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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH MEETING
Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 20 October 1958, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:
Mr. Urquía (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10-15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries (continued)

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AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, I wish to congratulate you very cordially on your election. I should also like to congratulate the other officers of this Committee, your colleagues, on their elections. I know that you will be able to draw from this debate all that it can yield for peace.

Before setting forth the position of France, forgive me if I begin with a personal word; it is important to what I have to say. My presence here this year, as in the seven preceding years, is evidence of the continuity of French policy in matters of peace and disarmament.

A few hours before I boarded my plane from Paris on 9 October, the head of our Government, General de Gaulle, whom I had gone to see with our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Couve de Murville, repeatedly and very forcefully stressed the primordial nature of disarmament and the three-fold necessity to defend its general principles more persuasively than ever: to set forth once again, clearly and frankly, the immediate measures suggested by France; and finally, to endeavour to initiate solid achievements, in other words, a lessening of the risks of conflict and a lightening of the burden that men must bear.

During the general debate sixty-one heads of delegation devoted part of their addresses to disarmament. What better proof could there be of our common anguish.

But I fear -- and I say so frankly,-- that the evolution during these past years of the general plan, of which we were all dreaming, towards partial and limited agreements, which are thought easier of realization, sometimes hides from us our essential objective: to reduce armaments and the risks of conflict.
France, having accepted this method of limited studies, certainly does not retract its former statements. Yet this studies must be a step forward along the road to disarmament, not an illusion from which each would suffer in the end, nor the sanctioning of a status quo which everyone thinks unfortunate.

I am referring here especially to two points that have been debated at length: the halting of atomic tests and the reduction of military budgets.

It is easy to understand that everyone would like to see the halting of test explosions. However divergent may be the interpretations that are put on the report of the Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, popular wisdom prefers that, when in doubt, we abstain. The halting of tests would stop radioactive fallout -- the actual danger of which is open to discussion -- would lead to a beginning of international control and would perhaps improve relations between the atomic Powers.

Nevertheless, we find ourselves already confronted with two opposing interpretations, to which a third will soon be added. Some speak of the definitive cessation of tests; others of cessation for a year, conditionally renewable for twelve month periods -- a difference difficult to resolve at Geneva at the end of the month.

I shall be careful not to choose between these theses. I repeat, in the name of France, what I said here almost a year ago to the day, on 22 October 1957: "... we too wish to end test explosions, but that is not enough... We... want more than that for peace." (A/C.1/PV.877, pages 26 and 27)

This was a thesis which was then common to the men of the West and which is still ours in 1958 as it was in 1957. It is my duty to make this clear today when, it seems, its defenders are becoming less numerous.
(Mr. Moch, France)

In itself, the halting of tests, whether temporary or definitive, does not constitute real progress towards peace, if the atomic Powers increase -- or merely retain -- stocks of nuclear weapons that are already sufficient to destroy all life over vast stretches of the globe. Under one form or another, this measure furnishes a typical example of illusion and of the mere maintenance of the status quo: the illusion being the world's hope following a decision that would by no means reduce the risks of war or those of a universal contamination; the status quo -- and a detestable status quo -- being the maintenance, unchanged or increased, of stocks of devastating weapons in certain arsenals.

I am thus speaking most especially to the representatives of the non-atomic Powers and I say to them will all the persuasive force of which I am capable: "Watch out. By accepting, out of weariness, a solution which stills your immediate anxiety, you are seriously and in fact dangerously mortgaging the future of your States, for the benefit of a confirmed monopoly of nuclear weapons. You are running the risk, perhaps a mortal one, that once the tests have been halted and the fear of fall-out dissipated the stockpiles will continue to swell and, with them, the dangers of annihilation. Thus you have, we have, all of us have the duty towards our peoples to demand more than is offered us; to put an end to the hideous threat of atomic war; to force the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes -- I showed last year that this is fairly easily controllable -- and also the gradual reduction of these stockpiles, by transferring those materials to peaceful ends; and this too is verifiable. Supplies will remain, of course, in quantities that are unknown and uncontrollable; but we will know that, each year, they will diminish by specified tonnages.

"If you agree to dissociate the halting, temporary or definitive, of tests from the cessation of production and the reduction of stockpiles, you will doubtless experience a fleeting sense of relief, but you will have sacrificed -- for a long time, may definitively -- the essential to the incidental; you will have sacrificed real disarmament to fears that are perhaps exaggerated and, at the very least, by no means commensurate with the risks of a war. For we must not forget that the report of the Scientific Committee does not hold that the tests made to date are any more dangerous than peaceful applications of atomic energy or the natural effects of radioactivity."
In all seriousness, and at the risk, for which I apologize, of offending some representatives, I say this: to isolate the halting of tests is to seek an accost without any direct bearing on peace. It is not real progress but only an alibi.

Our position follows from these remarks. France ardently hopes never to possess a single atomic or thermonuclear bomb. The head of its Government told me this again on 9 October. But France places one condition on this renunciation: that, under international control, the atomic Powers of today cease to increase and begin to reduce their stockpiles. No other country will think of building such devices if the countries at present possessing them agree to reduce the reserves in their arsenals. Then, and only then, will a first step be made on the long road to nuclear disarmament.

If such an agreement should not be reached -- and I am still saying this in all seriousness -- France would not renounce a weapon which other countries already possessed and the number of which they would increase. France, too, would then proceed to tests, which it would make every effort to render harmless; methods of achieving this now exist.

I am fully aware how grave and even how strange this statement may appear in such a debate. I intimated this last year when, on 16 May 1957, I declared before the Sub-Committee in London:

"We regard the prohibition of production as essential. Unless it is decided upon, France will become the fourth atomic Power; other States will ... follow its example." (DC/SC.1/PV.116, p.6)

I then said to my colleagues:

"You will keep your lead -- we agree to that -- but not your monopoly.

If you consent to end the nuclear armaments race by ending the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, we, and others after us, will abandon all plans to carry out tests. Peace requires that this race be brought to an end."

Our position remains identical and I should like to explain the exact reasons for this.
We passionately desire disarmament. First, because during the last forty-four years we have suffered tragically from conflicts which have taken from us, or mutilated, more than one out of ten of our young men; further, because we can conceive of peace only in independence. Now, disarmament averts the threat which the most powerful armies exert on others in spite of the United Nations Charter. These are valid reasons for all our people and also for those united with it; for seventeen of the eighteen great Overseas Territories have just decided spontaneously, in a referendum without precedent in the history of the world, to adhere to a free, egalitarian and fraternal community.
As long as weapons are not destroyed, the security of this hundred million men, associated together for better or for worse, is based on alliances concluded between nations that have equal rights. This is a security that is certainly more precarious, more uneasy, than that of peace with disarmament, but a security that is precious in an uncertain world.

If the atomic Powers, therefore, maintain their nuclear arsenals, in the name of what arguments should France renounce the building of such an arsenal, however painful the decision may be to continue such a manufacture? Because two of its friends and allies already possess such weapons? That would be to deny the equality of rights. Because it would set off its first explosion a few years behind the other Powers? That would be to forget that period of war, of occupation, of martyrdom during which France not only had to interrupt all nuclear research, but, in addition, gave its inventions and its best scientists to its allies to help them perfect that awful weapon, which at that time symbolized deliverance. That would be to forget the long years when priority had to be given to the reconstruction of our key industries. Because its economy would lend itself less than that of others to the production of these weapons? That would be to deny that France's scientists -- the Jean Perrins, the Francis Perrins, the Kovarskis, the Goldschmidt and others -- and its industry have built reactors, have extracted plutonium from their rods, have attained the first elements from the isotope separation of uranium -- in brief, that they have accumulated the materials for these weapons, while producing energy for peaceful ends.

