Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 22 October 1958, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament [647] (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests [707] (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries [727] (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.958. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before we renew our debate this morning, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to two documents that have just been circulated. The first of these, A/C.1/L.203/Corr.1, contains two changes which apply to the English text only of the draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The second document, A/C.1/L.209, contains an amendment submitted by Bolivia and six other Latin American countries to the seventeen-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.205.

Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The question of disarmament which we are now discussing has in fact become a fundamental problem of world politics. The eyes of the peoples of the world are focused on the consideration of this question and the peoples expect us to take concrete measures for a swift solution of the disarmament problem, the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons and the reduction of military budgets. It is well known that the armaments race, which is being encouraged by the aggressive circles, has reached such proportions that its continuance may lead to dangerous consequences for the cause of peace. In these circumstances, the necessity of adopting even only partial decisions on the disarmament problem at this session is manifest.
In his speech of 10 October of this year Mr. Lodge, the representative of the United States, set forth the position of his Government on the disarmament problem. In almost every sentence Mr. Lodge repeated the word "provided" or the word "if", the effect of his statement being, of course, that the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons would be made dependent on the solution of the whole complex disarmament problem. The statement of the representative of the United States was designed to cover up with talk of disarmament the armaments race as such to justify the United States in world public opinion and to divert this Committee from careful examination of the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons, the reduction of armed forces and armaments and the reduction of the military budgets of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.

The statements by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have made it clear that those countries are unwilling to stop the testing of nuclear weapons. Their speeches do not meet the demands of world public opinion.

The results of the Conference of Experts which met in July and August of this year in Geneva and studied methods of discovering and detecting nuclear explosions have dealt a body blow to the arguments of those who stubbornly contend that it is impossible to control the testing of nuclear weapons. It would appear that all obstacles should now have been removed in the way of a universal cessation of nuclear testing. The peoples of the world expected the United States and the United Kingdom to accept finally the cessation of nuclear weapons testing. But this has not happened.

Speaking on 14 October of this year, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Noble, essentially reiterated the arguments of the representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge, on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. The conditions set forth by the representative of the United Kingdom as a prerequisite to the cessation of tests differ in no way from the conditions set forth by the representative of the United States. Mr. Noble's clarification of one of these conditions is rather revealing: it is the achievement of satisfactory progress towards the establishment of effective international control over the cessation of testing of nuclear weapons and the adoption and
implementation of measures in the field of effective disarmament. This clarification was published in an addition to Mr. Noble's speech in our Committee on 14 October. The representative of the United Kingdom openly stated that the United Kingdom interpretation of the words "satisfactory progress" would have "... due regard for what is reasonably and practically possible, given the time factor and the difficulties of the disarmament problem." (A/C.1/PV.948, page 32)

This phraseology, which at first sight is foggy, actually makes it quite clear that the decision as to what is reasonable and practically possible will be reserved for the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus the United States and the United Kingdom wish to monopolize the right to decide whether or not satisfactory progress in the field of disarmament has been achieved. To grant such a right to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which is what they seek to achieve in their draft resolution, would be tantamount to making the solution of the problem of the cessation of tests entirely dependent on the decision of the aggressive NATO bloc headed by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Unfortunately, Mr. Noble was followed later by the representative of Thailand, Prince Wei Waithayakon, who in his speech of 16 October also spoke of preliminary conditions for the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons. The representative of Thailand, having participated in many sessions of the General Assembly, should be aware of the fact that for more than ten years these preliminary conditions have acted like the rapids of a river which hamper the flow of the current; they have prevented the solution of the disarmament problem.

At the same time, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have agreed to refrain from further testing of nuclear weapons for one year from the beginning of negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement for the temporary suspension of nuclear testing and the establishment of an international control system. It must be said that a one-year cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons will not stop the carrying out of a programme of nuclear arming. It was reported in the United States press in August of this year that a period of twelve to twenty-four months is required to study the results of the tests now being carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom. Moreover,
it is well known that about a year is required for the preparation of new nuclear tests. This shows the true worth of the statements by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.
In the statement of the United States and the United Kingdom we are told of their readiness to continue from year to year the agreement on the cessation of tests. However, this readiness is hedged in with reservations which actually reduce it to naught. We cannot disregard the fact that the American Press is already softening up public opinion so as to prepare it for an unsuccessful conclusion of the negotiations which are to be begin on 31 October in Geneva on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests, and they will try to get public opinion to believe that this would happen as the fault of the Soviet Union.

The New York Times of 12 October of this year stated that the question of the location of the 180 control posts and the way they will be manned, will serve as a reason or a pretext for frustrating the Geneva talks. The Russians, according to that newspaper, can always block an agreement by insisting that some particular control post must be in Crmansk rather than Tomsk, or outside Minsk instead of Pinsk, and that the Soviet Union, as before, is opposed to admitting foreigners to its territory. As you may see, the American Press is discounting a failure of the Geneva Conference in advance.

The American draft resolution, sponsored by seventeen delegations of countries which are members of NATO, SEATO and other blocs -- in which the United States plays a leading role -- also serves the purpose of frustrating and thwarting an agreement on the cessation of testing of nuclear weapons. The preamble of that draft resolution states that "negotiations on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and on the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report will begin on 31 October". In other words, what they speak about is only a temporary suspension of nuclear weapons tests, not a cessation of the tests as demanded by the peoples of the world. It is clear that the word "cessation" merely signifies a decision by the United States and the United Kingdom to refrain from further nuclear weapons tests for one year from the moment of the beginning of the negotiations. All this is done to delude simple people and to hide the fact that the ruling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom are unwilling to accept an immediate and unconditional cessation for all time of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and that they are bent on continuing the nuclear armament race in the future.
As far as the French position is concerned, it was rather candidly set out in the speech of 20 October by the representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch. Speaking from the rostrum of the United Nations, Mr. Moch stated that France would produce and test atomic bombs, and that France would become the fourth atomic Power. Consequently, the French representative spoke as an advocate of the intensification and expansion of the nuclear armaments race, with the inclusion of new States into that race. This is not what the peoples of the world expect us to produce.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR listened with great interest to the meaty speech of 16 October by the representative of Ceylon, Mr. Subasinghe, and the speech of the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Alemayehou, of 20 October of this year. As we understood them, these speeches reflected the profound alarm felt by the peoples of the countries of Asia and Africa in connexion with the present unsatisfactory state of affairs in the field of disarmament.

In his address, Mr. Subasinghe called for an immediate prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions, the conclusion of an agreement on the elimination of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and the achievement of disarmament in the field of conventional armaments. Our delegation warmly supports this appeal.

The representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Alemayehou, for his part, emphasized the dangers which nuclear weapon pose to mankind. He urged the United Nations to prohibit the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for military purposes as a crime against humanity. Here is a timely proposal, one in fact which is overdue.

At the same time, we wish to note that the memorandum of the Soviet Union on measures in the field of disarmament points the way to the solution of these questions, as well as a number of others. Unfortunately, we cannot say as much for the Western countries. We have yet to hear from the United States, the United Kingdom and France any concrete proposals on the questions of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and conventional armaments. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom prefer to speak of the advantages of a technical approach to the disarmament problem. But as the representative of Ceylon very aptly pointed out, the experience of the negotiations on disarmaments after two world wars, in this century, makes it clear that even though broad agreements on technical solutions were achieved, no disarmament
ensued. Apparently this is precisely what the western countries would like to achieve at this juncture.

We have likewise listened carefully to the speech of the representative of Greece, Mr. Palamas, in this Committee on 16 October. In his address, Mr. Palamas touched upon a number of important and urgent problems. Our delegation shares Mr. Palamas' expressed alarm on the question of the danger for humanity of any continuation of nuclear tests. Surely, no one can differ with Mr. Palamas on the point that the radiation resulting from test explosions creates a peacetime threat to the health of human beings.
(Mr. Kiselev, Byelorussian SSR)

After this warning, we might have expected the representative of Greece to go on to draw the only correct conclusion; in other words, to urge the great Powers immediately to stop nuclear tests. Unfortunately this was not the case. Mr. Palamas merely confined himself to supporting the draft resolution presented by the seventeen countries headed by the United States. He called it realistic and said it contained constructive elements. But can there be any question of realism in the draft resolution of the seventeen countries if it does not provide for the main thing — the cessation of nuclear tests? Approval of the draft resolution would in fact be tantamount to giving our blessing to a continuance or resumption, after a brief interval of time, of nuclear explosions which are already doing harm to the health of human beings.

