Chairman: Mr. UNQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.965. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 AND 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before proceeding with our debate I would draw the Committee's attention to two documents which have been distributed this morning. The first is document A/C.1/L.205/Rev.1, which is a revised version, in Spanish only, of the draft resolution submitted by Argentina and sixteen other delegations. The second is document A/C.1/L.212, which contains the amendments proposed by France to the joint draft resolution of India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.210). This refers to the composition and duties of the Disarmament Commission.

Mr. FEKINI (Libya) (interpretation from French): One of the significant yardsticks of the importance of the disarmament problem and of the urgency of a tireless search for a solution within the framework of the United Nations was indicated by the swift agreement in the First Committee to give it incontestable priority over all other items on the agenda. It is true that we encountered some difficulty in agreeing on the sequence in which the various aspects of the general problem of disarmament were to be taken up: that is, the disarmament question, the question of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and the reduction of military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10-15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries. Nevertheless, we found it relatively easy to take the decision to deal with the three questions together during the general debate, or, to adopt a terminology employed by some members of the Committee, to deal with these three items en bloc without giving any priority to any one of them. This decision was made possible by the
clarification given by the representative of the United States -- on whose proposal this decision was adopted -- to the effect that this examination of the various aspects of disarmament en bloc would in no way prejudice examination of the draft resolutions to be submitted to the Committee on this problem and on questions related thereto according to their merits.
The Libyan delegation has watched with care the general debate on the important disarmament question and has listened with great attention to the speakers who have addressed the Committee on this item. I would like to take this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute, on behalf of the Libyan delegation, to the earnestness, the ability, the eloquence, the dialectic and even sometimes the warmth which were spread out before an audience which was consecutively impressed, charmed, persuaded, moved and never disappointed by men whose lengthy experience on this problem, whose solid and variegated competence naturally designated them to advocate points of view which sometimes were so far removed from each other that the subtleties involved astonished a novice.

What remains to be said after all that has been said so aptly and so skilfully? My speech bespeaks the interest of a country which has grown on the fertile soil of the United Nations in so important a problem as the one of disarmament and its desire to contribute its modest meed to facilitating a desirable solution. My speech will be as brief as possible. I shall confine myself to sketching general considerations relating to this problem as viewed by my country, the United Kingdom of Libya. I shall then proceed to a swift comparative examination of the various draft resolutions before the Political Committee on disarmament and its various aspects. Finally, I shall conclude with some specific suggestions which sum up the point of view of my delegation on the procedure to be followed by this Committee, in our opinion, on the disarmament problem and various related matters.

One of the major concerns expressed by the peoples of the United Nations in the preamble of the Charter, along with the manifest priority that is assigned to it, is the question which is to be found now in the First Committee -- the First Committee which the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, in article 101, describe with such admirable logic as "Political and Security Committee, including the regulation of armaments". The preamble of the Charter starts with the vigorous statement of the first principal resolve of the peoples of the United Nations:

"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,"
The untold sorrow which war has always inflicted upon humanity, especially during the last two great world conflicts, has been increased yet at the end of the last year by the horrible prospects of atomic warfare, which is no longer a war of suffering but of extermination, of total destruction endangering all of mankind and the very essence of its existence. Euphoria and optimism, fed by carefully orchestrated propaganda, maintained the conviction of the peoples, at the end of the Second World War, that the fraternity in arms against what was called the common enemy and the apparent community of ideals and objectives would in fact assure or open the door to the creation of a new post-war world which would be marked by definitive peace, guaranteed security and prosperity maintained forever.

These hopes have unfortunately been dashed by subsequent developments on the international scene which have taken alarming forms in certain parts of the world which have been regarded quite properly as dangerous areas in Europe, in the Far East, in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East and in other regions of the world.

The incompatibility of interest and character between the capitalist and communist States, and in particular between the great Powers, has been dangerously exacerbated by the respective situation of both sides at the end of the victorious war. Existing mistrust was intensified as misunderstandings, injuries and mutual provocations, and respective attachment to positions which were often dictated by considerations of prestige became marked.

The balance of propaganda which was so active during the war, directed towards sustaining the war effort, became intensified after victory had been won in both camps, which had been allied yesterday, and now being directed against each other quite ruthlessly. The two camps of the allies of yesterday became divided after the war. They were pitted against each other and they passed without difficulty, after the defeat of the common enemy, to devoting most of their efforts to preparing for war, augmenting their stockpiles of conventional weapons, raising increasingly numerous and powerful armies, manufacturing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and undertaking the more dangerous, more dramatic armaments race -- the most dangerous and the most dramatic armaments race, in all forms, from the vulgar and modest bullet to the missiles which at vertiginous speeds crisscross the vast cosmic spaces, faithfully prepared to pour destructive hatred of communists over capitalists and vice versa, and promising to hit all those at the same time who are parties neither of the first nor of the second part.
Since these terrible efforts have been so devoted, the peoples of the United Nations, of the whole world, have been living in a state of fear and anguish. The news every day is becoming more alarming and it has made the world aware of the terribly destructive devices that are available. Injuries, crises and the dangers of approaching universal conflagration seem to be so many signs of an impending complete and total destruction of the globe. Alarm, fear and anguish have become the rule in the lives of individuals and peoples.

The United Kingdom of Libya considers that at the present stage of the world, as I have outlined it, the only hope of mankind and the peoples of the United Nations, in whose name the Charter was adopted, is to be found in their confidence in the effective capacity of this International Organization to save present and future generations from the scourge of war, to guarantee that force of arms will not be used save in the common interest and to carry out the essential principles required for the maintenance of peace and international security.
The peoples of the world have been following with some comfort and satisfaction the debates of the General Assembly for a solution of the thorny question of disarmament. The United Nations has unstintingly continued for a dozen years to devote to this task untiring efforts and untiring resolve. The delegation of Libya would like to express, on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya and of its peoples, a warm and grateful tribute to the perseverance of the United Nations in seeking to find ways and means for further consolidation of international peace and security, and finding in their framework and under their auspices a satisfactory solution of the disarmament question, efforts designed to bring the Powers concerned to an agreement on practical procedures for the achievement of disarmament in all of its aspects.

The Libyan delegation considers that it is very important for the maintenance and strengthening of confidence, which the peoples of the world have assigned to the United Nations, not to allow oneself to slide down the easy incline of weariness and disappointment, of discouragement and despair. It is true that the efforts made under the aegis of the United Nations for all these years, years which have not lacked in anxiety, for disarmament have not had the results which were expected. It is true also that a large number of resolutions have been adopted on this subject during successive sessions of the General Assembly and that their provisions have not been translated into the realm of reality and facts. It is clear, for example, that the organs established for the purpose of translating disarmament into reality under the aegis of the United Nations have not operated as was expected and desired and that some of them have had a precarious or difficult life. An example of this is the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. The representative of Saudi Arabia the other day, with his customary eloquence, gave a summary of twelve years of efforts devoted by the United Nations to the disarmament question.

