Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 23 October 1958, at 10:30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. UNQUIIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.960. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)

2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)


The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I wish to draw to the attention of members of the Committee that two new draft resolutions have been distributed this morning. The first is a draft resolution submitted jointly by India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.210), concerning the composition and the tasks of the Disarmament Commission. The second is a draft resolution also submitted jointly by India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.211), concerning technical studies on the question of surprise attack.

U THANT (Burma): Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me extend to you, on behalf of my delegation, our heartiest congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee, and also permit me to congratulate my esteemed colleagues, Mr. Osman of the Sudan and Mr. Matsch of Austria, upon their election to the posts of Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur respectively.

At this late stage in the general debate on disarmament, I do not propose to go into a lengthy discussion of the various aspects of the problem. Since many of my colleagues have ably and comprehensively dealt with several phases, I shall confine myself only to the most pressing issues.

It seems to my delegation that the issues are now comparatively clear.

In the first place, there is a growing consensus of expert opinion that the continuation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests may do irreparable harm to all humanity. More and more eminent scientists of the world, including some of the most outstanding ones in the United States, agree that each nuclear weapon test produces radioactivity which is dispersed through the atmosphere.
In the form of distant fall-out, it may settle to earth anywhere around the world. It is also an accepted fact that the amount of this fall-out varies depending upon the size of the bomb, the height of the explosion above the earth, and other conditions. Almost all the scientists of the world are agreed that most of such radioactivity ascended into the stratosphere in the form of strontium 90, an element with very long chemical life, descended to earth gradually over a period of years and was -- and is still being -- assimilated into vegetable and animal life. Almost all scientists are also agreed that the effects of this strontium 90 not only cause increased incidence of cancer but can bring about dangerous mutations in future generations.

If I am to quote the statements made by distinguished nuclear scientists at a conference in Central Hall, Westminster, London, held in the last week of September 1958, every large-scale nuclear experiment contains the premeditated murder of 15,000 yet unborn children, to say nothing of the misery of their parents. This is apparently the known minimum effect. How many more genetic disasters are in train nobody knows. Physically, morally and intellectually, one cannot make a household cat out of a man-eating tiger. It is just as impossible to domesticate the hydrogen bomb. Apart from any other consideration, common sense demands that we all abandon this death march.

The Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation confirms the widespread apprehension and concern regarding the effects of radiation. Therefore, I say that the issue is comparatively clear.

In the second place, the means for the extermination of the human species is now in the hands of the three great Powers. In due course it will pass into the hands of many Governments, large and small. There was a time when only the United States had nuclear weapons. This was followed by a time when only the United States and the Soviet Union had such weapons. And now the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain possess them. It is obvious that France and a few other countries will shortly manufacture these terrible weapons. It is not likely that the People's Republic of China, irrespective of its admission or non-admission to the United Nations, will lag far behind.
We must also expect that during the next few years the manufacture of engines of mass destruction will become cheaper and easier. In the course of the present debate the Foreign Minister of Sweden has, in a very significant intervention, revealed that Swedish scientists can now, if the Swedish Government permits, start manufacturing tactical nuclear weapons. Obviously many other countries will then be able to follow the example set by the great Powers. There is no end to this process until almost every sovereign State is in a position to inflict incalculable destruction. If all sovereign States were governed by rulers possessed of even the rudiments of sanity, they would be restrained from committing such colossal crimes by the fear that their citizens also would perish. But experience has shown that from time to time power in this or that country falls into the hands of rulers who are not sane.

There is still another hazard to mankind that stems from the sheer number of people who handle these weapons of great destructiveness. No doubt, the designers of nuclear weapons have attempted to install in them certain mechanical safeguards against accidental firing or explosion. There are, however, no final or foolproof safeguards against the probability of human failure. We cannot but shudder at the mere thought of this probability. This is one aspect of the problem on which there can be no two opinions.

In the third place, there is the problem of inspection. There is a consensus of opinion that an adequate inspection system for a nuclear test ban would require the establishment of monitoring stations at various locations inside large geographical testing areas. This problem has in the past constituted a deadlock between the great Powers, but now the deadlock is removed by the Russian acceptance of the principle of an inspection system. Meanwhile, the whole world is heartened by the Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests (A/3897) which indicates that it is technically and scientifically practicable to establish the arrangements and controls necessary to ensure the observance of an agreement on the discontinuance of such tests.

On all these three issues, it may be safely assumed that there is a large measure of common agreement. No one in his senses will maintain that nuclear explosions will contribute to human happiness. No one can deny that
the means for the manufacture of these terrible weapons of destruction, if unchecked, will pass in due course into the hands of many Governments, large and small. And no one can now deny that it is practicable to establish controls to ensure discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. What then remains as the stumbling block? The answer is to be found in the two points of view which are diametrically opposed to each other.
The first viewpoint insists on a package deal whereby almost all the important measures of disarmament are tied together in such a way that each proposal is contingent on the acceptance of all the other proposals. The other point of view insists on the breaking up of this package into bits and negotiating first on the most pressing item. My delegation feels that it will be excessively optimistic to press for agreement on all aspects of disarmament, and we honestly feel that one of the most pressing measures and one which would be a godsend to all humanity is the discontinuance, with the ultimate aim of complete cessation, of all nuclear weapons tests with adequate inspection on both sides.

Time is already running short, and delay entails untold risks. The greatest risk lies in doing nothing; in wasting time in hairsplitting and in piling up nuclear weapons as weapons of a crusade against what is regarded as an absolute evil. My delegation holds the view that no nation is entitled to try to exterminate an evil by invoking a greater evil than the one it is trying to get rid of. The hydrogen bomb, in the view of my delegation, is a greater evil than any evil it is intended to meet. These considerations will guide my delegation in the exercise of our vote on the draft resolutions now before this Committee.

In conclusion, let me appeal to the great Powers, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia, to show a spirit of give and take so as to achieve positive results in the present discussions on disarmament. It will be noticed that one fact clearly emerges out of the debates and discussions in the United Nations since its inception. This fact is that the United Nations can take action only if the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are in agreement. The problem of disarmament in general and the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests in particular is one which calls for an immediate solution. Only a spirit of trust and understanding by both sides can lead to a satisfactory solution of this pressing problem and thereby meet the greatest challenge of our times.

Mr. ESIN (Turkey): I would like, in the first place, Mr. Chairman, to express the congratulations of my delegation to you on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee and to add, to the feelings already expressed here by many, our confidence that under your wise guidance, our deliberations will
bring us nearer to the solution of the most important problem confronting mankind today. We also offer our warm congratulations to the Vice-Chairman and to the Rapporteur of the Committee on their election.

Once again this Assembly has to take a stand on the question of disarmament in general and on questions incidental to it. In spite of the fervent and constant wish of all mankind to see the attainment of at least a beginning of disarmament and of the desire of this assembly solemnly expressed in previous resolutions, we must note with regret that we are still a long way from reaching that goal. On the other hand, each ensuing year brings with it a terrifying increase in modern means of wholesale destruction, so that it becomes more and more urgent and imperative to take as soon as possible the first steps that will lead to a genuine reduction of armaments.

It is a source of great disappointment that the resolution on disarmament and the resolution on its machinery adopted at the twelfth session of the General Assembly have remained unheeded. The circumstances and factors which are responsible for the failure to implement the recommendations of these resolutions are too well known to all and have been aired too frequently for me to go into them, nor does constant recrimination serve any useful purpose. The question remains, however, as to whether it does serve any useful purpose for this assembly to continue to record its carefully considered consensus of opinion if there is a risk of its opinion going unheeded. We believe that it does. We believe that this assembly is in duty bound to continue to take a close interest in this vital question and to arrive at resolutions which carry the weight of world opinion.

In spite of the reverses that have been suffered in the attempts at disarmament, we are happy to see that in the course of last year a glimmer of hope has appeared. The Secretary-General, in his memorandum on this question, has pointed out that the picture is not entirely discouraging. We, too, believe that the modest progress which has been achieved on the technical level is a step in the right direction. We were happy to note that the experts who met in Geneva were able to reach agreement on the means of detecting nuclear tests, and it is our earnest hope that the forthcoming meetings on 31 October and 10 November on the suspension of tests and measures of security from surprise attack will be successful.
We fully realize that agreement in the technical field does not mean disarmament, and that such agreements are only worth while in so far as they prepare the ground for subsequent political understanding. Nevertheless, we welcome them as an invaluable means of clearing the atmosphere in both senses of the word and of providing mutual confidence, which is among the major prerequisites for disarmament. It is, in our view, primarily as a builder of that confidence that the discontinuance of nuclear tests is of value.