The representative of Greece also said that he found it difficult to understand why the Soviet Union refused to participate in the Disarmament Commission composed of twenty-five members. As is well known, the General Assembly at its twelfth session, acting under United States pressure, adopted a disarmament resolution (1148 (XII)) which fully answered the purposes and principles of the ruling circles of the United States. These purposes are clear: to continue to use talk about disarmament in order to cover up the continuing armaments race, to utilize United Nations organs in order to delude public opinion and to prevent the conclusion of even a partial disarmament agreement.

In the expanded United Nations Disarmament Commission consisting of twenty-five States, the participants of various military groupings headed by the United States and countries that depend on the United States would still call the tune. In these circumstances, the Soviet Union was obviously unable to participate in the deliberations of this Commission as composed.

American propaganda this year has repeatedly raised a hubbub in connexion with the convening of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, charging the Soviet Union with thwarting the work of that Commission. The representative of Greece, who has proposed the establishment of an eighty-one member Disarmament Commission, should be aware of the fact that it was the Soviet Union which, at the twelfth session of the General Assembly proposed -- and which now proposes -- that we set up a permanent Disarmament Commission consisting of all
States Members of the United Nations so as to enable all States, large and small alike, to take an active part in the consideration of disarmament questions which vitally touch upon their interests; or, alternatively, a commission with a more restricted membership which would, nevertheless, rule out any one-sided approach to the disarmament question. A commission membership in which no less than half of the members would consist of representatives of Socialist and neutral States would be in harmony with the interests and the requirements of fruitful work designed to achieve mutually acceptable agreement on disarmament. This would be only just.

On 20 October of this year, we heard the statement of the representative of Canada, Mr. Smith, my neighbour, whose absence now I regret. On all questions before us -- the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons; the reduction of military budgets, armaments and armed forces; the membership of the Disarmament Commission; and a number of other important questions -- the representative of Canada seemed to be aware of nothing but the American point of view.

Mr. Smith, speaking of the membership of the Disarmament Commission, called the demand of the Soviet Union that the Commission should have no less than half of its membership given to representatives of Socialist and neutral Powers a reactionary idea. It would appear that, from the Canadian point of view, a situation where the NATO countries, headed by the United States, would call the tune in the Disarmament Commission would be a progressive idea. Apparently this conception of progress exists only in the Ministry of External Affairs of Canada. In this question, the representative of Canada went even further than the Americans who, for instance, have recognized the principle of parity in various technical commissions.

One may well ask Mr. Smith: who would agree to engage in negotiations with you on fundamental political questions on an unequal basis? I think that there would be no volunteers for this role. Mr. Smith's mention of a mythical threat of communism against the countries that neighbour on the Soviet Union and, in fact, just about his entire speech were full of the spirit of the cold war and were designed to divert our Committee from the examination of the principal aspects of the disarmament question.
The representative of Peru, Mr. Belaunde, who addressed this Committee on 14 October of this year, used his eloquence in order to shift the blame for the impasse in which we are floundering in the disarmament problem to the Soviet Union. Mr. Belaunde expressed regret at the fact that the discussion on the disarmament question is taking place for the first time without having as a basis a report from the Disarmament Commission. He deliberately passed over in silence the fact that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee have for a decade proved incapable of advancing the disarmament question one step closer to a solution. The Soviet Union acted quite rightly and quite correctly when it announced that it was unwilling to engage in endless talk about disarmament for the sake of talk itself, or in order to spread illusions that merely cover up the arms race. Mr. Belaunde trained his guns on the word "prohibition" -- that is, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction of human beings. In his advocate's defence of the point of view of the United States and of the NATO countries, he went so far as to declare that the word "prohibition" was invented in order to delude mankind.

Mr. Belaunde apparently did not like the taste of this word because it was not tied in with the concept of control. We found it odd, to say the least, to hear this assertion since Mr. Belaunde flew in the face of facts when he declared that the Soviet Union would sever the question of prohibition of nuclear tests from control over this prohibition. Everyone knows full well that it was precisely the Soviet Government which was the first to approve the system of control worked out by the Geneva Conference of Experts. For one reason or another, Mr. Belaunde preferred to pass over this question in silence.

Mr. Abdoh, the representative of Iran, in his speech of 16 October, argued in favour of the draft resolution sponsored by seventeen countries. He spoke a good deal about the technical aspects of the solution of the disarmament problem, trying to argue that technical problems must be solved first and that political problems would then follow suit.
(Mr. Kiselev, Byelorussian SSR)

In our opinion it will be ill-advised to place exclusive emphasis on the solution of technical problems, leaving political questions aside. The main point in the solution of the disarmament problem is that a solution of political issues of principle must be arrived at. What Mr. Abdoh would have us do would, in reality, divert us from a solution of the disarmament problem. Such attempts to lead the Assembly from the path of inspection and control would again push the United Nations on to the old path of fruitless talks about disarmament. In the archives of the United Nations there are pounds and pounds of paper full of inky signs on this question, but, as the people of my country say, the cart is still stuck in the mud.

Under the cover of talk about the difficulties of control over disarmament there is a further unbridled growth of armaments and stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The cessation of nuclear tests, of course, is at variance with the plans of those who have committed themselves to the preparation of nuclear war and the creation of new types of this weapon.

The United States periodical Business Week of April 1958 stated that the United States requires continued tests of nuclear weapons because it wishes to perfect nuclear warheads for rocket missiles and in order to create "miniature" "clean" atomic and hydrogen bombs for "small wars". It is no accident, therefore, that increasingly large resources are being appropriated for the development of new types of nuclear weapons.

According to information published in the United States News and World Report of 24 January of this year, $1,990 million was appropriated in the 1957 fiscal year to American atomic programmes. In the fiscal year 1958 the appropriation was increased to $2,300 million. For the fiscal year 1959 the appropriation has risen further to $2,550 million. These are facts which illustrate the size of the atomic and hydrogen weapons race.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Under, in his speech of 13 October in this Committee, declared quite correctly that "During the last few years the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests has to an ever increasing degree attracted the attention and the interest of public opinion". (A/C.1/PV.946, p. 61) It is true indeed that the voice of world public opinion
is being heard ever more resoundingly in support of a cessation of testing of nuclear weapons. This is witnessed by numerous statements by scientists and public leaders, by various international organizations, Parliaments and Governments of a number of countries.

The British newspaper News Chronicle reported on 11 June 1958 that, as a result of a world public opinion poll, the following percentages of people expressed themselves in favour of a cessation of nuclear weapons tests: 90 per cent of those questioned in Delhi; 82 per cent of those questioned in Oslo; 79 per cent in Vienna; 71 per cent in Paris and Athens; 69 per cent in Helsinki; 68 per cent in Brussels, and 62 per cent in London. Many scientists have demanded the swift cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons and they know what they are talking about because they point to the dangerous consequences of these tests to present and future generations.

The prominent American scientist, Linus Pauling, declared on 23 June of this year that, given a maintenance of the present pace of test explosions, 75,000 children with serious defects will be born during the present generation, while the number of premature and still-births will exceed this figure ten times. That is why Linus Pauling considers that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests would be a boon to all mankind.

The question of the immediate cessation by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union of the testing of nuclear weapons for all time confronts the current session of the Assembly with unprecedented acuity. The Soviet Union previously made, and continues to make, every effort towards the solution of the question of the cessation of such tests. This is made clear by the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation on 5 October of this year. The thirteenth session of the General Assembly would enter the annals of history as a historic session if it adopted a resolution containing an appeal to all countries to stop without further delay the testing of nuclear weapons. Such a move would enhance the prestige of the United Nations; it would raise its authority in the eyes of all peoples.

