Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 28 October 1958, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament [617] (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests [707] (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries [727] (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/966. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): Since this is my first intervention in the work of the Committee this year, I take this opportunity to congratulate you, sir, on your well deserved election to the office of Chairman of this most important body. I have no doubt that your intrinsic merit, combined with your experience in the work of the United Nations, amply qualified you for the post which you now hold.

Permit me also to congratulate Mr. Osman of the Sudan and Mr. Matsch of Austria on their election to the offices of Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur respectively.

Representing as I do a small country which has nothing to disarm, it is with a sense of agitation and diffidence that I take part in this debate on disarmament. I had the opportunity of listening to the debates on the same subject in this Committee last year when hopes were expressed by several speakers that the twelfth session of the General Assembly would go down in the history of the United Nations as the disarmament session. The actual outcome of discussions on the subject during that session, however, very much belied these hopes and expectations. On the contrary, the result was a sort of double deadlock in regard to the problem of disarmament. In the past, there might have been merely a deadlock in the course of negotiations with respect to the substance of certain aspects of this problem of disarmament, but now we are faced with the breakdown even of the machinery for the conduct of the negotiations on this subject. As long as negotiations were in progress the people of the world at least had the hope that some day there might be a comprehensive agreement on the various aspects of disarmament, but now their sense of dismay and disillusionment has grown because of the fact that the great Powers, on which the Charter of the United Nations imposes a very great responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
are not even prepared to discuss the question of disarmament among themselves. This is indeed a sad and unfortunate state of affairs for the people of the world as a whole, who have pinned very high hopes on the United Nations as an instrument for promoting peace and security in the world.

The problem of disarmament is related to the basic purposes and functions of the United Nations itself. The United Nations as an Organization must show better results in this field of disarmament if it is to justify the purposes for which it was created. My delegation has felt strongly that the United Nations must always associate itself intimately and actively with the attempts at the solution of the problem of disarmament. This is not, however, to make light of the results of the Conference of Experts held in Geneva last summer. The report of the Conference, which represents what it has become fashionable to describe as a technical approach to the problem, has facilitated a political agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests with an effective control system. We hope and pray for the success of the forthcoming conference of the nuclear Powers in Geneva on this question. We hope also that the other conference, which is due to begin in Geneva on 10 November on the scientific possibility of preventing surprise attack, may lead eventually to further progress in the field of disarmament. However, it must be remembered that, as the Secretary-General has pointed out, the work of these conferences is marginal to the central problem of disarmament which eventually must be backed up by political agreement among the great Powers, without which agreement there can be no real progress in the field of disarmament.

In the present state of suspicion and distrust which prevails between the States it would be rather naive and unrealistic to think of a solution to the problem of disarmament without prior agreement on an effective international inspection plan. The lack of confidence between nations seems to be the main obstacle to progress in this field.
If there were confidence between States, perhaps there would be no necessity for an inspection system, and perhaps the problem of disarmament itself would not have been there at all. The objective of the United Nations in this matter has to be, as has been pointed out by the Secretary-General in his valuable Memorandum (A/3936) on this question, "balanced world-wide disarmament", because in matters that affect the very security of the States, they cannot be expected to act in haste or take undue risks.

Hence the utmost importance for the functioning of some kind of body inside the United Nations for the continuance of these negotiations among the States in a serious and realistic manner. There has been a divergence of opinion about the composition of such machinery. But disarmament negotiations themselves are considered important and urgent by all sides. Constructive attempts should be made here and now in this Committee to make arrangements for the creation of machinery for the conduct of negotiations which might prove acceptable to the principal parties concerned. The Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.208) is highly relevant to this purpose, and something must be done during this session of the Assembly to ensure the resumption of disarmament talks in the future.

In the light of the realities that have been made possible by modern science and technology, everybody will agree that the consequences of war will affect the international community as a whole, regardless of whether a country is big or small. Furthermore, there is the question of nuclear tests, which does not only affect those nations that conduct them, but even those that are situated far from the scenes of such activity. Therefore, the dangers of nuclear tests have justifiably become the concern of the entire international community.

The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (A/3838) has conclusively endorsed the apprehensions about the hazards of radioactive fallout. The effects of ionizing radiation have been the contamination of the air, earth and water, and many of the natural and living resources in the world. Nuclear tests, for that matter, are not merely affecting us and our well-being, but are even jeopardizing the potential well-being of generations yet to be born. Though the question of tests might be vitally related to the security of certain States that are conducting them, yet the stakes involved in this matter for the international community are such as to entitle every one
of us at least to a say in the matter. This question has of late attained so much importance in world public opinion that its urgency can hardly be minimized here or elsewhere by the responsible statesmen of the world.

My delegation honestly believes that any step that we might be able to take with regard to the cessation of the tests will bring a real sort of relief to the peoples of the world. It has been pointed out that the cessation of tests is not disarmament, and we also accept this view. But we urge such a cessation only in the hope that any progress in this matter might facilitate progress in other fields of disarmament. When we ask for the discontinuance of these tests, we do not for a moment minimize the importance or value of a comprehensive balanced world-wide disarmament.

It has been argued that the question of the cessation of nuclear tests must not be isolated from other aspects of disarmament, and must be viewed as a part of the whole. This might be true, yet there is another side to the question. Any positive step with regard to this question might not only have the effect of answering the clamour of world public opinion, but also that of creating an atmosphere more conducive to the negotiation and settlement of the entire disarmament problem. This initial step envisaged in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1) we have the honour to co-sponsor with other Member States may help the growth of confidence between the principal parties to disarmament and at the same time may contribute to the climate of peace in which we could expect better results for disarmament as such.

Nobody can deny that the reduction of military budgets is also an important phase of disarmament. But here again, as in other cases, the feasibility of examining and regulating the budgets of the different countries in relation to defence expenditure, through some international inspection system, is necessary and, to begin with, this might entail a technical approach as well. However, the suggestion for diverting the resources released from the reduction in military budgets to the development of under-developed countries would be a step of positive disarmament, as visualized for the first time by Mr. Edgar Faure some years ago.
There have already been several resolutions on the different aspects of the question of disarmament. The fact of the matter, however, remains that even resolutions adopted by the required two-thirds majority of the Assembly are not going to help us much in the solution of this problem unless there is real unanimity on one or several of these resolutions. Let us profit by the experience of the last session, and avoid having a resolution which may be adopted by a considerable majority but which will, in reality, serve no useful purpose. Nothing would be better than to try, even at this late hour, to adopt unanimously one or more resolutions on this question. Above all, it is important to get a disarmament commission of one sort or the other functioning with a view to reaching agreement in due course on a comprehensive plan for disarmament.

