1. Question of disarmament [64] (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests [76] (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries [72] (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/CR.954. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Venezuela on a point of order.

Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish):
Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate your having called upon me to permit me to put before the Committee a situation which I believe everyone should bear in mind in order correctly to interpret the views I expressed in my statement of last Friday. In point of fact, the English translation of the statement I made at that time, which appears in document A/C.1/PV.953, beginning with page 56, dated 17 October 1958, contains a number of errors of translation of substantive questions and, besides this, totally omits an entire paragraph, which I believe and which my delegation believes is the most important paragraph of the statement.

As the Committee knows, we are not given any other chance of correcting the English verbatim records to which I referred. Therefore, I am forced to speak today so that the corrections can be put into today's verbatim record. I shall not tax the patience of the Committee in pointing out the many errors of translation which are apparent in the English text, as for example, the omission of the words "military forces" whenever I referred to "reduction of conventional armaments and military forces", and the utilization of the English word "discontinuance" as the equivalent of "definitive cessation".

As far as the last three paragraphs of my statement are concerned, the change has been so serious, as I said, that one of these paragraphs has been completely omitted and the meaning of the other paragraphs has been so altered that I am forced to repeat those three paragraphs entirely here:
"Considering the specific point in the light of what has been said previously and the statements made in the Committee by the representatives of the Great Powers, my delegation feels that it would not be impossible to achieve agreement on a resolution which in its preambular paragraphs would clearly express the desire of all peoples of the world that conventional armaments and military forces be reduced, that measures be taken to avoid the possibility of surprise attack, and a definitive end be found to the production and testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and, in the operative part, recommend concrete measures which at present might be acceptable to all the great Powers, which at least would be a first effective step towards the definitive solution of the problem.
"These recommendations could be:

"1. To urge the great Powers to renew as soon as possible conversations on disarmament in general.

"2. Invite the great Powers to discuss adequate measures to avoid the possibility of surprise attack.

"3. Urge upon the great Powers that they come to an agreement as soon as possible on a system of effective control so as to cease the production and stockpiling of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

"4. Immediately suspend all tests with nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for a sufficiently lengthy and prudent time during which the necessary system of control would be set up so that that suspension could be definitive.

"With a resolution of this nature, it would be clearly established in the preambular part, and with all the moral authority of the United Nations behind it, what the true feeling of all peoples is. They insist on a cessation of this mad arms race, and especially and above all on the cessation of the production and testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Furthermore, in the practical field, measures would be recommended for a possible fulfilment, and it would be the first effective step towards the achievement of the objectives desired."

The complete and true reproduction of my statement is contained in the Spanish text of that same document to which I referred earlier, A/C.1/PV.953, dated 17 October 1958.

Mr. SHTYLLA (Albania) (interpretation from French): At the time it was founded, the United Nations set itself the fundamental task of not sparing any effort to safeguard the human species from the scourge of a new war. But the armaments race, especially in the field of atomic and hydrogen weapons, has assumed fantastic proportions. Every day new weapons, more perfected and more death dealing extermination devices are being produced. Stockpiles of nuclear
weapons are being increased. Never has the danger of a third world conflagration, the danger of an atomic war been so close to us than today. Never has the United Nations confronted the more urgent and pressing clamour of the peoples of the entire world to take, as long as there is still time, effective measures to prevent the catastrophe which threatens them. The United Nations has not so far been able, despite the efforts made, to fulfil this demand.

The peoples of the world hate war. They want peace. They want to live in tranquility, without the fear of the morrow; they want to work and to build; they want to enjoy life. Man, quite properly, wonders: why is it that the vast resources of nature and his own great achievements should not be placed at his service instead of being used for his destruction?

War brings only death, ruin, and misery. The peoples have not forgotten the horrors of the last two World Wars and they know that the consequences of a third world conflagration, involving the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, would be incomparably more tragic. With the discovery of intercontinental ballistic missiles, no part of the world can be safe from atomic war.

The only beneficiaries of the two World Wars have been the imperialist monopolies which consider war as a highly lucrative business and which are working twenty-four hours a day to prepare a third world war, an atomic world war. This is the purpose of the cold war and of the policy of "positions of strength" followed by the leading circles of the United States. This policy is directed against the Soviet Union, the countries of the people's democracies and the recently liberated peoples and countries of Asia and Africa. Among other things, that policy has taken the form of the conclusion of the aggressive pacts of NATO, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, for the establishment of a network of military bases in the member countries of these pacts, by acts of aggression against free countries and by the unbridled armaments race.

The attitude of the United States, as well as of its chief partners, the United Kingdom and France on the problem of disarmament, constitutes eloquent testimony of their deliberate policy which is deliberately contrary to peace and the interests of the people.
In his statement of 10 October made in our Committee, the representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge, endeavoured to present his country's position as regards that problem in rose-coloured hues. He said, among other things:

"We have co-operated wholeheartedly in every effort of this Organization to solve the disarmament dilemma." (A/C.1/PV.954, page 7)

To hear Mr. Lodge and the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Noble, who spoke somewhat later, it is the fault of the Soviet Union if the disarmament problem has not yet been solved. But as all members of this Committee know full well, and as the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, recently pointed out, nothing is further removed from the truth. For twelve years the Soviet Union has made and continues to make consistently vast efforts to arrive at a radical solution of the disarmament problem in the United Nations as well as outside the United Nations.

It is the Soviet Union which has long since presented a comprehensive disarmament programme under suitable international control and which, when this programme was not accepted by the Western Powers, advanced new realistic proposals for the reduction of armed forces, armaments and military budgets, for the immediate and unconditional cessation of the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons, for the elimination of these weapons from the arsenals of States and the destruction of existing stockpiles, for the dismantling of military bases on the territories of foreign countries and so on and so forth.
Like the other countries which are parties to the Warsaw Treaty, including the People's Republic of Albania, the Soviet Union has repeatedly and unilaterally reduced the effectiveness of its armed forces and has taken other concrete measures along the path of disarmament. So, as I have said, have the other countries which are members of the Warsaw Treaty, including Albania. The peaceful countries have long supported the indomitable efforts of the Soviet Union to bring about a relaxation of international tension and to solve problems of disarmament and to eliminate the danger of atomic war.

This year, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have consistently refused to display the same favourable attitude to the disarmament problem, on which the attention of all the peoples of the world is focussed. The history of the past twelve years of negotiations on disarmament -- years which in fact have been years of intensive armament -- clearly proves that if no headway has been made in this realm, the responsibility lies exclusively at the doors of the Western Powers, which have consistently evaded any disarmament agreement. They have made the conclusion of such an agreement conditional on the solution of other political problems, problems which they knew in advance were difficult to solve. For a number of years they have tried to limit the conversations to controls over disarmament, separating control from its object, that is, disarmament. During the general debate, Mr. Dulles did not even speak of disarmament; he spoke of control over armaments.

At present, these Powers, inter alia, advocate the theory of technical discussions. The representative of the United States championed this method for all aspects of disarmament, the problem of conventional armaments, armed forces, nuclear weapons, and cosmic space. We believe that technical and scientific discussions would be useful and would have a point if they took place for the purpose of bringing about an agreement on substance, an agreement on concrete disarmament measures. Otherwise, they would be a mere strategem to prevent any agreement and to justify the continuation of the armaments race.

The present attitude of the Western Powers on the question of the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons gives rise to serious misgivings about the intentions of those who propose this method. In his statement before this
Committee on 10 October, Mr. Lodge set out certain principles which he proposed to follow in the negotiations on disarmament. In reality, these principles serve to complicate the reaching of any solution of this problem and to remove it further from our grasp, because of the inter-dependent conditions with which this problem is hedged by Mr. Lodge.

