Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 24 October 1958, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament I647 (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests I707 (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries I727 (continued)

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58-24831
1. QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

Mr. LALL (India): Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my brief intervention today is relatively simple. The members of the Committee have already seen, and have before them, A/C.1/L.210 and A/C.1/L.211, which are two draft resolutions submitted by the delegations of India and Yugoslavia, under item 64 of the agenda. One draft resolution relates to the machinery disarmament within the United Nations, and the other draft resolution relates to our attitude and hopes in the matter of the technical Conference which will soon convene in Geneva to study technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack.

I have sought the indulgence of this Committee very briefly to introduce these draft resolutions, and I am happy that our other co-sponsor, Yugoslavia, through its representative, will also add its voice to mine in introducing these texts. I will therefore be very brief indeed.
Too long have we in the United Nations hovered close to decisions on disarmament, too long have we come near a peak of decision, only to find it to be a peak of indecision from which we slipped down a slope of frustration. We have achieved, in terms of positive results, not even the subtraction of a single weapon from the total armoury of the world. On the contrary, armaments continue to build up.

The nature of present armaments and their growing volume and quantity are the basic reasons for the approach which this Committee will find in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.210 on machinery within the United Nations for a continuing consideration of disarmament. The time has gone when the impact of weapons was on a specific target. The impact of modern weapons, not only of the weapons in use but of those when they are being tested, is on the world in general. We all know that if a war was let loose with the weapons which are now at the disposal of mankind there would be no question of spectators. Even those who did not participate in the war would be victims. It is this fundamental fact which has altered the nature of the discussions in this Committee.

Anyone who compares the discussions of this Committee at the current session with those of five or six years ago will find that, whereas the latter discussions were largely confined to generalities except in the case of a few countries, today, the representatives of almost all the countries of this greatly enlarged Assembly, which now numbers eighty-one Member States, are deeply concerned about the armaments position in the world. It cannot be hidden from the most innocent member of the world community -- and none of the representatives in this room is in that sense innocent -- that his fate today is bound up with this question of disarmament. This is not now a question which can or should concern two, three, four, five or six Powers; this is a question which does concern the generality of the membership of the United Nations. Therefore, whatever may have been the justification for arrangements, which many of us helped to initiate, which were made in the past -- that is to say, arrangements of small groups of countries to form Disarmament Commissions, Sub-Committees or what have you -- whatever may have been the justification for that sort of approach, it has been outdated by the developments in weapons by certain countries.
It no longer can be claimed that disarmament is the concern of four countries. It is the concern of this whole United Nations. It is the concern of every Member State in this room.
This has been stated repeatedly by speakers in this debate. It has been stated practically on those terms by the representative of the United Kingdom. And it has frequently been stated by other representatives whose countries are more closely concerned, simply in respect of the fact that they are more heavily armed than others, that the United Nations can never rid itself of its responsibility in the field of disarmament.

One more point in this connexion: It cannot have escaped the membership of this Committee that the only time in the year when we do face the problem of disarmament squarely is during the debate in this Committee on the subject of disarmament. Here, we do often seem to come near positive decisions, and this must be related to the fact that a large volume of opinion from countries big and small, from all parts of the world expresses itself on the urgency of these problems. Then the debate is over, the curtain is rung down, the General Assembly ceases to function, and we hear nothing of disarmament for another nine months.

Sometimes committees have sat elsewhere, but they have not got very far. It is no disrespect to the countries which sat on the Disarmament Sub-Committee to say that we feel we can no longer allow them to sit in that small group and try to reach conclusions. The plain fact is that the world cannot wait while a few eminent gentlemen representing great countries, fail to reach agreement on disarmament. How much more tension will the world bear before there is an explosion of the most terrifying weapons which man has created? How much longer can we leave it to countries which, while they undoubtedly have had the best will in the world, have been unable to make any progress in disarmament? We do not want to blame those countries for having failed. But the plain fact is that these matters do not brook much further delay and that we cannot leave these matters of disarmament to countries which, for one reason or another, during the many years they have been given by this Assembly to achieve results, have failed to do so. We cannot take that attitude. No country in the world can take that attitude in the interests of its own security, and no country can take that attitude from a humane point of view. How can we stand aside and allow this situation to continue?
Therefore, it is logical and it is reasonable that the world as a whole should involve itself in this issue of disarmament and should be in a position to meet continuously, if necessary, but certainly at any time, in order to consider those issues which are now creating this fearsome prospect for our world as a whole.

It is against this background, it is with this sort of thinking in mind, that the delegations of Yugoslavia and India have proposed that the Disarmament Commission shall now be composed of all Members of the United Nations.

Let it not be said to us in reply that such a large body cannot take specific measures in disarmament. Who can say this to us? Can those four countries which have sat fruitlessly for years in a sub-committee turn around and say that to us? We do not accept it from them. We do not accept it from the Disarmament Commission -- the slightly larger group -- which has also made no progress. This sort of statement, that we must be a small group in order to reach specific conclusions on issues of disarmament, does not cut any ice. Where have the small groups led us? To endless frustration, to a growing enormity of the problem, to a growing terror in the world. Therefore, we will not accept the argument that eighty-one Members of the United Nations are too large a group to make progress in the field of disarmament. We cannot accept that argument. Time is against us. The small groups have failed. The large group -- the generality of the world -- must now face this problem and attempt to reach solutions piecemeal in this field.

Here, then, is the resolution, saying that we should all join in this endeavour and that we should meet from time to time, as necessary and appropriate.

We do not wish to spell out what subsidiary bodies, what committees or sub-committees, might evolve. That, we think, is something which will happen in the normal course of discussions in the Disarmament Commission as enlarged. It is no secret that, even while this Committee is sitting, a great deal of work goes on in smaller groups, in informal discussions of groups which get together and try to look at problems confronting this Committee as a whole. It is not necessary to spell out these things. They will develop as required. And should the time come when the enlarged Disarmament Commission feels that a more formal small group should be set up for a certain purpose, it will be able to take such action.
These few remarks of mine dispose of the questions that might be asked: "What about small groups? What about sub-committees?" Those small formal sub-committees have not been tremendously useful so far. At any rate, we envisage -- and I am sure I speak also for the representative of Yugoslavia in this matter -- the possibility of ad hoc formations of groups; we envisage the possibility that the Disarmament Commission will itself formally set up certain groups on certain specific tasks, should that appear to be the most practicable way of achieving progress. Nothing like that is ruled out by this draft resolution.

It is, fundamentally, a draft resolution which expresses the fact of today -- the fact that all of us equally are involved, for life or for death, in this matter of disarmament. That is why we have introduced that draft resolution.

The second draft resolution, on the matter of the conference dealing with measures against the possibility of surprise attack, is a brief one. We hope that the conference will be very fruitful. We hope that the exchanges which will take place will be held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. We hope that the terrible suspicion and fear which cluds such meetings will lift and will allow results to be achieved.

However, because we take the view that the General Assembly must concern itself with disarmament, we have asked that those who will participate in this study should inform the United Nations of the progress that they achieve -- and in due course, at the right time, it might then be possible for the Assembly as a whole, or for the Disarmament Commission, to give a further push to the efforts which will take place at Geneva commencing 10 November. We do sincerely wish those efforts well.

On paper, these resolutions often look like formalities. But that is the disadvantage of black ink and white paper and of the fact that our minds have become used to seeing so much black ink on white paper. But the resolutions are not actually formalities. They represent the deep feelings of the countries of the world, the deep desire of the countries of the world that, even in this relatively abstruse conference on technical measures relating to surprise attack, there should be substantial progress which will lift some of the burden of potential disaster from the shoulders of this frightened world of ours.
Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia): The Committee has before it two draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.210 and 211) the sponsors of which are India and Yugoslavia. I should like on this occasion to explain briefly the position of my delegation and the reasons which have prompted it to co-sponsor those proposals.

