Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 27 October 1958, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament [64] (continued)

2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests [70] (continued)

3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries [72] (continued)

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58-25096
1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): In connexion with the discussion that has taken place concerning the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, the Soviet Government has instructed my delegation to make the following statement.

The Soviet Government has consistently advocated and continues to advocate the necessity for a complete and unconditional cessation of tests of all types of nuclear weapons. Wishing to achieve a practical solution of this question, the Soviet Union undertook such a step as the unilateral cessation of nuclear tests despite the fact that it had conducted fewer tests then had the United States and the United Kingdom. If the United States and the United Kingdom had followed the example of the Soviet Union, then the universal cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests would have already become a reality. However, the United States and the United Kingdom refused to join their efforts with those of the Soviet Union in this direction.

The Geneva Conference of Experts has fully confirmed the viewpoint of the Soviet Government with regard to the fact that there exist no obstacles to reaching an agreement between the Powers on the immediate cessation of tests of all types of nuclear weapons. The Conference of Experts came to the conclusion that it was entirely possible to control the universal cessation of nuclear tests and that such control could be established without great difficulties. As is known, the Soviet Government has agreed with all the conclusions and recommendations of the Geneva Conference of Experts.

In response to the initiative of the Soviet Union, which unilaterally ceased tests, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom conducted the biggest series of nuclear weapons tests.
Moreover, in connexion with the conclusion of the Geneva Conference of Experts when the Western Powers could no longer refer to the impossibility of establishing control, they adopted in their statement of 22 August as well as in their subsequent statements, a position which reveals that they are striving to continue to avoid in the future the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. In these statements they proclaimed their willingness to suspend tests temporarily for a period of only one year. As to the possibility of extending the temporary suspension of tests, which is referred to in the statements of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments and of their delegations to the Assembly, this is linked up with such reservations as are needed by the Western Powers in order to resume tests when it is convenient for them to do so.

It is well known that the temporary suspension of tests for one year does not actually mean the cessation of tests at all since the period of approximately one year is needed anyway in order to study and process the results of the series of tests previously conducted and to make preparations for the next series. To agree to such a proposal would be tantamount to embarking on the road of complicity in deceiving the peoples who demand from the Governments that atomic and hydrogen weapons tests be stopped once and for all. It stands to reason that the Soviet Union cannot and will not agree to such a position.

It is not difficult to see that when speaking of the suspension of tests for only one year, after the United States and Great Britain had speedily conducted the most intensive series of tests yet, the Governments of these States evidently pursued the aim on the one hand of obtaining unilateral military advantage as compared to the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, of retaining the possibility of resuming nuclear weapons tests when it is suitable for them to do so.

In view of the above-stated circumstances the Soviet Government categorically declines the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments to suspend tests for one year. The position of the Western Powers which have refused to stop nuclear weapons tests immediately and unconditionally, gives the Soviet Union grounds to proceed with the conduct of nuclear tests in the proportion of one to one with regard to the number of tests, made by the United States and Great Britain taken together, until the number of explosions conducted by it after 31 March of this year will become equal to the number of nuclear tests conducted by these
Powers since the above-mentioned date. The Soviet Government will act precisely in this manner if the Governments of the United States and Great Britain continue to frustrate agreements in the future as well, and continue to place obstacles in the way towards reaching an agreement concerning the universal cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

The Soviet Government would not like things to take such a turn. The Soviet Government considers it necessary that all the Powers that possess nuclear weapons should stop the testing of these weapons immediately and forever. If the United States and the United Kingdom Governments are prepared to sign such an agreement, then the Soviet Union having signed such an agreement, will alongside with them immediately cease the tests even though the Soviet Union, as is known, has conducted fewer test explosions than have the United States and the United Kingdom.

If the relevant resolution does not provide for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests for all time, the Soviet Union, as has already been stated by the USSR delegation, reserves the right to equalize the number of tests conducted by the Soviet Union after 31 March of this year with the number of tests conducted since the same date by the United States and the United Kingdom taken together.

The Soviet Union will continue in the future to make every effort to achieve a positive solution of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. At the same time the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that the cessation of such tests should not be made dependent on whether an agreement is reached or not at the forthcoming conference at Geneva starting on 31 October, to the success of which the Soviet Union for its part will contribute in every possible way.

