

The position of the United States and United Kingdom with regard to the question of nuclear tests, as well as with regard to the complex of problems of disarmament in general, is fully reflected in the draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation and sixteen other States (A/C.1/L.205).

As in the preamble, so in the operative part, the draft resolution speaks explicitly of a "suspension" of nuclear weapons tests. This mere "suspension" of nuclear explosions and not their permanent cessation should also be the centre of attention of the Geneva talks. Repeated statements in our Committee by
the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom give not the least reason to doubt that the ambiguous formulations of the seventeen-Power draft resolution conceal the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom for a temporary suspension of tests for one year, with the possibility of a prolongation of this suspension for successive periods of one year, provided, according to the United States statement, "that the agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively and that satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantive arms control measures." Consequently, it is not disarmament but armament.

Making the cessation of nuclear tests contingent on a solution of other broader aspects of disarmament is only an expression of the attempt to prevent the realization of this significant partial measure in the field of disarmament and to replace the disarmament issue by a long-discredited concept of "arms control". In the spirit of its policy of setting up the armaments race, the United States practically wants to put the cart before the horse. Instead of concrete and effective measures towards the reduction of armaments, it would like to discuss how to control arms, not the lack of arms.

The authors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution openly admitted such intentions in the last paragraph of the preamble:

"Recognizing that these developments are encouraging steps in the direction of progressive openness of information concerning technologies and armaments" (A/C.1/L.205).

Such a procedure is a profound contradiction of the basic principles which were long ago approved for the solution of the problem of disarmament by the General Assembly by unanimously adopted resolutions, in 1946 and 1954.

The Czechoslovak delegation, moreover, cannot agree with further provisions of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, especially in so far as they are directed to the aim of replacing the efforts towards effecting concrete disarmament measures by negotiations which are conducive to such concrete ends.

In the spirit of the United States concept, which, unfortunately, has found support even in the memorandum of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/3956), the draft resolution submitted by the United States and sixteen other countries lays emphasis in section C on the so-called "technical approach"
to problems. In the general debate in the First Committee, the Czechoslovak delegation has stressed that technical conversations can have a meaning only if their purpose is to pave the way to concrete measures for disarmament and if there is some evidence of goodwill to carry out such measures in policy. Technical talks, therefore, cannot be placed first, and even less may they be a replacement of necessary political negotiations aimed at achieving decisions for adopting concrete measures.

The very nature of the whole complex of disarmament problems denies a mere technical approach to their consideration. This was very aptly expressed by the representative of Ceylon, Mr. Subasinghe, in his statement on 16 October, when he said that the problem of disarmament involved both technical and political aspects and he stated further:

"In the opinion of my delegation, it would be unwise to concentrate on the technical aspect of disarmament while postponing the political aspects to a later stage." (A/C.1/PV.950, page 31)

It must be clear to anyone where would be the end of mistaking political negotiations for technical talks. Experience from the negotiations on disarmament testify to the fact that the present propaganda of preference for a non-political and so-called technical approach to the question of disarmament is intended only to create an impression that something is being done in the field of disarmament, while the solution of concrete questions continues to be postponed to a far-away future.
For all these reasons the draft resolution of the seventeen countries may not serve as a basis for a decision of the General Assembly which would move the negotiations on disarmament ahead and would be conducive to reaching some progress. Its adoption could only harm the deliberations on disarmament and prevent the United Nations from assisting in solving the most urgent partial questions of disarmament and in the first place, the question of a permanent cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

A positive contribution in this respect, that is, in the direction of solving the question of nuclear weapons tests, is the compromise draft resolution submitted by the delegation of India and by the delegations of thirteen other countries in document A/C.1/L.203/Rev.1/Add.2. The Czechoslovak delegation believes that this resolution, which was the first presented to this Committee will be, in conformity with rule 132, put to the vote in the first place. Having in mind also that this resolution has as a primary objective the immediate cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Czechoslovak delegation will vote in favour of this draft resolution and expresses the hope that this resolution will command unanimous support.

Great attention has been focussed on the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union on the question of the reduction of military budgets (A/C.1/L.204). This question is of immense importance as a single measure of disarmament because adoption of the proposed resolution would be a significant practical step towards halting the ever-intensifying armaments race. It would also permit the raising of the standards of living of nations and would contribute to a recovery of the development of national economy which, as a result of a constant increase of military expenditures, was seriously crippled in many countries. Adoption of the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union on the reduction of military budgets would mean that savings thus effected could be used for the development of peaceful sectors of economy, raising the level of employment and enhancing the well-being of the people. At the same time it would considerably lower the tax burden of the broad masses of the population.
At the present time, the highest military expenditures are provided for in the budgets of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Therefore, the proposed reduction of military budgets of these four Powers by 10 to 15 per cent would be of great importance. It would ease international tension, which is among other things created by the continuing arms race, and it would consolidate peace and international security. This corresponds to the ambitions of all peace-loving peoples in the world at large who expect that the United Nations will, without delay, take appropriate measures in this respect.

Of an unusual importance is the second paragraph of the operative part of the Soviet draft resolution calling upon the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France to allocate for assistance of the under-developed countries to their economic and industrial development a certain part of the funds released through the reduction of military budgets. This step would be joyously welcomed by the nations of these countries as a significant assistance in their efforts to attain in the shortest possible time a high degree of industrial and economic development on which a further rise of their living standards depends.

There is no doubt that the adoption of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.204) would be beneficial to peace-loving nations all over the world and would be conducive to the strengthening of confidence among States and the stabilization of international peace and security.

The Political Committee has also before it the draft resolution submitted jointly by the delegations of India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1) which is directed towards a resumption of activities of the Disarmament Commission. This Commission, as is well known, due to obstructions on the part of the Western Powers at the Twelfth General Assembly, did not hold a single meeting in all of last year.

The Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution proposes that the United Nations Disarmament Commission should be composed of all Members of the United Nations, requests the Commission to make every effort to reach agreement or agreements in the field of disarmament and to submit to the General Assembly, at a special session if necessary, its constructive proposals and recommendations.
The Czechoslovak delegation fully agrees with the leading idea of this resolution, that is, with the principle that all Members of the United Nations should have the opportunity to contribute to a solution of the problem of disarmament on a continuing basis. We believe that the Disarmament Commission composed of all Members of the United Nations can install favourable conditions for further negotiations and thus bring nearer the prospect of reaching generally accepted agreements in the field of disarmament.

In submitting the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution concerning the new composition of the Disarmament Commission, the representative of India, Mr. Lall, gave very clear and convincing reasons why this Commission should consist of all Members of the United Nations and why the General Assembly should not decide what ad hoc formations of groups, committees or sub-committees the future commission might establish.

The Czechoslovak delegation therefore does not understand why the delegation of France submitted amendments to the joint draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia requesting the Disarmament Commission to set up a "small working committee" and possibly also groups of experts. These French proposals remind us too much of a former Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee whose work, due to its partial composition, did not bring any positive results.

For this reason the Czechoslovak delegation will vote against the French amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.212.
Mr. JORIAAN (Union of South Africa): I have only a brief statement to make, but part of my remarks will be directed particularly to the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union.

During the general debate, the leader of our delegation had already explained the position of the South African delegation on the draft resolutions then before the Committee. I should now like to add a few comments on the other draft resolutions which have since been introduced.

The South African delegation was keenly interested in the compromise draft resolution which the representative of India read out to us this morning. I do not have the text before me, nor have we studied it. Therefore, I cannot say what our position would have been if the draft resolution had in fact been introduced. But the point that interested us was that what seems to be a fact was that the three nuclear Powers -- namely, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union -- all of them could have accepted that compromise draft resolution if it had not been for a Soviet reservation to the effect that where the draft speaks of "a cessation of nuclear tests" such a cessation would remain in effect regardless of what happened at the Geneva Conference. The compromise broke down on this point because the United Kingdom and the United States announced that they could not agree to a cessation of tests unless effective controls had been established. As closely as I have followed this debate, I have a feeling that the majority of the members of this Committee agree that effective controls are essential. My delegation supports this view.

I have listened to the comments of the representatives of Poland and the Soviet Union. If I understood him correctly, the representative of Poland said that his country wanted effective control, and undoubtedly the views of the Polish representative reflect the views of the Soviet bloc.

The burden of the comments made by Mr. Zorin himself was that they were in favour of controls, but that the United Kingdom and the United States were not interested in a permanent cessation of tests and were merely prepared to agree to a suspension of tests for one year, this -- according to him -- being the time needed to evaluate the results of previous tests in order to start a new series.
As I now understand the position of the United Kingdom and the United States, it is that they are prepared to stop tests for one year pending negotiations on an agreement to stop tests permanently. The Soviet representative seemed to have the same objective in view when he complained that the other two nuclear Powers were prepared to accept the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution which speaks of a cessation of tests, but that following the Soviet reservation they insisted on a vote on their own draft resolution which merely speaks of suspension.

If what I understand the position of both sides to be is correct, then I find it difficult to believe that the three Powers cannot agree on a form of words that adequately expresses their common objectives.

Let me say what I understand their common objectives to be. It is -- and now follows something that I think is important -- namely that the three Governments have agreed to meet in Geneva and, at the Conference there, they will aim at the establishment of machinery which will make possible agreement on a total cessation of nuclear weapons tests under an effective system of control. Let me repeat this. It is namely that the three Governments have agreed to meet in Geneva and, at the Conference there, they will aim at the establishment of machinery which will make possible agreement on a total cessation of nuclear weapons tests under an effective system of control. If this understanding on my part of the attitude of the two sides is correct, then it is to be wondered why this could not be publicly stated in so many words. If the Soviet Union cannot subscribe to what I might call this formula, then it must be abundantly clear that the Soviet Union is merely interested in the stopping of tests without effective control. In that case, I am afraid that all the speeches we have heard from the Soviet bloc must be regarded as a propaganda manoeuvre. If, on the other hand, they agree to this formula, then the door seems to be wide open for a reconsideration of the Indian-Yugoslav compromise proposal.

The United Kingdom and the United States have agreed that while the negotiations are in progress they will not undertake further testing of nuclear weapons, because this, after all, is provided for in the seventeen-Power draft resolution of which they are sponsors. The Soviet Union has not given a similar undertaking, but they should do so because it would be intolerable for the Soviet Union to continue the tests while the negotiations are going on. I think that what I have said in this regard is important, and I am sure that the Committee
will be extremely grateful for a categorical reply as to whether the formula I have read out represents the aims and intentions of the three Powers at the Geneva Conference.

May I now make a brief comment on a few of the other draft resolutions before us. As the Committee knows, my delegation will support the seventeen-Power draft resolution if it comes to a vote. Of course, this will preclude our delegation from voting in favour of any of the other draft resolutions dealing with the same subject. If the seventeen-Power draft resolution is carried, then the South African delegation will not be able to support all of the paragraphs of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolutions in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.211. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 in operative paragraph 2

"Requests the Disarmament Commission to make every effort to reach an agreement or agreements in the field of disarmament commencing with those aspects of the problem which seem to offer the best immediate possibilities;".

This paragraph is a duplication of what is already contained in paragraph 4 of section C of the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) which

"Expresses determination that the trend of the recent encouraging initiatives, including the technical approach, should continue with a view to contributing to a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament."

Operative paragraph 3 of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 seems to transmit all the documents to the Disarmament Commission. This is already provided for in paragraph 7 of section D of the seventeen-Power draft resolution. So what remains of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution is merely to set up a Disarmament Commission on an ad hoc basis and as a Committee of the General Assembly to be composed of all the Members of the United Nations. It seems to me that the remaining paragraphs might more effectively have been submitted as amendments to the seventeen-Power draft resolution.
I have the same difficulty with the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.211 where it refers to the technical aspects of measures on surprise attack, which again is a matter that is already provided for in paragraph 5 of section B of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, which

"Calls attention to the importance and urgency of achieving the widest possible measure of agreement in the forthcoming study of the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack."