The first draft resolution refers to the forthcoming conference of experts which is to study measures against the possibility of surprise attack. The very fact that agreement has been reached to hold this conference is, in itself, encouraging. There is no doubt that this will have a positive effect on the improvement of the general atmosphere and will fortify the hope that practical results may be forthcoming on some aspects of the disarmament problem. In view of this, it seems to me that it would be useful for the cause of disarmament itself if the General Assembly were to take an interest in and endeavour to encourage the possible favourable outcome of these negotiations. It is natural that, in keeping with the tasks laid down by the Charter, the General Assembly should want to be informed of the results of these negotiations so as to be able to take them into consideration in its further efforts in the field of disarmament and, more particularly, with respect to the achievement of essential initial agreements. Finally, in view of the significance of these negotiations, we feel that it would be useful, both for the negotiations themselves and for our Organization, if the Secretary-General were to render the participants such assistance and services as may be required.

I should like now to deal with the second draft resolution which refers to the resumption of the work of the United Nations disarmament body. It is, I think, evident -- and we all agree -- that the resumption of the work of the United Nations disarmament body is desirable and, moreover, indispensable. As will be remembered, my delegation has also strongly upheld this view. However, it appears to be clear at this stage already that there are no prospects of an agreement between the most responsible Powers on the establishment of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on a more limited basis. The indispensable need to resume disarmament talks on a permanent basis within the framework of the United Nations, as well as the existing situation with regard to the
composition of the Disarmament Commission, indicates the necessity of finding a corresponding acceptable solution. Since there is no agreement I think we should follow the course of extending the composition of the Commission to all the United Nations Member States. The particular reasons for this have just been explained very eloquently by my colleague the representative of India. This, it seems to me, would bar all objections relating to the acceptability of the Commission's membership since its composition would be the same as that of the General Assembly when dealing with the problem of disarmament. The implementation of the United Nations competence in the field of disarmament would thus be exercised within a framework which should be acceptable both to the parties most responsible for disarmament and to every individual Member State of the United Nations. In my opinion this composition -- in a situation which holds the danger of having the standstill in the activity of the United Nations in the field of disarmament carried over into the coming year -- has the advantage of emphasizing the common responsibility of all Member States for the state of affairs in the field of disarmament. Yet another of its advantages lies in the fact that it offers us the possibility of broadly contributing to a solution on a permanent basis.

These are the main reasons which have prompted my delegation to propose, together with the delegation of India, the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.210) which would establish the United Nations Disarmament Commission on the basis of the representation of all Members of the Organization. In this Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution we deemed it appropriate to determine the Commission's general tasks in broad terms, requesting it to make every effort towards the achievement of agreement or corresponding agreements, taking up in its work, first of all, those aspects of the problem of disarmament which offer the best immediate possibilities for progress. This draft resolution, in an adequate manner, instructs the Commission to report to the General Assembly -- at a special session if necessary -- on the progress achieved in its work. It is natural, and indispensable too, that the Commission should take into consideration the proposals and suggestions made in the course of our deliberations at this session of the Assembly.
It is along these lines that we have made the aforementioned recommendations which, in the profound belief of my delegation and, I am convinced, in that of the other sponsor, the delegation of India, could be generally acceptable. At the same time, I think that their positive aspect is that they go beyond the framework of declarations phrased in general terms and can, therefore, exercise a useful, positive influence on the further progress in the field of disarmament.

For these reasons my delegation wholeheartedly commits both draft resolutions to the attention of the Committee, and hopes that they will receive unanimous support.

The CHAIRMAN (Interpretation from Spanish): I would ask the next speaker on the list to be kind enough to permit me to call first on the representative of India, who wishes to add something to the statement he made earlier.

Mr. LALL (India): I am grateful for this opportunity to say that, in view of the fact that the delegation of India, along with other delegations, is co-sponsoring three of the draft resolutions before this Committee, I do just want to make it clear that we shall not be able to support the other draft resolutions which have been submitted. I am thinking, in particular, of the seventeen-Power draft resolution and of the USSR draft resolution on tests. We have our own draft resolutions, and we shall vote for them. What is more, we hope that our three draft resolutions will be adopted unanimously by this Committee.
Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia): In the first place, Mr. Chairman, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express to you our warm congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. Your exemplary ability, your unblemished impartiality, and your penetrating knowledge of international affairs make you not only the master of our orderly business, but a brilliant pilot leading the Committee in its rough and difficult passage. It is our hope that, under your skilful guidance, the work of the Committee will be successful.

In the same manner we congratulate also the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur, two distinguished personalities well qualified for the high positions to which they have been elected.

To all of you, Sir, including the able Secretariat team around you, we express our tribute and our best wishes.

Before speaking on disarmament, allow me to disarm a current contention from its apparent validity. I propose to dispose of this preliminary point at the outset, for if we allowed a certain prevailing tendency to dominate our deliberations, the present item would reach the point of liquidation, not by termination, but possibly by political bankruptcy. In all its phases and aspects, the question of disarmament would then belong neither to our Charter nor to our Organization. Indeed, the United Nations would lose its parenthood of the very reason for which it was initially established; and peace, the dearest objective of mankind, would stand in vacuum as an aspiration beyond reach.

At each and every session of the General Assembly when we endeavour to grapple with the problem of disarmament, we are confronted by a dilemma. There arises in our minds a big question with a big question mark. We are constantly being asked: What can the United Nations do about disarmament? What role can the small States play in this gigantic topic? What contribution can the less armed nations make towards arresting this wild race of armaments? These questions and a host of others are not raised for mere pleasure. They are no luxury. They are the core of the problem. As a matter of fact, they are provoked by the very trend of our deliberations in this Committee. Indeed these questions are reflective in the atmosphere which is being injected in our debate. It is no secret that in this crucial question we face incessant and relentless efforts to bypass
the United Nations, to belittle its competence, and to make of it a showroom for consumer goods, manufactured, finished and ready for delivery. The indications of this tendency are too numerous to be set out in detail at this moment. But two salient features that point to the red light cannot escape our intention.

In the first place, we cannot fail to note that of late the subject of disarmament has almost disappeared from memory. While the world crisis was at its peak, the question of disarmament was left in abeyance. Had it not been for the initiative of the Secretary-General, disarmament would have been an "orphan" topic, denied by all and received by none. Thanks to the Secretary-General the question was placed on the agenda of the present session. We owe to Mr. Hammarskjöld the fact that we are now meeting in this Committee to discuss disarmament. The question has been ranked in the Charter as a supreme — if not the supreme — responsibility of the United Nations. It has appeared on our agenda as a perennial item ever since the creation of our Organization. Nevertheless, no one cared to request its inclusion on the agenda of the present session. By itself, this phenomenon contains the gist of the story. It reveals diligence on the part of the Secretary-General, and it betrays negligence where negligence exists.

In the second place, the United Nations is confronted at this session with an ultimatum. One line of action, and only one, is open to the Assembly.

In the course of the debate, the representative of the United Kingdom has described the position of the Soviet Union delegation as one of ultimatum. In his turn, the representative of the Soviet Union replied that the position of the Western Powers on disarmament was itself an ultimatum. I do not propose to express an opinion on these charges. Accounts of this nature can best be settled by the parties concerned, and we are not equipped to intervene in this duel. One central fact, however, is self-evident: it is the United Kingdom which has served an ultimatum on the General Assembly.