The Soviet Government firmly adheres to the position that the resolution of the General Assembly calling for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests should not have any ambiguity but should clearly and distinctly spell out that it will remain valid up to the conclusion between the Powers concerned of an agreement on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests irrespective of the issue as to the place and as to what time such an agreement will be concluded. Only in that eventuality will the United Nations discharge its duty before the peoples who demand an urgent solution of the question of the cessation of nuclear tests.
If attempts are made to induce the General Assembly to adopt a resolution behind which the Western Powers could hide while hindering in every way the achievement of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, the Soviet Union will be unable to support this resolution.

The Soviet delegation expects that the United States and United Kingdom delegations will state clearly and unequivocally that the resolution of the General Assembly calling for the cessation of nuclear tests should remain valid until the achievement between the States concerned of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests for all time.

For its part, the Soviet Government will contribute to the achievement of the above-mentioned agreement. If the United States and United Kingdom Governments strive to achieve the same objective, then there will be no obstacles to such an agreement being concluded at a very early date and to the achievement of a definite and complete solution of the question relating to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests once and for all.

Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): At the beginning of my statement, it is my pleasant duty publicly to express the happiness of the delegation of Ecuador at your well-earned election, Mr. Chairman, and to congratulate you. I also wish to congratulate our colleagues, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur, on their election.

Disarmament, the different aspects of which are being debated here, is, in this period of titanic progress and gigantic dangers, an imperative that humanity insists upon. When confronted with the question of disarmament, there are no States which are more or less interested. Everyone is vitally interested in disarmament. The great Powers play a special role because it is in their hands that the great instruments of war at present lie. The great concern of the small Powers resides precisely in the fact that, when confronted by a situation fraught with danger which mortally affects them, they have no other influence than that of the moral power that we are called upon to exercise through the most important forum that is this Assembly.
In the course of the last year since the last discussion on disarmament which ended in November 1957, we have witnessed a number of contradictory events that have produced hope and disillusionment. It has been a year of extraordinary technical progress where the frontiers of outer space have been crossed and where the Conference of Experts called to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests has given us a unanimous report which is most constructive and must obviously give rise to great hopes. Furthermore, it has been a year in which we have seen a diplomatic stalemate in the general discussions on disarmament hand in hand with the continuation of the arms race at a rhythm alarming because of its technique, its economic impulse and its unforeseeable end.

Parallel to the serious warnings that we have received from the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation on the genetic degeneration and the somatic effects that can be caused by the slightest amount of radiation, there have continued nuclear tests, the suspension of which is being sought by the various Governments that are causing such tests to be carried out.

This panorama, which is so full of contrasts, is being repeated in the debate in this Committee. Some of the passages of the debate are contradictory, some are mysterious, especially for those of us who have not shared the great secrets of the negotiations on disarmament. However, we cannot deny that perhaps as a result of the moral pressure which is the common denominator of the statements which we have heard from all sides and perhaps because of the interest that we all have in the survival of man, which is over and above all frontiers, we see some roads that we feel we ought to follow to try to arrive at successful ends.

May I be permitted to stress some aspects which I deem to be of immediate importance. The report of the Conference of Experts which studied the possibilities of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests was received with unanimous applause. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have all stated that their Governments agree with the system of control suggested in that report. Despite the existence of an adverse international climate, the technical perspective has allowed us to lay the bases for a diplomatic effort which is to be carried out in the Conference that will start at the end of this week in Geneva to agree on the
methods of implementing such a system of control on which a definite agreement
can be arrived at on the suspension of nuclear tests, which will be equivalent to
a cessation of such tests.

I am not trying to establish priorities or degrees of danger in such a complex
and delicate field. I tend, rather, to stress the importance and urgency of the
proposal that the great Powers be requested by the General Assembly to make every
effort to come to an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests on the basis of
an adequate system of control. There are three reasons for this: first, the
scientific advice that atomic radiation must be restricted; secondly, the
significant progress already achieved through the Conference of Experts, which
opens the tremendous possibility of strengthening diplomatic negotiations with
technical opinion; and, finally, the psychological effect on the mind of world
public opinion because of the dangers inherent in nuclear tests that would be
attached to an agreement of this nature, both on lessening international tension
as well as on creating a more adequate atmosphere for the consideration of wider
aspects of the problem of disarmament.