The remaining paragraphs in that draft resolution again, it seems to me, might more appropriately have been included as amendments to the seventeen-Power draft resolution. Accordingly, if the seventeen-Power draft resolution is carried, my delegation will not support all of these paragraphs.

I will not deal at the present moment with the other draft resolutions before us, but I reserve the right of my delegation to comment on or explain our vote if this becomes necessary in respect of any particular draft resolution.
Mr. Osman (Sudan): With your permission, Mr. Chairman, and in the absence of a compromise resolution, I wish to make clear the position of my delegation with respect to some of the draft resolutions which are tabled before this Committee. The fact that we did not take part in the general debate is that we are satisfied that, since countries like our own have more than once put forward in a general way points of view not dissimilar to our own, we thought it superfluous on our part to take up the time of this Committee in making a lengthy statement. I sincerely hope that this will not be taken to indicate that our delegation is not interested in the problem of disarmament. The Sudan delegation firmly believes that the question of disarmament is the most important question facing the General Assembly and the world at large. We realize full well the far-reaching consequences to this generation the world over and to many generations to come if this vital question of disarmament is not resolved equitably and in a manner to guarantee world peace indefinitely and for all time.

It is this attitude which determines the stand we shall take regarding the various draft resolutions and amendments thereto. This attitude I will briefly state, as follows:

As for the thirteen-Power draft resolution sponsored by Afghanistan and others in document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1, and to which the delegation of Yugoslavia added its name, we shall vote in favour of this resolution, because there is a loud voice raised in my country and in many other countries for putting an end to atomic and hydrogen tests. And in this connexion, we wish to make it categorically clear that we are not blind to the fact that the cessation of tests is but a first step towards real disarmament, which cannot be achieved without the liquidation of stockpiles of these weapons of mass destruction and the cessation of their production — not to forget the conventional weapons as well.

Then there is the draft resolution of the Soviet Union contained in document A/C.1/L.203. At first I intended to abstain from voting on this draft resolution, not because I am in disagreement with its measures or its concepts, but because I sincerely believe that the fourteen-Power draft resolution covers the same ground and is relatively more comprehensive in its approach. Nevertheless, I shall vote for this draft resolution.
As for the draft resolution tabled by the delegation of Ireland, contained in document A/C.1/L.236, our delegation will vote in favour of that resolution because we are in agreement with the motivations and aims which are embodied in it.

We are also in favour of voting for the Mexican draft resolution found in document A/C.1/L.205.

We come now to the draft resolution in the name of India and Yugoslavia, A/C.1/L.210, in its revised form. We appreciate the difficulty inherent in any final discussion of the disarmament question in such a large body as a committee of all Members of the United Nations. But my delegation will find it difficult to oppose the principle of universality embodied in it, and, while we shall vote for it, we sincerely hope that the actual work will be handed over to smaller groups who will put their deliberations before this large body.

We shall abstain on the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden, A/C.1/L.213. We appreciate the efforts for conciliation made by these delegations, efforts which I am sure have earned for them the gratitude of all members of this Committee.

We shall also vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted jointly by India and Yugoslavia in document A/C.1/L.211, which calls for the widest possible measure of agreement on the study of the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack.

As for the seventeen-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.205, sponsored by Argentina and others, we believe that this draft resolution is an effort in the right direction for achieving real disarmament. We quite realize its shortcomings; but efforts in this respect are bound to have some shortcomings, since the authors of any draft resolution will try to meet as far as possible the viewpoints of others, and by so doing they sometimes sacrifice points or aspects which are of vital importance. But taking this resolution as a whole and considering that it contains elements which are absent from other resolutions, we shall vote for it.

There are, of course, other resolutions and amendments on which we shall make our position clear when they are put to a vote.
Mr. BRUCĂN (Romania): Under the circumstances, I will try to be as brief as possible. At the very beginning I would like to say that the conditions under which the Committee is supposed to consider the draft resolutions are rather unusual. At one moment we all were faced suddenly with the draft resolution sponsored by Austria, Japan and Sweden. Without having had even the time to study it, we were all faced with a request for priority proposed by the sponsors. Now the members of the Committee are being pushed around with the transparent aim of having the Committee finish its business tonight in a great hurry.
Commander Howe gave the signal for this speedy procedure. Now when an Englishman is in a great hurry, one should think carefully.

I submit that this Committee deserves to be considered as a thinking body and not as a push-button machine. I feel all the more entitled to say this since we are dealing with an extremely important and responsible matter.

Under the present circumstances, one might wonder whether there is any use in arguing one way or the other since it is not the argument that counts but the way in which the machinery works.

However, I should like to say a few words about the question of priority. Not long ago we all witnessed the manoeuvres which prevented the General Assembly from even debating the question of the representation of China. What was the prescription used at that time? The draft resolution submitted by India a long time ago, thus incontestably having priority, was pushed aside by an upside-down interpretation of the rules of procedure and replaced by a United States draft resolution submitted afterwards. We are now witnessing a similar attempt. One cannot overlook the fact that the most urgent aspect of disarmament, namely, the discontinuance of nuclear tests, included on the agenda as a separate item, has been actually been eliminated as such. What is going on now manifestly aims at even preventing a vote on the draft resolutions submitted on this item.

If this new attempt to succeed, then the thirteenth session of the General Assembly will be known as the session during which the General Assembly was prevented from taking a stand on the most urgent and important matters. The denial of this basic right of the General Assembly might be a hard blow to the United Nations, a blow to its prestige fraught with serious consequences.

What are the merits of the seventeen-Power draft resolution for which priority has been asked? First of all, may I say that at a time when the entire world is asking the United Nations for a first step on disarmament, for disarmament in deeds, this draft resolution is lacking in any decision, of any step on disarmament, of any clear-cut recommendation to the Member States. It does not commit anybody in any way.

Indeed, one might find in this draft resolution a lot of mere allusions and references to the forthcoming negotiations. But where is the position of the General Assembly? Where is the responsibility of the United Nations in the
field of disarmament so nicely mentioned in the first paragraph of the preamble? I would compare this draft resolution with a shop window that promises to sell you everything you want but the item you are looking for. And the very item which the whole of mankind is looking for is the cessation of nuclear tests.

Instead of this, the seventeen-Power draft resolution endorses the very questionable position taken by the United States and the United Kingdom for a one-year suspension of nuclear tests. A one-year suspension would mean that the preparations for a new and fresh series of tests will go on, the whole machinery set up for the perfecting of nuclear weapons will continue to work at full speed, distrust would continue to prevail among the atomic Powers and, what is even worse -- I mean from bad to worse -- additional Powers will get through with their nuclear tests. I feel that it is quite fair to say that the whole responsibility for having additional nuclear Powers in one or two years lies precisely with those who oppose a decision on the universal cessation of test explosions. Should the first nuclear test explosion set up by France in the Sahara Desert take place, the whole of mankind will know whom to blame for it.

Finally, I should like to say that the real issue before us is crystal clear for all the peoples of the world. It is the issue between suspension and cessation of test explosions. On that score, I beg to disagree with the representative of the Union of South Africa who just referred to the issue of control. Had control been the real issue, then the United States and the United Kingdom should have expressed their readiness to agree on a universal and permanent cessation of test explosions once an adequate control system is implemented. As a matter of fact, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom has made such a statement. In accordance with their well-known positions, even if a control system is in force, the two Western Atomic Powers will still maintain their year-to-year suspension proposal. In consequence, the real issue before us is temporary suspension or permanent cessation, and not control.
All the nations of the world, including the most outstanding personalities of our time, have manifestly expressed their demand for a universal cessation of test explosions. I do not know of any such expression of public opinion in any country favouring a one-year suspension of test explosions.

I just wish to emphasize that a draft resolution favouring a one-year suspension which would be voted by this Committee would clearly run counter to world public opinion.

I feel that this point deserves at least careful attention on the part of those who are hurrying the Committee to take a vote tonight.

I reserve the right to comment on the other draft resolutions at a later stage.

Mr. SOSO RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): As I stated on 17 October in the general debate on the three items of disarmament, on the discontinuance of nuclear tests and the reduction of military budgets of the great Powers, my delegation, from the very beginning, was in favour of this Committee's adopting a unanimous resolution that would satisfy the desires of all the peoples of the world that effective steps be taken to limit armaments and suspend nuclear tests, thus dissipating the spectre of atomic war and the dangers already inherent for humanity in the continuation of nuclear tests. This feeling took form in this Committee, and for one moment we believed that the solution sought for was already within our grasp. For two consecutive days efforts were made to come to a compromise agreement between the two different positions of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. The delegations of India and Yugoslavia warrant our special praise for their great efforts in this direction. Unfortunately, these efforts turned out to be fruitless, but the cause of the failure -- and we must say this -- is solely and exclusively due to the intransigence of the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, we must also recognize that the spirit of conciliation and the sincere desire to come to an agreement, making true concessions in their points of view, were shown by the United States and by the United Kingdom, and this has once again proved to this body and to the world itself the sincerity and good faith of those countries in trying to bring about a solution acceptable to all and one that will meet the desires of all peoples. This is a great moral victory for the United States and the United Kingdom, a victory which can never be taken from them.

With regard to the various draft resolutions that are to be voted upon, the position of my delegation is the following. We shall vote in favour of the seventeen-Power draft resolution contained in A/C.1/L.205, with the amendment submitted by Bolivia and the other Latin American countries in A/C.1/L.209. Although we feel that our desires are not wholly satisfied by this, nevertheless we believe it to be a constructive draft resolution and a step forward towards the solution of these serious problems.

My delegation will also vote in favour of the draft resolution in A/C.1/L.210 submitted by India and Yugoslavia for the same reasons which I have given regarding the seventeen-Power draft resolution.

With respect to the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution on surprise attack, in A/C.1/L.211, my delegation will abstain because we feel that this subject is already covered in the seventeen-Power draft resolution.

We shall vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution in A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and also against the USSR draft resolution, A/C.1/L.203, regarding the cessation of nuclear tests because we feel that both these documents require a definitive and unconditional cessation of tests without the necessary guarantees of control.

The Venezuelan delegation will vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution A/C.1/L.204 on the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers because we feel that this would not satisfactorily solve the problem of the reduction of armaments. The question cannot be reduced merely to a reduction of military budgets which can easily be side-stepped.

We shall vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Ireland in A/C.1/L.206 because we feel that it complements the measures to be taken to reduce the danger of atomic warfare since it recommends a study of one of the important aspects of the problem, which is the ever-increasing dissemination and distribution of nuclear weapons.
My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted jointly by Austria, Japan and Sweden, in A/C.1/L.213. We feel that this is an encouragement to those participating in the Geneva Conference, the results of which are awaited by the whole world.

Finally, we shall vote in favour of the Mexican draft resolution, in A/C.1/L.208. We consider it as favouring direct conversations between the great Powers and we know very well that, without the agreement of the great Powers, no final solution to the problem can ever be found.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to exercise the right of reply in connexion with the question asked of me by the representative of the Union of South Africa.

If I understood him correctly from the simultaneous interpretation, the gist of his question was: what were the intentions of the Soviet Union? He also asked the same question of the United States and of the United Kingdom as regards the tasks of the Geneva Conference, and he suggested that if it was the intention of the Soviet Union to attend the Geneva Conference in order to reach agreement on a complete cessation of tests with the establishment of international control; and if all three Powers agreed on that, then would it be possible to reach an understanding on the basis of a general formula along those lines?