But one comforting fact remains: the United Nations still is the centre where this important question of disarmament is being discussed, to the satisfaction and relief of the peoples of the world.
On this occasion I should like to congratulate the Secretary-General for the excellent report which he submitted on the disarmament question on 30 September 1958 (A/3936), a report whose concise wording underlines the wise realism, the confidence in the United Nations and the determination never to see the efforts of the United Nations abandoned since, in addition to their intrinsic value, they have had the result of opening the door to other efforts which the Organization must make in order to promote the purposes and principles of the Charter in this field.

At the time when the Libyan delegation expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his initiative in proposing the inclusion of the disarmament question in the agenda of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, I should like to say that we have taken note with particular attention of the explanations furnished in this report in order to support Mr. Hammarskjöld’s affirmation to the effect that "taken as a whole, the disarmament picture is not altogether discouraging".

The United Kingdom of Libya, born under the auspices of the United Nations as an independent and sovereign State, imbued with the principles and ideals of the Charter to which it is strongly attached, is deeply concerned that the General Assembly should continue its untiring efforts to restore the necessary confidence for the right solution of the disarmament problem. It supports and encourages all efforts capable of bringing this progress along the road to disarmament, and encourages the confidence of the peoples of the world, as well as the hope of seeing the disarmament measures become a concrete fact under the guidance and in the framework of this Organization. What encourages us even further in persevering along this road is the faultless attachment of the small nations, which constitute one of the most powerful streams of world public opinion, and their firm determination to have the United Nations devote to this delicate and grave problem the most important part of their efforts and attention. This position of the small nations is dictated by their faith in peace and in the need for maintaining international security as one of the essential factors for their own survival. Finally, what convinces us above all that the maintenance of this policy is necessary is the union of all peoples of the world and their solidarity in their love of peace and in their fear of war, of which the armaments race constitutes one of the most unfortunate factors.
I should now like to make some brief and rapid comments on the various
draft resolutions now before the First Committee on questions concerning
disarmament, the cessation of test explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear
weapons and the reduction of military budgets of the principle Powers.

Without going into the details more than is necessary, we may classify
these various draft resolution in three principal categories as a function
of what may be regarded as the three currents of opinion which have been
generally expressed in this Committee. On the one hand, there is the draft
resolution presented by Argentina and sixteen other countries, commonly called
the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205, 10 October 1958). This
draft resolution has been explained to this Committee by the representative
of the United States of America. I should like to review the principal parts
of this draft resolution. The preamble of the draft resolution reaffirms
"the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in the
field of disarmament ...". Then it states:
"Welcoming the agreement which has been achieved in the 'Conference of
Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible
Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests'".

Then it notes
"that negotiations on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and on the
actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of
the experts' report will begin on 31 October".

It further notes
"that qualified persons are expected to meet soon to study the technical
aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack".

It is stated, moreover,
"that these developments are encouraging steps in the direction of
progressive openness of information concerning technologies and armaments,
which may assist in promoting the fundamental aims of the United Nations
in the field of disarmament".

The operative part is divided into four parts, A, B, C and D. In the
first place, it urges the parties to the negotiations to
"make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear
weapons tests under effective international control".
It also urges these same parties involved in these negotiations "not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress".

In section B of the operative part, the draft resolution "calls attention to the importance and urgency of achieving the widest possible measure of agreement in the forthcoming study of the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack".

In section C, the draft resolution expresses "determination that the trend of the recent encouraging initiatives, including the technical approach, should continue with a view to contributing to a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament".

Lastly, the operative part sets out the basis of United Nations assistance to the proceedings of the two forthcoming Geneva conferences.
As may be seen, this draft resolution emphasizes the importance of the technical aspects as a new tendency in the matter of disarmament, an aspect to which the recent success of the negotiations of experts in Geneva on the possibility of controlling nuclear tests has given a new importance and a new emphasis by its conclusive results. The draft resolution also calls for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests so long as the negotiations are in progress. This provision reminds us with a bit less clarity and definiteness of the proposal of the United States of America, confirmed by Mr. Cabot Lodge before this Committee, to undertake not to engage in tests of nuclear weapons for a renewable period of one year, beginning with the date of the commencement of negotiations in Geneva, 31 October, provided that the Soviet Union observed the same obligation. Finally, the same draft resolution on the matter of general disarmament emphasizes the necessity of establishing effective control.

Let us now pass to the examination of the Soviet draft resolutions. We find here two distinct draft resolutions. The first one (A/C.1/L.203) deals with the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests. Let us examine its contents.

The preamble sets out the desire to safeguard mankind from the dangerous consequences of atomic radiation resulting from test explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons. It considers that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests is the first important step towards the total prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and would present a serious obstacle to the creation of new and ever more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the preamble emphasizes the profound concern evinced by the peoples of all countries of the world regarding the continuance of the testing of nuclear weapons. The operative part of the Soviet draft resolution calls upon all States carrying out atomic and hydrogen weapons tests immediately to stop such tests. The subsequent explanations of the representative of the Soviet Union make it clear that this immediate cessation is not subject to any limitation in time, and consequently it would call for an immediate and unconditional cessation. The operative part recommends that States possessing nuclear weapons should enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an appropriate agreement between them. Finally, it calls upon all States to accede to that agreement.
The second Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.204) recommends that the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France should assume an undertaking to reduce their military budgets by not less than 10 to 15 per cent and to allocate a certain part of the funds released through the reduction of military budgets for assistance to the under-developed countries.

A swift comparison of the two Soviet draft resolutions with the seventeen-Power draft resolution shows the following differences. First, the seventeen-Power draft calls upon the States parties to the negotiations of 31 October to stop their testing of nuclear weapons; the Soviet draft is addressed to all States which carry out nuclear weapons tests. This raises, among others, the question of the applicability of this matter to France, which we have been told will carry out its own activities in the atomic field and intends to proceed to the testing of nuclear weapons in the Sahara Desert. I shall revert to this point a bit later.

The seventeen-Power draft resolution calls for the cessation of tests while these negotiations are in progress; the Soviet draft calls for the immediate and unconditional cessation of tests.

Moreover, the seventeen-Power draft emphasizes the need to continue technical studies and the need for a technical approach in order to arrive at a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament. The Soviet draft, as supplemented by Mr. Zorin's explanations, calls for negotiations which would not be exclusively technical. The representative of the Soviet Union has even told us that exclusively technical discussions would be a choice method for burying disarmament in the labyrinth of committees of experts. Moreover, the notion of control, which is such an important element in the seventeen-Power draft, is not emphasized in the Soviet draft.