More and more people are realizing that the continuance of the present pace of the armaments race is fraught with untold dangers for the future of peace. Vast resources are being expended unproductively in the armaments race. The
United States press makes it clear that the members of NATO have spent, over the past eight years, more than $420,000 million on armaments. The momentum of the armaments race in the United States is indicated by some facts cited by a representative of the Defence Department of the United States, Mr. Maguire, in a speech in Detroit on 5 June of this year stating that military contracts concluded by the Defence Department of the United States with American industrialists cost about $50,000 per minute, which is the equivalent of $72 million per day. One B-52 bomber costs $8 million; that is, it is more expensive than its own weight in silver. One rocket missile of the equivalent weight is more expensive than its own weight in platinum. That is why it is no accident that military preparedness expenditures in the United States for 1958-1959 are running at the rate of $46,000 million. The military budget of the United States is growing with every year that passes.
The Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. McNamara, in a statement at a conference in June 1958, declared that, in view of the production of new and expensive types of weapons, the military budget of the United States would in future years grow to $60 to $70 billion.

On 17 April 1958, President Eisenhower made a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, in which he said:

"It is difficult even to imagine how extraordinarily large our military expenditures are. Over the five years alone, they have covered a sum of $200 billion."

According to Mr. Eisenhower these resources would have been sufficient to cover the needs of the United States in hospitals, schools and a highway network spreading over the whole country, along with the building of hydroelectric stations of any necessary power, and so on and so forth.

It is also appropriate to mention a speech by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, at a time when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1956. He analysed in what way the United Kingdom would benefit from a reduction of its military expenditures, which then were running at the rate of £1.5 billion per annum, by £700 million. Mr. Macmillan said:

"If we spent half of these £700 million on export, our foreign trade balance would be transformed. Additional resources of £700 million, which are now being used for defence, could utterly change the character of our economy."

It would seem that, after these acknowledgments, Messrs. Eisenhower and Macmillan would go on to speak of the necessity of stopping the armaments race. But, to our regret, this did not happen. In their latest speeches, they call for increased military expenditures, and they do this on the pretext and under the false slogan of ensuring the security of the United States and the United Kingdom against possible aggression by the Soviet Union.

Not a day passes without the American press, generals and admirals, various political leaders of all stripes, and especially leaders of American monopolies, calling for an intensification of the armaments race.
The New York Times Magazine of 3 November 1957 carried an article to the effect that guns must have preference over butter, and rocket missiles over television sets. We are familiar with these words. They are only a repetition of the old slogan of German militarists: "Guns instead of butter".

The United States has now been turned into the chief arsenal from which a broad stream of armaments flows into countries which are members of aggressive blocs headed by the United States. The United States has drawn into the toils of the armaments race its own partners in these blocs, compelling them, to the detriment of their national interest, to spend dozens of billions of dollars on the maintenance and support of vast armies, the building of military bases, and the like.

On 18 August of this year, the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, Mr. James Smith, declared:

"Over the past eight years, the United States spent $20 billion on military assistance, while the allies of the United States spent more than $122 billion on the defence of the free world. The allies supply five soldiers for every American soldier."

The United States is now busily engaged in preparing for the waging of chemical and bacteriological warfare. The record of a meeting of a sub-committee of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives, published on 9 May 1958, quotes a statement by the Commander of the Chemical Corps of the United States Army, General Creasy, who sang the praises of chemical warfare. He said:

"The Chemical Corps is very much interested in the development of devices that would completely disrupt the nervous system and mental activity of man. If we succeed in developing something that will lead to temporary blindness, that would be an ideal type of weapon."

The magazine Newsweek, on 16 June 1958, reported:

"The American army is being quietly equipped with special warheads for rockets and artillery which can paralyse and knock out of commission or, if necessary, kill the foe through chemical and bacteriological means."
From this it follows that, in addition to hydrogen and atomic bombs, bacteriological weapons will be added, along with toxic gases and radioactive dust.

The monopolistic circles of the United States are the chief opponents of a solution of the disarmament problem. They are the chief champions of the mad arms race, since they rake in huge profits from the production of armaments. They are afraid that any prospect of a reduction of tension and of a positive solution of the disarmament problem would cut into their profits. The armaments race is a cornucopia for the American monopolies. The American periodical Economic Indicators for September 1958 reported that if, in 1939, the profits before taxes of the monopolies were $6.4 billion, in 1948 they constituted $33 billion and in 1957 they had soared to $43.4 billion. These are eloquent facts. But the American monopolies feel that this is not enough. They clamour for the appropriation of additional billions of dollars for the armaments race.

These colossal military expenditures place a heavy burden of taxation upon the population. The French newspaper Le Monde of 14 May 1957 reported that, from 1945 through 1957, more than $700 billion in taxes was collected from the population of the United States.
High taxes and the militarization of the economy have had a sinister effect on the economic conditions in this country. It is sad indeed that the ruling circles of the United States have yet to display any sort of willingness to call a halt to this mad arms race. It is essential to take measures, before it is too late, to stop the continuous growth of military expenditures, to stop the arms race as a result of which vast resources are being poured down the drain to the detriment of the well-being of the peoples. To that end, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has submitted a draft resolution on the reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries. In this draft resolution it is very aptly pointed out "that inflated military expenditures, reflecting the continuing arms race, are disrupting the economies of many States and lowering the level of living of the peoples". (A/C.1/L.204)

It is clear that a reduction in military expenditures would contribute to the reduction of the arms race and to a relaxation of international tension, and at the same time make it possible not only to reduce the burden of taxation but also to allocate substantial sums for extending aid to under-developed countries.

The Byelorussian delegation is convinced that the question of the reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent can be solved at the present session of the Assembly without tying in this question with other disarmament problems. Having in mind the fact that it has not been possible so far to achieve the solution of the disarmament problem as a whole, the partial-measures approach proposed by the Soviet Union is the most suitable and correct and realistic way. The proposal of the USSR is such a concrete measure whose implementation could yield practical results in short order.

The peoples expect the Governments of all countries, especially the Governments of the great Powers which possess the largest military establishments and material resources and which bear special responsibility for the destinies of peace, to produce concrete deeds, not just talk. The proposals of the USSR, submitted to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly for its consideration, have one aim in mind: to liberate mankind from
the horrors of wars, to reduce tension in relations between States, to emancipate the peoples from the heavy armaments burden which they bear in connexion with the continuing armaments race. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR warmly supports these proposals.

In the present state of international relations the United Nations bears a special responsibility for the solution of the disarmament problem. It can and must utilize all available means and facilities to solve the disarmament problem, if only in part, and thus contribute to better mutual understanding and co-operation between the States. The General Assembly must make a new appeal to the great Powers that they make new efforts in the search for ways and means that would make it possible to get the disarmament problem off dead centre since it has such vital importance for the peoples of the whole world. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR expresses its confidence that the First Committee will make its contribution to the swift solution of the disarmament problem, which all of mankind expects with anxiety.

Mr. TSIANG (China): Mr. Chairman, I wish, first of all, to congratulate you and your colleagues, Mr. Osman of the Sudan and Mr. Matsch of Austria, for your election to the posts of honour and responsibility which you now occupy in this Committee. Under your guidance I am sure that the Committee will perform its work efficiently and in orderly fashion.

The problem of disarmament is vast, both in importance and in complexity. It is natural that this problem should have occupied the centre of attention in successive Assemblies of the United Nations. At this hour, it seems to me that no good purpose would be served by covering the whole ground or by repeating general considerations. Fortunately, the speakers in the debate this year have devoted their statements mainly to concrete and practical aspects of the problem of disarmament.

There is no doubt that the ultimate goal of our search is a comprehensive and balanced programme of disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional fields. The difficulty is that the component elements in the problem are mutually dependent. Success along one line without success along other lines is, for the most
part, difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, we must make a start somewhere. The debate this year is in fact devoted to this problem. What should our first steps be in this complicated process of disarmament?