I did not intend to indulge in controversy during this address. I am forced, however, to challenge the opinion pronounced on 10 October by Mr. Zorin on part of the statement made to the Assembly on 25 September, 1958 by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Couve de Murville. The representative of the USSR accused him of using "dialectical acrobatics" because he discussed our nuclear policy frankly. Mr. Zorin, I admit -- and I tell him so cordially -- is more conversant than any of us in matters of dialectics, whether these are acrobatic or not. Is he not the one who has maintained, among other things, that control must be put fully into effect only when the process of disarmament is terminated, when distrust has disappeared, that is to say, when it has become
superfluous? Is he not the one who will admit only very insufficient rudiments of control at the beginning of the process, when this control is indispensable precisely in order to reduce mistrust and show to all that everyone is acting in good faith?

But I hasten to return to my subject.

I beg you to listen and understand us when we speak of the joy and relief with which we would abandon these unhealthy applications, but with equality for all, and with all the Powers together renouncing the stockpiling of such weapons.

I beg you to listen and understand us when we assert that the era of the atomic secret is over. It first belonged to a single nation; then to two; soon after, to three; next to four; a day later to yet others. In an admirable speech made on 1 September 1958 at the opening of the second Geneva Conference, our well-known scientist, Francis Perrin, who was presiding over the meeting, exclaimed:

"It is useless trying to put Prometheus back in chains ... To stop science, it would be necessary to kill in man that thirst for knowledge and for understanding which is one of the noblest aspects of his nature ... The secret development of atomic weapons; the dangerous illusion, which can arise at certain moments, of a decisive advantage being augmented by a sudden attack with the help of these weapons; the fear that springs from this -- all these factors may suddenly lead to a general and catastrophic war, growing out of a secondary war or even of a minor incident ... The greatest service rendered to peace by these international conferences is that they diminish the hold of secrecy over vast fields of scientific activity."

This secret -- which certain countries believe they still possess -- this secret which obstructs and slows down progress, which prevents science from playing its role of acting as a bond between men -- we are in the process of proving its futility, which is added to its permanent harmfulness. No one has helped us in the field of nuclear weapons, no one has supplied us with the least little bit of technical information. We had to create our atomic industry, while at the same time rebuilding the innumerable ruins accumulated on our soil, at a time when those of the First World War had barely been erased.
What we have rediscovered and are doing, can we assert that others will not attempt after us, if stockpiles are accumulating in certain countries? We wish, all of us, to avoid a situation in which other States, one after the other, would use this secret which is no longer a secret. We refuse, all of us, even to think of the world, a few decades hence, dotted with atomic stockpiles. But do not expect that a resolution banning only tests will put Prometheus back in chains. The other countries will agree, as will France, not to undertake such tests, but only if they are assured of our common return to the path of reason, to the path of life and hope, which is that of the halting of production for military purposes and the reduction of stockpiles. By any other course, you will only accumulate disappointments, failures and threats.
If I may be permitted -- bowing respectfully before a coffin that has barely been closed -- to borrow a thought from Pope Pius XII, I would say that the policy of France in the matter of nuclear disarmament is and remains rigorously in accordance with the proposition that appeared in His Easter message on 18 April 1954 and which I now quote:

"For our part, we will tirelessly endeavour to bring about by means of international agreement -- always in subordination to the principle of legitimate self-defense -- the complete proscription and outlawing of atomic, biological and chemical welfare."

Our position with regard to the draft resolutions introduced results from what I have just said. The negotiations between "Powers that have carried out explosions" will continue at Geneva without our participation. We therefore do not commit ourselves on texts related to them: paragraph A of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) of the seventeen Powers, the entire Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) except for its last paragraph, and the first four paragraphs of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1) of the thirteen Powers. Any tripartite agreement that might be signed at Geneva would, initially, be for us a res inter alias acta, a text drawn up without the participation of France and therefore not applying to it. As for France's future support of such a document, if it actually comes into existence, such support will depend upon circumstances which I shall not treat at greater length today.

The present debate, I repeat, is distorted in its very premises. We are no longer really discussing disarmament right now.

For all these reasons, we shall avoid committing ourselves on the texts relative to these negotiations. Speaking on a wholly pragmatic level, my friend the British Minister of State, Mr. Allan Noble, declared on 14 October that an eventual agreement at Geneva would not bind the Powers absent from these debates. We share his opinion and I congratulate him for having understood our position, just as I understand his. Such a document, as he has recognized, would commit France only to the extent to which France would support it later, in conditions to be determined when the time comes.

In order to define our position clearly and to show our constant fidelity to the idea of making a start toward effective disarmament, I should be rather
tempted to insert identical amendments, after the next to the last paragraph of
the Soviet draft resolution, after paragraph A-1 of that of the seventeen-Power
draft resolution, and after paragraph 2 of the thirteen-Power draft resolution.
This amendment would read as follows:

"Considers that this agreement -- that is, the agreement on the
discontinuance, definitive or provisional, of test explosions -- in order
to be accepted by all the Powers, and thus to be effective and really to
serve the cause of peace and disarmament, must also include precise clauses
on the cessation, under international control, of the production of
fissile materials for weapons purposes and on the gradual reconversion
to peaceful ends, and likewise under international control, of existing
stockpiles."

On another subject, we have before us a proposal of the Soviet Union which
takes up an idea developed by Mr. Edgar Faure, French President of the Council
at the Big Four Conference in 1955, relative to a reduction in military budgets
and to the transfer of a part of the credits thus made available to a fund for
the under-developed States.

Mr. Zorin has not recalled this seniority in age of this proposal. I in
no way blame him for this and I merely refer those whom the question interests
to the eight pages of document DC/SC.1/PV.51, of 29 August 1955, at London, which
is now three years old, and the principles of which the Soviet representative
have just rediscovered.

But the idea, as he presented it to us on 13 October of this year, is, as
it were, stripped of its contents. It is drained of its substance; it is
transformed into an illusion. For in fact how will the Powers be certain of
the reality of the reductions? The Soviet proposal contains no particulars
regarding controls. There is nothing in it that makes it possible to ensure
that the promised reductions will be carried out, or even that a lessening of
military expenditures will not result merely in the transfer of certain items to
civilian headings. Furthermore, Governments generally announce the credits
established, but they do not necessarily announce the later transfers of credits,
nor do they announce the payments actually authorized. What guarantee of compliance therefore is offered us? I have so often discussed this subject that I shall not dwell upon it, except to make a suggestion.

The separation of the technical aspect of disarmament problems from their political context is beyond any doubt a very happy innovation of this year, which has been fruitless in other respects. This is an idea that the French delegation has constantly proposed or supported. In his memorandum -- on which, may I say, I want very sincerely to congratulate him -- our Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, has very opportunely emphasized the value of these technical approaches, just as, following Mr. Francis Perrin, he has condemned the superstition of secrecy.

Why then should we not alter the Soviet proposal, which is unacceptable in its present form, and why should we not call for a conference of financial experts whom we should charge with studying the various military budgets of the principal Powers in order to compare them carefully, and perhaps to develop for the future either a uniform presentation, or at the very least a uniform content embracing all the forms of military activity of States. This would include scientific research for defence purposes. These same experts would also consider the very difficult problem of comparing actual expenditures with estimates and, let us hope, would find methods of control over the books of each State, thus guaranteeing that that State would fulfil its agreements. It seems to us that this technical research ought to precede any action towards reducing credits.

Incidentally, I should like to point out here the effort already accomplished by France in this regard for the benefit of the under-developed areas, not counting France's various contributions through the United Nations. From 1954 to 1956 France invested 300 billion francs per year, that is to say a quarter of its average military expenditures, in the economic, social and cultural development of the Territories for which it assumes special responsibilities. This effort was intensified in 1957 and will increase considerably in the next few years.
What Mr. Zorin now proposes to allocate to the under-developed regions consists of a tenth of the savings of 15 per cent to be achieved, that is, it comes to 1.5 per cent of the military budgets. As far as France is concerned, this percentage represents 20 billion francs, that is, roughly speaking, less than a fifteenth of what it is already devoting to the improvement of the lot of the underindustrialized populations.