In fairness, we cannot deny that the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, although lacking validity, was an example of ability and clarity. It is indisputable that the general theme of his argumentation indicates an adamant ultimatum. Although richly couched in terms of great refinement, the statement of Mr. Noble breathes ultimatum. In explaining the seventeen-Power draft resolution, Mr. Noble has emphasized that, vis-à-vis the Geneva conference
on nuclear tests which is scheduled to take place on 31 October, the best that the General Assembly can do is to express encouragement. The representative of the United Kingdom went even further. At the end of his statement, not quite satisfied with confining the Assembly to a simple role of encouragement, he went out of his way to explain how such encouragement was to be shown. In his concluding words, Mr. Noble emphasized that the various sections of the seventeen-Power draft resolution were intended to indicate to the Assembly how this encouragement could best be expressed.

This position is nothing more than an ultimatum thrown at the door of the General Assembly. The premise upon which Mr. Noble has proceeded boils down to this: "Take it or leave it; your role as the Assembly is one of encouragement and no more." In essence, this is the United Kingdom position -- a position which we cannot accept in fairness to the sanctity of the Charter and the dignity of the United Nations.

This is not a matter of procedure; this is not a question of approach. Neither is it a way of thinking. Here in the United Nations we stand ready to be open-minded. We must be prepared to receive all sorts of ideas. But ideas which rob the United Nations of its fiscal responsibility are unreceivable. We cannot abdicate our duties or surrender our rights. We cannot accept resignation; we cannot merely observe and encourage as bystanders at a football match.
We refuse to sit back, with arms folded, simply extending idle blessings on a question which underlies the greatest curse for the human race. Our encouragement for an agreed solution is always there. We need not search for it and we need not urge it. All along the decades, before the League of Nations and after, the encouragement of the peoples of the world for an effective solution of disarmament, an agreed solution of disarmament, never ceased with the rattling of weapons. In the lifetime of the United Nations, encouragement was never withheld in spite of the stockpiling of hydrogen bombs. Encouragement has never been lacking. What was really lacking was genuine agreement by the great Powers for an effective plan for disarmament.

It is to conceal this failure that arguments are being marshalled with a view to divesting the United Nations of its primary responsibility. Perhaps this is the reason why the Secretary-General, in his memorandum of 30 September 1958, has stressed that "the attainment of balanced, world-wide disarmament through the United Nations must remain a primary objective of the Organization" (A/5936, page 4). And I invite the Committee's attention to the expression "through the United Nations", for the Secretary-General means every word and each letter of his statement, and the idea of "through the United Nations" is the vein of emphasis that runs all through his memorandum.

Yet to cover retreat from the United Nations, smoke-screen tactics are being applied. We are told the General Assembly cannot make decisions on this subject matter before negotiations between the great Powers can take place. This contention has been forcefully argued by the representative of the United Kingdom. In his statement before the Committee, his advocacy was as follows:

"The solution of disarmament problems must be the result of agreement. Agreement, in turn, must be the result of negotiations and of the free meeting of minds. It would be unrealistic to try to commit the nuclear Powers to a particular course of action before they have had full opportunity for negotiations among themselves." (A/CPV.48, pages 27 and 28)
With this statement, as embodying a general proposition, we do not quarrel as we cannot quarrel. It is a sound statement that raises no controversy. No agreement can be achieved without previous negotiations, particularly on a question as crucial and as vital as disarmament. The General Assembly no doubt has no statutory authority to force the big Powers to follow a particular course of action. Nevertheless, the General Assembly can enunciate general principles for disarmament, for control, for verification and what not. The General Assembly can recommend to the States concerned, including the big Powers, the suspension and prohibition of test explosions of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly can recommend the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the outlawing of atomic warfare and the destruction of hydrogen stockpiles. The General Assembly can call upon the Powers concerned to agree upon a co-ordinated plan of disarmament. Finally, the General Assembly can, in its wisdom and discretion, urge the great Powers to follow a particular course of action, the more so when the course they have thus far followed has yielded nothing but failure, and disastrous failure. All these and other allied matters can be decided by the General Assembly. They fall within the ambit of the United Nations jurisdiction, and no amount of eloquence can defeat this truism.

However, to a layman entirely ignorant of the history of the disarmament question, this plea for negotiation offers a great deal of inducement. Surely the argument put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom, that disarmament cannot be solved without an opportunity for negotiation, is most luring -- but to whom? It may be luring to a guest who may be here in the United Nations on a visit from one of the nearby planets; but our usual guests who come to the United Nations from this planet of ours cannot be swayed by such an argument.

After thirteen years of relentless efforts, of heated discussion and of contested debate, how dare we say that the great Powers need an opportunity -- just a simple opportunity -- to negotiate. Set aside the efforts of the peace conferences decades ago and set aside the endeavours of the League of Nations, what have we been doing in the United Nations during the past twelve sessions, weary with continued negotiations and accommodations. Between 1946 and 1951,
the great Powers were negotiating all aspects of disarmament in two organs, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Having failed to achieve agreement, these two organs were dissolved in 1952, and a new disarmament commission was established -- a unified machinery set up to provide further opportunities for negotiations.

Thereafter, the great Powers entered again into endless negotiation. But again in 1953, due to a deadlock in the work of the Commission, the General Assembly recommended the establishment of a sub-committee to offer the great Powers a further chance for negotiations. This Sub-Committee held its meetings in 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957, changing between New York, Paris and London, and back again. All along those tedious years, the work was one of negotiation. No stone was unturned, no avenue was left unexplored and no ground remained uncultivated. The volume of the minutes of the Commissions -- old and new -- is beyond imagination. They are a fleet of records in an ocean of negotiations. And here we come to hear the United Kingdom representative pleading for another opportunity, another opportunity for negotiations.

So much for the machinery established to conduct negotiations. But the action taken by the Assembly at each and every session, the debate unleashed -- and I would say "unleashed" with great emphasis -- each and every year, and, lastly, the resolutions adopted at each and every session, are most revealing and most telling. It is worthwhile to see, with our colleague from the United Kingdom, what they reveal and what they say.

At the first session -- and this is very important -- the very first session of the General Assembly an atomic energy commission was established. I beg the indulgence of the representatives to bring back to their memories some quotations from the resolutions of the General Assembly. Without delay or hesitation, the General Assembly urged the Commission, inter alia, to proceed with the "utmost despatch" -- a reference used by the General Assembly as far back as 1946:

"... and make such recommendations ... for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." (Establishment of a Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, 17th plenary meeting, first session)
In the very same session, a second resolution was adopted, General Assembly
resolution 41 (I), which states the following:

"Recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to
formulating the practical measures... for the regulation and reduction of
armaments and armed forces..."

"Urges" -- and again, this is a third term -- "the expeditious fulfilment
by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference..."

"Recommends that the Security Council" -- and this is a fourth term --
"expedite consideration... of draft conventions for the creation of an
international system of control and inspection, these conventions to include
the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in
the future to mass destruction..."

Again, here is another term which is used:

"Recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration...
to such practical and effective safeguards in connexion with the control
of atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments."

Again, I invite your attention to this term:

"Recommends the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the
placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the
Charter;"

It becomes obvious that our first session was one of speed, a year of high
hopes and ideals. This explains why the General Assembly has employed all
synonyms the English language can offer for "speed". Hence, the resolution has
used, with emphasis and in succession, such phrases as "the utmost dispatch",
"prompt consideration", "the expeditious fulfilment", "expedite the consideration",
and finally, "to accelerate". This was a natural behaviour in the aftermath of
war and miseries of war. It was a session held in the wake of affliction with
the wounds of humanity still fresh and bleeding, a session convened under the
shadow of the debris of fire and destruction, a session which cried, heart, soul
and mind, for action, and speedy action.

The second session was of a different climate entirely, a climate of inaction.
It was 1947 -- not a year of idleness, but one of diversion into other directions.
In that year, the General Assembly deviated from the field of disarmament only to succumb to pressures for another form of disarmament, political disarmament. That was the monstrous year for the partition of Palestine.