We know that nuclear tests represent a certain danger on account of radioactive fallout. However, such a danger cannot compare with the capital danger of nuclear war. We must be careful not to lose the proper perspective during our deliberations. Disarmament, including, we hope, the total abolition of nuclear weapons along with the reduction in other arms, is and should be our primary objective.

I speak here as the representative of a country which is earnestly desirous of a general reduction of armaments, Turkey is a country that is devoted to peace. The record of the Republic, which will celebrate its thirty-fifth anniversary next week, speaks eloquently for itself. We fully realize that genuine and lasting peace cannot be achieved without general and effective disarmament which will dispel the fears of aggression. Consequently, we, like all peoples who sincerely desire peace, yearn for disarmament. Furthermore, and more particularly, general disarmament would bring added blessings to Turkey. Turkey has a growing economy and is presently engaged in arduous efforts to raise the living standards of its people. Yet in the midst of that vital endeavour it still has to maintain a large defence establishment. That it is compelled to do in order to provide for the security of the nation and to play an effective part in the defence organizations to which it belongs.
The Committee will realize that this is a heavy and crippling burden by whose removal Turkey would be greatly relieved if general disarmament could be achieved. Yet we must not lose sight of the fact that disarmament, when it comes, must be such as effectively to ensure our security. We cannot exchange security against economic advantages, however alluring they may be. Consequently, we maintain, as we have always maintained in this Assembly, that disarmament should be accompanied by effective international control, and that it should also include the reduction of conventional armaments. Only then could disarmament provide the security and confidence which, in our view, are its essential factors.

The question then remains how this Assembly can best serve the purpose of leading the nations of the world towards disarmament. I have said before that the ardent wishes of an overwhelming majority have been solemnly expressed by this Assembly in the past. They are on record, and I have no doubt that they reflect the thoughts and feelings of the same majority today. But the fact remains that the dread weapons of our times are in the arsenals of a small and, so far, exclusive group of countries. Would it be sufficient, then, for this Assembly to dismiss the matter with a hope and a prayer, in the expectation that eventually agreement will be reached among them? We believe that the Assembly, in its approach to this vital question, should be helpful and, above all, realistic. We should discern the steps which are being taken in the right direction and lend our support to them. We should avoid following suggestions which sound attractive but which do not touch the core of the problem, or which are bound to remain impracticable in the present circumstances.

It is in the light of these criteria that the Turkish delegation has studied the draft resolutions which are now before this Committee. We would have wished to share the view expressed here by some delegations that these draft resolutions might be brought to coincide in a compromise. Had that been possible it would doubtless have facilitated our task, but it would seem that some of the proposals, at least, have different starting points and express widely divergent views as to the immediate course to be followed. In our opinion, the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) submitted by Argentina and sixteen other Powers is the one which comes nearest to the criteria which we in the Turkish delegation have set for ourselves and deserves the wide occurrence of this Assembly.
Mr. BEIAUDE (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): We have now arrived at a stage in our debate where it is incumbent upon the Peruvian delegation to refer to the draft resolutions which have been submitted, but we are reluctant to do so without having first made known, as clearly and as briefly as possible, the points of view that we have held on disarmament in the Assembly since 1951, and especially when Peru was a member of the Disarmament Commission. We expressed views that were contained in the resolutions adopted in 1955 and 1956. Those are the views that we must all bear in mind in judging the draft resolutions now before us on their merits. May I trace those points of view, and read them to the Committee?

First, disarmament is a matter that concerns the United Nations. The United Nations has both duties and powers -- the Assembly the powers and the Security Council the duties -- which are based on the Charter. A balanced system of disarmament is the basis of peace. Any lack of balance in armaments can lead to war.

Second, disarmament is one and indivisible. It includes simultaneous and co-ordinated measures both in the field of conventional weapons -- and here I am at one with the representative of Spain in preferring the expression "classical weapons" in Spanish -- and the field of nuclear weapons relating to the manner of their use. Here I am referring to the planes, guided missiles, rockets and so on.

Third, the discontinuance of nuclear tests is required today because of the dangers of irradiation, and if that discontinuance is achieved it must be guaranteed by a system of control set up after negotiations.

Fourth, the discontinuance of tests is an encouraging sign, in the first place because it is the beginning of an agreement and, in the second place, because it will be the first experiment in international control of armaments.

Fifth, the discontinuance cannot be represented as a solution of the question of disarmament, or even as the beginning of a solution. No matter what solution is proposed, it cannot be put into effect unless it applies also to the main aspect of the question, which is the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons which carry in them a danger which is greater than -- although perhaps not as imminent as -- that of tests. Our efforts to bring these tests to an end must go hand in hand with our efforts to obtain a general system of disarmament.
Sixth, control by means of adequate inspection -- permanent, though not necessarily continuous -- must also be applied to (a) the regulation of conventional weapons, (b) land, sea and air communication centres, (c) declarations of the parties on armaments budgets and the location of production plants.

Seventh, control, except over stockpiling, is possible as has been proved to us by the experts, as is control of the production of weapons, rockets and missiles that are assembled in plants which can be located.

Eighth, control is not an end in itself -- and in this connexion may I respectfully address myself to the representative of the Byelorussian SSR? I believe that he did not quite understand what I had said. Control, as far as we are concerned, is not an end; it is merely a means. The end is the absolute prohibition of use; the means is control. Prohibition without control has no meaning. Whoever wants the end must apply the only means. Whoever wants to achieve prohibition must, logically and inescapably, propose and accept control.

Ninth, control today, in the eyes of science, is the executive branch and the guarantee of the fulfilment of the greater part of multilateral treaties. Therefore, it fits into international law. To turn it down or to postpone it or delay it is to deny the superb evolution of international law and the progress of juridical science in the last few years.

Tenth, control is the final proof of good faith and of the sincerity of intentions of the parties. Besides, control can create or reestablish confidence. We would have to invert the order that once was established here mistakenly. Let us create confidence, and then let us set up control.
Control is a juridical fact; confidence is a state of mind. You cannot order a state of mind. On the other hand, you can decree a practical institution such as control, and once that practical institution has been decreed, then, as a natural corollary, confidence will follow. This is fundamental in political and psychological philosophy.

Eleven: Control cannot be objected to on the grounds of an enlarged concept of sovereignty based on the absolute supremacy of the State over and above international juridical order. Unfortunately, in certain cases we are not all speaking the same language. Those of us who believe that control should be established, believe that sovereignty means the freedom of a State within the framework of international law. Those who oppose control believe that nothing stands above the State; this, naturally, is in keeping with the Marxist-Engels philosophy. I am not making recriminations against those who believe in this philosophy, but that is the reason for the wide gap between us. I hope that the gap will be removed one day, but at the present time, since we do have a family of nations, we cannot accept the doctrine of the supremacy of the State over and above the international juridical order which is so necessary if that family of nations is to exist.

Twelve: Without over-emphasizing the technical as opposed to the political question -- I believe that the political side is more important than the technical, but it is also necessary to consider the technical side -- in our view, a conference of experts should be created to study practical means of setting up control over the prohibition of production and destruction of existing stockpiles or the transformation of these into peaceful pursuits.

Thirteen: If an agreement on control is not arrived at, we can at least negotiate -- if under the auspices of the United Nations, so much the better -- regarding the gradual cessation of production and the gradual destruction of stockpiles on an equal basis for both parties.

Fourteen: We cannot separate disermament from the vital questions affecting the personality and dignity of human beings and the inviolable right of nations whose entities are an historical fact. Such violations of human rights or such efforts to suppress the self-determination of peoples were the causes of international tension in the first place. Naturally, the armaments race accentuates and
exacerbates this tension, but we must face the truth. The cause of international tension was and is the fact that these problems exist and that they affect the rights of man in different sectors of the world. I shall not refer particularly to any people or any nation in this connexion, but I think that minds and hearts of all of us will be able to supply the missing names.

