Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE
VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-NINTH MEETING
Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 31 October 1958, at 4 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.969. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.

58-25605
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to inform the Committee that Yugoslavia has asked to add its name to the list of co-sponsors of document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1. Therefore, the name of Yugoslavia will be added to the names of the Powers co-sponsoring this draft resolution.

There has been a new draft resolution submitted on the Question of Disarmament, which was distributed this very afternoon. It is contained in document A/C.1/L.213; it is co-sponsored by the delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden.

Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): The trend of the debate in this Committee is moving toward the direction which my delegation feared most, that is, towards a sharp division of views -- and this is happening on the very day a Conference on the subject is to meet in Geneva. In the considered opinion of my delegation, and I believe in the view of many other delegations which earnestly wish for the success of the said Conference, this trend should not be left to take its course unhindered at this stage. My delegation has the honour at this juncture to submit, in collaboration with the delegations of Austria and Sweden, a draft resolution expressing hope for the success of the Conference beginning today at Geneva. This draft resolution has been submitted for your attention and is contained in document A/C.1/L.213.

It is my delegation's earnest wish, first, that this will create an atmosphere conducive to a happy conclusion of the Geneva talks, dispelling the tense atmosphere which may harm its chance of success; second, to help permit the foreclosure of a discussion of so many draft resolutions on the cessation
of tests. The adoption of this draft resolution, we believe, could bring to an end our discussion of the question of tests of nuclear weapons, which is now to be debated in the negotiations in Geneva. I wish to appeal, therefore, on this occasion to all delegations concerned not to press to a vote their draft resolutions concerning the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests which will fail to obtain unanimity. We shall then be able to continue with our debate at the appropriate time, on the other aspects of disarmament, such as the reduction of military budgets and, if it is found necessary or convenient, the question of continuing United Nations machinery.
Mr. UNDEN (Sweden): As a co-sponsor of the draft resolution just presented by the Japanese delegation, I might perhaps be allowed to say a few words about the reasons which have prompted the Swedish delegation to co-sponsor it. Our reasons might be best explained by recalling some of the remarks which I made on a previous occasion concerning the other draft resolutions on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

The Swedish delegation has no objections against the text of the seventeen-Power draft resolution in itself. However, the principal supporters of that draft have declared as their position that the ban on the tests should be accepted on a one year basis. My delegation considers that too short. Furthermore, this draft lacks a recommendation calling upon States other than the three present members of the "atom club" to refrain from testing.

The Soviet Union draft resolution does not contain any reference to the control system to be applied as a condition to the commitments that the parties of a future agreement ought to undertake.

The proposal made by India and twelve other delegations comes closer to our own position than the other drafts. However, we do not approve of the wording of its operative paragraph 1. In that paragraph the States concerned are called upon to reach agreement on the controls which are considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of nuclear tests. However, the question of how to proceed if an agreement on controls is not reached within a reasonable time is left open. For this reason we could not support this draft resolution without a reservation as to operative paragraph 1.

Unfortunately, the attempts to merge the different drafts into a common resolution acceptable to all have not succeeded, as the discussion this morning has shown. In these circumstances, and since none of the existing draft resolutions corresponds entirely to our views, we have found it natural to join the Japanese and Austrian delegations in their efforts to formulate a new draft, expressing only the Assembly's hopes that the negotiations which begin today in Geneva might lead to a positive result acceptable to all.

We are, of course, conscious of the substantial divergencies which have hitherto existed between the big Powers, but the prospects for successful negotiations in Geneva will not increase, I am afraid, if the Assembly conveys a profoundly divided opinion to the conference. The purpose of our draft
resolution is to avoid such dissention at the beginning of the new conference in Geneva. This purpose can be fulfilled only if our draft resolution receives priority over the other draft resolutions concerning nuclear tests, and consequently I should like to request priority for our proposal.

Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria): During the course of this debate the conviction of the Austrian delegation has been confirmed that it must be the task of the present Assembly to spare no efforts in order to create the necessary conditions for a discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. Such a discontinuance -- and let there be no doubt about it -- however, can only be achieved by an agreement between the nuclear Powers themselves. We welcome, therefore, the fact that the Powers have expressed their willingness to sit down together at the conference table in Geneva.

The General Assembly, for its part, at this stage can hardly do more than express its hope that the conference will have the desired success. That is the reason why the Austrian delegation has co-sponsored, together with Japan and Sweden, the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.213) submitted this afternoon.

We have no illusions about the fact that this draft does not provide a solution as to the substance of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We feel, however, that in the present circumstances and considering the opposing views expressed during the course of the general debate, it would be wiser to accept unanimously a procedural resolution than to aggravate the existing tensions by a controversial vote. We have the firm conviction that only in this way can we contribute constructively to the success of, and create a favourable atmosphere for, the talks that are being opened today in Geneva.

The representatives who have preceded me in introducing our draft resolution have made our common position so abundantly clear that there is hardly any need for further remarks. Let me therefore be brief and say that we feel this draft to be a fair and acceptable proposal which should find the support of all delegations here assembled.

I wish, therefore, to join the representative of Japan and the Foreign Minister of Sweden in appealing to all delegations that have submitted or sponsored draft resolutions on this question not to press for a vote on them.
so that the way may be open for a unanimous vote. Finally, I wish to support the request made by the Foreign Minister of Sweden that our draft resolution should be given priority in the vote.

**The CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from Spanish): The three co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.215 have now spoken, but they have not referred to one point. The Committee has three items before it and draft resolutions have been submitted on those three items. The new draft resolution just submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden is entitled "Question of disarmament", but it appears from its contents and from the statements just made that it refers exclusively to the question of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. I should therefore like to ask its co-sponsors whether they agree that its title should be modified.

**Mr. UNDEN** (Sweden): I should like to confirm the fact that our draft resolution concerns only the question of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

**Mr. WALDHEIM** (Austria): I quite agree with the Foreign Minister of Sweden on this point. Our draft resolution concerns only the question of the discontinuance of the tests.

**Mr. MATSUDAIRA** (Japan): I wish to confirm what has just been said by the Foreign Minister of Sweden and the representative of Austria. We have no objection to the Chairman's suggestion.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Taking into account the statements made by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, the document will be corrected, when it is issued as a document of the Committee, so that it will come within the scope of the item on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): We have all heard the statements made by the representatives of Japan, Sweden and Austria introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.213. They appealed, in the interests of success in the Geneva negotiations, for all Members of the General Assembly to support this draft resolution and for the sponsors of other draft resolutions on testing to refrain from pressing them to the vote in the interests of this conciliatory approach.

As soon as we were informed of the decision of these delegations to introduce this draft resolution, the seventeen Powers -- in, I may say, the same spirit of conciliation as they have shown towards previous efforts to reach a compromise -- met to consider their position. On behalf of the seventeen co-sponsors, I am authorized to say that we would support this draft resolution and give it precedence over our motion for priority if the sponsors of other draft resolutions dealing with the testing question agree to withdraw them or not to press them to a vote.

The co-sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution are prepared to take such action with respect to their draft resolution and to deal with the surprise attack and disarmament aspects of that draft resolution by introducing a revision of the twelve-Power draft resolution. We hope that, in the interests of the Geneva negotiations, the other co-sponsors of draft resolutions dealing with testing will agree to withdraw theirs also.

We think that, if the Austrian-Japanese-Swedish draft resolution were adopted today and we thereupon completed our debate on this issue, it would be the most constructive thing the General Assembly could do for the Geneva negotiations. We are willing to accept this compromise despite our firm belief that the seventeen-Power draft resolution is the one which the Committee would, and should, otherwise adopt. The compromise draft resolution, we think, would encourage the work in Geneva, and it is better not to try to duplicate their efforts there.
Of course, if the sponsors of other draft resolutions on testing insist that their draft resolutions be put to a vote, my motion for priority for the seventeen-Power draft resolution would, naturally, still stand, and in that case, of course, I should have to press it.

Mr. Noble (United Kingdom): I should like to associate myself with what has just been said by my colleague, Mr. Lodge. My delegation also welcomes the proposition put before the Committee by the delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden. We applaud their effort to enable the General Assembly to declare its attitude towards the Geneva negotiations and to do so on the basis of unanimity or at least a very wide measure of agreement.

