Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 17 October 1958, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries (continued)

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AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 AND 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

Mr. AKO-ADJEI (Ghana): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Ghana delegation, I wish to congratulate you and the other officers of the Committee upon your election to high office. We hope that under your guidance we shall do very well in this Committee.

The subject of disarmament, which we are now called upon to discuss, is a matter of great concern to the Government and people of Ghana.

In our view, the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world and, in fact, the future of the human race, depends upon the extent to which we are able to effect a final settlement to this vital problem. The question has been discussed in the United Nations for several years without agreement, and sometimes one is tempted to entertain fears as to whether a peaceful settlement could be reached at all.

I am confident that given goodwill, mutual understanding and accommodation on all sides, it should be possible for an agreement to be reached between the nations on this complex problem of disarmament.

It has often been stated that the great Powers, namely, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France are the States who are primarily concerned with the subject of disarmament, and the question of the discontinuance or suspension of tests of nuclear weapons.

This line of thinking assumes that the other nations in the world, and especially small nations like my country, Ghana, have little or practically no interest in disarmament and in the development of nuclear weapons. Small nations like Ghana are interested in the subject of disarmament and also in the discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.
(Mr. Ako-Adjei, Ghana)

The technological advances in our age and the development of various means of communication have influenced the movement of men and ideas to such an extent that it is no longer possible for the people in any part of the world to live in isolation.

We are dependent one upon another and I venture to say that we even have one destiny, that is, human beings in the world today are faced with the problem of either learning how to live together and work together in peace and harmony, or else blast themselves out of existence from this planet by means of the very weapons of our own creation.

This view was expressed admirably by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, when, in his statement before the General Assembly last month, he spoke of the inter-dependence of nations. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said:

"...the topic of disarmament ...is another matter where the inter-dependence of the world is very obvious. The consequences of modern armaments are such that they affect peoples far away from the scene of actual hostilities. The cost of modern armaments is such that to build them up throughout the world means a diversion of physical effort and resources from more worthwhile tasks. It is bound to affect the living standards of all." (A/PV.758, page 50)

We agree entirely with this statement. It is against this background of inter-dependence of nations that we must view the subject of disarmament and the testing of nuclear weapons.

The problem is not the exclusive concern of the great Powers, namely, the Powers to which the Foreign Minister of Sweden referred, in his statement before this Committee a few days ago, as the 'Atom Club'. It is a problem for all of us, the great Powers as well as the small nations. For this reason, we believe that it may be useful in a discussion of this nature to know the thinking and attitude of a small and under-developed nation, such as Ghana, on this important and intriguing subject.

We are interested in an early settlement of the problem of disarmament and all the ancillary matters attendant thereto, because a continued delay in reaching an agreement in this matter will increase tension in the relationship between nations and threaten the peace and security of the entire world.
My delegation is happy to observe that during the past year a substantial measure of understanding and co-operation has been achieved, at any rate in the technical field, to settle the problem of disarmament and the question of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

We are confident that this new spirit of co-operation will continue to be given encouragement by all the parties concerned, especially the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France, and we also hope that the forthcoming discussions of experts in Geneva will yield fruitful results to assure mankind of a continued happiness and prosperity in our relations, one with another.

As I set down in this Committee and listened to the statements made by several speakers, I was highly impressed by the common view held by all regarding certain important aspects of disarmament. It appears to me that all sections of opinion agree that the armament race, and the piling up of nuclear weapons, is contrary to the best interests of all nations and all peoples. Moreover, the large sums of money that are being spent in the manufacture of weapons could be spent more profitably on enterprises that would raise the standard of living of the masses of people throughout the world, and contribute to the advancement of civilization.

It is relevant to observe that the great Powers themselves, namely, the nuclear Powers, are not happy about the armaments race in which they are deeply involved. The large stocks of armaments, which they pile up, and are still continuing to manufacture, are in fact a great burden on their respective national economies.

In this regard, I wish to refer to the concluding remarks made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge, in the statement which he made in this Committee on 10 October last week. Mr. Lodge said:

"There exists today some real momentum towards progress in the disarmament effort, with all that this implies for humanity. We ask the Assembly to help us to maintain that momentum. Thus, we can hope to move toward the day when the nations can lay down their burden of armaments and their still heavier burden of fear."

(A/C.1/FV.945, page 19-20)
I was profoundly impressed by these remarks. My delegation would agree entirely with Mr. Lodge that the stockpiling of armaments is a burden on all the nations who have found it necessary to enter the armaments race. As has been already pointed out by several speakers, fear of one another is the motive force that has impelled the great Powers to engage in the armaments race, which the whole world now deplores.

Perhaps, it may be useful to state the view of a small nation like Ghana on the question of disarmament and the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

It is the view of my Government, and I believe all sections of opinion will agree, that a certain minimum quantity of armaments is always essential for the service of any State. The requirements of internal security and national self-defence are two main considerations which, in our opinion, should determine the level of armaments which any nation should reasonably possess.

Man is not the enemy of his fellow man, and if we are able to establish mutual confidence in our relations with one another we shall not continue to live in the nightmare of constant fear in which the whole of mankind now finds itself.

It baffles our imagination to understand why the great Powers are at present engaged in the armaments race. The countries from the continent of Africa are, perhaps, some of the most backward and under-developed in the world today. I use the expression "backward" advisedly, having regard to the standards obtaining in the highly developed countries such as the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and other European countries.

Centuries before the Europeans began the domination and partitioning of the African Continent, there was constant warfare among our various tribal groups. In that period of our history, whole communities, tribes or nations lived in constant fear of one another. With the coming of European civilization into Africa, a ray of hope began to develop and it appeared as if wars and the mass destruction of human beings were going to end forever, not only in Africa but also in Europe and in all other parts of the world.

Africans began to hope and to develop confidence in the ability of Europeans to maintain peace and harmony in the world by reason of the comparative advance of their civilization. However, the incidence of two great World Wars in recent history has tended to undermine the confidence of many Africans in the ability of the advanced countries to maintain peace and harmony in our world today.
All over Africa today, over 200 million Africans are becoming increasingly aware of their rights, which have been denied them under foreign rule for so many years. In the wake of this nationalist movement, new African nations are beginning to emerge on the scene of world affairs. Our only desire is to have peace and tranquility, not only in Africa but also in the world as a whole so as to afford us the opportunity of devoting all our energies towards the progressive development of our respective national economies in Africa, and to endeavour to improve the standard of life of our people.

With constant threats of war in the world today arising from the piling up of armaments and nuclear weapons of destruction, we are put in constant fear of the prospect of our continued existence as independent nations in Africa and the possibilities of our development in the future.

On the question of nuclear tests, my delegation holds the view that nuclear and thermonuclear weapons are a danger to humanity, not only because these lethal weapons have the possibility of annihilating the human race from the face of this earth but also because the radiation which is released from the experimental testing of nuclear weapons is a danger to human life in our age and even a danger to the lives of generations to come.

My delegation, in concert with other like-minded delegations, would appeal earnestly to the great Powers to stop the manufacture of all weapons of destruction, especially nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. We appeal to the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France to cast off what Mr. Lodge has admirably described as "their heavier burden of fear".

If fear has been the main cause of tension in the world and has motivated the piling up of modern weapons of destruction, then let us remove the causes of fear and establish confidence as a basis of co-operation and intercourse between the nations.

In the view of my delegation, the mere suspension of nuclear tests is not enough to allay the growing apprehension of millions of people throughout the world who are appealing for the discontinuance of these nuclear tests. Suspension would mean that at any time the tests could be resumed.

On the other hand, we realize that discontinuance of nuclear tests cannot be effective if the nuclear Powers do not agree among themselves to do so. The
General Assembly cannot compel them by resolutions to discontinue the tests or even to suspend the tests. We can only appeal to the great Powers on behalf of the masses of people throughout the world to save mankind from the nightmare of fear in which we are all engulfed, and from the threats of war with which we are afflicted from day to day.

It lies within the power of the four nuclear Powers to hold the whole of humanity for ransom if they decided not to listen to our appeal.

The continued existence of mankind on this planet or the early annihilation of man from the face of our earth itself lies almost exclusively within the power of the four nations who now possess nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

As I indicated in my statement during the general debate on 24 September, the people of Africa are very much alarmed by the report that one of the four nuclear Powers, namely, France, intends to carry out atomic tests in the Sahara desert. We view with great horror this intention to carry out such tests by France in the Sahara desert or in any other part of Africa.

We appeal to the conscience of France not to carry out any such intentions in Africa; and we also appeal to the four nuclear Powers to agree among themselves to discontinue nuclear tests entirely in any other part of the world.

