1. Question of disarmament (continued)

2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (continued)

3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries (continued)

**Note:**

The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/8R.957. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

Mr. PAZHWAKE (Afghanistan): Before dealing briefly with the questions before the Committee, I should like to say that the last time I had the honour to make an intervention under your chairmanship, Sir, it happened to be an occasion when I had to ask for permission to speak on a point of order, and I thought you would not allow me then to congratulate you and the Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur on your election to your respective offices, but I am quite sure that you will be kind enough to allow me to do so now. It is with great sincerity that, in doing so, I join my voice with the voices of other members of the Committee.

During the general debate on the problem of disarmament we have listened to all the constructive statements made by representatives. We have also noted the particular interest of a great number of representatives in formulating suggestions and proposals directed towards making the work of the Committee fruitful at this session. This is encouraging indeed.

The exceptional significance of the problem of disarmament has been emphasized by all. The increasing danger of the continuing arms race has been stressed. The aims and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations have been recalled. World public opinion and the expectations of the peoples of the world have been mentioned. Emphasis has been put on the importance of understanding and co-operation of the big Powers.

To repeat any of this would be a repetition not only of what has been said at this session but also of what has been emphasized at so many previous sessions of the General Assembly. Therefore, we shall not do so.
The dangers of the continuance of tests and the urgency of taking measures to discontinue experimental explosions of atomic and thermonuclear weapons have also been fully discussed by all members of the Committee who have spoken before me. The cause of human progress and the safety of mankind have also been spoken of. To repeat that would again be not only a repetition of statements and arguments already heard, but also a reproduction of the contents of the scientific report with which all of us are fully acquainted. Therefore, we do not intend to do that either.

Moreover, we think that a general debate in detail is useful only to the point that would lead us to see the problems involved clearly enough to be able to think of formulating specific measures and to make our deliberations constructive. We think that this has been done to a large extent since there are a number of concrete suggestions and draft resolutions before the Committee, and others may be forthcoming.

There is also the consideration of the time element, which makes us think that by avoiding repetition one may be able to contribute to the work of the Committee by making brief statements when longer interventions are not essential. That is why we shall make a few brief observations to state our understanding of the position in connexion with the questions that are before the Committee.

As we see it, what this Committee can do and should do at this session is to concentrate, on an urgent basis, on two issues: first, the termination of the prevailing deadlock in negotiations on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations; second, the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. This does not mean that the Afghan delegation is not equally interested in other aspects of the problem of disarmament which are before the Committee.
The main reason for our stressing these two points is not only that they are of exceptional importance in themselves, but also that they are basic to the solution of all problems in connexion with disarmament, and we feel that there is a hope for creating conditions which would lead to an agreement. This is why, on the basis of the aforementioned considerations, we shall use this opportunity only to explain briefly our own understanding of the suggestions dealing with these two matters.

At this stage we shall confine ourselves to the consideration of the two draft resolutions before the Committee: one presented by the delegation of Mexico (A/C.1/L.208), and the other presented by twelve nations A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1), of which Afghanistan is a co-sponsor.

In connexion with the draft resolution presented by Mexico, although awaiting future developments, we can say that we support the idea contained in this draft resolution to the extent that we would favour the consideration of this suggestion even before the conclusion of the consideration of items 64, 70 and 72, which can be done by the adoption of this draft resolution as early as possible, so that the negotiations suggested in it may be started after the conclusion of the general debate.

As far as the question of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests is concerned, we should like to try to explain our own understanding of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and to explain why we have joined the other eleven nations in presenting this draft resolution. Before making further observations, the Afghan delegation will wait until all suggestions, proposals and draft resolutions are before the Committee.

Our first reason for co-sponsoring the draft resolution is that we do not agree with the statement made by one of the small nations in this Committee that the small nations are bystanders. The small nations cannot be bystanders because they are affected equally by the consequences of the arms race in every respect. Moreover, they are exposed to the dangers, with no means of protection against them, while the big Powers, as creators of these dangers, might be able also to discover some means of protection against such dangers.
Secondly, the fear of the big Powers emanates from their concern about what will happen in the future and in case of war, while the small nations suffer at present, even in time of peace.

Thirdly, whatever happens to the big Powers will be the consequence of their own deeds, while small nations will suffer through no direct fault of their own.

While we recognize the concern of the big Powers, we can mention still more differences between their concern and the concern of the small nations. Their concern might be more political, based on their own interests, while that of the small nations must be humanitarian and based on the interests of mankind.

To summarize, we wish to emphasize certain points to the Committee. In the first place, the danger confronting the world is universal. In the face of the universal danger, the small nations should not be considered as bystanders. The small nations form the majority of the population of the world which is faced with this universal danger. It is only in this international democracy of the United Nations that the small nations can defend and protect themselves against the universal danger, and it is only here that they can play an important role in achieving something by which not only themselves, but also the great Powers would benefit.