I submit that in selecting our first steps we should keep in mind some guiding considerations. One is that there is sufficient agreement among the major Powers directly involved so that continuation of effort would be hopeful of success. While it is well for us to suggest the establishment of this or that kind of disarmament organ, it is obvious that some measure of agreement among the major Powers involved in the armaments race is the essential preliminary to all future efforts. The second consideration is: Any measure which we may select as a first step in disarmament must be of such a nature that this measure, once agreed upon and carried out, would facilitate the taking of further steps. In other words, measures qualified to be first steps should open prospects for future steps. In approaching the problem of disarmament from this very realistic and practical approach, my delegation feels that recent events have given us some ground for guarded optimism and that we can apply ourselves to good effect.
One of the first steps which is before the Committee for consideration and included in the seventeen-Power draft resolution, as found in document A/C.1/L.205, is the prevention of surprise attacks. In November of this year, experts of the United States and the Soviet Union, together with those of a number of other countries, will meet in conference to study the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attacks. My delegation regards this as a very important and wise undertaking. In this space-nuclear age the survival of a country may hinge on the outcome of a surprise attack. The fear which the possibility of surprise attacks spreads all over the world is one of the major causes of world tension and of the arms race. Any measure which can reduce the danger of surprise attacks, when carried out, will be a step towards disarmament because it will build up international confidence and thereby reduce the necessity for armaments. We believe that the General Assembly should unanimously give this proposed undertaking its whole-hearted endorsement and support and urge that the negotiations of the experts should be brought within the framework of the United Nations, as provided in the seventeen-Power draft resolution.

Another first step proposed for our consideration is the discontinuance of nuclear tests. We have three proposals which cover this aspect of the problem. One is the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.203). The second is found in the draft resolution of thirteen-Powers (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add. 1) and the third is included as part of the seventeen-Power draft resolution to which I have referred. The three present nuclear Powers of today agree that there should be discontinuance of nuclear tests. They also agree that this discontinuance should be subjected to international inspection. The technical capabilities and limitations of international inspection have been agreed upon and the political and administrative details are about to be the subject of negotiation in Geneva. The nuclear Powers, however, disagree on the duration and the conditions of the discontinuance of tests.

My delegation believes that a provisional discontinuance of tests should be agreed upon and carried out as one of the first steps towards disarmament, and that a permanent cessation must depend on the establishment of effective control
and on agreement on real disarmament measures. Unconditional permanent
cessation of tests at this point would leave the world with three nuclear Powers,
all free to continue their production of fissionable materials as well as types
of nuclear weapons already tested. This would not be disarmament. It would
not relieve international tension, nor would it slacken the present arms race.
All it would do would be to perpetuate the status quo of the number of
nuclear Powers. Is such a condition desirable? Can the status quo be
perpetually maintained?

In the early postwar years there was a time when the world had only one
nuclear Power. The United States, this one nuclear Power, offered to give up
its monopoly under the condition of international control of atomic energy.
The Soviet Union rejected that condition and succeeded in making itself the
second nuclear Power. More recently the United Kingdom has also succeeded in
making itself the third nuclear Power. During this period, was there something
the Assembly could have done to prevent the emergence of the second and third
nuclear Powers? I do not believe that the Assembly committed any sin of
omission in this matter. It was not within the power of the United Nations to
prevent the rise of the second and third nuclear Powers because it was not
within the power of the United Nations to enforce international control of
atomic energy in face of the Soviet opposition. Today, is it possible for the
United Nations to prevent the rise of the fourth, the fifth, and perhaps even
the sixth nuclear Power? I believe not, if the production of fissionable
materials and of existing types of nuclear weapons should continue. Furthermore,
I do not believe that the world will necessarily be worse off because there will
be four, or five, or six nuclear Powers instead of the present three.

A speaker in this debate conjured up the spectre of Germany becoming the
fourth nuclear Power. He tried to scare us with what he called the militaristic
and revanche currents in Western Germany. I do not know that Germany wishes to
produce nuclear weapons, and I do not know that Germany has today any militaristic
or revanche cravings. Of the present nuclear Powers, one, the Soviet Union, is
a totalitarian Power which pays little or no heed to international public opinion
and which complies with or defies Assembly resolutions as it pleases. The Soviet
Union with nuclear weapons is certainly more frightening than any fourth, or fifth,
or sixth nuclear Power that we can think of.
The cessation of nuclear tests should be conditioned upon agreement in the nuclear field of disarmament. In this connexion, the Assembly, by its resolution 1148 (XII), has adopted a programme. That resolution is fresh in our minds. I need therefore only remind this Committee of its general outline. Under that resolution fissionable materials are to be divided into two categories: the existing stocks and future production. The latter can be controlled and, therefore, agreement on the prevention of future production from being used for military purposes should be first reached. With the knowledge on the production facilities, it would be possible to give a rough estimate of the production in the past. A programme of gradual transfer of the existing stockpiles to non-military uses under international supervision could be worked out. Both the control of future production and the transfer of existing stocks might be carried out simultaneously.

If this programme in the control of fissionable materials could be carried out, then we would have real nuclear disarmament. Under that condition we could ask all Powers to cease nuclear tests. Under this programme all would be equal, and the non-nuclear Powers of today would not find it necessary to join in the competition for nuclear power. If we should try to seek permanent cessation of tests without carrying out the Assembly's resolution 1148 (XII) we would fail.
In addition to the prevention of surprise attacks and the discontinuance of atomic tests, this Committee has before it a third concrete proposal in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.204). This draft resolution takes the budgetary approach to the problem of disarmament. It calls for the reduction of the military budgets of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by not less than ten to fifteen per cent. It also promises that a part of the funds released through the reduction of military budgets would be for the economic and industrial development of under-developed countries. This proposal is very attractive, on the surface. It also looks simple. However, before my delegation can make a final determination of our position, we should like to know more.

My delegation would like to know more about the budgetary systems of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. My delegation would like to know much more about the system of military budgets practised in these four countries. I am particularly bothered by the system of military procurement in countries where all production and distribution are government-owned and managed. In the United States, I think I am right when I say that the Department of Defense buys food and clothing for soldiers, steel, oil, airplanes, tanks, motor vehicles and all other military supplies on the open market and pays market prices. In a country like the Soviet Union where the Defense Ministry procures its military supplies from other departments of the same Government, we do not know the price asked for and paid. If the four Powers should agree to reduce their budgets by ten to fifteen per cent, how do we know that the Soviet Ministry of Defense will not next year get its steel, its automobiles, its oil and other military supplies at a reduced price? In the Soviet Union today, is the fixation of price based on economic considerations or on political considerations or on a combination of both? In the Soviet Union, is the fixation of price on consumer goods determined by considerations different from the fixation of price on military supplies? What does a reduction of the military budget in the Soviet Union really mean?

The proposal of the Soviet Union in this regard appears to be attractive. I do not believe we should dismiss it. Neither do I believe that we should accept it right away. I suggest that the United Nations create a body of
experts to make a comparative study of the budgetary systems of the four
countries involved, particularly the systems used in making their military budgets.
When this Committee has before it such a comparative study, we should know
exactly what the Soviet proposal really means. By that time I think we
should all be qualified to vote on the Soviet draft resolution. Before such a
comparative study is made, I believe this draft resolution of the Soviet Union
should be kept on the table.

I have approached the problem of disarmament in a very "matter-of-fact" way.
I believe that the discussion has reached a stage when we must face facts.
Thirteen years of experience in this matter of disarmament should both fortify us for our future efforts and guide us from straying into paths that are dead
alleys. It is for this reason that I have refrained from generalities or emotional
appeals.

We are at the stage of first steps. If the proper first steps are taken,
I believe we will then be able to take further steps until we reach our
ultimate goal of a balanced and comprehensive disarmament programme.

I have refrained from discussing the Irish and the Mexican proposals
and the later amendments because my delegation has not had enough time to study them carefully. I reserve the right of my delegation to intervene in this
debate again.

Mr. PICCIONI (Italy) (spoke in Italian; interpretation from French text
supplied by the delegation): It is easy to scoff at the usefulness of the
debates that take place each year in the United Nations General Assembly and
that have taken place over the past eleven years on the subject of disarmament.
It is always easier to do so if one does not realize the complexity of the problem,
the need for a complete study of it, and the always new aspects and elements of it
that crop up because of the tremendous pace at which the arms race is now going on.
This pace requires us to make a continuous re-evaluation of interests and methods,
and we must also realize that it is the security of States that is at stake.
But no one can come to easy conclusions on the question of disarmament if he is
unaware of the needs of security. I do not refer merely to the security
of the country to which one belongs but rather to the security of all. What we intend to do is to set up objective conditions that will permit co-operation between States and the fulfilment of the desire for civil progress, peace and tranquillity; therefore we must take all these aspects into account. Such progress has been jeopardized by the danger of increasing numbers of weapons with increasing destructive power. I would not share in the superficial criticisms of our debates, nor would I underestimate the efforts that have been made to clarify the problem and to search for ways of solving it.