Humanity is at the crossroads in our present existence. It is within our power to learn how to live together in peace and harmony or to destroy ourselves by the very weapons of our own creation, if we fail to agree on the question of disarmament and on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

Let us look forward to the day when the nations of the world "shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks" -- the day when the nations shall not lift up swords against their fellow nations, the day when the nations shall mutually agree to lay down their arms, and learn to develop the arts of peace and no longer the arts of war.
Mr. Krishna Menon (India): My delegation considers that it is its good fortune to be able to follow in the footsteps of the representative of Ghana, who represents the voice of Africa. This is in no sense to make an invidious distinction between delegations which are present here from that great continent, but here we hear the voice of people who, in the true sense, are only on one side of this great context, that is, on the side of the victim. The others can be spoken of as being partly victims and partly the other way round.

I would like to ask the indulgence of the Committee to be able to express the views of the Government of India as fully as I can on the three subjects that are before us. My delegation fully subscribed to the view that there should be simultaneous discussion. While it may appear that this was partly in order to save time procedurally, the fact still does remain that it is not possible to consider even the most proximate -- I will not say the most important -- problem of the discontinuance of test explosions apart from the general problem of disarmament, which, in itself, is only a preliminary arrangement to the outlawry of war. The doubts that exist in peoples' minds, sometimes often exaggerated for the purpose of argument, about those who are regarded as fanatical on this subject without knowing the implications of it, and, what is more dangerous, to lay emphasis on the discontinuance of tests is in some way to lay less stress on the whole problem of disarmament, is as fallacious as to say that because we argue about disarmament year after year to no main purpose, and an appreciable portion of the United Nations budget is spent in the time and arrangements made for this purpose, one can rightly refuse to discuss it. Because of all that, we cannot abandon the main purpose of the United Nations, namely, to create a world that is peaceful and to outlaw war.

Therefore, the emphasis that we lay on the discontinuance of tests is no more isolated from the problem of disarmament than disarmament itself is isolated from the main objective. I think I should like to clear this away at the beginning because it is one of those doubts which might still persist in the minds of those Member States which still have to make up their minds on the proximate problem. My delegation proposes, therefore, in the first few minutes, to set out the way in which we are going to deal with this matter. We would like to make some preliminary observations on the item as a whole, and then come to the question of tests and deal with the resolutions and other matters.
While it is perhaps not quite proper to say so, because delegations are not represented here as individuals, in view of the personal association I have had on this subject, and since I have to leave this country in a day or so, perhaps I may be forgiven if I trespass into the resolution stage at this moment before my colleagues take it up later.

Now, we have made some progress, not so much in the twelve months that have preceded our coming here to this session of the General Assembly, but since we came here. The impression that my delegation gathered was that when the General Assembly met it was thought that disarmament had been relegated to the Geneva talks and that all we had to do was to say "Amen" to their efforts, that is, just to give a general blessing. In fact, in some quarters -- I will not say responsible quarters -- there were impressions created that perhaps we need not discuss the question at all, and that we could wait for the results of Geneva. No one minimizes the importance of talks, not only at Geneva, but anywhere where the Americans and the Russians meet to talk, because they will contribute to the progress of humanity and be one more indication of progress towards a healing of the cleavages that exist in the world. Therefore, no one minimizes the importance of the talks in Geneva, quite apart from their practical aspects.

Therefore, my delegation wants to say, in the first instance, that in no circumstances can the United Nations, if it is to survive, in any way give an indication to itself or to the world that it is not always and continually seized of this problem. It is its primary responsibility, and it cannot be delegated either to one or two countries, however important they may be, or to one functionary or another, however effective or important he might be. Therefore, in dealing with this problem we would first refer to the position that today we are, at long last, in Geneva recording the progress that has been made about ideas that were not put by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd in the Disarmament Sub-Committee last year, but which are contained in the resolutions of the General Assembly from the tenth session onwards.

At the tenth session the General Assembly commissioned the Disarmament Sub-Committee to make technical examinations and to come to agreements. I am not saying this in order to find out who said what and so on, but in order to lay stress on the fact that this progress in this matter has been very slow.
The General Assembly has been seized of the idea that while the practicability of the cessation of tests is shown, it is not possible to effect cessation.

In the discussion of the general problem, while we may deal with so many technical details, so many proposals and counter-proposals, we may never lose sight of the fact, which has been high-lighted by the last few words of the representative of Ghana, that we are really dealing with a problem of human survival, and once we all keep that in the forefront of our minds, some of the objections will seem less insurmountable than they would otherwise.

The United States representative has told us that this Assembly must give a push to this momentum towards settlement. No words could have been spoken which would have elicited a greater response from my delegation and, I am sure, from the majority of delegations here. The representative of the United Kingdom told us that the picture of disarmament does not look so bad. One can never appreciate a picture very much by looking at it too closely or for not long enough, especially if it is a picture that is worth remembering. One has to look at it for a long time and also, at least imaginatively, have something of the background of this question.

Ten years ago the United Nations ventured on this issue of disarming the world after the great re-armament of the war. What is the picture today? It is very wrong to take a few countries, but whether one takes the United States, the United Kingdom, France or the Soviet Union, military expenditures have reached phenomenal figures, and in order that our imaginations may be impressed by this, let us take, for example, the United States, not always as wealthy as it is today.

In pre-First World War days, in 1913, the United States spent £64 million - probably less than it would spend for building a large edifice today. This expenditure rose to £5,113 million in 1947, and today it is £15,750 million, that is to say, from the end of the Second World War expenditures have increased by 300 per cent.
Let us take the Soviet Union. The pre-First World War figures were above those of the United States because at that time Russia was an imperialist country under the Czars. It spent £92 million at that time, rising to £8,594 million in 1958. It is necessary to take into account the fact that its economy is of such a character that it is not possible for us to make real assessments of the value or significance of these figures.

The United Kingdom, in spite of its vast far-flung empire before the First World War, spent £77 million. In 1947 it spent £1,653 million. Last year it spent £1,525 million. They are a very economical and frugal people, so they must have received from these £1,525 million far more than other people received from their greater amounts of money. The United Kingdom has a system of very strict accounting, with Parliament and newspapers constantly checking. They have the very healthy system, as they consider it, of private enterprise which is very strictly controlled by the governmental organization. So they must have received out of this £1,525 million far more in potential destruction value than any of the others.

This is the picture which Commander Noble asks us to consider as a hopeful picture.

Let us now see what has been done during the past ten years. Since the first atomic explosion in New Mexico, civilization has gone on from one progress to another. When the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, of 500,000 people, 100,000 were killed; 100,000 more were injured. Even today, 99,000 people are under clinical examination and 6,000 of them receive clinical attention. During the period of the last twelve months, 185 people -- more than ten years after the explosion -- died as a result of the atomic attack.

I shall not refer to the Nagasaki affair, as the one at Hiroshima is sufficient. I do not do this to single out the United States in this matter, because I am sure that it must have been thought -- and I gather this from reading Mr. Truman's memoirs -- that the dropping of an atom bomb was no different from that of any other war weapon.
Compared with the weapons of today, the Hiroshima days appear as child's play. Today we have weapons which do not even require a man to guide them. We have progressed to the point of being able to launch weapons under the sea, on the surface, in the air -- in fact, we have almost got to the position where, if a politician sits down and thinks somewhere, everything can go off. We have the development in the field of atomic power under water, in the field of long-range missiles, and so on. What is more, we have come to the stage -- and I say this with great respect to my colleague from France, who chided me last time on ranting on scientific fiction -- where we now have the possibility of portable atomic weapons. This is not scientific fiction, unless the leaders of the United States Army or the Russian Army and their statesmen are all writers of fiction. That is a good occupation. My colleague, Mr. Arthur Lall, is engaged in it.

We have come to the stage where we now have what has been called in United States publications by the term portable atomic weapons, which may be carried somewhere to blow up bridges and to carry out sabotage. We know a great deal more of what takes place in the United States than of what takes place in the Soviet Union, but there is enough evidence to believe that the same thing goes on there. What is more, we have been told that these portable weapons, or tactical weapons -- I do not know where tact comes into this -- which, when we spoke here last time were sixty feet long, can now be carried all over the place and, during the recent Chinese developments, were spoken of as being under use.

The worst side of the picture is this: while my colleague from Ireland states that these weapons should not be given to anybody, there is ample evidence to show that they are being given or are on the way to others. In other words, one can no longer speak -- and this is the point I want to make -- of three nuclear Powers; one can no longer speak of this exclusive club of "three hydrogen gentlemen". It is now spread all over the world. Its distribution has become so wide that the capacity of destroying the world has become decentralized. Many speak out against authoritarian and monolithic forms of government, but the decentralization of the capacity of destruction in this way presents a far greater danger to the world than otherwise. That is the picture as we look at it.
I am quite prepared to look at the picture even from the short-term point of view. It is quite true that progress was made at Geneva so that we can now say that it is technically possible to detect explosions and to impose degrees of control. With great respect to the representative of the United Kingdom, I wish to point out that this is more in the nature of a declaratory act than a creative one. Everybody knew all about this before. It has been repeatedly stated in the Assembly, not only by my delegation but by others as well, that there was no unsurmountability about the obstacles in the way of detection. Now there should be no difficulty about inspection or control. ...and that enables me to lay stress on another aspect of our approach to this problem.