My delegation would certainly be prepared to support the draft resolution submitted by these three delegations in that spirit, that is to say, as a means of obtaining unanimity.

As I pointed out this morning, the Geneva negotiations are already under way, and time is pressing. It would be a matter of disappointment not only to my delegation but, I think, also to all others here and to the world at large if the General Assembly were not able now to raise its voice in encouragement of the Geneva negotiations. Surely the Assembly will wish to urge those taking part to make every effort to reach an agreement on the problem of nuclear weapons tests, an agreement which could be of such great significance for the cause of disarmament and of world peace.

Therefore, if the new three-Power draft resolution proves generally acceptable for this purpose and if the sponsors of the other draft resolutions relating to the problem of nuclear tests are willing not to press their proposals, then my delegation would likewise not wish to press the seventeen-Power draft resolution in so far as it concerns the subject of nuclear tests. We should be willing in those circumstances to have no vote taken on the seventeen-Power draft resolution as it stands now.

The seventeen-Power draft resolution does, of course, deal with other matters quite apart from nuclear tests. I think the Committee will want to declare its attitude on these matters later, and we should accordingly reserve the right to put forward our views on these other subjects in some different form.
My delegation would, therefore, now wish to hear the views of delegations sponsoring the other draft resolutions before us. If these delegations are willing to take the same attitude as ourselves, then I would urge the Committee to resolve this matter here and now on the basis of the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden. If, however, the sponsors of the other draft resolutions dealing with nuclear tests were not willing to refrain from pressing them to the vote, then, I fear, the initiative of the three delegations would have to be regarded as having failed of its purpose, and we should have to recognize that unanimity or near unanimity could not be achieved. In these circumstances my delegation would be obliged, of course, to stand by the seventeen-Power draft resolution, and we should support the motion of the United States that priority be given to this draft resolution in the voting. But I earnestly hope that this will not be necessary and that the new initiative by Austria, Japan and Sweden will command the unanimous support of this Committee.

Mr. Belaunde (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation is willing to cede the floor at this time to the co-sponsors of the other draft resolutions on the question of the discontinuance of tests -- that is, to the representatives of the Soviet Union, India, Afghanistan or other countries that may wish to speak on the thirteen-Power draft resolution. If, however, they do not wish to speak now, I should like to make a brief statement on the joint draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden.
Mr. LALL (India): The delegation of India has listened with interest to the preceding speakers on the draft resolution which has just been introduced by our friends of Austria, Japan and Sweden.

Mr. Chairman, it has often been the case that the General Assembly in its wisdom has found it best to express itself very mildly, very gently on an issue. Very often we have genuflected, praised faintly, and passed on to something else. But in the considered view of the delegation of India, and I believe I say this with the agreement of the fourteen co-sponsors of our draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202) this question of the discontinuance of texts is not of the character that this Assembly, in our view, should express itself in this pious, gentle way.

Now, that being the case, though of course we wish well to the Geneva Conference -- and we have welcomed the present Conference in our own draft resolution -- we regret very much that we are unable to agree that it would be a constructive move for this Assembly to adopt this resolution. We are not in a position to support this draft resolution, much as we have tried to understand, and I think do understand, the motives of our friends in putting it forward. We do believe that in a matter of this gravity, of this importance to the world, that the General Assembly must express its opinion on the substance of the matter. In that view, which we, all the co-sponsors of our draft resolution, maintain, we will be obliged to request that our draft resolution be put to the vote first -- which would be the normal position under the rules of this Committee. We realize, of course, that others have asked for priority, but unless the Committee decides to displace our text by a vote, our draft resolution will be put to the vote first. And that is the position we would wish to maintain.

While I have the floor I would crave your indulgence to say one word on the matter which arose this morning when I made a statement about the negotiations for an acceptable text. It is relevant that I should do so at this point because we are now talking about texts on the same subject. All I wish to say is that the representatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union commented upon my presentation of the efforts in which we engaged. I was sorry
to feel that either of them should think that I had misrepresented what had occurred. I should like to assure this Committee that to the best of my ability I honestly and frankly told this Committee what had occurred as I saw it. I have no doubt that other representatives who were involved in those conversations would see what had occurred differently from the way I saw it -- that is only natural. But I do not think it fair to attribute to me any motives in the statement which I made, as I certainly would not do in the case of the statements which were made by the other representatives who were concerned in these rather difficult and taxing negotiations.

May I just say this, in conclusion, that it is my belief that all the three Powers who are meeting in Geneva -- and I say this on the basis of the protracted discussions which I have had the fortune to have with their representatives here -- want to lead to a definitive cessation of nuclear weapons tests. There is no difference in the objective so far as I can discover. It is for that reason that we persevered in our negotiations right to the last moment. We still hope that the Powers mainly concerned will be able to come to agreement on this whole matter and that if they do not do so here, they will come to agreement at Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, to sum up, we regret very much that we are unable to withdraw our draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.202, and we will maintain it and ask that it be put to the vote in its proper order.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has listened carefully to the statements of the representatives of Japan, Sweden and Austria on the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.213) just submitted by their delegation.

I wish to draw attention to the fact that the representative of Japan has acknowledged that the draft resolution presented by these three States should, as he put it, put an end to the discussion on the question of the discontinuance of tests. He accordingly asked other sponsors of draft resolutions, under that head, to withdraw their products.
In his statement the representative of Sweden likewise noted that since no agreed draft resolution had been forthcoming, only one thing was left, and that was to express hope for the success of the Conference. In other words, the representative of Sweden would not find it possible for the General Assembly itself to express its views on the matter. He would shift the matter wholesale to the Conference.

The representative of Austria was also candid in disclaiming any illusions. He acknowledged that there was no solution as to the substance of the matter in the draft resolution, but he suggested that it was better unanimously to adopt a procedural resolution than to continue disputes or debates as to substance. This was the burden of what he had to say.

If one will analyse the implications of what was said as well as the draft resolution and its text, the conclusion is bound to be that this draft resolution so far from moving us forward one step, actually would return us to the point where we started out three weeks ago.

In his first statement, opening our debate, Mr. Lodge saw as the task of the Assembly to encourage the forthcoming Geneva Conference. To judge by his speech then, there was the long and short of it as far as the job of the General Assembly was concerned. And before Mr. Lodge said that, Mr. Dulles said essentially the same thing during the general debate in the plenary.
What does this draft resolution say? It is actually an expression of this attempt merely to voice encouragement of and a generalized hope in the success of the Conference. This hope, however, as the sponsors of the draft resolution recognize, is not based on the true state of affairs as regards the discussion of this matter in the Committee; it bears rather the characteristics of a platonic wish.

The draft resolution does not stem from the views which the Assembly itself would be called upon to express in the matter, stimulating, as it should, movement in this matter in the direction which all the countries and all the peoples unanimously expect. In these circumstances, a draft resolution of this nature, far from helping matters, actually impedes them as regards the consummation which we wish, that is, the cessation of tests.

I do not wish to question the intentions of the sponsors. A discussion on that score would hardly serve a useful purpose at this stage, all the more so as some of these representatives, especially the representatives of Sweden and Austria, have taken in the course of our debates more or less clear-cut positions on the substance of the matter in support of the universal demand, a demand voiced by public opinion of their own countries and peoples, that tests be stopped. Therefore, I will not question their motives. But, like all other delegations, I must approach this matter from the point of view of the objective significance of the step which they have chosen to take after our debate of three weeks. Everyone will surely agree that after our debate, heated though it possibly was on occasion, on this vital matter on which the attention of millions of people in the world is focused, to wind up the whole matter by returning to the starting point is not correct, is ill-advised and is not helpful as regards the substance of the matter on which the Geneva conference are now working.

That is why the Soviet delegation is unable to support this draft resolution. In fact, it will -- and I regret to have to say this -- have to vote against it. Surely we cannot be expected to support a draft resolution which creates the delusive semblance, the spurious appearance, of the Assembly's having done something in this matter. By adopting this draft
resolution, the Assembly will contribute nothing useful to this matter. The contrary is true: the Assembly will create the impression that nothing to speak of has actually happened in the past three weeks in our Committee or in the Assembly, that everybody in this Committee is happy that things are going just fine and that the situation is quite to one's content. The representatives of Sweden, Austria and Japan would have us unanimously adopt a draft resolution which says nothing on the substance of the question which we have been busy discussing for three weeks.