This was our first reason for taking an active interest in one aspect of the problem of disarmament and in co-sponsoring one of the draft resolutions.

Our second reason is that, at least in this Organization, the small nations should not, as some of them have done during the general debate, be satisfied merely by making appeals to the great Powers. What should be done is that the great Powers should be urged to realize their grave responsibilities. This, we believe, should be done by taking an active interest, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, in matters of importance to all.

We think that the big Powers can prove their realization of their responsibilities only by the elimination of the fears which they have created and with which they have confronted the world, including themselves, through policies which have been increasing their lack of confidence in each other. The need for confidence between these Powers is evident. While, up to this time, the creation of mutual confidence has proved difficult, we do not think that it
will be created if it is left only to the efforts of the great Powers. The change in the situation calls for more effort. An unceasing effort in every direction towards the same goal must be made by all of us.

We think that if the big Powers cannot trust each other, they might at least have confidence in the rest of the world and in its sincerity. We believe that the majority of the nations of the world are their friends, particularly as regards universal issues which affect the greatest and most important party, namely, humanity as a whole.

A realistic analysis of the whole situation leads us to think that the efforts of countries which are not involved in the political differences of the big Powers, if applied, would be an effective means of bringing about the confidence which is needed for reaching an understanding.
This was our second reason for joining efforts with twelve other nations to present the draft resolution. This draft resolution has been introduced by some of the other co-sponsors, but we would like to introduce it from our own point of view, as one of the co-sponsors.

As we see it, this draft resolution is a result of a careful study of the situation as far as the question of discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests is concerned. In this study, we have been as realistic as possible. From our point of view, this means that the minimum initiative that the General Assembly can take in the present session and in the present circumstances should be taken in proper time, keeping in mind the urgency of the situation now prevailing.

We believe that although there is a gap between the points of view of the nuclear Powers, there exist certain conditions which would encourage hope for an agreement. We think that the so-called gap is more political in its nature than anything else.

The main difference between the two sides concerns the question of cessation or suspension, while encouraging statements have been made by both sides on the question of control. There are also grounds to believe that some hope exists for an agreement in regard to technical arrangements and control. We cannot think that anyone who will agree to suspension of tests would be completely against the cessation of tests, at least in principle. Therefore, we do not think that persistence by any side on suspension or cessation would be the proper approach to this question.

However, it is our hope that some understanding will be reached among the big Powers, not to persist on their respective points of view. This is why the first operative paragraph of the draft resolution calls for immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, until agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to the technical arrangements and controls considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of such tests.

We would like to state once again, and with all emphasis, that at this stage, particularly in the existing circumstances, the right course for the General Assembly is: firstly, to take measures for the immediate discontinuance of tests, a subject with which this draft resolution deals; secondly, to urge the Geneva Conference to deal with this matter on an urgent basis and reach speedy agreement,
which purpose can be secured by the second operative paragraph of this draft resolution that emphasizes the imperativeness of such an agreement, and which deals with the matter in the most positive manner.

We would like to point out on behalf of our delegation that in our understanding of the contents of this draft resolution there is nothing that should lead anybody to think that we have favoured the spirit of persistence on either of the two different points of view favouring cessation or suspension. Our understanding is that the substance of this draft resolution refers to discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and particularly an immediate discontinuance of tests. What is really important to the world is that when complete cessation does not seem to be agreed upon immediately, the minimum possible effort is to take measures for immediate discontinuance of tests.

Whatever course the debate in this Committee may take, we hope that no resolution adopted will achieve less than this draft resolution. We hope also that any such measure that would be adopted by the General Assembly will have the support of a unanimous vote. The unanimous agreement of all Members on this matter is one of the most important considerations which we as a co-sponsor of this draft resolution have always had in mind.

This hope may be emanating partly from the fear that a division of votes or a decision which would mean nothing but a majority of votes will be a disappointing outcome of the United Nations efforts on a question of great importance that concerns not only the Members of the United Nations, but the world as a whole.

As I have stated before, my delegation reserves its right to speak about the different suggestions and draft resolutions when the general debate is over.

Mr. SASTROAMIDJOJO (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would also like to take this opportunity to extend to you, on behalf of my delegation, the warmest congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee. Equally, we congratulate our colleague from the Sudan, Mr. Osman, and the representative of Austria, Mr. Match, on their respective elections as Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur. We hope that the results achieved by the First Committee will be commensurate with the high calibre of its officers.
For over a decade the peoples of the world have been living under the shadow of an arms race, an arms race that generates its own momentum, resulting in ever-greater stockpiles of more terrifying weapons of mass destruction. There is no final balance of armaments. Even when the capability for mutual annihilation is achieved, the race goes on at its accelerated pace, seeking to accumulate and to develop instruments of war to the most efficient degree.