It is entirely fallacious to think that the Government of India, or anyone else who lays stress on the question of cessation, is unmindful of or places less stress on the question of control. We do not think that any agreement in the present day conditions of the world, with all the imperfections of humanity and, what is more, with all the suspicion and lack of faith in each other, can ever be effective without the machinery of control any more than a municipal community, in which we are all supposed to be civilized and not wanting to take each other's lives or steal each other's property, can get on without policemen and laws.

Therefore, my Government stands fully for the establishment of the machinery of control and inspection. But where the rub comes in is here: we should never plead control at the bar of disarmament; that is to say, we should not make control anything more than a device for effecting an agreement. We could not say that people should not live free because there are not enough policemen. We must work towards established control, for without control we can have no assurance that the agreements would be kept. Looking through the records and examining all the statements made by both parties to this controversy, there seems to be agreement on the establishment of control. We have the statements here of the Western side from the United States and the United Kingdom, and of the other side from the Soviet Union, that there is no difference with respect to this point.
My delegation wants to make this clear. Since we are not one of the military
Powers, and in any case we are not a nuclear Power, people tend to believe that
we speak in a vacuum so far as this point is concerned and that we do not take
so-called tactical questions into account.

In looking back over the resolutions -- and for the sake of brevity I shall
take those of the tenth, eleventh and twelfth sessions of the General Assembly --
I want to say that there has never been a climbing down on anybody's part, and
certainly not on the part of my delegation, from the general purposes of the
terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission; that is to say, we all stand
committed to comprehensive disarmament and to the prohibition of weapons of mass
destruction. We have agreed to an approach by stages, which is sometimes
remembered and sometimes forgotten. But in all that has been said and done in
this Assembly, I think there has been progress. The sentiment was expressed by
my colleague from the United States, Mr. Cabot Lodge, when he said that these
debates have the effect of bringing about flexibility; that is to say, it is not
the view that some proposition should be put forward and accepted, and no more.
That, I think, is a very great advance on certain positions held in previous years, and it is there that lies the hope, because it springs from the realization not of the effectiveness of argument but of the realization that the most important party in this world is the people of the world as a whole. That is the reason for the expression of this sentiment.

From that, I should like to take these items one by one. You will remember that when we began there seemed to be a very hot controversy about the priority of items. Now, is it not a commentary on the whole of this business that, whether delegations held one view or the other about the priority of importance, practically all the speeches in this Committee have been either fully concerned with the cessation of test explosions or mainly so? Therefore, irrespective of what positions may be politically held, what is uppermost in the minds of delegations, reflecting the sentiments of the world -- and that is what is most important, that they reflect the sentiments of the world -- is the immediate necessity of regarding test explosions as the proximate issue not unconnected with anything but unrelated in the sense of one hinging upon the other, which I shall come to in a moment. We regard this matter as of great importance, and we make no apology for that.

The situation, as I have said, has deteriorated. In the last ten years, while we have spoken about disarmament, in effect we have had an armaments race. Two years ago when my delegation, almost by inadvertence, put into a draft resolution the words "armaments race", it was very strongly objected to from either side, and it was said that we ought to make it "competitive armament". I thought a race was a competition, but there it is. What we have in the armaments race is the development of these new formidable weapons, not only in size but in their potency and, what is more, in their portability, which is greatly important. Next, the area of this has so widened as to include the open seas of the Pacific -- not the Atlantic but the Pacific -- the Polar regions north and south, and vast expanses of countries which for this purpose cannot morally be regarded as exclusive sovereign territory. These have advanced the capacity for discharging them with very little human guidance from day to day. That has increased. Even the continent of Antarctica and its possible use is a cause of great apprehension.
All this progress in a reverse way -- or I should say all these developments in a reverse way -- and the fear, which seems to be reflected in some of the items put down, that even so-called outer space may perhaps be pressed into the service of war -- that is dominant in people's minds.

When first this problem was brought before the Assembly, there was a general acceptance or a general disposition to regard this as a possible thing, because comprehensive disarmament had been discussed year after year and had been bogged down by rival propositions which, from an analysis of them, seem very much alike, though it may be that our imperfect minds do not grasp the subtle differences. The Assembly came to the conclusion, through the Disarmament Commission, that on the one hand it had to be done by stages, that any step in this direction, as one of the resolutions said, would be something that would lead to progress in other directions. In that way the idea of the suspension of explosions came about. Since Geneva we have spoken about discontinuance. In fact, the Geneva item itself, so far as I understand, is discontinuance. The reason for being allergic to this word "suspension" is that suspension has become associated in fact with preparations.

To save time, I shall try to think aloud on what is the case against this, why we must not do it and why we should. The representative of the United Kingdom has told us that the cessation of nuclear tests is not disarmament. With great respect, I agree. I hope it does not stop there. The first step that you take in a race is not reaching your goal; but that is no argument for not running at all. We have not said at any time that if we suspended nuclear tests there would be disarmament as the night follows the day. All we have said is that it would have certain consequences that would help towards this.

The second argument against suspension is this. It is now argued not only that suspension may be dangerous, not only that suspension is not effective, but that non-suspension, non-cessation, is necessary. The most categorical advocate of this is the Government of France, that is, that there should be no cessation of atomic weapons tests. The Foreign Minister of France, talking to us only a few weeks ago, ended his statement by saying:

"That is why the ending of tests is conceivable only within the framework of effective nuclear disarmament. We shall never weary of repeating this, for the very safety of mankind is at stake."

(A/PV.758, page 66).
In other words, the continuance of these tests is necessary if this argument subsists. But, happily, the trend of the discussions here from every side has shown that that is a view that may be subject to modification. It is argued that if tests are suspended humanity might get a feeling of comfort and that under the general atmosphere of satisfaction that would be created those who are capable of making these bombs will continue to make the old type of bombs without further tests. It is argued that tests are not necessary for development. If tests are not necessary for development, then why have tests? We have it both ways. We are told that it is necessary to develop these weapons and that therefore we must have tests. Then we are told that you can develop them without tests and that therefore, if you suspend tests, the developments will take place without being known, that there will be no bang and that therefore people will think there is no nuclear arming going on. That is another argument that is put forward.

Finally, there is the theory, to which my Government is irrevocably opposed, that these atomic weapons are the instruments of peace. That is what is called the theory of deterrent. The theory of deterrent is logically, philosophically and practically fallacious. The theory of deterrent on the one hand is based upon fear: the whole of its foundation is fear. At the same time its effectiveness is dependent upon faith. You may say that the weapon deters because the other side may be afraid of being killed. But at the same time, if it is to remain a deterrent and not to be active, then you have to rely on the other fellow not using it. So you have some faith in the man on the other side saying that when it comes to that he will not destroy humanity. It is very difficult for us to reconcile these two contradictory positions. My Government is irrevocably opposed to the conception that the peace of this world can be balanced on two, or now three, hydrogen bombs. They are a definite menace to humanity. They ought to go out of use altogether. Their stock-piles ought to be dismantled in whatever way is possible. There ought to be no further manufacture of them, and they should not be regarded as instruments of war.

We thought that, when the great move initiated by President Eisenhower in regard to the peaceful uses of atomic energy gained so much public support, while it was not a step towards disarmament, the emphasis would be shifted. But, if we were to be realistic and truthful to ourselves, far greater attention has been paid in the last two or three years to the war uses of nuclear energy than to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
It is quite true that developments have taken place -- might have taken place in my own country -- but the whole conception of this deterrent theory, that is the fear that it will keep. Then it is said that these tests are required to eliminate the evils of radiation, because one of the reasons for giving up these tests is the contamination of the air and the consequences it will have on humanity as a whole. So we at last hear a great deal of emphasis on what is called the 'clean' bomb -- a contradiction in terms; a "clean" bomb, one gets a "clean" death somehow or other.

The head of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States has said that these tests are required for developing relatively clean and accurate weapons for defence against bombers. Well, I do not say that it is an argument for continuing tests but that statement is contradicted by another responsible quarter, namely, the Secretary for Defense of the United States. He has informed the American Congress only some time ago that "some nuclear weapons in the nation's stockpile have been altered in a way that increases radioactive fall-out over a local area." Then he goes on to say "we are stockpiling bombs which are essentially 100 per cent fission and have never made any statements to the contrary. In our terminology these are 'normal' weapons." He went on to say that "when he referred to 'normal' were those in which no attempt had been made to cut down on fall-out as opposed to 'clean' weapons." Therefore, the idea that these tests are in order to evolve "clean" weapons does not hold water. The Russian weapons are also called "non-clean" and there are dirtier and dirtier weapons -- so we are told by these statements. And now we have the Secretary of Defense of the United States telling us that what he calls a normal weapon is a non-clean weapon.