As the Foreign Minister of Sweden pointed out in the course of this debate, there does not seem to be much difference in purpose between one draft resolution and the other on the question. Given goodwill and understanding on all sides, and above all strong-willed determination on the part of all principally concerned, to resolve what I have earlier described as the "double-deadlock" with regard to this question, something positive could still be achieved with regard to disarmament at the present session of the General Assembly itself. If this could be done, it would undoubtedly bring a great sense of relief and comfort to the people of the world who are greatly concerned about the failure of the disarmament talks, and who are morose about the breakdown of the machinery for the conduct of the negotiations themselves, that are so vital to the peace of the world.

My delegation still hopes and believes that it might eventually be possible for us here in this Committee to work out something which might be acceptable to all, and especially to the principal parties concerned. In a spirit of humility, but with the utmost sincerity of purpose, my delegation would venture to address an appeal to the great Powers of the world: Never before, and in no other field, has there been a greater need for co-operation, goodwill and understanding among them than in this noble and worthy enterprise of freeing forever the minds of men from fear, and "saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war", to quote the words of the Charter. This is the time when the great Powers can and should give proof of their real greatness, by showing their foresight and imagination which the perilous circumstances in the present case demand of them.
It has been suggested of late that a working party should be formed under your chairmanship, Mr. Chairman, with a view to exploring the possibility of having one or more unanimous resolutions, on the different aspects of this intricate problem of disarmament. I have endeavoured in the course of my brief statement to show to the best of my ability how important it is for us to have a unanimous resolution on this subject. Although there has been a suggestion that a working party should be set up, to the best of my recollection nobody has formally proposed that such a working party be set up. May I, Mr. Chairman, therefore propose that you should appoint a working party representative of the various cross sections of views on this question and also representative of the broad geographical regions in the world, with a view to working out a compromise resolution on the subject in collaboration with the sponsors of the various resolutions and amendments thereto. I make this proposal in the hope that even at this late hour something might be accomplished in the way of conciliating the various points of view and having a unanimous resolution on this subject. I think that the importance and urgency of the problem itself demands this.

My delegation reserves its right to speak on the draft resolutions at a later stage if it is found that no agreed resolution on the subject is forthcoming.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Since the representative of Nepal has just made a proposal, I should like to know whether his proposal, concerning the setting up of the Committee to which he referred, is a formal proposal so that I can take it into account in due course.

Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): I think I have already said that I want to make a formal proposal to that effect; you can take it as a formal proposal.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In other words, you intend to submit it in writing later?

Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): If it is necessary, I will do so.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): It is not necessary because it relates to a procedural matter.
Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) (interpretation from Spanish): This Committee yesterday heard the serious statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union who, as head of the Soviet delegation, stated here that his country not only flatly rejected the proposal of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to suspend nuclear tests for one year, until complete agreement is arrived at on the question, but he crudely announced that if the Western Powers did not accept the Soviet terms of immediate and unconditional cessation of tests of atomic and nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would carry out an equal number of nuclear tests or, to use his words, would carry out enough tests to make the relationship one to one regarding the aggregate of nuclear tests carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom since 31 March of this year.

I know that there are people who believe that the position of the Western Powers, as well as the position of the Soviet bloc, are rigid ones and that neither one will start the ball rolling to enter effective negotiations. My delegation, however, believes that the United Nations can and must place at the disposal of the parties adequate instruments, at least, to come to certain agreements on disarmament, agreements which we believe to be indispensable for the survival of humanity and for the maintenance of international peace and security, as is the case of the controlled cessation of nuclear tests and the adoption of measures to avoid surprise attacks.

Nevertheless, I believe that the tasks of this Committee, with the abovementioned purpose, have been gravely affected by the statement made yesterday by the representative of the Soviet Union. My delegation does not intend to add its recriminations to those that are usually heaped on one of the great Powers by the other. What we would rather do, if possible, is to find common ground between the nuclear Powers, and we believe that this can be done.

I gathered during the course of the general debate a few ideas that I intend to voice today in regard to the subjects before us for discussion. However, I do believe that the Soviet declaration has impressed on this debate a new characteristic under which the statement I had prepared would not be justified. Therefore, my delegation has preferred to make this brief statement in the general debate, reserving our right to speak when we take up the specific examination of the draft resolution submitted to us.
In the meantime, may I be permitted to make one brief comment. The coming negotiations in Geneva at the political level on the possibilities of reaching agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests is, on the one hand, and on the other, the conversations and negotiations regarding the technical problem involved in the adoption of measures to avoid surprise attacks, and should lead us to make every possible effort to avoid such conversations being unsuccessful. We therefore believe that extreme care should be given to declarations made by Mr. Zorin. If that statement were to be interpreted as an ultimatum, the constructive negotiations would be interrupted and the effect would only be to cause greater sadness and disillusion. If, however, on the contrary, this is purely a statement of position as a point of departure upon which negotiations can begin and as such may be subject to variation, then today, more than ever, we should support the ideas that have been expressed here and avoid irreconcilable standing differences.

The technical, psychological and economic problems involved in the question of disarmament cannot be solved overnight. A number of draft resolutions have been submitted, but in themselves they cannot be taken as being the magic wand with which we can solve the question of disarmament.

Thus we believe that today, more than ever, we should give favourable consideration to the Mexican proposal, a proposal which my delegation will support. We believe that the Mexican proposal opens the way to further negotiations and conversations on disarmament. Both the Foreign Minister of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, and Ambassador de la Colina of Mexico have clearly and most convincingly expressed the constructive ideas underlying their proposal. We have been told by Mr. de la Colina that that suggestion will not in any way hamper the development of the general debate nor will it, as he said, raise obstacles to the examination and vote on the resolution dealing with items 64, 70 and 72 of our agenda which are being discussed in this Committee. The representative of Mexico also said that this Committee should examine important procedural questions that arose or that will arise when we have finished discussing the substantive items before us.
He added that the proposal informal conversations will obviously depend upon the desires of the Powers mentioned in the proposal and that the date of the first meeting would have to be decided in consultation with the Chairman of the First Committee and the Secretary-General. The Chairman of the First Committee would decide on when to report to the Committee.

I wish to conclude my statement with the hope that some formula will be found that will lead us to constructive results.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The First Committee is approaching the end of its consideration of the disarmament question. The debate has gone on for more than two weeks and has served to confirm the correctness of the position of the Soviet Union, whose delegation from the outset pointed to the necessity of granting priority to the consideration of the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons, as this was the most urgent question.