Yet there is every reason for the impetus inherent in the armaments race to be reversed and redirected towards the efforts to disarm. Measures towards disarmament may also generate their own momentum. When a first step is taken, it paves the way -- both in practical experience gained and in a relaxation of international tensions -- to further measures of disarmament.

What is imperative then is to take the first step, to make a start in reversing the trend of seeking security in preparations for war. We have the opportunity to take this step now.

The Conference of Experts, held at Geneva last August, provided the key for resolving one of the most urgent issues facing humanity today, namely, the question of discontinuing the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. It removed the one factor that heretofore had been considered the technical obstacle to such a ban. The Conference reached the unanimous conclusion:

"that it is technically feasible to establish...a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the world-wide suspension of nuclear weapon tests."

It further considered that:

"whatever the precautionary measures adopted by a violator, he could not be guaranteed against exposure..."
Naturally, my delegation received these conclusions with a feeling of satisfaction. In particular, however, we welcome the fact that all three nuclear Powers concerned have accepted and agreed with the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Conference of Experts. It is, after all, within the power of these States to end the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, with all that this augurs for the well-being of mankind.

Of course, this does not mean that we, the non-nuclear countries, have no interest or responsibility in this matter. On the contrary, our interest and responsibility are as great as those of the nuclear Powers. We too -- individually and as Member States of the United Nations -- have obligations to our peoples. The difference lies rather in the means at our disposal to discharge the common responsibility. The nuclear Powers have the bombs. We have the force of moral persuasion to induce these Powers to discontinue test explosions. The measure of our responsibility is the same, and it is, therefore, not without reason that the representative of the United States the other day asked this Assembly as a whole to help maintain the momentum towards progress in the disarmament effort.

Indeed, although most of us may be spectators of the nuclear arms race, we are spectators of a special kind in that we are as deeply involved in this race as are the actual participants, as my colleague from Afghanistan has already emphasized when he spoke just now. The danger of atomic radiation does not discriminate between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. It threatens all of humanity. In fact, it may be said -- and not without some irony -- that many of the non-participants of the nuclear arms race are its foremost victims. My own country, for instance, by virtue of its geographic position, is susceptible to the hazards of fall-out from test explosions carried out to the north, the south and the east of our national frontiers. Because of the type of housing and clothing demanded by the Indonesian climate, our people are afforded little, if any, protection from exposure to radiation. As a less developed country, we are also fined in terms of economic progress by the continuing nuclear arms race. We need peace and co-operation, not nuclear explosions and fall-out.
For all the countries of the world, the dangers, the waste, are all too evident. I do not intend, therefore, to elaborate upon this aspect of the question. Everyone must know of the statements made by such men as Albert Schweitzer, Bertrand Russell and others, who have spoken from their hearts and who have spoken for what fills the hearts of peoples throughout the world. We also have the cold facts about the dangers of radiation as set out in the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. There can be no longer any question of either the strength or the validity of the widespread apprehensions regarding the hazards of radiation, intensified by the continuing testing of nuclear weapons. The time is past for words and pleas. The time has come to act.

This sense of urgency is only increased by the fact that if these test explosions should continue other countries may soon be joining the present still rather exclusive so-called "Nuclear Club". Undoubtedly, an extension of the "Nuclear Club" would serve only to further accelerate the already precarious nuclear armaments race while, at the same time, making more difficult the attainment of an agreement on discontinuing nuclear weapons tests. We cannot but agree with the representative of the Soviet Union that "this consideration alone should alarm the United Nations and should sharpen its feeling of responsibility and induce it to carry out urgent measures in this field before the situation becomes even more complicated." (A/C.1/445, page 31)

The possibility of a widening of the nuclear armaments race is indeed not an academic one. France already has announced its intention to carry out nuclear test explosions in the Sahara. We also have the thoughtful statement made in this Committee by the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Mr. Udén, with respect to his country's capabilities of manufacturing smaller so-called tactical atomic weapons in the near future. All this only emphasizes the necessity of achieving, with the least delay, a world-wide agreement on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

But there is something else that we should bear in mind. Is it true that as regards the nuclear Powers the discontinuance of test explosions may not in itself be a measure of disarmament or a limitation of armaments. Such a ban,
however, does serve the purpose of disarmament or a limitation of armaments as regards the non-nuclear countries which, because of a world-wide agreement to stop test explosions, would be disarmed so far as acquiring the necessary know-how to add, on their own initiative, nuclear weapons to their present arms stockpiles. In this marginal sense, then, a ban on tests would be also a measure of some disarmament.