The negative attitude on disarmament problems of the United States and other Western Powers has been vigorously condemned by world public opinion. Being short of arguments and, at the same time, quite unwilling to arrive at a genuine solution of the problems, these countries try by all means at their disposal not only to evade the concrete, realistic and constructive proposals of the Soviet Union, but, in order to delude public opinion and justify their negative attitude, they have even distorted the character of the genuine scope of these proposals and sought to brush them aside as mere propaganda. One cannot help wondering who it is who engages in propaganda in this case. Is it the Soviet Union, which has made concrete proposals to try to arrive at a genuine solution, or the United States, which has been evading these proposals and intentionally and deliberately distorting them?

The issue is a simple one, it is a question of "yes" or "no". Are the United States and the other Western Powers in favour of disarmament, of the immediate and unconditional cessation of testing, of the elimination of nuclear weapons and the destruction of stockpiles thereof, of the reduction of armed forces and armaments and of military budgets, of the dismantling of military bases in foreign territories? Yes or no? World public opinion clamours for an unequivocal answer to this question. World public opinion will no longer be satisfied with verbal declarations that are devoid of meaning.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Albania considers that the attitude adopted so far by the Western Powers has not only prevented any solution of the disarmament problem; it has been fraught with danger for world peace. In our opinion, the General Assembly, faithful to the responsibility conferred upon it by the Charter and by the confidence of the peoples regarding the problem of disarmament and the safeguarding of peace, must take up a position and act to promote the conclusion of an agreement on this problem or on
individual aspects of it. In the present situation, as tense and grave as it is, disarmament is the key to the reduction of tension and to the safeguarding of peace.

We recognize that the solution of the disarmament problem depends in the first instance on the great Powers, while we acknowledge likewise that all the peoples and all countries, large and small alike, are equally interested in this vital problem, that they have their words to speak and that they must be listened to. The General Assembly must clearly express their will that peace must be preserved and that the danger of war must be removed. Disarmament must be carried out by the adoption of precise and concrete decisions in this sense, such as along the lines of the proposals made by the Soviet delegation.

On the proposal of the Soviet Union, the General Assembly decided to examine at the present session the question of the cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and all of us are aware of the gravity of this issue. During the general debate in the General Assembly and in this Committee, the overwhelming majority of the speeches expressed the alarm of the peoples of the world at the dangers implicit in nuclear testing. The speakers expressed the demand of the peoples that these tests should be stopped. Nuclear tests are the gravest and most alarming expression of the armaments race, which they accelerate in the most dangerous sector, that of nuclear weapons. Their continuation encourages other countries to produce such weapons of mass destruction and increases the danger of atomic warfare.

As has been confirmed by the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Ionizing Radiation, it has been ascertained that every nuclear test releases considerable quantities of radioactive substances, which are propagated throughout the world and endanger human health. The Government of the People's Republic of Albania has consistently declared and continues to declare itself in favour of the immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear tests. It considers this measure as the first step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, and it is in this frame of mind that we welcome the initiative of the Soviet Union in proposing the cessation of the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons.
The question of the cessation of nuclear testing is not new to the General Assembly. The Soviet Union presented this question three years ago and it has been making energetic efforts to arrive at an agreement on stopping these tests. However, it has met the systematically negative attitude of the United States and United Kingdom.

The Soviet Union, consistent with its peaceful policies and as proof of its firm desire to arrive at an agreement on this question, on 31 March 1958 unilaterally stopped all tests of nuclear weapons and appealed to the two other atomic Powers to follow its example. Unfortunately, this appeal has not been heeded. On the contrary, the United States, which, according to the American press, had already carried out a larger number of tests than the Soviet Union before 31 March, continued with its own tests with even greater intensity, and it so continues even now. The United Kingdom has acted in the same manner.

The Government of the Peoples Republic of Albania considers that in these circumstances the Soviet Government was fully justified in resuming the testing of nuclear weapons in the interests of its own security and of that of other peace-loving countries. The Soviet Union has declared itself prepared to carry out the immediate and unconditional cessation of nuclear tests under suitable international control. The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203) reflects this stand.

With the permission of the Chairman, I should like to make a few preliminary comments on the draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States.

Having in mind the danger to mankind presented by atomic radiation and considering the cessation of tests to be a first important step towards the total prohibition of nuclear weapons in the solution of the disarmament problem, the Soviet draft resolution calls for the immediate cessation of nuclear tests, a proposal which is in harmony with the unanimous demand of all the peoples. Moreover, having in mind the negotiations which will soon begin in Geneva and in asking for the immediate cessation of nuclear tests, the Soviet draft resolution clearly expresses this popular demand which cannot be completely disregarded by the representatives of the three Governments in Geneva. Our delegation firmly and wholeheartedly supports this draft resolution, which alone proposes a radical solution and enables the General Assembly to act effectively and make its
voice, and the voice of the peoples represented therein, heard and felt at the Geneva conference. We consider that all countries that favour the cessation of nuclear tests should vote in favour of the Soviet draft resolution.

Many delegations cherished the hope that, owing to the positive and firm attitude of the Soviet Union and the universal movement in favour of the cessation of tests, and in view of the conclusions of the conference of experts at Geneva as to the feasibility of control, the United States and United Kingdom would abandon their negative attitude at this session. However, that did not take place. These two Powers continue to adhere to the same position, even though their tactics have somewhat changed.

First, they have reverted to their old position to the effect that the question of the cessation of nuclear tests must not be examined and solved separately but only together and concurrently with other aspects of the disarmament problem.

Secondly, they have proposed that, as from 31 October, the date of the opening of the Geneva conference, the three atomic Powers should suspend nuclear tests for one year. This suspension could be prolonged from year to year, provided that the system of inspection accepted by all parties were installed and functioning effectively and that satisfactory progress was made with a view to the conclusion and implementation of an agreement on substantial measures for the control of armaments, as advocated for some time by the United States. I have quoted these conditions from the United States statement of 22 August 1958.

Thirdly, they have been trying to maintain negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests on a technical level even though the question calls for a political solution.

Thus, while presenting the semblance of favouring agreement on this question in order to conceal from the public their true purpose, these Powers have been advancing a host of previous conditions for the obvious purpose of making any such agreement impossible.

The United States and United Kingdom are not only opposed to the cessation of nuclear tests, which is the only fair, concrete and necessary solution of the problem, but their proposal for the temporary suspension of tests merely provides an escape valve. In fact, the one-year period offers the means any interval required for the preparation of a new series of tests, while the provision...
for the subsequent extension of the suspension is hedged with conditions which make it impossible to carry out.

Our delegation wishes to draw the attention of the Committee to another negative aspect of suspension which, in our opinion, not only fails to advance the solution of the problem one step, but, on the contrary, makes it even more difficult. When we contend that nuclear tests must be stopped, we ask for a radical solution; we ask that there should be no more nuclear tests in the future. If there is agreement on the immediate and unconditional cessation of tests, the problem is solved once and for all. On the other hand, if there is only a temporary suspension, what is going to happen? There is no guarantee that during the suspension period feverish preparations for a new series of tests will not be carried out. Once the suspension interval has lapsed and if no agreement has been arrived at in the meantime, test explosions will be resumed with increased intensity in order to make up for lost time. The danger will be increased. That is why, from all points of view, temporary suspension is unacceptable and at variance with the requirements of the solution of the problem. This fundamental shortcoming underlies the draft resolution presented by United States and a number of other countries in document A/C.1/L.205.

Our delegation fully endorses the criticism to which that document has already been subjected by a number of delegations. We regard it as wholly unacceptable mainly for the following reasons.

First, by calling for the temporary and conditional suspension, instead of the immediate and unconditional cessation, of nuclear tests, the United States draft resolution is not of a nature to contribute to the solution of the problem before us, but, on the contrary, it is designed to frustrate the General Assembly in its endeavour to adopt a clear and effective decision.

Secondly, it imposes no precise and clear obligation on the Atomic Powers to conclude an agreement to stop nuclear tests effectively.