Finally, the seventeen-Power draft does not speak expressly on the reduction of the budgets of the four great Powers. The second Soviet draft, however, is wholly devoted to the reduction of military budgets and to the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries.

The third category of draft resolutions comprises the following. A draft resolution which was originally proposed by India, to which a number of Afro-Asian countries have become co-sponsors (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1), whose text deals with the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. The representative of India,
Mr. Lall, eloquently introduced this draft the other day and we were impressed by his moving arguments. May I quickly review this point of view.

The preamble of this draft indicates that the continuance of testing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons not only increases the hazards to man and his environments but would also encourage other countries to manufacture and test such weapons. The preamble refers to the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests. The preamble pays tribute to the decision of the States which are now testing such weapons to meet in a conference on 31 October 1958 with a view to reaching agreement on the cessation of such tests.

The operative part of this draft calls for the immediate discontinuance of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons until agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to the necessary technical arrangements and controls considered necessary to ensure the observance of the cessation of such tests. Moreover, the operative part considers that such an agreement is imperative and does not brook delay, and therefore urges the conference to reach a speedy agreement. The operative part requests the States concerned to report to the General Assembly their agreement on the necessary arrangements in order that the Assembly might extend the operation of the agreement to all States. The operative part calls upon the other States not parties to the Geneva conference to refrain from embarking upon nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests. It also requests the Secretary-General to place the necessary assistance and services at the disposal of the conference.

India has also proposed, jointly with Yugoslavia, two other draft resolutions. The draft contained in document A/C.1/L.210 seeks, within the framework of disarmament, to expand the membership of the Disarmament Commission so as to include all the Members of the United Nations. It requests that the Disarmament Commission thus constituted should receive all the documents, proposals and records of discussions relating to disarmament at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. The other draft (A/C.1/L.211) deals, likewise within the framework of disarmament, with the forthcoming conference on the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack. It expresses the hope that the widest possible measure of agreement will be achieved in the
forthcoming study. It requests the Secretary-General to render such assistance and provide such services as may be asked for, and it requests the States participating in the study to inform the United Nations of the progress achieved.

Finally, within the framework of this comparative study, I should like to speak briefly on the draft resolution submitted by Ireland (A/C.1/L.206). I shall not let this opportunity pass without saying that my delegation has been profoundly impressed by the analysis given by the representative of Ireland of the prospects of the expansion of the "atomic club", of the distribution of nuclear weapons and of the dangers of having these weapons pass into the hands of small and medium sized Powers, as well as insurrectional groups.
The preamble of the Irish draft resolution recognizes "that the aim of the United Nations in the field of disarmament is an effective general agreement on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction which will provide for the cessation of the production of such weapons, the destruction of existing stocks and the progressive limitation of conventional armaments". The preamble then mentions the danger that now exists of an increasing number of States possessing nuclear weapons.

The operative part of the Irish draft resolution calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to study the dangers inherent in the further dissemination of nuclear weapons and to recommend to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly appropriate measures for averting these dangers.

This brief comparative study of the various documents submitted to this Committee shows clearly that the elements of resemblance far outweigh those of difference. We cannot pretend, however, that the elements of difference are unimportant or that they have little weight as regards the course of the debate. We consider that, on the contrary, owing to their importance and our respect for the points of view of all the parties involved, a final effort must be made by the Committee to find a solution acceptable to all concerned.

The representatives of Ireland and Haiti have already stressed, quite properly, that the various draft resolutions contain a large number of common ideas, a large measure of agreement. It would be important for further progress, whether under the aegis of the United Nations or in the new framework of the discussions of the experts in Geneva, that a single resolution be adopted unanimously by all Member States. Such a decision could only increase the confidence of the peoples of the world in the effectiveness of the United Nations and its ability to safeguard international peace and security.

My delegation would be happy to support the proposal by Haiti to the effect that we set up a restricted committee composed of the sponsors of the various draft resolutions to which I have just referred, whose task it would be to submit to the Committee a draft resolution capable of commanding the unanimous support of all Members. For our part, we would be prepared to welcome with great satisfaction the setting up of such a committee on the basis I have set forth or designated by you, Mr. Chairman, taking proper account of equitable geographical
distribution, and we would sincerely hope it would succeed in achieving a conciliation between the various points of view. The amendments and additions introduced recently with regard to the original texts, sometimes by their own sponsors, indicate a certain desire for compromise. This display of goodwill encourages us even further in our inclination to try this solution of a joint draft capable of producing a complete text acceptable to all.

The Libyan delegation has also followed with great attention the suggestion by the representative of Ethiopia that the General Assembly adopt a declaration of the United Nations on disarmament. We think that the disarmament problem represents so important a factor for the maintenance of international peace and security and we consider that the idea of the representative of Ethiopia is so apt that it deserves serious contribution. It would contribute to galvanizing the efforts of the peoples of the world and foster that current of opinion which it is our duty to encourage in view of the danger of war created by the mad armaments race.

I cannot let this occasion pass without again voicing the indescribable alarm caused in my country and among all the African peoples by the frightening news of France's intention to carry out test explosions of nuclear weapons in the Sahara desert. I should like to join with other delegations which during the course of the present debate in this Committee have made vigorous protests against these alarming intentions. The Libyan delegation considers that the carrying out of these intentions, besides the unprecedented dangers to which the African peoples and the continent on which they live would be subjected, would add even further to the complexity of the sad situation to which the atrocious war that for four years has ravaged Algeria has led.

Finally I should like to state that the Libyan delegation has studied with particular attention the draft resolution presented by the representative of Mexico to the effect that the representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union meet immediately after the conclusion of the debates on the three first items of our agenda, under your wise chairmanship, and with the competent assistance of the Secretary-General, with a view to considering the possibilities and procedures for the resumption of negotiations on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations. We shall support this draft resolution with all our strength and wish to express our heart-felt hopes that this initiative will yield a most satisfactory result.
I should like to conclude by expressing once again the sincere attachment of the United Kingdom of Libya to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We shall take our position with regard to the various draft resolutions in full conscience, taking into account their respective merits and reasonable elements in order to satisfy the hopes of the peoples that the United Nations will continue unstintingly its efforts to put an end to the mad armaments race. Moreover, I should like to express the fervent hope of my delegation that the forthcoming Geneva conferences will take place in harmony and will be marked with complete success; that negotiations on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations will resume soon; that the result will be the banishment for all time of all weapons of mass destruction, bringing hope to all the peoples of the world that the future will bring peace, security, co-operation and prosperity.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER (United States of America): I deem it a privilege to address this body. I have asked for the floor today as a member of the delegation of the United States since disarmament is a problem very close to my heart. Because my primary responsibility in the General Assembly lies elsewhere, I have not been able to participate in all of the proceedings of this Committee. I have, however, followed the discussion with great interest.