So far, I have stressed the involvement of the non-nuclear countries in relation to the continuing nuclear armaments race. Now I should like to say something about their responsibility both to promote and to guarantee an end of this terrifying race. That their co-operation is necessary is alone evident from the report of the Conference of Experts. A control system to ensure compliance with an agreement on the world-wide discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests would involve a world-wide network of control posts. According to the report of the experts, the approximate distribution of control posts over the globe would be as follows: "North America, 24; Europe, 6; Asia, 37; Australia, 7; South America, 16; Africa, 16; Antarctica, 4, together with 60 control posts on islands and about 10 ships." Moreover, the experts recommend that such a control system should be under the direction of an international control organ. Thus there can be no doubt that the establishment of a control system to ensure compliance with a world-wide agreement to stop nuclear weapons tests would in one fashion or another involve practically every country of the globe.

In other words, the non-nuclear countries have a direct stake in the forthcoming Geneva negotiations, as well as in the carrying out of whatever agreement may emerge. We believe that this fact should be properly acknowledged. The non-nuclear countries, and may I say in particular the non-aligned countries, should be given an opportunity to use their influence to assist the nuclear Powers in reaching agreement and maintaining the present momentum.
In this connection, permit me to recall that, when the International Atomic Energy Agency was established, it was generally recognized that the co-operation of the great Powers was imperative for its success. At the same time, the other countries of the world were not merely spectators of this effort, but from the beginning participated actively in the establishment of the Agency. It was understood that it was the concern of every country to secure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The activities of the countries other than the great Powers were indeed instrumental at least in exerting that amount of pressure necessary to bring about a successful conclusion of the common endeavour.

In the same way, we feel that the non-nuclear countries should today be given the chance to assist the nuclear Powers in the direction of removing current differences and finding a solution acceptable to all. Needless to say, a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons depends, in the first place, upon agreement among the nuclear Powers. Likewise, it is reasonable to assume that the co-operation of the other countries of the world would be forthcoming in ensuring compliance with such an agreement; that no nation would stand in the way of an international effort to guarantee the health of mankind in a peaceful world. But, in our opinion, this should not mean that we ignore the considerable contribution that the non-nuclear countries can make in achieving agreement with the least possible delay. I cannot stress strongly enough that these countries too are concerned and involved in this endeavour. I cannot stress strongly enough that we should leave no stone unturned in the efforts to answer the expectations of humanity. Consequently, we consider it advisable and even necessary that the non-nuclear countries, and in particular the non-aligned countries, join at every possible level in the efforts to reach agreement on a ban of nuclear weapon tests.

In the meantime, this Assembly, in addition merely to expressing the hope that the forthcoming Geneva negotiations will succeed, should make more positive and concrete recommendations to the Powers concerned. Of course, we cannot here negotiate for them. Our task is rather to facilitate the Geneva talks and to foresee the further steps that should be taken at the conclusion of these talks. This means also that this Assembly should refrain from merely adopting, by majority vote, the position of one or two of the participants at Geneva. Contrary to being helpful, an Assembly resolution along these lines probably would actually hamper the forthcoming negotiations by emphasizing the differences rather than
the areas of agreement. We should limit ourselves, therefore, to making recommendations that can command the support of all the Member States or, at least, the majority of Member States, including the nuclear Powers concerned. Such recommendations can be constructive not only in substance but also -- what is of equal importance -- in smoothing the way to the attainment of agreement.

Now, is there any common ground among the nuclear Powers? They agree, in principle, on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. They agree further that such a discontinuance should be under effective international control to ensure its strict observance. Moreover, as previously noted, all three nuclear Powers accept the recommendations and conclusions in the report of the Conference of Experts. A concrete basis for agreement thus exists. Nevertheless, there remains for negotiation the question of putting into practice the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests under effective international control.

On the one hand, the delegation of the Soviet Union calls for a complete and unconditional cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom have announced their willingness to suspend the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons for one year, unless the Soviet Union continues testing during that period. They are further willing to extend such a suspension on a year-to-year basis, provided that the inspection system is working and reasonable progress is being made on other aspects of disarmament. The crux of the difference is thus whether a cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons should be unconditional or should be conditional at some stage.

The position of the Indonesian delegation on this question must be well known to everyone here. We have consistently urged a complete and unconditional cessation of nuclear weapon tests under effective international control. We believe that the discontinuance of these tests is the least that we can do pending the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons, as well as the implementation of other measures of disarmament. With the removal of the establishment of an effective control system as a technical impediment to a cessation of test explosions, we do not believe that new obstacles should be raised.
In this context, I would like to say two things about the conception of balanced disarmament, since it seems to underlie the insistence of some States that a discontinuance of nuclear test explosions be agreed upon on a year-to-year basis.