Now I come to the guarantee against the possibility of a surprise attack, a subject upon which I hope an agreement will be reached. As in the nuclear field, France maintains the position defined in the quadripartite proposal of 29 August 1957.

We continue to favour aerial inspection based on the sort of premises we have suggested, along with ground control posts at carefully chosen points, and all this to be accompanied by the submission to the control body of inventories of fixed installations, of the numerical data and stationing points of military forces and certain specified armaments.

But in this field, as in others, technical progress on the one hand, and our ineffectuality during the past few years on the other, add to the difficulties of prevention. Toward the end of the Second World War, the ordinary range of artillery and rocket launchers was reckoned at about one-hundred kilometres maximum; the speed of aircraft did not exceed the speed of sound and the radius of action of fighter planes was extremely short. All these facts made possible the delimitation of relatively narrow sensitive zones.

This problem is infinitely more complex today when the range of weapons has become intercontinental; when nothing seems any more to limit the speed and radius of action of aircraft; when even the differences between powerful bombers with large crews, pilotless planes and rockets are becoming blurred. These are so many modifications that should call for an extension of the zones under surveillance.

But we know what opposition is encountered by projects that are too ambitious. That is why we are ready to study again in this Organization, and first of all on the military experts level, the general technical conditions and, if and when that point is reached, the configuration of the zones to be controlled. We therefore suggest such a meeting of experts.
In a related field, I shall very briefly mention the various suggestions towards creating, in certain sectors of the globe, zones of reduced armament and of reduced military density. These zones could serve as pilot areas for international control. Their existence would certainly cut down the risks. But this idea, which in itself is attractive, raises such difficulties of a strategic, tactical and political nature that it would be impossible to study it here and now, and this should be submitted to experts representing the Powers most directly concerned with their creation. I shall therefore merely bring it to your attention in this review of the efforts to be pursued toward peace.

From the point of view of disarmament there is still one field to be explored, at least from the point of view as it is being explored by the artificial satellites of our planet. We must establish a law for outer space, like the law still overly disputed -- of the high seas. We must also be able to limit these explorations to scientific research, while waiting to send up peaceful pioneers of the ether. We must forever banish the haunting fear that would result from the circulation of satellites carrying nuclear warheads, whose artillery rockets could alter the trajectory so as to make possible, at a chosen hour, the devastation of a continent.

France has always declared itself ready to participate in any juridical and scientific conference organized for this purpose. France considers that the internationalization and the neutralization of these outer spaces is imperative and can be more easily achieved before there is any great increase of satellites of a military nature. I shall reserve our further explanations until the discussion of that particular point on the agenda has begun.

There still exists a procedural difficulty: the work of the Disarmament Commission is blocked by conditions that are well known. There is a stalemate posing two problems that do not appear at this point on the agenda, but with your permission I should like to discuss them because of the shortness of my stay here this year.

First of all, shall we revive this Commission, and eventually its Sub-Committee before the meetings of the committees of experts, whose creation we are suggesting? How shall its composition then be altered in order to permit it to function normally?
My delegation feels that it would be better for the Commission to meet without delay. It would then summon the various committees of experts, as we suggested in 1957; they would receive from the Commission directions as to the questions to be examined; they would report to it instead of leading an independent and perhaps anarchic life outside the United Nations, should their number increase. I do not think that I would be the only one to see in this work outside the United Nations a cause for disorder and for future difficulties. However, we are placing such hope in these technical conversations that if a premature re-establishment of the Commission were to be a cause of delay in the work of the groups of experts, we would prefer to postpone the meeting of the Commission, rather than delay that of the technical committees.

As for the second difficulty, we consider it to be an artificial one and do not attach great importance to it. Actually, the Commission can reach agreement only by unanimous decision. Therefore, the number of representatives of the various parties is of but little importance since de facto if not de jure, each party exercises the right of veto. That is why we are prepared to make all the necessary concessions in order to restore harmony. We should like to add, however, one comment: our interest in the proportion of representatives from each tendency or each "bloc" is as little as our dread is great at the hypertrophy of an organism devoted to continuous, detailed and delicate work.
Only a very limited number of drafters can put into its final form an agreement that is difficult to reach and then to draw up. Let us modify, therefore, the composition of the Commission in order to solve the dilemma, but let us reduce its total membership as much as possible, or, if that offends certain delegations, let us, then, without delay, decide upon the recreation of a sub-committee which, in order to be able to work effectively, should not, in our opinion, include many more members than the old one in London.

One final remark on these procedural questions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico was kind enough to recall the rapid but useful work achieved by a committee of four members, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Mr. Vyshinsky and myself, which met in Paris under his chairmanship at the end of 1951. We, Mr. Padilla Nervo and I, are the only members of that group who are present among you today. I am happy to confirm the impression he has retained of those meetings and I say to him that, if the Assembly accepts his suggestion of reviving a temporary body of that sort, I am prepared to work immediately with it in the name of France and to bring it all my devotion and my love for peace. I make the same reply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland. To us, form is of little importance so long as we can make progress with regard to substance.

Last year, I recalled the permanent principles that must underlie our action. First, we believe that any disarmament agreement must be unanimously supported by the States directly concerned. Who can hope to impose such agreements on a minority through a majority vote? This unanimity will be possible if the agreement increases the security of all the parties at each stage, and not the security of some to the detriment of others. This is a primary condition.

We believe, secondly, that the universal increase of security is conceivable only if disarmament, even if partial, extends to all fields simultaneously. To limit disarmament to its conventional aspect alone would augment the security of the atomic Powers to the detriment of the others. To limit it to measures of an atomic nature would reinforce the security of peoples who have powerful armies of the conventional type at their disposal, at the expense of the atomic Powers. It is therefore imperative to let the axe fall everywhere at once and to do so on the hypothesis of partial and limited disarmament, as well as on the hypothesis of a general agreement.
Thirdly, we are convinced that today -- and over the last twelve years -- mistrust has dominated international relations. It seems to us futile to look for the causes, which are often shared. Let us beware of this harmful discussion about past responsibilities which irritates people's susceptibilities. Let us make every effort to draw a veil over the whole past, to combat mistrust in the future, without accusing one another of having provoked it. Let us avoid in our initial agreements all assurances that are solemn but vague, all prohibitions that are attractive but uncontrollable, that assume a confidence that is still nonexistent. Let us admit frankly that each one of us, prejudging the others of bad faith, will not be satisfied with assurances but will demand tangible accomplishments, that is to say, accomplishments that are immediately controllable. Hence the role, which is our opinion is essential, of controls. Not that we have ever thought of substituting controls for disarmament, an idea which has at times been wrongly attributed to us. When I speak of controls, I think of the control of disarmament, not of weapons, even though at times, in order to verify how much one is subtracting from a total, one must first of all know what that total is.

In the fourth place, we believe that the need to re-establish this international confidence sets the limits of disarmament that is at present practicable. Indeed, in accordance with the preceding principle, we are opposed to uncontrolled disarmament, which neither dissipates doubts, proves the good faith of others nor re-establishes confidence. Neither do we agree to controls without disarmament, which does not consolidate peace any more than the mere suspension of nuclear tests, but is related to the illusions of which I spoke earlier. We recognize, on the other hand, that in the present mood of mistrust, certain Powers, more easily offended than others, or less inclined to open wide their frontiers, refuse to submit to certain controls, declaring that they will accept them only when confidence has been re-established. That is to say, in our opinion, when they will have become superfluous, as nobody would then ascribe criminal designs to his neighbour.

This argument seems to us to be contrary to reason. In our opinion, controls are most useful during times of great mistrust. But we have agreed, however, to make concessions on this position, however irrational we deem it to be. From
this we deduce the necessity of limiting initial disarmament to measures whose control is immediately accepted, and we will patiently await future extensions of disarmament and, correspondingly, of controls, which we are convinced no one will be able to reject.

Thus, supported by facts, we come back to the permanent thesis of the French delegation: no disarmament without controls; no controls without disarmament; but as much progressive disarmament as is presently controllable.