Regardless of the attempts of the representatives of the United States and their partners to drown this question in the general debate on disarmament and regardless of their attempts to minimize the significance of the matter, the discussion in the First Committee has shown irrefutably that the task of the immediate and universal cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons occupies the foremost place among the various aspects of the disarmament problem. The overwhelming majority of the representatives who spoke in the debate, in fact, invariably spoke of the urgent character of this question and emphasized the necessity of solving it first. The discussion further showed that the majority of the delegations favoured the definitive and complete cessation of nuclear tests. Suffice it to note that more than thirty representatives of countries situated in all continents of the globe favoured this demand, which now constitutes the universal demand of all the peoples of all countries.

Among those who spoke in favour of the complete cessation of nuclear tests, in addition to the representatives of all the Socialist countries, were the representatives of such Asian and African countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Ghana and Ethiopia, and of
neutral States such as Sweden, Finland and Austria, and of Latin American countries such as Mexico, Venezuela and others.

Among the speakers there were some who, while for easily understandable reasons they refrained from direct support of the demand for the complete cessation of tests, nevertheless in one form or another came out in substance in favour of stopping nuclear tests once and for all. In this connexion, I might well point to the statement of the representative of Greece. Even though he stated that he would vote in favour of the proposal for the temporary suspension of tests, he nevertheless made it a point to urge the Powers that possess nuclear weapons to "constantly bear in mind that all the people of the world, including their own peoples, are anxious to see the nuclear tests discontinued by common understanding and agreement". (A/C.1/FV.950, page 25-25)

The representative of New Zealand also made the point that the achievement of agreement on the cessation of tests is a matter of urgency.

Without fear of exaggeration, one may say that the demand for the immediate and complete cessation of nuclear weapons explosions constituted the chief content which emerged from the disarmament debate which is now being concluded. This surely is the positive outcome of this debate.

At the same time, the discussion showed that the United States and the United Kingdom, flying in the face of the demands of the peoples of all countries, including their own peoples, opposed an affirmative solution of the question of the complete cessation of nuclear tests. The statements of the representatives of these Powers in the First Committee made it clear that they saw their main task to lie in preventing an Assembly decision for the cessation of nuclear tests. Their prime concern was the search for various reservations or quibbles which would enable them under the guise of various pretexts to sidestep the solution of the problem.

In the course of the debate, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and of certain other countries which willingly or under compulsion follow in the wake of the policy of these Powers, came forth with various arguments against the cessation of atomic tests. In order that there should be no lack of clarity, the Soviet delegation deems it essential to dwell on some of

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)
these arguments, and this is all the more essential as the propaganda machinery of the Western Powers has been doing everything possible to create the erroneous conception that there are some types of objective obstacles which impede an affirmative solution of this question.

One of these arguments put forward and intensively publicized by the Western Powers is that the Soviet Union hampers the institution of control over the cessation of tests. With the obvious intention of casting aspersions on the position of the Soviet Union, the United States Press has published inspired reports that the stumbling block on the way to agreement on the cessation of tests is the uncompromising position of the Soviet Union concerning the establishment of an international control system and that the Soviet Union allegedly was unwilling to admit international control personnel into its territory.

It is quite characteristic that the United States Press, which United States representatives often like to describe as being well informed and as informing its own readers dispassionately, deliberately passed over in silence the special statement of the Soviet delegation that the Soviet Union stands in favour of suitable control and that the Soviet Government had agreed to all the conclusions and recommendations concerning a system of international control over the cessation of nuclear tests put forward by the Geneva conference of experts.
The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in this Committee have repeatedly endeavoured to distort the position of the Soviet Union on this matter, but this endeavour has been a failure. The representative of Italy, obediently following the same direction, even tried to assert that the Soviet Union, all through the past twelve years of disarmament debates in the United Nations, consistently sidestepped any sort of commitments in respect of international control. If he were to display a minimum of objectivity he would be unable to deny that this assertion is completely at variance with the facts. All those who have been following the consideration of the disarmament question in the United Nations know full well that as early as 1947 the Soviet representative in the Atomic Energy Commission submitted a detailed proposal on control which, however, failed of acceptance by the Western Powers. Since that time the Soviet Union has invariably taken a stand in favour of the necessity of control of disarmament.

We have always felt, and we continue to feel, as the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, so aptly put it here:

"we should never plead control at the bar of disarmament; that is to say, we should not make control anything more than a device for effecting an agreement". (A/C.1/PV.952, page 18)

That is why we have always objected and continue to object to supplanting the carrying out of practical measures on disarmament by talks about control.

The representative of Italy, likewise, surely knew that on 27 March 1956 the Soviet Union presented to the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee a proposal for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. In the second section of that proposal, detailed, and if I may so, exhaustive proposals for an international control organ and a whole system of control over the reduction of armaments and armed forces was set up. However, these proposals also failed of acceptance by the Western Powers.

As regards control over an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated in this Committee and has clearly and unequivocally announced that it is in agreement with all the conclusions and recommendations of the Geneva Conference of Experts on this score.
In view of this record, what is the worth of the attempts of certain Western representatives to put forward the question of control as just about the chief obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on the immediate cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons? They are worth naught. The Western representatives, further, say that they cannot accept the complete cessation of nuclear tests, on the grounds that such a decision would, as they put it, undermine the security of these countries. The representative of the United States today made the same point. In order to give some semblance of weight to this assertion, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Noble, quoted from a speech by Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in which Mr. Khrushchev said: "We shall never renounce our right to ensure our security. We recognize this inalienable right to others". (A/C.1/PV.948, page 33-35) The Soviet Union firmly adheres to this statement. But what, if I may ask, is the actual bearing of a cessation of tests on the question of the security of States? Can a simultaneous and universal cessation of nuclear weapons tests in any way impair the security of the United States or the United Kingdom?

Every sound-thinking human being will realize that the cessation of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom on a basis of mutuality affects all these Powers in equal measure and will bring no advantage to the Soviet side. It may rather be argued that the cessation of tests might bring a certain advantage to the Western Powers, which have set off substantially larger numbers of test explosions than has the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government, however, in examining this whole problem, proceeds from the main premise that the cessation of tests will contribute an important step towards the discontinuance of the atomic armaments race and the cessation of the further development of atomic weapons and that it would likewise eliminate the dangers of atomic radiation consequential upon the continued testing of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government likewise takes into account the fact that the very achievement of an understanding on this question will introduce an element of pacification into the international situation and will thus pave the way to the carrying out of further disarmament measures.
In pressing for the immediate cessation of nuclear tests, the Soviet Government does not place any narrow egotistic aims into the foreground of its considerations but rather has in mind the interests of the peace and well-being of all mankind. The fact that the cessation of tests in no way impairs the rights of, or alters the mutual relationship of military power, between the main Powers has been confirmed by such a prominent Western spokesman in the field of disarmament as the representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch, who, speaking against the cessation and even the suspension of tests in general, nevertheless emphasized at the same time that the status quo in the field of atomic armaments should in no way be altered if tests of nuclear weapons are discontinued.