At that time, the Assembly was murmuring under crushing pressure to elicit a majority vote against the majority of the people of the Holy Land. That year there was no room for disarmament. The General Assembly was engaged in another effort of a different disarmament: to disarm the people of Palestine from their inherent right to determine their future.

The third session, with its two resolutions, had met with little success. While the General Assembly, in resolution 191 (III), approved:

"...the general findings and recommendations...and the specific proposals... for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy...and for the elimination...of atomic weapons",

the General Assembly expressed:

"its deep concern at the impasse which has been reached in the work of the...
Commission..."

Tracing the failure, the General Assembly requested the Security Council to pursue its study for the reduction of conventional armaments, urged the Commission to proceed with its assignment and finally appealed to all nations for co-operation. The year of 1948 was one of impasse.

The fourth session also adopted two resolutions on the question, the first dealing with the international control of atomic energy, and the second with the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. In substance, the General Assembly, in resolution 299 (IV), called upon:

"...Governments to do everything in their power to make possible, by the acceptance of effective international control, the effective prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons;"

Further, the General Assembly approved the proposals of the Commission for full information to be submitted by the Member States on their conventional armaments and armed forces, with a request to the atomic Powers "to continue consultations...to explore all possible avenues and to examine all concrete suggestions" that will lead to an agreement on disarmament.
What is of significance is that the General Assembly has recommended that all nations should join in mutual agreement to limit the exercise of their individual rights of sovereignty. The General Assembly even went as far as that, recommending the limiting of the sovereignty of the Members of the United Nations in the control of atomic energy. That was the session of 1949. Thus that session of 1949 could be marked as the session for the principle of openness of information, and the limited sovereignty on atomic energy.

At the fifth session, the President of the United States, addressing the General Assembly, proposed the co-ordination of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The General Assembly, upon lengthy deliberation, decided to establish a committee of twelve, consisting of the eleven members of the Security Council, with Canada, to study the question. With this idea in mind, and with the address of the President of the United States, that year of 1950 could be termed as one of co-ordination, coupled with negotiation.

The sixth session, moved by anxiety and the continued race of disarmament, made a new start. Responding to the report of the Committee of Twelve, the General Assembly decided to dissolve the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. In their place, the General Assembly created the Disarmament Commission with generous terms of reference to prepare proposals for reduction of armaments and armed forces, for effective control of atomic energy and for the prohibition of atomic weapons. Having enunciated a set of guiding principles, the General Assembly proceeded to declare -- and this is of great significance -- that a conference of all States should be convened to consider a draft treaty of disarmament as soon as the work of the Commission permitted such a course of action.

Therefore, that session was for a new effort, a new machinery and new terms of reference and new negotiations, with an international conference for disarmament as an immediate target.
The seventh session was dedicated to the examination of the report of this new organ, the Disarmament Commission. The report was a comprehensive survey of the statements and proposals of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France, but no decisions were reached. Thus the General Assembly had nothing to do except take note of the Commission's report, reaffirming its past resolutions and requesting the Commission to continue its work. That year of 1953 was one of reaffirmation and reiteration for continued negotiations.

The eighth session, again receiving a lengthy report detailing the disagreement of the Disarmament Commission, has affirmed the earnest desire to reach agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan for disarmament. The Assembly, while taking note of the report, requested the Commission to continue its work and requested the major Powers to intensify their efforts to reach agreement. The resolution of the Assembly concluded by suggesting the creation of a sub-committee which would seek in private an acceptable solution. Thus, the year 1953 was for an approach in private. Privacy might be a way out. And that too has been tried.
The ninth session was convened after the historic nineteen meetings of the Sub-Committee held in secret at Lancaster House in London. In the course of those meetings, the Sub-Committee examined the proposals of the Soviet Union for strengthening peace and security and for the prohibition of atomic weapons. It also examined a United Kingdom memorandum concerning weapons that should be covered by a disarmament convention; thirdly, it examined a United States working paper on implementing disarmament programmes and controls; fourthly, it examined a joint memorandum by the United Kingdom and France for a compromise proposal, or at least it was described as a compromise proposal. Finally, the Disarmament Commission reached a unanimous disagreement and, as the report claimed, has expressed "hope for the fruitful consideration of the question of disarmament". Under the circumstances, the General Assembly had nothing to perform except to reaffirm its previous pronouncements, to request the Commission and its Sub-Committee to make further efforts in further negotiations and to report accordingly. Although the General Assembly at that time was cognizant of a proposal made by the Prime Minister of India for a standstill agreement on test explosions -- the very question we are dealing with now -- yet no worthy action was taken. And that year, 1954, was one of a standstill disagreement.

The tenth session, as we all know, was convened under the umbrella of the Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955 which gave rise to the so-called and well publicized "Geneva spirit". The General Assembly had before it the report of the Commission and its baby committee which held twenty-eight meetings in London and eighteen meetings in New York. There was an avalanche of memoranda, working papers and draft proposals; but as the General Assembly has noted, "agreement has not yet been reached on the rights, powers and functions of a control system, which is the keystone of any disarmament agreement".

(General Assembly resolution 914 (X))

Furthermore, the General Assembly has noted the report of the Commission urging that priority -- and again this is the very same question that we dealt with last year -- be given to the plan of President Eisenhower for aerial inspection and the plan of Prime Minister Bulganin for establishing control posts at strategic centres. The General Assembly also suggested to the Commission that account should be taken of the proposals of the Prime Minister of France for information on military expenditures -- again the very same item we are dealing with this year -- that account should be taken of the proposals of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on matters of inspection and control and of the proposals
of the Government of India for suspension of experimental explosions and for an armistice on arms, an armaments truce. That was an exciting session indeed. Giant proposals were made, debated and finally conveyed en bloc to the Disarmament Commission. There was a great deal of zeal and enthusiasm. It was the Geneva spirit. For a time it was generated -- later it evaporated. Nineteen-hundred and fifty-five was the year of the spirit that later lost its spirit.

At the eleventh session, driven by the force of inertia of the preceding session, the General Assembly was seized, in addition to the reports of the Commission and its Committee, with a wide variety of proposals submitted by Canada, Japan and Norway; by France and the United Kingdom, by the United States, by the Soviet Union, by India and by Yugoslavia. Under the impact of this shower of proposals, the General Assembly was left spellbound. But thrilled with a promise of hope, the General Assembly invited the Disarmament Commission to consider the convocation of a special session. We have gone as far as that in our hopes to convoke a special session of the General Assembly or a general disarmament conference to dispose of the problem. Thus the year 1957 was heading towards a disarmament conference.

The twelfth session, which was the last one, our very last session, received the report of the Disarmament Commission which outlined the narrowing of differences as a result of extensive negotiations amongst the major Powers. With this encouraging indication the General Assembly proceeded to set out the priority for the various aspects of disarmament, with particular reference to the immediate suspension of nuclear weapons tests, to the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, to the reduction of nuclear weapons, to the reduction of armed forces and armaments, to the progressive establishment of open inspection to guard against surprise attacks and, lastly, to ensure the exclusive use of outer space -- this is the most recent topic on the United Nations agenda -- for peaceful and scientific purposes. These priorities have embraced practically the whole field of disarmament, so much so that they can hardly be described as priorities. Be that as it may, the problem of disarmament, in all its entirety, is falling into the abyss of the well-known General Assembly resolution which enlarged the membership of the Disarmament Commission by the addition of fourteen members. Further, the General Assembly has decided to
transmit the records of the proceedings of the twelfth session to the Commission. But those records found no one to receive them. The Commission did not convene, and the year 1958 was a deadlock. It is at the peak of this crisis that there came the abortive efforts to hold the summit meeting for which the world was waiting with profound hope and burning expectations. This is the history of the disarmament negotiations, set out in miniature for our colleague of the United Kingdom to refresh his memory and our memory.