At this time I wish to state that I shall not reply to yesterday's statement by the representative of the USSR, although I am sure the United States will have something to say on that score at an appropriate time.

As a member of the United States Senate, as former Chairman and as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy since its establishment, and as a member of the Senate Special Subcommittee on Disarmament, I have had opportunity for rather varied and often intimate exposure to the questions of armament and disarmament, especially in atomic areas. With your permission, therefore, Mr. Chairman, I should like to make some observations concerning the subject now before this Committee.
I cannot over-emphasize the importance the people of the United States, the Congress, and my Government attach to the disarmament question. I can assure you that we recognize this as one of the most pressing items confronting mankind today. We believe that every effort to achieve a controlled and properly balanced reduction of the weapons of war must be made in the interest of a progressive human society. We seek, through disarmament, progress toward the goal of a just and peaceful world. The ever present spectre of another world conflict must be exorcised. The quest for a way out of the present impasse and the relief of international tensions reflects the deepest and most sincere aspirations of the American people.

The United States, is, of course, willing to do whatever the defense of freedom requires, but we zealously strive for a climate in which we and the world may be relieved of the tremendous armaments burden which the present world situation demands of us. We never cease to hope that a way can be found so that those countries which cherish liberty can feel secure in their independence and can devote their energy and resources to the peaceful development of their own and their neighbours well-being. We believe this goal can be achieved through good faith agreement on balanced world-wide arms limitation with effective controls. We recognize that this may be a long-range objective and that there are difficulties in the way of its achievement; yet we are convinced that this goal can be attained. We believe that the logical way to proceed is through realistic steps cautiously measured and carefully taken.

I have been impressed by the amount of discussion in this Committee devoted to the question of halting nuclear weapons tests. This is widely regarded as an initial step toward real disarmament, and it may well be so. I believe that the Chinese have a saying to the effect that a journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step. However, that first step will be only a gesture unless it leads to successive steps toward the goal.

The United States agrees that the matter of suspension or stopping of atomic weapons testing is of importance but, standing alone, it can be only
a timid action in the direction of realistic and reliable disarmament. We pray that the Geneva Conference on this subject that begins on the 31st of this month will be fruitful. We are devoting our energy to its success.

Because of our great interest in this matter, I want to devote most of my remarks to this topic and its relationship to disarmament.

It is true that an end to nuclear weapons tests may tend to limit the variety of nuclear weapons which could be developed. However, it by no means follows that if tests are stopped, existing weapons stockpiles will be reduced or that the manufacture of nuclear weapons will cease. We must face the fact that, while it might improve the political or psychological climate, a discontinuance of nuclear testing is not the crux of the disarmament problem. An agreement on test suspension can be basically significant only insofar as it contributes to and is integrated with progress on actual disarmament.

The representative of Peru, Mr. Belaúnde, put it brilliantly. He said that if we set up a table of values in which the only essential question was the suspension of tests, then we would be putting at the end, almost as a footnote, the cessation of production, destruction of stockpiles, and so forth. He added,

"This would give humanity a mistaken idea ... we cannot give mankind the idea that, because we have encouraged and will encourage negotiations in Geneva, we have solved everything or have laid the foundation for a final solution of the question."

I certainly agree with his thought that we can really take heart only when we are sure that the world is moving toward a realistic arms limitation agreement.

The representative of Cuba, Mr. Nuñez-Portuondo, a few days ago in his excellent address before this Committee, clearly pointed out a basic problem in connexion with disarmament. He showed clearly and convincingly that the cessation of atomic tests or atomic disarmament would only shift the balance of power, from a military standpoint, especially on the Eurasian continent, to those nations which would still maintain vast reservoirs of manpower and so-called conventional means of waging war.

Now, the United States would like to see the world situation develop so that never again will it be necessary to conduct nuclear tests. Mr. Lodge has already
expressed the hope of the United States Government that a permanent test cessation will prove possible. As my Government stated in its note to the Soviet Union on 20 November last:

"It is the supreme hope of the United States that the Geneva Conference will make sufficient progress to justify the expectation that the final termination of all nuclear weapons test explosions may in due course be achieved."

As an elected representative of the American people, I wish to state that I wholeheartedly share this hope.

As my Government has emphasized here, what is necessary to translate this hope into reality is that reasonable progress be made on real disarmament measures. Much has been made of this principle on which our policy is based. I believe it is appropriate, therefore, to restate the position of the United States. We know that the Soviet bloc maintains substantially larger conventional forces than the West. We know too that this advantage is offset by nuclear power. If the United States is to renounce its ability to maintain an adequate posture of defensive strength through atomic power, then there must be adequate assurance that other means of waging war which would give other nations definite superiority be diminished through balanced disarmament measures. In effect, the relationship between conventional and nuclear armaments requires that equitable reductions in both fields take place. We recognize that States will not accept disarmament measures which give the opposing side a definite military advantage. We could not ourselves accept such steps. We do not expect that others will agree to them. This is why we stress the point that nuclear tests must be viewed in their proper perspective, that is, in their relationship to the disarmament problem as a whole.

In other words, we are willing to forego improvement of our defensive capacity and versatility, which a continuation of tests would bring, so long as we have assurances that nations are definitely moving toward the desired goal of effective equitable disarmament.
I believe the representative of Canada, Mr. Smith, in his address of 20 October, summed up our position most accurately. He said, and I quote a portion of his statement:

"... we should realize that serious risks are involved for those countries which have sought to turn their manpower to productive purposes and are forced to rely on modern arms for their security. The offer of the United States and the United Kingdom should not be underestimated. It is a daring step in a perilous international situation."

Having said this, I should like to review quickly what the United States has done in an attempt to make a test suspension possible.

At the end of the 1957 London Disarmament Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada presented proposals for partial measures of disarmament. They called for simultaneous progress on four major measures of disarmament and the question of nuclear weapons tests.

I might add that these proposals included specific recommendations for convening groups of technical experts to study the feasibility and practicability of inspection systems required to adequately monitor and control agreements reached in any of these areas. All of us know where this initiative has led - the Geneva technical conference on detecting violations of nuclear tests has concluded successfully. A technical conference on surprise attack is about to begin.
Now, with respect to the testing question, the four-Power paper proposed a suspension of nuclear tests for a twelve-month period provided that at the end of that time an effective inspection system to verify the suspension had been installed and was in operation. In such a case, the suspension would continue for another twelve months provided that satisfactory progress was being made in establishing an inspection system for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes to enable a "cut-off" to be put into effect at the end of that period.