It is true that a year ago in the United Nations we came to a halt and, what is much more serious, we have marked time since then, after having made a remarkable effort -- as we did when we adopted Resolution 1146(XII) -- to establish a reasonable basis for concrete negotiations to take place. With the increase in the membership of the Disarmament Commission, we thought we had set up a more appropriate and more representative machinery within which such negotiations could take place.

In this statement I shall avoid as far as possible any accusations or incriminations. However, I feel that I must recall that, if no practical effect was achieved as a result of our discussions, that was not because of the lack of goodwill on the part of the majority of the States but because the Soviet Union refused to attend meetings of the Disarmament Commission and has also stopped the carrying out of negotiations. Whatever may be the reasons of the Soviet Union for thus interrupting the activity of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, it is not for me to state them, and I do not think that any of us has the right to assume the task of impugning the motives of others. We are here to study the facts and to see what we can accomplish. But the facts must be understood and put clearly before us.
And among the facts that are clear we must be aware that if no progress had been achieved in the United Nations in the field of disarmament, it is due to the refusal of the Soviet Union to continue the debates and the negotiations in the Disarmament Commission and in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, as well as the refusal of the Soviet Union to abide by the resolution of the General Assembly -- a resolution that attained a majority of 56 votes against 9 votes cast by the Soviet Union and its European allies.

I must say that the picture before us, after the Soviet decision, was most discouraging. It would continue to be so now had it not been for the fact that at a different level from that of the United Nations, and with the participation of the Soviet Union itself, certain tasks were undertaken which -- following a method mentioned in our resolution last year -- have opened new possibilities and roads to us. At least, insofar as certain aspects of the problem of disarmament are concerned, certain measures could be applied which would be progress toward the end that for the last few years we have tried to achieve, that is to say, balanced and controlled general disarmament. We have not heard anyone renounce this end; furthermore in order to fulfill the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and in the interest of peace and security, we must make every effort to achieve such an end.

I refer to the Conference of Experts that took place in June and July in Geneva. The results of that conference were extremely encouraging and positive, because these scientists, these experts came to the conclusion that technically it was possible to set up a system which at one and the same time would be practical and efficient to control violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. In the course of my statement I should like to return to this matter.

But I should like to express the profound satisfaction of the Italian delegation at noting that this result -- although at the moment it may only be theoretical -- was achieved, and that the conclusions of the experts were accepted by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. A greater satisfaction still was that in the meantime the above-mentioned countries had decided to return to Geneva and discuss the suspension of nuclear tests. And this is not all. Other ideas have been put
forward and other agreements have been arrived at. One of them is an extremely important one, and that is the possibility of a meeting to be held between experts to consider the chances of avoiding surprise attack. I think that none of these ideas should be underestimated. These problems are of major importance. However much we may regret the interruption of the Disarmament Commission, it would be neither fair, just nor realistic not to realize that some progress has been achieved even if the results of such progress have not as yet been felt by all, and if we still have to wait in order to evaluate such results. However, given time and given patience, we will see what agreements have been arrived at on the control of nuclear tests, and we will find out how the conference in Geneva carries out its tasks.

But to come to the question of disarmament within the framework of the United Nations, we must refer to what we have done in the past and what we plan to do in the future. We have before us, at the moment, a number of draft resolutions.

I should like to make some comments on the two draft resolutions submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union. If we compare these draft resolutions with that adopted last year by the General Assembly we will immediately note that the draft resolution contains what was already contained in last year's resolution. I think it is useless to refer to the fact here that the request or the urging for an immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons was already contained in paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 1148 of the last session of the General Assembly. This, too, is the case regarding the invitation of States to devote funds made available by disarmament to the improvement of living conditions of less-developed countries -- contained in paragraph 5 of the same resolution. But if these ideas, which lie at the basis of the Soviet draft proposal, are presented to us in a different guise from that of the General Assembly resolution of last year, what is different is that these two points, that is to say, the question of the cessation of tests, and also of the utilization of reduced budgets, these two subjects are separated from the general framework where they belong, and they are presented to us as independent aims.
Well, this is a procedure that changes things tremendously. Far be it from us to contest the importance of the two points contained in the Soviet draft resolution, but separating these questions weakens them completely and we feel that it would seem certainly not to bring us to the end we are seeking.

I think it would be a rather serious and dangerous withdrawal from our aims were we to separate these from the general framework. What we are trying to achieve is disarmament. And, in this substantive aspect of the question we would be taking a step backward from where we stood in 1957. In fact we find no trace whatever of the already adopted resolution, insofar as the destruction of the atomic stockpiles is concerned, nor any mention of what we consider to be a necessary condition to the setting up of the stopping of these tests, that is to say, a system of control. We must realize that this is more obvious when we link this silence on the part of the Soviet draft resolution with what was said in this debate. Certain declarations and also certain statements regarding the unconditional character of the cessation of nuclear tests proposed, make it obvious to us that there is an intention to separate as two equally important but different and independent questions, the suspension of nuclear tests from the abolition of such weapons, and the separation of the particular problem, of the existence of nuclear weapons from the general problem of disarmament.

This must obviously preoccupy and concern us. We are the first to consider the need for advancing progressively and the need to act little by little, but only so long as we remain within the framework of disarmament. But we must not allow ourselves to separate objectives which are part and parcel, one of the other. And these doubts, and these fears are even greater when we have heard certain delegations state quite clearly that they considered that the cessation of nuclear tests must be taken as a completely separate question.

But there is more. The aim of disarmament would be obviously the ensuring of greater security. By doing away with thermonuclear tests we would certainly be doing a most splendid thing, but it would in no way solve the problem of the security of our countries against the possibilities or the dangers of an atomic aggression. I should like no misunderstanding to exist on this point. In order to understand the interest shown by Italy in this problem, suffice it to refer to the declarations made by myself last year, and which I confirm
here, regarding the decision of my country to stint no effort to achieve as far as possible and as quickly as possible a cessation of nuclear tests for military purposes.
But we must consider the definitive solution of the problem, inserting it in a more rational and organic way into the general problem of disarmament. This idea will appear if we also consider the meaning of the measures adopted in November of last year by the General Assembly and omitted from the two draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union for consideration this year.

I am certainly taking great care not to underestimate the dangers represented by atomic armaments, and I shall refer to them in my statement in due course. May I be permitted to state here that the importance of disarmament and of limitations of conventional weapons is certainly not secondary.

It is sufficient to consider that, by the mere quantitative limitation, we would diminish the destructive power of arms, and this would obviously be of inestimable benefit. But there still exists the tremendous power of conventional weapons, and if we do not reduce these too, we will, in truth, be doing nothing towards strengthening security, and especially the security of small States that are terrified of being attacked by greater Powers that may not even have to resort to atomic weapons. All we have to do is look at history to see that conflicts of all sorts up to the last world war broke out without the existence of atomic weapons. It is true that, in the first place, the arms race existed with all its dangers to peace well ahead of the invention of atomic weapons, and, in the second place, that the two last world wars began by acts of aggression without the use of atomic weapons. But the danger faced by small Powers must give us pause and must cause us to weigh the serious danger to the peace and security of the world inherent in conventional weapons.

There is more. When the Charter of San Francisco was signed and the United Nations was created and charged with the main task of achieving disarmament, only conventional weapons existed. This means that the problem will continue to exist unchanged if we achieve only a quantitative limitation of armaments. Furthermore, unless we are ready to agree on the subject of reduction and limitation of conventional weapons at this time when, as far as most people are concerned, thermonuclear weapons represent the true danger to peace, do you believe that agreement will be easier to achieve on the day when, following the limitation of the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, conventional armaments will have recovered their old importance for everybody? In the absence of such
an agreement, will peace and the security of small States not be threatened? If we do not want to practice simple demagoguery and if we do not truly want to go into the particular causes that might undermine peace, the least we can do is to turn our attention to the question of conventional armaments and not only to atomic weapons.

The second point contained in resolution 1148 (XII) adopted last November by the General Assembly and omitted from the two Soviet draft resolutions is that of the achievement of general agreements on the reduction of armaments. I think we ought to consider this point for a few moments in order to examine it both from the point of view of principle and also in so far as it refers to the forthcoming conferences at Geneva.