Dr. Teller told the United States Senate Disarmament sub-committee that by suspending nuclear testing now "we may be sacrificing millions of lives in a 'dirty' nuclear war later." Therefore, all these arguments tend to justify a kind of apprehension that is created in the minds of people who have no desire to attribute motives to any statement that is made.
If the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States or anyone else tells us either privately or publicly here, my delegation would not say that it means something else. We would say that it means what it says. But it says a great deal. And that is, that there can be no cessation of nuclear testing, and of these explosions until there is effective disarmament. Well, of course, if there is effective disarmament, they themselves will not want the tests, it would be a useless occupation. They would not use these bombs anymore.

Now, I say again, there has been no progress, and Commander Noble said to us that the picture looked more hopeful. Now let us look at these explosions. In 1957 the United States had to its credit twenty-four explosions, the United Kingdom six, and the Soviet Union twelve, thus making forty-two explosions in all. In 1958 there have been eighty-seven explosions -- in the last twelve months there have been eighty-seven major thermonuclear and nuclear, I suppose, explosions -- in the way of fifty-six and thirty-one. That is to say in the previous year there were forty-two explosions. So while the technical discussions are going on in Geneva, while we think we are getting a better picture, in the last twelve months the explosions have increased by 100 per cent. There were forty-two last year; there were eighty-seven this year.

Now, the case that there would be a clandestine manufacture of weapons, there would be more other destructive weapons. I think it is only fair that we should try as best we can with our limited knowledge to deal with this element. There is a legitimate apprehension that once these nuclear tests are suspended, one of or the other side may devise weapons that may not come into this category; that is to say, we stop explosions. In the meanwhile other weapons of mass destruction may be devised, thereby leading to consequences which are graver than they are.
My Government is of the view that any kind of suspension or cessation of this character must apply to all weapons of mass destruction; because so far as we know these weapons of mass destruction can only be weapons of this category of this thermonuclear, nuclear or any other development arising from that and could not be the old conventional war-type. Therefore, there is no question that this cessation refers only to the kind of explosions that might take place in Siberia or in Christmas Island only, but any other kind of development, whether it takes place between continents in the way of inter-continental missiles or from anywhere else -- we do not know anything about these things -- from outer space or whatever it is. This ban must apply to the whole lot of them if there is to be a step towards peace in this world.

Now, having put this in this negative way, then it is our duty to state before the Committee what are the positive results of cessation. We say first of all, the immediate positive result of cessation would be to increase the danger to humanity. I should have said that in the expansion of the destructive potential of the world, not only have we increased the size of it and the quantum of it, not only have we increased the variety of it, not only have we increased the area of its use, we have also increased the destructive potential in the other dimension -- in time. That is to say, in former wars you killed, and I suppose you buried the man who was killed if you could get him, and that was the end of it. But now, the destruction is towards generations yet unborn. And in that dimension also it increased. We say therefore, if there is cessation of these tests, there will be less radioactivity in the world harmful to humanity.
Now, there has been a considerable amount of argument in this room. The main exponents as against the position we take up, being the representatives of France and the United Kingdom saying that these radiation results are not so important; in any case we carry a certain amount of radioactive elements within ourselves, and so on and so on; therefore, it is not too bad. Fortunately, the Committee on Radiation which we shall discuss later, while its report is couched in very cautious language, makes it quite clear that any further increase in this, would be harmful to us.

The Committee, in its general conclusions -- I do not want to go into great length, because we shall be discussing this afterwards -- says "even the smallest amount of radiation is liable to cause deleterious genetic and perhaps traumatic effects. Natural radiation fallout involves the whole world population and to a greater or lesser extent only a fraction of the population with medical or occupational exposure. It is clear that medical and occupational exposure in the testing of nuclear weapons can be influenced by human action and that natural radiation already injected in the stratosphere cannot". What we cannot prevent, we cannot prevent. But what we are causing we can stop from causing.

Paragraph 54 of this report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation states:

"Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations; these hazards, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed persons." (A/3838, page 41)

In other words, all that the majority of the peoples of the world can do is to just await atomic annihilation. In the same paragraph there is this statement "The Committee concludes that all steps designed to minimize irradiation of human populations will act to the benefit of human health." Now, there is another factor that we ought to bear in mind, that this Committee has assumed that there will be no increase in radiation levels because there is all this talk of suspension and so on -- set out in tables -- that if there is no further radiation, then perhaps we can keep at this present level of danger.
They already say that an estimated total of 2,500 to 100,000 of cases of leukemia will ultimately occur in subsequent years from tests already made, if they are stopped in 1958. Their effects are not now known, and each year from 2,500 to 100,000 people will suffer from these genetic effects.

Naturally a scientific committee does not go into the political issue of whether or not tests will be continued. All this is written on the basis of what has happened. Since then, we have the continuance of these tests.

My Government and a great many Governments in the world received with great relief and feeling, which we did not disguise, the news that the Soviet Union had unilaterally decided to stop exploding these bombs. There were two reasons. First of all, it was because this was a beginning in cessation. Secondly, my Government rightly or wrongly thinks that, in a contest of this kind and generally in the case of all conflicts, any unilateral action undertaken with the realization of danger has not only political but good moral effects on the world as a whole. Therefore, when the Soviet Union suspended these tests five months ago, not only my country but a great part of the world, particularly Asia and Africa, responded very generously. It would be wrong -- in fact, we would not want to do so -- to disguise our feelings of disappointment at the fact that these tests have been renewed. That the United States and the United Kingdom have not discontinued the tests is, in our opinion, no justification for their renewal by the Soviet Union. We understood that the tests had been given up unilaterally and this was a recognition of the dangers inherent in them and a denial that no amount of capacity for nuclear war as a possible deterrent would in any way make up for the results against humanity.

When I have said this, I want also to refer to the other side of it. The representative of the United Kingdom said here that his delegation had said in August that they were prepared to stop these explosions if there was agreement on it. I submit with great respect that greater than all agreement at that time was the fact of cessation, and the interest of cessation as a whole required that there should have been a general stopping on all sides.

From August to the end of October time has elapsed. In the meanwhile, instead of proceeding towards cessation we have moved away from it in the sense that one party that had stopped has already restarted and, what is more, restarted not only
with the consequence of increasing radiation but also throwing some doubts and suspicions on the bona fides of suspension as a whole.

We have tried to state as objectively as we could the results of this action as we saw them. After all, if there is a crime against humanity, if it is an anti-social action, if it is a deleterious action, it does not appear right to say that we shall stop this on a particular date. We believe that a great opportunity has been missed and therefore the responsibility to recreate it arises very strongly.

We have the other side of it. We are very happy to see that at this session of the United Nations and preceding it, the call for the giving up of these tests has come from quarters from where it did not come before. We had the privilege of having present with us one of the veteran statesmen of the world in the person of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, a great advocate of the cause of peace over the years whether or not he was in government. He told this Assembly categorically -- and this does not come from an uncommitted nation or from a nation that belongs to any unnecessarily critical group of the present nuclear Powers on his side.

"For reasons of overwhelming cumulative force" -- this is Anglo Saxon understatement -- "the cessation of nuclear tests is essential." -- He does not say it is desirable.

"First, it would end the problem of radioactive fallout from test explosions of nuclear weapons ..."

"Secondly, it would, if it were universal in its application, rule out the danger that efficient atomic weapons will be developed by an ever-increasing number of countries ..."

"Thirdly, it would establish for the first time a world-wide inspection system ..." -- In this we heartily agree.

"The Fourth benefit of an early agreement ... is more general and more tangible, but potentially the most important of all: confidence and trust between the nations." (A/PV.770, page 12)

So states Mr. Nash. These are the four reasons that have been set out by him.
We also have an appeal from another Western country not committed to the Western group as such, that is, from Sweden, to ask for the cessation of tests in spite of a certain section of opinion in that country not being so much in favour of it. Mr. Uden told us only a few days ago:

"The Swedish Government supports the proposal for a universal discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests." (A/C.1/PV.946, page 62)

I wish I could be as brief and as effective as Mr. Uden.