I am speaking of the general burden of the remarks of the representative of the Union of South Africa because I would find it difficult to reproduce his formula verbatim, but I do not think that I am mistaken as to the general sense of what he had to say. I can answer that question, and I must say that the answer is wholly concrete in nature.

I have just been handed a United Press dispatch from Geneva. The United Press reports that Russia has handed to the West today a draft treaty between West and East proposing the immediate cessation of atomic tests for all time, with the establishment of a control system to verify observance of this treaty.

This is the dispatch from Geneva. The Soviet Union has taken its stand in favour of the cessation of nuclear tests for all time, with the establishment of a control system. Not only does the Soviet Union stand for that, but it has proposed a concrete treaty which the Soviet Union representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, handed today to Mr. Wadsworth, representing the United States of America.
In that same United Press dispatch it is stated that the United States made it clear that it is not now prepared to conclude an agreement of that kind. I wonder what Mr. Lodge will have to say on that score. It is, of course, up to him to reply, but I think that my reply is clear. We agree to a formula of that kind and we have, in fact, couched it in a concrete draft treaty. The United States, unfortunately, is not prepared to consider this concrete draft treaty.

I should like to take this opportunity to draw the attention of the representative of Venezuela to this point. For some reason, he apparently thought that the Soviet Union was opposed to control. This concrete draft treaty calls for the establishment of a system of controls based on the results of the previous Geneva Conference, and it constitutes a full answer to the question and misgivings of the representative of Venezuela.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of the Netherlands wishes to speak on a point of order.
Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands): When this Committee decided this afternoon to hold this night meeting, the object of that exercise, I take it, was that we should be able to finish dealing with this matter and to pass one or more resolutions on it tonight -- the day when the Geneva Conference has opened.

We have quite a number of draft resolutions before us, and we understand that the voting on those resolutions may take a considerable time, and that is the reason why I have the honour to propose that the debate on this subject should now be closed, and that we should proceed to the voting. I think that, after three weeks of debate, the Committee is now in a position to give its vote.

I would add that I know that a proposal for a closure of debate is sometimes not very popular. And, therefore, I would say at once that it is not my intention at all to deprive anybody of the right to explain his vote, but I think that the explanations of the vote could just as well in this case be given after the vote is taken as before it.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call the representative of India on a point of order.

Mr. LALL (India): We have just had a proposal that the debate should be closed and that the voting should proceed immediately. I am not going to question the merits of this proposal, but, surely, it is essential that before the debate is closed, those delegations which have sponsored draft resolutions in this debate on the resolutions should be allowed to answer the debate. We have had various questions put to us. Various criticism have been made of our draft resolutions. Are we not going to be allowed to clear up these points before the vote is taken? Obviously, it does not answer that purpose if we are told that we can explain the position after the vote. But surely, as proposers of draft resolutions, we think it is a well recognized right to explain to those who have raised questions. This is our position regarding our draft resolution. I would be grateful for a ruling on this point, and I hope that you will permit me to make a few observations, which will not extend over more than five minutes, regarding some of the points that have been raised with reference to the fourteen-Power draft resolution on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.
The **CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from Spanish): The only thing that the Chair can do is to interpret the statement of the representative of India to mean that he opposes the closure of the debate. According to Rule 118, once the closure of the debate has been moved, two speakers can speak against the motion, and, therefore, the representative of India has given reasons for his opposition to the closure of the debate and why he feels it is not appropriate to do so. Naturally, these will have to be weighed by members of the Committee when the vote on closure is taken. I would be willing to honour any other speaker who may wish to address himself against the motion of closure. Is there any other representative who wishes to speak against the motion of closure? I see a representative raises his hand on a point of order. We are discussing a point of order. We cannot have a point of order on a point of order. We are discussing one point of order now. Rule 118 says, and I quote it: "A representative may at any time move the closure of the debate on an item under discussion whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak." The representative of India has expressed his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the closure of the debate shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote. Therefore, in both circumstances, from my point of view, the representative of India does not have sufficient reason for wanting to raise a point of order above or over the one we are now discussing. Once the Committee has decided on one point of order, then we can hear the second point of order. It is for the Committee to decide whether closure is to be accepted or not. Therefore I repeat my question: Does any other representative wish to oppose the motion of closure submitted by the representative of the Netherlands?

Mr. **WINIEWSICZ** (Poland): I do oppose the motion for the closure of the debate. Neither the argument that we have debated this problem for three weeks, nor the argument that today -- in Europe it is already yesterday -- the conference in Geneva started are reasons for curtailing our discussions here on this all-important problem. We have really succeeded in keeping this debate as free from acrimony as possible. So, now, at the end of our debate, I should not like to introduce any bitter tone. We still have a few draft resolutions,
resolutions which do not concern the question of tests. I appeal to this Committee not to accept this motion for closure. Let us continue this discussion, which is of such importance that no matter of convenience of any delegation should lead us to the curtailing of any opinion which anyone wishes to express in respect to the problems before us. In particular, I support, very sincerely and very firmly, the words just uttered by the representative of India. The Indian delegation was very active in our whole work of trying to reach some kind of an agreement which might be unanimously accepted. Certainly, I for my part, my delegation for our part, would really like to hear the answers given by the representative of India and similarly by others on the points raised in this debate.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We have only one road open to us. As I said before, we can only apply the rules of procedure. A formal motion has been made before the Committee for the closure of the debate. Two speakers, the representative of India and the representative of Poland, have presented their arguments against the motion for closure. Therefore, the only step for us to take now is to vote. Is there a point of order on this same question?
Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) (interpretation from Spanish): If I have correctly understood the representative of India, he did not make a statement opposing the motion of the representative of the Netherlands. I believe that he asked a question of the Chairman, if I followed the translation correctly. That being the case, may I suggest that the representative of the Netherlands be given a chance to clarify his point -- and I think that the representative of the Netherlands has indicated that he wishes to speak -- and that the representative of India be given a chance also to give his reasons in their entirety. I think that this might ensure harmony in the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I certainly do not object to acceding to the request of the representative of Panama. I now call on the representative of the Netherlands and then I shall be happy to call on the representative of India if he wishes to speak.

Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands): I only wanted to say one word in connexion with what was said by the representative of Poland, namely that when I proposed the closure of the debate, I meant, of course, the closure of the debate on the question of test explosions, not of the entire debate on disarmament.

Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland): Point of order.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I said that the representative of India would speak next and he may do so now.

Mr. IALL (India): I must confess that at this point I do not know what I am speaking to. Am I speaking against the motion for closure, or is the Chairman permitting me to make a few remarks in answer to the debate on the fourteen-Power draft resolution on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests?
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I believe that your question is somewhat peculiar. A formal request has been made that rule 118 of the rules of procedure should be applied and that the debate be closed. One representative, the representative of Poland, asked to speak against the closure. The representative of Panama made a suggestion. He said that when the representative of India had spoken, he had perhaps not intended formally to oppose the motion of closure, but rather that the representative of India had intended making other comments, as well as addressing a question to the Chairman. Therefore, he asked me to give the representative of India an opportunity, if he desired it, to speak against the motion for closure. According to the statement of the representative of Panama, I ask the representative of India whether he wishes to speak against the motion for closure?

Mr. LALL (India): I am against the motion for closure because to agree to closure at this point takes away from the members of this Committee the well-known and well-respected right to reply to a debate, and I would be surprised indeed if the Committee would agree to take away this right. Might I remind the Chairman that earlier in this debate I also made a motion under a rule which called for a vote without any speeches. The Chairman then ruled, in his wisdom -- and we all respected it -- that there should be some comments on this matter, although the rule was unambiguous. It called for a vote immediately. As the representative of the United Arab Republic pointed out at that time, the proper course would have been to take a vote and then to have a discussion on the substantive part of my statement. However, in your wisdom, Mr. Chairman, you ruled otherwise, and, I repeat, we respected it.

I would request the Chairman and the members of this Committee to allow to the proposers of draft resolutions the ordinary well-recognized right of replying to the questions and points raised in the debate. If we are not permitted that right, how are we as members of this Committee to function here? How are we to come to a vote if the proposers of resolutions are not allowed the normal right to clear up the points and the questions which have been addressed to them?
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): With regard to the first part of the statement of the representative of India, we might refresh our memories by reading the verbatim records. We would then see what the Chairman said this morning when certain representatives were called upon to speak. When the representative of India made a speech, the first part of his statement referred to certain representatives. However, we cannot compare the statement which the representative of India made this morning with the motion just put before the Committee by the representative of the Netherlands, which was a plain and simple motion. In the statement made by the representative of the Netherlands there were no comments other than merely to state that he was putting before the Committee a motion for closure of the debate, for certain reasons. Therefore, I do not think that I need to labour this point.

However, it is not for the Chairman to decide on the question of acceding to the request or suggestion of the representative of India. The proposer of the motion is the only one who can do anything, such as to withdraw his motion. However, if he maintains his motion, I have to put it to the vote.

We are now applying one of the rules of procedure and I do not think I can go on calling upon other speakers because otherwise we are going to set up complete chaos here. I shall therefore put the motion to the vote. Two speakers have spoken against the motion for closure and now rule 118 must be applied.

Mr. ABDOH (Iran): Point of order.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We are discussing a point of order and we have not quite solved the point of order. Therefore, how can there be another point of order? We are going to vote now on the motion upon which we have not as yet voted. A roll-call vote has been requested. The Committee is going to vote on the motion of the representative of the Netherlands to close the debate.

We must take into account a specific modality that was mentioned by the representative of the Netherlands in the second statement he made. He said
that his intention was not to close the debate on the entire question, but
exclusively the debate on the draft resolutions and amendments regarding nuclear
tests. That was what the representative of the Netherlands said.

I must say that I am in a rather difficult position because we were carrying
out the debate here on all the draft resolutions and all the amendments. We
were not holding a specific debate on a certain category of documents. However,
that is the way the representative of the Netherlands wished to word his motion.
Perhaps we could have this point clarified for the Committee before the vote
takes place.

Mr. SCHUMANN (Netherlands): As I said in my first intervention, it
was not my intention to deprive anybody of the right to speak on draft resolutions
and to explain his vote. I must say that the reason which the representative of
India has given, that he wanted to reply to those who had spoken on his draft
resolution, is, I think, a reasonable one and therefore, if the Chairman will
accept it, I would be quite prepared to amend my motion in this sense: I would
ask for a closing of the debate after the representative of India has replied to
those who have spoken on his draft resolution.

Sec. DIJON (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of the
Netherlands seems to have offered some solution to the problem raised by the
representative of India. He has suggested that the vote be held only after the
representative of India has made his statement. If the representative of India
wishes to go along with this, I will call on him. But it is understood that
immediately after the representative of India has spoken, we will proceed to the
vote, because we have already heard two speakers against the proposal of the
representative of the Netherlands. Does the representative of India wish to
speak?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Point of order.

Mr. SLLIM (Tunisia): Point of order.
Mr. PAULAK (Afghanistan): Point of order.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Afghanistan on a point of order.

Mr. PAULAK (Afghanistan): In the light of the statement of the representative of the Netherlands, I would like simply to ask the representative of the Netherlands if he meant that he did not want to deprive any speaker of his right to speak? Did the representative of the Netherlands mean that he would not deprive only one speaker of his right to speak, but that all the members of the Committee would have that right? It may be that others, besides the representative of India, would care to speak on the issue. I just want the representative of the Netherlands to please answer this question.

Mr. SCHUMANN (Netherlands): I think it was perfectly clear when I said that I did not want to deprive anybody of the right to speak. I said that in the first instance everybody would be able to give an explanation of vote after the vote had taken place. The reason why I amended my proposal in favour of the suggestion of the representative of India was that it seemed fair to me that those who had proposed the draft resolutions should be given the chance to answer the objections that had been raised against their proposed draft resolutions.