Thirdly, by fixing the suspension interval to coincide with the period of negotiations in Geneva, it leaves the United States and United Kingdom Governments free to break off these negotiations under some pretext at a time suitable for them and immediately to resume tests.
Fourthly, the draft resolution clearly reveals the tendency of the United States to transform political negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, as well as on other aspects of the disarmament problem, into technical discussions. More than that, it appears from the last paragraph of the preamble that even the Geneva conference on 31 October would be devoted, according to the sponsors of the draft resolution, to technical discussions. Moreover, the same paragraph makes it clear that, in the last analysis, the conference will have the technical character designed to serve the United States in gathering military intelligence, a purpose which is surely not in harmony with the fundamental purposes of the United Nations.
Fifthly, all of section 8 of the draft resolution seems to us to be superfluous. As regards the conferences envisaged in paragraph 5, there has already been an agreement between the countries participating in these conferences and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Paragraphs 6 and 7 contain only provisions which are within the recognized competence of the Secretary-General. It is for that matter understandable that decisions on the problems dealt with at the various conferences will be taken by the Governments participating therein, while the Secretary-General and staff of the United Nations would surely not fail to serve dispassionately all the Member Governments and facilitate the proceedings of these conferences.

These are briefly the reasons why we are opposed to the draft resolution presented by the United States and a number of other countries and why the amendments proposed by the Irish delegation in document A/C.1/L.207/Rev.1 in no way change the substance of the question. We hope that the great majority of the members of this Committee will reject them as unacceptable.

The Government of the People's Republic of Albania considers that the General Assembly should be in the forefront of the universal movement against the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The Assembly should take vigorous and effective measures to secure the immediate cessation of nuclear tests, thus answering to the fundamental purposes of the Charter and the hopes of the peoples. The Assembly would do so successfully if it rejected the United States draft resolution and adopted the one proposed by the Soviet Union, which has in mind the safeguarding of the vital interests of the peoples and of peace.

Another question of vast political and practical importance in the realm of disarmament is the proposal by the Soviet Union for a reduction of the military budgets of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries.

This question assumes particular importance at a time when every year the armaments race devours huge financial and material resources. The greatest energies, the foremost minds, the most magnificent achievements of science and technology, all are concentrated in the armaments domain. In our time,
a fraction of the material, financial and intellectual resources devoted to
armaments would make possible the elimination of the revolting misery that is
still rampant over a good part of the world’s population; it would be possible
to combat successfully such diseases as malaria, cancer and tuberculosis,
which every year claim the lives of hundreds of thousands of human beings;
and it would be possible to improve signally the living conditions of broad
masses of people who do not enjoy all the material and cultural possibilities
that might be available.

The proposal by the Soviet Union that the military budgets of the great
Powers be reduced by 10 to 15 per cent is one of great importance. On the one
hand, a reduction of the military budgets would bring about a consequential
reduction of armaments and armed forces by those countries which maintain the
largest armed forces. This would constitute a genuine step along the road to
disarmament. On the other hand, part of the savings so effected would be
allocated to the under-developed countries in the form of free and unconditional
aid. In this manner a noble humanitarian task would be fulfilled, and this
would be entirely in line with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.

The question of the reduction of military budgets as a disarmament measure
has already been tackled on other occasions. The delegation of the People’s
Republic of Albania, which welcomes this initiative by the Soviet Union, would
like to believe that the draft resolution relating to this will command the
unanimous support of the General Assembly and that the four Governments directly
concerned will take practical measures to implement this positive recommendation.

The disarmament problem is broad and complex. Experience has shown that,
even though a radical solution is an historical imperative, agreement on a
comprehensive disarmament programme does not seem to be within the realm of
possibility under the present conditions of tension and mutual mistrust. Other
ways must be sought. The Albanian delegation considers that the method of
examination and conclusion of separate agreements on the various aspects of the
disarmament problem, a method proposed in the memorandum of the Soviet Government
on disarmament measures (A/3929), is the most suitable one and the most capable
of leading to positive and concrete results. It thus appears altogether
possible to arrive at separate agreements on the cessation of nuclear tests and
the reduction of military budgets. This would lead to a notable reduction
of tension and create an atmosphere of confidence and understanding. At the same time, this would open the door to new agreements on the reduction of armed forces and armaments, the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and other aspects of disarmament. The Soviet memorandum proposes a series of measures on various aspects of this problem, measures which we regard as perfectly proper and which we unreservedly support.

The memorandum of the Soviet Government is an important contribution to the efforts of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament. We are sorry to be unable to say as much for the memorandum presented at the present session by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the disarmament question in document A/3936. We have examined this memorandum very carefully, but unfortunately we have found in it no proposal on concrete disarmament measures. Speaking as it does only of the suspension of nuclear tests and not of their cessation, and giving preference to the method of technical discussion and the technical aspects of the disarmament problem, this memorandum is not what we would call a model of objectivity. We should have been entitled to expect the Secretary-General's memorandum to refrain from reflecting the point of view of one of the parties on this very serious problem.

Some speakers in this debate have expressed regret that the United Nations has not, since the last regular session of the General Assembly, been in a position to deal with the disarmament problem, and they have again raised the question of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.
I do not wish to take any more of the time of the Committee, but I do wish briefly to recall the facts and background of this issue. For a number of years a Disarmament Commission and a Sub-Committee had been operating in this field. They failed, among other things, owing to their membership which ensured in advance a majority in favour of the American position and thus did not contribute to the search for compromise and concerted and agreed conclusions. It is a well-known principle that there can be no fruitful negotiations if there is no equality between the parties. In these circumstances, and given the gravity of a problem which concerns all the peoples of the world, and in order to make the deliberations of the Commission effective, the Soviet delegation last year, as you know, proposed that the United Nations Disarmament Commission should comprise representatives of all the Member States. The United States categorically opposed this and sought to impose upon the General Assembly a commission which, while numerically larger, would still retain a majority that would favour the United States.

In this situation the delegation of the People's Republic of Albania endeavoured to make its modest contribution by submitting a formula (A/L.236) that would ensure in the new commission that was envisaged complete equality between, on the one hand, the countries that are parties of blocs attached to the United States, and on the other hand the socialist and neutral countries. Our draft proposal commanded a considerable measure of support among the Member States but was rejected by a small majority. The facts have proved that the methods of a policy of force which the American delegation tried to impose on the General Assembly, in the question of the membership of the Disarmament Commission, were inoperative and ineffective, and led straight to the present impasse.

Before concluding I should like to say that notwithstanding the dark clouds which have been lowering, owing to the policy of the United States which is a policy of brinksmanship that war is not inevitable, that it is not due to come. The relationship of forces in the world now favours the forces of peace. We wish to express the hope that the General Assembly will place itself on the side of the forces of peace against the forces of war and that it will adopt effective measures in the field of disarmament. With every day that passes the facts demonstrate that the only alternative to a policy of war is a policy of peaceful
coexistence between nations regardless of their social systems. We consider that the armaments race must be supplanted by peaceful competition and co-operation in the realms of commerce, science, technology and culture, in the efforts to create a better and happier world for the human race.

Mr. Smith (Canada) Mr. Chairman, at the outset I desire to join other members of this Committee in congratulating you on your election as Chairman. We look to your wisdom and to your experience for guidance in the important work of this Committee. At the same time, I add my congratulations to the Vice-Chairman and to the Rapporteur on their election.

The Canadian delegation has listened with great interest to the statements made in this Committee on the subject of disarmament. It seems to us that there is universal awareness expressed by all the speakers, a universal awareness of the appalling threat which the possibility of war presents in a nuclear age; an awareness of the need for disarmament as perhaps as a condition of human survival. Against this sombre background it must seem to those who are, in all countries, following our discussions, that a great effort is demanded of the United Nations to reach some measure of agreement as to our objectives. This Committee cannot, by its own direct action, bring about disarmament, but we can, I believe, powerfully influence the outcome.