To speak of disarmament without control is merely to indulge in demagoguery. Control is necessary first of all because in a matter which touches the possibilities of survival of a State no Government can be expected to denounce its duty or legitimate responsibilities. The smaller the State, the greater that duty. In effect, the greater Powers can always hold their own by increasing their arms. But this is out of the question for the small countries because of the technical and financial means at their disposal. In the second case, the instances of the breach of international agreements have been all too frequent lately for us to consider it easy to achieve this type of treaty or agreement that is so much more delicate and difficult than any other, so much so that no agreement on disarmament has yet been arrived at.

It is true that in principle the Soviet Union recognizes the importance of controls. On 4 August 1955, Mr. Bulganin stated to the Supreme Soviet: "Any idea of disarmament implies the question of controls and inspection." But in practice the Soviet representatives, in twelve years of debates, have constantly evaded definitions and commitments. In the course of the last meetings of our Committee, we have witnessed broadsides against those who proposed controls. They were accused either of wanting to avoid disarmament by complicating it or of trying only to discover ways of improving their systems of espionage. This is a most peculiar position to adopt. It cannot but give rise to all sorts of grave doubts and very serious fears in the minds of all.
The Conference of Experts which met in Geneva in August, as I have just mentioned, came to the agreement that it is possible to control and check on explosions, and the three Governments have accepted this conclusion in principle. But though we may recognize that control is technically possible, it is another thing to set up such control. To this end, we would have to set up an ad hoc organization and also some sort of punishment for those violating a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. The technique may indicate the way, but the decisions belong always to the responsible Government officials. I note with satisfaction the clarifying statements made by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, but I must point out that in the Soviet draft resolution the question of controls is not mentioned.

In insisting on the pure and simple abolition of thermonuclear tests for military purposes and in keeping quiet on the matter of controls, would we be really trying to facilitate the success of the forthcoming work at Geneva? I think that we would not. We would be strengthening the hands of those who have traditionally opposed controls and we would truly not be labouring for disarmament.

Having said this, I should like to stress that Italy and its friendly neighbours, far from adopting a rigid stand on the position taken in November 1957, has made all efforts to achieve common ground. It is sufficient to read carefully the draft resolution presented on 10 October last by my Government together with sixteen other Powers. The contents of this draft resolution have been referred to by a number of other speakers who have preceded me in the debate, but may I stress some aspects of them.

The Italian Government is second to none in its appreciation of the dangers of thermonuclear tests for military purposes, tests which result in the ionization of the atmosphere.
The Italian Government fervently desires the immediate suspension of these tests. But we make this request only on the basis of an agreement that would be respected by all and that would be durable. Anyone with any common sense would realize that no agreement could last unless the arms race were stopped, since that is the reason why these tests were begun and are being carried out. If causes are not tackled, one cannot hope to achieve lasting effects.

The Government of Italy is as interested in the reduction of conventional weapons as in that of atomic disarmament. A number of speakers have stressed the progress that has been made in the course of 1958, but we feel that this progress was due to the fact that the technical questions were separated from the political. The Italian delegation interprets the fourth paragraph of the seventeen-Power draft resolution as an invitation to hold further meetings of experts for the purpose of solving the main technical problems of disarmament, especially the problem of the organization and functioning of an efficient system of international control.

The Italian Government also attaches great importance to the study of technical measures to avoid surprise attack, and we eagerly await the forthcoming conference in Geneva on this subject. Anything that can be done to reduce the dangers will represent a substantial contribution to the relaxation of international tension and to disarmament. My Government is ready to make every possible contribution towards examining and studying this fundamental problem.

The Italian Government attaches particular importance to the permanent prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes and we believe that it is urgent to create a committee entrusted with the study of an international convention for the regulation of this new problem.

Briefly, these remarks outline the position of Italy regarding the principal problems concerned with disarmament.

We are convinced that the efforts which are to be made in Geneva will represent concrete progress and that the method of holding technical conferences is useful. But we are equally convinced that we must consider the problem of disarmament in all its complexity, even if we do so gradually and by
different paths. In other words, we must proceed by degrees, by problems or groups of problems according to the practical necessities which present themselves, but also moving towards global disarmament, a disarmament balanced and controlled. Above all, we must bear in mind the fact that the ultimate aim of disarmament is the search for a wider margin of security of States, particularly small States. We believe that the draft resolution presented by my delegation and sixteen other countries does exactly this. That is why we commend it for the approval of the Committee, being convinced that with such a decision taken we shall register some progress towards the achievement of the objective which represents the supreme aspiration of our people: the safeguarding and maintenance of peace.

Mr. ORTIZ (Costa Rica) (interpretation from Spanish): The congratulations which I should like to offer you, Mr. Chairman, besides being according to protocol, carry with them the sincerity with which I feel, as a Central American, when I note the dignity and wisdom with which you are presiding over our deliberations. I wish also to extend our congratulations to the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Osman, and the Rapporteur, Mr. Matsch, who are part of the team which guides us.

In questions of disarmament, Costa Rica is one of the countries having the greatest moral authority to speak and that is why my delegation must clearly make known its point of view in this tremendously important debate.

Traditionally, in my country there have never been weapons and, according to the new constitution, the army as such is definitely prohibited. We closed the barracks and opened schools. We beat our swords into ploughshares. We have no territorial ambitions and we know that our neighbours will never invade us. To settle our domestic problems we do not use bullets, but ballots. We are convinced that people should solve their problems through negotiation and understanding and spiritual harmony which would save them from the hecatomb of war.

We do not really understand the use of the oft-repeated phrase "small nations". We know full well that when the riders of the Apocalypse set out they trample great and small, and it is precisely those so-called small nations which have been used as a pretext to unleash wars. That was the case in the First World War and in the Second also. Because of a desire to
find some justification for a conflict, some small unhappy nation has served as a guinea pig, and if these great Powers do not disarm it will be the small nations, which have served as the guinea pigs, which will feel in their flesh the murderous touch of weapons. It is we who will be used as cannon fodder.

My delegation wishes to state clearly that the reason why we support the draft resolution submitted by the United States and other countries is that, according to our history, since our nation was established on the basis of the Christian principles brought to us with our language and the nobility of our race, from Spain, these are the same principles which have established Western civilization, to which we belong and whose eternal values we nurture with care. We are not standing with the United States because that country has had some hand in our destiny, but because we are part of the institutional structure of European culture, and there would be no means by which nations, however strong, could change the desire of our people for peace based on justice. It is a fact that we are in the economic and geographical zone covered by the United States, besides which the United States has assumed the armed defence of Western civilization and the guarantee of our independence. That is why, when we ask the great Powers to disarm, we must stubbornly stress the fact that, in order to do so, they must exert careful control and prudence, to the end that other Powers will also disarm. They will have to take into account the fact that criteria based on a different philosophy from ours sometimes reject what to us is sacred, such as word of honour and good faith such as are expressed in the Holy Scriptures.

Stretching our imagination to picture for ourselves a world destroyed by nuclear rockets, the survivors of the tragedy might well ask how it was possible that the Western Powers who had protected them failed to keep an agreement to disarm, with unforeseeable consequences. The responsibility of the Western leaders is a triple one, for not only are they obliged to safeguard their own territories and the integrity of their institutions, but must also defend the security of the hemisphere and preserve our civilization. Therefore, control over disarmament must be based on wise measures which will make it a positive fact for all.
The testing of atomic explosions, had it only been used for scientific advance and for the benefit of humanity, certainly could not be objected to despite the risks involved in these dangerous tests. But what we do not want is that this prodigious source of energy should be used for destruction instead of progress. In this field of nuclear science, with its most enchanting future for the under-developed areas that might obtain cheap energy to supply the imperious demand of their industrial development, these explosions must not be ill used. We are infinitely saddened by noting that men are not sufficiently good to utilize their scientific inventions for the improvement of conditions of workers. Therefore, tests must cease. The sacrifice is hard. But our responsibility towards future generations, which will be the ones to judge, is stronger.