Therefore, it does not apply to just any representative who wishes to speak on the draft resolutions that have been introduced. It applies only in this case to the representative of India, and I do not think that I am discriminating by suggesting it in that way.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call upon the representative of Tunisia, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): To judge from the latest statement by the representative of the Netherlands, it appears to me -- and if I have misunderstood I am open to correction -- that his motion closure of the debate applies exclusively to the question of the cessation of tests, that is to say, to what used to be called item 70. Does he mean that the closure applies also to the draft resolution A/C.1/L.205, which also covers items 64, 70 and 72 of the agenda? In the event that he is asking for closure on item 70 only, on what part of the draft resolution A/C.1/L.205 is the debate to be closed? In requesting closure of the debate, has he not prejudged the priority of sequence for the voting on the draft resolution? This is merely a request for an explanation.

Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands): Perhaps it is easier to give a negative definition than a positive one. I said that it should only apply to the question of test explosions. What I meant was that it would not apply to the other questions, namely, the reduction of budgets and the machinery for disarmament talks. Those are the subjects that have not yet been discussed today, and I do not even know that all the draft resolutions have been submitted. That is why I meant that my proposal should apply only to those draft resolutions on which it was intended to vote today.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I must stand by the point of view I expressed earlier. That is to say, in view of what the representative of the Netherlands has said, before we vote on the motion for closure, I could call on the representative of India, because undoubtedly a representative submitting a motion of closure has the right to speak on it if he wishes. The representative of the Netherlands was kind enough to leave this leeway for the representative of India. However, the Chair finds this modality, so to say, is rather difficult to follow. Unless there is a formal objection in the
Committee, I am willing to go along with the suggestion of the representative of the Netherlands that the closure apply only to those draft resolutions concerning the discontinuance of nuclear tests either partly or wholly. We cannot subdivide the voting on a draft resolution that contains provisions dealing with three items. This is juridically impossible. I think we ought to cross this bridge when we come to it and interpret this question at the time of the voting. I am willing to call on the representative of India to speak in reference to the draft resolutions if he so wishes.

I give the floor to the representative of Ceylon who wishes to speak on a point of order.

Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): The point of order is this. After having heard the representative of the Netherlands, I do not know whether there is a motion for closure or not. But, if his motion for closure still exists, then my point of order is that the representative of India is not entitled, under rule 118, to speak on the motion. He may be one of the speakers opposing the motion for closure, but I do not think he can speak for it, although I would very much like him to have the right to speak and I would like the representative of the Netherlands to withdraw his motion. However, interpreting the rule, I submit that, on a point of order, the representative of India has no right to speak, because he can only speak against the motion, if the motion still exists.

The Chairman (interpretation from Spanish): From the purely legal point of view, I agree with the representative of Ceylon, but I do not want to apply the rules of procedure in such a strict way. I think we ought to give them a wider application. Therefore, I did not see any objection to acceding to the request of the representative of the Netherlands that before the debate was closed the representative of India should be given an opportunity to reply to certain allusions that had been made to him as one of the sponsors of the draft resolutions. The truly legalistic interpretation of the rules would be that presented by the representative of Ceylon, but I am afraid
I cannot share that view. I still make the offer to the representative of India that if he wishes he may speak on the draft resolutions in general.

Mr. LALL (India): I find myself in a very embarrassing position. I am not going to speak on the substance at this point but I am going to make an appeal to my friend, the representative of the Netherlands. The appeal is that he withdraw his motion for closure and tell us that he will re-introduce that motion for closure after two or three speakers have spoken in reply to the questions put to them as proposers of the draft resolutions. In other words, I am not trying to say that this debate should go on for ever but I am saying that those who have introduced draft resolutions should be allowed the normal right of reply before we come to a vote. So I would appeal to the representative of the Netherlands to consider withdrawing his motion for closure at this juncture so as to enable me -- not in the present circumstances but in good order, and along with others in good order -- to reply to the debate.

Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands): I think I have gone as far as I could to meet the wishes of my friend, Mr. Lall, and I am afraid that I can go no further than that.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In view of the statement by the representative of the Netherlands, and since, as I said before, two speakers have already taken the floor against the motion for closure, I shall now put the motion for closure to the vote. A roll-call vote has been requested.
A vote was taken by roll call.

The United Arab Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Thailand.


Abstaining: Venezuela, Austria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Greece, Haiti, Iran, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa.

The result of the vote was 27 in favour, 27 against, and 27 abstentions.

The proposal was not adopted.

Mr. IALL (India): Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful to you for having called upon me now. I feel I have won the right to speak in the hard way.

As I told you, I wished to speak only for a few minutes. Two questions have been raised regarding the fourteen-Power draft resolution on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1/add.2). In a sense these questions are inter-related, and I shall cover them both in this brief statement.

A doubt has been raised on the matter of controls. In fact, I heard my friend, the representative of Venezuela, say that the fourteen-Power draft resolution does not provide for effective controls. That is one point.
The other point, I think, was first raised by the Foreign Minister of Sweden who said that this resolution does not provide for the contingency that controls are not installed as a result of the Conference or the subsequent conferences which will take place on this matter.

On the first point of controls, perhaps there has been some ambiguity in translation, because the first operative paragraph refers to the technical arrangements and controls considered necessary. In other words, it refers to these controls being necessary.

Then, the second operative paragraph says that an agreement to cover the matter of controls is imperative, is essential -- more than essential. Finally, that same paragraph says that this is an urgent matter, this matter of reaching agreement, and that such agreement should be reached speedily.

So, the urgency, the necessity, the essentiality of controls are all contained in the fourteen-Power draft resolution. I greatly regret if any member should be in any doubt about this matter or that there should be any ambiguity about it in any of the translations of this document. But the fact is that controls are blessed in this resolution on moral grounds and on practical grounds. This resolution is postulated on successful controls.

Then, as I said, the Foreign Minister of Sweden said we say nothing as to what will happen if agreement is not reached. Now, this whole project is a positive project. It is a project which says that the tests should stop, controls are necessary and should be instituted, and that the Geneva Conference should succeed. It is not a defeatist resolution. It does not try to bring before this Assembly the view that the Conference will fail in establishing effective international control. On the other hand, we felt that this resolution should give the maximum push. I hope that the Geneva Conference will not mind that phrase. I do not mean to be impolite by saying that we want to give them the maximum push but we do want to give them the maximum push in the direction of achieving agreement, particularly on this matter of controls.
What happens if an agreement is not reached? That is the question in the mind of the Foreign Minister of Sweden. The answer is simply this: the General Assembly is here, the United Nations continues and this issue can be brought back to the United Nations either to the next session of the General Assembly or even to a special session of the General Assembly or to the other disarmament machinery which we are hoping to set up. That is to say, if agreement is not reached speedily -- and this draft resolution asks for agreement on the matter of controls to be reached speedily -- it is open to those who will confer in Geneva to bring the matter back to the Assembly or to the Disarmament Commission or to call for a special session of the Assembly. That is the answer there.

This is not a defeatist resolution. It looks for success. But should there be failure, then the whole machinery of the United Nations would be available to take this matter up again and to see that progress is made in the right direction.

With this explanation covering both the matter of controls and the question of what would arise if agreement could not be reached among those who are going into conference, I trust that those who have felt that they could not vote for the draft resolution will be in a position to reconsider their stand.

Mr. SOSA-RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): May I reply to my colleague, the representative of India, regarding the interpretation I gave to the fourteen-Power draft resolution on the question of cessation and the interpretation he has just given to us.

The reason why I held that in the fourteen-Power draft resolution an indefinite cessation of nuclear tests is set out without the necessary guarantees for control being provided for was not because the draft resolution does not mention the need for controls but because in the way in which the draft resolution is drafted it permits of the possibility to continue a suspension indefinitely following the will of one of the parties that does not want an agreement to be arrived at that will set up the definitive cessation.

With regard to the other point, if such a situation is arrived at, the resort open to them would be to come to this Assembly. I ask: When cessation has taken place for a certain number of months or for a certain length of time, can anybody come to this body and ask for a resolution for renewing tests? This is a situation
in which the moral constraint is too great. This would place the party which is at a disadvantage in an impossible position because that party would be forced to come to the Assembly and say, "Will you pass a resolution permitting me to renew tests?"

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Apparently there is no one else who wishes to speak.

May I state the following: In view of the fact that I do not see any representative asking to speak, I intend to close the debate on all the draft resolutions and amendments. I was somewhat willing to accept the suggestion of the representative of the Netherlands because I did not want in any way to try to budge him from the position he had taken. I consider that if we close the debate, we close the debate that we were going to hold that was started two days ago, the debate, in other words, on all the draft resolutions and amendments. I even went on to ask whether the draft resolution presented by Austria, Japan and Sweden was before the Committee, and I was told that it certainly was. Nobody objected to our discussing it. Therefore, before closing the debate I point out that this is the case. If we close the debate, it does not mean that when we vote on the draft resolution I cannot allow explanations of vote. I certainly will.

The debate itself will be closed then. I am merely pointing this out so that perhaps some representative may be galvanized into speaking on the draft resolutions if he wishes to do so.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): We have not yet settled the question of priority on the various draft resolutions, so I think that the next thing to do is to exchange views on that matter. We have not talked about that. There have been various views expressed by individual representatives, if I am not mistaken, but the question as such has not been discussed by the Committee.

According to a previous decision of the Committee which we adopted at the very outset of this debate, it was decided that after the general debate the question of the priority of the various draft resolutions would be taken up and decided. I take it that the debate will be closed and that we will then take up next the question of priority.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We have not officially closed the debate on the draft resolutions as yet. I was merely asking the members of the Committee if anyone wished to speak on the draft resolutions and the amendments. If no one wishes to do so, then I will formally close the debate. Once the debate is closed, we will discuss the question of priority. Before we vote we will decide on the priority. I do not think that this will cause us any trouble as far as the order of discussion is concerned.

Mr. de la COLINA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I merely want some clarification. I should like to know if, before we close the debate, I may be permitted to make a very brief statement regarding the draft resolution which my delegation had the honour to submit to the Committee and which obviously will have to be revised in the light of what may occur with regard to the draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia when it is voted upon.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The problem here is that once the debate is closed there will be no official way in which I can call upon you to speak or upon any other representative to refer to your statement. The problem would become more difficult because Mexico, as a sponsor, cannot explain its vote.

Can the representative of Mexico not make even a conditional statement now?

Mr. de la COLINA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): On the hypothetical and conditional basis that, as I hope and as I wish, the draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia is adopted, I should like to make a statement. The Mexican delegation without any reservation warmly welcomes the draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia on the composition of the new Disarmament Commission, which, to a large extent, would be a prolongation of this very Political Committee, although it would bear a different name. I want to congratulate the delegations of India and Yugoslavia for their untiring efforts to bring about this agreement, which I trust will be successful.
The satisfaction that we would all feel if such an agreement were to be arrived at cannot, however, dim the fact that as yet we have not solved the basic aspect of the problem -- that is, the setting up of a negotiating body to which the French amendment refers in document A/C.1/L.212. I do not know whether that amendment was withdrawn while I was absent from the Committee room. However, until that small body -- whether it is a sub-committee, a working group or a negotiating group, call it what you will -- is set up again and is working, the impasse will continue. Because any statements that may be made and any votes that may be cast in the new Commission will certainly not eliminate the obstacle, which is the lack of direct, constant and close communication between the nuclear Powers. We know full well -- and this has been said here many times -- that it is the nuclear Powers which bear the largest, not to say the entire, responsibility for the drawing up of disarmament conventions and treaties and implementing such treaties. Sooner or later -- and I am sure that we all feel that it should be sooner -- we will have to face that problem too. Whether it is only the great Powers to whom the invitation contained in the Mexican draft resolution is addressed, whether it is a smaller group still by means of a delegation of power made by some of the greater Powers or whether there is set up a larger and more numerous group of which other countries elected by the previous countries would form part in the preliminary discussion on a possible composition of a body acceptable to all, the Powers that we call the nuclear Powers must participate because they, all of them, have the technical capacity, the industrial development, the scientific knowledge and the necessary resources to manufacture nuclear weapons.
If what I have said is obvious and undeniable, then it is also true that the reason for which my delegation submitted its draft resolution still stands, and the reason for which many delegations supported our draft resolution still stands. Those reasons become more powerful, more weighty, because we must take full advantage of this first step to encourage the great Powers to take the second step. It matters not if they do not meet right away; what is essential is that they intend to do so in the not too distant future, so that before the General Assembly concludes its present session we might receive encouraging news.