Fifteen: No matter what difficulties may arise in the question of disarmament, the Powers concerned should not and must not lose contact with each other. They must make every effort to preserve the points which have been gained in the debate, such as those of ceilings on conventional weapons, the inspection of centres of communication, as well as the open skies proposal, which was, in the first place, postponed by the Soviet Union and later rejected. Certain points have become common ground, but the duty to negotiate is one which belongs to all of us. We cannot evade this duty. In this connexion I should like to recall some words of Lloyd George -- politically speaking, he was a genius and frequently expressed principles of eternal wisdom -- who said: "We must never break cables." These are the principles which I shall bear in mind in discussing the draft resolutions.

Let me take up first of all the Soviet draft resolution. I have no prejudice regarding this. If I had any, it would be because of the ability of that delegation to submit and defend draft resolutions. But the Soviet draft proposal, as far as I can see, suffers from the following faults. First, it contains no affirmation of the permanent competence of the United Nations regarding the entire question of disarmament. Reading this draft resolution, one gains the impression that the United Nations no longer has the right to deal with the question of disarmament.

Secondly, the establishment and acceptance of juridical obligations in regard to atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and the crystallizing of this responsibility cannot depend on a decision of the General Assembly. The Assembly can create a moral atmosphere, but the juridical responsibility can only emanate from negotiations, and in the hierarchy of values the most important thing is to encourage negotiations. Yet, in this draft resolution I find no definite reference to negotiations. A general reference to negotiations is made, but no specific mention is included. It is true that, in the course of the debate, the
representative of the Soviet Union made it clear that his Government and his people accepted -- and I am happy to say this -- the report of the experts.

This draft resolution overlooks other aspects of disarmament. I have said, and I believe, that disarmament is indivisible and, therefore, my delegation cannot support this draft resolution, although it is based on the most noble purpose, which is to attain the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

We shall be told that other questions have been touched upon in the memorandum of 18 September (A/3929). That is true, but in that memorandum there is no mention of control over the regulation of conventional weapons. The Soviet Union had already accepted that. Nor is mention made of the control over the prohibition of production and stockpiling of atomic weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. There is one point in that memorandum which has been brought to the Committee in the form of a draft resolution, but the other points have not been presented in the form of draft resolutions -- at least, not in so far as the items before us are concerned.

The point which the Soviet Union has covered in another draft resolution is the question of the reduction of military budgets. This reduction is a matter which, I might say, is apparently seductive, but we find that such a general global reduction loses much of its charm and appears to be mere window dressing.
We know that military budgets are changing constantly because of the progress achieved in science and techniques. Therefore, since these changes can take place at any time and at any given moment may call for extraordinary expenditures, no State can in good faith accept a reduction which it might be unable to fulfil.

With regard to the second point, there is no chance of accepting this reduction of military budgets without controls which would have to be very carefully drafted and prepared, and may I read here what is contained in the general report on the Inspection for Disarmament edited by Mr. Nolman in 1958. Regarding governmental and State budgets, he stated:

"Existing practice permits some types of appropriations to be expended at the discretion of administrators. In other circumstances budgeted funds may be transferred among accounts, and the outlays for certain activities may be concealed by distribution, in whole or in part, of the amounts in budget accounts bearing unrelated titles. In the federal budget of the United States, Professor Burkhead estimates that the particular allocation of amounts up to $100,000,000 is and can be readily concealed from view by such means. Larger amounts could also be concealed, although with increasing difficulty. It is important to note that such possibilities for concealment characterize the relatively open and published budget of the United States government. Such possibilities could very well be multiplied in the case of governmental budgets operating where there are multiple security restrictions over the entire budgeting system." (Inspection for Disarmament, Columbia University Press, pages 14-15)

I do not think that I need add one single word to that. It is an authoritative opinion by someone who knows what he is talking about. We cannot in good faith accept this reduction unless very strict international control is applied. To do so would be merely to try to make propaganda and to indulge in window dressing. For this reason the Peruvian delegation will be unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. Closer to the truth, the facts and the present possibilities of reducing military budgets is
the amendment submitted by Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Uruguay, which is much more acceptable.

I hope the Committee will forgive me if I go into great detail on this question, but I now have to deal with the draft resolution submitted by the thirteen Powers. I know that everyone is aware of the fact that I feel very friendly and close to the co-sponsors of this draft resolution because, first of all, of the warm feelings that exist between all small countries which share the common desires to develop and to live in peace.

I feel that this draft resolution cannot be said to ignore, as the Soviet draft resolution does, the jurisdiction and the competence of the General Assembly, a competence which I would call essential. On the contrary, the reference made to the Secretariat, to the international community and to the work and tasks of other States proves, as we expected, that what this draft resolution intends to do is to move and act within the jurisdiction and under the aegis of the United Nations. This draft resolution stresses the result of the meeting of experts on atomic radiation and its effects. It uses almost the same words regarding the report of the experts on the possibility of detecting test explosions, and it also welcomes and makes a specific reference to the conference which is to begin at Geneva on 31 October next. It is this which makes it different from the Soviet draft resolution.

In studying the concrete points of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of this draft resolution and comparing them with the corresponding paragraphs of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, one finds that whereas the thirteen Powers want the discontinuance to be prolonged until an agreement is arrived at, thus making it imperative for the States concerned to come to an agreement, the other draft resolution, which to a large extent mirrors this, urges cessation while the negotiations are in progress.

When the seventeen-Power draft resolution refers to negotiations, it urges the parties not to undertake further tests for a year and to continue this cessation, not because the negotiations have been successfully concluded or because such negotiations are over, but because an agreement is in view. This is a difference, and it is an important difference, but I sometimes wonder,
since we are dealing with countries that have the same feelings as ours, countries that do not accept or want the problem of disarmament to leave the purview of the United Nations, who want solutions to be found within juridical science and within the Charter -- and basically I am not one of the co-sponsors of the seventeen-Power proposal -- whether these two groups -- the thirteen Powers and the seventeen Powers -- could not find some common ground on these two paragraphs. I throw out this seed for their minds and I water this seed with my hopes. I do not know the intimate thoughts of the great Powers and I respect the responsibilities they have assumed. I cannot make suggestions and I must leave it to them and their good sense, but might it not be possible for them to find some common ground on which we could all agree?

It is true that the proposal of the thirteen Powers omits the other aspects of disarmament, but it omits them in a different way, on a different level, and in a different style, and since I know the state of mind of these thirteen countries, I am sure they would not object to voting in favour of the rest of the proposals contained in the seventeen-Power draft resolution.

Furthermore, the other sections of the seventeen-Power draft resolution contain nothing new. They were in the resolution adopted in 1956 and, in essence, in the 1955 resolution which was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. Therefore, I am very sorry that, because of this difference which exists, I am unable to go along with the thirteen Powers.
Numerous other drafts were submitted, some based on very noble ideas, such as
the draft resolution of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland; I believe
there are two. One is the suggestion of the setting-up of a committee that would
study the dangers inherent in the further dissemination of nuclear weapons,
and to recommend to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly appropriate
measures for averting such dangers. The other urges that the parties involved
in the negotiations should not supply other States with nuclear weapons;
this is an amendment to the seventeen-Power draft resolution; it is to the effect
that while negotiations are taking place and during the period of any suspension
of tests that may result therefrom, no nuclear weapons would be supplied to other
States.

To refer, first of all, to the first proposal: to a large extent this fits
in with the proposal we adopted last year which was presented by the Belgian
delegation, in other words to put before humanity all the information regarding
the dangers inherent in atomic warfare, to let humanity know the dangers of the
devastation produced by the use of atomic bombs.

I certainly do not object to our accepting the establishment of this
Committee, which to a large extent would complete the work begun by Belgium
last year. With regard to the obligation which is to be imposed on the countries
possessing nuclear weapons, during the negotiations, not to supply other States
with these weapons, I must say that the present situation is one of great
international tension. We must admit today, unfortunately, that nuclear weapons are
the only element of defence that we have against the overwhelming manpower
on the other side, apart from the geographic situation and the greater or lesser
facility of the mobilization of these human masses. Thus it would be rather
difficult to impose this obligation on these countries when we do not know
what defence needs can arise for the defence of these countries.