I think that there has been, during the last few days of this debate, a growing tendency in the Committee to try to find some common ground on the means of attaining our objectives, particularly over testing of nuclear weapons. There are, as we all know, a number of draft resolutions relating to this subject before the Committee, and indeed, it is dealt with in the draft resolution which we ourselves, along with sixteen other Governments, are co-sponsoring. For our part, we very much welcome this trend in the Committee towards a search for a unanimous approach to this problem, a trend which has found expression in various forms in a number of recent speeches from representatives of countries in many parts of the world. It is very understandable that sober opinion in this Committee should not wish to see our discussion end in an atmosphere of disunity. It is particularly important in connexion with the forthcoming meetings in Geneva of 31 October, to consider here the question of nuclear testing.
In this context, there has sometimes been too much emphasis, and I suggest this respectfully, on matters of semantics. We have had a good deal of play on words in connexion with this question of nuclear testing: such words as "cessation", "discontinuance", "suspension" and "halt". Of course, these shades of meaning may represent different approaches to the problem. Yet, I believe, it is our duty to seek what is common in our aims and not to underline our differences. This, if I understood him correctly, was the objective of the Foreign Minister of Sweden in his statement. And I must say that I was sorry that the representative of the Soviet Union took occasion, in his remarks of 17 October, to give the impression that he was analysing away the possible grounds for compromise which Mr. Undén appeared to be indicating.

Nevertheless, it seems to us that common ground does exist and that it has become increasingly apparent during our discussions. Unless I am mistaken, most of the members of this Committee who have spoken, and this includes the representatives of the great nuclear Powers, have expressed themselves in favour of the objective of the discontinuance under sufficient control of nuclear testing for weapons purposes. There are important differences as to timing and as to the relationship of tests discontinuance to other aspects of disarmament. But agreement as to the acknowledged goal remains.
Certainly the Canadian delegation has no desire to foster an illusion of unity where none exists. On the contrary, we believe that a practical and realistic approach which faces all facts is the only one which offers any hope for progress towards disarmament. But we think that, if there is a measure of agreement as to our aims, this fact should find expression.

When we turn from words to deeds in this matter of test explosions, we are faced with an obscurity in the Soviet position which gives us ground for real concern. One of the most promising auguries for the success of the forthcoming Geneva negotiations has been the willingness of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to suspend all test explosions for one year from 31 October, the date on which these negotiations begin. I ask with great respect: When is the Soviet Union going to match this offer? For what purpose is the Soviet Government keeping us all in suspense while awaiting an answer to this question? The equivocal statement made by Mr. Zorin on this subject on 10 October can hardly be considered adequate. Members of the Committee may be more interested in this practical question than in score-cards of past nuclear explosions.

So far, I have been dealing with questions relating to nuclear testing. Although this subject has been in the forefront of our discussions here and although my Government attaches great importance to it, we must, I believe, all agree that it is not the heart of the matter. Let me make our viewpoint clear. What we want is total disarmament as soon as possible. We do not like nuclear weapons, and we want to rid the world of them. We do not, however, subscribe to the thesis that it is only nuclear warfare that is wicked, with the apparent conclusion that if we could get rid of nuclear warfare we could go back to nice clean wars like the last one. The existence of nuclear weapons in the first place was made necessary by the existence on a larger scale of conventional weapons of destruction. The refinement of nuclear weapons after the Second World War was made necessary by the accumulation of and the threat to use huge stocks of conventional armaments by the USSR and its allies, coupled, of course, with their own stockpiles of missiles and weapons. It is not stubbornness or malevolence which causes us to insist on the connexion between nuclear and conventional disarmament. We cannot tackle one aspect of disarmament with tackling the other.
I am no more happy than other speakers in the thought that peace should be maintained by a balance of the forces of destruction. That is why Canada wants to move forward through stages of disarmament to healthier international relations. This is a hard, tough world, however, and the transition from a balance of forces to something better is indeed precarious. Those who insist on the immediate abolition of nuclear weapons without regard to any other factors should ask themselves whether they are sure that the unhealthy balance of power which would result in the world would ensure peace for any country. Would it, for instance, safeguard the countries on the expanding perimeter of the Communist empire? It has been with conventional forces and the threat of conventional forces that those countries have been threatened or subjugated in the past. We do not yet live in the ideal world of the philosophers, and we dare not talk here as if we did.

Having insisted on the fundamental importance of balanced disarmament, I wish to make clear that Canada recognizes that we can proceed to our goal only by stages. We do not object to taking a first step if that step is valuable in itself and equitable in effect. In particular, we strongly endorse the suspension of nuclear tests as an initial measure. We do so because we believe that suspension can soon become permanent cessation. Such a measure, we hope, would encourage greater nuclear confidence. The essential control feature, although not an end in itself, could become a first-rate experiment in international scientific collaboration. It would point the way to a solution of the complex problems ahead in controlling even more difficult aspects of disarmament, because no progress in disarmament is possible without control. The establishment thus set up might also carry on positive scientific programmes in the spirit of the International Geophysical Year.

The immediate suspension of tests would have many desirable results. Nevertheless, we should realize that serious risks are involved for those countries which have sought to turn their manpower to productive purposes and are forced to rely on modern arms for their security. The offer of the United States and the United Kingdom should not be underestimated. It is a daring step in a perilous international situation.
For our part, we have always pressed in this Assembly for the cessation of nuclear tests as urgently as possible. Those of us who are impatient, however, should take stock of the extent to which the United States and the United Kingdom, in the interest of reaching agreement with the Soviet Government, have changed conditions considered only a few months ago as necessary accompaniments to the suspension of tests. No Power can be expected to rush into moves of this kind without caution. If this programme is accepted by the USSR, it can lead us to the total cessation of tests, which we are all united, I am sure, in wanting. The USSR is on record with offers which should make such a programme possible. There is no question, therefore, as has been suggested in this debate, of the United States and the United Kingdom attempting to impose something by marshalling a majority vote of the Assembly. Given goodwill and good faith, there is no reason why there should be a single test explosion after 31 October, ten days from now.

Whatever declarations we might extract from the great Powers, I do not believe that we can expect any of them to scrap completely and immediately their capacity to develop and test nuclear weapons, because it will take time to establish and prove the worth of an agreement. Whether we call it a cessation, a suspension or a discontinuance of tests, the fact is that it will, of necessity, be tentative until all parties concerned are assured that the control system is operating effectively.

I realize that there are those in this Committee who honestly doubt that the Western Powers are in earnest, and there are those who may think that the United States and the United Kingdom are seeking to provide a means of escape from any agreement on discontinuance of nuclear tests. For my part, I can say that I am by no means certain of the good intentions of the USSR, but I am prepared to accept the declarations that they have made before us and at Geneva in spite of the attempts that they have made here to cloud the issue. As for the United States and the United Kingdom, I know much more of their intentions. I am convinced of their determination to strive earnestly for a situation in which the cessation of tests will be achieved.
The stand of my own Government was put on record last April when the Prime Minister, Mr. Diefenbaker, stated in an address:

"My hope is that the nations of the free world will announce in the immediate future their desire and willingness to discontinue nuclear tests, except for the application of known explosive techniques to peaceful purposes" -- and I emphasize "to peaceful purposes" -- "provided that there is suitable international supervision."