It is our fervent hope that an agreement for suspension will be arrived at
and that such an agreement will be permanent. We believe that we can only arrive
at such an agreement through an adequate system of control. This is obvious.
We must state that one of the great unknowns in this debate, as far as we are
concerned, is the fact that in the Soviet draft resolution no mention whatever
is made of a system of control despite the constructive participation of the
Soviet Union in the Conference of Experts and despite the fact that the
Soviet Union approved the system of control suggested by the experts in Geneva.
This desire for success in the forthcoming conference is expressed in the first operative paragraph of the draft resolution submitted jointly by the delegation of Ecuador and sixteen other delegations. This is a paragraph in which the parties to the negotiations are requested to do all in their power to come to an agreement on suspension of tests as soon as possible -- that is, suspension based on effective international control.

Despite the Soviet Union statement that we have just heard, the present debate permits us to hope that the parties to the negotiations at Geneva will suspend their nuclear tests while such negotiations are taking place. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have unequivocably expressed their intention of suspending such tests for a year beginning 31 October, if the Soviet Union agrees not to carry out nuclear tests during that period. Furthermore, we have heard proclaimed the Soviet Union position as regards an agreement for the final cessation of all nuclear tests. This is a position which permits us to believe that the Soviet Union will reconsider the position which it stated today and will be willing to accept the more modest, but more realistic and viable proposal offered by the Western Powers.

As has been many times repeated in this debate, the problem of the suspension of nuclear tests, although urgent and serious, is only one of the chapters in the great problem of disarmament. That is why the draft resolution of the seventeen Powers had to include a paragraph which is intended to urge the setting up of a world-wide system of balanced disarmament and effective international control. To omit this would be to underestimate the importance of the other five chapters so clearly defined in the resolution of 14 November 1957 which, despite the fact that it has been a dead letter as far as implementation through the machinery provided is concerned, is still valid as a well balanced programme for disarmament. It would, I think, be superfluous to try to make a new analysis of the meaning of each of those chapters. However, I believe that we ought to stress the fact that the seriousness of the problem of nuclear tests must not permit us to lose sight of the fact that the greatest danger to peace still lies in the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and that in the future -- and a number of speakers have mentioned this -- we may have to face the indescribable danger of international trade in nuclear weapons and a possible increase in the number of countries with nuclear weapons industries.
It would be difficult for the General Assembly to recommend formulas that would meet with the vast complexities of the problem, but we do believe it to be necessary that, gradually, we should define a moral position that will stop any possible advances in the dire directions to which I have pointed.

In view of the stalemate in the negotiations on the general problem of disarmament, we share the concern expressed by a number of delegations, especially when stated with the authority and experience of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico. We believe that the Assembly would be remiss in its duty were it not to try to avoid the diplomatic stalemate of the last years becoming permanent. We hope that the draft resolution presented by the delegation of Mexico will be adopted unanimously in this Committee so that, under your chairmanship, Sir, and with the valuable assistance of the Secretary-General, some road may be found whereby future negotiations can be channeled into constructive ends.

There is one aspect which we must bear in mind, and that is the participation of our Organization in negotiations. The seventeen-Power draft resolution contains a provision which is restricted to the Geneva conference but which might be widened to cover other negotiations, with the participation of the Secretary-General. Previously an opinion had been expressed that, in order to encourage negotiations between the great Powers, the co-operation of an internationally renowned personality should be sought, someone who would exercise the functions of a high commissioner for disarmament. The Secretary-General, who has his own responsibilities pursuant to the Charter and who has the power to act efficiently, could play an important role in a realistic and constructive direction, and his own memorandum speaks well for this since, in a few lines, he was able to synthesize the crux of the problem which faces us at present.