I say this in spite of my admiration and friendship for the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Ireland, and I wish to say that I should like to vote in favour
of this draft because I am one of the greatest admirers of Ireland, which today
represents one of the great elements in the world because the Irish have
travelled and emigrated all over the world, chiefly in the countries of the
British community of nations. The Irish have brought their intelligence and
hard work to all the world, and we in Latin America cannot forget the many
people of Irish descent who fought with us and for us to safeguard and achieve our independence.

Finally, I come to the very interesting proposal submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, my friend, Mr. Padilla Nervo. The Mexican proposal is the answer to the fifteenth principle of disarmament which is that countries have the inescapable duty to negotiate. Not only must they not cut themselves adrift, but also they must hold on to one another, as Lloyd George said, and they must stick to one another to see whether the negotiations can be a new link to hold them together. Naturally Peru looks at this draft resolution with great sympathy. Whether this draft resolution is practical will depend not so much on the General Assembly but rather on the Powers concerned. It is they who have to decide. We hope and trust that these Powers will be able to negotiate under the chairmanship of Mr. Urquía, our Chairman, and thus lay the foundation for future negotiations. If this effort does not succeed, then perhaps the General Assembly might be obliged categorically to invite the countries concerned to continue negotiations; this could be done by setting them up in a sub-committee or a Disarmament Committee, with the help of the Secretary-General under the auspices of the United Nations. Perhaps if they deem it necessary, they could carry on with the aid of Powers that both groups trust; in other words, mediators who would enjoy the full confidence of both sides. The Secretary-General would be obliged to inform the Council of the result of these negotiations. The Security Council would be obliged to take a position on such reports, and then on the basis of the report of the Security Council the question would once again come to the General Assembly because this is the way that the United Nations would fulfill the duties incumbent upon it in accordance with Article 11 and, above all, Article 26 of the Charter.

I should like to ask the indulgence of the Chair and of my colleagues in order to make some observations on this debate. The debate has been very useful. We must, I think, congratulate ourselves because this time, generally speaking, the debate has been on a very high level, in obedience to the wise, timely and appropriate suggestions of the Chairman. An agreement has been reached. The Soviet Union and its allies have come here to confirm, with dates, figures and observations the points of view that other delegations had previously set out,
along with information given by the Secretariat of the United Nations and the

case put forward by the delegation of Peru. The General Assembly is a sounding

board, and it is necessary to point out to the world the categorical statement

that the armaments race is forcing certain countries to channel their immense

production, to the detriment of its economic structure, to war purposes.

This is, at the same time a heavy burden on the economic structure of these

countries and on their budgets, and the armaments race also carries with it the

possibility of a war.

The absorption of tremendous amounts which were cited by Soviet

representatives proved what we had stated earlier, that is, it separates the

highly favoured nations from their duty, which is to work for the other two-thirds

of humanity that lives in misery, want, hunger, illiteracy, malnutrition and

which are condemned to premature death.

Taking into account the fact that the figures of increased production

in those countries make their situation even more painful, we have all read the

article that Barbara Ward wrote on the "billion", and we have also read what they

said as to how much was needed for the under-developed countries. We know

that this sum is not sufficient. This is the great problem of humanity,

this is the mission which the great Powers have. There has been what we might call

a concerted voice in which a kind of symphony has been played and in which the

orchestra has been able to play fully to the right and to the left, and I think

we ought to congratulate ourselves that at least on this one matter there has

been agreement. But we have at last broken all disagreements.
I do not want to become bitter; I want to be objective, because at last the delegations of the Soviet countries have explained the present crisis. They have seen the objective factors that are outside human control, factors that represent the slavery of mankind and the current of facts and events that it itself sets up. Man at the moment is caught in a whirlpool -- he is being submerged because of a series of errors. These errors, however, cannot be imputed to one intention. We do not have the right to judge intentions. We cannot ascribe to others plans and intentions of a tremendous and fantastic genocide; we cannot impute to others the desire to commit the greatest crime in the history of mankind. In any event, it would be an error to do so, and I make this statement in all sincerity and honesty. It would be an error to impute imperialistic intentions and planning to the Eastern Powers because they are surrounded by a capitalist world. To do this would be to repeat the errors which are contained in the works of Marx, who did not see before his death the transformation of modern capitalism. They are also present in the works of Lenin, because he also died before the transformation of capitalism took place.

Today we are viewing a phenomenon which is extraordinary in history. First of all, the social democracies are limiting the functions of the State. The representatives of the Soviet countries must understand that this is taking place and that it was Nehru who said, in an article published in the newspapers of all the world, that the social democracies are transforming the structure and orientation of ancient capitalism.

There is, in addition, another point. We are witnessing a resurrection of spiritual values which also place a limitation on the State. Spiritual values mean the acceptance of the spiritual community upon which the State is based and the primacy of the spiritual community over and above the political machinery -- the independent juridical and ethnic importance of that community which imposes itself on the State and on which the State must be built. This explains the circulus fact that after the war Germany and Italy rose from the rubble under the principles of Christian democracy. These principles have influenced the policy of Ireland; they have influenced French policy, Belgian policy, Dutch policy and, to a different extent, the policies of others, countries with great juridical traditions, such as Spain and Portugal. A profound
transformation has occurred in England. Suffice it to recite here the words of a famous author who said that he accepted the State so long as the State was efficient and respected individual enterprises.

In this connexion my friend, Mr. Lodge, has told us many times of the transformation in the United States economic structure, thus guaranteeing life to all, raising the standard of living of all and avoiding conflicts between management and labour, which are usually solved by wage increases. There is a common movement all over the world which is transforming capitalism. This is accentuated by the new tendencies of law which, at one time, were at the service of the individual but which now are at the service of social justice. There are new techniques that have also caused incredible transformations. We have, too, the freedom of the press. And in this connexion I wish to make a sincere, honest and warm appeal to my colleagues here, the representatives of the Soviet countries, to think of what freedom of the press means in the Western world. It would be unthinkable to apply a policy of violence in the field of international justice because, at the slightest error or difference of view, the press of our countries would arise and defend the points of view of the people, and this is particularly so in the United States and the United Kingdom. A change has to take place on the other side too.

I do not want to say in reprisal what there is on the other side. I am not going to attack any person, institution or group. I am not going to impute to them any imperialist desires or any desires to dominate others. My colleague, Mr. Amadeo, the representative of Argentina, stated very clearly that intentions can only be judged by God. However, there are certain facts that worry us. Today, for example, we see the shortening of the period of education for youth so that they can be sent for military training or to work in factories.
What do we see taking place in China? In this debate we must consider all the aspects of the problem. Can I avoid mentioning here what we read in the newspapers of Hong Kong about what is taking place in China, information which is also contained in the American press? We learn that the co-operatives no longer exist and that they are now replaced by the communes, which represent the exaggerated and extreme views of Plato's utopian State. The family is wiped out and women, children and the aged are mobilized in a gigantic army that might reach the incredible number of 350 million people.

The supremacy of the State and the wiping out of the family and the old institutions, the emphasis on heavy industry and on war-time industry, and the reduction of consumer items might be considered by them to be defensive, but we do not think so. We do not wish to impose any position on the countries of the East. Our position is one of peace. We are not forcing the Soviet Union into an arms race. Such views constitute an obsession on their part; they are a substitution of motives.

At one time the State constituted the means and peace and social justice were the ends so that social justice could not be attacked from the outside. However, the State has become all powerful and instead of being the means, it has now become a monstrous end, an end that wishes to absorb all human energy.

And yet, even in this I find some sparks of hope. I know that in many of the Soviet countries religions have not been wiped out and that around these religious feelings there is a feeling for freedom. I know that in the Soviet Union, despite the fact that anti-religious propaganda is the only acceptable kind, churches have not been abandoned nor are they impoverished and empty. There is some mysterious feeling and some extraordinary desire on the part of the Christians to teach. There is a great hunger for culture among the youth of Russia. I know that this hunger for culture will ultimately give rise to freedom.