In my country we do not make or possess nuclear weapons. Our considerable atomic industry is devoted to peaceful uses. It is tempting for a country like Canada to make a virtue of this fact and commit thereby the all too common sin of those of us who are not great Powers. Canada, I admit, is linked for reasons of defence with those who do possess nuclear weapons, and we do not question their justification for doing so under present circumstances. All of us here would do more for the cause of genuine disarmament if we would recognize the terrible dilemma which faces all the great Powers today. It would be better for us if we would not treat their problems as if they were miasmas which could be exorcized by rhetoric.
Nothing I have said is intended to give the impression that we in Canada view the development of nuclear weapons with equanimity. I think that we all should be grateful to the distinguished Foreign Minister of Ireland for bringing to our attention here and now the danger involved in the spread of nuclear weapons. I share Mr. Aiken's grave anxiety about the uncontrollable anarchy which could result from the wide dissemination of these dangerous instruments. The main danger, as we see it, lies in an extension of the capability of making nuclear weapons, and I join heartily in Mr. Aiken's appeal to all those not now engaged in making nuclear weapons to refrain from doing so. The indiscriminate spread of nuclear weapons by transfer is something we would also like to discourage. Nevertheless, I am bound to add that to forbid their transfer absolutely before relevant disarmament measures are agreed upon might not contribute to the good cause which Mr. Aiken has in mind.

As I stated in the General Assembly, we are deeply concerned about the stalemate that has been reached in United Nations machinery to deal with disarmament. The Disarmament Commission has been rendered inoperative by the demand for parity. It seems to me that parity is one of the most reactionary principles yet propounded in the United Nations, and that principle would quickly destroy our institutions if it were accepted. Any country which has the best interests of the United Nations at heart must struggle to maintain the necessary flexibility within this Organization for movement and growth. Any country which has the best interests of the United Nations at heart must frustrate efforts from all quarters to force Member States into two or more camps. The principle of parity would freeze us into a straitjacket of alignments so rigid and so unnatural that paralysis might quickly set it. I fully agree that the various schools of thought in the Assembly should be represented, and I admit -- and I do this very seriously -- that the proportions in the United Nations bodies dealing with disarmament and other subjects have not always been justified. It was for this reason that my delegation last year took a lead in seeking a more equitable distribution of seats in the Disarmament Commission. We see no reason, however, why we should distort the world to suit the Soviet Union in this regard. Adjustment of the balance of interests is one thing, but this so-called parity is
something quite different. For our part, we could not agree to the principle of parity, whether it was put forward by the Soviet Union or by any other great Power.

It may be that the time has come for a new approach to the whole question of disarmament machinery within the United Nations. The Secretary-General in his memorandum has suggested the new responsibilities which will have to be accepted if, as we trust, positive results are achieved in Geneva. We may be moving from a largely deliberative phase to a phase in which the United Nations will have administrative, along with deliberative, functions in this regard. If progress begets progress, then both aspects of our work, the administrative and the deliberative, may be much greater than anything previously undertaken, and for this purpose we may well need new and different bodies. Countries participating in these bodies will have to be chosen, I suggest, for functional as well as geographical reasons. It seems to me that there was a creative idea in Prince Wan's suggestion that the Disarmament Commission might remain a consultative body, with sub-committees composed for purposes of negotiation in accordance with the function to be performed. These are questions which must be considered urgently, whether in accordance with the interesting suggestion made by the Foreign Minister of Mexico or in some other way. We ourselves are not disposed to let old forms and traditional attitudes stand in the way of new measures to suit new times and new problems.

As for the Soviet resolution on the diversion of expenditures from defence to economic assistance, I shall be very brief. The basic conception is an admirable one, a conception which we have been advocating in the United Nations for years. There seems to be widespread doubt, however, whether, in its present form, the Soviet resolution is intended to be taken seriously. The under-developed countries have had enough from the Soviet Union except tracts and bad advice. We are pleased that somewhat belatedly the United Nations has heard from the Soviet Union to this effect, that it is beginning to supplement the kind of intervention to which I have referred with economic and technical assistance -- although I must remark that it has been notably reluctant to divert much of this through even-handed agencies like the United Nations or other non-partisan organizations. It seems to me that it is incumbent upon the Soviet Union to begin correcting the enormous disproportion between its defence expenditures and its
meagre contributions to needy countries outside its own orbit before calling on other countries with far better records within the United Nations by way of contributions to under-developed countries.

There are always some grounds for discouragement about the progress of disarmament. This debate has itself produced good cause for anxiety. Nevertheless, I still believe, as I stated in my opening remarks during my intervention in the plenary meeting of the Assembly, that there are hopeful prospects. The reason I believe that the prospects are somewhat better than they have been is that we are coming closer to reality than we have in the past. Too often, our debates on disarmament in this and in other bodies have seemed more like the bandying of fine phrases and a contest for favourable repute than an effort to adjust the gross facts of international life in the direction of disarmament. For this reason, I have confined my remarks today to what seemed to me to be concrete issues -- the concrete issues facing us right now -- rather than utopian visions, which have their rightful place in our thinking but which too often have beguiled us from getting down to business. As I have said, it is not unrealistic even to be optimistic about the trend of this debate. The Canadian Government, for its part, welcomes the fact that in spite of obvious differences there is among the peoples of the world, and even in this Committee, a wide measure of basic agreement with respect to objectives.
Mr. de LEQUERICA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): I think that we can make certain observations now, at the height of the discussion, although later, under the rules of procedure and thanks to the kindness of the Chairman, I know that if necessary we shall be given the chance to make known any further views that we may deem necessary. And since I am speaking of you, Mr. Chairman, may I take the opportunity to add my voice to those of the representatives of all delegations who have congratulated you not only on your election but also on the competence which you have shown already in directing the proceedings of this Committee, a competence which augurs well for the future of our work. I should like also to congratulate the colleague who was formerly my neighbour in this Committee and is now the Vice-Chairman, and also our apparently perennial Rapporteur -- the latter both on the successful way in which he carried out his work previously and upon being elected for the purpose of continuing that work.

We take part in this debate -- and I shall always repeat this -- as representatives of two types of peoples, which might be clearly defined and delimited as follows. One type is represented by the group of peoples without atomic weapons, to use the general word, and that group has seventy-eight members. The other group comprises the peoples which, because of the development of their science and the powerful way in which they can put the success of their scientists into practice, already possess atomic weapons. The differences between the reactions and the concern felt by the two groups are quite human and quite understandable. There are seventy-eight on one side and three on the other.

In this debate we have successfully shown a unification of ideas on some sides, and we want to be able to avoid dreadful catastrophes to the earth -- catastrophes which men have in mind and which, if they should come to pass, would be even worse than we can imagine. We are trying here to bring the armed States together so that they shall diminish their means of destruction and, within the scope of this general purpose, gradually suspend and finally cease altogether their warlike preparations, both as a whole and in detail. We have believed the United Nations to be the best place in which to achieve those results. In this connexion, I should like to say that no one can maintain that he has lacked ways of contacting people and chances of speaking to others here in the United Nations, and that that is why this problem has remained unsolved.
The representative of Peru referred to the procedures -- procedures in which he participated as a member of a number of committees -- which had been followed over many years in an attempt to solve the problem of disarmament and the cessation of atomic test explosions. I do not need repeat his arguments to have them in mind. Nor do I need to repeat them here in order to remind the Committee how struck we were by his words.

The delegations of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom have constantly clarified matters, even more than the debate would warrant, so that all members of the Committee understand full well what roads are open to us for the finding of formulas and the establishing of contacts between the representatives of the armed nations. On 31 October there is to be a conference which, perhaps, will turn out to be the most practical and effective of all because it is basically a technical conference and those who take part in it will all have political authority.

What more can we do? The representative of Mexico proposed, very aptly, that we should take advantage of the session of the General Assembly to bring together the representatives of the main countries -- that is to say, the representatives of the best armed nations -- and let them find a formula. That would be a very wonderful way of doing it, and I see that the proposal has now been distributed in the form of a draft resolution.

The Spanish delegation is willing to encourage any efforts to increase contacts. Going beyond what the Mexican Foreign Minister said, I would not hesitate to suggest that we should seek out the representatives of the three countries possessing atomic weapons and lock them up together in the manner of other illustrious groupings -- there is a precedent at the moment -- in one of the rooms of the Secretariat of the United Nations. I suggest that we should allow Messrs. Cabot Lodge, Noble and Zorin no way of getting out until they are able, in conclave, to draft some formula that will once and for all wind up the present explosions, control future explosions and reduce all arms.