Since that time our position has been modified. We are suspending nuclear weapons testing unilaterally for one year comming with the 31 October negotiations, provided that the Soviet Union does not test during this period. We are ready to extend this suspension without limitation. We ask only that each year the parties to the agreement are satisfied that the inspection system is working effectively and that reasonable progress is being made on real disarmament measures.

Our forward stride is readily apparent. Today for an indefinite discontinuance we ask only that a reliable control system be established and that progress be made each year in the area of disarmament. Are these two principles unreasonable? Are they undesirable? I think not. Why did we make this compromise? In simple terms, we want the present encouraging momentum to continue.

Both sides are agreed on the need for a control system. While the Soviet Union has stated it agrees with the principle of controls, nevertheless the Soviet Union's position as set forth in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203) pending before this body leaves room for doubt as to how vital it believes a control system to be. One is compelled to wonder why the Soviet draft resolution fails to mention either the forthcoming Geneva negotiations or the principles of controls. Even in the latest revised, or, as the Soviets call it, the "corrected" version of their draft resolution which has been circulated here, there is still no reference to these salient questions. I hope this is only an oversight.
I should like to discuss for a moment the importance we attach to this problem of control. Throughout the long disarmament discussions in this Organization, one fact has been apparent. If there is to be progress on any disarmament measures, a basis of mutual confidence must be established. Without trust there can be no disarmament. This trust must be based on facts, and not on words alone. Consequently, any agreement reached must be implemented by controls so as to assure each State of the continuing good faith of others party to the agreement. Without this means of verification, the fears and suspicions which already exist would continue to fester and the infection would spread. In fact, what would an agreement to suspend tests without adequate controls amount to? In my opinion, it would be worse than no agreement at all. Small-scale tests of from one to five kilotons could be conducted with a minimum chance of detection. Moreover, there is a problem not only of detection of explosions but also of identification as atomic or other types.

For example, a state of uncertainty could be repeatedly created by earthquakes which might be interpreted as underground nuclear explosions. In fact, a percentage of earthquakes create shock waves which are also characteristic of sub-surface explosions, and a seismograph cannot differentiate. In such cases, free access to and inspection of the site is essential.

I cite these examples only to point out that, without an effective control system to verify compliance with the agreement, mistrust would undoubtedly be greater than under the present circumstances.

In the interest of creating this necessary foundation of trust, the United States has insisted on controls. Only when each party to the agreement can be reasonably assured of compliance by the others can international tension be lessened and a greater degree of confidence gained.

As we have heretofore stated in this body, we accept the control system recommended by the scientists at Geneva this summer. We believe that the establishment of such a system of detection and of control is essential and therefore we attach the greatest importance to the negotiations beginning this week in Geneva. There are two basic reasons for needing such a control system.
First, it would reassure each side that the agreement was in fact being carried out. Secondly, it would deter any country from violating the agreement. No one could be sure that even the smallest yield test might not be detected.

The United States believes that for these reasons a control system to verify a test suspension agreement must be operating as soon as practicable. Such a control system could be installed and working within a reasonable period of time. We, for our part, are prepared to proceed as soon as an agreement is reached. In furtherance of this position the United States has stated its willingness to suspend, unilaterally, nuclear tests for one year, believing that within that period a test-suspension agreement can be negotiated and a necessary beginning made on the establishment of an international control system. This, to me, represents a logical approach.

As I mentioned at the outset of my remarks, I wished to speak directly to the matter of nuclear weapons tests. However, in concluding, I want to re-emphasize that the basic objective of my country is reliable peace and disarmament.

We sincerely believe that progress in all areas of disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, must be achieved. As we have repeatedly demonstrated, we are ready and willing to explore and to move along any road that holds out the possibility of achieving progress. In this regard, we view an agreement on halting nuclear weapons tests as an important part of any programme leading to disarmament.

We would but deceive ourselves, however, if we let an agreement on test suspension blind us to the need for further progress on disarmament. Therefore, I hope the United Nations will endorse the progress that has been achieved to date. But, more important, I hope the United Nations will continue to make every effort to achieve a world-wide system of balanced and controlled disarmament.

We do not expect miracles -- but we must not accept stagnation.

In closing, may I advert to a page of history and again recall certain events, namely, an offer unique in the annals of nations. World War II ended with the United States in sole possession of atomic weapons and the means to produce them. My country also had the most powerful military force -- land, sea and air -- the world had ever seen. We were fully aware of this power and had our policies been aggressive we no doubt could then have imposed our will by force upon any country. But we have no aggressive intentions towards any nation. We are a nation dedicated to peace, freedom and human dignity. We respect the honour of nations founded on the free choice of their citizens.
With full realization of the power of atomic weapons then and the vast potential of future weapons, we knew that an atomic war might well destroy civilization, and we felt that every effort should be made to forestall such a possibility.

Accordingly we made a sincere proposal unique in the history of the world. Through Mr. Bernard Baruch, as United States representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, we proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority whose functions would include:

1. Control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security;
2. Control, inspection and licensing of all other atomic activities;
3. Fostering of the beneficial uses of atomic energy;
4. Research and development activities intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge, thus enabling it to comprehend, and therefore detect, any misuse of atomic energy; and
5. Power to control nuclear raw materials and primary nuclear production plants.

Operation of the system would have been by an international civil service; and "immediate, swift and sure punishment" was to be provided for violators.

Under this proposal the manufacture of atomic weapons would have ceased, all existing weapons, then held exclusively by the United States, would have been destroyed as weapons and the useful nuclear material transferred to the international agency for peaceful purposes.

In 1946 we will recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations formally approved the essential elements of the United States proposal. However, tragically, the Soviet Union cavalierly rejected this proposal and intensified its drive for the production of atomic instruments of war. I am not aware of any other instance in history when a nation offered to give up a weapon or an instrumentality of war within its exclusive possession which could dominate the world.

We can only speculate what the posture of the world today might have been had the Kremlin co-operated and accepted in good faith this programme designed to advance the cause of peace and freedom. We do not ask any nation to do anything which we are not willing to do ourselves.
In spite of the fact, however, that the task of waging peace and reducing world tensions has multiplied many fold, we and the peace-loving nations must redouble our efforts and must continue to dedicate our hearts and minds to the accomplishment of this goal.
Mr. BRUCAN (Romania): As we approach the last stage of our debate on the item before us, I should like to take only a few minutes of the precious time of the Committee in order to point out the main reason that has prompted the Romanian delegation to favour a universal cessation of nuclear tests rather than a temporary suspension of these tests. Since this issue has proved to be the crux of the problem we are dealing with, I feel the more justified in doing so -- and what the previous speaker, the representative of the United States, has just said further confirms our opinion.