This is a survey of the action taken by the General Assembly in the last twelve years on the question of disarmament. We do not say with Shakespeare, "Much Ado About Nothing"; rather it is much ado about everything but, unfortunately, yielding nothing. After those lengthy years of hard labour, disarmament comes to us now as critical as it was twelve years ago, but multiplied tenfold in gravity, in intensity and in complexity. It seems as though we have aimed at exactly the opposite goals and that the objective of our Charter was no disarmament. Had our Charter called for an armaments race, our response could not have been more faithful and more abiding.

Without dwelling on figures or details, the picture now is crystal clear in its gloom and its darkness. Control of atomic weapons has become a decontrolled production of hydrogen bombs. Reduction of arms and military budgets have been translated into more arms and more expenditures. And the rise is still rising. Each year we appeal for disarmament agreement, only to find a disarmament disagreement. Each resolution calls for continued efforts to achieve control, a co-ordinated plan of disarmament, only to witness a co-ordinated plan to step up armament. And while we concentrate on disarmament in inner space, we suddenly find ourselves gripped now by incalculable dangers in outer space.
This is the progress thus far realized. It is a progress in every direction, in every field and every horizon, but on rearmament, co-ordinated and intensified to limitless and endless bounds.

To give this sad story its finishing touch, the disarmament question comes to the United Nations, for the first time in its history, with no report, and indeed with no substantive proposal now before this house. The emphasis has shifted to matters which, although of significance, are really on the margin of the margin. So far, discussion has centred upon nuclear tests and the like, but disarmament, the nucleus of the problem, has been set back to the background. The United Kingdom, for instance, has almost ignored the question of disarmament in its cardinal and has focussed on its marginal. It seems the United Kingdom was too much occupied to think of disarmament. The United Kingdom has been deeply engaged lately in selling arms, submarines and aeroplanes to Israel; and there is little time to ponder disarmament. We should not, however, pass hasty judgments. The United Kingdom may have its own reasoning. Reinforcing the military build-up of Israel may be interpreted by the United Kingdom as one form of disarmament. Surely, such an interpretation does not stand to question; for the British are admittedly masters in the art of interpretation.

With disarmament, we have the question of the reduction of the military budgets of the four Powers. As a matter of fact, both topics are one and the same, with no line of demarcation in between. A reduction of arms and armed forces irresistibly leads to a reduction of military expenditures, and a reduction of military budgets brings about a reduction of armaments. This is an axiom that stands self-proven.

Up to this session, the question of the reduction of military expenditures has been discussed as one of the many aspects of disarmament. On various occasions, the General Assembly and the United Nations organs have examined the implications involved in the question. But it is at this session that the matter has been included at the request of the Soviet Union in the agenda as an independent item. The problem, however, is not without its history. The allocation of funds from disarmament for assistance to under-developed countries was put forward by President Eisenhower in a public address on 16 April 1953. The Soviet Union, in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, proposed in 1954 a one-third
reduction of military budgets. In 1956 and 1957, the Soviet Union proposed a 15 per cent reduction. In 1955, the question was raised by the French Prime Minister at the meeting of the Heads of State in Geneva.

It was this French proposal which was referred to by the General Assembly in its resolution at the tenth session calling

"upon the States concerned ... to study the proposal of the Prime Minister of France for the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament for improving the standards of living throughout the world and, in particular, in the less-developed countries". (Resolution 914 (X))

Two years later, at the twelfth session, the General Assembly took up the question again. After lengthy debate, the Assembly finally decided to invite

"the States concerned ... to consider the possibility of devoting, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament," -- and here is the significant proviso -- "as and when sufficient progress is made, additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in the less developed countries".

(Resolution 1148 (XII))

Compared to the resolution of 1955, the resolution of 1957 is two years backward! The latter resolution injects conditions and qualifications that never existed in the former. The latter resolution did condition and time the question with: "as and when sufficient progress is made" on disarmament. Well, this is an amusing proviso. You say that you will reduce military budgets when progress is made in disarmament. But no progress on disarmament can be made unless and until you reduce expenditure. Such a formulation helps neither disarmament nor reduction of military budgets, should these two aspects be anchored to one another. Reduction of military expenditure brings about reduction of armaments, and vice versa. It is futile to quarrel when first things must come first. By such an exercise we revert to the ancient riddle: which comes first, the chicken or the egg!

Yet I do not intend to dwell at length on this question. This is a delicate matter which involves the feelings of the have-nots and the reactions of the haves. We want it to be understood that the have-nots are not coveting the resources of the haves. We pray for the day when the big Powers can cut down
their military expenditures even without extending any assistance to the less developed countries. Let the great Powers reduce their military budgets; let them keep those resources to themselves, and the small countries can take care of themselves. For it is peace and peace only, not economic assistance, that mainly brings prosperity to the under-developed peoples and to the whole world at large. However, the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament to small countries must be preceded by a necessary step. It is one of right and not one of grace or charity. Certain small countries are suffering from unlawful restrictions which arrest their development schemes. Those countries have considerable assets frozen in foreign countries for no legal justification whatsoever. Of particular mention, oil-producing countries on the eastern extremity of the Arabian Peninsula have huge accounts in London which are frozen too and have been frozen for years and years. All such accounts and the like should be released. They should be invested at home and in the countries of the Middle East. To arrest such assets when they can finance development projects in the area is an act of pure economic genocide.

I turn now to the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. I do not think the Committee needs to be reminded of the clamouring of public opinion on this question all over the world. People of all walks of life, of all political complexions and of all creeds, have strongly expressed themselves in favour of cessation. Since the days of the Bandung Conference, strong and respectable agitation for the prohibition of nuclear tests has been gaining momentum in every corner of the globe. Scientists of different shades of opinion have warned against the dangers to human life in the continuation of nuclear tests. It is our sincere conviction that on this question it is safer and wiser to accept the most pessimistic findings, for what is at stake is the survival of the human race. When our survival is involved there is no room for gambling. These tests may prove to be a slow and gradual extinction of mankind. Continuation of tests becomes a war without military operations, but waged against humanity. Nonetheless, France has found it convenient to reject the idea of suspension of tests even should the other Powers reach an agreed solution. Obviously it is easy for France to continue its tests, for it is not French skies which become contaminated. It is the continent of Africa, through the heart of the Sahara, where France can saturate the atmosphere of the Africans with the poisons of radiation.
We are fully aware, however, that cessation of nuclear weapons is not a
direct measure of disarmament. This point has been made amply clear in the
statement of our colleague of the United States. Mr. Lodge, with his usual
ability and clarity of mind has elaborated this idea to the utmost satisfaction
and conviction, I believe, of this Committee. In his words, and they are worthy
of being quoted, "the suspension of testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons is not,
in itself, a measure of disarmament or a limitation of armament". This is, on the
part of our colleague of the United States, a very wise caution. Suspension of
tests is mainly a confidence-building measure; and we should not rest with the
thought that suspension is disarmament, nor with the recent trend to focus on
suspension at the expense of disarmament. Yet, continuation of tests is bound to
lead to catastrophic results. Apart from scientific knowledge, tests will
necessarily lead to the constant development of nuclear weapons. No doubt the
result is progress but to achieve maximum destruction at a minimum cost. The
outcome would be wholesale killing and devastation at the cheapest price and on
the largest scale ever known in the history of man. Moreover, as our deliberations
in this Committee have revealed, the continuation of testing is expected to
transplant this abominable industry of nuclear weapons to more than one country
in Europe. This would be transmitting this evil from one continent into another
continent. It becomes the duty of the United Nations to set up a curtain -- an
atomic curtain, if you please -- to prohibit the entry of this industry of war
into Europe -- Europe which was the theater of two world wars. By itself, this is
a vital reason for the suspension and cessation of nuclear tests which must call
for our attention and action.