All of this goes to show that the representatives of the Western Powers argue from the necessity of ensuring their security, and not because the cessation of nuclear tests can in any way impair their security but rather because those Powers are unwilling to stop the atomic armaments race at all. They are bent on continuing to perfect these weapons of mass extermination of human beings. They are bent on continuing to threaten the peoples with atomic bombs.
The statement of 22 October of this year of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, General Twining, bespeaks this same point, since as reported by the New York Times, General Twining said: "Our national policy calls for the use of nuclear weapons in all cases when this will be advantageous or beneficial for us." Now this is the true visage of America's national policy in the field of disarmament.

It is imperative to add a few more words concerning the assertions of some representatives to the effect that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests will alter the existing balance of military force. This argument was invoked, in particular, by the representative of Canada, and by the representatives of the Netherlands, Argentina, Cuba and some other countries. The representative of Argentina stated, for example, and I quote "that the Soviet Union proposes the solution which if adopted in isolation from the remaining questions, will alter the balance of power in the world." Now, I submit that this argument will not hold water since the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons, as we have already noted, will affect all Powers that possess such weapons in exactly the same measure, and will not consequently be capable of shifting the balance of power in either direction.

The experience of the examination of the disarmament question in the United Nations shows that the argument on the necessity for maintaining the balance of power is usually invoked in order to prevent the solution of concrete disarmament problems. Facts make this abundantly clear. When the Soviet Union called for the prohibition of atomic weapons, the Western Powers declined this proposal on the grounds that they would in that event remain defenceless in the face of the Soviet Union's numerical superiority in conventional armaments and armed forces.

Echoes of this position were heard in this Committee during the debate. Atomic weapons, they said, and they continue to argue, is now of the essence in order to maintain the balance of power. Now, when the Soviet Union agreed that the entry into force of the banning of the nuclear weapons should be postponed until conventional armaments and armed forces were reduced by 75 per cent of the agreed amount of reduction proposed by the Western Powers
themselves, then the Western Powers immediately withdrew their own proposals concerning armed forces levels, and announced that they were unable to accept a substantial reduction of armaments because this would be conducive to a collapse of the NATO military system.

The representatives of Canada and the Netherlands spoke here of what they professed to regard as a sinister threat from the Soviet Union. They contended that this alleged threat can only be held at bay through the use of nuclear weapons. It is sad that in the course of serious debates in the United Nations these hackneyed strategems of anti-Soviet propaganda still have currency. I deem it beneath my dignity to respond to fabrications of this kind. But one wonders whether Mr. Smith, the Minister for External Affairs for Canada -- I am sorry that he is absent now, but I am sure that Mr. Ritchie will fully and accurately report this debate to him -- and the representative of the Netherlands remember that in March 1956, the Soviet Union, seeking to meet halfway the positions of the Western Powers, submitted to the Sub-Committee on Disarmament in London a proposal to the effect that the conventional armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union, and of the other great Powers should be reduced substantially, leaving aside altogether for the moment the question of the banning of the atomic and hydrogen weapons. It would have seemed that such a proposal should have afforded complete satisfaction to the most far-reaching wishes of the Western Powers. But strange as it may seem, even this was rejected by the Western Powers completely.

In the light of this record, what is the value of talk about the maintenance of balance of power and about threats or the danger of the mighty armed forces of the Soviet Union. I submit that the value of this is nothing, exactly. One may only express surprise and regret that the Minister for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Smith, should have taken up so ungrateful a mission as merely a reiteration of the most uninspired methods of American propaganda.

Attempts have been made here to distort the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the cessation of tests, on the one hand, and to whitewash the position of the United States and the United Kingdom on the other. Referring to the statement of the Soviet Government which I made yesterday,
some representatives, and the American press, have tried to argue that the
Soviet Union is now unwilling to stop the tests as of 31 October of this year,
and that it had rejected any agreement for the cessation of tests.

Now, if yesterday's statement is read in good faith, no such inference
as some are now trying to impose on world public opinion will ensue. In
yesterday's statement I clearly said:

"... that the temporary suspension of tests for one year does not actually
mean the cessation of tests at all since the period of approximately
one year is needed anyway in order to study and process the results
of the series of tests previously conducted and to make preparations
for the next series." (A/C.1/PV.964, p.3)

And I went on to say "... that the Soviet Union cannot and will not agree to
such a position" because this would mean, I said "... embarking on the road
of complicity in deceiving the peoples who demand from the Governments that
atomic and hydrogen weapons tests be stopped once and for all". It is
in this connexion precisely that it was further stated:

"In view of the above-stated circumstances the Soviet Government
categorically declines the proposal of the United States and the United
Kingdom Governments to suspend tests for one year. (Ibid.)

In other words, the Soviet Government rejected not the cessation of tests itself
but only the proposal of the Governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom that the tests should be suspended for one year.

And in order to close the door to any misunderstanding, we went on to
say yesterday:

"The position of the Western Powers which have refused to stop nuclear
weapons tests immediately and unconditionally, gives the Soviet Union
grounds to proceed with the conduct of nuclear tests in the proportion
of one to one with regard to the number of tests, made by the United States
and Great Britain taken together, until the number of explosions conducted
by it after 31 March of this year will become equal to the number of
nuclear tests conducted by these Powers since the above-mentioned date."
(Ibid.)
We went on to say:

"The Soviet Government will act precisely in this manner if" -- and I emphasize the word 'if' -- "if the Governments of the United States and Great Britain continue to frustrate agreements in the future as well, and continue to place obstacles in the way towards reaching an agreement concerning the universal cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests." (Ibid., p. 4-5)
Thus, if the United States and the United Kingdom Governments do not frustrate the achievement of an agreement and do not place obstacles in the path of an achievement of an understanding on the universal cessation -- not the temporary suspension -- of tests, then the Soviet Union will not continue the tests. In order to make this point altogether clear, yesterday's declaration of the Soviet Union went on to say:

"If the United States and the United Kingdom Governments are prepared to sign such an agreement, then the Soviet Union, having signed such an agreement, will alongside with them immediately cease the tests even though the Soviet Union, as is known, has conducted fewer test explosions than have the United States and the United Kingdom." (ι/C.1/PV.566, page 4-5)

In other words, the matter of the cessation of tests now hangs entirely on the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom and not on the position of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is prepared immediately to sign an agreement on the cessation of tests for all time without any conditions whatever. To this, however, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will not agree.