In view of all the above, my delegation will make some slight changes in form in our text to adapt it to new circumstances that might obtain, and which, if I am permitted to mention them, I should like to mention briefly at the time when I submit the revised draft, subject, as I said before, to the hypothetical but in all ways desirable, unanimous acceptance of the India-Yugoslavia draft resolution.

It is our warmest hope that our draft resolution will also earn the unanimous support of the Political Committee.

Mr. AIGNÉN (Ireland): I wish to move the adjournment of this meeting under rule 119. We have had a prolonged discussion on one group of draft resolutions, namely those which deal with the suspension or discontinuance of tests. That was a very prolonged discussion on a very important subject. But the various delegations tabled other draft resolutions one of which, in my opinion, is of great importance, that is, the draft resolution dealing with the non-extension of nuclear weapons; and I think that it is of the greatest importance that this Committee should debate that draft resolution in full, that all the delegations should have time to consider that draft resolution in all its details. Therefore I move that this meeting adjourn in pursuance of rule 119.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): According to rule 119, such motion shall not be debated but shall immediately be put to a vote.

The motion was rejected by 36 votes to 26, with 16 abstentions.
Mr. AHERN (Ireland): In view of the fact that the Committee has not preferred to adjourn, I wish to say that my delegation shares with many others who have spoken a deep sense of disappointment at the negative outcome of our long discussion on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. It is clear that this Committee can now do no more than hope that the discussions in Geneva will lead to an effective and controlled cessation of tests.

My delegation would like, however, to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that the present failure to agree on the test suspension increases the danger to which we referred earlier in the debate and on which we submitted proposals, the danger of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. In our opinion, the present nuclear Powers, as long as they are unable to agree among themselves on a formula for the discontinuance of tests, ought surely, in their own interest, at least -- to put it no higher -- to seek ways of limiting the danger by checking the further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

We can understand that fears, exaggerated or not, for their own security render each nuclear Power highly exacting as to the formula which it will accept for the stoppage of tests. The fact must be faced, there are great risks involved. But in the case of an agreement to check further dissemination of these weapons, no such risks arise. On the contrary, risks, very great risks, are inherent in failure to reach such an agreement. This aspect of the problem, in our belief, should now be isolated and studied. Agreement should be reached and action taken as soon as possible. If that is not done, if the matter is simply allowed to drift as it is now drifting, then we believe that risks of war will multiply beyond hope of control.

In that belief, and with a deep conviction of the special gravity of this aspect of disarmament, we should like, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, to reply to the numerous observations that have been made during our long debate.
We have had an opportunity during the general debate to learn the attitude of many Member countries towards this important question of checking the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The delegations of more than twenty Member countries, in the course of their interventions, have referred to the possibility of the extension of the so-called "nuclear club". Several representatives have emphasized, sometimes in very striking terms, the great dangers which such an extension would involve. Thus the Foreign Minister of Canada, Mr. Smith, spoke of the, as he called it, "uncontrollable anarchy" which could result from the wider dissemination of these dangerous instruments. The representative of New Zealand, Mr. Shanahan, told us that "we must seek most assiduously to avoid" the promiscuous spreading of nuclear weapons throughout the world. The representative of Burma, U Thant, vividly evoked one aspect of the danger when he said:

"There is no end to this process" -- of dissemination -- "until almost every sovereign State is in a position to inflict incalculable destruction. If all sovereign States were governed by rulers possessed of even the rudiments of sanity, they would be restrained from committing such colossal crimes by the fear that their citizens also would perish. But experience has shown that from time to time power in this or that country falls into the hands of rulers who are not sane." (A/C.1/PV.960, page 4)

The Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Winiewicz, directed "an earnest appeal to nations which do not as yet possess (these weapons) not to contribute to the spreading of nuclear armaments. The consequences of such a step could but complicate further disarmament discussions and render the necessary agreement on this matter more difficult to achieve." (A/C.1/PV.953, page 23-25)

Perhaps the most solemn warning of all was delivered by the representative of Australia, Mr. Walker, when he said:

"if the manufacture and possession of nuclear arms becomes widely diffused throughout the world, the negotiation, let alone the implementation, of an effective disarmament agreement, might well become practically impossible." (A/C.1/PV.960, page 43)
I have quoted only a few of the references which were made to this question. Representatives of many countries, from widely separated regions of the world, have borne witness in this Committee to their deep concern about the dangers inherent in the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. That such authoritative statements have been made publicly here is good in itself. Such statements cannot fail to have a good effect on public opinion in the world at large, as well as on our deliberations here. But as well as individual statements we need, in our opinion, a collective action in the form of an Assembly resolution. It is my belief, after attentively following the whole of the general debate, that the sense of this Committee is that the wide dissemination of nuclear weapons would involve the most appalling risks and dangers. Certainly the statements made to that effect -- some of which I have quoted -- were not offset by any statements of equivalent weight tending to minimize those dangers.

Now if it be the sense of this Committee that these grave dangers exist, it seems to follow logically that this Committee should give solemn expression to that sense of danger and should also take measures -- at the very least preparatory measures -- designed to avert the dangers themselves. Such measures, in our belief, are urgently required. They cannot await the comprehensive disarmament settlement which we all earnestly desire.

There are two reasons why measures to check the spread of nuclear weapons cannot be held over. The first is that we must face the fact that many years -- very many years -- are likely to elapse before any general disarmament agreement can be achieved. The difficulty experienced in this Committee in getting agreement on the relatively simple problem of the suspension of tests is an index of the difficulties which will have to be overcome in order to reach solutions of the far more complex problems involved in a general disarmament settlement.

The second reason against delay on this specific question is that failure to check the dissemination of nuclear weapons during a long period of general disarmament negotiations is likely in itself to render those negotiations abortive. I would remind the Committee once more of the wise words of the representative of Australia when he said:
"If the manufacture and possession of nuclear arms becomes widely diffused throughout the world, the negotiation, let alone the implementation, of an effective disarmament agreement, might well become practically impossible." (A/C.1/PV.960, page 43)

The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, expressed a similar view, at least as regards one aspect of the problem, when he said:

"It is evident that, as the number of States with facilities for the production of nuclear weapons increases, the possibilities for stopping the tests will become less. This consideration alone should alarm the United Nations and should sharpen its feeling of responsibility and induce it to carry out urgent measures in this field before the situation becomes even more complicated." (A/C.1/PV.945, page 31)
I should like to emphasize that the measures urged by my delegation are not intended either to express the existing situation or to serve as a substitute for an agreement on effective equitable disarmament -- to use the phrase of Mr. Hickenlooper in his masterly intervention in this debate on 28 October. We agree with Mr. Hickenlooper's views that such matters as the suspension of tests must, as he said, be viewed in their proper perspective; that is, in their relationship to the disarmament problem as a whole. It is precisely in that perspective that we insert our proposals.

The disarmament problem as a whole is at this moment grave. It is in danger of becoming worse. Our proposals are intended as preventive measures to check an imminent deterioration which may prove catastrophic. In the words of Mr. Amadeo, representative of Argentina, our proposals are "an attempt to localize the fire while, in the meantime, the rest of us try to put the fire out". And I would add to that that if the fire cannot be localized, it is likely to extend beyond all possibility of control.

The idea which I have tried to refute, that our proposals are conceived as some sort of substitute for comprehensive disarmament, appears to be linked in the minds of certain delegations with the idea that the proposals would confer a blessing on the existing situation and would preserve an undemocratic distinction between the nuclear Powers and the non-nuclear Powers. The representative of Spain, in a picturesque phrase, referred to "a clique of atomic aristocrats". Should we then aim or drift towards an atomic democracy, a world in which every State possesses its own nuclear weapons? Such a world, in the opinion, I believe, of many here, would not be likely to last very long -- or rather, such a world would not even be attained because the intervening phase in which many States, but not all, would possess nuclear weapons would be even more dangerous. During that phase a number of States, and even factions within States, would find themselves in possession of a decisive temporary advantage over a rival or over an enemy. Can we be confident that all who hold such an advantage will display the restraint which the United States -- as Mr. Hickenlooper so rightly reminded us -- showed in a somewhat similar situation at the end of the Second World War?
Some delegations have conceded the need for action but have questioned whether the measures we propose are practical. The representative of the United States today questioned the practicability of our proposals. In this connexion the question of inspection and control has been raised, and rightly raised, as indeed, in our remarks in the general debate, we anticipated that it would be.

The representative of Israel, Mr. Eban, with his usual clarity, put it this way. He said that here, no less than in any other field, the value of any ban on prohibition is precisely equivalent to the efficacy of the control system established to implement it. And Mr. Lodge seemed to emphasize Mr. Eban’s point.

We admit -- indeed we proclaim -- that this is an important point and, as well as referring the Committee to my initial remarks on the subject, I should like to make some further comments on it now.

First, I should like to emphasize that an important part of our proposal -- that which would ask the present non-nuclear States to refrain from producing these weapons -- is in fact capable of effective inspection and control. It is agreed by many experts on the subject that diversion of nuclear production from peaceful purposes to weapons is capable of detection under a comparatively simple inspection system. Such an inspection system, set up in the countries agreeing not to produce nuclear weapons, could not only serve to guarantee non-production there, but could serve also as a pilot scheme for the working out of techniques which would be applied in the case of the hope for cessation of production by the present nuclear Powers themselves.

As regards the second and no less important aspect of the proposals -- agreement by the nuclear Powers not to transfer the weapons to the control of present non-nuclear countries -- we agree that here international inspection and control can probably not be made a hundred per cent effective with existing techniques, but we suggest that any risk involved in illicit transfer is very small in comparison with the enormous risks involved in the free and unhindered dissemination of weapons. Our best guarantee that such an agreement would be
kept is that it is inherently self-enforcing in that it would be in the interests of the nuclear Powers, severally and collectively, to keep the agreement.

Seldom, if ever, in our belief, has a proposed international agreement been in such obvious conformity with the mutual interests of the signatories. As history shows, it is such agreements rather than those equipped with the most elaborate safeguards which tend to be kept. None of the nuclear Powers has anything to gain by a transfer of these weapons, which would counterbalance with it the sacrifice of a considerable part of its power and the creation of a situation in which disarmament would become impossible and general war more likely.