In the first place, it should be noted that balanced disarmament cannot mean alone the maintenance of some sort of equation between States as regards military power. Balanced disarmament, according to the definition laid down in Assembly resolution 808 (IX) and reaffirmed in subsequent Assembly resolutions, means disarmament so that "no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered." To translate this into positive terms, it means that any programme of disarmament should ensure that every State feels secure. But the security of any State in this interdependent world cannot rest solely upon the accumulation of military hardware. It depends also upon other factors. Foremost among these is the winning of the hearts and minds of the peoples of the world. Any State that loses or disregards this will inevitably also lose a large measure of its security.

Secondly, it does not seem logical that the acceptance of the concept of balanced disarmament should result in perpetuating a situation that endangers the security and health of every nation. It is surely an illusion to make the right of ensuring one's security the justification for continuing a course of action that can only lead to an intensification of international tensions.

Having said this, let me assure this Committee that my delegation does not subscribe to the view that conditions to a cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests are being raised to evade agreement on and implementation of such a ban. We are convinced that there is a universal and sincere desire to stop these tests. If such conditions are still being raised, we view this as a reflection of the continuing climate of mistrust in the world. We cannot altogether ignore or escape the reality of mistrust in the international community. But to be governed solely by suspicion and fear also can lead only to ever greater suspicion and fear.

A middle way must thus be found. Political realities and the prevailing mistrust should be taken into consideration without parcelling the endeavours
to promote peace and stability in the world. Surely there must be found a
meeting ground between an immediate indefinite cessation of nuclear test
explosions and a suspension on a year-to-year basis. It should allow for making
real progress in establishing a control system. Moreover, the whole world
expects that agreements on further measures of disarmament would follow.
Finally, we say this with the conviction that any discontinuance of test
explosions would be prolonged indefinitely, unless the accepted international
control organ would detect a positive indication of bad faith on anyone's part.
If that were to happen, not only would the guilty party be condemned by world
public opinion, but its effect upon international relations would be such as
automatically to nullify any agreement. Under any other circumstances, we
cannot imagine how any nation could refuse to prolong a ban on the testing of
nuclear weapons.
What it boils down to, then, is that an agreement must be reached on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests at the forthcoming Geneva talks. As the Foreign Minister of Mexico has rightly pointed out, one can no longer expect humanity to resign itself to the dangers inherent in test explosions now that the basic technical obstacle has been removed. Humanity demands an end of these tests. It would be cruel indeed, as well as reckless, to disappoint that expectation. And it should be added that it is the height of folly and cruelty to play a kind of musical chair game with respect to the cessation of nuclear test explosions.

It is with these thoughts in mind that my delegation has co-sponsored, along with Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal, the United Arab Republic and Yemen, the draft resolution found in document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1. This draft resolution emphasizes four things that we consider of the utmost importance. First, it calls upon the States concerned to discontinue immediately the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons and thus create the proper atmosphere for achieving agreement. Secondly, it stresses the urgency of reaching an agreement on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests and leaves no doubt that this is expected by the whole of mankind. Thirdly, it recognizes the responsibility of the United Nations in this matter by requesting the States concerned to report to the General Assembly on the conclusions reached in their negotiations so that the Assembly may forthwith take the necessary subsequent steps. Fourthly, it makes clear that the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests should be carried out on a world-wide basis.

This twelve-Power joint draft resolution does not dictate agreement in accordance with the position now taken by one or another of the nuclear Powers. It has one aim: to exert the full moral influence of the United Nations on the attainment of agreement among the nuclear Powers at the coming Geneva talks.

In this initial statement before the Committee, I have concentrated my attention largely on the question of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests. This is not from any lack of appreciation of the necessity to make progress on the general question of disarmament. Nor does it imply that we are not interested in the other item before this Committee: that is, the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part
of the consequent savings for assistance to under-developed countries. Our
interest in this matter should be obvious, and, in fact, I have already
touched upon this question in my statement in the general debate of this
Assembly. But, nevertheless, we do consider that the great urgency today is
to take the first step towards disarmament. It would be tragic if we missed this
opportunity.

As was confirmed by Mr. Jules Koch's statement of yesterday, there are
clearly divergencies of opinion on the importance of ending test explosions
within the framework of the complex problem of disarmament. But there can be
absolutely no question of the significance of finally making a start towards
disarmament. To begin -- that is the heart of the matter. In other words, it
is not alone a question of the step itself. Some consider it to be a momentous
one; others, who minimize or disregard the legitimate anxieties and fears of
the peoples of the world regarding the hazards of ionizing radiation, view it
as a small, even faltering, step. But what now is actually at stake is the
taking -- I repeat, the taking -- of a first step that will add considerably
to the momentum already generated by the Geneva Conference of Experts and, more
than that, will open the way to a second, third, fourth and nth step towards
consolidating peace and saving mankind from radioactive contamination and even
the possibility of a nuclear holocaust.

We are living in an era of unprecedented scientific discoveries. But we
must still prove that man's moral and spiritual resources are equal to his
scientific and technical capabilities. We are confident that we can meet
this challenge. Indeed, we cannot afford to fail.

Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman,
since this is the first time that my delegation has taken the floor in this
Committee, permit me to congratulate you on your election to the Chair. Your
eminent services to the cause of peace and the United Nations fully justify
your election; and the wisdom you have shown in presiding over our debates
is proof that your election was a felicitous one. I should like to extend
my congratulations also to the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur, whose work
in this Committee is known to all of us.
This general debate is nearing its conclusion, and I shall not now refer to the background of the question that is at present before the Committee. What has already been said by eminent speakers who have preceded me has been sufficient to bring us up to date on the general aspects of the problem of disarmament and on what has been achieved under the auspices of the United Nations. I merely wish to explain briefly the reasons why Argentina co-sponsored the seventeen-Power draft resolution and will vote in favour of it.

As the representative of Venezuela pointed out in his very lucid statement on the matter, we all realize that, as far as this question is concerned, there are a number of fundamental agreements. In point of fact, we have all expressed our warmest desire that the world continue to live in peace. We have all agreed on the need to stop the arms race. We all feel that the desirable aim would be the definitive prohibition of the use of atomic weapons; and we have almost all agreed that there must be a clear stipulation that nuclear tests will not be carried out later, which would be beneficial as regards peace and the health of mankind. How then, if there is a basic agreement on the ideal ends, can one explain why this debate is at times somewhat bitter and leaves the impression that the divergencies separating us are difficult to overcome?
The answer to this question must lead us directly to examine the draft resolutions that are at present before this Committee, because from the difference in the context of these resolutions I think we may be able to gather the final reason for the dissidence.

The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) that my country has the honour of co-sponsoring with sixteen other Powers starts from the premise that the question of disarmament is one problem, the different aspects of which must be dealt with as a whole because these different aspects are part and parcel of an indivisible whole. That is why we suggest the possibility of negotiations to eliminate any further nuclear tests, and we urge the suspension of such tests as soon as possible that is why we stress the need to come to agreements so as to avoid a surprise attack, and we stress the importance of this possibility; that is why we want to establish a world-wide system of disarmament; that is why in all cases we call for the adoption of adequate procedures for control. In one word, our draft resolution, submitted by the seventeen Powers, takes up the essential matters bearing on disarmament, and for each and every situation indicates an adequate solution. Finally, we can not omit a reference in our draft resolution to the tasks assigned to the Secretary-General and the importance that we attribute to the forthcoming meetings in Geneva.

Confronted with the position expressed in the seventeen-Power draft resolution -- a position which we believe to be clear and which furthermore was admirably put before the Committee in the splendid statements made by the representative of Brazil -- there is the position held by the draft resolution submitted by India and eleven other countries, and the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. To these delegations there is a matter which is of previous and especial importance that must be separated from the general item of disarmament, and which calls for a special resolution of the Assembly. And that is the matter of the immediate cessation of atomic tests. Focusing on the reasons of general welfare of humanity, these countries have submitted different resolutions whereby the United Nations would appeal for an immediate cessation of tests. But we must point out also that there is a very important difference between these draft resolutions. Whereas the idea of the Soviet Union sets up this cessation as immediate and definitive, the thirteen-Power draft resolution.
"Calls for the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to the technical arrangements and controls considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of such tests;" (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1)

I have cited paragraph 1 of the operative text of the draft resolution submitted by the twelve Powers.

Those of us who have supported and co-sponsored the seventeen-Power draft do not deny that if future tests are not to be held, this will be a very important question within the general framework of the question of disarmament. Moreover, I represent a country that does not have nuclear weapons nor is it liable to do so in the near future, and therefore I am very happy to agree with the ideas expressed a few days ago by my eminent friend, Ambassador Belaunde of Peru. He stressed the fact that in principle it was necessary that a prohibition of the use of atomic weapons should be sought and the accumulative stockpiles be destroyed. Some seem to believe that we are rejecting the inclusion of a text that urges the interruption of tests. This is not the case. What we are trying to do is to decide if it is more useful and more appropriate, and if it will better help us to achieve our ultimate aims, to adopt the special resolution on the cessation of tests or rather if it were better to achieve a suspension of these tests until a general agreement is reached, including all the basic problems of disarmament. And here is where the adamant position of those who oppose the idea contained in our draft resolution is rather difficult for us to understand.

We have been told in this debate that the cessation of nuclear tests is not only one problem among others in the general framework of disarmament. We have been told that it is a separate isolated question. It has been affirmed to us that the cessation of tests is an urgent measure of tremendous importance to the welfare of humanity and from this point of view is much more important than the item of the reduction of armaments.