Finally, let me turn to the star question, How best shall we dispose of
the whole problem at this session? There is already tabled a set of draft
resolutions dealing with the different aspects of disarmament. First of all,
we have the two draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union: one
providing for the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, and the
other for the reduction of military budgets with the resulting funds to be allocated
for the development of the under-developed countries. Then, we have the
seventeen-Power draft resolution which deals with the suspension of testing, with
measures against surprise attack and with an indirect reference to disarmament
in general. Lastly, we have the thirteen-Power draft resolution which provides for
the suspension and eventual discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen tests. Without referring to other procedural motions, these are the lines of action thus far proposed in our Committee.

All these are excellent draft resolutions. They have many elements in common. They are at variance only in matters of degree or emphasis. But there is not one single draft resolution which attempts to deal with the present deadlock and with the merits of disarmament. For the first time since its establishment, the Disarmament Commission did not function nor report for the simple reason that it did not convene. To our mind, this is the crux of the outstanding difficulty. It is no problem to propose good resolutions, and even to adopt them. In the last twelve years the General Assembly has passed the best resolutions, spelling out the best principles. At this session we can add to the caravan another resolution or another set of resolutions. But the main question is how to reconvene the Disarmament Commission and how to end this illegitimate separation. The representative from the United Kingdom has stated, and here we agree with him entirely -- we agree when we must agree, and we disagree when we have to disagree -- that disarmament without the agreement of the Soviet Union cannot be achieved. But how can negotiations be resumed within the United Nations machinery? This is the question which should engage our thinking and invite our efforts.

We believe, and we earnestly do so, that the suggestions cast in the Mexican draft resolution offer a way out of the impasse. I hope our colleague from Mexico will find it easy to make certain alterations. I do not intend to propose any amendments. They are simply suggestions for the Committee to ponder, and for our colleague from Mexico to think over. First, we believe the working group, as suggested in the Mexican draft resolution, should be as small as possible. The representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, under the chairmanship of our Chairman and the participation of the Secretary-General, would make a good team to consider the resumption of negotiations on disarmament and its procedures. With the United States as the leading Western Power, we think that the participation of the representatives of the United Kingdom and France in the working group, at least at this stage, does not help to cut the Gordian knot. It may complicate an already complicated situation.
Secondly, we have to decide how best we should deal with the draft resolutions and their pertinent amendments. It goes without saying that I refer also to the draft resolution of our colleague from Ireland, which has a great deal of merit; and the resolutions sponsored and explained this morning by our colleagues from Yugoslavia and India. However, speaking frankly, we believe that on this question of disarmament, resolutions -- however forceful they may be -- cannot activate disarmament unless all the major Powers sanction such resolutions by their collective efforts to translate them into genuine agreement. Within a few days, two conferences will be held in Geneva: one to deal with the discontinuance of tests and the other with measures against surprise attacks. These two meetings may prove to be of historic significance. They may help to unlock the age-old deadlock of disarmament. They may tend to break this vicious circle of how to start disarmament.

Thus far, the stress has been on linking the different stages of disarmament, one with the other. In a word, the dialogue has been going on like this: "We will not agree to this stage before you agree on that stage" -- with the result that no stage has ever been achieved. Even this year, the representative of the United Kingdom has linked the cessation of testing with progress on disarmament. All along this decade, disarmament followed this course, although the General Assembly, in its first resolution of its first session in 1946 declared:

"The work" -- of disarmament -- "should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken". (Establishment of a Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, 17th plenary meeting, first session)

Now, an opportunity is being offered in the Geneva conferences, and a great deal of technical ground has been agreed upon. But what promise for progress, and what hope for success can we hold if the Assembly conveys a divided opinion to these conferences. Our primary duty is to formulate a unanimous stand from which the Geneva conferences can draw inspiration and guidance for a unified action and a concerted effort.
This brings me to a suggestion, which I make informally, that a working group be set up for an endeavour to produce one single draft resolution containing all the helpful elements to be found in the various draft resolutions and their respective amendments.

This is the only course of action, if action on disarmament is ever destined to reach a fruitful solution.

In conclusion, let me express our ardent hope and prayer for an early settlement of this agonizing subject. As small States, we have no arms to reduce, no bombs to ban and to tests to cease. Yet with our collective will and behaviour we can make a great contribution to the cause of peace. This is not a question upon which we are to back this side or that side. Small nations, whatever their ideologies may be, can assume a very leading role in the field of disarmament. The present grouping of West and East is very much below the heights of this gigantic question. To shoulder our responsibilities, we must rise above blocs and dislodge ourselves from our trenches. On this subject, if any grouping is allowed, it must be the atomic and the non-atomic; and, as such, our position as non-atomic can be decisive and effective. It is a stand for a unanimous resolution, or no resolution.

By this, we can be assured of the survival of man, and the salvation of our civilization and our dearest material and spiritual possessions on earth.

Before closing, I should like to make this solemn declaration to be noted by the United Nations and conveyed by the representatives around this table to their Governments. The matter has a direct bearing on the peace of the Middle East and the peace of the world, as a direct goal for the disarmament question.

Yesterday morning, The New York Times carried a dispatch from its Cairo correspondent referring to the possibility of an Israel attack against eastern Palestine that lies in Jordan.

This is not the first report of this character. In the last months there has been a growing mass of news pointing to a contemplated Israel aggression.

I do not call for a denial, for aggression is never officially disclosed or admitted. I simply wish to make it clear beyond any shred of doubt, that any
Israel attack against Jordan will be treated as a direct attack against all the Arab States, and, as provided in the Charter, will call for all collective measures of self defence that are normally used to repel aggression and finish off aggressors.

I should like to assure you that this is the stand of Saudi Arabia, and the common stand of all the Arab States -- their Governments, their armies, and their nation.

It goes without saying that, should Israel embark upon such an aggression, the peace of the world would be endangered and your books on disarmament would be closed.

Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic): (interpretation from Russian): Today we celebrate United Nations Day. On 24 October 1945, the Charter of the United Nations, which had been signed by the founding States at San Francisco, entered into force. Guided by its lofty principles, our Organization has, since 1946, devoted much effort and much labour to the search for an agreed solution to the key international problem, the problem of disarmament.

A bit of reckoning may be of interest today. To the disarmament question, the Atomic Energy Commission and its Committees devoted two hundred meetings, the Security Council devoted forty-two meetings, the Disarmament Commission devoted sixty-four meetings, the Disarmament Sub-Committee devoted 157 meetings and the General Assembly and the Political Committee devoted four hundred meetings, making a total of 863 meetings.

It is a matter of profound concern, however, that the United Nations has yet to get the disarmament problem off dead centre or to make one practical step forward in the direction of a cardinal, radical or partial solution. In this realm of endeavour, failure has been our lot.

If anyone seeks consolation in the thought that at least agreement has been reached on the general aims of disarmament, then the answer to this is, yes, the general aims of disarmament are clear and are supported by all without exception, but not all are moving in the necessary and correct direction, not all want disarmament. That is why obstacles are erected in the path of its fulfilment.
The swift development of military technology on the basis of general technical progress, the appearance of various types of contemporary weapons, including atomic and hydrogen bombs, ballistic rockets and the like, have increased substantially the difficulties of a practical solution to the disarmament problem. But our delegation would like to point out that difficulties can be overcome, that they lie in the political field and depend mainly on the desires, the sincerity, the goodwill and the devotion to the cause of international peace of the Governments of all States, especially those which possess nuclear weapons. Fruitful co-operation of States on the disarmament problem within the United Nations is possible on the basis of an honest, sincere, non-aggressive policy. That is why, when the representative of the United States tried to persuade us that the United States had always co-operated in all the endeavours of this Organization for the solution of the disarmament problem, we felt like asking: On what basis did this co-operation take place if, for example, in his recent election campaign speech in the state of Iowa, the President of the United States said that "In a world torn by antagonisms, we can only engage in talks from positions of strength?" The material expression of this policy from "positions of strength" is the armaments race and the further development of nuclear weapons through test explosions.