This is our permanent, lasting and reasonable objective. We suggest this year that we approach it by technical means, that we come to an agreement regarding the composition of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee and that we summon committees of technical, military, legal and financial experts in order to study the following questions -- if possible, under the authority of the Commission or, failing this, on their own:
1. Composition of the military budgets of the chief Powers and means of controlling reductions.

2. Reduction and control of armed forces and certain specified armaments in accordance with the principles on which a general agreement, without particulars, was reached last year.

3. Control of the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and of a start toward conversion of stockpiles to peaceful ends, in accordance with the thesis I have been developing.


5 and 6. Control of outer space and international law relative to outer space. This obviously assumes the existence of two distinct groups of experts.

Perhaps at the end of these lengthy explanations the Committee will excuse me for stressing once more the constancy of our position. We have already suggested in previous years the formation of these various groups of experts. The Committee will find the general outlines of our positions on these groups of experts in my statements before the Sub-Committee in London on 29 August 1955, and 16 May, 6, 21 and 29 August 1957. The verbatim records, which are available to members are numbered DC/SC.1/PV.51, 116, 131, 149 and 153.

The only group of experts that has materialized -- the one charged with working out an effective control of the suspension of test explosions -- has had such great technical success that I am impelled to ask for the general application of this method despite the reservations again expressed by Mr. Zorin, which I hope he will withdraw. Surely he, like us, has been able to note the advantages of the technical approach to political problems. I hope, too, that certain delegations of other countries with which we have strong ties of friendship but which formerly believed that it would be premature to increase the number of committees of experts will now share our unwavering belief in their usefulness.

It is true that even if we revive the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee and if we decide to form the six groups of experts, we shall not have achieved any immediate progress in disarmament but we shall have sown the seeds for future harvests, and thus we shall have rectified a situation that had been compromised and, in part at least, responded to the hopes of the world.
Mr. ALEMAYEHU (Ethiopia): The question of disarmament is perhaps by far the most important item every year on the agenda of the General Assembly, as it affects the security and, indeed, the very existence of mankind on this planet. And yet it is one with regard to which United Nations achievement stands low compared to its other achievements in the political, economic and social fields.

I do not believe it is necessary for me to elaborate in great detail on the reasons which have complicated the solution of the disarmament problem, since they are very well known to all. They are political, ideological, psychological, and many others, so intricately woven together that they have given rise to the prevailing sense of fear, suspicion and insecurity. Had these problems, which have divided this shrinking world of ours into two worlds and which are the main sources of the prevailing sense of fear, suspicion and insecurity, been solved individually, there is no doubt that the solution of the disarmament problem would have been easier and the world would have been happier.

However, unfortunately their solution seems to require much more time than the security of the world allows. The security of the world demands that first things must be done first. In this case, the first thing is to relieve the peoples of the world of the dreadful nightmare of nuclear destruction. Positive action by the General Assembly to relieve the world of the fear of nuclear war would be good, I believe, not only per se but would also facilitate the solution of other fundamental problems.

I think I would not be wrong in saying that in principle the peoples of every land and their Governments, including those now in possession of nuclear weapons, agree with the general view that nuclear warfare must be prevented, that nuclear weapons that have been manufactured and are now in stock must be destroyed, and that the further testing of nuclear weapons must be stopped. This has been reiterated in many exchanges of communications between the leaders of the great Powers as well as in statements of their representatives both inside and outside the United Nations. There seems, therefore, to be a unanimity among the peoples of all lands to disapprove of the use of atomic and hydrogen power for war purposes. The only difference in the views among the great Powers, as far as my delegation is aware, is how this agreement in principle
should be translated into practical application. But it must be admitted that this is not an easy task, especially if it has to be undertaken alone by those same great Powers that are parties to the disagreement.

In the view of my delegation the task which the great Powers have been asked to undertake alone -- namely, to eliminate their differences and to reach agreement on matters which each side considers vital and at a time when the security of one side seems to be threatened by the other -- appears to be not only extraordinarily difficult but also unusual. And yet this is what has been done by the United Nations so far.

It has often been said here that the question of disarmament is primarily the concern of the great Powers and that the middle-sized and smaller Powers have little to do about it. As a result of this passive attitude of the middle-sized and smaller Powers, which constitute the great majority of the United Nations, the General Assembly took the same attitude regarding the question of disarmament as that of the majority of its Members. Thus, the action of the General Assembly regarding this vital question has been limited so far to recommendations to the great Powers to seek agreement on the solution of the disarmament problem. My delegation believes that if the middle-sized and smaller Powers would join hands, the General Assembly could do more than merely make recommendations, and this ultimately would assist the great Powers in their difficult task.

I am not in any way saying that the General Assembly did not make efforts in seeking a solution of the disarmament problem, nor do I say that the great Powers did not do their best to reach agreement on their differences in this matter. In fact the General Assembly has taken up the question of disarmament at its regular session every year, and the debates thereon have always been long and heated. Similarly, the great Powers have met in many commissions and sub-committees and have even made encouraging progress on some aspects of the disarmament question, encouraging progress for which my delegation wishes to congratulate them, because such progress could not have been possible under the prevailing difficult and most delicate circumstances had they not exerted determined effort.
So there is no question of lack of interest in both cases, but there seems to be something wrong in the procedure of approaching the whole problem.

It is the view of my delegation, therefore, that, if the General Assembly is to assist the great Powers in their difficult task and if its effort is to achieve the desired objective of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear and thermonuclear field, then it should change its traditional attitude; it should take more positive steps than it has done so far; it should move from indirect to direct action. It should make declarations of guiding principles, in particular, on nuclear weapons, instead of recommendations. Such declarations made by eighty-one States, constituting the vast majority of the States of the world and supported by world public opinion, would have tremendous influence on the attitude of individual Governments and would induce them to conform in their way of thinking and action to the will of the great majority of the peoples and Governments of the world.

Such declarations could also pave the way to the signature of more concrete treaties, conventions and protocols, as occurred in the past and about which I am going to say something in a moment. Declarations of principles in other fields are not new to the United Nations either. The Declaration of Human Rights, which has now almost become a standard rule of conduct for States, and which is now being transformed into binding covenants, and the declaration on the crime of genocide, which led to the signature of the Genocide Convention, are outstanding examples of such declarations.

Similar declarations of principles, particularly in the field of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, would seem to my delegation to be timely and helpful in all present and future negotiations on the comprehensive disarmament question and would also enhance the prestige of the United Nations before world public opinion, as discharging its responsibility in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the Charter.

I am therefore going to submit a concrete view, for the consideration of the Committee, which my delegation believes would be helpful in the solution of the nuclear and thermonuclear aspects of the disarmament question, along the lines that I suggested a moment ago for the General Assembly to follow. But, before I do that, I should like to request your permission to make some slight digressions
from the immediate subject and to refer very briefly to some historical parallels which, in the opinion of my delegation, have a bearing on the proposal that I am going to make.

Towards the close of the last century, the development of certain substances having the capacity of wide diffusion, such as poison gas and related materials, and the possibility of use for war purposes, gave rise to widespread apprehension among the peoples of the world.

It was thought then that, while the object of the opposing parties in war is to weaken the enemy through disabling as many combatant forces as possible, the employment of these substances and materials, with their capacity of wide diffusion and the causing of human suffering, would exceed this object. It was believed that, were these substances of wide diffusion to be used as weapons in war, not only would they cause unnecessary human suffering to the combatants in the field but they would also cause such physical and mental suffering to the civilian population within wider range, and that, this being beyond the scope of war, the employment of these substances of wide diffusion as weapons of war must be prohibited as being contrary to the laws of humanity.

Poison gas and related materials were not used as war weapons in any conflicts then. It was only their possible use in future wars that gave rise to such widespread apprehension. There was no organized community of nations to which the security of the world was entrusted then.