I would not like to conclude without saying that, as far as the third item on our agenda is concerned -- that is, the reduction of military budgets -- the delegation of Ecuador supports the text submitted by Bolivia and a group of Latin American countries, by virtue of which we reiterate the invitation previously made by the General Assembly to the States concerned to devote, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, as and when sufficient progress is made, additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world, and especially in the less developed countries. In this way, the Assembly
will be recognizing once more the fact that the economic and social welfare of peoples is an indispensable element in peace. It is painful to note how the defence expenditures deprive great sectors of human beings of the opportunity of liberating themselves from poverty and misery. This thought must be weighed by all statesmen and it must act as a further reason to lead them to improve the international atmosphere so that order and justice may prevail internationally, without which the road to disarmament would be made more difficult and almost endless.

Mr. PARCO (United States of America): The statement which we have heard this afternoon by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union was a very important statement which the United States delegation will study with great care. I should not, therefore, wish to reply fully to it now. I should like, however, to say one thing.

The Soviet Union statement this afternoon, if I understood it correctly, justifies every fear that has been expressed in this Committee concerning the Soviet Union's real intentions. I hope and trust that I may be wrong.

Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom): I too will, of course, have to study the statement made this afternoon by Mr. Zorin. My first impression, however, is that the Soviet Union Government is persisting in a position of extreme rigidity which is hardly calculated to bring about an agreed solution.

From the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, I understood that the Soviet Union Government is insisting on carrying out tests after 31 October. The position of my Government is that we are prepared to suspend tests for one year as from 31 October, the date on which the Geneva talks begin, provided that the Soviet Union Government will agree also to suspend tests for one year.
Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): I have asked to speak not to exercise the right of reply, because my country was not referred to or attacked today, but in order to ask permission to do what others have done before me, that is, to combine a bit of general discussion with a bit of analysis of resolutions.

The reason why I ask for this permission is that I must regretfully leave this Assembly the day after tomorrow to participate in an electoral campaign in my country, as scheduled. I say that in order to make it clear that there are no political reasons for this departure, and I shall therefore have no opportunity to participate in the wind-up of this debate.

I should like to make it clear that I shall not deal with the question of the duration of the suspension of tests. I shall not therefore analyse the brief statement which we heard from Mr. Zorin, on which our colleagues from the United States and the United Kingdom have reserved the right to reply. As I see it, he feels that the cessation must be definitive and must not be conditional even on reaching agreement in Geneva in the Conference which will begin on 31 October. In other words, it would be an unconditional measure right away.

At this point I wish not to set out again the position of France -- I did that some days ago, at some length perhaps -- but I hope clearly -- but I should like to tell what consequences we derive from this as regards our attitude to the various draft resolutions. May I recall that our attitude may be summed up as adhering to the limited but balanced programme of the joint resolution of 16 October 1957, which was voted by this Assembly in November. I apologize for not following chronological order, but when I read the draft resolution of the seventeen Powers (A/C.1/L.205), I only see one point of that declaration of last year covered. I am referring to a good but rather vague passage, paragraph C, which says:

"Expresses determination that the trend of the recent encouraging initiatives, including the technical approach, should continue with a view to contributing to a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament,".
This cannot give satisfaction to the representative of Ecuador who spoke with great precision just before me and who emphasized, as many of you think, that it is necessary to maintain a close link between the various disarmament measures lest we achieve very disappointing results. We cannot therefore vote for the seventeen-Power draft resolution. We shall abstain on that draft resolution.

The same goes for the amendment, which is a mere wish under which part of the savings so affected would be devoted to improving living conditions throughout the world. We are likewise unable to accept the Irish amendments (A/C.1/L.207) to the seventeen-Power draft resolution for reasons which are readily understandable. We will not agree to being excluded from among the nuclear Powers, even while others continue to increase their stockpiles and, with those stockpiles, the dangers and risks of war.

As to the proposal presented by the USSR (A/C.1/L.205), I said a while ago that we would not opt between a cessation isolated from the context of disarmament -- which the French Prime Minister at a recent press conference described very aptly as a mere alibi, and which I also described as an alibi -- and complete cessation and suspension. We therefore will not vote for the draft resolution of the USSR concerning the complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

The same goes for the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.204) dealing with a 10 to 15 per cent reduction of military budgets. I said why in my main speech. I said that no control was specified. Such control would require previous examination and study in view of divergencies of budgetary practices of the nations to be compared. We shall therefore likewise abstain on this draft resolution.