I think that Prince Wan is right, as were a number of other representatives who said here that the United Nations had a very important role to play in the collective efforts which alone can achieve disarmament. But there must be more than good will involved here; there must be more than subjective desires when
the problem is so far from a solution. For instance, we know that it is most visible in its spectacular aspect -- the aspect handled by the representatives of the Soviet Union and its associated States in order to impress the peoples. I refer to the suspension of atomic tests. Because of the violence of those tests, because of the damage we might see done to the most delicate sensitivities of the nations of the world, and because it contains the most dreadful dangers both for the present and for the future, this problem draws our attention and tempts our imagination, which must definitely weigh on the stand we take in the debate.

Since we represent countries here we are all, practically speaking, laymen and we do not know the real secrets of the atomic problem. But, laymen though we are, we still realize what a mistake it is to endeavour to awaken noble passions, which are not always well directed and which underlie the raising of the problem as only the general problem of disarmament. We have just heard a very good statement by the representative of Canada, and he is right when he says that atomic war is not only frightening -- and we wanted to say this right away because we wanted to explain our vote.

We agree with the United States and the United Kingdom, among the armed nations who do not wish to separate the problem of atomic explosions from the problem of the international control of such explosions and the cessation of production, or from the general problem of disarmaments and its other consequences. In the course of a similar debate last year I said -- and I was speaking, as I say, as a layman -- that only to stop atomic explosions or, worse still, to suspend them for a period without sufficient vigilance would, to a large extent, be tantamount to inventing a procedure which would make it possible to avoid seeing the smoke of fires while the fire itself continued its inroads without being discovered. This might impress the spectators at first until they came to realize that all that was being done was to hide the effects of the fire without trying to put it out.

This problem, I know, goes deeper, and I think that the sensitivities of the countries represented here make it impossible for us to go into the problem at great length. We have the studies of scientists and experts which show the danger to humanity if we should now merely limit ourselves to suspending atomic explosions. We agree
that they should be suspended, and that we should try, but we must at the same time adopt the general measures required by the world situation. My delegation certainly does not come to this discussion as a mere spectator or bystander. We certainly must now allow ourselves to be led by apparent humanitarianism to adopt measures now which would, in the long run, damage the world itself. We do not wish to hurt or harm anyone. We respect the desires of all, and we might stress how much the Soviet Union itself might get from a universal position, apparently guided by goodness, fed with the greatest desire to save humanity terrified by atomic destruction and, at the same time, without looking at procedures too much, insisting on the cessation of all preparations for such calamities. It would be a solution which would ask all sides to stop before they came to the final abyss.

I am sure that in that there would be great danger to the true defence of order. No matter what our positions may be, we cannot consider this essentially political problem looking only at the idea of being generous.
Hasty conventions arrived at through fear of the danger of atomic power might result in greater harm to humanity.

At a previous debate we said that in this sad division of the world we are not neutral; nor are we equi-distant, nor are we absent, nor are we obsessed by fear in our desire for peace and disarmament. We do not necessarily need to stress the si vis pacem para bellum angle, which is full of pagan truth but, thanks to the position adopted by the Western Powers in a recent crisis, we have been able to avoid the ultimate danger.

The same worthy representatives of the Soviet Union have, in their own country and in their discussions, denounced the threat to the world inherent in the violence and the dominating purposes of those who were at one time the leaders of the Soviet Union. But the Western Powers, through the positive advantages which they put before the world, have shown that there is no need for the world to become a series of Baltic States. It does not have to be like Eastern Germany, whose position is a scandal to Europe, subjected as it is to tyranny and foreign domination. Aware of this justified fear of the spirit of ideological conquest -- to which the representative of Brazil has referred -- the rest of the world does not consider this problem with indifference. We believe that we have to maintain solid armaments in the Western world in order fully to guarantee world peace. Any premature measure of supposed appeasement, the weakening of the military backbone, would result in irreparable harm to the freedom of the world. Emotional attitudes without solid guarantees -- and I am referring to one of the great universal revolutions, namely, the French Revolution -- will never solve a problem such as that of disarmament.

Mr. Khrushchev, the head of the Soviet Union Government, has said that the Soviet Union would never renounce its right to ensure its own security; and we recognize this as the inalienable right of all. That is a realistic doctrine and the only one which can lead to peaceful results. I would refer also to the statement of the representative of Greece to the effect that, by disarmament, all must gain and all must lose.
When we speak of security, we are not thinking only of the security of the armed Powers with whose ideas we agree. We would be committing a grave error, if desirous of contributing to the creation of an international atmosphere of peace, we were also to try to press on the public opinion of the Western Powers the desire to take any step which would presumably safeguard peace but would be in the long run contrary to our security. There is no record in history of any one side in a conflict being unworthy of confidence. We believe that all sides could be trusted at some time.

We have considered the views which have been expressed in the past, many of which we understand. In looking backwards our views are sometimes inspired by poetry, nobility and romanticism, but I believe that it is difficult to think that any of the captains of people -- either individual or collective captains -- under critical conditions could relinquish the right to make use of any just means of defence in order to maintain their position in the world. We do not reproach those who now make offers to us, but experience forces us to consider ways of avoiding deception. Thus, we are fervent devotees to the idea of confining to one problem the question of atomic explosions and control, the question of the cessation of manufacturing and producing atomic weapons, the question of vigilance, and the question of disarmament. While those who know most about the subject, without pressure from us, do not submit formulas which we can support, we must not be led by our hearts and our emotions because, in so doing, we would leave ourselves open to later deception.

A number of representatives have quoted from an article by Mr. Kissinger in which he spoke of the danger to the Western Powers, particularly the European Powers, in renouncing, without counter-renunciation, the use of nuclear weapons, even if the Soviet Union is really sincere in its propositions to establish equilibrium in conventional armaments. We are also aware of the seriousness involved in the suspension of atomic weapons tests by the Western Powers for political and psychological reasons, which would make it difficult to begin the task if the other side failed in its commitments, in which case we should find ourselves in a deplorable situation.
What about the detection of explosions? Mr. Kissinger's article agrees with the generally expressed opinion as to the possibility of discovering nuclear explosions on the surface of the earth and at considerable distances. But there is another difficulty. What about the underground explosions, or the explosions from very high altitudes, or under the polar ice, as well as those caused by the peaceful uses of atomic energy? This is most serious now, and I agree with Mr. Kissinger when he says that we must be led to believe that violations of the prohibition of nuclear tests will not necessarily be a _casus belli_ and might call for further tests of the other side, but the opinion of the world would refuse to start another competition and, although in the end it might decide to do so, it might take years to reach that decision. Undoubtedly the Western States are aware of this and will bear it in mind in their dealings with the Soviet Union. It may be naïve for me to say this, but since we are trying to form opinions here, these views must be taken into account.