Yet it seems that the leaders of the various nations of those days were more responsive to popular demands than those of our times. It seems that the leaders and statesmen of those days were more far-sighted and more interested in the preservation of man and his civilization than those of our time, because they responded to the popular demands when they met in conference and made a declaration of principle prohibiting the employment in war of poison gas and other materials of wide diffusion and causing human suffering as being "contrary to the laws of humanity". This, as we all know, is the famous declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. This Declaration was followed later by other declarations, conventions and protocols, of which I should like to quote some passages by way of example.
The Declaration of the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 states:

"The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the powers represented at the International Peace Conference at the Hague..., inspired by the sentiments which found expression in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of the 29th November (11th December) 1868, declare as follows: The Contracting powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles, the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases."

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 follows:

"The undersigned Plenipotentiaries etc..., Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, have been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in treaties to which the majority of powers of the world are parties; and to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; Declare: That, the high contracting parties, so far as they are not parties to treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. The high contracting parties will exert every effort to induce other states to accede to the present Protocol".

I do not think there is any doubt that the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 and the subsequent conventions and protocols, such as those I have referred to, and to which the majority of the States represented here are parties, have greatly contributed to the discouragement not only of the use but also of the production of those materials the employment of which in war was considered to be contrary to the laws of humanity.

As to whether nuclear radiation has something in common with those substances and materials the use of which for war purposes was condemned as being contrary to the laws of humanity by those declarations, conventions and protocols to which I have just referred, my delegation believes that the answer would be in the affirmative. They are both delivered from the ground, sea and air;
both are capable of wider diffusion than their target in the military sense; and both cause unnecessary human suffering, physical and mental, among non-combatant civilian populations, exceeding military objectives.

The only difference is that nuclear and thermonuclear radiation and all the evils generated therefrom have much worse ill-effects than those condemned by the declarations, conventions and protocols to which I referred a moment ago, and that the ill-effects of nuclear radiation far exceed those of poison gas and related substances, both in time and in space.
If then the use of less dangerous weapons was prohibited as being contrary to the laws of humanity, by a less organized community, in a less enlightened period of time, why should we, who claim to represent a more organized community of civilized nations, who claim to live in a more enlightened period of time, allow mankind and its civilization to be destroyed through the use of the most cruel and inhuman means?

No, Mr. Chairman, the peoples of the world whom we represent here, do not want this to happen. People in every land and in every walk of life, even individual governments including governments now in possession of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, unanimously condemn not only the use of these weapons in war, but also their manufacture and testing. It is only a collective, formal condemnation by the United Nations of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for war purposes, which is lacking.

The United Nations must therefore act in conformity with the general will of the peoples whom it represents and formally ban the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for war purposes, as being a crime against mankind. Such a declaration by the United Nations may not perhaps put an immediate end to the production of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, but it would seem quite natural that a declaration prohibiting the use of such weapons for war purposes would tend ultimately to make their production and testing unnecessary.

This universal condemnation of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in war is, in the view of my delegation, an additional guarantee against violation of an agreement renouncing those weapons, which might be reached between the nuclear Powers, and would therefore help them to reach such agreement.

But a declaration of this magnitude must be universal to exert maximum influence upon all concerned and to achieve the desired objective; and it is therefore, to that end, that I appeal on behalf of my delegation and of my country, particularly to the middle and smaller Powers, to join hands in this worthy endeavour.
If the general idea is acceptable to the members of the Committee, the Assembly could make a declaration at this session, a tentative text of which I am going to read. The text may be amended and improved provided its purpose is fully achieved, and it can be formally introduced with other co-sponsors at a later stage, after we have heard the views of the members thereon.

Now, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I should like to read the tentative text of the declaration I have referred to.

The General Assembly,

Mindful of its responsibility under the Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security as well as in the consideration of principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments;

Considering that, while the progress made in the field of disarmament is slow, the rapid development of modern weapons of mass destruction and wide diffusion coupled with the tense world situation makes it imperative for the United Nations to take all precautionary measures designed to mitigate human suffering which might result from any possible war;

Recalling that, under similar circumstances in the past, precautionary measures, taken by the civilized community of the world in prohibiting, through declarations, conventions and protocols, the use for war purposes, as contrary to the laws of humanity, of certain weapons and substances of wide diffusion and causing human suffering, have greatly contributed to the discouragement of the use of those weapons and substances in subsequent wars;

Recalling that, weapons and substances prohibited from being used in wars as being contrary to the laws of humanity by the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which the majority of Member States of the United Nations have been parties, were those projected by any means and having wide diffusion and causing human suffering;

Considering that, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons projected by any means, have wide diffusion and cause human suffering to an immeasurably great scale;
1. **Declares** that nuclear, thermonuclear and all related substances to be weapons of wide diffusion and causing human suffering within the meaning of the aforesaid declarations, conventions and protocols and as such their use in war to be prohibited as being contrary to the laws of humanity;

2. **Declares** further, States using nuclear, thermonuclear and all related weapons and/or substances in wars, to be acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as such to be committing crime against mankind and its civilization;

3. **Recommends** that, a United Nations Conference of "Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons for War Purposes" be called as soon as possible to sign a convention outlawing the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in war;

4. **Appeals** to all States, Members and non-Members of the United Nations to become parties to the Convention;

5. **Requests** the Secretary-General to make the necessary preparations, including preparation of a draft convention for the use of the conference, and to report on the result achieved by the Conference to the [session] of the General Assembly.

This, therefore, is the tentative text that I should like to submit for the consideration of the Committee. As I said, it is not a formal proposal, but it is a suggestion with regard to which action could be taken if the Committee would agree.

Now, with regard to other matters I should like you to allow me to speak at a later stage on the various draft resolutions, including that to which my delegation is a co-sponsor.

**Mr. SHANAHAN** (New Zealand): Mr. Chairman, as this is my first intervention in our debate, may I take this opportunity to offer my congratulations to you, to your colleagues, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur, and to express to you my delegation's confidence, that under your experienced leadership our deliberations here will be truly fruitful.

It would, I believe, be a fair comment on our experience during the last decade to say that hitherto most of us have approached our annual debate on disarmament strong in hope, but not in confidence of success. Optimism has seldom been the prevailing mood.
The problem is of universal concern. The possibility of surprise attack creates an atmosphere of acute tension. A large part of the world's resources is drawn away from the urgent needs of human welfare to support retaliatory strength in instant readiness. It is especially disturbing that this condition should persist when so many countries stand in need of additional capital to finance their plans for the economic betterment of their peoples.
My delegation shares the Secretary-General's view that the United Nations "must welcome and be associated with all real progress in disarmament, in whatever forum it is achieved." (A/3596, page 4)

For most of this year, that association has been incomplete. I do not propose today to enter into a detailed discussion of the manner in which it can be made more effective. I do, however, wish to say how helpful and useful my delegation has found the observations made by Prince Wan and Mr. Sidney Smith of Canada. These are of direct and practical importance. All of us, I am sure, will want to have that in mind in seeking the best means to ensure the discharge by this Organization of its responsibility in an issue which is related in the most direct sense to the fundamental aim of the Charter. The maintenance of international peace and security is the sine qua non, the indispensable condition for the fulfilment of the other purposes of our Organization.

But the history of United Nations endeavours to regulate and reduce armaments has for too long been one of lost opportunity; of initiatives that have come to nothing; of unanimity only on the certainty of disagreement. Principles attracting wide general support have remained mere abstractions, ineffectual guides towards action that has never been taken.

We have been eloquent in our diagnosis of the evil, but we have done perilously little to cure it. We have advanced, not in harmony, but only in our capacity to destroy ourselves. Our immobility in negotiation has been very different from the swift course of the arms race and the multiplication of its dangers.

Yet if the years of our activity have had no other effect, they have, I believe, helped to clarify our objectives. They have helped to isolate our differences, if not to reconcile them. And, within the United Nations, they have added to the efforts of the great Powers, on whom progress must depend, the conviction and the hope of Governments and of peoples in every region of the world.