Then comes the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.211) sponsored by India and Yugoslavia, expressing the wish that agreement should be achieved on measures against the possibility of surprise attack. We will vote in favour of this wish. Here again is a resolution which is a mere wish and which can scarcely be anything else.
There comes finally a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.210), again sponsored by India and Yugoslavia, which would establish a disarmament commission of eighty-one members. In my main speech I had my say already about commissions with too large a membership, and this also applied to the twenty-five-member Commission which we wanted to establish last year. If we survey impartially the proceedings in this room, I can scarcely think that one could expect the detailed discussion of a treaty of peace to take place around vast concentric tables where eighty-one representatives sit. This is perfectly proper for an interesting general debate, and we have given considerable evidence of that over the past few years. Everybody surely realizes that it is impossible in such a setting to draw up and compile a disarmament treaty and weigh all the formulas as would be necessary.

I have said and I repeat that we are in favour of small working organs, as small as possible. But since in fact everyone has the right to veto in matters of disarmament, in view of the fact that no disarmament treaty can ever be imposed by a majority vote upon a minority which would include States directly concerned and which would be unwilling to accept it, therefore the theoretical membership or composition of the Commission was for us Frenchmen a matter of secondary importance. We would therefore be prepared to accept the idea of an eighty-one nation commission, but we would like to assure you that in this maximum form it will be no more effective than was the twenty-five-member Disarmament Commission which was already hypertrophied.

We would however suggest two amendments to the text, one real amendment and a group of small alterations. We would propose to add, at the end of paragraph 1 of document A/C.1/L.210, which reads:

"Decides that the Disarmament Commission shall be composed of all the Members of the United Nations"

the following addition:

"that this Commission shall set up a restricted working committee and that, moreover, groups of experts may be set up whenever this is regarded as useful."

I should like to comment on this addition briefly. To begin with, I know full well that the representative of India, Mr. Lall, and the representative of
Yugoslavia have already said that this can indeed be done, that committees or sub-committees can be set up. But, you know, things that go without saying go even better when they are said, especially when they are written. This is better than having it merely recorded in the verbatim records of this Committee -- whose verbatim records will be piled on top of the previous pile, vast as it is, of verbatim records of this Committee.

Therefore, we should be able to say that that Commission shall set up a restricted working group. Surely no one can oppose this. Everyone surely will agree with me that it is simply impossible to work effectively in preparing a treaty in a body of eighty-one. It just cannot be done.

I wanted to avoid causing any umbrage or recalling past experience. In the last months of last year, our Soviet colleagues vigorously opposed the notion of a sub-committee. I will therefore not call it a sub-committee in order not to evoke memories which may be painful to some. I rather propose the expression, "restricted working committee".
As for the right to be reserved either to the plenary commission or to the limited working committee to set up groups of experts whenever deemed useful or necessary, I think that no one will deny that this weapon must be given to this organ.

This is our first amendment.

The second amendment would slightly alter paragraph 2 of the operative part by three additions or modifications. I will first read the paragraph as it is now:

"Requests the Disarmament Commission to make every effort to reach agreement or agreements in the field of disarmament commencing with those aspects of the problem which seem to offer the best immediate possibilities".

I have read it in French; of course, it was born in English. I request that the words "of disarmament" be replaced by the words "of an effective and balanced disarmament".

I do not attempt to conceal my ideas. I do not think that a limited or definitive cessation of explosions is something which is related to disarmament. I wanted it made clear that the new Commission of eighty-one members and its restricted working committee and its group of experts will have the purpose and objective of achieving effective and balanced disarmament.

Secondly, I ask that after the words "those aspects of the problem which ..." the words "in the opinion of the Powers directly concerned" be added. Why? Because there are problems to be dealt with by the Commission, by its working committee and by the group of experts which may appear, to Powers not directly concerned in the question, to be easily capable of solution whereas other Powers, large or small, which are directly concerned, may find difficulties which the former do not.

I do not wish to use the expression "the Powers principally concerned". I did not want it to be believed that I wanted to give some sort of privilege, unknown or unmentioned, to any particular group of Powers. A Power directly concerned could very well be a very small Power. If, for example, you study some sort of a formula for demilitarization in central Europe, a Power like Luxembourg -- and I hope its representative here will not take umbrage if I suggest that it is not a principal Power -- is, nevertheless, directly interested in the problem.
Therefore, I ask that topics be selected which give the best possibilities of agreement in the opinion of the Powers directly concerned.

