Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VEREATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 16 October 1958, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/8R.951. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

Mr. COOPER (Liberia): Once again we commence our discussion on world disarmament, with all the same fears of suspicion which confronted this Committee when the problem was first discussed over ten years ago. The tone of the discussion has remained the same. The only changes have been the improvement in the type of destructive weapons, which create more difficulties.

This point of view has been set forth in a Memorandum (A/3936) by the Secretary-General wherein he states:

"The lack of confidence between States in this respect hitherto has been one of the major causes of fear, suspicion and international tension."

In the speeches made over the last ten years on the question of disarmament, we have continuously stressed our difficulties, but nevertheless continue to express our optimism, that is, a successful outcome to our discussion on disarmament. Hope is the inspiration of life and, therefore, one must be an optimist in this perplexing world of ours to exist. But there are few signs to justify our optimism on disarmament when we realize that over a decade we have not been able to disarm ourselves by a single gun, except perhaps to replace obsolete weapons by more powerful ones.

As a matter of fact, the more we have discussed disarmament and the longer we have delayed action, larger and more powerful bombs have been made, new engines of destruction have been discovered, all of which have been added to the arsenal of the nuclear Powers. But what must astonish and confound humanity is that these instruments of destruction have become the boast and pride of many of the great Powers.

It has often been stressed in this Committee that the fundamental responsibility of the United Nations is the problem of disarmament. That being the case, an anxious humanity must look to this Organization for the solution of this question.
The question therefore arises, on what does the will of the United Nations depend -- is it the eighty-one countries or only the nuclear Powers which have the right to make negative the decisions of the United Nations? If the latter is true, which I believe no one can disagree with, the little nations under such a situation, in the interest of their own preservation, have found themselves compelled to ally themselves with one side or the other, or to remain in a semi-neutral position. They realize that there is little they can do except by persuasion or an appeal to the moral principles of both sides. It is, however, doubtful whether such persuasion or appeal will have any effect when it is so often said in this Committee that it is the right and duty of each State, particularly the great Powers, to decide upon what measures they consider necessary on disarmament to assure that their security is not impaired. This my delegation fully supports. It, nevertheless, has been the stumbling block to the problem. If we are to be our own judge and jury, any decision is bound to be in favour of ourselves, especially when we link it to our national existence. Under such conditions it is unfair and unjust to saddle the United Nations as a whole for the failure to reach a decision on disarmament and to relieve mankind of its fears and anxieties.

In our world today the question of national security, in our opinion, is somewhat archaic. This could well be applied to ancient and medieval times, and even the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when weapons of war had a limited scope of destruction and conflicts were therefore confined to definite spots on the globe. We, in this century, have witnessed two wars which we have called world wars, as they encompassed our entire world, with few exceptions. With our improvement of the airplane and the discovery of the inter-continental ballistic missile, the question of safeguarding our national frontier becomes outmoded. Our security extends far beyond our frontiers and at times to the utmost corners of the earth, involving the destiny and livelihood of nations of different races, cultures and religions. It is no longer a question of national security but one of world security. This the great Powers have come to realize by the distribution of their armed forces and weapons over our entire planet, and therefore what measures are taken must be for the survival of man, as was so nicely expressed by the Mexican representative. It is therefore in the interest of the entire human race that we should discuss the problem of disarmament.
However, in a world of alliances and counter-alliances, which have generally divided the world into two blocs, history has shown that under such a situation disarmament becomes impossible.

It gives us much satisfaction to read the report of the conference of experts on the study of the possibilities of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. These scientists, divorced from power politics, have agreed after only a period of seven weeks on the possibilities of detecting violations of a suspension of nuclear weapons tests. Both sides have hailed the report as a wonderful achievement, but when it comes to its implementation the old nightmare of suspicion and fear tends to creep in and nullify all our attempts to implement such a report. Mr. Lodge, the United States representative, in his statement, said:

"Now, encouraging and important as these developments are, it is only prudent to recognize that, as isolated steps, they do not deal with the heart of the problem of disarmament. But these developments do illustrate the fruitfulness of the new approach -- an approach which means that we should stop arguing about generalities and get down to practical and specific discussions on how various disarmament measures, which we all agree to be desirable, can actually be applied and enforced. We need no longer argue theory." (A/C.1/PV.945, page 13)