When the Assembly addressed itself at its twelfth session to the disarmament problem, it did so against the background of almost six months of intensive negotiation in the Disarmament Sub-Committee. After a most thorough examination of the two divergent sets of proposals emerging from the Sub-Committee,
the Assembly gave its endorsement, by an emphatic majority, to the programme of partial measures suggested by the Western Powers.

The New Zealand delegation supported that programme as a practical and sensible one which was fully capable of being controlled and which would neither accentuate any existing security imbalance, nor create any. We believed -- and still believe -- that measures of this character, with whatever modifications may be necessary to meet changed circumstances, could provide the essential elements for a first-stage agreement on disarmament. They would, of course, be a long way from the comprehensive solution which the world community expects from the major military Powers. While a comprehensive scheme of controlled disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, cannot be regarded as an early prospect, it must, however, remain the ultimate objective. As we were reminded last year by the representative of France, the long-term need is to replace "antagonistic blocs condemned to a precarious existence" with world-wide security based on complete disarmament, completely controlled. Nevertheless, the initial measures to which I have referred would, if made effective, strengthen confidence and mark an important beginning in genuine disarmament.

We know what response the Assembly received from one of its most important members. The other participants in the Sub-Committee laid emphasis on the flexibility of their approach, on the fact that they were presenting their plan, not as a dictate but as a working document and a basis for discussion. The Soviet Union acknowledged the central concern of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, but, in spite of that, the Assembly found itself at the end of the twelfth session in a double deadlock, both on substance and procedure, lacking even the means of renewing negotiation in the bodies which it had expressly created for the purpose.

No one will question the truth that without the consent and co-operation of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the major Western democracies on the other, there can be no disarmament, nor any beginning in disarmament. In this issue, which as a critical bearing on vital national interests, progress must depend on unanimity. That must obviously be an essential condition of agreement. Whatever the forum may be, and whatever may be recommended by majority rule, the veto is a reality in this question. For this Committee, and
the other representative United Nations forums of discussion, the essential aim should be to encourage the continuance of the disarmament dialogue on sound and practical lines. New Zealand has always sought to assist this objective.

My delegation does not, however, agree -- as has been suggested here -- that the twelfth session of the Assembly attempted either to dictate the terms of the Sub-Committee's deliberations, or to establish debating advantages for one side, or to substitute arbitrary Assembly recommendations for the decisions to be arrived at in private meetings through free discussion and negotiation.

We regret that the Soviet Union chose to interpret last year's resolution in that light. We are equally regretful that this year the Soviet delegation, in its draft resolution on the discontinuance of nuclear testing, should ask the Assembly to endorse an approach which exposes itself to the very criticisms which the Soviet Union levelled against the Assembly a year ago.

During last year's debate, my delegation said that New Zealand anxiously awaited the time when the conditions necessary for the cessation of nuclear tests could be established. It has been my Government's consistent desire to see the early conclusion of an international accord to bring about the end of testing by all countries with adequate safeguards against violation. We have accordingly been heartened to observe the progress which has been made in recent months on this issue. Aspects of this progress are: the agreement of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to enter into technical discussions to decide whether test detonations of nuclear weapons could be detected; the agreement of the experts who met in Geneva that this objective could be achieved and how it could be done; and acceptance by the three Governments of the findings of the experts and their agreement to start negotiations at the end of this month on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report.

These developments are greatly to be welcomed, both because progress was achieved and because both sides acted in a spirit of greater accommodation. We are encouraged to expect that, in this spirit, the forthcoming Geneva negotiations will be brought to an early and successful conclusion. To assist
this result, we believe that the Assembly should leave the participants in the negotiations in no doubt as to the importance it attaches to their efforts to reach an early agreement.

My delegation is also of the opinion that the Assembly should pursue the opportunity presented by the offers of the two Western Powers to suspend their tests for one year from 31 October, and to urge the three participants in the conference to suspend their tests while the negotiations are being carried out. Our views on these points are fully reflected in the seventeen-Power draft resolution of which New Zealand is a co-sponsor. It would, we think, be consistent with the spirit of that draft resolution and highly desirable if all countries were to refrain from testing while the Geneva talks were in progress.
I have already indicated that last year New Zealand was one of the fifty-six countries which supported the Western proposals linking a cessation of tests with other measures, including a cessation of the production of nuclear material for weapons. These were, regrettably, rejected by the Soviet Union, though they were in our view good proposals. If they had been accepted when they were put forward a year ago we might by now have had the agreed test suspension which is so urgently needed. Their acceptance might also have cut through the cloud of doubt and frustration which has surrounded the problem of control measures. It might have opened the way to checking the deadly flow of weapons manufacture. It would have brought other significant benefits, but no agreement on the suggestions for partial disarmament has so far proved possible.

In the circumstances, and in full awareness of the strong arguments which exist for maintaining the links established in last year's resolution, the New Zealand Government has come to share the view that if a wider agreement cannot be found at the present time there would be value in seeking a separate agreement to end tests independently of other measures, for reasons of a most compelling nature.

First, it would end the problem of radioactive fall-out from explosions which has been so disturbing to public opinion throughout the world. The Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation has, we feel, done much to clarify this issue in its report. Although many of its scientific findings are of necessity preliminary only, the Committee records the important conclusion that all steps designed to minimize irradiation of human beings, including cessation of nuclear tests, will act to the benefit of human health.

Second, it would, if it were universal in its application, rule out the danger -- which otherwise seems inevitable -- that efficient nuclear weapons will be developed by an ever-increasing number of countries. We usually look to the present nuclear Powers as being responsible, for we would be loath to regard them as ready to provoke a nuclear conflict, either through rashness or by design, but it would become progressively more difficult to feel this assurance if, in the absence of an agreement to end tests, more and more countries attained nuclear capability. I do not want my comments on this point to be misunderstood. The
assertion is not that the present nuclear Powers are inherently more responsible than other countries. What I am saying is that, sooner or later, if we do not put a stop to testing then these weapons, and with them the fate of humanity, could fall into the hands of tomorrow’s Hitler, in whatever country he might rise to power. We must seek most assiduously to avoid the situation to which Mr. Dulles referred in the Assembly last year when he spoke of nuclear weapons spreading

"promiscuously throughout the world, giving irresponsible persons a power for evil that is appalling even to contemplate". (A/PV.680, paragraph 31)

On Friday last we heard a lucid and most impressive analysis of this aspect of the problem from the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland. It follows from what I have said about the dangers which could flow from the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons that my delegation finds itself in sympathy with many of the views which have been put forward in that statement. With Ireland, New Zealand shares the hope that sovereign States, in the interests of their sovereign rights and in the wider interests of peace, will not acquire nuclear weapons by manufacture and will forgo the right to develop them. This, we most earnestly believe, would be a renunciation which would meet with universal and positive results.

There are, of course, other means besides manufacture whereby States can acquire these weapons. I refer to the question of transfer which is raised in the first paragraph of the additions proposed by Ireland to the operative paragraphs in section A of the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205). That amendment (A/C.1/L.207) would have the Assembly urge the nuclear Powers to refrain from supplying nuclear weapons to other States. My delegation hopes that this suggestion will receive the serious consideration of the Powers concerned. There is, of course, a practical difficulty -- a difficult which the sponsors of the proposal have already recognized. Such an appeal must derive its strength not from the knowledge that if it is met compliance can be enforced, but only from the hope that the concern it expresses is shared by all the nuclear Powers.
There is no avoiding the fact that the dominant attitude in great Power relations at the present time is distrust. Having in mind the primacy of the principle of control, it must be asked whether the nuclear Powers would be ready to enter into the desired undertaking without the assurance that practical measures could be devised to protect them against the consequence of non-compliance on the part of others. I believe that it is accepted that as there are at present no means of detecting unexploded nuclear stocks there are no means of ensuring the necessary controls over the transfer of these stocks.