We do agree with the idea that the cessation of atomic tests is a decisive matter that not only bears upon the security and the peace of the world but also on the life and health of mankind. And that is why -- and it is precisely because of this -- that in our draft resolution, in paragraph 2, section A we urge
the parties involved in these negotiations not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while negotiations for the definitive cessation are in progress. Because were we to believe that the tests with nuclear weapons are merely one more element, one element among many in the question of disarmament, we would have limited ourselves merely to recommending measures to stop these tests, but we would not have urged the parties involved not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while negotiations are in progress. And it is because we attribute such essential importance to this point that our draft resolution provides for emergency measures to be taken regarding this one aspect.

But although we believe that the suspension of atomic tests is of great importance justifying an urgent measure from the very beginning of negotiations, we do not nevertheless believe that this point can be separated completely from the item of disarmament, nor can it be the subject of a separate resolution. Because, although it may be true that to a large extent the suspension of atomic weapons tests is of human interest and therefore goes beyond the political, there can be no shadow of a doubt that in another sense this entire question of tests raises a type of problem that has to be considered when we consider the general question of disarmament.

The first and foremost of the problems dealing with disarmament, and, of course, including the question of nuclear tests, is the need for a plan to be adopted, but no plan, no resolution coming from our Organization can be intended or can result in an alteration of the distribution of military forces in such a way that one country or one group of countries can be strengthened, and another weakened by the implementation of such a resolution.
The United Nations was intended to guarantee peace, but within the realm of law. It did not have as its object to change those in power or, to use an old Spanish expression, "to be a king-maker or a king-breaker". The military power of countries is the result of historical processes which do not fall within the purview of the United Nations. That is why we, as an international Organization, have no right to propose measures that would bring about alterations in balance that would not be accepted by the States which considered themselves affected by such drafts or plans.

Here is where the most vulnerable point of the thesis opposing ours lies. In effect, in proposing the immediate and unconditional elimination of tests of nuclear weapons without referring such an elimination to the other aspects of disarmament, the Soviet Union does not limit itself to supporting a measure which can be understood as being of a wholly humanitarian nature. It is proposing a decision which, if adopted isolated from the rest, would alter the world balance of power. Because I do not think it is a mystery to any of us that what today is an element of the balance in the military field between the great Powers is simply that they do have atomic weapons, and it is well known that if these weapons were suddenly to be eliminated, the above-mentioned balance of power would be shattered immediately to the benefit of one of the parties and to the detriment of the other. Therefore, in order to avoid a situation where a resolution of our Organization would become paradoxically a weapon placed in the hands of a group of countries, we suggested and sponsored the formula of the balanced reduction, so much so that the proportion and the relation of forces that exist at present will still stand after our resolution has been implemented.

The seventeen-Power draft resolution -- and I point this out -- as the representative of India admitted, does contain the necessary elements for the achievement of the common aspirations of all peace-loving peoples. We, too, would like to be able to achieve the complete and absolute elimination of atomic weapons tests and the limitation of armaments. But we want to achieve this by a gradual and progressive method. No one can deny that such a procedure, although perhaps less spectacular would, in the long run, be much more efficient than the noisy adoption of a measure which, when studied, would turn out to be purely partial.
In the light of this opinion, it is perhaps understandable why we prefer suspension, which permits this equitable and integral agreement, to cessation, which would immediately place one of the parties in a position of irreparable imbalance. The representative of the Soviet Union has stressed the use of the word "cessation". He has said that he opposes the seventeen-Power draft resolution because, as he put it, he felt it was "insufficient". I do not think that this is the moment to get into a rather vexing grammatical or semantic discussion on the meaning of these words. But if what we are really seeking, if what we are truly interested in achieving is to get away from the danger of the physical damage that nuclear tests can cause, our draft resolution is not insufficient because, from the very beginning, it establishes one positive fact -- the interruption in the weapons tests. Whether this interruption is called "cessation" or "suspension" is but of slight importance in this case since, if it is carried out, nuclear tests would stop. And that, when all is said and done, is what is important and what does matter.

However, no result may be achieved in the forthcoming negotiations and perhaps atomic weapons tests may be renewed. But if this were unfortunately to occur it would mean that one of the parties concerned was not showing a sincere desire to achieve peaceful solutions. In that case, we could put but little hope in a drastic resolution which would completely eliminate nuclear tests because we would have reason to believe that such a drastic resolution would never be implemented.

We do not share that pessimistic view. We are convinced that the renewal of negotiations under the sign or symbol of atomic tests will place the question in the most favourable position it has been in in the last thirteen years since it first became a subject for discussion at the United Nations. But this will be the case only so long as we start from a basis which we believe to be indispensable in order for renewed negotiations to be held -- that is, that the views expressed by others, those differing from ours, may truly express the intentions of those formulating such views. If we do not start from this point, no negotiations are possible in our Organization. The systematic doubt cast on the sincerity and the true intentions of the other party breaks the rules of
the game on which the coexistence of civilized human beings must rest. Thus, if we begin by saying that our opponents do not believe what they say and do not say what they believe, then, this Organization, which is a great experiment in civilized coexistence between men, would be much better off by simply closing its doors.