May I say that, from the very beginning, I have found it difficult to follow the line of thought of those representatives who have argued in favour of a temporary suspension for one year because they consider such a step as being more conducive to other disarmament measures. Some of these representatives have even gone so far as to claim that by advocating a temporary suspension, they prove themselves to be genuinely interested in the general progress of disarmament, while those who stand for the universal cessation of test explosions would be satisfied with a single step towards disarmament. This kind of approach seems to reflect a new philosophy of bargaining: the less that is done today, the more that will be accomplished tomorrow.

The representative of France carried the demonstration further and argued that even a temporary suspension of tests is too much for the time being. Such a decision, in the opinion of the French representative, might impair the adoption of an overall programme of disarmament.

The matter is actually a very serious one. What would be the impact of a one year's suspension, and what would be the impact upon disarmament of the cessation of nuclear test explosions? One does not need to be an expert to realize that the nuclear race of today is a quantitative as well as a qualitative race -- and, may I say, primarily a qualitative one. It has become obvious that while the quantity of atomic and hydrogen bombs maintains great importance, it is the constant improvement in the quality, the development of new devices or of entirely new weapons, which impel the major effort. The nuclear Powers' objective is the development of the most destructive weapons, or the most precise weapons, or the weapons with the widest range, or weapons with some other special quality. Therefore, a stop signal for this deadly process of testing nuclear weapons would
greatly impede, if not prohibit, the development of new types of nuclear weapons, even more destructive. It should also prevent other Powers from developing their own nuclear weapons.

Objectively speaking, what does a one year's suspension of tests mean? First of all, a temporary suspension implies the possibility of resuming the tests. As a matter of fact, the nuclear Powers would feel not only free but compelled, to continue the preparation of new tests so as to be able at the end of the year to begin testing again. This is quite foreseeable for the very reason that none of the atomic Powers, as experience has made abundantly clear, will permit the other side to gain advantage to the detriment of its own security; and everyone knows that one year is exactly the period of time required for such preparations. What, then, would be achieved by a one year's suspension? The preparations for new tests would go on; the whole machinery set up for the perfecting of nuclear weapons would continue to work at full speed; millions of dollars would continue to be spent for that purpose, and so on. As for distrust and fear, they would continue to prevail among the atomic Powers.

One can hardly answer the question: what, if anything, might result for disarmament from such a temporary suspension of nuclear tests? Moreover, if we are to be realistic, we should contemplate a situation in which, due to the persistent effort in perfecting nuclear bombs, a new device or a new type of weapon is discovered, which must be tested to see how it works. Is it not logical to assume that such a situation will rebound against the extension of the suspension rather than towards its extension?

To sum up, we might conclude that, whereas a mere suspension of test explosions for one year will maintain all the evils of the nuclear race in a state of preparedness and will thus have a negative effect on disarmament as a whole, a cessation of test explosions will put an end to the development and perfection of nuclear weapons, will discourage this diabolical endeavour and will thus open new avenues for agreements on disarmament.

Now, let us consider this issue from another point of view. There is undoubtedly wide-spread concern that other Powers might shortly produce nuclear
weapons. If that is so, one must acknowledge that a temporary suspension of
test explosions is precisely what those Powers need in order to complete their own
tests. It is not accidental that the representative of France has already stated
that the seventeen-Power draft resolution does not commit France in any way.
This is one more reason -- and an extremely important one - why the Romanian
dlegation feels that only a universal cessation of test explosions fully and
adequately responds to the expectations of mankind. I feel that there can be no
discount on this pledge by which the General Assembly is bound before the peoples
of the world.
Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): May I at the outset join with other representatives in this Committee who have preceded me in the debate in congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on your election to your high office. We indeed need your wisdom in the important work of this Committee. I should like also to add my congratulations to the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur respectively.

My delegation would like to define briefly its position at this stage on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We wish to tell the Committee that we have listened with respect and consideration to the statements made by my colleagues here. These debates have elicited diverse attitudes towards this problem among those delegations which have participated in it.

On one side, there is a strong view to the effect that nuclear weapons tests should be stopped immediately and without conditions. This view was expressed by the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union in the following terms on 10 October:

"... if the United States and the United Kingdom accept an immediate cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons for all time, we are prepared to stop our tests as well." (A/C.1/PV.365, page 46)

The representative of the Soviet Union reaffirmed this position in somewhat stronger terms yesterday.

There is another view that the permanent cessation of the nuclear weapons tests should be subject to certain conditions, in addition to the establishment of an inspection system.

In a somewhat different light, there are again two different views with regard to whether the discontinuance of the nuclear weapons tests should be linked with the enforcement of other disarmament measures.

The view in favour of linking this particular issue with the enforcement of other disarmament measures has been expressed most forcefully by the representatives of France.

On 20 October, the representative of France, in his exercise of the right of reply, said to the effect that France considered that the cessation of atomic explosions alone is a sort of alibi to sidestep disarmament itself, and that it was possible to get together on a foundation which was capable of control as regards nuclear disarmament, namely, the cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes and the reduction of stockpiles, together at the same time with the cessation of tests.
Earlier in the general debate at the plenary meeting, the Foreign Minister of France said:

"... such a programme must be a programme of disarmament, and this comprises ... a series of specifically defined measures: namely, in addition to halting tests, the cessation of weapons manufacture and the gradual reconversion of stockpiles." (A/PV.758, page 63-65)

The other school of thought advocates that the issue of the cessation of tests should not be linked with other disarmament measures.

Between these opposite ways of thinking, there are a number of delegations who stand for a permanent discontinuance of testing, but are prepared to approve, as an immediate initial measure, a suspension of testing for a certain period of time because they trust that once a suspension is instituted, it will be morally difficult to reverse it. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Unden, propounded masterfully this position the other day. May I be permitted to pay tribute on this occasion to the eminent Foreign Minister.

As my colleagues may remember, I had the honour to put forward last year during the twelfth session of the General Assembly a proposal on the suspension of tests. The main features of the proposal were as follows: first, to suspend tests for one year from the time that agreement is reached for the prompt installation of the inspection system; and second, to enter into negotiations immediately after the said suspension has taken place.

As you may notice, therefore, my delegation upheld at that time the functional approach to the problem of the discontinuance of tests.

My delegation suggested also that a temporary suspension of tests without control be instituted for a certain period of time, for example, for one year.

On the other hand, we deemed it advisable to separate the specific issue of the suspension of tests from those other disarmament measures. We were of the view that the solution of the issue of the suspension of tests lay in this approach, which we thought was a realistic one.