The third benefit of an agreement to suspend tests is that it would establish for the first time a world-wide inspection system. This, in our view, is really the key to disarmament, and it is encouraging to know that at least in one limited field it has been possible to remove the issue of control from the realm of controversy and propaganda. The fact that the experts have shown that a control system is feasible has therefore cleared away one major difficulty in the way of political agreement. Moreover, if such an organ can be made to work successfully the experience gained in its operation will, as the Secretary-General has observed in his memorandum,

"be invaluable preparation for implementing, with the least delay, further world-wide inspection and control systems as agreements are reached on other disarmament measures." (A/3936, paragraph 7)

The fourth and perhaps the most important benefit which we would hope would come from an agreement to end tests under effective international control -- and I would stress those words -- is a lowering of tension and an increase in understanding and international confidence. It can hardly be gainsaid that this is badly needed. In the present state of relations among the great Powers the absence of confidence must be taken for granted. The Soviet representatives in this Assembly, for their part, made this clear in presenting their Government's interpretation of the motives and policies of the other two nuclear Powers. The Soviet Government has, moreover, provided in its recent decision to resume weapons tests a striking demonstration of the part which suspicion and fear for national security can play in the sinister dynamics of the armed race. If an agreement to end tests can serve to increase confidence even in a slight degree, it is to be welcomed for that reason alone.
That point, it will be recalled, was well made by the representative of India in his intervention in our debate on Friday afternoon last. My delegation would not wish to ignore the difficulties which must be overcome in order to complete an agreement even on the limited issue of ending tests. It is evident that the forthcoming negotiations are bound to raise complicated problems of immediate as well as longer-term importance. One, to which my Prime Minister has already referred in the Assembly's general debate, is the universal application of whatever may be agreed upon at Geneva by the three nuclear Powers. There is in this connexion -- and I wish to emphasize this -- the extension of the control system to the mainland of China.

For the reasons I have indicated, my delegation regards a properly safeguarded agreement to end tests as an urgent necessity. As far as we are concerned, those reasons have overwhelming force. I feel bound to observe however -- and I do so not in qualification of what I have already said but to emphasize a point to which we attach much importance -- that one of the substantial benefits we look for in a test suspension would be lost if the suspension were not to be the prelude to a wider disarmament agreement.
Certainly the halting of tests should limit the capacity of countries not now possessing nuclear weapons to produce their own nuclear armaments. In this sense at least it would reduce the possibility of nuclear war; but it would not in itself reduce the risk of war among countries which already have atomic weapons and the means of adding to their stocks. It is hard to see how this can be seriously questioned. We consider it imperative, therefore, that, immediately there is agreement on the suspension of tests, efforts should be renewed to achieve measures of genuine disarmament. These must be balanced measures. They must bring reductions in conventional as well as nuclear armaments.

The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs very properly reminded us this morning that we cannot tackle one aspect of disarmament without tackling the others. In his memorandum the Secretary-General has mentioned the possibilities presented by "a technical approach to such subjects as leave room for study of a non-political nature". My delegation shares the view, which is, of course, not a novel one, that all such possibilities should be promptly and fully explored. The technical approach admittedly has its limitations, but it would be wrong to conclude from this that to stress the technical approach is to attempt to obscure the issues of substance.

Unanimity among technical experts on what is needed to verify compliance with specific disarmament undertakings will not mean much if a unanimous decision cannot be reached at the political level to enter into disarmament undertakings. It seems equally clear, however, that Governments which are sincerely anxious to have disarmament but which do not trust each other will attach no value to acts of faith alone; they will want to be satisfied that they can be protected against non-compliance before they commit themselves. Technical studies of inspection and control systems, therefore, have a contribution to make in the essential process of building confidence. But technical approach has demonstrated its value in the case of nuclear testing and there is, we believe, scope for its fruitful application in other fields. We accordingly welcome the decision which has been taken to study the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack. We look forward to the beginning of similar studies on initial disarmament measures.
In our view, the key to the development of the necessary confidence for the achievement of the comprehensive disarmament which we all desire is the devising and effective operation of methods of inspection progressively applied to each measure of disarmament that may be agreed upon. If the participants in the Geneva negotiations, with the encouragement of the General Assembly, succeed in their endeavours, a first and important step will be taken. We must all hope that they will succeed and that this first step will lead to others.

The Chairman (interpretation from Spanish): There are no more speakers on the list for the general debate, but two representatives have asked to speak briefly at this meeting.

Mr. de la Colina (Mexico)(interpretation from Spanish): I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me an opportunity to make a very brief explanation of the draft resolution which has been submitted today.

The head of the Mexican delegation, in his statement of 13 October, gave the reasons of principle and practical utility with regard to our draft resolution. Its only objective is to try to continue the negotiations on disarmament which were interrupted more than a year ago. Mr. Padilla Nervo said at the time that the questions of means, participation, date, place, relationship of the problem of disarmament, with other connected matters, were all questions falling within the purview of the General Assembly and all its Members, although it is true that, as far as certain Powers are concerned, because of their power, the greater responsibility is obviously theirs. Mr. Padilla Nervo also stressed the fact that the consent of these Powers was the sine qua non for the renewal of conversations on disarmament.

Consistent with the ideas expressed at the meeting which I mentioned before, my delegation now wishes to put formally before the Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.208. I must stress the fact that our suggestion will in no way stand in the path of or hamper the general debate, nor will it in any way put obstacles in the path of the examination and voting on draft resolutions dealing with items 64, 70 and 72 of the agenda of the General Assembly,
items which, in the letter of transmittal of items to this Committee (A/C.1/L.806), are numbered 4, 7 and 8. In fact, what we would like is that the Committee should examine the important procedural question which we have raised at the end of the consideration of the substantive aspects of the problem to which we are now devoting our attention.

Since the beginning of the informal conversations which we propose obviously will depend on the approval of the representatives of the Powers mentioned before, it would be the Chairman of this Committee who would have to decide, in consultation with them and with the Secretary-General, the date of the first meeting. It would also be the Chairman of this Committee, with the assent of all persons concerned, who would have to decide on the appropriate moment to report to the Committee with an explanation.

As the head of the Mexican delegation said, our delegation fervently hopes that the negotiations which are to begin in Geneva on 31 October will be successful and that an agreement will be reached which will convert into a political reality what, undoubtedly, is the desire of all humanity, namely, the final cessation of nuclear weapons tests. We hope and trust that the next meeting of experts which is to examine measures to avoid surprise attack will also be fruitful and successful.
We agree with the Secretary-General that, even through the United Nations, the achievement of a general and balanced agreement on disarmament must still be the main objective of our Organization, to accept with joy and satisfaction anything that may spell real progress towards disarmament.

The delegation of Mexico is convinced that the presence and active participation of the purely representative body of the United Nations, that is, the General Assembly, is not only advisable and useful, but necessary and ineluctable. This explains and, I think, amply justifies the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.208).

Before concluding, may I offer again my sincere thanks to the speakers who have taken the floor in the last few days in support of the suggestion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico. I especially wish to express my gratitude for the persuasive words spoken this afternoon by the eminent representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch, when he referred to the problems of procedure, the solution of which is being sought by the Mexican delegation through its draft resolution.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I am grateful for this opportunity to speak, which I shall do very briefly, in connexion with the speech of Mr. Moch, the representative of France. I shall not touch on Mr. Moch's observations addressed to the Soviet delegation because this will require an examination of the verbatim record. We shall be in a position to supply a full answer to those comments towards the end of our debate.

But I am unable to pass over in silence the general conception implicit in the speech of the representative of France, especially where he dealt with the basic practical questions which we are now confronting. If we are to look at the general burden of his speech on an issue such as the cessation of the test explosions of nuclear and hydrogen weapons, then it may be said, as Mr. Moch said almost literally, that France intends to carry out the testing of nuclear weapons and it will endeavour to render such tests harmless.

To this Mr. Moch added that in the event that agreement is reached in Geneva between the three atomic Powers, then inasmuch as such agreement will have been reached in the absence of France, this will mean that such an agreement will not
apply to or commit France. In other words, France does not intend to support such an agreement if the conditions which France now puts forward are not fulfilled or complied with.