I return to these reasons why there should be. First of all, I have referred to the reasons of lesser radioactivity. I have said something like this in the Assembly previously. But I think it is well for us to remember that publications in this country -- one of them by groups of men who are engaged in big business and therefore cannot be regarded as being uncautious, to put it very mildly -- have all referred to this enormous destructive potential of these weapons. And to make it more graphic and more real to our imaginations it is calculated that, shall we say, the power of a twenty megaton explosion, one of these big explosions that either the Russians or the Americans have set off, we are told, if it was to be equated in terms of TNT, would require as much of that material as would cover wagons that would stretch from here to Los Angeles and back. And one of these smaller ten megaton explosions would require more explosives than were used in the whole of the last two world wars.

That being the position, I think that when we deal with these matters we may not simply look to our sights as such, as to what are our immediate political advantages. And we say definitely that if there are risks in this, there are risks of peace and of human survival which we should take.
The second cause for cessation is this: It is quite true that we are representatives of our Governments. No doubt, we are all very estimable people -- because, if you were not, I would not be. So we are all very distinguished representatives over here. But we do not live in isolation. We are here, we are heard, we are able to speak, because, whatever our forms of government may be, we represent the enormous public opinion of this world, and there is no doubt that in every country, irrespective of their forms of government, irrespective of the freedom of press or otherwise, irrespective of their economic organization, the overwhelming volume of world public opinion is in favour not only of the cessation of these tests but of the non-use of nuclear and thermonuclear power for destructive purposes.

Only recently, nearly ten thousand scientists, who ought to know something about this -- I wish they had all taken some sort of binding oath upon themselves that they should not use their talent for the purpose of destruction -- sent out a memorial calling for the cessation of tests, and said:

"Each nuclear bomb test spreads an added burden of radioactive elements over every part of the world... We deem it imperative that immediate action be taken to effect an international agreement to stop the testing of all nuclear weapons."

I spoke of them simply as ten thousand scientists. But they are not just new graduates of universities. They include some seventy or eighty Nobel Prize winners. Since we know that these distinctions are not conferred upon men with small ability or men of small stature, we know that this is an expression of opinion of what may be called the intelligentsia and the scientific knowledge of the world. This does not come from science fiction.

I have here another quotation, which reads:

"Two Japanese ships showered with radioactive rain in the Pacific returned home today to a nation showing increasing bitterness towards American nuclear weapons tests. But Japan, the only nation to know first hand the horrors of atomic bombing, feels any radioactivity at all is suspect."

This is from an American paper in 1958.
I want to refer to another expression of American public opinion, and I am sure that my colleague from the United States will not regard it as interference in domestic affairs, because these are published documents. They are public documents of an organization called the National Planning Association, which I understand is an organization of comparatively conservative people. They say:

"We believe the test control issue should now be separated from others, and that our country should take prompt initiative for a worldwide test control programme."

That is not along the same lines as the remarks of Commander Noble.

Again, I say that we entirely support the idea that controls should be effective. But we would not say that, because controls are not yet effective, we cannot do this. We should not plead machinery in bar of an objective.

In this way, the enormous volume of world public opinion that is welling up, expressing itself in different ways, is something that we cannot ignore, because world public opinion really represents the side that is most affected, namely, the victim.

The third argument is that other weapons cannot be developed if there are no tests. Well, for myself, I would say: "Thank God that they cannot be developed". But, since the ban should be on all weapons that carry nuclear or thermonuclear power, I do not see the force of this argument. If the argument is that we can still manufacture the kinds of weapons that have already been manufactured even if there are no tests, we say that in addition there is the matter of the radioactivity that is spread -- and, what is more, it is only another argument to push us on toward obtaining the total prohibition of these weapons of war.

Fourthly, my Government thinks that a decision by the great Powers concerned, endorsed by the Assembly, as it would be -- an appeal to other countries not to make these things and to explode them -- would reverse the trend toward war.
(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

In all that I have said, I have tried to show that in the last ten years, instead of disarming, we are rearming, and what the world wants most is to reverse that. Even if we agreed, for the sake of argument, that cessation of tests is not disarmament, nevertheless its political and psychological and emotional effects would be such that there would be a wave of feeling away from war. As Mr. Walter Nash has pointed out, that would probably be the most important consequence of such a step.

Moreover, once the test question is out of the way, with all the feeling that arises from the immediacy of its possibilities and other factors that surround it, it would be easier to take up a comprehensive disarmament programme -- and I am here to commit my Government to any effort that pushes all the other aspects of disarmament.

We therefore say that not only is there no case against cessation, but everything is in its favour.

So much for the cessation of tests. There are two other items on the agenda that I want to discuss, one relating to the disarmament problem as a whole and the other to the problem of military budgets. But I should not like to proceed to that without referring to another topic that is to be discussed at Geneva and that is included in the Western resolution -- that is, the matter of surprise attacks. I am free to confess that countries of our size, situated as we are, are not motivated very much by these considerations. But I dare say that those who think in these terms have to do so, because they pay attention to it, and we are therefore happy there is agreement to consider this problem. But may I say, without being cynical, that a surprise attack about which there is so much talk and discussion can hardly be a surprise -- a surprise prepared over a generation. But, on the other hand, if the fear is about another Pearl Harbor, I think it is a legitimate one.

We therefore hope that the attempt will be made to reach agreement and, what is more, to establish machinery of inspection and control, without unnecessary and mischievous interference in one another's affairs or in such a way as to violate not only the sovereignty but the sense of dignity of people.
We think that would be a great advance, and my Government would welcome any development that takes place in that way, because the consequence would be the removal of fear and the creation of confidence. It would remove another argument against disarmament, and it could also be another nail in the coffin of the "deterrent" theory. We therefore welcome the meeting in November to discuss the question of surprise attacks.

We also have a secret hope that all these discussions about surprise attacks will lead to a method of discovery of stockpiles. It is true that it has been said that there are no known methods of detecting stockpiles. However, the data that each side would have to place before the other in order to ensure that there would be no surprise attack would also lead inevitably, in some measure, to some statements with regard to existing stocks, and that would be a contribution toward disarmament. For that reason also, we welcome the November talks.
That takes us to the general problem of disarmament. If we had had no item before the Assembly on the cessation of these tests they would have come under the discussion of the general problem of disarmament. Therefore, there is no competition between these things, but since I have spoken at length about the cessation of tests and there is another item I shall not, in discussing that other item, deal very much with nuclear tests.

The Disarmament Commission has been functioning for many years. My delegation, during the sessions of the General Assembly, has been associated with the endeavours to make progress in that way. In 1954 a Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission was set up -- first in the face of opposition, when the proposal came in here, and afterwards by general acceptance, proving what the representative of the United States has said, namely, that these debates do have the effect of creating flexibility.

Before the Disarmament Commission proposal after proposal has been made. I want to say this in no way of petty complaint, but these proposals are discussed; they are not thrown out of the window. And delegations such as ours agree to the practical idea that they should be referred to the Disarmament Commission for discussion, but year after year that has been opposed. The opposition, I am sorry to say, has come mainly from our friends of the United Kingdom. Equally, it was the United Kingdom which suggested in this Committee that those proposals, including the Indian proposal, should go before the Disarmament Commission.

So, after nearly eighteen months of argument, and continued representations by the Government of India, India's proposals were received by the Disarmament Commission somewhere in 1955. I had the privilege of representing my Government on that occasion, and I am glad to state before this Committee that all the members of the Disarmament Commission, and not least of all the representatives of the United Kingdom and of France, welcomed the suggestions that we made in terms so embarrassing to me that I do not want to quote them. But at any rate they agreed to grant our request to be allowed to appear before them. They paid tribute to the suggestions that we made, but nothing more came out of it.
We made many suggestions at that time, one of which was that there should be technical consultations on these matters. Those proposals and others made by various delegations had been sent time after time to the Disarmament Commission. Now this is the occasion to look at the whole of the disarmament problem and the disarmament machinery, because what we have is a situation where, in between sessions, there is discussion -- in the last three or four years mainly in the Sub-Committee -- the Commission meets in order to forward the documents, they come here, there is a general debate, and the matter goes back to the Disarmament Commission. That was bad enough, but during the past twelve months the Disarmament Commission has stopped altogether. That is to say, the machinery of consultation, the machinery of what is euphemistically called connexion with the United Nations, has disappeared altogether.

My Government, for one, welcomes the direct talks between the Powers mainly concerned which are in a position to stop these tests, but we think that it has to go on two lines -- or several lines if you like. On the one hand, there should be these direct talks, but the general competence and the influence of the General Assembly ought to be upon them.

We regret that in the last twelve months the Disarmament Commission has not met and that there has been no progress in that direction. This brings to mind one or two matters. One is the matter which was put very much better than I can put it the other day by Mr. Noble when he said that no resolution that is passed, whatever the majority, has any effect unless it has agreement. I believe he said this last year, and it was not a statement which met with much approval.