My delegation has followed with particular pleasure the progress made during the last year on this important problem. Here are the facts:
1. The Soviet decision of 31 March of this year to suspend nuclear weapons testing;
2. The success of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests;
3. The American and British declaration of 22 August to suspend nuclear weapons testing;
4. Agreement to meet in conference at Geneva reached between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR for the negotiation of an agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system.
(Mr. Matsudaira, Japan)
We wish to express our satisfaction for the evolution which has occurred in the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom during the last year. The United States position on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests has been clarified by the representative of that country. I quote from his statement:

"The United States position on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests is not conditional on the existence of an entire disarmament plan. I say it is not conditional. We will suspend for one year, without controls, unless the Soviet Union continues testing during that period." (A/C.1/PV.945, page 51)

The representative of the United Kingdom also stated the following:

"... we also announced on 22 August that the United Kingdom would discontinue nuclear test explosions for a period of one year from 31 October, if the negotiations began on that date as proposed, and provided the Soviet Government would also discontinue testing in that period." (A/C.1/PV.948, page 26)

The progress in the position of the United States and the United Kingdom is remarkable. Indeed it is very gratifying. It is to be noted that such progress has been made, in the words of the representative of the United States, after consideration of minority views that were expressed here in the United Nations. On the other hand, my delegation regrets that the Soviet Union reversed its decision of 31 March of this year and resumed nuclear testing.

The people, the Diet and the Government of Japan desire not only the cessation of nuclear weapons tests for all time, but also the prohibition of their manufacture and stockpiling, to say nothing of their actual use. My delegation, however, feels that if any concrete results are to be obtained, it is incumbent on it to be flexible and realistic in its approach to the question of nuclear weapons testing.

Japan's deep anxiety over nuclear weapons testing arises from humanitarian considerations. In its view, humanitarian principles should be given the utmost importance in the deliberations of such an issue as this, which is of the greatest concern to all mankind. The report of the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation has not been able to lessen the widespread apprehension and concern regarding the effects of ionizing radiation. The report says:
"Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from experience of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations; these hazards, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed persons." (A/3838, page 54)

Japan feels sincerely that because of its own experience it has a role to play and a duty to perform so that the world may be spared from such hazards and sufferings as these.

The generation of today lives in anxiety, in fear, and in tension. We know that we cannot humanize war; that is the reason why we are so dedicated to peace. But if we cannot humanize war, why not endeavour at least to humanize peace, to circumscribe the anxiety and disarm the fear, and thus catalyze the hope.

We believe that the suspension of tests will favourably affect not only future discussions on other aspects of disarmament but will encourage the makings of a wider area within which to reach a detente and thus to ease international tension. We feel that here is the case for Ad Augustus per Augustus.

On the occasion of the Geneva talks, my delegation submits that two approaches to the problem of nuclear weapons tests might be attempted.

First, one approach is for the immediate and temporary measures, in order to create an atmosphere conducive to the success of the Geneva talks. The Committee should take note of the declarations of intention made by the two nuclear Powers: the statement made by President Eisenhower, and the announcement made by the United Kingdom Government, both of 22 August 1958. These declarations are the basis for future hope. They should be formally consecrated and consolidated for a new start.

May I be permitted to express my regrets on this score with regard to the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, yesterday.
In the view of my delegation, the declaration to suspend for one year further testing of nuclear weapons is most welcome. However, my delegation is now inclined also to think that one year is not long enough, even for temporary suspension.

Secondly, another approach is for a lasting formula for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. In this connexion, the United States position is to discontinue the testing of nuclear weapons on a year-by-year basis, subject to a determination at the beginning of each year that, (a) the agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively, and (b) satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures such as the United States has long sought.

On the condition defined in (b) may hinge the fate of the permanent discontinuance of the tests. It is, however, to be noted that this paragraph presumes negotiations for agreement. The Geneva talks should be and could be the best place for such negotiations. It is only natural that the General Assembly, under the circumstances, should urge the parties participating in the negotiations to make every effort to reach an agreement on a lasting formula for the discontinuance of these tests.

The said negotiations may not be very easy. That is the reason why my delegation feels that here again the United Nations presence is helpful and necessary. The role of the Secretary-General could be extremely useful. My delegation is of the view that the Secretary-General should be given the opportunity to render the necessary advice and assistance, when requested.
My delegation pins its hope, with prayers, on the outcome of the Geneva talks. We have two reasons to be hopeful. One reason is our strong faith in all forms of negotiation. With good faith and a sincere desire for peace, the candid talks and negotiations among the three Powers principally concerned could be reasonably expected to produce some tangible and constructive results.

Another reason is that we are able to notice a certain flexibility and even mobility in the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom on this issue. Their positions are, as we have noticed, in constant evolution. On the other hand, when we recall the fact that last year the Soviet Union stood for a two to three years' temporary suspension, we may hope that the stiff stand which Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, is now taking is not the last word on his part. We wish earnestly that a compromise formula between permanence and one year can be found somewhere, while a lasting formula for the permanent cessation of tests is not out of sight.

A problem of such magnitude as that of disarmament could not be solved successfully unless all parties concerned are willing to accept the settlement and to insure the fulfilment of such a settlement. My delegation also feels that the unity of views on the essentials among all Powers concerned is indispensable. We have learned this lesson by past experience. We will join wholeheartedly any attempt to bring the dissenting views closer together. We believe sincerely that this attempt will serve the cause of disarmament and peace.

My delegation would admit, however, that the possibility for the success of such attempts is doubtful if the positions taken by the Powers concerned are going to be inflexible.

On the success of these attempts may hang, on the other hand, the outcome of the Geneva talks. Unless we find a formula capable of securing that unity of views on the essentials, the prospects for a successful conclusion to the Geneva talks will not be very bright.

The eyes of the world are now focused on the Geneva talks. The talks should not be permitted to fail. Here lies the responsibility of the General Assembly and of this Committee. Here lies also a case of the conscience of mankind.

In the face of this overwhelming problem, the Assembly must be aware of the fact that action and not rhetoric is what we should seek. The time should
surely have passed when we are allowed to adopt unworkable resolutions and then to forget the issue for another year. The moments are too serious, indeed.

My delegation hopes that the debates in which we have been engaged will benefit the deliberations on the subject in Geneva.

Negotiations in Geneva will start in a few days' time. Everybody wishes the negotiations to be successful. Everybody would like to make an appeal to the Powers concerned to reach an early agreement with regard to the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests under an international control system. My delegation joins in this wish and appeal wholeheartedly.

Mr. ECLAUNDE (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): First of all, may I express my appreciation of the words spoken by the representative of the United States regarding my previous statement, and may I take advantage of these few minutes to express a feeling which I believe is crystallizing in all sectors of the General Assembly.