What type of co-operation on disarmament can the United States contemplate if its delegation follows the official governmental line which prescribes force as a panacea for all evils and ills of the contemporary world.
It is manifest that the foreign policy of the United States and the United Kingdom is based on nuclear weapons and that disarmament is ruled out as a reliable method for the strengthening of peace and international co-operation. There is something tragic in this stubborn unwillingness of the ruling circles of the United States to forswear their policy of nuclear "deterrence" or intimidation and their policy of turning their back upon disarmament.

This dangerous state of affairs has given rise, in its turn, to some sort of hallucination among the official circles of the United States. They think that those who, full of good intentions and especially with a profound feeling of responsibility for the destiny of the world, propose radical and comprehensive solutions are actually on their knees, stretching out their hands in a gesture of begging the United States and the United Kingdom to disarm totally or partially. Wedded to their "positions of strength", as they call them, they find themselves incapable of surveying the political horizon and the world as it is. For these and other reasons, they become increasingly embittered and irreconcilable when conditions arise in which solutions are at hand. Instead of ascending, step by step, the steep incline of disarmament, and instead of dealing with the problem in parts, they pile up obstacles in the form of preliminary conditions, so that climbing up that incline becomes extremely arduous. Among these conditions an important place is occupied by the old schemes having to do with an exclusively technical approach borrowed from the dust-covered archives of the League of Nations.

In the meantime, a tendentious propaganda is pulling out all the stops in certain countries, to the effect that disarmament is a hopelessly complex knot, a labyrinth from which there is no way out. Public opinion is being given the feeling that there is no prospect of disarmament, and the nuclear armaments race is being represented as a vital necessity. In this way, they attempt to impress upon people the thought of the fatal inevitability of nuclear war and, on the other hand, to minimize the existing danger from the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

The nuclear weapon, which is in a stage of development through tests, is already gradually and invisibly poisoning the upper strata of the atmosphere, from which, for many years, the world will be penetrated with radioactive fallout.
Many competent scientists have reached definite conclusions concerning the dangerous effects of radiation resulting from tests. If the process of poisoning the world's atmosphere to an extraordinary degree is not stopped, nobody will be able to avoid the harmful consequences of radiation, which will surely have deleterious effects on the coming generations.

This is no exaggeration. This is the true shape of reality. And the consideration of disarmament in this Committee is taking place under the impact of this state of affairs.

At the very outset of our proceedings, the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries succeeded in their efforts to set up a procedural obstacle to prevent consideration of the question of the cessation and prohibition of nuclear test explosions as a first and separate item. To our satisfaction, and as might have been expected, the problem of the prohibition of the tests has nevertheless dominated our discussion from the very first day. This confirms the correctness of the point of view held by many concerning the first-priority need to consider and arrive at partial measures in the field of disarmament, especially the cessation of nuclear tests, without tying this in with any other questions.

What has experience taught us? What conclusions can we draw from the failures which the United Nations has suffered in the field of disarmament? Owing to the position of the Western Powers, there is no possibility of a comprehensive solution of the disarmament problem, especially the atomic disarmament problem. Consequently, it is necessary to cast about for ways and means to carry out partial measures and to bring to life what is capable of being realized now.

Among these partial measures are the cessation of the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons and the reduction of the military budgets of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. Even though these partial measures will not solve the disarmament problem as a whole, nevertheless, being capable of implementation at this stage, they would not only apply a brake to the armaments race but would in fact be conducive to its cessation.

In the proposal of the Soviet Union, there is an appeal to all States that carry out the testing of nuclear weapons immediately to stop such tests. This is simple, clear, forthright and comprehensible to millions of human beings.
The purpose is the cessation of tests. The purpose is the liberation of mankind from the dangerous consequences of atomic radiation which have arisen as a result of test explosions -- and this is an important step toward the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and is a serious obstacle to the development of even more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction.

Why is it that this measure that was proposed by the Soviet Union displeased certain critics? What is it that aroused alarm in these critics? Why are they so unhappy? Some have spoken about the question of the sincerity of the Soviet Union's intentions; they tried to question the Soviet Union's sincerity in connection with the resumption of the testing of nuclear weapons. However, the champions of sincerity did not, it appears, give vent to their generous indignation in regard to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which, after the unilateral cessation of tests by the Soviet Union, not only failed to follow suit but in fact utilized the Soviet Union's decision in order to extract optimum military advantage.

The representative of Peru, Mr. Belaunde, professed to be displeased by the clearly expressed forthrightness and concreteness of the Soviet draft resolution. When previously it was proposed, time and again, to the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other Western Powers that a broad set of disarmament measures should be undertaken, we heard in this same Committee voices to the effect that this was altogether too radical a demand, that it was necessary to search for partial solutions. Now, a proposal for the immediate cessation of tests -- that is, a partial disarmament measure -- appears too radical for Mr. Belaunde, and he reaches the odd conclusion that not every radical solution leads to its goal.
In his second speech yesterday, Mr. Belaunde presented us with a remarkable portion of heavy-weight belles-lettres deliberately designed to distort the process of the lives of the Chinese People's Republic, the Soviet Union and the countries of the people's democracy. We were not surprised that Mr. Belaunde used his gifts of eloquence in order to increase the number of speeches not in favour of cessation of tests, but in defence of the carrying out of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

The discontent of the representative of France with regard to the question of the immediate and unconditional cessation of nuclear tests goes further. He resorted to intimidation of the non-atomic countries. He said that the adoption of this proposal would endanger the future of those countries. Addressing himself to us, he exclaimed: "Watch out!" Why? we ask. Because, it appears, it is the duty of all of us to demand more. This is true, of course, but it is the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France which are asking for more. The Soviet Union proposes less, but at least it is possible, it is feasible, it is in fact essential, that the tests should be stopped. This would pave the way to the "more" which is being demanded or which is being looked forward to. Why is this a danger as regards the destiny of the non-atomic Powers? If we speak of danger, the danger is here, it is present, owing to continuing nuclear test explosions.

A number of small countries have expressed concern in our Committee in connexion with the existing threat. Mr. Moch -- and this did not surprise us -- followed in the steps of the Foreign Minister of France who, quite unambiguously, came out against the cessation of nuclear explosion tests on the ground that, in that event, there would be bound to be silence on the question of disarmament. Apparently fearing that less than the silence of eventuality, France seeks to become the fourth atomic Power. That is why the immediate cessation of tests is repudiated by Mr. Moch.

Some critics of the Soviet Union draft resolution pit the cessation of the tests against their suspension. They are displeased by the formula of the immediate and unconditional cessation of tests, even though this meets the demand of the peoples. They are in favour of a temporary suspension of a year. The
draft resolution submitted by the United States and cosponsored by other
diplomatic missions speaks of the necessity of attaining agreement not on the cessation
of tests, but only on the temporary suspension. As Mr. Noble of the United Kingdom
stated, a suspension may be continued indefinitely on condition that there is
some progress regarding the adoption and carrying out of measures in the field
of actual disarmament. Naturally, the logical question arises: what are these
measures in the field of actual disarmament which he had in mind? For an answer
let us refer to the document of 28 May containing proposals of the Governments of
the United Kingdom, France and the United States for the agenda of a summit meeting.
That paper said that tests could be stopped indefinitely if the necessary system
of inspection were set up and if the production of fissionable material for
military purposes were likewise effectively stopped. The one and the other would
be carried out subject to effective measures of international control.