To what will they agree? In the note (ι/3956) of the United States Government which was handed to the Government of the Soviet Union on 20 October of this year--a copy of this note has in fact been distributed to all the members of this Committee -- the United States Government, referring to the tasks of the Geneva Conference, indicated one week ago that

"It is the sincere hope of the United States that the conference will make sufficient progress to justify the expectation that the final termination of all nuclear weapons test explosions may in due course" -- I emphasize the words "in due course" -- "be achieved." (ι/3956, page 2)

In other words, the United States Government is going to the Geneva Conference not for the purpose of achieving agreement on the complete cessation of tests but in order to breed the hope that at some future time a definitive cessation of tests will eventually be achieved. When will this "due" time finally arrive? When will these hopes be fulfilled? The note is fairly clear on that score too. It says:
"... the United States would be prepared to refrain from nuclear weapons tests for further successive periods of one year after the initial suspension of one year, provided" -- I emphasize the word "provided" -- "that the Soviet Union would do the same, that the agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively, and that satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantive arms control measures." (Ibid.)

In other words, the United States wants the Soviet Union to affix its signature to an agreement which would state that the condition for the cessation of tests would be progress on the question of control over armaments -- not control over disarmament, mind you, but precisely control over armaments. Can the Soviet Union or any other State which is committed to genuine disarmament accept an agreement whose purpose is precisely the reverse -- to watch the armaments of States and carry out control over these armaments? I should like to ask the representative of the United States: What do you think we are? Do you seriously think for a moment that the Soviet Union can contribute to your carrying out an armaments race and that you can cover this up with talk about control over this race? It is sufficient to put the question in this form in order to make the answer to it quite manifest.

The Soviet Union will not sign an agreement of this nature because the Soviet Union stands not for the continued armaments race but for its cessation not for the temporary suspension of tests but for the complete cessation of such tests with no conditions whatever.

It is worthy of attention that, in speaking of conditions for the cessation of tests, the Government of the United Kingdom, our other counterpart in the Geneva talks, formulated the thought somewhat differently. In the United Kingdom note (A/3955) sent to the Government of the USSR also on 20 October, copies of which have also been distributed to all the members of the Committee, the following is stated:
...Her Majesty's Government declared that they would be prepared to refrain from nuclear tests, for further successive periods of one year after the initial suspension of one year, provided that the Soviet Union would do the same, and that satisfactory progress had been made towards the installation of an effective system of international control over the suspension of nuclear tests" -- I draw your attention to this last clause -- "and towards the adoption and execution of measures of real disarmament." (A/3955, page 2)

Thus, the Government of the United States makes it a condition that progress be achieved in control over armaments while the Government of the United Kingdom says that the condition is progress "towards the adoption and execution of measures of real disarmament." How can we understand the divergencies between these two Powers which are going to the same conference and profess to occupy a common position on the question of the cessation of tests? I would be very glad to elicit an exhaustive clarification on this point from the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom who are present here. Unwillingly we are bound to wonder whether these different formulations of the same question, of the conditions prior to the cessation of tests, are not merely a camouflage of the genuine sense of these conditions which are being put forward by the Governments of these two Powers before a complete cessation of tests is accepted. If one reads carefully the text of the note of the Government of the United Kingdom on the execution of measures of real disarmament, one begins to wonder whether this more edifying formulation is not merely designed to cover up the genuine sense of the intentions of the Government of the United Kingdom, which, in reality, may be said to be expressed in the note of the United States rather than in the note of the United Kingdom and which consists of calling for the institution of control over the armaments of States without any disarmament whatever.
The fact that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States put forward this kind of conditions for the cessation of tests bespeaks their refusal to accept any genuine and complete cessation. That is why the obstacle to an affirmative solution of this urgent question, which alarms the peoples of the world, is the current position of the United Kingdom and the United States Governments. Nevertheless, the representative of Japan, Mr. Matsudaira, who spoke today of the approach of the Japanese delegation to the solution of this question in Geneva, astounded me no end when he repeated this United States position in its entirety -- an appeal for compromise on this basis. On this basis, a compromise by the Soviet Union is impossible. Having listened to Mr. Matsudaira's speech and read the text thereafter, almost unwillingly I asked the question: Where, oh where, is the independent Japanese position on this question which is so urgent, so acute for the Japanese people? Is Japan not interested in the complete cessation of tests? I should have thought that no two answers to this question were conceivable. The temper of the Japanese people on this question is well known. The fact, however, that the representative of Japan does not hearken to the voice of the Japanese people causes astonishment.

The Government of the Soviet Union is prepared to conclude an agreement on the immediate and complete cessation of all atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and appeals to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to do likewise.

If the General Assembly takes a resolute stand and appeals for an immediate cessation of all atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, without associating this with conditions of any kind, then the Assembly will have helped the Geneva Conference to achieve such agreement. That is why the Soviet delegation so urgently presses for support of this kind of proposal which is most unequivocably formulated in the draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

All of this makes it clear that the arguments put forward in the debate against an affirmative solution of the question of the cessation of tests are utterly devoid of validity and foundation.

The observations made by a number of representatives on the question of the shortcomings of the Soviet draft resolution touched on secondary matters on
which agreement can easily be achieved. Many representatives of the Western
Powers surely realize full well that it is not these secondary shortcomings of
detail which are the cause of their failure to support the Soviet draft
resolution. Do the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom
and France truly refuse to vote for the Soviet draft resolution because it does
not mention the Geneva Conference of Experts which met in the summer or the new
Conference which is to meet in Geneva on 31 October, or because it lacks an item
on the assistance which the Secretary-General would be able to furnish in the
course of the negotiations, a point on which agreement has long since been reached
in any case? Do the Western representatives really refuse to vote for the Soviet
draft resolution because it does not speak directly of control, even though it
speaks of the task of the conclusion of agreements, which obviously could not be
even conceivable if there were no agreement on control?

Of course this is not so. This is not the object of our main controversy.
The main controversial issue now is on another matter. It is on whether the
tests of nuclear weapons shall be stopped for all time unconditionally, or whether
the cessation should be made conditional or contingent on a number of demands
which obviously create obstacles to the conclusion of such an agreement that would
enable the Western Powers to confine themselves to temporary suspension of tests,
while leaving in their hands the possibility of resuming such tests at any time
they may deem fit.

The Soviet Union delegation has already noted in its speeches that the
intentions of the United States and the United Kingdom to suspend the testing of
nuclear weapons temporarily for one year can yield no fruit and that the
statements of these Powers attest one thing only. They spell their desire to
utilize this breathing spell, which is necessary for the preparation of a new
series of tests, in order to alarm public opinion with regard to the continuing
tests of nuclear weapons, although public opinion demands that these tests be
stopped once and for all and forthwith.