On the other side, in what does the risk consist? Is it in the possibility that one party to the agreement, in breach of it and secretly, would transfer the weapon to another country? In terms of the general situation, the risk of such a transfer exists already; it would not be created by the agreement. What would be created by the agreement, however, is a limited specific risk for the complying party who would have foregone whatever advantage might reside in such a transfer, while his rival in bad faith obtained that advantage. That is the sole extent of the risk.
Remember that both parties would be free, according to our proposals, pending a general agreement on disarmament, to hold nuclear weapons anywhere in any allied territory that wished to hold it. The supposed advantage which might be sacrificed would be that of handing over these weapons into the ownership and control of an ally. I submit that the potential loss of this supposed advantage is scarcely worthy of being described as a risk. It is more in the nature of a hypothetical military inconvenience; but even if we agreed to regard it as a risk, it is surely insignificant in comparison with the risks on the other side and with what can be won by such an agreement, for -- and this is an important aspect of the question to which I would invite the Committee's special attention -- the agreement by the nuclear Powers not to transfer these weapons is essential if the non-nuclear Powers are to be invited not to produce them. And we are lucky that we have such a wise Power as Sweden prepared to stop, if there is a general agreement not to produce these weapons by non-nuclear Powers, and Sweden, as we all know, is among the Powers that can immediately proceed to manufacture these weapons if there is no agreement that they are not to be further disseminated throughout the world.

It may well be that the nuclear Powers will never, in fact, transfer these weapons to others. Some of them are at present prohibited by their own parliaments and congresses from giving these weapons to other parties; but as long as they do not formally and reciprocally engage to refrain from doing so, some non-nuclear Powers will regard a transfer to their enemies or rivals as a possibility, which they will strive to counteract by endeavouring to produce their own nuclear weapons. And non-nuclear Powers, generally, will not consent to refrain from exercising their right to produce the weapons as long as nuclear Powers are not bound by a corresponding obligation to refrain from transferring.

The two points of our proposals are, therefore, interdependent, and the prime responsibility for checking the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons rests on the present nuclear Powers, and they can never get rid of that responsibility before history.

In the entangled dangers of today, the progress and even the survival of our civilization requires initiatives from the Great Powers, which only they can take and which no one can force them to take. These initiatives to be effective must equal in generosity the great American initiatives of the Baruch proposal and the Marshall Plan.
I suggest that one of these initiatives should be an agreement between the nuclear Powers binding themselves voluntarily to abstain from distributing nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States. I suggest that the non-nuclear Powers should complement this decision by undertaking to abstain from production of these weapons. I would appeal to those responsible, in considering this matter, to put to themselves the following question: Have we the right, in seeking to raise our present security to the maximum which the imagination of military planners can conceive, to leave the way open in the future to what the Foreign Minister of Canada described as undercontrollable anarchy, bequeathing to our children a world in which atomic weapons will have become generalized?

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Gentlemen, I think that the debate is now over. I do not believe that any other representative wishes to speak. Therefore, I declare the debate on the draft resolutions hereby closed. That includes the amendments to those draft resolutions. This morning I made a detailed enumeration of the first eight drafts. This afternoon I stated that the ninth draft resolution was distributed, that of Austria, Japan and Sweden on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Since we will immediately go on to vote on the draft resolutions, it is imperative that the Committee pronounce itself upon the question of priorities to be given draft resolutions in the vote. In his statement this morning, the representative of the United States asked for priority for the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, etc. -- in other words the seventeen-Power draft. At the afternoon's meeting priority was requested by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden for the draft resolution submitted jointly by Austria, Japan and Sweden. In accordance with the regular procedure, the draft resolutions should be voted upon in the order in which they were submitted. That being the case, the first to be put to the vote should have been the draft resolution of the fourteen Powers submitted by India and thirteen other Powers; but, since such requests for priorities were made, and the first request for priority was made regarding the seventeen-Power draft, we will have to vote on this question first, in accordance with rule 132, the contents of which are known to all. I shall, however, read it out:
"If two or more proposals relate to the same question, a Committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted."

In other words, "unless it decides otherwise." Therefore, the question I am to ask the Committee is: Does the Committee decide otherwise regarding the order of priority? I repeat: The request for priority was submitted for the seventeen-Power draft resolution, and this is the subject or the item or the point that I shall put to the vote first.
IIR. WIEJSZIC (Poland): The rules of procedure of the General Assembly lay down the procedure which governs our action in such a situation as this. I am of course referring, as did the Chairman, to rule 132 of the rules of procedure, which says that if two or more proposals relate to the same question, then the vote on the proposals should be conducted in the order in which they have been submitted.

On the basis of this rule, we consider that the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1), which was submitted to the Committee on 14 October, should be voted upon first because it was submitted first. Rule 132, of course, also envisages the possibility of exceptions in case the Assembly or the Committee decides otherwise.

But we cannot subscribe to the view that the order established in rule 132 should be changed unless there are important reasons for doing so. This is, I submit, the only proper interpretation of this rule. If that general principle were to be changed without well-founded reasons, then I would like to ask for what purpose such a general principle has been laid down. If we were to change the established procedure upon the wish of any delegation, and on any occasion, then the rules governing our voting procedure should be included in our rules of procedure in the following way: The Committee shall vote on the proposals submitted to it in the order decided by the majority on each occasion.

But this is not the case. Rule 132, which governs our action in voting, has not been established in order to be evaded every time it is convenient to certain delegations. Do the reasons advanced here for priority for the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) justify such an exception? Does the seventeen-Power draft resolution go further than the other draft resolutions which have been filed here before? In our opinion this is not the case. On the contrary, whereas the seventeen-Power draft resolution envisages only a suspension of tests, that of the fourteen Powers, and also the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, calls for an agreement on the discontinuance of tests and elaborates on various questions concerned with this problem, such as, for example, that of extending the operation of such an agreement to all States.
It would follow from this that the application of the clause providing for exceptions cannot be justified on this ground. If we were to accept this argument we would be creating a not too pleasant precedent.

Basing itself on the rules of procedure, on the substance of the draft resolutions before us, and on logic, the Polish delegation is firmly opposed to the proposal which asks for priority for the seventeen-Power draft resolution and we will vote against it. We appeal to other delegations to uphold our rules of procedure in the clear logical sense in which they have been drafted. Of course, these days anything can happen in this Committee.

Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Ecuador supports the request for priority presented by the delegation of the United States of America, namely, that priority be given to the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205). In so doing, we would like to offer the following clarification. Strictly applying the rules of procedure, we ought, first of all, to vote on the three Soviet draft resolutions. They were submitted on 9 and 10 October. Then the seventeen-Power draft resolution was submitted on 10 October. According to the rules of procedure, the thirteen or fourteen-Power draft resolution, which is now contained in document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1, should be voted upon after the seventeen-Power draft resolution, because although it still bears the same document number of A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1, it was submitted on 14 October; that is, four days after the seventeen-Power draft resolution.

Therefore, the request for priority for the seventeen-Power draft resolution refers only to the three Soviet draft resolutions. Although I entirely agree with the representative of Poland that the order of voting should only be changed when there are really serious reasons for doing so, I think there is a logical reason here, namely, that the proposal contained in the seventeen-Power draft resolution, (A/C.1/L.205) covers all aspects of disarmament, that is to say, the three items that are being considered in the Committee.

As far as many delegations are concerned, it would be difficult to pronounce themselves on the specific draft resolution dealing with the different aspects, before knowing the view of the Committee on the draft resolution covering the entirety of the problem.
For this reason, I think that we would be perfectly justified in going along with the request for priority by the delegation of the United States, and the delegation of Ecuador urges upon the Committee that it so decide.

**The CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from Spanish): I would like to clarify the point raised by the representative of Ecuador regarding the dates of the presentation of documents. The fourteen-Power draft resolution, document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1, is dated 14 October. But the original draft resolution submitted by India, document A/C.1/L.202, is dated 9 October. Furthermore, these documents had been previously published and distributed with different numbers and probably earlier dates. I do not have that information before me at the moment. However, I do see that the document submitted by India was distributed as General Assembly document A/L.246, dated 5 October.

Therefore, if the representative of Ecuador wishes to offer any additional comments on this question of dates, he may do so now.

**Mr. CORDERO (Ecuador)** (interpretation from Spanish): I know that the Chairman is right in what he has just said. But the proposal that is to be voted upon by the Committee is not the original Indian draft resolution which was voted 9 October, but rather the fourteen-Power draft resolution which is dated 14 October. Therefore, there should be no reason to apply to the fourteen-Power draft resolution the date of presentation of the original Indian draft resolution, which is not the one on which we are presumably going to vote.

**The CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from Spanish): Perhaps the representative of Ecuador may be right, but I do believe that a revised text does not change the date of presentation of the original text. There may be an error in the copying of the document. But the original document itself dates back to 5 October. A revision was then submitted which modified a part of the draft resolution, but it certainly cannot modify the date on which the draft resolution was originally presented, nor the resolution itself. I do not know if there are any objections on the part of the Committee. I may be wrong, but this is the view of the Chairman.
This is the view of the Chair. However, a motion for priority has been submitted in favour of the seventeen-Power draft resolution as well as one in favour of the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): Speaking in the debate on the agenda of the Political Committee which took place more than three weeks ago, the Czechoslovak delegation expressed the view that the question of the cessation of test explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons should be accorded priority in our consideration. The Czechoslovak delegation was proceeding from the conviction that the question of the cessation of nuclear tests is the most urgent among all the present issues of disarmament and the most mature and ripe for a solution. The views of the Czechoslovak delegation now, after the debate on the draft resolutions has been concluded, are the same in determining what should be the order to be followed in the voting on the draft resolutions that have been submitted. Owing to the procedures undertaken in particular by the United States delegation, the solution of this issue was prevented at the outset of the deliberations of our Committee.

The general debate in our Committee confirms the fact that the cessation of nuclear tests is generally regarded as an urgent and soluble problem of disarmament. Moreover, it has been revealed that an unconditional and immediate cessation of nuclear tests by all countries is not only demanded by all nations but is gaining ever greater and stronger support from an increasing number of Governments.

The procedural proposal of the United States delegation is but a further attempt to use procedural manoeuvring in order to suppress the consideration of questions which are rather uncomfortable to some delegations. The seventeen-Power draft resolution has been imposed with the aim of rigidly replacing a reasonable and comprehensive settlement of individual, significant and independent problems. Such a procedure is even more inadmissible since it concerns such an important and urgent question as the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

On these grounds, the Czechoslovak delegation strongly opposes the motion put forward by the delegation of the United States. On the other hand, my delegation supports the point of view presented by the delegation of Poland, that is, that the draft resolutions should be put to the vote in the order in which they were submitted to the Committee.
Prince Narayan WATTHAYAKON (Thailand): The rule says that we should vote upon draft resolutions in the order in which they are submitted unless the Committee decides otherwise. The Committee has already decided otherwise, because you no doubt remember, Mr. Chairman, that, in regard to priority, it has been decided by this Committee that the priority was determined largely by the merits of the draft resolution. That was a decision of this Committee. I submit that the seventeen-Power draft resolution, being comprehensive and general, covering many fields of disarmament, should be voted on first. That is the merit of this proposal with regard to priority.

Mr. FAZILWAJ (Afghanistan): I merely wish to state that, if the argument of the Foreign Minister of Thailand is upheld, we should not forget that the general debate has not been completed on the other parts of the draft resolution not dealing with the cessation of nuclear tests, and therefore we do not think that we can proceed to a vote.

Mr. JALL (India): May I say, on behalf of the sponsors of the fourteen-Power draft resolution, that we are opposed to ceding the natural priority that we have, in terms of the rules of procedure, to any other draft resolution before this Committee.

There is one quite important point in the rule itself to which I would draw attention. That is that the rule applies only to proposals which relate to the same question. Obviously, what the Committee should do is to take those proposals that relate to this question. The proposals that relate solely to this question are the proposals of the fourteen Powers and the proposal of the Soviet Union. The other proposal does not relate solely to this question, and to the extent that it relates to other questions it is outside this rule.