Last year the Indian delegation brought three draft resolutions before the General Assembly, one of which, appearing in document A/L.238 dated 14 November 1957, was to the effect that the great Powers, with such other assistance as might be required, should conduct a technical examination, with a commission to be set up for the purpose, of the one impediment to the cessation of test explosions, which was -- if the speeches made are to be accepted at their face value, as they must be -- the inability to detect them. The draft resolution came before the General Assembly, and it was rejected by 34 votes to 24, with 20 abstentions.
I think these abstentions are not only increasing but are becoming increasingly significant. The defeat of the draft resolution had minority support, taking the membership as a whole. But, in any case, we are happy that practically that suggestion is now before Geneva. The work has been done in that way, and the results are as they are set out. The Swedes had at that time conducted experiments which made the discovery of explosions possible even to the extent of the slightest consequence to the atmosphere of the world, and, without the consent of the Swedish Government, we produced that evidence before the Assembly last year.

As far as the Disarmament Commission is concerned my delegation wishes to submit that, on the one hand, we should not divorce this problem from the competence of the Assembly. I do not mean the logical, official or technical competence, but the Assembly's generally having its hand on it. Secondly, in view of the experience not only of last year but of previous years, the time has come, perhaps, to have a de novo approach to this problem in our opinion. We think that the only time when disarmament really gets any attention is when the Assembly meets. We believe that, as Mr. Lodge has pointed out, it has a very healthy effect on those who are thinking about this problem. It leads to flexibility; it leads, if you like, to some sort of light on any rigid positions which may have the effect of ameliorating that situation. But where we differ from the representative of the United States is when he equates any assistance of a technical character which the Secretary-General may give with the United Nations as a whole. This is what Mr. Lodge tells us:

"Fourthly, there is the role of the United Nations. The United Nations has a vital responsibility in the field of disarmament."

No one could disagree with that. He then goes on:

"The last section of the draft resolution states explicitly how the conferences and the United Nations can assist each other. Operative paragraph 5 invites the forthcoming conferences to avail themselves of the assistance and services of the Secretary-General. We are pleased that both sides in these conferences have in fact already been working with the Secretary-General to this end. This paragraph also calls for the United Nations to be kept informed about the forthcoming conferences. This is
obviously important. Operative paragraph 6 reflects the significant role that the Secretary-General can play. He is invited, in consultation with the Governments concerned, to give such advice not only as may seem appropriate to facilitate the current developments, but also with respect to any further initiatives on disarmament. Finally, operative paragraph 7 assures that the deliberations of the General Assembly and the proposals made here should be taken into account by the States... concerned.

(My delegation yields to no one in connexion with the part which the Secretary-General has played in the promotion of peace efforts during the last three years, especially in the Middle East, but the whole of this relates only to this particular conference in Geneva, the technical parts of it, and so on. It would be quite impossible to accept the contention that the views of Governments have to be communicated to the disarmament Powers or to the disarmament bodies second hand. We believe, therefore, that while all this may be subscribed to, and while it may be all-important, it does not exhaust the problem. The problem is that of the concern of the United Nations, expressed through the General Assembly, making its continuous impact upon these discussions to create a situation whereby the separate conferences outside these meetings, whether here or anywhere else, must take place, with whatever the Secretary-General can do in this way being done. At the same time, the United Nations must be able to play its part, not for any reasons of what we call organizational selfishness or otherwise but because the impact of world public opinion comes only in that way.

I think, therefore, that -- even forgetting the Disarmament Commission -- instead of again trying these permutations of various combinations and various figures, we should get to a position where the United Nations General Assembly has more intimate contact with what is going on. Therefore, at the appropriate time, when moving a draft resolution on our item -- we have a draft resolution on one item only -- we would suggest that full consideration should be given to this idea that the General Assembly as a whole should constitute the Disarmament Commission. Our permanent representatives live here the year round; disarmament is not a seasonal crop, but is with us always. And it is our view that, other methods having failed, the Assembly as a whole should have an interest in this matter.
This is not a suggestion that vital problems can be decided upon by public discussion or by debates. It gives the opportunity for private discussion. It gives the opportunity, to which Mr. Lodge referred, for the impact that brings about flexibility.
It gives the opportunity, if you like, of showing up those who are making difficulties. It gives the opportunity of the concern of various parts of the world to be more alive in the minds of those who have the responsibility than otherwise.

Therefore, we would, at the appropriate time, make a suggestion that the Disarmament Commission be composed of the eighty-one nations represented here; how it should function is a matter that will work itself out. Then there will be no question of parities and non-parities; there will be no question of some being left out or not left out. Even the smallest of us may have to make a contribution. We have heard a speech by the representative of Ghana a few minutes ago. Ghana is one of the smaller and newer countries of the world. Who would say, after hearing the representative of Ghana, that his concern, the part which he is to play in this, however different it may be from that of anyone else, is any less significant to his country and the world than any other?

The overall responsibility, said the representative of the United Kingdom, in referring to the preamble of the draft resolution, for disarmament still lies with us here in the United Nations. If I may say so, that word "still" is significant. As soon as possible we want to see substantive discussions on disarmament brought back into the United Nations so that the Organization may be entitled to begin to discharge its responsibility. I think that any arrangements which we should make should not sort of isolate this problem and take it away and prevent the impact of opinion playing upon those concerned. At the same time it would be fatal that it should prevent direct contacts between those primarily concerned or anyone else who would make a contribution. The efforts which we have made have been rather infructuous in the last two years. Any expansion of the Disarmament Commission was totally opposed by the representative of France last year and the expansion as it was made caused the efforts to be infructuous because it did not work according to plan.

Therefore, we submit that the responsibility lies on the world as a whole and that the United Nations should be the Disarmament Commission. We believe that, in this way, attempts made in the very effective talks in Geneva, particularly in regard to inspection and control, will become transmitted to the
general knowledge of the world and the growth of opinion in favour of effective inspection and control will develop; and inspection and control, instead of becoming a bar to consideration, will become an instrument of effection action.

There is also an item on the agenda in regard to military budgets. It is very difficult for us to pronounce on the most efficacious way of dealing with this, but in so far as it is an attempt to limit the quantum of armaments, I am sure that we are all in general agreement with it. It is not always possible to say what a certain quantity of money means in a country and, therefore, the actual detail of it must be left for study and discussion, but we would support any limitation in this way; and, while we are not one of the highly armed countries, I am sure that the Government of India would make its own modest contribution towards the scaling down of defence expenditures if there were any possibilities in that direction tending to lower tension in the world, particularly in our neighbouring areas. I want to say here and now that when we are taking military expenditures into account, it is not sufficient to take into account the actual amount of money spent in the building of arms in a particular country: we must also take into account the expenditures incurred by providing arms to other people through the creation of armed stations elsewhere and by the whole system of military pacts. My country is definitely opposed to the system of military pacts, which not only has sent instruments of war, but has projected the machinery of war into otherwise non-warlike lands. We have been definitely opposed to this position always. Even in the last few years these pacts have shown definitely that they have no value, even in terms. So, whether it be the lion to the east or the lion to the west, drawing in more and more countries to the so-called defence systems, they would become unnecessary in the general course of disarmament. But the continuation of the situation would, on the one hand, distribute arms more and more over the world and project the machinery of the cold war into areas where it should not. It creates deep concern in other areas, and while it would not affect us in any way, in many countries it would lead to greater armaments.

Looking at the greatest proposals that have been made over the years, my delegation finds that there are many proposals which are common, and if the idea of the General Assembly becoming the Disarmament Commission is seriously...
undertaken, then it should not be impossible to take either the greatest common measure of agreement in this or to take those items on each side, whichever contribute to the widest disarmament, and put them together. While it has incurred definite opposition from one of the great Powers, we should still have before us what may be called the abridgement of a disarmament convention. Then the discussions would be more concrete instead of always as they have been before. From 1955 onwards there have been various proposals, and we find that in regard to the reduction of conventional armaments there is a general degree of agreement. In regard to the second stage also there is general agreement, except that the question of political issues is tied up with it by one side and not by the other.

Our view is that disarmament will lead to the solution of political issues; and we should go back to the phraseology which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd put to us at one time, that progress in one field would result in progress in other fields.

There is a reference to disarmed manpower of other countries: all the more reason why those countries should be involved. Even the smallest country would hesitate to have an imposition on itself with regard to its military, civilian or other potential without consent.

With regard to nuclear disarmament, my Government wishes me to state that our position is and will remain unchanged. That is, there can be no disarmament in the world unless the world of nuclear Powers as a whole decides that the nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and their development for destructive purposes must come to an end. That is to say, we must implement the general decision of the Assembly in regard to the total prohibition and abandonment of nuclear weapons. But we do not say that it can be done without progressing from stage to stage; and, small as it is, the stopping of these tests as the first stage, the introduction of control and inspection, and the confidence which it would create would lead towards that. Equally, we think that the development of long-range missiles is a greater danger, and they would be checked by this process.