Surely you will agree that such a step by the General Assembly will not commend the approval of world public opinion or of those who have consistently and stubbornly waged the campaign for the universal cessation of tests. To refuse to heed the demands of millions of human beings would be tantamount to having the Assembly shirk its responsibilities. The Assembly would be remiss in its duty in a matter on which it is eminently obliged to have a say. It is incumbent on the Assembly to speak on the substance of the matter rather than hide its head in the bushes in dealing with this question.

As far as the question of priority in voting is concerned, I submit that it is by means accidental that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have chosen actively to support the suggestion that this draft resolution should be given priority. This is no accidental move by the United States and the United Kingdom. In fact, it means that the United States and the United Kingdom are unwilling to take any decision on the question of the cessation of tests or, for that matter, on all other disarmament questions. The United States and the United Kingdom are determined to hide behind this draft resolution which says nothing in the hope that world public opinion will thus be kept in ignorance as to the position which they had espoused in the concluding stages of the debate. My delegation finds it quite intolerable that a draft resolution introduced at the eleventh hour, with regard to which our rules of procedure require at least a twenty-four-hour delay, be given priority, all the more so as this draft resolution in substance diverts the General Assembly from any solution of the substance of the question on which we have been working and debating for the past three weeks. Not only will we vote against this draft resolution, but we will also vote against the illegal, illegitimate demand that priority should be given to it.
Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia): Faced with a situation in which we are compelled to take positions and cast votes on the different draft resolutions referring to the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, may I, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, briefly set forth the attitude of my delegation.

We regret that in spite of the efforts made it has not been possible to reach an agreement that would have provided the most favourable conditions for the talks in Geneva which open today. However, we have not lost hope. The problem is of such vital importance for the whole of humanity that we feel certain that the countries which are carrying out nuclear weapons tests will inevitably have to come to an agreement among themselves. My delegation desires that the negotiations which have started in Geneva be successful and that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests be achieved. Even such an arrangement among the nuclear Powers on the discontinuance of tests would mark the turning point to a new stage of positive development not only in the field of disarmament but also in international relations generally. I have in mind the tremendous relief which the whole world would feel if such an agreement is achieved.

I turn now to the draft resolutions which are before us. I feel I must say that our entire work here has been directed towards the achievement of a unanimous solution, for which we believe the objective possibility existed. However, in a situation marked by the absence of a generally acceptable solution, my delegation considered it necessary, with a view to expressing the policy and position of my Government regarding the question of the cessation of tests, to co-sponsor the proposed draft resolution on the discontinuance of tests submitted by Afghanistan and twelve other Powers.
Bearing in mind all that I have just said, my delegation is not in a position to support the other draft resolutions now before us which deal with the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

What I have said will also guide our position on the question of the priority of the draft resolutions before us.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): It appears to me that we are getting close to the voting stage and I therefore wish to explain the position of the United States on all of the principal substantive resolutions pending before the Committee. I had hoped that this would not be necessary, frankly, but since the sponsors of other draft resolutions on tests refuse to accept our offer and support the Austrian-Japanese-Swedish draft resolution in lieu of all others, I am left with no other choice.

The United States will vote against the Soviet draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.203. As I have stated here before, we cannot accept a draft resolution calling for an end to nuclear weapons tests which purposely overlooks the need for any control. Such a resolution would be a hoax on the peoples of the world. But we do not reject the draft resolution on this point alone. The Soviet draft resolution does not even mention the Geneva talks, the forum which offers the greatest hope that an agreement on this matter can be reached. I think it is crystal-clear by this time that the Soviet Union wants a mere paper promise, whereas we want real, actual stoppage. I do not think the Soviet position deludes anyone, and the difference between us is the difference between the shadow and the substance.

The United States will also vote against the thirteen-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1. This draft resolution recognizes the importance of an agreement on controls. However, it calls for an unconditional ending of tests until such agreement is reached. Now this would strengthen the hands of those who may not want to reach agreement in Geneva on a suspension of tests under effective international control. It would make it possible to avoid controls entirely by insisting on an unconditional cessation, pure and simple. We have pointed out in this debate that this would be worse than no agreement at all. The fact that the word "pending" in the original draft of this resolution was
subsequently changed to the word "until" makes it clear that the intent of this
draft resolution also is that there should be a discontinuance of tests whether or
not controls are established.

We will vote for the Austrian-Japanese-Swedish text contained in
document A/C.1/L.213. We think that these three States are to be commended for
this effort. It expresses a sentiment which we all share and which we should relay
to the parties now assembled in Geneva.

With respect to the seventeen-Power text, for which I have made a formal
motion for priority and which is, I believe, the pending question before this
Committee, the co-sponsors accept the amendment proposed by several Latin American
delegations in document A/C.1/L.209, and we will incorporate it in the draft
resolution. This constitutes a sensible approach to the use of savings which would
be effected by genuine disarmament measures.

We will have to vote against the amendment to the seventeen-Power draft
resolution presented by the Foreign Minister of Ireland in document A/C.1/L.207.
While we share his basic objective, we do not believe that this is the context in
which this objective can be achieved. We cannot accept any obligation the
observance of which cannot be verified. The Irish proposal seemed to us obviously
deficient in this regard.

We shall also vote against the Irish draft resolution A/C.1/L.206 for the same
reason. Our objective is to provide a context in which States can make an
undertaking on nuclear weapons problems with the full knowledge that its observance
can be assured without jeopardizing their own safety. This can be accomplished as
part of a concerted action. An ad hoc committee to study the problem of the
transfer of weapons would in effect be a committee to examine the entire disarmament
problem. This would but complicate matters and duplicate the work of the
Disarmament Commission.

We will also vote against the Soviet draft resolution on military budgets in
document A/C.1/L.204. A reduction of military expenditures will come in connexion
with real agreement on disarmament measures. We regard the Soviet draft resolution
as a completely transparent manoeuvre designed solely for propaganda purposes.
We shall vote for the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.211, on surprise attacks. It reflects the same ideas contained in the seventeen-Power draft resolution, and we see no objection to restating these ideas in a separate resolution if the sponsors wish to put it to a vote.

This leaves the question of United Nations machinery on disarmament. There are two draft resolutions on this question: the Mexican draft resolution, A/C.1/L.208; and the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution, A/C.1/L.210. We think something might be worked out on this problem which might be acceptable, and I suggest that this particular matter not be put to a vote today as we have all been so busy on the other problems; but I am sure this can all be worked out next week.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In order to clarify matters, I should like to set the parliamentary stage at this moment. First of all, I would like to refer to the question of the draft resolution of Austria, Japan and Sweden (A/C.1/L.213) submitted today and distributed today. The representative of the Soviet Union pointed out in his speech that this draft resolution could not be discussed nor voted on today since it was distributed and presented to the Committee today. This is true. According to rule 121 of the rules of procedure:

"Proposals and amendments shall normally be introduced in writing and handed to the Secretary-General, who shall circulate copies to the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be discussed or put to the vote at any meeting of the committee unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations not later than the day preceding the meeting. The Chairman may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments, or of motions as to procedure, even though these amendments and motions have not been circulated or have only been circulated the same day."

Naturally, in view of the urgency in which we find ourselves, and because we must continue with our debate and vote as soon as possible, the Committee might decide to admit this draft resolution and, though it was distributed today, it might be discussed and voted on today as well. However, in order to avoid any objection of this nature, I prefer to ask the Committee.

Does the Committee object to our discussing and, if possible, voting on this draft resolution today? I am referring to the draft resolution of Austria, Japan and Sweden, A/C.1/L.213.
Mr. Tsvetanov (Bulgaria): We have before us a draft resolution which, as the sponsors who presented it have stated, might be given priority. However, since this concerns a subject which we have discussed at length and which is of the greatest importance, concerning as it does humanity itself, this draft resolution warrants very careful consideration on the part of all delegations in order that they may be in a position to take a stand. That is why I believe that it would be advisable to adjourn the discussion so that this draft resolution may be considered and studied.

The Chairman: The representative of Bulgaria believes that the meeting should be adjourned in order that representatives may have time to study the new draft resolution. I take note of his opinion and, once again, I ask whether there is any objection to a discussion taking place and, if possible, a vote reached on the draft resolution of Austria, Japan and Sweden.