The small nations have here expressed their anxiety and concern as to the results of this debate. Despite the fact that there are some very important points such as the fact that the Geneva meetings, beginning on 31 October, are imminent, there is, however, a kind of shadow of pessimism and a fear of failure. This became more apparent yesterday in the apparently adamant and antagonistic stand on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and on the Soviet Union on the other. This opposition is the cause of grave bitterness for us because we wish, over and above all, that the Geneva talks should take place in an atmosphere of confidence, of concord, of optimism, in an atmosphere, should I say, of faith. And yet I see, and I am not alone here as the representatives of the small countries are with me, that the Geneva meetings are to begin on 31 October. How are they going to be begun and in what atmosphere? The atmosphere in which these conversations are going to take place has been up to this time characterized by two facts.
First of all, as far as the suspension of tests is concerned and as far the essence of disarmament is concerned, that is, control, between the two great Powers today, there is an open gap that seems to have widened. As far as the other Powers are concerned, we too have no resolution to offer which represents the unanimity of the non-nuclear Powers. There is no compensation in the fact that the agreement of the nuclear Powers must be obtained, that there must be an unanimous position in the negotiations. All the other countries look with respect on the negotiations which are to take place in Geneva, and it would be something if at least we could raise a united voice on behalf of humanity in a clamour for agreement by the great Powers.

Unfortunately, this is not the case either. We do have two proposals: the seventeen-Power draft resolution and the thirteen-Power draft resolution. The two groups represent highly respectable groups of countries, countries that are dear to us, countries that have rendered and continue to render great service to the cause of peace. Thus may I express the wish that some formula will be found by virtue of which -- as a kind of moral mandate -- there would be a kind of creation of the right spirit infused in these negotiations at Geneva.
Would it be perhaps asking too much to do this? Yet, in order to fulfil a moral duty, I am impelled to speak at this time, and I believe that I am not alone in feeling this moral pressure. I believe that this moral pressure should be exercised more freely by the small nations so as to end the radical opposition in the respective attitudes which exist between the Soviet Union and the United States.

I am being extremely objective and I wish to address myself in particular to the representative of the Soviet Union. When I stated in my first intervention that I did not want to suppose that the Soviet Union could not accept the point of view of possibility even as a compromise without giving up their ideal of unconditional cessation, I said this in all sincerity, because I believe that the Soviet position could be one that could be taken, but it should not be a position from which the Soviet Union could at no time retreat. But I believe that without sacrificing the ideal of the absolute cessation of tests, the Soviet Union might be willing, because of the ideals of the Soviet Union, because humanity must be saved from the possible risk of the increase of radiation, to accept the middle of the road position offered by the United States. I think frankly that it is an illogical position to want the whole and to be unwilling to accept the part, at least from the humanitarian point of view, if not from the political point of view. Therefore, if a one year suspension can be achieved, it should be accepted. Otherwise, you would be giving up the reality of the partial advantage for the shadow of the intellectual or political position. This is a serious responsibility which the Soviet Union is undertaking.

I am speaking to the representative of a great Power, representing a great culture and an important country in the world. With great respect and with full knowledge of what I state, I wish to say the following: If we can stop tests and end the increasing amount of radiation, why not go along with it? The answer can only be that complete cessation has already been proposed and that unconditional cessation is preferable. But perfection is the enemy of good. And while it may be that the radical measures are the best, I believe that possible measures should be preferred. One who accepts a possible solution may be giving up his ideal for the moment, but at least he will obtain a partial advantage for humanity. Therefore, I do not believe that the position of the Soviet Union will be sympathetically received by world public opinion.
I should also like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union to see clearly the circumstances in which the Geneva conference will take place. We have expressed our hopes for its success, but these hopes can do nothing alone. What do our hopes mean if the Geneva conference is to take place while tests are continuing? What the Geneva conference needs is a statement that the meetings will coincide with a gentlemen's agreement that, at least for one year -- a time-limit which can be extended -- the tests will stop. I do not want to go so far as to say that the time-limit will be extended, but the suggestion was made by one delegation and we all know of the experience which Japan has had in this matter. It was Japan which first suggested this compromise position in its excellent presentation last year.

I believe that I am duty-bound to give my frank opinion. If the Geneva conference begins in an unfavourable atmosphere, then we shall have lost half the battle. The possibilities of success will then be very few. Failure will increase distrust and future negotiations will be more difficult. If you believe that the cessation of tests is a guarantee for the survival of humanity and if you believe that it will be a good beginning, then we must do everything to make sure that the Geneva conference will be a success. We must try to create the necessary atmosphere for agreement.

On the other hand, the Geneva conference should begin not by a diktat of the Assembly but because of agreement that has been arrived at -- we must bear in mind the fact that cessation must be the product of negotiation. The atmosphere can be set by the Assembly, that is true, but the Assembly cannot juridically establish a cessation, because juridically cessation must be the product of the agreement of the parties. Absolute and unconditional cessation decreed by the Assembly, whether or not there are negotiations, would eliminate the idea of any negotiations and would replace the will of the parties by the very respectable but out of place will of the Assembly. No matter how great the will of the Assembly may be, it cannot replace the will of the party. The moral value lies in the Assembly but the juridical and the concrete value of the effective obligations that will determine the course of events lie in the negotiations. We cannot leave negotiations aside. We must have faith in negotiations.
The position of the Western Powers that there will be no tests for one year, with or without control, creates an atmosphere of confidence. It places a heavy responsibility on the negotiators, because their failure would change a position favourable to humanity and accepted by the parties, with the approval of the Assembly. Thus, the negotiators would have a moral obligation before them. The cessation would last for one year or for one year and a half -- I do not know the consequences which would accrue to the parties because I do not know the difference between one year and one year and a half in matters of testing. I am not going into that question.
What I am an expert on is to say that you cannot allow a juridical obligation, or you cannot create a juridical institution, based on the obligations of the parties and leave it to the will of the parties to maintain it. Therefore, some time limit must be set. If you create no time limit, if you say you are going to suspend tests until an agreement is arrived at, then you are setting up an indefinite cessation which depends on that party that wishes no longer to negotiate. This I can say. This I know full well, because this is a juridical principle that states that a juridical obligation cannot be set up and its fulfilment left to the mercy of one of the parties.

Therefore, I make a sincere and heartfelt appeal to the great Powers, and I also make this appeal to my colleagues in the Assembly, that we hasten our intellectual efforts, that we come to an agreement which will be a happy omen for the results of the Geneva negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As you may have noticed in today's Journal, on Thursday the First Committee will meet only in the afternoon. I am informed by the Secretary that the reason for this is that there will be a plenary meeting on Thursday morning, at which, among other subjects, we shall consider the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.