I think this must be the wishes of all delegations here, but I am afraid, despite our wishes, our prejudices and suspicions have already begun to make this negative. We all look forward to the meeting in Geneva but what is strange, although grievous, is who should undertake the negotiations, whether they should be Ambassadors or Foreign Ministers. Here the question of technicality presents itself once again. To our thinking, this is indeed illogical, as a representative despite his rank speaks for his Government or his country whenever he is authorized, whether he be an Ambassador or Foreign Minister, for in either capacity he is a mere servant and acts only as the mouthpiece of the Government he represents. Another question that must concern us greatly is the race now being carried on in the further testing of nuclear weapons especially when it is contended that it is necessary to continue such tests to arrive at a stage of parity. Under such conditions a gloom has already been cast over the outcome of the hoped-for conference in October in Geneva.
We welcome the resolutions tabled or likely to be tabled on the suspension of nuclear tests and especially that resolution proposed by India and others which cannot be considered as nuclear Powers. We all are of the opinion that for the good of humanity these tests should be stopped. What we are up against now is under what conditions the discontinuance of such tests should be made effective. It is proposed by one side that the suspension of tests should be provisional pending safeguards as to detection. The other seems to suggest suspension without any qualification. Both these proposals are debatable; their merits and demerits have been outlined by the countries that have tabled such resolutions. I am reminded in this connexion of two contentious friends who decided to dine together and share the cost of the meal in like proportion. However, when the bill was presented one party claimed he should pay less because he had not taken salt; the other, on the other hand, claimed that he should pay less for he had not eaten pepper.
Whilst we endorse the hope for the suspension or discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons, the continuation of which, according to some experts, is liable to affect if not ruin our natural health, yet we are of the opinion that the suspension of tests by itself will not allay the fears and anxiety of mankind as to his final extinction.

We are like a man who meditates on suicide, but cannot make up his mind whether it shall be done by the slow process of poisoning or the rapid method of life extinction by a bullet through the brain. What is sure is the final result, which is death. It would be little consolation to mankind if a resolution were adopted unanimously by this Assembly for the suspension of nuclear tests by itself without any effective measures being taken for the banning or control of nuclear weapons. What man seeks is a guarantee against the horrors of death and destruction, be it quick or be it slow in its approach.

The question of conventional arms and armed forces, like all other questions on disarmament, has never presented any problems to the small countries. We are already disarmed in comparison with the great Powers and we would not wish to change our status, even if we could, as it would mean the earmarking of the greater part of our assets in maintaining forces that would be inadequate to compete with any major Power. The best that could be expected from any conventional army of a small country would be for it to augment or serve as an appendage to the armed strength of one of the major Powers at the expense of its progress and national achievement. We, therefore, could not but welcome the agreement on figures of level of armed forces of the great Powers, but it seems, however, that the implementing of such agreement is now bogged down under the settlement of political issues, especially as to what the States regard as necessary to their security. If, however, the agreement on figures for level of armed forces is implemented, which would be a step in the direction of world disarmament, it would nevertheless do little to relieve our anxieties as long as the big Powers continue their stock-piling of nuclear weapons and their experiments in devising new means of destruction.

As long as a course is pursued of the stock-piling of atomic and hydrogen bombs and experimenting with rockets and missiles, conventional armaments and armed forces become obsolete in any future war. It would, therefore, be practically useless in any nuclear war to rely on conventional armaments and armed forces, which would likely suffer the same fate as the civilian population. If, as
contended an agreement on conventional armaments and armed forces is a stepping stone to an understanding or agreement on the control of atomic and nuclear weapons which can be launched by planes, rockets or other means requiring little human labour or strength, we would welcome such an agreement as a step to world disarmament; otherwise it would have no practical value to the threat of our complete annihilation.

At present nuclear weapons seem to be the key to our whole problem of disarmament. Without the abandoning or control of such weapons, any agreement on the other aspects of disarmament seems to be absolutely futile. My Government and, I believe, humanity as a whole, abhor the continuous manufacturing of and experiments with nuclear weapons. We could never find any satisfaction or any comfort in the desire of man to see how much destruction to human life and property can be achieved by his experiments in the use of fissionable materials. Whilst we fully agree to the principle of the control, if not the complete abandoning of nuclear weapons and the further tests or experiments in creating new and more powerful atomic and hydrogen bombs, we realize that this cannot be done as long as States through fear and suspicion feel that such weapons are necessary for their defence, or perhaps their existence.

One of the arguments now being put forward for the suspension of nuclear tests is the fear that such tests may also be undertaken by Powers which have up to now remained out of the armaments race of atomic and nuclear weapons. The great nuclear Powers have had over ten years to arrive at some agreement for the banning or control of these weapons. It is therefore natural for other Powers in their own interests of self-preservation, when they realize that such an agreement is not forthcoming in the near future, to undertake such steps for the manufacture and testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs. No State, if it is in its power to do so, will entrust its safety and security to the whims and caprices of another, it matters not how friendly. We should never forget the story of Cain and Abel, especially the part where Cain, when queried after slaying his brother, as to his brother's whereabouts, replied, "Am I my brother's keeper?"