Mr. Winiewicz (Poland): I apologize for raising this point but, with due respect to all representatives, and particularly to the Chairman, I must say that this Committee is acting in a zigzag manner, and has been doing so since we began consideration of this whole question.

In the first place, we had a prolonged discussion as to whether priority should be given to the question of tests. Some representatives expressed the view that the general problem of disarmament should be discussed. So we began a general discussion on the disarmament problem. Now we have reached the stage of expressing our views on the draft resolutions before us. We are asked to decide within sixty minutes a question of the greatest importance, the question of tests -- not the question of tests on the basis of the substance of the matter or on the basis of what the draft resolutions have to say, but on one draft resolution only.

I would suggest that, although we began our discussion with some unsuccessful moves, we continue in the proper manner. I respectfully submit that the proper order would be to allow all delegations the opportunity of expressing their views on the merits of the various draft resolutions. For my
part -- and I think that many delegations are in the same position -- I made a reservation after my statement in the general debate to the effect that I should like to have the opportunity to speak about the merits of the different draft resolutions, and I cannot speak on their merits without taking due note of what they really contain. I am not prepared to say that nothing else can be done about all the draft resolutions before us and to discuss and vote only upon the one which has been submitted today -- rather in a hurry, I may say, although, of course, I have great respect for the authors of the document.

My suggestion is that we should proceed with a detailed discussion of the merits of the draft resolutions before us at the proper time and then proceed to vote, rather than to select from all the draft resolutions which have been submitted only one, which not every delegation has had the opportunity to study fully.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I presume that, because of the interpretation, or because my words were not sufficiently clear, the representative of Poland has not quite understood my meaning. I did not mean -- nor do I think I said -- that I felt that the debate should crystallize into the Austrian-Japanese-Swedish draft resolution. I made reference to the Soviet Union representative's statement that, in accordance with the rules of procedure, a proposal submitted this afternoon should not be discussed nor voted upon today. I asked the question of the Committee in an endeavour to ascertain our parliamentary position. We have heard two speakers, but neither has made any formal objection to my statement. Therefore, I take it that there is assent to the proposal that as well as discussing the other eight proposals and amendments, we can begin to discuss and perhaps vote upon the joint draft resolution of Austria, Japan and Sweden. This does not at all mean exclusion of the other proposals; it does not limit the scope of speakers to speak of one draft resolution, or of eight or nine, or of the amendments.

In view of the fact that the proposal made by the sponsors of the Austrian-Japanese-Swedish draft resolution, which was accepted by the United States, did not receive general acceptance because the United States made the condition that the draft resolutions presented respectively by the fourteen Powers and by the Soviet Union on nuclear questions would be withdrawn, therefore, we have returned to a discussion of all the draft resolutions and amendments.
Those whose names are on the list of speakers will refer to all the
draft resolutions, as will also those who may wish to have their names inscribed.
The time has not yet arrived for voting, but when that time comes I shall try to
take up the questions of priority which have been raised. I repeat,
speakers may refer to the entire problem of all the proposals and amendments.

Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): On the question of
the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests the following ideas have been
expressed. The first was that contained in the seventeen-Power draft resolution;
the second, the Soviet Union proposal; next, the fourteen-Power draft resolution
and, finally, the proposal of the delegation of India expressed this morning by
Mr. Lall.

The delegation of Peru regrets that the thought expressed by the delegation
of India, extending the initial draft (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1) was not submitted as a
proposal. Lastly, we have the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and
Sweden.

Four different stands have been taken. The Committee could choose which of
the four it wished to go along with, but a certain peculiarity has appeared. The
representative of the Soviet Union accepts no proposal but its own, because,
basically, the declaration which is being suggested as a rather vague
reservation to a compromise solution reiterates the thoughts already expounded
in the Soviet draft resolution.
So it is, I admit, an extremely difficult position to be in, because, as far as this position is concerned, we all do want to have some solution. The shadings do not matter, but some solution must be arrived at, because the Geneva Conference has already convened; and the Geneva Conference and the world, the public in general, expects and awaits a word of encouragement, a word of trust, not a useless, an empty word, but a word which will express the sincere views of the Assembly and of world public opinion. But we meet with such a negative attitude that it reminds me somewhat of the person that Goethe defined as the spirit that denied all. Everything is denied here.

The seventeen-Power draft: No. The Indian draft: If it does not carry a cancelling reservation, no. The proposal that represents the noble ideals of Austria, Japan and Sweden: No. Everything is bad, everything is negative. What the Afro-Asian countries suggest: No. What the neutral countries believe, what the western countries believe, accompanied by some Latin American nations: This, too, is no. In the face of this universal "no", this cosmic negation, one is, I must say, somewhat worried. I do not wish to antagonize, I do not wish to fight, but I must speak with great bitterness in my mind. Gentlemen, I must call a spade a spade, because here is the place to do so.

Imagine if, instead of the very noble suggestion of Austria, Japan and Sweden, which expresses the hope that the Conference will lead to an agreement acceptable to all, instead of these words, which are certainly not trite -- and by now they express the true feelings of the assembly, and they are not trite because they express the feelings of humanity -- instead of this, if we tell the Geneva Conference, "regardless" -- and I will use the English word -- "regardless of the position that you may take, regardless of what work you may do, I give the order that, once and for all, you cease, for all times, in eternum, to use a liturgical expression, nuclear tests", what would the Geneva Conference say? They would say, "Certainly you are trying to help me, aren't you, when you say that my work is of no use whatsoever, because you say that no matter what I may do, you have already decided that, with or without inspection, there shall be unconditional and final cessation of tests."
Well, where do we go from here? Well, I do not think that human intelligence can be thus overlooked. There are certain limits to tolerance, to human understanding. You cannot, as an encouragement to the Conference at Geneva, present a proposal such as that of the Soviet Union, or a declaration such as that contained in the Soviet resolution. If I were a representative at Geneva I would say, "Well, then, may I ask why we are here?" If the General Assembly has already told us that no matter what we do we are going to get absolutely nowhere; that they have decided it their way, perhaps in our logic—I believe we have only one logic, because there is only the logic of primitive peoples; we do have certain logic, all of us—but I do not think that, under any system of logic, you can take the stand that this is an encouragement to the Conference in Geneva. Nor is it encouraging to the Conference at Geneva to say that the suspension will be consolidated, with no agreement arrived at either. I told the Committee this earlier: You cannot set up an institution and depend upon the will of one of the parties to keep this institution in existence. A juridical institution presupposes a certain understanding between two different parties. Therefore, if an institution is to appear as a consequence of the will, the negative will, rather, of one of the parties, then the institution is null and void, and the Assembly is absolutely useless because of its very nature. So that, basically, things are becoming clearer. I was afraid of this, but I must say I respect the position taken by parties, but I was afraid of this. I felt that the Soviet Union resolution overlooked the Geneva Conference. It made no mention of it. It preferred to pass over it in silence. Now we understand full well why. Instead of the practical process of negotiations to guarantee a cessation with necessary controls, which is the only way to give the parties full guarantees, which will make effective this cessation, inspection, guarantees of suspension of tests, as does control guarantee the prohibition of the use of atomic and nuclear weapons, and as we cannot accept prohibition of nuclear weapons without control, so we cannot seriously formally discuss cessation without a system of inspection and control, because, otherwise, the party imbued with good faith would be disarmed,
and the party imbued with bad faith would rule the roost. But there is a very peculiar thing happening here. When control is to be perfected, which is a practical, material process -- it is a process of ideals on the march -- then the Soviet Union startlingly announced an absolute no, absolute prohibition -- full stop. And therefore, the word "prohibition" became a slogan to detain control, to stop control. Now, sir, with great sorrow in my heart, I have to say that the words "unconditional cessation" are the way of carrying out the slogan for stopping control.