In contradistinction to this position, the Soviet Union is prepared not to
suspend for a short time, but to stop completely and forever nuclear tests,
provided the other Powers which possess nuclear weapons do the same. The
representatives of the majority of countries who spoke in this room demanded insistently that tests of nuclear and hydrogen bombs should be stopped, that a solution of this question would brook no delay. The representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, speaking on behalf of his great country, declared unequivocally that his country had in mind the necessity of stopping tests, not the necessity of a suspension, which meant that they would be stopped only for some interval of time and, in certain specifically stated circumstances, might be resumed.

The representative of Ceylon, Mr. Subasinghe, stated the following:

"Therefore, my delegation demands that, irrespective of the concepts of 'balanced disarmament', 'massive retaliation', 'bargaining from positions of strength', 'atomic deterrents' and so forth, nuclear and thermonuclear explosions be brought to an end forthwith."

(A/C.1/PV.950, page 33)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Undén, speaking in this Committee on 16 October, declared that the Swedish Government supported the proposal for the universal cessation of nuclear weapons tests; that an international agreement on this issue would constitute an important initial step in the efforts to limit and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.

The representative of Indonesia, Mr. Sastroamidjojo, said in this Committee on 21 October:

"... We have consistently urged a complete and unconditional cessation of nuclear weapon tests under effective international control. We believe that the discontinuance of these tests is the least that we can do pending the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons, as well as the implementation of other measures of disarmament. ..." (A/C.1/PV.957, page 22)
(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I likewise wish to note the constructive character of the proposal submitted in this Committee by the representative of Ethiopia. He suggested a declaration forswearing the use of nuclear weapons and banning such weapons. The Soviet delegation supports this proposal wholeheartedly. These were the voices of representatives of Europe, Asia and Africa alike. These voices express the will, the demands, of the peoples of all countries. These demands were recently confirmed at the Third Conference of Atomic Scientists which took place in Austria, in Kitzbuechel, where outstanding scientists from many countries of the whole world unanimously agreed that all measures should be taken to avert a future war, which would inevitably turn into atomic warfare with all the horrifying consequences that this would bring to mankind.

The General Assembly, reflecting the views of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, must at last say its weighty word in favour of a cessation of nuclear tests. The proposal of the Soviet Union, namely that the General Assembly should urge States that have been carrying out atomic and hydrogen weapons tests immediately to stop these tests and should recommend to the States to enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a suitable agreement, in the opinion of my delegation, reflects the common demand of the majority of the countries of the world and of the majority of the representatives who participated in the debate of the First Committee.

The Soviet proposal expresses the fundamental interests of all mankind. Translating this into reality would spell the first important step toward the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the liquidation of the danger of atomic war.

I should like to say a few words at this stage on the question of the reduction of military budgets. The debate has shown that the representatives of the Western Powers apparently prefer to pass this question over in silence even though it directly affects the interests of hundreds of millions of human beings. The representative of the United States remains silent on this question altogether, even though, as we have already pointed out to this Committee, United States representatives in the past -- last year to be precise -- themselves proposed that military budgets should be reduced by 10 per cent as a first step.
Why is it that the representatives of the United States now have lapsed into reticence? Are they silent because the Western Powers intend to continue to breed armaments and build up their armaments further and inflate their military budgets to an even greater extent? Actually, how could we have expected anything else from the United States delegation when, quite recently, the Under-Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. Quarles, declared that the United States proposes in the next fiscal year to increase its military budget by $2 billion as compared to the current fiscal year. The representatives of other Western Powers also decline support of the Soviet proposal for the reduction of military budgets and the allocation of a part of the resources thus released in order to extend assistance to the under-developed countries.

These other representatives, however, took a rather different tack. They proposed that the question be referred to experts for study. But we know full well what it would mean to hand this budgetary question over to experts for study. This would be tantamount to shelving it for good. Probably many of you remember that the League of Nations studied the budgetary question in various technical commissions and committees for years, and no good resulted from all of that. In particular, this proposal came from the representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch. He knows on to what sidetrack to shift this proposal and to make sure what sort of results will emerge.

It is surprising that France, as may be seen from Mr. Moch's statement, now rejects its own proposal on this question. Mr. Moch spoke of the consistency which, he said, was a feature of French policy in the field of disarmament. One is bound to agree with him that, quite consistently and invariably, France, like the other Western Powers, rejects its own proposals as soon as they are supported by the Soviet Union and as soon as hope appears that they may be practically put into force.

One could only express regret at this sort of consistency. Mr. Moch spoke here of the efforts made by France in support of under-developed regions, and he had in mind territories which are under French control. I think it is hardly proper for the representative of France to speak such words here where everyone knows what the true shape of affairs is in Algeria, in Madagascar, in the Cameroons, in French Guinea and other Territories, where surprise can be caused by such cavalier propaganda statements from Mr. Moch, which apparently discounted the lack of
information of listeners or readers, as the case may be. It has been argued that it is impossible to control a reduction of military budgets. We consider that there are no grounds to make this point.

The Soviet delegation, in its first speech on this question, already referred to previous Soviet proposals on this matter, which, as is known, stipulated that the control organ shall have unhampered access to materials relating to budgetary appropriations of States for military purposes, including all decisions of legislative and executive organs of government. Provided only there is a will to achieve agreement on the reduction of military budgets, there will be a way to achieve an agreement on control without any particular difficulties.

The question of the reduction of the military expenditures is a relatively uncomplicated question within the general complex of disarmament problems. In addition, apart from everything else, it has one important advantage. The solution of this question will make it possible not only substantially to reduce the heavy economic burden which weighs on the shoulders of the broad popular masses, not only to extend substantial assistance to under-developed countries, but also to proceed to a solution of the whole question of the cessation of the armaments race; because after all, if military appropriations are reduced, this will inevitably lead to a reduction of armed forces, to a reduction of military procurement and purchasing, the procurement of other military equipment, and so on. In this manner a reduction of military budgets will be the beginning of a cessation of the armaments race.