I made the proposal, on behalf of my delegations, that there should be a discontinuance of tests -- and by discontinuance we mean discontinuance.
At this stage I might deal with the draft resolutions that are before us. His Excellency Prince Wan, the representative of Thailand, in discussing these draft resolutions, referred to the draft resolution submitted by India, I think almost alone. We have not had the privilege of knowing the views of the United Kingdom or others on it, but I believe they are probably sympathetically disposed to it, but do not want to say anything.

The main objection, in regard to the representative of Thailand -- which is the only one I can take up at the present time -- is that we have said here that there should be discontinuance "until agreement is reached". Two questions have been asked in the lobbies of the United Nations. What does the word "until" mean? It means "until", and nothing else.

Prince Wan asks us: Supposing there is no agreement at Geneva, then what happens? I would like to tell him what happens. What does he think should happen? If there is no agreement in Geneva, should there be continuance of these tests? The answer is, 'that there should be agreement, if not in Geneva, then somewhere else. We should do everything to get agreement, and we say that tests should be kept discontinued until there is agreement. That is what it means. This would also mean, as a corollary, that if the discontinuance remains and one or the other of the three Powers should in spite of the discontinuance start explosions, then it would be for the Assembly to intervene.

That would be the occasion when there is a real breach, a real fear, that there would be no agreement at all. That is why we have said that we should proceed on the basis that there will be agreement, that we should work for this agreement. The technical people have said it is possible.

We have heard statements of the United States and the Soviet Union that they are in favour of controls. The Soviet Union expresses itself as accepting the control position, and therefore all that remains on this is the devising of the machinery of control. The machinery of control has been tried in other contexts where there were great difficulties, and they have, if not one hundred per cent, succeeded. Even in the very difficult situation as between Israel and the Arab countries, we have had a degree of success in these arrangements, and we should try and pursue the methods either of direct balancing of positions as between the parties concerned or seek other methods.
Therefore, we say, in answer to the representative of Thailand, that what we mean is that there should be a cessation of tests and not suspension, which means that they will stop for some time and when something happens they will start again. The only condition where discontinuance should be discontinued is where one of the parties starts all over again. It is agreed that a test explosion is not a surprise attack and therefore there is no danger involved. We therefore hope that the General Assembly will tell the great Powers concerned that there should be a discontinuance of these tests.

Now we come to the draft resolutions before the Committee. There is before the Committee the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) submitted by the United States and sixteen other countries. We have no objection to a great part of it. But we have certain objections to putting all these problems into the same draft resolution -- not because they are not inter-related, but because we happen to be discussing different items and this is not purely a procedural matter. The very fact that they are put together lends colour -- not in our minds -- to the fears that are entertained that it is intended to make the suspension conditional, interlinked, as it is called by others.

Now I say, with great respect to the representative of the United Kingdom, that there is some justification for this apprehension. If he will read his own speech, he will see it. In one part of his speech, he says that the suspension, as he calls it, can take place:

"Our ultimate aim is of course the final cessation of all nuclear weapons tests..." (A/C.1/PV.948, page 28-30)

There we part company. He says:

"Our...aim is" -- and that is what we are now trying to do -- "cessation, because that is part of the aim of comprehensive disarmament..." (Ibid.)

This knocks the bottom out of the whole idea of cessation.
It is only in comprehensive disarmament that there can be a cessation, in the United Kingdom view. There is part of the aim of comprehensive disarmament which we hold constantly before us. We want the cessation of tests with real disarmament, because only thus will real security be achieved.

This word "with" is a very difficult word. It has the advantage that if the United Kingdom is so disposed, it can adopt for it a meaning which simply means "in the same direction". I looked up all the English dictionaries in the world on this, and I find that this little word has miles and miles of explanations. Therefore the word "with" can mean almost integration; it can also mean pointing in the same direction.

Therefore, if the representation of the United Kingdom would accept the view that the suspension points in the same direction, then we should all be happy. Thus, he does not abandon his word "with"; he remains with the "with". But if it means a condition precedent, the cessation is conditioned by the other fact; and, of course, if rearmament goes on in the world and there is no improvement in the position, a new situation arises. If anyone makes a breach of the cessation arrangement, then a cause arises for this purpose.

I would like, with great respect, to ask the representative of the United Kingdom whether a Government like mine has not reason to be apprehensive of this matter. When we brought this matter up before the General Assembly, with the United Kingdom itself, in early 1954, there was general enthusiasm. I submit that all the resistance to this has come from that quarter. First of all, we were asked to accept limitation of explosions, and some of our friends from Asia agreed with it to a certain extent. We were totally opposed to the idea of limitation of explosions because it legalized them and lent a colour of morality to it. A limitation of explosions, we thought, was licensing this evil -- and that came up in 1955.

Then there are repeated statements that the suspension of tests must in the long run be conditioned upon the progress towards real disarmament. If there is no progress, then you use this as a lever to bring about progress. In our opinion,
that is wrong. Thirdly, we heard the position, after the first initial
enthusiasms were over, that the main difficulty in regard to this was that the
explosions could not be detected. At no time was the Government of India and
its advisors of the opinion that there was any substance in this argument. Not
for a moment did the people in Asia regard that there was substance. But from
our point of view — and we have some knowledge on this matter, though very limited,
and which now has been justified by the technical committee -- I have stated this
each time on behalf of my Government.

In 1956 we said:

"We have taken scientific advice, in our own and other countries,
and we find that there is no valid reason to support the contention
that large-scale explosions, explosions that could do the kind of damage
which I have described, could take place in a concealed way."

I also said the following:

"No concealment of any effective character is possible in regard
to this."

I further stated:

"...all the evidence that my Government has is to the effect that
atomic, nuclear and thermonuclear explosions, under proper arrangements,
are detectable...No one can say that it would be one hundred per cent
detection, but the evasion of detection is almost impossible."

We went on to repeat this position. That enables me to say the following:
If it is true that a one hundred per cent detection cannot be assured, is it not
also true that evasion would not be effective? We may not be able to detect
explosions in a case -- there may be a case where you cannot -- but no country that
commits an explosion will feel sure that they will not be found out. Is that not
the basis of all law? Are there any policemen in any country who can prevent
every misdemeanour of crime, a real crime or misdemeanour? The departure from
law is prevented by the fear of that exposure. Non-exposure is not a certainty.
Therefore, if it is true that all detection is not possible, it is equally true
that all evasion is beyond the bounds of detectability. I think I have made the
submissions I have to make. We are not in favour of putting forward one resolution.
We hope the United States and its colleagues will consider this problem again. We hold no brief for every word that appears in the resolution that was put forward. There is no reference in the draft resolution of the Soviet Union to the attempts that will be made at Geneva, which we think is a great defect. We also cannot support that draft resolution for that reason. It creates suspicion in the minds of others because there is no reference to control.

But in justification it must be said that any agreement means that there will be control; therefore, it is not necessary to state it. The two parties are not likely to come to an agreement unless there is control. Therefore, control is implicit; but, in our opinion, it should have been said.

The main defect from that point of view in both draft resolutions is that there is no reference to the return of this matter to the General Assembly. We think that whatever happens in Geneva -- agreement, partial disagreement of disagreement -- it ought to come back to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly which, so far as this item is concerned, should stand adjourned for the purpose, unless of course the idea of the whole Assembly becoming a Disarmament Commission finds acceptance in the minds of the Assembly as a whole.

Therefore, my submission is this: in view of the great dangers that face the world, in view of the fact that control and inspection is regarded by all responsible peoples as necessary and in view of the fact that suspension of these explosions would create a change in the psychology in regard to this and would bring hope to humanity, there is no alternative.

Prince Van asks us, "What would you do if it were not effective"? I ask him the same question. Does he say that if there is no agreement in Geneva we should go on testing ad infinitum until the preparations for a more complete blowing-up of the world is in train? We are told that the present stockpile of weapons are enough to destroy civilization as we know it. Why should we destroy the world more than once even though the ones who think that when the contingency comes it must be met? If there is enough destructive power either to bring a war to a conclusive end or which will lead to total destruction, why should there be any more power than there is at the present time? There is no case whatsoever in the world for developing more massive weapons of destruction
I say this not in any sense which is beyond my competence, but this Assembly and the United Nations will live or fall by the contribution it makes in our time to the problem of disarmament, irrespective of political parties and affiliations and philosophies.