This is the problem we have to face. What humanity wants is a true cessation, not a verbal cessation. What humanity wants is a true prohibition, not a verbal prohibition. And as we stand upon the idea that control is indispensable, and it is absolutely indivisible and cannot be separated from prohibition, so, too, do we hold that control, which is to be negotiated in Geneva, is substantially one and part of cessation; and anyone turning down control, and anyone who believes that control is unnecessary, is revealing that they certainly will not go towards cessation. This is a point of view that is not held by me but by world public opinion. World public opinion cannot be hoaxed. It cannot be misled. The public has its logic, and, if it lacks logic, it has instinct, and such a public cannot accept as sincere a proposal for unconditional cessation which excludes negotiation, and which takes into account none of the practical aspects of negotiation, which are the controls and inspection.

I frankly feel that at this moment everything should be clear cut. The Assembly must take some resolution: granted. And today, I stand firmly on this fact: that a negative vote on the Soviet proposal and a negative vote on the unrevised resolution, as so wisely expressed by Mr. Lell, are the one stand to take -- because we do not want a paper cessation; we cannot accept a cessation depending on the will of one party that may reneg at any moment. I have had some experience in negotiations, because in fifty-seven years of diplomatic life I have taken part in numerous negotiations sessions. Why should there be disagreement in Geneva? It would not be disagreement on the ends. We all tend to the same things. We all want the same ends. We all feel
equally that cessation is good and desirable, and that is the end we are aiming at. But we have to consider the means. We are not arguing over the ends. We are arguing over the means. Negotiations and exchanges of ideas are meant to decide upon the means, not the ends. The ends are taken for granted, shall we say? Agreements on negotiations will come on the question on the question of inspection, and then what would happen? We would leave standing indefinite cessation of tests without any inspection whatsoever. There would be no inspection, but there would be the moral obligation to abide by the decision indefinitely to suspend tests. That is a situation that we cannot in good faith accept. That is a situation that cannot be technically acceptable. So that, on behalf of logic, on behalf of jurisprudence, and on behalf of common sense and world public opinion and instinct, that prefers a partial Utopia, if it cannot have a total Utopia, I believe that we can vote, with full knowledge, against the Soviet proposal and against the proposal of the fourteen countries, despite the very noble ideal underlying it as it appears in document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1.
If the representatives of the fourteen countries co-sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 are willing to substitute for the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.213) sponsored by Austria, Japan and Sweden an idea that was the basis of an agreement, and it was acceptable to the United States, I would like to inform those Powers that the Peruvian delegation would not only vote in favour of it, but would be honoured to defend it warmly. But I cannot understand -- and in this, of course, I have to respect other people's positions; I do not have to go along with them, but I have to respect them -- why the delegation of India did not crystallize the ideas that Mr. Lall read out to us this morning, which made such a good impression on us, by submitting them formally in a draft resolution.

As far as the other draft resolutions are concerned, I shall only refer to the one submitted by India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.211), which my delegation will support warmly. The other draft resolution (A/C.1/L.210) refers to the constitution of the Disarmament Commission. I have studied this document meticulously and have come to the conclusion that this draft resolution is not contrary to the Charter but rather fits in within the framework of the Charter.

It is true that the Charter gives security powers to the Security Council. It places upon the shoulder of the Security Council the task, and therefore the duty and the function, of coping with disarmament, and it is only Article 11 that brings this question of disarmament before the General Assembly. But since the Secretary-General has told us that the Disarmament Commission has not been able to function, then, not only because of the "Uniting For Peace" resolution, but because of the precedents at the San Francisco Conference, the General Assembly, when it is notified by the Secretary-General that a body which the Security Council has set up, or a body that is dependent on the Security Council, is not dealing with the matter, it has to do so.

Therefore, it is at this moment up to the General Assembly to act because the Disarmament Commission has been paralysed. The General Assembly now has full jurisdiction over the question of disarmament because of the "Uniting For Peace" resolution as well.
Therefore, we would have to constitute ourselves as a commission. It would be useful for us to act as a commission, and we would represent the Assembly. This commission, as in the case of a great radar screen, will have to follow the steps of the negotiations. It is the Assembly which will have to listen in on those negotiations. Besides, other questions will come up in this commission, such as the question of surprise attack, and finally, the question of control of the final cessation of production of nuclear weapons and the transformation of stockpiles.

This is the view of the Peruvian delegation. We will warmly support the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.215) submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden when the moment comes to vote on it. We trust and we hope that this proposal will fit in with the seventeen-Power draft resolution. My delegation will vote in favour of the seventeen-Power draft resolution as revised, as announced by Mr. Lodge on behalf of the co-sponsors.

Mr. AMADO (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): In the course of the general debate my delegation explained why we deemed it appropriate to support the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) which, in alphabetical order, my delegation is the first to have sponsored. We do not believe that we should go back and discuss the causes for that approval. Our delegations have expressed the desire to conciliate, to compromise. We have shown great flexibility -- and I feel that I should bear public witness to this -- so much so that in these last few days we have worked overtime to try to bring about the desired unanimous solution awaited by the General Assembly and longed for by world public opinion.

I shall not go back and explain again the reasons for that support. But I feel that I must clarify one aspect which in this morning's debate might have been left in the shadows because of certain remarks passed by the representative of India when he referred to his worthy efforts for general unification of ideas. At that time Mr. Lall said that the seventeen-Powers, through the United States which had represented these Powers, had decided in these conciliation talks, to support the draft resolution on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests submitted by India and Yugoslavia.
It is true that that approval was given by the seventeen co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.205, but it is no less true that perhaps unwittingly -- the representative of India did not say it -- that approval regarding the cessation of nuclear tests was conditioned by the approval of two more draft resolutions, one on general balanced disarmament, and the other on surprise attacks.

The idea generally held by the co-sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution was based upon the fact that disarmament is one general and indivisible problem. We could not therefore renounce our concept unless we were ready completely to abandon our position, which we could not do. It was already making a tremendous effort to bring about conciliation, harmony and compromise, and the seventeen Powers were willing to consent to a formal division of the draft resolutions, separating the reduction of military budgets on the one hand, surprise attack on the other, and the discontinuance of atomic tests.

So that on this question we had gone as far as we could possibly go to try to bring about understanding and compromise. But what we could under no circumstances do was to renounce a fundamental aspect of our views, such as the basic substantive link that exists between the three main facets and aspects of disarmament. Since this was not sufficiently clear from the explanations given this morning by Mr. Lall when he relayed to the Committee the substance of the conciliation talks that took place, and since from that partial version there might be a misunderstanding regarding the firmness of our stand and the warmth with which we are ready to defend that stand -- and I speak on behalf of my own delegation at the moment -- I felt that my words were called for.

In conclusion, I want to repeat that I do not have the slightest shadow of a doubt regarding the good faith and the honourability of purposes of the representative of India. We have all highly praised the efforts of Mr. Lall.
We have seen his arduous work and we certainly pay tribute to him and to it. But I do wish to reiterate the position of my delegation in defending the seventeen-Power draft resolution which we believe to be wise and impartial, and which certainly should not give rise to any discussions.

We will support the request made by the representative of the United States to the effect that this draft resolution be given priority at the time of the vote. We will at the right moment vote in favour of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.215) submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden. With these words I conclude my explanation.
Mr. WINTER (Poland): The general debate in our Committee has
proved once again that amongst all the problems presented to it the
cessation of nuclear weapons tests is at present the most important and the
most urgent question in connexion with the disarmament problem. It is indeed
an issue on which agreement in our humble opinion could be reached without any
delay. Therefore it can be regarded as the first step which would facilitate
future disarmament agreements and would thus lead to an improvement in the
international climate, as well as to an arresting of the armaments race. Its
particular value is reflected in the field of radiation, so dangerous to the life
of present and future generations. Not to waste too many words, suffice it to
mention the comments in this morning's newspapers on the situation in Los Angeles,
for instance.

This first step should therefore take the form of a permanent and unqualified
agreement. With these premises in mind we have studied with great attention
all proposals submitted to our Committee for decision. At the same time,
bearing in mind the Geneva Conference of the nuclear Powers, we believe that it
is the duty of the United Nations to convey to this conference the explicit
position of our Organization on atomic tests.

In the first place these demands are not by the Soviet Union resolution:
It calls upon all States experimenting with nuclear weapons to put an immediate
and unconditional end to such experiments, at the same time recommending that
these States enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an appropriate
agreement. The approval of this resolution by the United Nations would
constitute an act which world public opinion has been expecting for a long

The Soviet resolution provides the recommendation to the Powers directly
concerned to work out an agreement on the cessation of tests and to find ways
and means for such implementation. There is not a word about giving any orders
to the participants in the Geneva Conference.