Thus we are told that the cessation of the production of fissionable material
and the institution of control over that cessation are measures of actual concrete
disarmament. In the second place, we are told that these measures are preliminary
conditions for the achievement of agreement on the cessation of the testing of
nuclear weapons. However, in making agreement on the cessation of the testing of
nuclear weapons contingent on the necessity of the cessation of production of
fissionable material for military purposes, the Western Powers refuse to eliminate
these weapons from the armaments of States and to prohibit their use. However,
the abandonment of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons of all types, including
air bombs, rockets, bombs of any range, with atomic and hydrogen warheads, would
be an important measure of actual disarmament. Historical experience speaks in
favour of such agreement. A similar agreement concerning such types of weapons
of mass destruction as chemical and bacteriological weapons
role in the sense of preventing or discouraging the use of these weapons in the
Second World War.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR listened with interest to the speech of
the representative of Ethiopia on 20 October, calling for the convening, within
the framework of the United Nations, of a conference on the special prohibition of
the use of atomic weapons for military purposes, with a view to signing a convention
which would ban the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Such a convention would surely constitute an important step towards the carrying out of a genuine disarmament programme and it would facilitate the complete prohibition of atomic and nuclear weapons. The statement of the representative of Ethiopia deserves careful study and attention on the part of the Assembly.

In his speech on 10 October in this Committee, Mr. Lodge paid tribute to the thesis which artificially ties in disarmament with the problem of improvement in the currently existing political situation. He said in particular that a substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces could be expected only in the event of an improvement in the political situation which now prevails.

Let us recall that in the proposals of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada of 29 August 1957, presented at the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments was made contingent on the attainment of progress in the direction of the solution of political questions. The year that has elapsed has not substantially altered the position of the Western Powers in any way, and in seeking to evaluate this position, we may have in mind the point that has been made in this Committee that "it is good when governmental policy evolves instead of remaining frozen and rigid forever". In other words, we are confronted with some sort of endless chain of preliminary conditions and reservations in which the clear and forthright question of the cessation of tests simply gets lost. Its significance is minimized and its solution becomes extremely problematical.

We may conclude that the United Kingdom, France and the United States artificially tie in the cessation of test explosions with more complex questions on which agreement has not so far been possible owing to the positions of the Western Powers themselves. The solution of these questions is being tied in by the Western Powers with the solution of fundamental political problems.
The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in reality have tried and continue to try to minimize the significance of the cessation of the testing of atomic weapons as a major contribution to disarmament. Why have they done this? Is not the object of tests to seek to verify theoretical computations and calculations and to develop new types of nuclear weapons and to further perfect existing types? If this is so, then the adoption of a decision on the cessation of tests would surely stop or at least delay the process of development of new means of mass destruction. Contrariwise, the continuation of tests would surely be tantamount to sinking ever deeper into the abyss of the armaments race. Would not this spell an unproductive wastage of vast resources which could be used for the greater well-being of mankind?

For a long time we were told that in order to solve the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapons we would have to have the key, that key being a technical system of control. Now, after the Geneva Conference, the key has been handed to us, let us try it.

But in proposing this, we would say to all those who now champion the technical approach to the solution of the disarmament problem, especially the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons, please remember that in 1932 in the League of Nations almost all the technical aspects of the disarmament problem were solved. Formulae had been found on almost all points. The only thing that did not exist was a political decision of the Governments of the Western Powers to the effect that they would disarm. Now it has become abundantly clear that what is at issue is not the technical aspect of the matter but whether the United States and the United Kingdom are prepared to display the goodwill that the Soviet Union has already displayed and to forego nuclear testing.

We would like to emphasize that an agreement on the cessation of tests would be a simple and uncomplicated international action. We bear in mind that, as shown by the Conference of Experts in Geneva, the cessation of tests would not require the creation of any complex system of control. The obligations which the States would assume are so clear that any State which violated them would be immediately revealed and exposed as a violator.
That is what the Ukrainian delegation wishes to say at this stage on the question of the testing of nuclear weapons, on the basis of the proposals of the Soviet Union on that score. Common men throughout the world are watching the United Nations with increasing alarm. They are asking whether this Organization will be able to adopt an affirmative solution calling for the immediate cessation of the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons. They are asking whether this Organization will be able to remove this heavy burden which is weighing upon their hearts and impeding their very breathing. On this United Nations Day, we should not only ponder upon this matter, we should be prepared to act vigorously upon it.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The United Kingdom representative has asked to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom): I should like briefly to exercise my right of reply in answer to the observations which the representative of Saudi Arabia, in a characteristic speech, made about my delegation's position earlier this morning. I confess I am somewhat taken aback by his suggestion that in sponsoring the seventeen-Power draft resolution my delegation is confronting the General Assembly with an ultimatum. If that were true, it would presumably also be true of the other sixteen delegations who are sponsoring the same draft resolution and to whom, of course, he did not refer. I see no considerations strictly relating to the question of disarmament which should differentiate our action from theirs.

Whatever the representative of Saudi Arabia may think of our policy of disarmament, surely to sponsor a resolution is clearly not an ultimatum. The Saudi Arabian representative complains that we put a draft resolution to the General Assembly and say, "take it or leave it". That is perhaps rather an abrupt way of expressing the situation, but is it not in essence what the original sponsors of any draft resolution are doing? After all, we heard from the representative of India only this morning that he preferred his own three draft resolutions and that he will not vote for any of the others before the Committee.
I repeat that I cannot understand for what reasons the representative of Saudi Arabia should wish to criticize the exercise by my delegation of the ordinary right of any Member State to suggest a course of action to the General Assembly. What we on our side have pointed out is that progress in disarmament will be achieved only by agreement, and that agreement can only be achieved by negotiation. I was glad to note that the representative of Saudi Arabia did agree with me to the extent of confirming my statement that an effective disarmament agreement cannot be achieved without the full and free participation of the Soviet Union. I hope that he will extend the benefit of that principle to my country as well.

In the course of this year, the United Kingdom has engaged in technical discussions at Geneva on the possibility of control over a suspension of nuclear tests. That discussion, in a small, private body, produced a technical agreement. We now hope to consolidate that technical agreement on the political plane as a result of the future negotiations at Geneva. If this can be done -- we believe it can -- we think it will represent a much more solid achievement and a much more solid basis for future progress than any mere declaration, by however large a group of Powers. I believe that there is very wide support for this view in this Committee.

The Saudi Arabian representative also has chosen to make certain allegations against my country which are not connected with the subject matter of this item before us and because of that I do not propose to detain the Committee by answering them now.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of Peru has also asked to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. DELAUNDE (Peru)(interpretation from Spanish): The Ukrainian representative has attributed to me the guiding of arguments against the suspension of nuclear tests. I presume that this is a mistaken understanding of my statement, because the Ukrainian representative must be aware of the fact that I have always upheld the suspension of tests, not merely in the debates
when I affirmed my adherence to the seventeen-Power draft resolution, but also in the Disarmament Commission in 1956 and in the debates that were held in 1956 and 1957.

On this point, my position is extremely clear. I believe that tests should be suspended in accordance with the technical reports and, furthermore, in accordance with measures taken by the countries that are to enter into negotiations. I deem this to be an extremely important step, but I do not believe it to be a decisive step. I feel that not to condition the cessation of tests to the cessation of production would be wrong. We have to work along parallel lines with regard to the suspension of tests and the suspension of production.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I must say that I am extremely happy at the way our work has gathered momentum, especially since the representatives have shown their desire to co-operate by speaking when their turns came and not forcing us to interrupt our meetings. There are six speakers for Monday's meetings, and perhaps we could fit in two or three more. The remainder of the speakers on the list -- seven after the six I have mentioned -- have said that they would prefer to speak on Tuesday. I would invite those representatives to be good enough to take account of our desire to get ahead with our work and to make a great effort over the week-end to be prepared to speak on Monday. Perhaps we could then finish our general debate by mid-day on Tuesday.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.