Therefore, the whole argument based on the comprehensiveness of the seventeen-Power proposal is an argument against priority. Priority is to be determined between the proposals which relate to this question. The fact that the seventeen-Power draft resolution goes into matters other than the question that our draft resolution goes into is really rather irrelevant at this juncture.
The representative of Thailand very rightly pointed out that we ought to look at these proposals on their merits. It has been said by quite a number of representatives around this table that the fourteen-Power draft resolution is the most comprehensive draft resolution on the question of the discontinuance of tests. I think that any objective assessment of the fourteen-Power draft resolution and the seventeen-Power draft resolution on this question of the discontinuance of tests would reveal that the seventeen-Power draft resolution is rather slight in this regard. It hardly touches on the question; it slides over it; it does not really deal with it; it does not express the opinion of the Assembly about this question. It merely wishes the negotiations in Geneva will. Of course, we all do that. No one in this Committee wishes the negotiations anything but well. But that is hardly the subject for a resolution.

The seventeen-Power draft resolution, I heard our colleague from Ecuador say a little while ago, covers the whole of disarmament. I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I say very respectfully to all those who have proposed that draft resolution that I doubt whether the seventeen-Power draft resolution covers anything about disarmament at all. It merely refers very vaguely to certain aspects of disarmament, mostly in terms of work which is going to be done outside the General Assembly.

Therefore, the point here is that the proposals on this question are the fourteen-Power proposal and the proposal of the USSR. We have another proposal, the seventeen-Power proposal, which alludes to this question in a rather slight degree.
This seventeen-Power resolution, which alludes to this question in slight degree, should not be given priority over those proposals which deal solely with this question. In fact it is very doubtful whether, in terms of rule 132, the seventeen-Power proposal qualifies for consideration on this issue at all. It is only by stretching the rule that it does. The two proposals which qualify for consideration are the ones I have mentioned. And after those two, ours comes first, and the sponsors of the other draft resolutions have not asked for priority. The fact that the seventeen-Power draft resolution deals with other matters, other questions -- that is outside the scope of rule 132. So, on the ground of the contents of the rule and on the ground of substance, our draft resolution deserves the prior consideration of this Committee.

Surely, if this Committee wants to express itself on the question of the cessation of tests, it will not want to vote first on this very slight, exiguous draft resolution which, in two short sentences, disposes of the question of the cessation of tests -- and that in a domain which is outside the Assembly.

For all these reasons I am sure the Committee will wish to vote on the proposal which is on the question, and on the proposal which is substantial, rather than on the slight proposal which is before it -- the one from the seventeen Powers.

The Chairman (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to refer now to what was said by three representatives. Then, after I have spoken, I shall call on the representative of Ceylon.

Three representatives have given opinions regarding the question of priority, and I should like to make known the opinion of the Chair.

The representative of Thailand told us that the problem of priority does not really arise at this moment because at a previous meeting the Committee had decided regarding the priority when, following the proposal of the United States, the Committee decided to hold a general debate on all three items, and decided that once the general debate was over, the Committee would decide on the draft resolutions in accordance with the merits of the draft resolutions themselves. Despite the great respect I have for the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, might I remind him that what was left to be
discussed after the debate was a decision on priority, taking into account the merits of the draft resolutions. We still have to take a decision on it. A decision on priority was not arrived at.

Secondly, I should like to refer to what the representative of Afghanistan said, especially where he said that in the question of priority we must take into consideration the fact that we have closed the debate on certain draft resolutions but not on others. This was an idea which arose in the incident on the closure of the debate, caused by the motion of the representative of the Netherlands -- an incident that concerned the possibility of dividing the closure, applying it only to resolutions dealing with the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, and leaving the debate open on the other items. But I thought I had been clear when, on behalf of the Chair, in connexion with the motion of the Netherlands and also when certain other speakers took the floor, I said that we would close the debate on all draft resolutions. I think I was extremely pressing in my appeal to representatives to speak, if they wished to, so as not to give rise to difficulties later because they might not be entirely sure how far the closure stretched. As you will see in the verbatim record, the closure of debate applied to all the draft resolutions and not only to some of them.

Now, I should like to refer to what the representative of India said.

The representative of India said that since there are certain draft resolutions that refer separately to each of the three items and the seventeen-Power draft resolution refers to all three together, we cannot compare these resolutions in order to decide on priority among them; we cannot compare the seventeen-Power draft resolution which cover all three items with those draft resolutions that refer only to one item.

Despite the respect I have for the opinion of the representative of India, I do not think we can go so far in interpreting rule 132, because it does say that:

"If two or more proposals relate to the same question, a committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted."
Undoubtedly the proposal of the United States does refer to discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. It can, therefore, in the question of priority, be compared with the fourteen-Power draft resolution and with the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the seventeen-Power draft resolution does refer to the question of disarmament and can, on that basis, and for purposes of priority, be compared with the other draft resolutions on disarmament.

It is no less true that the seventeen-Power draft resolution does refer, since the seven-Power amendment has been added to this seventeen-Power draft resolution, to the reduction of the military budgets of certain Powers, and therefore it can, on that basis, be compared, for purposes of making a decision on priority, with the proposal of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, the Chair feels that there is no objection to a decision being taken by vote, to give priority to one draft resolution dealing with all the subjects. I believe that this is the way it should be considered. This is the view of the Chair.

Sir Claude CORÉA (Ceylon): Mr. Chairman, you have really dealt with this point I was going to raise a little more specifically than the way it was put forward by the representative of India.

As you will observe, the purpose of rule 132 is to find out which question should be put to the vote first — that is the main purpose of it. Here we have to determine, therefore, the competing claims of two questions that are to be put to the vote. If two or more proposals relate to the same question — if the two proposals relate to the same question — then we decide on the merits, outside the normal course, whether we can give priority to one of them. But in this case the fourteen-Power draft resolution is one proposal; the seventeen-Power proposal is a grouping of a large number of proposals — A, B, C and D.

It is proposed, and the proposal is from the United States, that the seventeen-Power draft resolution should be put to the vote. My submission is that there is no question here of any proposal relating to the same question. What is the same in these two proposals is only Section A in
the seventeen-Power draft resolution, and the whole of the fourteen-Power draft resolution. It is only those two problems that can come within the wording "same question". Now, if you will put the whole of the seventeen-Power draft resolution to the Committee, then you are putting to the Committee many other proposals which are not the same as the proposal in the fourteen-Power draft resolution. Therefore, you will be calling upon the Committee to decide on other questions under the guise of a priority claim, basing it on the same question of principle.

There is no "same question" applicable to both -- and that is a point I should like to put both to you and to the Committee for consideration. What is the same is section A of the seventeen-Power draft resolution and the whole of the fourteen-Power draft resolution. But the others are additional to that, and therefore do not relate to the same question.
On the merits, I should like to submit that there is the fact that the fourteen-Power draft resolution is more comprehensive on the question of nuclear suspension than section A of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, and it would be desirable for the Committee to consider the more comprehensive proposal rather than the less comprehensive one for another reason that is important -- because it would give members the right to vote as they wish under a more comprehensive draft resolution in the first place. If, for instance, such a comprehensive draft resolution is defeated, such members will be able to vote for the other less comprehensive draft resolution if they wish. However, if you take the less comprehensive one first, you preclude any member from voting for either one or the other. It would therefore be more advantageous to take the more comprehensive draft resolution first. If that is defeated, those who support it may be able to support the less comprehensive one.

For these three reasons, I think that the Committee should not exercise the right given to it to decide that some other draft resolution should be taken before the one which had priority as to date.

Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru)(interpretation from Spanish): I believe that the question of priority must be open to a decision by the Committee itself. There are two tendencies. One is the competence liée, as the French call it; in other words, when there are imperative reasons militating in favour of the Committees deciding. There is also the second tendency which is called the discretionary power of the Committee where it decides to act expeditiously. I think that the power granted by the rule invoked here, rule 132 is the discretionary power of the Committee. This power is at times appropriate because our debates, not only on the merits of the draft resolution but on the priority, would otherwise be endless. The moment has come when the question is at a head and has to be decided by the will of the Committee. In order to express the desire of the Committee, there is but one road open -- to vote. Therefore, I do not believe that we should prolong this debate on priorities unduly.

Furthermore when it was decided not to pigeonhole and compartmentalize the draft resolutions under the different titles -- disarmament, discontinuance of tests and reduction of budgets -- it was in all truth recognized that the Committee had the right to decide the priority according to the direction the debate was
taking. In other words, from that moment it was agreed that at a certain time the Committee could apply its discretionary power according to the way the debate was going.

All these arguments are based on two false premises. One is that we agreed to what was not agreed -- the pigeonholing of the draft resolutions within a certain framework. We did not agree because the debate was general. Secondly, rule 132 represents a linked position of the Committee. In other words, we are not being asked to pass judgement on the basis of anything other than the discretionary power of the Committee based on its functions. Therefore I submit that we should end this debate on priorities and that we should vote on the priorities as submitted by the representative of the United States first.

Mr. LALL (India): As we are being so technical about the rules today, I should like to point out that we have a Journal of the United Nations before us. It is No. 2,005 dated 31 October 1958. This Journal shows meetings scheduled for 31 October and 3 November. It shows no meetings scheduled for 1 November. It is now 1 November and there are no meetings scheduled for 1 November. I think that the Committee should take due note of this fact.

If we are to meet on 1 November, a decision must be taken by the Committee to do so. In short, how long are we going to continue to meet? It is no longer 31 October. If there was a question of passing a resolution on 31 October, we have not done so. I do want to point out that there is no Journal for 1 November, but we did schedule meetings for 31 October and that none was scheduled for 1 November.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): As the author of the motion that is now pending, may I simply say that no one questions the competence of the members of this Committee to decide this question. May I suggest that the Committee vote either in favour or against this motion.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): (interpretation from Russian): I see that Mr. Lodge is longing for a vote because he knows in advance what the result is going to be. But I still tend towards the view that the important question of the priority of the various draft resolutions dealing with the question of the cessation of tests is a matter which should be weighed carefully.

We started our deliberations three weeks ago with the question of what item should be dealt with first, and we argued that the question of the cessation of tests should come up first in this Committee. The representative of the United States studiously sidestepped any such decision for dealing with that matter first. He therefore devised the procedure which combined three different questions into one complex item for concurrent consideration, but this method did not yield the results hoped for or expected by those not interested in a cessation of tests. Despite all these efforts, the Committee nevertheless did focus most of its attention on the matter of the cessation of tests. The Committee, by its words and actions, actually decided the matter of priority since for three weeks it dealt mainly with the cessation of tests.

It is difficult, may impossible, to understand why, after three weeks of deliberation, in the course of which the major attention of the Committee was devoted to the cessation of tests, we should now be called upon to vote on draft resolutions in an entirely different sequence, all the more so as the representative of India and a number of representatives have aptly pointed out that rule 132 specifies that if two or more proposals relate to a question the proposals shall be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

The General Assembly adopted an agenda, which included a question entitled, "Discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons." We devoted the major part of our debate to this item, which is a matter of great urgency. There are two draft resolutions which are directly relevant to this item. One was submitted on 5 October and the other one also on 5 October, but a bit later. I take a very deferential attitude with regard to the claim of the Indian representative, even though the Indian and Soviet draft resolutions addressed themselves to the same item. I quite understand the position of the representative of India since his proposal was submitted a few hours earlier.
It has document No. A/C.1/L.202, whereas our draft resolution has document No. A/C.1/L.203. I am not prepared to question the right of the Indian delegation to have its draft resolution put to the vote first.
That is now the draft resolution which is known as the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

In short, two draft resolutions touch upon the question of the discontinuance of the testing of nuclear weapons, which is an independent item on the agenda of the Assembly and was so adopted by the Assembly.