We have also closely studied the draft resolution tabled by the seventeen
Powers; its main shortcoming in our opinion is that it is evasive on the most
important question -- namely, on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The
authors propose that the States experimenting with these weapons reach an
agreement on the suspension of tests. We consider that the proposition to
suspend tests in itself implies the probability that they will be resumed
and thus it is provisional in its very conception and falls short of the essential goal it is meant to serve. The sword of Damocles will remain suspended over humanity; tests may be resumed and on a more terrifying scale. This is bound to undermine hopes for a durable improvement of the international atmosphere and may become a subject of most undesirable pressures which we would like to avoid.

It was also stated in the general debate by two of the atomic Powers that they were not ready to agree to a definite and final cessation of tests. They could however agree to a suspension of tests for one year with the possibility of a continuation should adequate control machinery be established and the whole disarmament programme make progress. I hope I am not distorting the views of those two atomic Powers, but it is exactly with this that we are concerned. There is no need for me to reaffirm that we are in favour of a speedy, general, controlled disarmament, but we are aware of the difficulties inherent in reaching this goal. The past few years have shown how complicated it is to achieve progress in this respect. That is why we have advocated, and do so now at this late hour in our deliberations, a step-by-step approach. Let us at last take a first constructive step; let us not make it conditional upon further disarmament measures for by so doing we shall never be able to take this first step. This is why tying the eventual extension of the one-year period with general disarmament makes the value of such an obligation extremely doubtful.

The fulfilment of these conditions we know is not an easy task, as was so rightly pointed out by a number of delegations in the general debate. Obviously, all doubts and reservations of this character could be removed by a decision to stop all tests of nuclear weapons forever by all States concerned and of course an agreement to this effect should be reached.

I now intend to turn to the fourteen-Power resolution A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1. As I have already mentioned the Polish delegation considered the proposed draft resolution bearing in mind that the present task is to take a stand in favour of the cessation of nuclear tests. In view of the three Powers' meeting in Geneva, we therefore studied with particular interest the draft presented by India, twelve States in Asia and Africa and Yugoslavia. In their
draft resolution we see a serious and worthwhile effort to reach a compromise solution of the most urgent problem before us -- that of immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until an agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to technical arrangements and controls to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of such tests. This draft resolution rightly emphasizes the importance and the urgency of reaching an agreement to this effect. We also agree with the evaluation of the situation created by the continuance of nuclear tests and the position on the reports of the United Nations Scientific Committee on Radiation and of the Geneva Conference of Experts as referred to in the preamble of the resolution of India and the other thirteen Powers.
We have before us a new draft resolution submitted by the representatives of Austria, Japan and Sweden. With the full conviction we have about the noble motives of the authors of this draft resolution, we have to make the following observations on their draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.213.

First, the draft resolution avoids the expression of any views concerning the important problem of the cessation of atomic tests, the solution of which all mankind is awaiting with anxiety -- and I am certainly not using too pathetic words in this respect.

Second, it does not even try to sum up the opinions expressed in this Committee during our three weeks' deliberations. Certainly the majority of these opinions was in favour of a discontinuance of tests, despite some points of disagreement concerning tactical considerations rather than the substance of the matter.

Thirdly, the three-Power draft resolution, in our opinion, evades the issues on which the First Committee was expected to act and on which the United Nations should give its considered and clear-cut view.

My last words are, of course, that we in Poland regret that it became impossible to reach a compromise solution which would be acceptable to all here, on which the Indian and Yugoslav representatives were working for days, with the co-operation of many other delegations. The reasons for the lack of compromise, however, are only too obvious as to leave any doubt that in this particular case a compromise at any price could not have constituted the best solution. What was asked, and may I refer now to the statement by the Soviet Union representative this morning, as we understood it, was a clear declaration on the proper interpretation of the meaning of the compromise resolution, namely, that the discontinuation of tests means the cessation of tests forever until agreement is reached between the atomic Powers. Now the other side, of course, having in mind only suspension for the short time of one year, did not agree. What was then attempted was to produce not a piece of paper whose meaning one could twist in all directions, but a real understanding pushing towards the long overdue solution of the problem of the cessation of atomic tests -- therefore, an honest and straightforward approach. I repeat once again: we do regret that the compromise efforts did not succeed, but we still hope that at the last
moment in our deliberations this Committee will take as clear as possible and as straightforward a step toward the cessation of atomic tests. In order not to postpone our debates further, which this day mainly concentrates on the problem of tests. I should like to reserve my right to speak later about one or two of the other draft resolutions before us.

Mr. AIGKEN (Ireland): As the Committee is aware, my delegation has submitted a draft resolution of its own contained in document A/C.1/L.206, in addition to the amendments to the seventeen-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.207.

Both the draft resolution and the amendments concern the question of the danger of a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. It was our hope in presenting our amendments that a unanimous resolution would emerge from the discussions in the Committee and that that draft resolution would cover both the discontinuance of tests and the restriction of nuclear weapons.

It has, unfortunately, become clear that no substantive unanimous resolution on the discontinuance of tests is now possible. We consider it preferable, therefore, in seeking the widest possible measure of agreement, to separate the question of nuclear restriction from the very much disputed ground of the continuation of the tests. With your leave, Mr. Chairman, I propose to withdraw the amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.207. The Irish draft resolution on nuclear restriction, document A/C.1/L.206, remains. It will be before the Committee and will be voted on in due course. In introducing it, I hope to reply to the numerous observations on the subject which were made in the course of the general debate, and also which were made just now by the representative of the United States.

I hope that when the draft resolution comes before the Committee to be able to show to the satisfaction of all the representatives here that the restriction of nuclear weapons not only is urgently necessary but also that it is practicable.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation deems it essential to state its views concretely on a number of the draft resolutions presented to this Committee, draft resolutions which are about to be voted on. First of all, I will deal with the draft resolutions dealing with the question of the cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons and related problems.

We have once again carefully examined the draft resolution of the seventeen Powers which has already been referred to here at some length. In our preliminary observations, we pointed to the principal shortcomings of this text, which in no way disposes of the problem of the cessation of tests and which merely calls for or proposes a suspension of these tests. In paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part, it speaks in so many words of a suspension while the negotiations in Geneva are in progress because the resolution specifically refers to these negotiations.

In examining the elements of the seventeen-Power draft resolution in the context of today's situation, we have also noted that the draft is different on a number of basic points from the compromise draft resolution which was presented this morning by the representative of India. The representative of India reported that the draft resolution itself had seemed to command the approval of both of the parties participating in the talks: the United States, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other.
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, I can confirm that this is so. The draft was supported by us. The representative of the United States today was not quite clear as to his attitude to this draft, but some of the representatives of the other co-sponsoring countries have stated that they would be prepared to support that draft. The representative of the United States, for his part, also let it be understood that the draft would not encounter insuperable objections from the United States, and that matters came to nought only because the Soviet Union had demanded a clarification of the position and a declaration of intentions.

In looking at the seventeen-Power draft resolution and comparing it to the draft to which the United States had in principle expressed acceptance, one is bound to ask the question: why is it that the United States has now gone back on those propositions that were formulated in the compromise draft resolution and which are substantially different from what was presented before by the United States but which are now what the United States again presses for?

On the basic question of the cessation of tests, the seventeen-Power draft resolution said before, and says now, that the negotiations in Geneva have in mind the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the establishment of effective international control, presumably on the basis of the report of the Geneva Conference of Experts. In other words, the task assigned to the Geneva Conference is talks on the suspension, and not the cessation, of tests.

At the same time, the compromise draft worked out by the delegation of India, with the participation of a number of other delegations, spoke of the tasks of the Geneva Conference in completely different terms. It welcomed the decision of the States which are now testing such weapons to meet in a conference commencing 31 October 1958, with a view to reaching agreement on the cessation of such tests. In other words, the purpose of the Conference was formulated differently. It was not said that it was a conference on the suspension of tests; it was said that it was a conference on the cessation of tests. We were told then that the United States did not object to that. Why is it that now the United States will only vote in favour of its own seventeen-Power draft resolution, which says that the task of the Geneva Conference is to bring about a suspension of tests?
Secondly, the operative part of the seventeen-Power draft resolution states that the Assembly urges the parties involved in these negotiations to "make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control" and "urges the parties involved in these negotiations not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress." In the context of the whole draft resolution, it is clear that the negotiations referred to are the ones taking place in Geneva.