I would like to say a few words now on some other general disarmament problems. The Soviet Government has submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly a memorandum on measures in the field of disarmament, in which it has proposed a programme on concrete practical steps the fulfilment of which would lay a sound foundation for further steps in the field of disarmament and further achievements in disarmament. The proposals of the Soviet Union, including a minimum of initial measures in disarmament, are compiled in such manner as to answer to the interests not only of the Soviet Union but also the interests of all other countries, large and small alike, including the interests of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.
Mr. Zorin, USSR

The Soviet proposals call for measures for the reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments and military budgets, for the renunciation by States of the use of nuclear weapons of all types, for a cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons, on the question of cosmic space, on international control, for the prevention of surprise attack, for the reduction of the number of foreign troops stationed in the territories of Germany and within other European States, for the prohibition of all propaganda, and of hatred and enmity between peoples.
For their part, what do the Western Powers have to propose on the general question of disarmament? In the course of the general debate, the policy trend of thought of the Western Powers and other States that are members of military blocs organized by the Western States became evident. It was to refuse the solution of any concrete questions of disarmament, to refuse to elaborate any practical measures on the cessation of the armaments race and the reduction of the atomic danger, and merely to deal with the technical study of all these topics. Unfortunately, this is the path on to which the United Nations is being pushed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who, it would have appeared, should by virtue of his position help in the search of such ways and means as would genuinely contribute to the practical solution of disarmament problems instead of diverting the United Nations away from this, as befits the opponents of disarmament.

What benefits will the so-called technical approach to the solution of disarmament problems yield? Such an approach would in reality mean that, instead of dealing with the elaboration of concrete measures, we would delve into fruitless and feckless discussions on the techniques of control, disclosure and verification in which we could drown the living body of disarmament. How can we deal with the elaboration of questions of the techniques of control if we do not know yet what this control is supposed to control? We have always stated and continue to state that before working out questions of control, it is essential first to reach agreement, if only in principle, on those concrete measures which in reality will conduce to a solution of the disarmament problem. As the representative of Ceylon so aptly remarked in this Committee:

"... it would be unwise to concentrate on the technical aspect of disarmament while postponing the political aspects to a later stage." (A/C.1/PV.950, page 31)

The representative of Ceylon stated at a somewhat later point:

"Experience of the disarmament negotiations after the two world wars of this century shows that, although wide agreements on technical solutions were reached, there was no disarmament." (Ibid.)
The United Nations, if it does not wish to share the sad fate of the League of Nations, must at last pass from endless discussions to the carrying out of practical measures of disarmament. It is extremely important now to take at least the first steps in this matter in order to clear the way to the solution of the disarmament problem as a whole. This task, and we are convinced of this, is met by the Soviet proposals for the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and the reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10-15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries.

We are confident that the present session of the General Assembly will adopt solutions which will make a beginning for the practical steps to be taken by States in the field of disarmament and, first of all, the solution of the question of the complete and unconditional cessation of nuclear tests.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Japan to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. MATSU DAIRA (Japan): I wish to exercise my right of reply on this occasion. I am doing this with due respect to the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin. I naturally reserve the right to do so again if it is necessary after my examination of the verbatim records.

There are two points which Mr. Zorin raised in his statement. The first point is with regard to his statement to the effect that he was astounded that Japan should appeal for a compromise between the United States and the USSR on the problem of the cessation of tests. He said: Where is the independent position of Japan on this issue?

Another point is to the effect that the representative of Japan here in the First Committee: Has he hearkened to the voice of the Japanese people in making such a statement?

As to the first point, I should like to tell him that he should read carefully the verbatim record containing my statement. What I have stated is exactly the independent position of Japan on this issue. As the Committee may know, Mr. Zorin has a very strange notion of semantics, so perhaps what he attempted to say by the word "independent" is something other than what we understand.
What I have said is, first, that for any disarmament measures, including the
cessation of tests, to be put into action and to have some concrete results, it
must have the unity of views of all the Powers concerned. I think that there is
no misunderstanding on this point, and I should like to say that I still maintain
this position.

Two, as to the temporary suspension of tests, I have said that, since the
Soviet Union last year stood for two to three years temporary suspension of tests,
there could be some compromise formula as to the length of time. I have stated
these two points on the instructions of my Government.

This carries my statement to the second point, the question as to whether I
have hearkened to the voice of the Japanese people. The only answer I can make
is that Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, could not reasonably
adopt himself to the position of judge so as to know whether my statement
represented the voice of my people or not. That is all I wish to say.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of
Mexico has asked to speak and I now call on him.
Mr. de la COLINA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to thank the Chairman for allowing me to clarify the nature and scope of the suggestion which my delegation has put before the Committee.

After having heard the statements of those who have participated in the general debate on the question of disarmament, I believe we may categorically state that there is one point on which practically everyone agreed, namely the urgent need for negotiations to take place among the great Powers within the framework of the United Nations, negotiations that have been discontinued since the twelfth session of the General Assembly. It was this over-riding need that prompted the submission of the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.268).

The numerous statements of support, for which I am duly grateful, strengthen our conviction that we must not stint any effort to achieve the renewal of these negotiations. The Mexican draft resolution, therefore, is a purely procedural one. It does not anticipate any substantive solutions. It does not set time-limits, nor does it set out methods of work. With the impartial help of the Chairman of the First Committee and with the efficient assistance of the Secretary-General, it leaves it up to the parties to seek in complete freedom a method of resuming the negotiations on disarmament that were suspended over one year ago.

The Mexican draft resolution in no way hampers the careful consideration of the other draft resolutions before the Committee, nor will it complicate the vote on them. The approval of our proposal by the First Committee will in no way prejudice the conversations to be held in Geneva. On the contrary, we believe that it will contribute to their success. Even if, unfortunately, the negotiations were to fail, it would still be appropriate, as Dr. Padilla Nervo pointed out in his statement on 13 October, for an official United Nations body, recognized and supported by all the great Powers, to be able without delay to continue exploring the possibilities of reaching agreement, using all appropriate procedures.

I wish to speak briefly on operative paragraph 2 of the Mexican draft resolution. We believe that the Chairman of the First Committee would be in the best position to decide when a report should be submitted to the First Committee as well as what type of report should be submitted. On both these
matters, of course, the Chairman would have to receive the agreement of all those taking part in the conversations. I do not think there would be any obstacle as far as procedure is concerned. The item on the question of disarmament would remain open so that the Chairman might be given the opportunity of submitting his report to the Committee.

In view of the nature of our proposal, I would appreciate it if the Chairman would put it to the vote after the other draft resolutions have been voted upon.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom): I am grateful to the Chairman for allowing me a very brief right of reply.

It would seem to me that if the last speaker in these general debates is going to misrepresent much of what has already been said, I do not really see how these debates will ever come to an end, as this process will necessitate endless rights of reply and counter-reply.

When I have studied the verbatim record of what Mr. Zorin has said, I shall consider whether I shall need to reply in detail. But in the meantime I would ask the members of this Committee to re-read any statements that I have made. I would also ask them to compare those statements with the misrepresentations which Mr. Zorin has just given to the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of the United States, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. BARCO (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The representative of the Soviet Union has requested here this afternoon an exhaustive clarification of what he terms the divergencies between the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom.