I want to think of all these good parts and I want to preach patience, understanding and the spirit of humanity. And yet, we must weigh history. We are living in a tragic era and we cannot be either optimists or pessimists, which are absurd extremes. Optimism refuses to accept the possibility of events taking place and pessimism commits the error of accepting disillusionment as the obvious end.
I think that, in view of these facts and events, we must keep alive our human feelings, no matter what positions the Soviet Union may have taken. They are men, and nothing human is alien to us. We must hope that some psychological evolution will take place, that confidence will be reborn, that some political understanding will be born, however small its symptoms, that a moral rebirth will take place. The night is long, but it is a privilege in the end to work for the arrival of the light.

Mr. Walker (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I take the opportunity of my first statement in this Committee to congratulate you on your election and to say that we look forward to constructive work under your able leadership. I also wish to congratulate the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur on their election to their important offices.

It cannot be said that the course of the present debate on disarmament so far has been very encouraging to the people of the world, who look to the United Nations to take positive steps to reduce the crushing economic burden of armaments and to combat the dreadful insecurity under which we all live. We have, it is true, heard many able speeches but we are confronted by a number of conflicting proposals that probably give the world a sharper picture of the divisions that exist amongst us than of our desire to make real progress in the field of disarmament, strong though that desire is. There are some indications that the Committee finds itself today in a state of frustration similar to that which we encountered a year ago.

Yet many of us have approached the present session of the Assembly with rather stronger hopes than we had a year ago that the United Nations might at last be on the doorstep of some real and visible progress in the field of disarmament. It is true, as several speakers, including the Foreign Minister of Mexico, pointed out, that the past twelve months have seen no specific United Nations activity in the field of disarmament, and that the resolution adopted by a large majority at the last session of the General Assembly, expanding the Disarmament Commission to make it a more representative body and setting a programme of work, has remained a dead letter. We all know that the Disarmament Commission has not met, because it was threatened with a boycott by some of its members. For several
months it seemed possible that there might be a meeting of Heads of Government within the framework of the United Nations, in an attempt to resolve some of the differences that have been obstructing progress in the field of disarmament. Against this background the Australian Government, like others represented on the Disarmament Commission, did not consider it either necessary or helpful to press for a meeting of the Commission at which no constructive progress could be achieved.

For reasons which at the time were the subject of much speculation, the Soviet enthusiasm for a summit meeting seems to have evaporated, and the stalemate in disarmament discussions appeared to be more complete than ever; there was no longer any pretence of negotiation on the general problem of disarmament. So it comes about that, whereas in recent years the question of disarmament has come on our agenda in the form of a report from the Disarmament Commission, this year it was the Secretary-General who proposed its inscription. I should like, in passing, to say a word of appreciation of the memorandum which the Secretary-General submitted to us in this connexion. It contains a number of stimulating ideas that most of us will wish to consider closely.

Our hopes had already been somewhat revived by the convening of the Conference of Experts from Western and Communist countries to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. These hopes were reinforced when the experts produced an agreed report. It was with great relief that the world learned that the experts from both sides had come to the conclusion "that it is technically feasible to establish with the capabilities and limitations" indicated in their report "a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the worldwide suspension of nuclear weapons tests". (A/5897, Annex VII, page 1) These conclusions have been accepted by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and on the 51st of this month, one week from tomorrow, the representatives of the three Powers are to meet in Geneva to consider practical steps to establish the control system that the experts have recommended and to draw up an agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control.

Furthermore, we also have the agreement of the three Powers to begin international
discussions on measures to prevent surprise attack. As the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Casey, said in his speech in the general debate, "All these developments indicate that things are on the move". (A/759, page 13)

Most delegations, I believe, have consequently approached the present debate in the hope that we might be able to do something here that would contribute to the success of these forthcoming tripartite negotiations. We may have some regrets that it has been necessary for this degree of progress to be made outside the disarmament machinery established by the United Nations. Yet it is apparent that no progress can be expected here unless there can be agreement between the major nuclear Powers, and none of us, I feel sure, would wish to stand on procedural formalities if by so doing we endangered the prospects of such an agreement being reached. In any case, it is quite clear that there will be need for appropriate United Nations machinery, if and as agreements are reached between the great nuclear Powers, such agreements requiring the adhesion of others for their effective development into world-wide measures of disarmament.

The reaching of an agreement, such as we all hope for at the next tripartite conference in Geneva, for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under an effective system of international control and inspection, would be welcomed by the whole world, not only because of the protection it would afford against the hazards to human health that may be produced by a prolongation of these tests, but also because it may be the first positive step towards more important measures of disarmament backed by international inspection. It would certainly represent a great advance in the field of international co-operation between Governments that have previously been extremely distrustful of each other's intentions.

So delegations have approached this debate in a more hopeful frame of mind than might have seemed likely some months ago. But whether these hopes can weather the passage of the present debate is another matter. It is clearly a matter of very great importance that we should concentrate our efforts upon developing an atmosphere favourable to the forthcoming Geneva negotiations -- for these are likely to be fairly complex.

There has been a tenency in some of the statements by the Soviet representative to suggest that, now that the experts at Geneva have agreed that it is technically feasible to establish a workable and effective control system,
all is plain sailing and that the next step is a simple one; namely, to agree to
halt tests forever and then proceed to establish the necessary control system
to detect violations of that agreement. But everybody knows that the mere
agreement that it is technically feasible to establish a workable and effective
control system is not in itself enough to bring such a system into operation.
The system envisaged by the experts requires the establishment of an international
control organ; the development, testing and acceptance of various kinds of
apparatus; the selection of sites for control posts and their actual establishment
in a network covering the whole world; the establishment of a reliable
communication system; machinery for the analysis and processing of data from
the observations of the control posts; recruitment and other arrangements for
staffing of the control system. All this is in the report of the experts, which
has been submitted to us.
The experts recommend a network of control posts at distances from each other bearing from 1,000 kilometres to 3,500 kilometres, according to various conditions. And in this network there would be 160 to 170 land-based control posts and about ten ships. However, the experts say:

"the exact number of control posts within the limits indicated above can be determined only in the processes of actually disposing them around the globe, taking into account the presences of noise at the sites at which they are located and other circumstances".

The experts envisage twenty-four posts in North America, six in Europe, thirty-seven in Asia, seven in Australia, sixteen in South America, sixteen in Africa, four in Antarctica and sixty control posts on islands. Each control post would require about thirty persons with appropriate scientific or technical qualifications and arrangements would also be necessary for air sampling to be accomplished by aircraft flying over areas that are remote from surface control posts. The construction and operation of such an international control network is well within the capabilities of the great nuclear Powers and the other Governments that will be involved, but it is none the less quite a considerable undertaking in a new field of international co-operation.

As I have said, the experts in Geneva envisage the establishment of seven control posts in Australia and it is conceivable that additional posts may be proposed for places that are within Australian territory.

Already a year ago Mr. Casey, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, issued, on behalf of the Australian Government, a statement that we would be prepared to accept in principle the establishment in Australia of international inspection posts as provided in the draft of the Western proposals of August last year. Mr. Casey made it clear at the time that Australia could not commit itself to any inspection system that did not include potential aggressors.

Speaking in this Committee a year ago I commented that this statement of Australian policy refers, of course, to the acceptance only of the principle of inspection posts. If posts were actually to be established, Australian security requirements would have to be met and, as I said, we would expect close consultation in any technical discussions related to the establishment of posts and inspection procedures in our own country.
Mr. Chairman, this is still the Australian position. We have thought it necessary to make our position clear at this stage because Australia is a country in which nuclear tests have taken place. But an effective control system will require the establishment of control posts in many other countries and in many parts of the world where there have not yet been any nuclear tests. It will be necessary for the non-nuclear countries concerned to extend their full co-operation and it is not necessary for me to remind the Committee of the problems that lie ahead in ensuring that the control system will cover the whole world. No significant area of the world can safely be omitted. Even assuming a general spirit of co-operation, such as my own country displays in this matter, there will be many practical problems and some political problems to be resolved before the control system is complete.

Against this background we recognize that the forthcoming tripartite negotiations at Geneva may be somewhat protracted. They will certainly deal with complex issues and may require considerable patience and understanding on all sides. At an appropriate stage other countries will have to be brought in to the extent that their agreement is necessary for the practical implementation on their territory of the proposed methods of control.