In the operative part of the draft resolution to which the United States had previously agreed, it is stated that the Assembly appeals to the States concerned immediately to stop -- not to suspend -- the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons and to proceed to the further measures set out in that draft resolution, that the Assembly considers that an agreement between the States concerned on the cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons under effective international control should be reached, and urges the Conference in Geneva to examine this problem urgently and to achieve rapidly an agreement of the kind mentioned above.

It is perfectly clear that the tasks assigned to the States participating in the negotiations differ as between these two formulations. It is also quite surprising that the United States delegation, to judge by Mr. Lodge's latest statement, will now vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution. We should like to know why it will vote against this draft, inasmuch as the draft appears to contain everything which was contained in the compromise draft and which Mr. Lodge invoked here in criticizing the Soviet draft. He spoke of the Soviet draft as containing no reference to international control and no reference to Geneva, and said that it was merely declaratory, and so forth. But now the fourteen-Power draft resolution does mention control. It states:

"Calls for the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to the technical arrangements and controls considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of such tests."
Here there is reference to control and reference to the Geneva Conference, both in paragraph 1 and in paragraph 2. There is also a request to the States concerned to report to the General Assembly, depending upon the results achieved in Geneva. In other words, everything that the delegation of the United States described as being lacking in certain draft resolutions is to be found in the fourteen-Power draft resolution. The fourteen-Power draft resolution formulates things in a manner similar to the compromise draft. It would seem to me that as far as the fundamental substantive tasks are concerned, the differences are purely formal.

If the United States took an honest and decent approach to the compromise draft resolution and was prepared to accept it in substance as it was then formulated, why does the United States now say that it will vote against the fourteen-Power draft, which in substance answers the same questions in approximately the same terms? Why does the United States now again press for its original seventeen-Power draft resolution, where the position on these basic questions is set forth altogether differently. The position in the seventeen-Power draft is the one which the United States advocated from the beginning and for which the United States earned the criticisms which we addressed to it.
The Soviet delegation submits that a comparison of the texts indicates that, in approaching the compromise draft, the United States delegation thought of something altogether different and took a position altogether at variance with the words in which the compromise draft had been couched. If the United States had taken a position in any way in harmony with that compromise draft, the United States would surely not have been in a position to vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution. In that event, in fact, the United States would have had to move away from the position of the seventeen-Power draft.

It is because misgivings had arisen in our minds as to the true nature of the position of the United States that the Soviet delegation requested the Indian delegation at least to include in the joint declaration of the three great Powers an indication as to the main direction we should proceed to travel on the basis of that proposed compromise resolution. To this I addressed myself in some detail this morning, and I shall not take the time of the Committee now to deal with this matter. But the formula we suggested and its variants constituted an attempt to find a compromise text acceptable to the United States, because we wished to find a compromise draft acceptable to the United States. However, in dealing with that, we always found that, whenever we approached the formulation of a common three-Power position, the United States manifestly did not even wish to seek a cessation of tests as an ultimate objective to be sought by the Geneva Conference and by other possible conferences in the event that no immediate agreement was forthcoming at the Geneva talks. This was no accident. It demonstrated that the United States, in extending support to the compromise draft, actually had in mind something completely at variance with what the compromise draft said. The United States tried to lead us and everybody else into error and confusion as regards the true nature of its position.

For this reason, it seems to me, the seventeen-Power draft resolution as it now stands cannot by any stretch of the imagination become the basis for an acceptable solution, as far as those truly desirous of a cessation of tests are concerned, because this text reduces everything to a temporary suspension to enable the United States and the United Kingdom to resume testing whenever they see fit and, in fact, at such time as they deem suitable. On such a basis the talks in Geneva cannot make progress, and surely the General Assembly cannot place its stamp of approval on such a proposal.
The seventeen-Power draft resolution contains some points which we have partly dealt with from the outset of the deliberations, but I should like to refer to some of these now. For instance, the last paragraph of the preamble states: "Recognizing that these developments are encouraging steps in the direction of progressive openness of information concerning technologies and armaments, which may assist in promoting the fundamental aims of the United Nations in the field of disarmament" (A/C.1/L.205).

We feel that this paragraph quite incorrectly orients the United Nations and those bodies and conferences which may deal with disarmament. To suggest to them that they should facilitate access to information concerning technologies and armaments is tantamount to pushing them in the direction of development as systems for the collection of intelligence data on the armaments of other States. I submit that this is not a proper task for United Nations organs. The United Nations cannot properly decide on tasks of this kind.

Paragraph 4 of the operative part expresses the determination of the General Assembly: "that the trend of the recent encouraging initiatives, including the technical approach, should continue with a view to contributing to a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament" (A/C.1/L.205).

We have already commented on the technical approach. As the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom see it, this approach means in reality leading the United Nations away from consideration of concrete disarmament measures and in the direction of consideration of technical methods of control, while side-stepping any concrete measures of disarmament. Such an approach is not conducive to a practical solution of the disarmament questions, let alone the carrying out of disarmament measures, and we, of course, cannot extend our support to such an approach.

With regard to the addendum to this draft resolution presented by a group of States in an attempt to deal with the question of a reduction of military budgets (A/C.1/L.209), I believe that this amendment will yield no fruit in the form of a concrete solution of the problem. It refers to a resolution adopted last year which lumped all disarmament problems together in one inextricable knot, allowing no leeway for the solution to any individual problem, by way of a partial solution
of the whole problem, unless there is a comprehensive world-wide system of disarmament. Such a comprehensive world-wide system of disarmament preoccupied the League of Nations for a number of years and has been talked about in this Organization for twelve years. If we travel down that path, there is a guarantee that no problems will be solved. The timely and relatively simple matter of the reduction of military budgets, which is forthrightly set out in the Soviet draft resolution, cannot conceivably reach a solution in the terms of the amendment which is now accepted by the United States and the sixteen other sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.205.
I should like to mention in passing the position of the United States on the matter of budgetary reduction. On this position we have received some enlightenment today from Mr. Lodge. His speech made it crystal clear that the United States does not intend practically to solve the problem of budgetary reduction as regards its own budget and as regards the budgets of other great Powers. The United States says that the Soviet draft resolution on this point is not satisfactory because it would call for too generalized a solution, couched in slogan-like phrases, et cetera.

Now, we have heard criticism of this kind oftentimes in the past with regard to all constructive proposals made by the Soviet Union either in the United Nations, in the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London, or in the Disarmament Commission or in the General Assembly. This only serves to demonstrate that the United States is practically unwilling to solve any question no matter how capable of solution, least of all questions which can in fact be solved and require no complex enforcement machinery.

The Soviet delegation feels that its draft resolution is entirely suitable for a practical decision of principle by the General Assembly. And if the General Assembly's will is expressed, practical means of implementation of this draft resolution could easily be worked out as between the Powers which are referred to specifically in the draft. Naturally, if one of these Powers, the United States, simply does not want to reduce its military budget, then, of course, one cannot do a thing. This merely makes it even more manifest that the United States does not want to call a halt to the arms race.

As for the draft resolution or the proposals concerning surprise attack, moved by India and Yugoslavia, the Soviet delegation will find it possible to vote in favour of this draft resolution inasmuch as it contains no provisions that will be unacceptable to us. But we must say quite candidly that it contributes little to the solution of the question of the prevention of surprise attack. Nevertheless, since that question has occupied some of the attention and interest of the Assembly, and of the United Nations, we will find it possible to support this proposal.

As far as the fourteen-Power draft (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1/Add.2) is concerned, we will say that even though from our point of view it does not altogether meet the requirements which we feel a draft resolution on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests should fulfil, we do, nevertheless, find it possible to take
an affirmative attitude on this draft, and we will support it because on the main issue it charts the right and proper direction for the solution of the question: it calls for the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until agreement is reached in practical ways for the establishment of control and the enforcement and observance of such discontinuance. While maintaining the position of the Soviet draft resolution, we nevertheless find it possible to support the fourteen-Power draft resolution as well, since it answers the main problem; it calls upon States to discontinue tests, without condition. So much on the various draft resolutions which the Soviet delegation meant it useful to comment on.