The delegation of Costa Rica, together with those of Uruguay, Bolivia, El Salvador and Mexico, made a proposal that was adopted on 6 November 1957, at 892nd meeting of the First Committee, during the twelfth session of the General Assembly, by 71 votes to none, with 10 abstentions. That proposal read, in part:

"Invites the States concerned, and particularly those which are Members of the Sub-Committee, to consider the possibility of devoting, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, as and when sufficient progress is made, additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in the less developed countries."

An amendment to the draft resolution before us, consistent with what I have just read out, was co-sponsored by my delegation and those countries that submitted this amendment earlier, in order to assure the growth and development of those countries that we are trying to develop.

I repeat: Costa Rica loves peace over and above all, and is firmly convinced that disarmament and the cessation of atomic explosions must be achieved. This will logically lead to a reduction of military budgets. The main elements to achieve it are in this, but these are not all the elements. In disarmament there is another element which, if fulfilled, could with immediate effect contribute to setting up a true peace in the world. This would be the dissipating of the atmosphere of fear. The generations born after the Second World War
and that are in full development now constantly receive moral and psychological aggressions that confuse them, turn them bitter, and fill them with fear of the cold war. Two months do not go by without headlines stating the imminence of war. Disquiet, fear, even despair are sapping a world peopled by populations that see before them a tragedy that, under the slightest provocation, might be unleashed on the world. It is bad, because our youth is terrified at a great Power fomenting revolt, causing internal and external conflicts, in countries in which they would like to set up their political ideas, thus destroying the spiritual stand of these countries, making a legion of pessimistic human beings who lack faith and illusion in the future. In America, too, this dread seed has been sown. It teaches brother to hate brother, patriot to desert his country, and man to deny God. These teachings take advantage of any dissatisfaction to tear apart our democratic institutions and our freedoms.

Costa Rica wishes for a material disarmament, adequately controlled, and, while negotiations are taking place, to check on the possibility of cessation of atomic tests. We feel that, once and for all, we ought to try and end the cold war, so that young men and women may once again nurture ideals and that people may live happily, with hope in the future, and that this happiness may bring peace to men of good will.
Mr. EBAN (Israel): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of Israel is deeply gratified to see the work of this Committee proceed under your distinguished and experienced leadership and that of our colleagues, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur.

Our annual debate on disarmament is always marked by a special gravity and tension. No other international issue so acutely reflects the anguish and hope of mankind. Between one year and the next the debate becomes more momentous, the need of success more compelling, the penalty of failure more immense.

And yet the contrast between diplomatic stalemate and scientific progress has never been more ominous than in the year which has passed since the twelfth session of the General Assembly. During this period no negotiations have taken place between the great Powers on the reduction and limitation of armaments, on agreements for stopping the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, or on an agreed system of control which is the manifest condition of an effective disarmament agreement. While diplomacy has stood still, science has rushed forward at headlong pace. The year between our sessions began with the first controlled penetration of outer space -- and has ended with the flight of a projectile 80,000 miles from the earth. Scarcely one of the twelve months separating these events has lacked some demonstration of man's new resources of power. In each hemisphere the factories of nuclear explosives have been busy, new thermo-nuclear devices have been tested and proved, and additional concentrations of radioactive substance have been flung into the atmosphere of the earth.

The crisis of our times arises not from the discovery of new forces in nature, but from the failure to bring these forces under international restraint. Our perils are the result not of scientific success but of diplomatic failure. The challenge which science makes to statesmanship is the dominant theme of our Committee's agenda this year. The problems of disarmament and of nuclear tests, the question whether the exploration of outer space shall be internationally controlled or left to a competitive anarchy, the enlightened proposal for a joint development of the Antarctic region, the pressure of inflated military budgets on the strained economies of nations -- all these are directly related to this challenge. The world now understands the perils of a scientific rationalism uninhibited by moral and legal restraints. But international diplomacy has not yet begun to establish its rightful command over the new age in natural power.
Small nations cannot evade their role in this challenge. They cannot, even if they would, inherit the responsibility which rests uniquely upon the nuclear Powers. But the fate of small nations hangs on the consequences of this discussion. Indeed, there is no problem which affects us so much and which we can influence so little. Our least duty is to help develop the weight of world opinion and bring it to bear in full solemnity upon the policies of our more powerful colleagues.
At its last session the General Assembly pursued a consistent and logical aim. It sought to bring about simultaneous progress across the whole disarmament field. Its resolution called for the suspension of test explosions; for the early termination of the production of fissionable material for weapons; for the conversion of stocks of fissionable material to peaceful purposes; for agreed reductions in the forces of the four greatest Powers; for the initiation of controls for the prevention of surprise attacks; and for the study under international auspices of the peaceful uses of outer space missiles. But our failure to reach an agreed composition for the proposed Disarmament Commission was followed by a full year in which these questions were not even put to the test of negotiation. This year the thinking of the Committee is oriented not towards an integral plan of disarmament but towards measures -- "marginal approaches", to use the Secretary-General's words -- which many delegations hope will break down the deadlock step by step.

Because there has been no direct discussion between the Powers since August 1957 on the reduction, limitation and regulation of armaments, this Committee has been virtually reduced to a debate on two problems alone: First, can this Committee increase the prospect of an agreed suspension of nuclear weapons tests by the three Powers about to meet at Geneva? Second, can we ensure the existence during the coming year of procedures and mechanisms under which more substantive disarmament negotiations can go forward within the United Nations framework?

In the past year an agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests by the three nuclear Powers has come within the range of possibility. The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation indicates that the continuation of intensive and widespread test explosions may have results from which the universal conscience must recoil. The Committee points out that the radiation involved in industrial research and medical application "expose only part of the population" while "environmental sources" such as nuclear tests "expose the whole population". The Committee concludes in a note of deep gravity:
"Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations; these hazards, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed persons. ... All steps designed to minimize irradiation of human populations will act to the benefit of human health. Such steps include ... the cessation of contamination of the environment by explosions of nuclear weapons". (A/3838, General Conclusions, page 41, para. 54)

Other passages in the Committee's report throw light on some of the human issues involved in this uncontrolled sequence of explosions into the atmosphere. The danger is greatest to those who are most "near to the sites of nuclear explosions". "Children", says the report, "are regarded as being more sensitive to radiation than adults". It writes that

"embryonic cells are especially sensitive to radiation, and some evidence suggests that exposure of the foetus to small doses of radiation may result in leukemia during childhood".

Now the hazards described in these words cannot yet be precisely measured, and they do not all derive from test explosions alone. The whole area is still surrounded by fences of doubt. But now that scientific opinion is divided only between a greater and a lesser alarm, it is natural for us to be guided by the more cautious alternative. We move here in a field where an unduly complacent approach, if proved wrong, might be beyond consolation or repair.

The general disarmament deadlock has not prevented some progress towards an agreed and controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests by three Powers, all of whom have amply tested their basic nuclear equipment. After the Soviet suspension of tests on 31 March -- which has since been rescinded -- the United States and the United Kingdom Governments invited the Soviet Union to join in a conference of scientific experts at Geneva to consider the methods of controlling suspension and of detecting violations. Ambassador Lodge has informed us that "the United States accepts the report of the experts including the control system contained therein". Commander Noble has made it clear that the United Kingdom statement of 22 August constitutes an acceptance of the experts' report and of its recommendations on effective international control. Mr. Zorin on 15 October noted that the Western Powers had accepted:
"the system of control proposed by that Conference and that ... they do it in a manner similar to that of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, in his well known statement".

(A/C.1/PV.949, p. 29-30)

Several resolutions and amendments lie before us, each dealing principally with the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, and the Geneva Conference is only ten days away.

In these circumstances, my delegation has a clear conviction about the action which this Committee should take. It should strive to present the General Assembly with a unanimous formula designed to promote agreement between the three Powers at the Geneva Conference. We believe, in common with the Foreign Minister of Sweden, that such unanimity is possible and necessary. It is true that agreement in principle on a controlled suspension of tests has been achieved. But it still remains necessary to establish the organization, the system and the procedures whereby this principle may be implemented. It is not even yet clear whether all the parties meeting at Geneva agree to discontinue their tests from the day that the Conference opens, as the Governments of two of the nuclear Powers have agreed to do. In these conditions the prospect at Geneva is still sufficiently fragile to justify helpful support from this Committee. But a three-Power agreement at Geneva will not be facilitated by a sharp three-Power division in New York, leaving the negotiating parties aligned behind the barriers of rival texts. Since we are taking action auxiliary to a three-Power agreement, the crucial condition of a successful text is that it should, at least, be supported by the three negotiating Powers themselves. This consideration, added to those which the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Canada have adduced, leads us to hope that the delegations sponsoring draft resolutions on the discontinuance of weapons tests will strive to consolidate their efforts into a text which all the negotiating parties can support.