The urgent need for early agreement on these matters is pointed up by the general recognition that all our unsettled problems in the field of nuclear disarmament are likely to be gravely complicated in the very near future by the emergence of additional nuclear Powers. There is no longer any scientific secret that can maintain a narrow monopoly of these terrible weapons. And indeed there are a number of countries with the technical capacity, the basic industrial framework, the trained scientific personnel and the resources of raw materials to enable them to enter the nuclear arms race if they so choose. With the international spread of peaceful application of atomic energy the number of countries capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons is bound to increase still further.

This presents most serious problems which have not so far been fully faced by the United Nations nor apparently fully faced by the major nuclear Powers in their tripartite discussions. Australia regards the prospective wide diffusion of the production of nuclear weapons as an issue of the greatest
importance and urgency far transcending what used to be referred to as the fourth power problem. The Australian viewpoint was already indicated by our Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, on 19 September 1957, in a statement made on the Government's defence policy in the Australian Parliament. Mr. Menzies gave certain reasons why Australia should not embark upon the production of nuclear weapons. One of the principle reasons, said Mr. Menzies, is:

that there is an advantage to the world in having nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in the hands of the United States and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and no others. These great Powers, apart from their enormous resources, are sufficiently informed about the deadly character of these weapons to find themselves reluctant to cause a war in which they are used. The possession of these violent forces" -- said Mr. Menzies -- "is, in the case of these great nations a deterrent not only to prospective enemies but also to themselves".

Mr. Menzies also expressed concern lest the extension of the manufacture of nuclear weapons to a number of other Powers might materially increase the danger of irresponsible action in some quarters, with calamitous repercussions in the world as a whole. The Australian Government, therefore, had acted and proposed to act upon the footing that, apart from the co-operative experimental work going on at Woomera and Maralinga, Australia's immediate plans for defence would be in the "conventional" field.

In the year since Mr. Menzies made this declaration, the probability of a wide diffusion of manufacture of nuclear weapons has undoubtedly increased. It may be that the fourth and fifth, and perhaps even the sixth, nuclear Power would feel compelled to exercise no less restraint in the use of nuclear weapons than the present nuclear Powers can be expected to show, but the process of securing international agreement is undoubtedly complicated by every expansion in the number of Governments whose agreement must be secured, and if the manufacture and possession of nuclear arms becomes widely diffused throughout the world, the negotiation, let alone the implementation, of an effective disarmament agreement, might well become practically impossible. The dangers of such a situation are too obvious to need further elaboration at this time.
It is therefore a matter of urgency, not only that the control system for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests be set in operation as soon as possible, but also that agreement be reached on other disarmament measures, such as will remove the present incentive to additional countries to manufacture nuclear weapons.

The Australian delegation fervently hopes that we are on the doorstep not only of the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective supervision, but also of a renewed attack upon the whole problem of disarmament by international agreement.
The Australian delegation has joined with sixteen other delegations in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document No. A/C.1/L.205. This draft resolution is not, of course, a blueprint for disarmament or an expression of the future role of the United Nations in disarmament negotiations. As we see it, the intention of the draft resolution is simply to indicate the lines of work that seem the most likely to yield constructive progress over the next few months. This is probably as much as the Assembly can hope to do at this stage and, indeed, the prospects for further progress over a wider range of disarmament measures will depend upon the results that can be achieved through the specialized negotiations that are scheduled to take place soon in Geneva. It would, in our view, be a major failure of the United Nations if we were unable in this Assembly to give some impetus and guidance to the forthcoming negotiations. Australia has joined in sponsoring this draft resolution because, modest though its terms may be, we feel that it embodies some ideas that should command the overwhelming support and perhaps the unanimous support of this Assembly. We recognize that some delegations would wish to go further than these ideas, and we would ourselves hope that within the framework of this draft resolution actual progress can be carried beyond what is explicitly spelt out in the draft resolution. We recognize, moreover, the pressing need for direct negotiations between the major Powers concerned, and we do not think that the process of negotiation can necessarily be facilitated by the Assembly spelling out in any detailed way all the developments which particular delegations hope will follow those negotiations.

The main stress in the draft resolution, therefore, is upon the need for agreement in the coming negotiations and on the desirability of the parties avoiding further testing of nuclear weapons while the negotiations are in progress. I do not think it is necessary for me to elaborate on the importance of this part of our draft resolution.

I would, however, like to make some comment on paragraph 4, which stresses the important contribution of the technical approach as a contribution to our primary objective of a balanced and effectively-controlled world-wide system of disarmament. The Soviet representative has tried to give the impression that the West is endeavouring to drown the real problems of disarmament beneath a flood of technical studies. This is certainly not our intention
or cur expectation. Surely the success of the Geneva Conference of Experts holds an important lesson for us. For many months, public discussions of the problem of test suspension by international agreement have been confused by conflicting opinions on the technical possibility of detecting violations of any agreement on test suspension. Views on the technical and scientific problems have been expressed by many people with varying qualifications. Self-styled authorities have sometimes advanced scientific arguments with great dogmatism, and undoubtedly political views have often been expressed in the disguise of scientific terminology, and not only in connexion with weapons tests. The significant thing about the Geneva Conference was that when the experts from both sides sat down together in private, free from the glare of publicity and remote from the political arena, they found it possible to reach agreement not only on the theoretical possibility of detecting explosions by various methods, but also on the sort of practical control system that would give reasonable assurance against violations of an agreement going undetected. And now, at the political level, the findings of the experts have been endorsed by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. It is only because of the agreement reached by the experts in the circumstances I have described that we are now able to look forward hopefully to an early international agreement for the suspension of tests and even to the prospect of the permanent cessation of tests of nuclear weapons if all goes well. The essential contribution of the technical approach is to enable the men who have to take political decisions to base those decisions upon a firm foundation of agreed scientific knowledge rather than on the welter of conflicting opinions. We are hopeful that the same method will produce agreement at both technical and political levels on the problem of international measures to safeguard against surprise attack, a problem at least as complex in technical terms as that of detecting violations of a test suspension agreement.

The concluding paragraphs of our draft resolution are intended to establish a link between the United Nations and the negotiations that are taking place outside the United Nations. No attempt is made in this draft resolution to face the difficult problem of continuing United Nations machinery for work on disarmament. That is undoubtedly a matter requiring careful consideration, but
its complications should not be allowed to stand in the way of an early decision by this General Assembly to support and encourage the Governments that are going to begin negotiations in eight days time.

I have said that our draft resolution is not a blueprint for disarmament, and I think it is necessary to face the fact that while our attention in the present debate has been concentrated very largely upon what might come out of the forthcoming negotiations at Geneva, the suspension of nuclear tests, though it may be an encouraging preliminary to further progress along the road to real disarmament, does not in itself take us very far along that road. The nuclear Powers already possess sufficient stocks of these terrible weapons to destroy each other and indeed to wipe out human life from vast areas of this planet. An immediate and permanent ban on further nuclear tests would not alter that situation. All the complex problems of nuclear disarmament and its relation to conventional disarmament remain.

Bearing this in mind, I venture to repeat very briefly some observations I made last year on the Australian attitude towards disarmament in general. Viewing the problems of defence against potential aggression in the part of the world in which we live, we have never considered it realistic to draw a very sharp distinction in any disarmament plans between conventional forces and weapons on the one hand and nuclear weapons on the other. In the Disarmament Commission and in this Committee we have consistently maintained the view that the prohibition of nuclear weapons under an effective international control should go hand in hand with major reductions in conventional forces and weapons to agreed levels. In Australia, we are very conscious of the fact that agreements developed mainly against the background of the security problems of the great Powers may require some adjustment to take account of the effects of proposed arrangements upon the security of smaller countries in various parts of the world. As I said last year in this Committee, we feel in Australia that a disarmament agreement that did not impose suitable obligations upon Communist China would fall short of what is needed for security in our part of the world. It is quite evident that at the present time, as my friend, Mr. Belaunde, so eloquently said earlier this morning, the major potential danger to the peace of Asia and the security of countries bordering on Asia is the
disproportionate strength of Communist China's conventional forces and the militerization of its tremendous and growing population. It is not surprising, therefore, that we should sometimes feel some misgivings lest preoccupation with the problem of reaching agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests, on measures against surprise attack in Europe or across the top of the world, and even on nuclear disarmament may make it difficult to devote adequate attention to other fundamental aspects of disarmament which are of direct and vital concern to Australia and its neighbours.