If we come to the vote on other draft resolutions, the Soviet delegation, of course, reserves the right to make some comments on some of the other texts before us.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We still have two speakers on the list in this debate. In order to continue taking advantage of the time this afternoon, since we have wasted time in the last two days, I think it would be correct for us to continue with the list of speakers. I therefore call on the representative of Hungary.

Mr. PETER (Hungary): Before dealing with the draft resolutions tabled in this Committee, I feel the moral obligation to make a short reference to a message of a great personality, to whom we all have to pay tribute. I am speaking about Pablo Casals.

We were honoured by the presence of this genius on United Nations Day, and thus we are given a special impetus to listen to what he wanted to say to us regarding the very subject under discussion in this Committee. He made clear, in a personal message, that his coming here was by no means a l'art pour l'art gesture. His firm and clear words rule out any possibility and any excuse for misunderstanding what brought him here to the hall of the General Assembly. Having applauded and congratulated him in the General Assembly hall for his unique artistic achievement, we are even more bound to take into consideration in our decision what he has brought us and what prompted him here. Let us remember what he said:
"If at my age I have come here for this day, it is not because anything has changed in my moral attitude or in the restrictions that I have imposed upon myself and my career as an artist for all these years, but because today all else becomes secondary in comparison to the great and perhaps mortal danger threatening all humanity. Never has the world been nearer to catastrophe than at this moment.

"The anguish of the world caused by the continuation of nuclear danger is increasing every day; all realize the horrifying consequences of a nuclear war, which would cause not only irreparable material and physical destruction, but also moral and spiritual degradation. How I wish that there could be a tremendous movement of protest in all countries, and especially from the mothers; that would impress those who have the power to prevent this catastrophe.

"All nuclear experiments ought to be stopped altogether and I profoundly hope that the negotiations in the near future will end in an agreement that will make this possible ..."

In this statement made by Pablo Casals to us and for us, we find not only the appeal of a great contemporary, but also the pressing demand of peoples all over the world. "All nuclear experiments ought to be stopped altogether ..." Nothing would meet this just demand except a resolution as a result of this discussion with a firm appeal for the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests.

From the point of view of this demand I wish to compare the three main draft resolutions with one another: the draft resolution presented by the United States and sixteen other States, the draft resolution presented by India and thirteen other States, and the draft resolution of the Soviet Union. What are the main characteristics of these proposals?
The draft resolution of the seventeen delegations is based on the principle that agreement on cessation should be conditioned by gradual agreement on different aspects of the whole disarmament problem and that, in the meantime, the atomic Powers should agree on suspension for one year. The draft resolution of the fourteen delegations intends to offer a sort of compromise. No doubt its co-sponsors are in favour of immediate and final cessation, but being aware of the difficulties in the way of a clear-cut decision to this effect, they try with goodwill to find a compromise between the continuation and cessation of tests.

The draft resolution tabled by the Soviet Union is in favour of immediate, final and unconditional cessation of all atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

The arguments for and against each of these draft resolutions may be reduced to a few sentences. All the interventions in support of the seventeen-Power draft resolution may be reduced to four points:

First, since all problems of disarmament are interlinked and indivisible, separate agreements on test cessation should not be envisaged. The problems of disarmament are truly indivisible, but not indiscernible. If the United Nations does not hold the view that the great Powers should embark upon partial disarmament agreement on discernible problems of the armaments race, then there never will be a beginning to disarmament.

Secondly, it was argued that since cessation in itself does not mean any step in reducing existing stockpiles of arms, agreement on cessation has no value or is even harmful from the point of view of disarmament. In using these arguments, some representatives have forgotten their own point regarding the interconnexion of all disarmament problems. It is obvious that continuation of tests has a double harmfulness. It results, on the one hand, in poisoning present and future generations and, on the other, in giving new fateful possibilities to the armaments race by developing new types of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. At the same time, the agreement on complete cessation would, on the one hand, stop the flow of contamination and, on the other, bar the possibility of developing new devices for the armaments race. Even if agreement on complete cessation does not mean in itself the actual reduction of existing armaments, it does mean limitation of the arms race and it does introduce a note of goodwill by the great Powers into the international atmosphere. It creates a certain degree of mutual confidence necessary for further progress.
Thirdly, it was said in support of the seventeen-Power draft resolution that in the resolution of the General Assembly mention should be made of the control system necessary for agreement between the great Powers. It is easy to recognize the mistake underlying this argument. The task of the General Assembly does not consist of drafting a model agreement for the atomic Powers but in expressing the necessity of complete cessation. When delegations of atomic Powers vote in favour of a draft resolution for complete cessation, it does not mean that they have already agreed upon cessation. It only means that they express their readiness to comply with the interests of present and future generations, and they start negotiations on the problems of such an agreement with this readiness.

There was one more argument in favour of this draft resolution; namely, that the Western Powers should not start reducing their atomic strength without reaching agreement on conventional armed forces because the Western Powers are worse off in military manpower and for the sake of balance, they would need the effectiveness of nuclear weapons. In using this argument, delegations certainly did not look into the consequences of such a statement. If we take this argument seriously then we should think that the Western Powers have to rely on the effectiveness of nuclear weapons to make up for the lack of mass support. True it may be said that atomic weapons are the most reactionary military force because they offer the possibility even to a discredited political group to threaten whole continents and to keep great masses of the people in anxiety and fear.

We should not be mistaken by supposing that suspension is a compromise between continuation and cessation. The experiences of this month with regard to experiments show that suspension, however short or long, leads inevitably to intensified preparations for new tests. We have never before had so many nuclear test explosions as during these last weeks. It is not accidental. It results from the very suspense of the situation. A period of suspension, however long or short, without the necessary assurance of never to resume experiments compels all the atomic Powers for the sake of their own security to make as intensive preparations as possible at all events; that is to say, in spite of all goodwill, a compromise of this kind could lead to an intensified period of test explosions.
Since the basic principle of the seventeen-Power draft resolution is erroneous and since the arguments brought up in its support are not convincing, my delegation thinks that it would be supporting the idea of continuing nuclear tests if it voted in favour of this draft resolution.

As to the draft resolution presented by the fourteen delegations, the main argument is that it is a sort of compromise. Really it is a good sort of compromise because its main objective is the permanent cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Therefore, my delegation is ready to vote in favour of this draft resolution. There is no contradiction between the draft resolution tabled by the fourteen delegation and the one tabled by the delegation of the Soviet Union.
The main argument in favour of the Soviet draft resolution is that it gives a clear expression of the interests of all peoples in stating without any condition or mystification the necessary of complete cessation of all tests.

Therefore my delegation is ready to vote for both of these draft resolutions since we are not in a position in this sorrowful situation to reach the main goal, an agreement upon immediate and permanent cessation. Therefore we ought to be glad for all small mercies.

In conclusion, we have only one choice in this Committee: either the draft resolution for the continuation of tests, at least in its ultimate aim; or the real and complete cessation of tests presented in draft resolutions of compromise of the fourteen delegations, and in the draft resolution presented by the Soviet delegation. The last two draft resolutions offer us the better choice, the only good choice.

As to the question of priority, my delegation is of the opinion that priority should be decided upon the basis of Chronological order. Since the draft resolution of the fourteen delegations was presented first, my delegation is of the opinion that the Committee should vote first on the draft resolution presented by the fourteen delegations.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call upon the representative of Ecuador on a point of order.

Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor to raise a point of order regarding our work-day. In view of the interest of the hour and because a number of heads of delegations who have been present have to attend other functions and have been obliged to leave the Committee room; and since, furthermore, I believe there is unanimity in the Committee regarding the need to do as much as possible to reach a vote on these resolutions this evening and not postpone it until Monday, I think, sir, in these circumstances the appropriate thing to do would be to adjourn our meeting forthwith and meet this evening at 8.30 o'clock.
Therefore, in accordance with rule 119, I propose that this meeting be adjourned until 8.30 this evening.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In accordance with rule 119 referred to by the representative of Ecuador, I am constrained to put this motion to a vote immediately.

The motion was adopted by 40 votes to 9, with 15 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.