There has been a long discussion on the relative merits of "cessation" and "suspension". It must be evident that if a permanent agreement on cessation is not yet within sight, we need not admit an "all or nothing" posture. We should not concede that the alternatives are between complete perfection and complete failure -- between total cessation and uncontrolled promiscuous continuation of
weapons tests. Those who advocate an agreement on "suspension", beginning with a discontinuance for a limited period, are not implying a wish to resume the tests after that period. Their vision is of a renewable suspension, accompanied by a continuing scrutiny of the control system and by the general progress in disarmament to which we all aspire. The United States, for example, has told us that it has a "determination to reach an equitable and lasting agreement".
If an agreed suspension can be organized and controlled for a definite period, the confidence thus generated and, above all, the exigent pressure of world opinion might well rule out any return to the period of uncontrolled nuclear weapons tests. Recent international experience is full of agreements, originally concluded on a provisional basis, which perpetuate themselves by their own manifest efficacy. Thus, the real difference between suspension and cessation is much smaller than it has been made to sound in this debate. It might be helpful if any resolution dealing with a "suspension" of tests were supplemented by language indicating that this suspension is envisaged as a stage leading to an "equitable and lasting agreement".

But it has rightly been said that a discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests is not in itself a measure of disarmament. It is a step which has positive importance for two separate reasons. First, it prevents the physical dangers described in the report of the Scientific Committee on Radiation. Second, it may have a symbolical value in creating a momentum leading to a confidence and agreement in more substantive fields. For if an agreement on nuclear tests is reached at all it will be because a control system will have been worked out and accepted. Now the inhibition about control has been the focal point of the whole disarmament deadlock. Many of us have always felt that if the control issue could be breached, the highway towards limitation and regulation of armaments would lie open. No State, large or small, as our Italian colleague has eloquently pointed out, will renounce the conditions of its security and survival in response to a mere unilateral declaration or assurance. Thus, if a control system can be applied to nuclear weapons tests, and if the fears of deception or of espionage or of violated sovereignty are laid to rest, the prospect of a general disarmament system based on control might be enhanced.

But if the prospect of real disarmament is to endure, the General Assembly must surely do something more than deal with the sole question of nuclear weapons tests. Shall we recommend the abolition of nuclear tests -- and passively endorse the continued and unrestricted production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons? After all, the danger to peace and to human survival lies in the production and accumulation and potential use of these weapons -- not in the question whether they are tested or untested. The discussion in this Committee
has given full weight to the dangers of radiation arising from unlimited nuclear test explosions. But let us not forget that there are dangers greater than those. Not even the most alarming view of the effect of nuclear tests in peace time ascribes to such tests one fraction of the damage which would be done to man and his world if the manufacture and accumulation of nuclear weapons were to continue to their natural conclusion. One bomb dropped on a populated area in war would inflict more havoc than all the tests ever undertaken in time of peace. Let us therefore not lose sight of the horizons which transcend the admittedly urgent problem of test explosions, namely, the issue of unlimited production, uninhibited manufacture and potential use.

But let us understand the limitations of the draft resolutions submitted to us here. The three draft resolutions and the various amendments now before us on nuclear tests do not require any Government to destroy one existing nuclear bomb now in its arsenal; or to abstain from a massive continuance of nuclear weapons production; or to transfer any fissionable material from existing military uses to peaceful uses. The headlong manufacture and accumulation of existing tested weapons, or of future untested weapons, is not restrained by these resolutions. If all of them were adopted, there would not have to be a single nuclear bomb less in the world.

Nor does the Committee have any proposals before it for the limitation of conventional armaments which are also increasing in destructive power. Without disputing the primacy of the nuclear question we urge more consideration for the extreme vulnerability which afflicts small nations through the increase in the explosive force of conventional weapons. In our revulsion against atomic war we must be careful not to legitimize, even by implication, the mass destruction of life by non-nuclear explosions.

Here then, is a whole series of urgent questions lying beyond the nuclear test question, and yet the prospect is that we shall move on to the next point in our agenda, having acted only on the question of nuclear tests, while the actual production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons goes on in deadly profusion and while no measures are concerted to limit conventional weapons or to prevent surprise attack. Another problem beyond the issue of tests is discussed in the draft resolution submitted by the Foreign Minister of Ireland. This is the problem of further dissemination of nuclear weapons. We are approaching a time
when the capacity to make nuclear weapons will not require vast industrial strength, provided that the manufacturing country is rich in scientific manpower and has access to radioactive material. Thus, the problem raised in the Irish draft resolution is certainly very real, the more so when we reflect on the possible distribution of surplus nuclear weapons by the great Powers to countries which do not manufacture or possess them. Here, no less than in any other field, the value of any ban or prohibition is precisely equivalent to the efficacy of any control system established to implement it.

In these conditions, the fact that we may have to satisfy ourselves in this session with such limited action is a necessity, not a virtue. A more integral agreement would certainly be preferable. On the other hand, this Committee is clearly not in a mood now to enter into the substance of these broader disarmament questions. Its best hope is that a three-Power accord at Geneva might lead to agreement on control techniques and procedures which would be relevant to the other aspects of disarmament. But these possibilities will not mature if the United Nations is totally disengaged from the whole field of disarmament negotiations between now and the next session of the General Assembly. For several months the disarmament negotiations proceeded in London at a Sub-Committee of five Powers. Last year we unsuccessfully sought their resumption through the appointment of a twenty-five-member Disarmament Commission. Many Members of the United Nations, and certainly my delegation, feel that any reasonable procedural framework would be acceptable, provided that it were really used by the four Powers most directly concerned.

These considerations lead me to express the support of the Israel delegation for the line of thought opened up by the Foreign Minister of Mexico whose exceptional experience and statesmanship command our respect. He has expressed the crux of the problem in these words:

"The question of disarmament cannot be left subject to the sporadic yearly meetings of the General Assembly nor can it be left open to the occasional discussions on specific items such as that at Geneva". (A/C.1/PV.946. p. 53-55)
My delegation hopes that the four great Powers will take earnest counsel in an effort to find a bridge across which the United Nations disarmament discussion can advance during the coming months. Only thus can we be sure that a success at Geneva would have a chance of broadening out into a more general progress. Otherwise such a success, even if secured, will leave the basic issues of the nuclear and conventional arms race untouched. From the depths of his unrivalled experience and authority the eminent representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch, has portrayed under six broad headings, the categories of problems, which become increasingly grave as scientific progress goes forward; and for all these weighty chapters in the disarmament problem the United Nations does not even possess a working framework within which negotiations can proceed. We should give urgent head to Mr. Moch's plea for a revival of the basic substantive disarmament discussion.
If, apart from a cessation on nuclear tests, we can reactivate the broader disarmament negotiation we may avoid another year in which deadly engines of havoc are piled up on each other without the consoling accompaniment of any positive diplomacy seeking to arrest the grim descent. Multitudes throughout the world look to the United Nations for relief from the "terror that walketh by night" -- the cold, stark dread of a world which may be devastated by the very forces which hold the promise of its most abundant florescence. We cannot disperse without a serious response to this yearning. The United Nations owes the world a measure of progress away from the deadlock towards the road of genuine disarmament, however long and hard that road may be.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The list of speakers for the general debate was closed at 1 p.m. this afternoon. Of course, this does not exclude any representatives wishing to exercise their right of reply from taking part in the debate. I shall now read out the names of those countries on the list of speakers: Iraq, Guatemala, Bulgaria, Haiti, Burma, Peru, Australia, Austria, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, Philippines, the Union of South Africa, Japan, Pakistan, the Federation of Malaya, Finland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, the Ukrainian SSR, Uruguay, Ecuador, Lebanon, Denmark, Panama, the Soviet Union, Nepal, El Salvador, Libya, the United States, Romania, Belgium, and the Soviet Union.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.