It is not my intention to extend these observations further on the present occasion, for, with the opening of the Geneva negotiations but eight days away, the Committee will wish to move on as quickly as possible to consider the draft resolutions that have been submitted. At that stage, I may wish to make some further comments.

I conclude by expressing the hope of my delegation that the General Assembly will succeed within the next few days in giving adequate expression to the fervent desire of all the peoples of the world that the forthcoming negotiations on nuclear weapons tests and measures against surprise attack will in fact prove to be a decisive step along the road towards international agreement.
Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria): I do not wish to let this opportunity pass without expressing, as other representatives have before me, our deep gratification at the fact that the work of our Committee is in the hands of so able and inspired a man, which gives us the conviction that its discussions will proceed in a most satisfactory manner.

The past year has brought us considerable setbacks in the field of disarmament. This was due, in the first place, to the fact that it was not possible to revive the disarmament negotiations that had been at a standstill since the last General Assembly. However, regrettable this may be, it would be wrong to overlook the progress that has been made in recent months in some fields of disarmament. The Geneva Conference of Experts on the Control of Nuclear Weapons Tests has proved that results can be achieved along the thorny way of disarmament provided that both parties negotiate in an objective manner.

With great satisfaction we have taken note of the results of the Geneva talks, and we trust that the negotiations to begin on 31 October will bring us an agreement on the discontinuance of tests.

The willingness of the big Powers to agree on a cessation of nuclear weapons tests is certainly a significant step forward and gives rise to the well-founded hope that more far-reaching agreements on general disarmament will be achieved. This is encouraging although it should not delude us about the fact that the core of the disarmament question will not be solved by it. We realize that disarmament is a political question. At the same time, however, we do share the view expressed in the Secretary-General’s memorandum (A/5936) of 30 September of this year that the discussion of the technical aspects of disarmament -- as at the aforementioned Geneva Conference -- opens the way for new possibilities that should be thoroughly exhausted. We too believe that steps in this direction, as for instance the work of the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the Second International Conference on the peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, could lead to a steady exchange of information concerning military technologies and armaments. This suggestion of the Secretary-General -- that is, to lessen international tension by an open-minded exchange of information in the field of armaments -- undoubtedly deserves our attention, and we trust that further progress in this direction will be made.
The Austrian delegation believes that with some good will it should be possible to reach an agreement regarding a cessation of nuclear weapons tests, a question that has now entered into a decisive stage. We share the opinion repeatedly expressed in this Committee that the working out of an agreement in this matter should be the subject of the Geneva Conference that is to open on 31 October. This, however, should not detain this Commission from reaching, if possible, a unanimous decision that will guide the representatives at their discussions in Geneva.

Let me briefly summarize the present situation: East and West agree that nuclear weapons tests should be discontinued; they disagree on the duration of such a cessation. Whereas the United States of America and the United Kingdom proposed, for the time being, a suspension for one year, the Soviet Union insists on a permanent cessation of such tests. The United States and the United Kingdom, however, have declared their willingness to prolong the period of suspension beyond that year, provided certain conditions have been complied with by that time.

We recognize the good intentions of both sides and believe that never before in all the years of disarmament negotiations has there been a greater rapprochement in any one particular field.

If now, at long last, both parties have agreed in principle to a cessation of tests, it should after all be possible for them to achieve an agreement on the duration of this suspension. We all would certainly prefer a permanent cessation of tests to a temporary suspension. The report of the Scientific Committee has shown us only too clearly the danger of a continuation of tests to the health of mankind. Allow me to recall the remarkable statement by the Swedish Foreign Minister before this Committee on 13 October in which he gave two principal reasons for the great interest the world takes in an agreement regarding the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Mr. Udén cited, in the first place, the hazard that radioactive fall-out constitutes to health and, in the second place, the universal desire for a limitation of the production of nuclear weapons as a first step towards a total ban on these weapons of mass destruction.

Whereas a prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons is, of course, linked to the complex problem of control which -- as was very correctly outlined by the Swedish Foreign Minister -- does not yet seem ripe for a solution, there
is no reason why a discontinuance of tests should not be possible, especially since an agreement has already been achieved regarding the method of control. A cessation of tests, provided it took the form of a world-wide prohibition, would automatically limit the number of atomic Powers and consequently contribute considerably to a reduction of danger.

From all that has been said we can draw the conclusion that the main emphasis of our present efforts should be on an agreement regarding the question of a discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. Aware of the necessity to reach such a solution equally acceptable to all parties concerned, a number of delegations have in recent days made efforts to work out compromises of various kinds which, however, as far as we know, have so far not led to concrete results.

One of the main difficulties that stand in the way of an agreement is the interpretation of such words as "suspension", "discontinuance" and "cessation" -- which in the end only amounts to the basic distinction between a temporary and a permanent halting of tests. We feel, however, that it will be somewhat difficult to reach an agreement on this basic question within this Committee. Should we not, therefore, rather leave the decision thereon to the Geneva talks and concentrate our own discussions on arriving -- if possible -- at a unanimous decision regarding the general policy to be followed at the Geneva talks?

The Austrian delegation believes therefore that a decision based on the above-mentioned considerations will have the best chances of success. We welcome therefore the suggestions offered by some delegations to combine all the drafts submitted into a single draft resolution equally acceptable to all, and to demonstrate to the world our good will by a unanimous vote thereon.

In essence such a resolution would have to contain an urgent appeal to the Powers concerned to reach an early agreement with regard to the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests under international control and an expression of the desire that as a result of such an agreement no further tests should take place. We believe that such a decision would best take into account the given facts and at the same time create the psychological foundation for fruitful negotiations in Geneva.
Closely connected with the question of atomic tests is that of the limitation or cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Unfortunately we have so far not reached an agreement on this subject. Still we believe that it would be particularly important to make a first positive step in order to lessen the international tension. The Austrian delegation would therefore like to suggest that the atomic Powers should voluntarily contribute a part of the fissionable material destined for military purposes to peaceful uses through the International Atomic Energy Agency. A symbolic first step would thus be made whose psychological repercussions might well prove to be of great importance.
Allow me now to comment briefly on the other questions of disarmament. As I have stated at the beginning, an eventual cessation of nuclear weapons tests would by no means constitute a genuine measure of disarmament; although an agreement in this field would mean a considerable step forward we must nonetheless face the fact that other important problems have to be solved concurrently. As far as one of these questions is concerned, that is, the prevention of surprise attacks, there are some indications of a possible agreement. We feel that in this particular field the confronting points of view are not too far apart. Both sides are aware of the danger of surprise attack and try, in the interest of their own security, to avert this danger by concrete measures. There seems to be agreement that such measures would have to include both control stations on the ground and aerial inspection. The extent of the zones of control, however, is still a point of controversy. Yet we hope that the negotiations which are to begin in Geneva on 10 November will produce some progress in this important matter.

The agenda of this Committee includes also a proposal regarding a reduction of the military budgets of the big Powers. An agreement on this subject would undoubtedly contribute considerably to a lessening of international tension. There is agreement, in principle, as to the usefulness of such a measure, even though the extent of the reduction, as well as some other related questions, is still a matter of controversy. We do not fail to recognize the difficulties that are in the way of a solution to this problem. But we believe that with some good will an agreement on this question, as far as the principle is concerned, should be feasible. Here again, an objective study by an expert committee of the countries in question may be advisable. I need not emphasize that we welcome the utilization of a part of the funds thus freed for assistance to under-developed countries.