Mr. Noble today urged speed on grounds which relate obviously to the Geneva conference. But on the agenda of the Geneva conference there is only the question of the cessation of tests. No other items figure on the agenda of the Geneva conference. The Geneva conference has in fact already begun its work. If the representative of the United Kingdom felt that we ought to make haste, what he had in mind was not the question of the week-end, but the question of the substance of the matter. We should therefore make haste in adopting a decision on the question of the cessation of tests.

As far as the seventeen-Power draft resolution is concerned, in that draft resolution, as the representative of India has so aptly pointed out, the question of tests is touched upon in the first two paragraphs, constituting section A. Consequently, this draft resolution actually deals with this question only tangentially. Therefore neither considerations of form nor considerations of substance warrant priority for this draft resolution. If the United States moves priority for this draft resolution, this actually is a continuation of the line which the United States has espoused from the very outset of this Committee's work, a line which, however, was repudiated in practice by the record of the deliberations of this Committee over the past few weeks.

In fact, an attempt was made to lump the three items together for the purpose of the debate, and now an attempt is being made to lump the three items together for purposes of the draft resolution.

In this connexion I should like to draw the Chairman's attention to the following point which I make in connexion with his statement. The Chairman urged the view that the seventeen-Power draft resolution encompasses all three items which are being discussed now, and in this connexion he mentioned the amendment on the budgetary question which has been accepted by the seventeen sponsors of that draft resolution. I should like to point out, however, that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.205 was entitled as a
draft resolution on three items: on the question of disarmament; on the question of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons testing; and on the question of the reduction of military budgets, even though that draft resolution did not say one word about the reduction of budgets. In other words, the United States in compiling this resolution prepared it for all possible eventualities, not bothering to deal with all of the three questions included in the heading. Consequently, this draft resolution was designed in advance to be all-embracing, to be all-encompassing, with regard to all of the items discussed in this Committee now; but the sponsors did not even bother to put in a paragraph on budgets, which was an item that was supposed to be covered. Then they had second thoughts and they incorporated an amendment which has now been accepted by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution.

Consequently, formally speaking, that draft resolution does not cover all the questions at all except as it has them listed in the heading. In substance it did not deal with them. So, from this point of view again, it cannot be regarded as comprehensive, and surely on these grounds, among others, it does not warrant priority. The Soviet delegation therefore feels that we should abide by the rules of procedure; we should vote on the resolutions which answer this important, this urgent and throbbing question, and the vote should be taken in the order of submission, which means that we vote first on the fourteen-Power draft resolution, that we vote then on the Soviet draft resolution, and then decide on the subsequent order of our consideration.

Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands): One of the points that have been raised in this debate is whether rule 132 applies only to two draft resolutions which deal exclusively with the same subject, or whether it applies also to two draft resolutions which deal with more than only the subject which they have in common. I would respectfully suggest that although that is a very interesting legal question it is irrelevant in this case, because as the Foreign Minister for Thailand pointed out, and as you yourself have repeated, Mr. Chairman, we did at the beginning of the debate take the decision that when it came to the voting on draft resolutions, it would be the merit of the draft resolutions which would decide the order of the voting. We therefore decided at that time
that the draft resolutions will not be voted on necessarily in the order of dates, but rather that they will be voted on in the order of merit. And in order to determine the merit, obviously a vote is needed.

Therefore, if anyone suggests now that we should vote in order of dates, that would be a reversal of the decision that we have already taken, and a two-thirds majority would be needed for that.

Therefore I suggest that we have to abide by the decision which this Committee has already taken, namely, to vote on the order of priority, thus determining the merit of the draft resolutions.

Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa): My delegation is not directly concerned with any of the draft resolutions. We have listened, of course, with much interest and attention to all the arguments that have been advanced in favour of or against the motion for priority of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, and if I can sense the feeling of the Committee, I really do think that we have come to the stage where we can make up our mind on this matter. The arguments, frankly, are now becoming repetitive; we are not hearing anything new that can contribute to our making up our minds one way or the other. Accordingly I now move the closure of the debate on this procedural motion.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I take it that there is no objection to closing this debate, because, as the representative of the Union of South Africa has pointed out, enough has been said on this incidental point. That being the case, this debate is closed. As I said earlier, I felt that there was no legal obstacle to our putting to the vote the question of priority moved by the delegation of the United States that the seventeen-Power draft resolution receive such priority. That being the case, I shall put to the vote the motion of priority presented by the United States for the seventeen-Power draft resolution. A roll call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Iceland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras.


Abstaining: Ireland, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Venezuela, Austria, Finland.
The motion was adopted by 41 votes to 25, with 11 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): May I remind the representatives that there are two revisions to this draft, one that refers to the translation into Russian and the other refers only to the Spanish translation of the document. Amendments were submitted by the delegation of Ireland but they were withdrawn today. As regards the amendment submitted by Bolivia and six other countries, this was incorporated into the text of the seventeen-Power draft resolution by a statement of the delegation of the United States on behalf of all sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution. We will vote on the seventeen-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.205, which incorporates the paragraph contained in document A/C.1/L.209. A roll call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Costa Rica, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour:
Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia.

Against:
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.
Abstaining: Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.205, as amended, was adopted by 49 votes to 9, with 23 abstentions.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): A proposal was made this afternoon by the representative of Sweden that priority be given to the draft resolution submitted jointly by Austria, Japan and Sweden (A/C.1/L.213). I make this observation so that the Committee will be prepared to vote on the proposals related in part to the resolution which has been adopted, since, according to rule 132, a committee may, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal. In this connexion the co-sponsors of the draft resolution which I have mentioned have requested priority for the latter.

There appears to be no objection to a vote being taken on the items dealing with this question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Therefore, I put before the Committee the priority requested for the draft resolution of Austria, Japan and Sweden (A/C.1/L.213).

Priority for the draft resolution in A/C.1/L.213 was agreed by 47 votes to 19, with 11 abstentions.

The draft resolution in A/C.1/L.213 was adopted by 52 votes to 9, with 19 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We have seven other draft resolutions before us. For these, no formal request has been made for priority. Therefore, we shall vote first on the draft resolution in A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1, since this was the first to be submitted. A roll-call vote has been requested.

Mr. de la COLINA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I would request that a separate vote be taken on paragraph 1 of this draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of Mexico has requested a separate vote on paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, reading as follows:

"Calls for the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to the technical arrangements and controls considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of such tests;".
A vote was taken by roll-call.
Honduras, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Belorussian SSR, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana.

Against: Honduras, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti.

Abstaining: Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Austria, Bolivia, Federation of Malaya.

Paragraph 1 of the draft resolution in A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 was rejected by 36 votes to 26, with 19 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We shall now vote on the remainder of the draft resolution.

Mr. LALL (India): In view of the defeat of paragraph 1, we would withdraw the rest of the draft resolution from the vote. There is no point in putting it to the vote without the first paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In view of the comment by the representative of India, the rest of the draft resolution is withdrawn.
Mr. 

(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation voted in favour of the basic point in paragraph 1 of the fourteen-Power draft resolution, which referred to the discontinuance of testing of atomic weapons until agreement is reached. This is a fundamental demand which is likewise contained in the Soviet draft resolution. Therefore the Soviet delegation, with many others, in voting for this paragraph, demonstrated its desire and its will to have this agreement achieved. Those who voted against this paragraph, especially the atomic Powers, have demonstrated their unwillingness to stop the tests. When this paragraph was voted on, various positions of members of this Committee were made adequately clear, and, therefore, the Soviet delegation does not deem it expedient to press for a vote on its resolution.

Mr. WILEWSICZ (Poland): I would like to explain our vote on paragraph 1 of the fourteen-Power draft resolution that we just voted on. We voted in accordance with our basic stand on the problem of cessation of atomic tests, and as to the whole resolution, we would have voted for it too, as we would have voted for the resolution of the Soviet Union if it were voted upon in proper order.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In view of what the representative of the Soviet Union has said, we will not put to the vote the draft resolution of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.205. We will, therefore, go on to the draft resolution on the reduction of military budgets submitted by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.204. No amendments have been proposed to this document. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Belgium having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.
In favour: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania.

Against: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia.

Abstaining: Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavie, Afghanistan, Austria.

The draft resolution was rejected by 39 votes to 10, with 32 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In the order of presentation of drafts, the next one is the draft resolution of Ireland on the question of disarmament, A/C.1/L.206. The sponsor of this draft resolution has asked for a roll-call vote on paragraph 2 of this draft. I take it that there is no objection to the request of the sponsor that paragraph 2 of the draft resolution be voted on separately and by roll-call vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Poland having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama.
Against: None.
Abstaining: Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines.

Paragraph 2 of the draft resolution of Ireland was adopted by 57 votes to none, with 44 abstentions.
Mr. Aiken (Ireland): Although I am very glad that no negative votes were cast against this paragraph and that, therefore, the recognition of this danger stands unopposed on this Committee's record, I do not want to press any particular method of dealing with it or any particular method for the Assembly to deal with it, and therefore I withdraw the draft resolution and I hope that the Disarmament Commission that will be set up will deal with it as one of its first items.

The Chairman (interpretation from Spanish): As the Committee has just heard, the representative of Ireland has withdrawn his draft resolution. Therefore, there will be no need to vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

Mr. Walker (Australia): I would just like to say, in explanation of the Australian delegation's vote, which was an abstention, that we voted cast an abstention on paragraph 2 because it was our intention not to support the substantial proposal in paragraph 3. The Australian delegation does consider that this is a very serious matter. We believe that the Irish delegation has done a service in lending emphasis to the problem, and it is certainly our view that this is one of the matters that should receive very earnest consideration in the Disarmament Commission in whatever form it is established.

The Chairman (interpretation from Spanish): In the order of presentation of draft resolutions the next draft resolution to be considered is that of Mexico, contained in document A/C.1/L.208. The Committee will recall that the representative of Mexico requested that his be the last draft resolution to be voted upon. We will therefore proceed to the next order of presentation, which is the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1) of India and Yugoslavia. Amendments have been submitted by France to this draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.212.

Mr. Iqbal (India): Many delegations in this room have made representations to the delegations of Yugoslavia and India that they would prefer to defer the vote on this draft resolution until Monday, the reason being that many delegations have told us that they would like to consider the
proposal with us at greater length. I hope that in the interests of getting a unanimous decision on the future disarmament machinery, the Committee will allow us to defer the vote on this draft resolution until Monday.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of India has stated that the Indian and Yugoslav delegations, in view of requests received by them, prefer to postpone the voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 until Monday. If there are no objections the Committee could thus proceed.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): Might I suggest Monday afternoon rather than Monday morning? I think it would be more convenient for many members.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of India nodded; so presumably he agrees that the draft resolution be voted upon on Monday afternoon. If there are no objections, we shall postpone the voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 until Monday afternoon.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We shall now go on to the next draft resolution, the one submitted by India and Yugoslavia on the question of disarmament in document A/C.1/L.211. No amendments have been proposed to this draft resolution.

Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa): May I ask the sponsors of this draft resolution whether they insist on a vote on it, considering that the subject matter of this draft resolution is already covered by paragraph 3, section B, of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, which has already been adopted?

Mr. LALL (India): I understand the concern of the representative of South Africa, but, if the Committee will pardon me for saying so, we prefer the formulation that we have in this draft resolution to the one that has been accepted and we should be grateful if the Committee would vote on this draft resolution.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If there are no further comments we shall now vote on the draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia in document A/C.1/L.211.

The draft resolution was adopted by 73 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We still have the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1 to be voted upon on Monday afternoon. I take it that in consequence the Mexican draft resolution will also be left till Monday afternoon, because from the text we gather that it will have to be voted upon after the other draft resolution. We gather this also from the statement made by the representative of Mexico at the beginning of this meeting. I see that the representative of Mexico acquiesces.

The meeting rose at 1.5 a.m.