I do not think that it is superfluous to say that we should not try to simplify matters so as to cover up those who might be looking for advantages. One of the obstacles with the Soviet Union is an agreement to establish international control inside the Soviet Union. We cannot accept an exclusively Soviet Union idea. We do not blame the Soviet Union for its concern. After all, it has been in existence for only forty years and it must take certain measures to maintain its political organization. We are not discussing this point. We respect the provisions of Article 2 (7) of the Charter and will abstain from entering into the domestic affairs of another country; but when such a country crosses its frontiers and violently dominates another, it is a different matter. When the international control sought by the Western countries is allowed to function in the countries under Soviet domination, then a step forward will have been taken in connexion with the cessation of atomic explosions. In the meantime it is difficult to relax our vigilance. I am not trying to discourage those who are working on this problem or to underestimate the value of debate or of conferences on this topic; nor am I going to permit myself to hope too fervently that the Conference of 31 October will give positive results.
But can atomic radiation endanger humanity? Can it make an urgent solution of the problem necessary? Views have been expressed on both sides. I do not think that, as far as cancer is concerned, it is a greater danger than tobacco; nor do I think it is such that we must hastily adopt any particular point of view. Many fear the dangers of atomic radiation. We must not allow ourselves to be influenced by our first impressions. We must not attempt to solve the problem prematurely and thereby allow it to escape us in the long run.
There is a definite desire to solve the problem on the part of all people, but the truth of the matter is that, with very rare exceptions, when any nation is in a propitious position to get atomic weapons, it does so. Last year France told us -- and its purposes have certainly not been suspended -- that it was going to obtain such weapons. A few days ago the Foreign Minister of Sweden did not hide the fact that if the people did not agree soon Sweden -- whose high technical and scientific level is known by all -- would also enter the road of atomic arms, one way or another.

Then looking into our conscience, which of us would not like to be on an equal footing at a moment in history, so that with the same means at our disposal as the others, we would be able to maintain the balance? Which of us does not feel that he could control himself? Which of us feels that he would not be dragged into injustice no matter how powerful the weapons in his hands might be? This is obvious. Last year, in 1957, I spoke in the general debate on the possible expansion, distribution and dissemination of inventions of this nature, so that within forty or fifty years a man owning any little industrial plant might be able, with scientifically advanced instruments, to manufacture these destructive weapons. As a prototype of a peaceful man in a peaceful State, I picked out a druggist in Andorra, in the Pyrenees, who one day, because he was moonstruck or sunstruck, lets go with his bomb and destroys the entire world.

However, we believe that States should be willing not to be armed all the time, that they should delegate their functions to a select group, although this of course would not solve the entire problem of disarmament. We feel that facts have to be taken into account, and I do not believe that this general spirit of peace will gain by giving an official seal to the clique of atomic aristocrats. When critical moments arrive, the communication of arms secrets -- and I think the representative of Canada referred to this -- will definitely make the danger more inevitable.

This feeling of inferiority on the part of many nations causes them to feel that their moral strength has also been sapped. They have to be able to feel that they are also taking part in the formation of an international opinion. This morning, in a Spanish-speaking newspaper of New York, I read a few words which
I thought were rather interesting. A Mexican thinker, José Vasconcellos, whose ideas may or may not be in agreement with ours, but whose authority in matters of thought is certainly not disputed by anyone, writes as follows:

"The only thing we need is to achieve the complacency which material prosperity of our civilization has inculcated in us and then we will realize that today, as yesterday, we must, with the weapons of the day, defend our heritage and our homes, our tranquillity, our peace and our very lives. What has most damaged us in the last years is the fear of war accompanied by the preaching of peace at any cost."

There is a wide road to evil and destruction open to us. However, I think that we should try to trust the progress of science itself. I think that in science itself we might achieve ways of defence against the scientific ways of destruction, although the new way of attack might obviously and historically lead to certain advantages. The wall was old, but the cannot overcame the principle of the wall. The arrow preceded the shield and the armour. But when we are faced with evil, we can always hope for the moral improvement of humanity in the strengthening of the essential virtues that are the heritage of all peoples.

We think that a solution can be found to all this trouble. A man surrounded by universal respect died recently. The Pontiff Pius XII was respected by all of us Catholics as a man of great spiritual authority. Many others learned great lessons from him, a lesson which was translated in our Committee by a minute of silence and meditation. Humanity has been able to appreciate many qualities in His Holiness Pope Pius XII. His goodness, his abhorrence of violence, his suffering at seeing the assault on justice and reason have greatly impressed persons of all spiritual positions and beliefs.

His goodness was well-known though it was not the goodness of the naive, nor even that of a man wholly given to prior meditation, but rather that of one prepared at great length by a full diplomatic life, by mixing with the most difficult problems, and given to studying all the facets and partial aspects of problems, and seeking solutions after having carefully sounded out the conflicting currents, and according to a viable possibility. This great soul, refined and experienced, separated himself from the binding of human concerns and gave himself to the belief in them, in supreme goodness and in that of his fellowmen.
He made of love the very nucleus of his strength and all men have bowed to his example, and a most impressive example of agreement on the highest is this. This does not mean that we are not aware of the need for negotiations on the solution of all these sort of problems. We know that there is a lack of confidence, of one country in another. This is obvious to all of us, and I stressed this earlier. But this should not be an obstacle to negotiations in any event. When did such confidence between those who are quarrelling exist? They quarrelled, they strove, and then finally they signed truces, or an armistice, or a peace which in the long run was only a truce. These agreements can precede confidence and that is why we realistically believe in this possibility. We respect the will and desire of others. We may not be able to agree with the views or resolutions of others, but we do believe that the one draft resolution that contains the nucleus of a solution is the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) which stresses the possibility of considering the problem of disarmament and atomic explosions as a whole.

It would be foolish to see in this symptoms and yet not solve the definitive and great ill. Disarmament, control, suspension of atomic explosions, cessation of production, guarantees and good will -- all this is inherent in that proposal and that is why we shall vote in favour of it.

Mr. Vidić (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for giving me this opportunity to make a brief intervention. In the course of the past week I already took the liberty of appealing, as several other representatives have done, for endeavours aimed at seeking agreed and generally acceptable solutions for the problems which now confront us. The subsequent discussion has only further fortified our conviction that this would be the best result of the work of our Committee, whereby the General Assembly could contribute most to having progress achieved this year in the field of disarmament translated into practical agreements.

I think that the statements in the discussion so far have clearly revealed that the question of the cessation of nuclear tests has acquired foremost prominence in our deliberations. However, the absence of a unanimity of views on the problem is also plainly evident.
We still have ahead of us about a week to work, intensively I hope, on this problem, and it is my belief that in these coming days we can further examine the possibilities which are at our disposal and which have not been exhausted, that is to say, the possibilities of achieving a rapprochement of views, so useful and indispensable for peace. The question now is what the General Assembly should recommend with respect to the necessary discontinuance of tests, as well as in regard to the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests. In this respect, the proposed draft resolutions offer us a choice of several possibilities. First, the halting of tests -- the Soviet draft resolution. The statements made by the Soviet representatives leave no doubt as to the fact that what they have in mind is a permanent cessation of tests. Secondly, discontinuance of tests pending an agreement -- the Indian draft resolution. This draft clearly indicates that what India and the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 envisage and urge is also a permanent cessation of tests. Thirdly, suspension of tests while the negotiations are in progress -- the draft resolution of the United States and sixteen other sponsors. The representatives of the Western nuclear Powers, too, have declared that their objective is also the permanent cessation of tests which, however, should be implemented by stages.

As may be seen, the positions enunciated here do differ indeed. May I now, with regard to what has just been said, raise several questions and offer several answers. Have the positions of the nuclear Powers anything in common? Is there any point in insisting on out-voting procedures, if conditions exist to achieve, through earnest endeavour, a generally acceptable recommendation? Can an acceptable solution be found so far as the General Assembly is concerned, and along which lines should it run?

What I have in mind is the practical approach. I should like to turn the attention of this Committee to the fact that we have already had a unilateral suspension of nuclear tests conditionally put into effect by the Soviet Union, as well as its present insistence on the cessation of tests. We also have the stated readiness of the United States and the United Kingdom for a unilateral suspension of tests. The feature in common here is that both the practical action of the Soviet Union and the declarations of the United States and the
United Kingdom have, in our opinion, already played a useful role on their part in creating the necessary conditions for negotiations and for a rapprochement of views.

This is an important aspect because we believe that in view of the stated readiness of both sides to discontinue tests for a certain period of time, provided each side takes similar steps, a basis for an arrangement between them to discontinue tests after 31 October could be reached. I do not at this juncture propose to show why this is justified; I simply wish to point out that this is feasible.