For this reason and mainly for this reason, I listened with great concern when the representative of the Soviet Union stated the other day that the offer on the part of the United States to suspend nuclear tests was not so much intended to prepare an agreement on a final interruption, but rather to gain time for the planning of a new series of tests. This subjective argument is, dialectically speaking, inadmissible because it does not rest on any concrete proof, but, above all, passes judgement on intentions that we can neither invoke nor accept in this Assembly. Because, with the same right, others might utilize this same type of argument. Others might also hold, for example, that the desire shown by the Soviet Union for an immediate and permanent cessation of nuclear tests did not have as its origin a generous and humanitarian concern, but rather the use of collective emotions regarding the danger of new tests in order to weight the balance of power in its favour.
If, therefore, we are to criticize another's position, we must do it on the basis of reasons which that position may invoke, and not base our criticism on an invisible intention that we may desire to attribute to the other.

I should now like to say a few words regarding the amendment submitted by the delegation of Ireland in connexion with not giving nuclear weapons to countries that do not as yet have them. My delegation wishes to state that we fully understand the ideas underlying this proposal. It is an attempt to localize the fire while in the meantime the rest of us try to put the fire out. But we are really sorry that we cannot vote in favour of this draft amendment. The fact that a number of great Powers today possess atomic weapons is something that we cannot deny, and we agree that it is fortunate that the great majority of countries are not in a position to produce nuclear weapons. But we believe that to give a juridical stamp of approval to this situation of inequality would be to place a capitatis deminutio for the smaller nations which would perhaps widen the gap that separates the smaller nations from the so-called great countries.

Furthermore, even though it might be held that the limitation imposed does not in any way damage the principle of sovereignty because it would come from a decision really arrived at, it is obvious that the limitation in the use of atomic weapons, since it does not cover all States, would permanently diminish the possibility of those prohibited from handing over such weapons. However, since we understand the noble intentions of the delegation of Ireland in submitting this amendment, and also in tribute to a country with which my own is so closely linked, my delegation will not vote against this draft resolution but will abstain in the vote.

Disarmament is a problem that has technical aspects of undeniable importance, but in itself is not a technical problem. It is rather a political problem. It would therefore be of little use for us to try to find procedural formulas to limit armaments if we did not attack the cause of the arms race. Therefore, as has so often been said in the Committee, it is not a question of limiting armaments to diminish international tension but, on the contrary, to diminish tension so that, as a corollary, we can efficiently face the reduction of armaments. The reduction of international tension will
not be achieved by technical means, nor will it be achieved purely by moral exhortations. We will achieve it only if we find a political formula that will permit coexistence between Powers that are very different from one another, spiritually and ideologically. What that political formula may be is something that does not fall within the scope of the item before this Committee.

However, I should like to take the liberty of submitting that, if such a formula is to be viable, it must definitely take into account today's territorial and political status quo. This, I think, is a fact that must be borne in mind by all of us. And even though this status quo may put a seal of approval on obviously unjust situations, and even though we may consider the possibility that some of these might be revised through peaceful means and international negotiations, we must not allow this status quo to be altered by unilateral acts of violence. If what we wish to achieve by means of acts of aggression or by means of appeal to faits accomplis is carried out by means of violence, war will definitely follow, as the night follows the day.

I have given some of the reasons why Argentina has co-sponsored the fifteen-Power draft resolution on the question of disarmament. We believe that this draft is broad and effective and cannot give rise to polemics. We do not oppose the political position adopted by any country, and the fact that the most severe criticism leveled against our draft is that it is "insufficient" is the best tribute that can be paid to it.

Some may think that, from this day on, we might have achieved a complete elimination of nuclear tests. We have already given the reasons why this elimination seems to us neither equitable nor viable. But even those who do not share our views should prefer a gradual solution and a provisional solution to a total absence of any solution. This policy of all or nothing is not a policy that can give the most lasting results in international affairs.

In conclusion, may I say that my delegation profoundly hopes that effective negotiations will take place between the great world Powers. This meeting concerns us, and also concerns the representative of Mexico, and we too hope that the conference to be held in a few days in Geneva will be successful. We pray to God that He will shed His light on those who are to meet in Geneva
and on those great nations that will be represented there. We say to them that
to a large extent the happiness or the future unhappiness of humanity lies
in their hands. God will that our hope may not be disappointed.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): There are no other speakers
on the list for this afternoon. As the Committee has already been told,
the speakers' list will be closed at the end of tomorrow morning's meeting.
Therefore, I must appeal once again to those of you who wish to speak in the
general debate to be good enough to have your names placed on the list of
speakers.

The meeting rose at 4:40 p.m.