I feel sure that this Committee has no desire and no need for an exhaustive clarification. The statement of the representative of the Soviet Union
is simply another in a series of continuing misrepresentations of the United States position, which the representative of the United States will dispose of briefly in his right of reply at tomorrow's meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of France, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. MOCHE (France) (interpretation from French): Each and every representative who does not fully agree with Mr. Zorin has had his part of criticism, attack and distortion heaped upon him. I noted that I was attacked on another topic. I was attacked almost exclusively on the referendum which France had organized. Even though this is somewhat alien to the topic of our debate, I am sure that the Chairman will allow me to say a few words on it.

In the overseas territories for whose administration France has responsibility, the question was asked of all men and women to vote "yes" or "no". To vote "yes" would signify "we wish to remain within the French community, either in its present form or as overseas departments" -- we have some three of them in America -- "or as territories associated within the framework of the community". On the other hand, a "no" vote would signify, as explained by General de Gaulle, that they wished to sever the bonds with the community and become fully independent.

The results were as follows: for the overseas territories alone, 9,256,000 men and women voted yes; 1,200,000 voted no, half of them in Guinea. Guinea was the only one of the eighteen large territories thus consulted in which a large majority voted no. Guinea became independent the day its vote was cast, and the other territories are now freely organizing themselves within the framework of the French community.

I must say that I am rather proud to show what we have done in these overseas territories, and that we are completing this by granting independence to two Trust Territories after suitable approval by the United Nations. Since Mr. Zorin suggested that all sorts of appalling things were going on in these territories, I simply express the wish that an equally free vote should be allowed within all the Federated Republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This will be my only reply.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Interpretation from Russian: I shall not take up too much of the time of the Committee, but I owe some clarification in connexion with what has been said by some of the preceding speakers.

I gathered from the speech of the representative of Japan that apparently either I did not express myself quite accurately or he did not fully understand what I had in mind in my statement when I made some comments on his position. The representative of Japan said he was surprised that I had criticized him on the grounds that he was calling for a compromise. If he reads carefully the verbatim record of what I said, and perhaps if he listens to my additional clarification, he will surely find that whatever criticism I addressed to him was not on these grounds. I did not criticize him, nor do I find it possible to express critical comments, on the grounds of the appeals for compromise, of which we have heard quite a number in this forum. The desire to find a mutually acceptable decision is in harmony not only with the interests of other representatives but also with the interests of the representatives of the Soviet Union, and it is not on this score that I made a certain amount of criticism of the representative of Japan. I criticized his position not because he appealed for compromise but because he urged compromise on an unsound foundation. He urged compromise on the basis of the United States proposals. What kind of compromise is that, I ask? That is what I fail to understand, and that is what gave rise to my astonishment. I trust that the representative of Japan will no longer take umbrage at my having drawn his attention to this circumstance.

As for the observations of the representative of the United States, I am afraid that his answer not only failed to satisfy me but it likewise failed to satisfy many other members of this Committee. What is at stake here is not a matter of elucidating some unimportant issue; what is at stake here is one of the most important and most substantial issues: that is, on what conditions, if any, the United States is prepared to stop the testing of nuclear weapons. If the representative of the United States has nothing to contribute on that score, of course, I am not in a position to help, nor am I in a position to be satisfied.
As regards the comments by the representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch, his answer interested me in one of its sentences only. He stated candidly that he had thought he would be attacked on other grounds. Everyone understands what he had in mind. He had in mind the position of France on the question of the cessation of tests. I did not assail the representative of France on these grounds, because that position is so manifestly wrong, its wrongness is so apparent to all members of the Committee that criticizing it would be like gilding the lily. The wrongness of this position and the harm it has done to the cause of world peace are surely beyond any doubt. That is why we did not touch on this question at all, and it appears that Mr. Moch is rather glad of that.

As for the other questions, I believe that the clarifications that he vouchsafed could satisfy neither myself nor others, and Mr. Moch himself knows full well why this is so.

Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me another occasion to exercise the right of reply. I just want to thank Mr. Zorin for his clarification. I greatly appreciate his taking the trouble to make it. I can assure him that I shall not take umbrage at his criticism after his kind clarification. However, his statement to the effect that I urged a compromise on the basis of the United States proposal is, I think, not quite right, and somehow it is a result of a misunderstanding of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I had intended to declare the general debate over because all the speakers I had on my list had already spoken, but three representatives, exercising their right of reply, have made known their desire to add to their replies tomorrow. Therefore, I believe it would be prudent to postpone until tomorrow the official closure of the general debate.

Before we proceed, I should like to remind you that in the statement he made at the beginning of the meeting the representative of Nepal made a formal proposal that the Chairman of the Committee designate a working group representing the different points of view on the subject before us as well as the geographical areas of the world in order to find, as he says, some common
denominator among all the draft resolutions, if possible, with the agreement of
the sponsors of the draft resolutions and amendments thereto. By its nature,
this procedural proposal by Nepal should be dealt with and decided upon as soon
as possible -- in other words, as much in advance as possible of the taking of
the vote. Therefore I beg members of the Committee to give this suggestion
consideration so that, if possible, the views of the Committee upon it might be
made known tomorrow morning.
Mr. LALL (India): Mr. Chairman, I think this might be the appropriate moment for me to say a few words. This Committee has been dealing with disarmament in a general debate now for close upon twenty days. We have had, in the course of this general debate, submitted to the Committee a very considerable number of resolutions. Various proposals, suggestions and exhortations have been made in the course of the debate showing clearly the strong feeling that exists in this Committee that, if possible, the General Assembly should express itself in an unanimous way regarding at least some of these important problems which we have been discussing.

Now, we have come virtually to the end of the general debate subject, of course, to what you, Mr. Chairman, have just said about the exercise of the right of reply by certain speakers. It would seem to the delegation of India that it would be desirable at this point to pause in our consideration of this item. As is known to members of the Committee, efforts are being made to try to find some broadly-based, broadly acceptable resolutions which would advance the cause of disarmament. If we were, however, to embark now on a consideration of the various drafts before us, such a debate would not be conducive to efforts to find common ground.

In the circumstances I feel that it would conduce to a speedy result of our endeavours on these items if we were not to meet tomorrow morning but were to postpone our next meeting until tomorrow afternoon, and I so propose.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): You have now heard the proposal submitted by the representative of India that in order to allow certain conversations to take place, which might bring agreement on the draft resolutions before us, that we should cancel the morning meeting and that we should postpone our work until the afternoon. Is there any objection to such a procedure being followed, as suggested by the representative of India.

The Indian proposal was adopted.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.