For these reasons, I propose that the General Assembly should call upon the Powers which have been testing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons to ensure, on the basis of their stated readiness for a unilateral discontinuance of these tests and through an appropriate arrangement, the immediate discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear experimental explosions. It might be asked what the term "appropriate arrangement" implies. My delegation understands it to mean everything from a unilateral, tacit discontinuance of tests based on the nuclear Powers' awareness of their responsibility to mankind up to any arrangement which could bring it about formally. We see no obstacles to this except a possible lack of the above-mentioned sense of responsibility.

In connexion with the second question I raised, we do not think it useful for this matter to be decided upon by a majority vote unless the Assembly has no other choice. We believe that this can be avoided if the parties concerned here and now do their best to bring their views closer together. This would be a welcome result which would be greeted by all the peoples of the world with hope and with due recognition to all the participants. This would further increase the faith of the international community in peace and in our great Organization which has been primarily created to safeguard and strengthen world peace.

Along with what I have said concerning the first and second questions I raised, we consider it essential to emphasize and keep in our recommendations the request that the nuclear Powers participating in the forthcoming Geneva Conference should conclude an early agreement on the cessation of tests under an adequate system of control. It is therefore obvious that in our opinion we could find a
solution which would produce a unanimous recommendation both with respect to the immediate practical discontinuance of tests and to the achievement of an agreement. In one word, we are proposing a solution in both directions, one which lays down no "conditions" to either side but stems from the absolute necessity to halt tests, from the objective possibilities, and from the sense of responsibility of the nuclear Powers towards the peoples of the world.

We hope that the proposal we have just advanced will be given careful consideration. Its adoption would lead to a solution which would not aim at winning the support of the majority, but would rather clear up the atmosphere and provide an incentive for the coming negotiations in Geneva. In view of the existence of three draft resolutions on the cessation of tests, we could offer formulations which, assuming that our view is accepted as being correct, would facilitate the reaching of an agreement. They could read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having in mind the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the declarations of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom with regard to their readiness to discontinue nuclear tests;

"Deeply convinced that this will facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests;

"Calls upon the Powers which have carried out nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests to arrange, on the basis of their stated readiness for unilateral discontinuance of such tests, immediate discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear tests;

"Urges the Powers participants in the forthcoming conference on the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests to conclude an early agreement on the cessation of these tests under an adequate system of control."
Naturally we assume that any of our decisions here will include the request to all other countries not to carry out nuclear tests until the envisaged agreement is reached, to which all countries would then become parties.

We agree that in the event of the failure of the talks in Geneva, the situation should be re-considered within the framework of the United Nations or at a special session which would be convened for this purpose.

I should like to reserve the right to speak again if necessary on these questions, and in particular on the question of the United Nations disarmament body.

Mr. TAMAYO (Bolivia) (interpretation from Spanish): I wish very briefly to present the views of my delegation on this important question of disarmament.

The views of my country on this question have been known since the tenth regular session of the General Assembly. My delegation agrees with the terms of the seventeen-Power draft resolution. What we stated at the tenth regular session we have repeated at subsequent sessions, both in the plenary meetings and in the First Committee. The under-developed countries, such as my own country, can only view with growing hope the efforts which are now being made to find a formula for the reduction of military budgets and the prohibition of more efficient instruments of destruction.

We now begin to see clearly the symptoms of rebellion on the part of men who, not because of the part of the world in which they live but for the future of mankind as a whole, speak out for peace; men who are tired of living in an atmosphere in which the fear of death by war seems to be the guiding motive; men who are worried by the news of new and more destructive weapons; men who are cornered by the arguments of those who feel that because they possess these weapons they may take upon themselves the monopoly of reason. Mankind now demands from the great Powers a position that will give confidence to all in the greater destiny of humanity and that will remove the fear that it will be wiped out.

The seventeen-Power draft resolution which my delegation supports expresses the desire for peace which is so necessary at this time.

It is useful to recall that the conversations on disarmament in the First Committee have been held for a number of years and that each year the weapons to
which reference is made are more powerful and more destructive. We have thus arrived at a point in history where the pressure of circumstances points to the only way for the salvation of mankind, namely an agreement on the complete prohibition of the use of all weapons of mass destruction.

The great Powers seem to have in mind the one idea of perfecting these weapons. I do not think I am wrong in saying that questions on disarmament at this session of the General Assembly constitute the highest point of our discussions and that a concrete solution of this question can no longer be postponed in the face of stark reality.

I should like to repeat briefly the views of my delegation on the question of the responsibility of the great Powers. In my statement before the General Assembly I referred to the fact that we must look to the great Powers at the present stage of negotiations among nations. It is their responsibility to ensure to mankind the right to live without fear. I believe that none of the questions being considered at the present session can be considered to be half as important as that of disarmament. That is why I am happy to note that the seventeen-Power draft resolution explicitly sets out the responsibility of the United Nations in this important subject. World public opinion follows closely the Assembly discussions, and especially those on the reduction of military budgets and the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction, and it must certainly be pleased to see that we are not evading our responsibilities.

Ever greater sums are being spent in the arms race while the world cries in misery and want, a world that cannot offer the inhabitants of vast areas even the minimum conditions for a dignified existence. The great deposits of raw materials and the gigantic resources of the world are not being used for the benefit of humanity because those fabulous sums are channelled to the development of improved methods of mass destruction.

This problem does not apply only to the powerful nations which invest a large part of their budgets in armaments, but it applies also to the smaller countries which are arming without any particular purpose. They also are using resources which should be used to promote better standards of living in their own countries. They are using their money to purchase what are called conventional weapons.
I trust that at this session some measure will be adopted to ensure peace through disarmament so that we may be able to take full advantage of the resources which are being used today on instruments for wiping out humanity, so that we may be able to raise the standard of living and improve the cultural development of all those in the under-developed areas.

In conclusion, my delegation would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the Spanish text of the seventeen-Power draft resolution. The question under discussion is of such great importance that I believe all the documents which are produced must be clearly and carefully drafted and must be exactly in keeping with the original text. I wish to point out with great respect that the English text seems to be somewhat watered down in the Spanish version. The English text emphatically expresses the responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, whereas the Spanish text speaks of the constant duty of the United Nations, which seems to destroy something of the original meaning. The English text states "expresses its determination" while the Spanish text states "expresses its desire".

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to state that an appeal should be added to the seventeen-Power draft resolution that the great Powers, in following the invitation made by the General Assembly in its resolution 1148 (XII), dated 14 November 1957, should devote a larger amount of their budgets to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in the less-developed countries.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The remarks of the representative of Bolivia with regard to the Spanish text of the seventeen-Power draft resolution will, of course, be taken into account in the drafting of the final text of the resolution.

The representative of Sweden has asked for the floor in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. UNDEN (Sweden): The representative of Spain referred to some words from my speech of the other day, but I am afraid he has misunderstood what I intended to say. I did not indicate that Sweden would embark upon the manufacture of nuclear weapons in the event that a prohibition of tests is not soon adopted. I have not said anything about Sweden's intentions in such a case, for the simple reason that the Swedish Government and the Swedish Parliament have not as yet taken any position about the production of nuclear weapons. I have limited myself to the statement that the Swedish Government is in favour of a universal stopping of testing, in spite of the fact that our technical knowledge possibly permits us to produce such weapons within a certain number of years.

Mr. de LEQUERICA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): I wish to thank the Foreign Minister of Sweden for his correction but, since hearing him, I still feel that what he says is not far from saying that one is ready to arm although speaking more reticently and with less Latin violence than myself, he says that the necessary means are available for arming oneself.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I would draw to the attention of members of the Committee the fact that this morning a new draft resolution on the question of disarmament has been distributed. This is the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Mexico in document A/C.1/L.208.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.