Permit me, finally, to deal briefly with a matter which, although not before the Committee at the present time, is closely related to the overall question of disarmament. I mean the question of the peaceful use of outer space, an item which, in the course of technological advances, has increasingly gathered momentum. We are all alive to the gigantic possibilities, but also
to the dangers, of human advance into outer space. It must be in the interest of all countries to reach an international agreement on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only. It seems to us important, however, that we reach such an agreement as early as possible in order to avoid a development which has brought us, as far as atomic energy is concerned, into a situation as critical as the one in which we find ourselves at present. This is why, in his statement before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Austrian Foreign Minister said the following:

"In view of the ominous development of modern means of mass destruction, mankind realizes more and more that international conflicts cannot possibly be solved by force. This realization is one further and compelling reason for discontinuing the dangerous as well as senseless armaments race and the staggering inflation of military budgets. Indeed, is it not the most urgent task of our generation to deal with this question without consideration of prestige or propaganda in that spirit of responsibility and objectivity which alone can lead to its solution? ...(A/PV.755, page 61)

I have taken the liberty of presenting briefly the point of view of the Austrian delegation regarding the question of disarmament, and I venture to express the hope that these ideas may contribute, however modestly, to a better understanding of this crucial problem.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)(interpretation from French):

Mr. Chairman, I wish to join, if I may, in the congratulations tendered to you on the occasion of your election. My delegation noted this election with satisfaction. We know your experience and impartiality. We know of the perfect way in which you apply the rules of procedure.

I also wish to address my sincere congratulations to the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur.

I propose to define my delegation's position on the item under discussion in this Committee. While the disarmament question concerns especially the great Powers that possess modern and atomic weapons with all their destructive potential, and while it is up to them, in the first instance, to shoulder the responsibility for the solution of the problem, it is still true that the
disarmament question and its solution affects humanity as a whole. We feel, therefore, that the States Members of this Organization can, and in fact must, express their views and make every effort to help the great Powers in bringing their views closer together constructively towards reaching a solution of this vital problem. It is in this frame of mind that my delegation approaches the subject.

We are sorry that this year the disarmament question has not been discussed in the Disarmament Commission, set up by the General Assembly last year, which did not deem it fit to meet. This, as has been pointed out, is the negative aspect of the question.

In our opinion -- and I hope that the great Powers will agree -- it is necessary for us to get together on a formula which will make it possible for the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission to be resumed.

We have before us the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.208) which may open the door to a solution. We have also a draft resolution sponsored by India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.210) which deserves the Committee's careful attention. We have no preconceived ideas on this score and are prepared to examine any acceptable solution. On the other hand, one aspect of the disarmament problem in which progress has been made is the agreement on a meeting of experts to study the matter of surprise attack. If an agreement were reached on such measures against surprise attack, this would surely reduce the tension between States and would distinctly improve the international situation. I notice that a further draft resolution by India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.211) on this question has been distributed, and I am confident that the members of the Committee will examine it with the attention and sympathy which it deserves.

Another aspect of the disarmament problem which has been of great interest to my delegation is that of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. This is another matter in which progress has been made, and I shall discuss this briefly.

The Conference of Experts which met in Geneva last summer reached common conclusions as to the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests through the establishment of a permanent control post network. The decision of the great Powers to hold a conference
on 31 October for the purpose of concluding an agreement between the atomic Powers on an international control system on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests is another step in the right direction. We are all the more gratified at these achievements since my delegation has always taken a stand in favour of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. In this sense we supported the recommendation of the Bandung Conference in which the countries of Asia and Africa stated that so long as no complete prohibition of nuclear weapons has been agreed, the great Powers should be urged to agree between themselves to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons. Similarly, at the Accra Conference in April last the United Arab Republic Government joined with the independent Governments of Africa which, in their declaration, stated that they would seek to persuade the great Powers to discontinue the production and testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
In the resolution adopted at that Conference, it is stated:

"The Conference vigorously condemns all atomic tests in whatever part of the world they may be conducted, but especially in the Sahara, and urges the great Powers that nuclear and thermonuclear energy be devoted to peaceful purposes only."

There is no need for me to make explicit the grounds for our position. The danger of radiation from the fall-out of nuclear weapons tests would in itself be sufficient to justify our position. There is no need for me to enlarge on this point, which has been repeatedly illustrated in this Committee by many representatives, both this year and last year. It is true that some scientists have minimized this danger, but other scientists from various countries of the world have recognized that the danger exists. The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the effects of atomic radiation seems to corroborate this point of view. At all events, even though there may seem to be some disagreement between scientists, surely it is in the interests of mankind as a whole that we should find ways and means of stopping these tests so as not to expose our and future generations to the dangers caused by these tests.

In the opinion of my Government, therefore, all nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests should be stopped. There is no doubt that the rumours about the French Government's intentions to carry out tests in the Sahara Desert have caused us profound alarm, and in this connexion we can only endorse what has been so aptly stated by the representative of Ghana who, on 17 October last, appealed for such tests not to take place. In this context, I wish to emphasize that the statement made by the representative of France on 20 October last failed to dispel our anxiety. If I understood him correctly, the representative of France indicated that his country was resolved to carry out those tests unless the present atomic Powers stopped increasing and began to decrease their stocks under international control.

In explaining this position, Mr. Moch said that the cessation of tests alone would not mean a solution of the problem of disarmament. We are by no means unaware that the reduction of stockpiles and the cessation of production of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would raise problems of control which would
require careful examination and which could not be resolved quickly. On the other hand, we consider that while the cessation of tests is not a solution of the disarmament problem, it would constitute — and this cannot be gainsaid — an important step in the direction of disarmament, as many other representatives have already pointed out.

In this context, I wish also to draw attention to the danger that if these tests continue many other States will want to produce nuclear weapons. This would make the situation more complicated and would make the cessation of tests more difficult of accomplishment. It would also make atomic disarmament more difficult, as the Foreign Minister of Sweden pointed out in his statement of 13 October last, a statement to which I wish to draw the Committee's attention. He said:

"But if a prohibition of tests becomes universal, it has the important effect that States which have not yet manufactured nuclear weapons would desist from carrying through possible plans for future production." (A/C.1/PV.346) page 61)

This is a point of view which my delegation wholeheartedly endorses.

It is true that the cessation of tests might not suffice to stop the nuclear weapons danger, but it would be a step in the right direction; it would at least make it possible for us to obtain the objective which we all of us share, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons along with the cessation of tests.

The States that are to meet in Geneva on 31 October have not agreed on a number of important aspects of the question. This may be seen from some of the statements that have been made to this Committee and from the draft resolutions which have been presented. This, unfortunately, is one of the consequences of the atmosphere of mistrust which continues, especially among the atomic Powers, but we still feel that the positions are not altogether irreconcilable. We are confident that all these States are at one in desiring to achieve the cessation of tests.

Many draft resolutions have been submitted to this Committee concerning the cessation of nuclear tests. My delegation, in a spirit of conciliation, has co-sponsored, together with the delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal and Yemen,
draft resolution A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1. This resolution reflects our position on this question. In it, we emphasize the importance of the matter, and that is why we submitted a separate draft resolution dealing with the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests alone. This is a problem which requires an immediate solution.

Other representatives speaking before me explained this draft resolution at adequate length. May I merely emphasize operative paragraph 4 which contains an appeal to all the States that will not take part in the Geneva Conference to refrain from testing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons pending the completion of the action set out in operative paragraph 3. There is no need for me to enlarge on the importance of this paragraph.

The representative of Ireland has presented a very interesting amendment to the seventeen-Power draft resolution. This concerns the same topic and its principle deserves the careful attention of this Committee. The representative of Ireland has also sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.206, which also refers to this topic.
May I also state that my delegation, as I have already said, has co-sponsored this draft resolution in a spirit of conciliation and compromise. Indeed, we consider that on the points concerning disarmament majority votes on resolutions are not of great importance and do not often facilitate the solution of the delicate problems before us. This question frequently brings about more rigid positions. My delegation ardently hopes that a joint resolution will be unanimously adopted by this Committee which would make it possible for the Geneva Conference to begin its deliberations under happy auspices and give them a greater chance of success. I am confident that the delegations which have co-sponsored our draft resolution with us also share this point of view.

In conclusion, may I make an appeal to the atomic Powers to make every effort to achieve an agreement in Geneva. If they did so, they would be serving the cause of peace and, therefore, all of humanity.

I reserve the right to speak again, especially in order to state the position of my delegation on the other draft resolutions.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.