The world is tired of this conception of bearing the burden of arms. The world is tired of the idea of living under fear. The world is afraid that today we have the problem only of three Powers but that next year there may be four, there may be five or there may be six. Personally, I do not subscribe to just six Powers; there might be forty or fifty because it will be purveyed to other people; whether they make it or not they will have it; we should have the imaginativeness to see the consequences of these things as great as they are. Perhaps even soon after New Mexico and soon after Hiroshima it would have been possible to use restraint with greater ease, but there is no use for us to go back, to look back into the past except for gaining experience. Therefore, the survival of this Organization as a body that is in the service of humanity, the promotion of its objects, the prevention of evil that must come to succeeding generations is involved; even according to this conservative representative committee of the United Nations, which says that even the explosions that have already taken place can have genetic effects on from 2,000 to 100,000 people every year — that means that there is a progressive deterioration.

Even knowing that damage has been done, it is the appeal of my Government to these great and powerful nations which have contributed so much to humanity. Whether we agree with them in one way or another, they have brought full succor, shelter, sanitation and education; they have made great contributions to human knowledge in the conquests of space and time. They have helped the endeavours of other under-developed nations like ours to come forward. The masses of the people, from which are not excluded the statesmen who govern their countries, want to see an era of peace. But peace will not drop from heaven. We must be prepared to make an effort, this small effort that is now required to tell the world that we shall reverse this armaments race, whatever its cost.
We have been told they will suspend tests for a year and are prepared to continue. Why introduce into this act of faith that element of fear and suspicion which nullifies it? The appeal of my Government, therefore, to the United States, to the Soviet Union and to the United Kingdom is that they report to this Assembly before it rises that there has been an agreement in regard to the cessation of these test explosions; that is to say, the explosions of all weapons of mass destruction, which will bring relief and hope to humanity and, what is more, bring faith to us in the United Nations that in spite of all the failures of the last ten years, in spite of the many speeches we have delivered and the large numbers of resolutions we have adopted, the various ways of balancing the minority with a unanimous vote, which is like covering a crack in the wall with a piece of tissue paper — all that must belong to the past. We make this fervent appeal to everyone concerned, and we hope that it will be agreed that in view of the very closeness of this problem, in view of the possibility of doing something and in view of all the consequences I have spoken about, we will be able to have a special resolution on these tests, to come to a decision of a character which will enable us to review the results of the decision very shortly. Then we can go on to the problem of disarmament in such a way as to make our functioning in this more operative. What is more, we all can do as Poland and some other countries have done, either in the way of denial of our space for these purposes or our voluntary desire to limit military expenditure — I speak of the responsibility in this matter. By all this we will make a step forward.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of France has asked to speak in order to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief.

Mr. Krishna Menon has referred to my country on a number of occasions, as well as some others. He did so in peaceful terms, as called for by the subject; he did so in amiable terms as dictated by his temperament. I do not take a tragic view of his remarks, but a number of clarifications are necessary, I think, before the representative of India leaves us to participate again in the governmental life of his country and in directing the armies of India.
My first remark is as follows. Carried away by his talent for improvisation -- which all of us admire and recognise -- Mr. Krishna Menon upbraided me for having spoken of science fiction in connexion with what he calls portable or tactical atomic weapons. In reality, he had on the day he was referring to spoken of the horrible future involving atomic pistols and thermonuclear machine guns. It was that which brought me to speak of science fiction. In fact, such weapons today are still within the realm of science fiction.

But the second point is more important. Mr. Krishna Menon had, still very courteously, reproached my friend, Mr. Couve de Murville, the Foreign Minister of France, for having called for the stopping of test explosions within the framework of an effective disarmament programme. Mr. Krishna Menon added that surely this position would be modified. I imagine that he received information from Paris which has not yet been provided to me. But at the same time he declared himself the champion of such a disarmament plan and justified his request for the cessation of tests on the grounds that no one would need such tests since nuclear weapons of all types would be prohibited. This is where our paths part, and this, very courteously, may I suggest, is where he is putting the cart before the horse.
I do not wish to say now what I am going to say on Monday afternoon, but there is one question which must be asked, in view of what Mr. Menon has said, and I must say that no satisfactory answer seems to be forthcoming straight away. Like many other representatives, Mr. Menon would like to advise, or even impose, the cessation of test explosions, which everyone surely recognizes is not an act of disarmament itself. But why does he not advise with the same vigour the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes and the beginning of a progressive reconversion of stockpiles of fissionable material, because these surely would be measures of a genuine beginning of disarmament.

All that I wish to adduce from all this is an appeal to the General Assembly not to confuse appearance with reality. We are here in order to disarm.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of India has asked for the floor. I understand he also wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): It is not possible for me fully to exercise my right of reply, because I must see the verbatim record of Mr. Moch's statement. I have no desire to enter into this kind of argument at this stage of the debate on this subject. I was extremely careful, in regard to both my colleagues from the United Kingdom and from France, to keep strictly to the texts of the words they have used, but now an appeal has been made to the Assembly not to confuse appearance with reality. The Assembly must draw its own inference as to what that means.

It was asked: Why did I not speak with the same passion in regard to fissionable materials and their uses? I advise Mr. Moch, if I may say so in this particular case because it refers to me, to read the statements made on behalf of the Government of India over the years. We have never resiled from the position that fissionable materials should not be transferred to use for war purposes, that the use of atomic weapons should be denied. The objection has been from the other side. Will the representative of France join us, or allow us to join him since he represents a more powerful, more important and more experienced country, in calling for the total prohibition of these weapons, for the total non-use and transfer of fissionable materials for this purpose, for the dismantling
(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

of them. These are all in resolutions against which Mr. Moch voted in the past. These are all in resolutions that Mr. Moch, speaking with great passion, and speaking not only for France, but taking it upon himself to speak for the United States and the United Kingdom, last year denied. It was Mr. Moch who was the most convinced opponent of the idea of technical examinations. I can understand that if one does not want to prohibit test explosions it would be wrong to agree to technical examinations, because technical examinations would lead to that.

But I want to say categorically to this Committee that so far as the Government of India is concerned, there is no resolution which we have not supported with regard to the use of fissionable material for war purposes and to the elimination of total prohibition of atomic weapons. We do not think that they can be used for beneficent purposes. That is why I spent so much time on the question of deterrent weapons, and I would ask at least some part of this Committee to recall, considering that my country has some capacity in this matter, the way in which, from the very beginning, we have denied ourselves in this way. But there has not even been a shadow of this because it is legally impossible in my country to use fissionable materials, either for ourselves or to give it to others, for this purpose. That is to say, all the atomic development, on which a very considerable portion of our meagre resources is devoted, is exclusively -- not in part -- directed towards civilian purposes. I submit with great respect that whatever implication is contained in that statement, it is not warranted so far as the views of the Government of India are concerned.

Now that I am answering, I want to lay stress once again on the fact that the Assembly must be aware of the danger of the spread of this, of more people joining the group of countries that are able to produce atomic weapons, particularly countries where the control of weapon manufacture is not in the hands of the Government -- I lay stress on this -- and where the economy of a country is partly dependent upon the supply of weapons to others. It is very dangerous, even without that. The danger is increased by the spreading of this to other parts of the world.
I have nothing to withdraw from what I have said. I have tried to submit my statement to the Committee with all the courtesy that is due, and a great deal is due to the representative of France. We have no particular reason to do otherwise, but it so happens that the position taken up by the representative of France is that this thing cannot be suspended, and so far as we are concerned Mr. Moch has been the most determined opponent in this matter. Last year he said that he spoke not only for himself, but also for the United States and the United Kingdom in his opposition to technical examinations and the enlargements of that character of the resolutions adopted. All that I said was that there was more proximity about the prohibition and discontinuance of tests.

As to the challenger, as I have said, we are willing to join the representative of France if he would put out a categorical resolution calling for the total banning of these weapons, their non-use, their non-production, the non-transfer of fissionable material, the whole gamut. That has been our position all along.

Among the proposals put before the Disarmament Commission, and Mr. Moch referred to these in what I may call embarrassing terms of endearment, were those of the Government of India calling for the prohibition of the further use of fissionable materials for military purposes -- this was before the Commission of which Mr. Moch was one out of the eleven, and he was one of the representatives of the ten Powers who spoke -- the prohibition of the transfer of fissionable material from civilian to military purposes, and an agreement among the Powers most advanced in the production of weapons of mass destruction to dismantle in public, as a token of their will towards disarmament, a limited number of atomic weapons and to make the fissionable material available for peaceful purposes. (DC/96) We knew that they would not dismantle the whole lot, but we thought that if they dismantled at least one it would be a gesture to the world as a whole.

Those were the proposals which we put forward as initial steps to be taken. We also said that the prohibition of these tests would be self-enforcing in the sense that we felt that test explosions were detectable, and that, since it would be an act of self-determination on their side, it carried with it its own degree of enforcement.
I am very sorry we were not given sufficient reason by the representative of France to feel convinced that the argument we put forward regarding tests was a tendentious one, was weighted in one way or the other. I am sorry to say that those observations had a cold war tinge about them.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.