Mr. Moch was sufficiently candid to acknowledge that in this question France has espoused a position the supporters of which are getting to be fewer. He said so himself. I think he is right and everyone will surely agree that such a position by France cannot command our support.

With respect to the second question -- which can be discussed practically, and it is being discussed in our Committee here -- namely the question of the reduction of military budgets, Mr. Moch mentioned the circumstance that this idea was originally sponsored by France -- and we are not prepared to deny that. Even though Mr. Moch expressed some general support of the notion, nevertheless, at the present time, and speaking on behalf of France, Mr. Moch says, in almost so many words, that this question is not possible of solution at this stage, that it is almost pointless, that, in other words, the reduction of military budgets would not be feasible at the present juncture from the point of view of the interests of disarmament.

To speak of other issues touched upon by Mr. Moch, the general sense of his line at this stage consists of the following. It is necessary to refer as large a number of disarmament questions as possible to technical experts, and he says that this applies to the budgetary question too, because, as far as he is concerned, if there is no detailed consideration of types of budgets, etc. of budgets, chapters, and so on, it is impossible to solve the question of the necessity of the reduction of military budgets even in principle. Consequently, the French slogan now is: Hand over more and more things to the technical experts. Let them sift these matters while political decisions may ensue, and then again may not.

This is the main burden of Mr. Moch's address. At the beginning of his speech Mr. Moch said that there was continuity of French policy in the matter of peace and disarmament. He emphasized that his speech today would provide evidence of such continuity. If this is so, then one can only express a regret at the fact that this continuity is reducible to a negative attitude, to any and all practical steps in the field of disarmament.
This is sad, both in respect of France's past policy and in respect of its present policy. To maintain a continuity of policy in this manner is sad indeed in this day and age when the whole world is vitally and urgently interested in practical achievements in the field of disarmament. What Mr. Moch had to say today on behalf of France unfortunately leads us to the sad conclusion that, to judge by Mr. Moch's speech, France does not propose to contribute either to the reduction of the atomic threat or to any genuine concrete steps in the field of disarmament.

Basically, these are the few brief comments which I felt bound to make on the basis of the statement of Mr. Moch which we have just heard. The Soviet delegation reserves the right to address itself to this statement in greater detail at a later stage.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): It appears that the representative of France wishes to reply and I therefore call on him.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): I do not wish to engage with Mr. Zorin in one of those controversies of which we have had quite a few in London and elsewhere in preceding years. I would simply like to ask him to read carefully the text of the address which I delivered a while ago, after which he may attack it or criticize it as much as he pleases. He will find in particular, in reading this statement, unless the statement is much less clear than I thought it was, that France wishes to go further, especially that France considers that the cessation of atomic explosions alone is, as I said, a sort of alibi to side-step disarmament itself, that, if the Soviet Union seriously wants to put an end to the nuclear danger, it is possible to get together on the foundations which I have indicated, foundations which are capable of control, mainly that which is controllable as regards nuclear disarmament; that is, the cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes and the reduction of stockpiles, together at the same time with the cessation of tests. If we get together on these three points concurrently, then France will subscribe to the cessation of tests, along with the two others and in so doing, incidentally, we would be rendering a great service to peace.

As regards the second point, I am glad that Mr. Zorin has acknowledged at this late stage that the ideas he expressed on the reduction of military budgets was borrowed from the statement made by Mr. Edward Faure, made before Messrs. Khrushchev and Bulganin in Geneva. We maintain this statement, but we merely say that, precisely because it is better to say candidly that mistrust does prevail among us, we are not in a position to accept a solution of this kind unless a preliminary study of it has been fully undertaken. I am familiar with Soviet budgets. I am wont to study them. I do not wish to use an offensive expression, but a Soviet budget contains five or six figures and no detail is given and there is no budgetary debate. I am not yet at the stage where, if I am told that a military budget has been reduced from 100 billion to 90 billion rubles -- these are the orders of magnitude involved -- I can say that the reduction has been actually made. I need -- and all of need -- to be sure that this will actually have been done, that is to say, to be sure we have
the means to verify it. Otherwise, those who keep faith will fall victim to those who do not.

That is all I wanted to say. But, raising the level of the debate a little, I wish to emphasize a point which I think is essential, that these problems, whatever they may be, budgetary problems or any other problems in the field of disarmament, are so complicated that I do not think it is possible to solve them, as we have tried to do heretofore, through negotiations between politicians or between ambassadors and politicians. I do not think so because, as soon as you get into the substance of a question you are dealing with, you find out that there are so many ways of circumventing and side-stepping, that in the absence of confidence between us one will always imagine that the other side is taking some measures to circumvent or avoid taking measures while appearing to take them. That is why the technical study of these questions by qualified experts who are not called upon to solve the political problem, but who are to give an answer merely if it is possible to verify fact A or fact B, if it is impossible to find the means of circumventing such measures, to appear to be taking measures while actually not taking such measures, acquires considerable value.

After the failures which we have unfortunately endured -- and I feel them more poignantly than many others because in eight years I have devoted a considerable part of my life to these debates -- I think that a new approach to these questions is necessary. We have had the example of the experts on the method of detection of nuclear explosions. Men from different countries reached an agreement. Now we think that control is possible in this field. I stated a while ago why I do not think the cessation of tests alone is the answer, but I will not revert to that. But I think that if we made the same study for the cessation of production of fissioiable materials for military purposes -- that is to say, to control the separated uranium or plutonium extracted from bars so that they would be used only for peaceful purposes -- then conclusions would be arrived at that would surprise many representatives here.

In the Sub-Committee in London I previously supported the idea that an international team of about 3,000 men composed of technicians only in part and of simple supervisors in part, would be still sufficient to afford the certainty
that all reactors are operating for peaceful uses only, to afford the certainty that no important amount of materials can be diverted for military purposes, that therefore it was easy to decide -- if agreement was reached -- that there should be a cessation of production of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes without the control so instituted being in any way, whatever its title, a kind of super-espionage network or intervention in the economic life of States.

I have said so. You are perfectly entitled not to believe me. But I ask the experts to verify it. Their conclusions may perhaps differ from mine; I am not an expert. They may tell us perhaps that more than 3,000 men will be needed or perhaps less. They may discover new difficulties. But, at least, they will lay a foundation for going further. I do not think that there is one reasonable man, one man who is not blinded by partisanship who would be incapable of supporting an objective and dispassionate analysis of the facts as proposed by the French delegation.

Mr. Zorin was pleased to say that our continuity in policy is a continuity of negativness. You have heard me out. You can be the judges, and I will not repeat myself. It might be said that I wish to give as much work as possible to the experts. Yes, let us give more work to the experts because we want to see clearly what the situation is. How many of you have seen once in their lives a reactor? No doubt, nobody among you knows exactly how it is possible to control what is extracted from used bars in reactors. Let us get the experts to do that work. Let us ask them whether or not it is possible, and if possible how, and through what methods and at what costs so that we might be certain that all these reactors are working for peace. I say, with the support of French experts, that it is possible, that it is easily possible of realization. I do not ask you to believe me. I do not ask Mr. Zorin to take my word. I merely ask that Russian, American, English and French experts and experts from other countries, wherever there are reactors, should get together and examine this question, a question on which the peace of the world may well depend.

I do not think I have been remiss in my duty to peace in submitting this proposal which I still think is a reasonable one.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As I have already said, we have no more speakers for this afternoon.

In view of the number of speakers who have already taken part in the general debate and those who have had their names put on the list for the rest of the week, it seems to me that it is possible, in accordance with what the Vice-Chairman stated on Friday, to decide that the list of speakers should be closed at noon on Wednesday. This does not mean naturally that the debate will be closed, but merely the list of speakers. Naturally the debate will continue later, especially the debate on the different draft resolutions.

The next meeting will be at 10.30 tomorrow morning.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.