Finally, the last alteration, which is only a formal change: I do not like the expression "seem to offer", especially after the clarifications which I have tried to offer. Therefore, I suggest the replacement of the words "seem to offer" by the word "offer", so that the text would read as follows:

"Requests the Disarmament Commission to make every effort to reach agreement or agreements in the field of an effective and balanced disarmament commencing with those aspects of the problem which, in the opinion of the Powers directly concerned, offer the best immediate possibilities".

If you accept these two amendments, which seem to me to add some clarifications but not difficulties, the French delegation would be prepared to cast one affirmative vote at this session by voting in favour of the draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia.

There remains draft resolution A/C.1/L.206, presented by Mexico.

I have already responded to the appeal of Mr. Padilla Nervo. As the first, and perhaps the only representative, so far, of the Powers directly concerned, I said that, in the hour that followed the adoption of the Mexican draft resolution by the General Assembly, France would participate in that meeting proposed by Mexico. This means, of course, that we will vote in favour of the Mexican draft resolution.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having allowed me to anticipate the discussion of the draft resolutions. I am unable to state, naturally, what our attitude will be on the texts at the very end, as they will emerge. However, I can assure this Committee that our attitude will be prompted by our faithful adherence to the position outlined by France last year. We will not vote in favour of any text which, by omission or commission, would seem to abandon last year's formula.
Mr. LALL (India): I am sure that members of the Committee would prefer to have before them the text of the amendments to the Indian and Yugoslav draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.210 before they make up their minds on the suggestions which have been made by the representative of France in this Committee.

As a preliminary observation, may I say this before Mr. Nach leaves New York. The possibility of further revision in this draft resolution was one which did not escape the attention of the representative of Yugoslavia and myself. It is of course possible to make this draft resolution more precise. But the point is whether precision in this organization, which we are hoping to create, should follow meetings of the new Disarmament Commission or whether we should now try to foreshadow such precision. It is our view that it would probably be wiser to let the Commission meet and to discover in its own discussions those purposes and avenues of work which would be promoted by smaller groups being set up on an ad hoc basis, as may be required as the Commission turns its attention to those matters. It is for that reason, and not because we are opposed per se to smaller groups considering some of the detailed matters which must be dealt with, that we have left the draft resolution in its present form. This is a preliminary observation, but I did wish the Committee to know that we had not overlooked this matter of spelling out certain aspects of this draft resolution in greater detail. We had deliberately left the draft resolution in this form as we thought that that might be wiser and more conducive to the purpose which we have in view.
This remark refers mainly to the first of the suggested amendments. Regarding the second amendment, which is in several parts, we shall study the proposals very carefully indeed. It may be possible to accept at least some of these suggestions. In any case, I would like to assure the representative of France that I do not see any great difference between the thoughts which we have expressed and the thoughts which he has elaborated this afternoon. I hope that even if we are not able to accept these amendments fully, the delegation of France, which in principle is not opposed to this draft resolution, will be able to give it its sympathetic consideration.

**Mr. Vidić (Yugoslavia):** I shall, of course, study the suggestions of the representative of France.

I wish to reserve the right to speak at some subsequent time on the questions which he raised here.

I wish also to add that I agree with what the representative of India has said here just now.

**Mr. Zorin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian):** I have listened to the preliminary observations of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom following the statement which I made here on instructions from the Soviet Government. It would seem to me that both these preliminary observations, and those which we may expect to ensue, should be based on a careful examination of the text of my statement.

I would not like to respond to these preliminary observations at this stage, even though they struck me as being rather premature. I think that after a study of the text of the Soviet delegation, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and other representatives, may see their way clear to expressing their considered thoughts, in connexion with which the Soviet delegation will be able to offer clarification and an answer in substance, as the case may be.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): There are no further speakers on my list for this afternoon. There are eight speakers for tomorrow, four in the morning and four in the afternoon. I trust that by tomorrow afternoon we shall be able to conclude the general debate and perhaps begin our discussion on the draft resolutions and amendments before the Committee.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.