However, despite our sympathies and understanding for these or any other Powers which contemplate testing nuclear weapons, we must register our strong objection to the testing of such weapons in the Sahara or in any other part of Africa or on any continent inhabited by people whose lands are far removed from the so-called nuclear Powers.
We welcome and admire the experiments of man in the field of space. It is to be hoped that the knowledge gained from such experiments will be to man's progress and achievement and not, as in all other experiments, a threat to his existence. We therefore further welcome and approve the suggestions made by the United States and other Powers for agreement on the control of outer space. I am sure if a solution is ever possible on the control of nuclear weapons, which will allay the fears and suspicions of nations and peoples, a comprehensive agreement will be found on control of outer space which would in a large measure influence our happiness and prosperity on our own planet.

It is with some degree of despair and despondency that I refer to our resolution of last year on disarmament. It is about time that we become realistic and recognize that any resolution on any aspect of world disarmament that does not have the approval and consent of all the nuclear Powers, becomes a resolution only for the archives of the United Nations or a document for reference. It is therefore to be hoped that this Committee will not undertake, as it has in the past, to adopt any resolution, if this cannot be done unanimously or at least with the approval of all the nuclear Powers. It would be wise for this debate on disarmament to terminate without favouring or approving the views of either side in the form of a resolution, if that resolution could not be adopted unanimously or obtain the concurring votes of the nuclear Powers.

We look forward to the proposed conference to be held in Geneva on 31 October, and the outcome of that conference will depend in large measure on our action here. We should, therefore, do nothing to forestall the prospects of such a conference by passing a resolution by majority vote without the concurring votes of the nuclear Powers.

My delegation, like delegations of other small countries, has intervened in this debate on the simple principle that the disarmed and armed are linked together in one common fate. This has been made inevitable by the range and destructive powers of modern weapons, which know no territorial limits. The world has become one single unit and each part is liable to the fate of the rest - this is what makes world disarmament the problem not only of nations or especially the great ones, but the problem of humanity as a whole.

Man has in his grasp powers of destruction that make puny the wrath of nature in the forms of earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods and other forces of destruction.
With the improvement of such weapons in range, scope and destructive power, in like proportion our earth shrinks in size, distance and time. Judging from what we are permitted to hear and read, it would seem impossible to pin-point our target or limit the scope of our bombs to any particular spot.
Under such conditions, our friends and foes, the armed and the unarmed, are exposed to the same perils. It is but natural that under such prevailing conditions the world is anxious and tense and would welcome and rejoice over an agreement reached on disarmament as a relief to its fears and anxieties. However, it is the belief of my delegation that we can never have an agreement on disarmament that would be foolproof, owing to new discoveries and the development of more improved weapons, which make the problem more difficult and complicated as well as our cunning and ingenuity in deception.

Our only hope in this age of such modern weapons of death is that man, being the most rational of all animals, will come to realize that the most effective form of disarmament is his knowledge that any global war will mean his final extinction.

**Mr. Unden (Sweden):** May I be permitted to say a few words concerning the draft resolutions before us?

I begin with those draft resolutions, or parts thereof, which deal with the question of a discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. In examining these drafts it has struck me that all of them are couched in very cautious, I would even say "neutral", terms. It is true that during our discussions the different opinions have clashed sharply with each other in certain respects. But it would seem as if the authors of the draft resolutions have been anxious to keep the controversial questions out of the texts of the resolutions. For my own part I have found, in studying these drafts, that I can agree with practically everything that is said in all three of them.

Who would object to the appeal, contained in the seventeen-Power draft resolution, to the participants in the forthcoming conference to "make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control"? To be sure, Mr. Zorin has criticized the word "suspension" as implying only a temporary measure. But this linguistic dispute does not seem to be too serious. Besides it could be solved by using, for instance, the word "discontinuance". The same draft resolution contains an appeal to the parties involved in the negotiations that are to begin on 31 October "not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress". Obviously it is the intention to express the desire that the
suspension of the nuclear weapons tests should not be postponed until such time as an agreement is ready to be signed, but should be put into effect already at the time when the negotiations concerning an agreement are begun, that is to say, on 31 October. It is true that the two other draft resolutions prescribe that a discontinuance should become effective "immediately", but since we are already in the middle of October the difference is slight. Finally, it may be noted that the text of the draft resolution does not say anything to the effect that in the opinion of the sponsors a future agreement should be in force for only one year at a time. This position, which I criticized earlier, has been presented in other connexions, that is to say, in diplomatic notes and orally during the discussions.

With regard to the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, I do not believe that anybody would raise any objections to the three preambular paragraphs. The first operative paragraph "calls upon all States carrying out atomic and hydrogen weapons tests immediately to halt such tests". Nothing is said about the period for which, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, a "halt" should remain in force. We have heard that Mr. Zorin has a definite cessation of nuclear weapons testing in mind, but this has not, as I see it, found expression in the text of the draft resolution. In the following paragraph it is recommended "that States possessing nuclear weapons should enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an appropriate agreement between them". This recommendation seems in substance to coincide with the corresponding desire stated in the seventeen-Power draft resolution that the three Powers which are to take part in the forthcoming conference "make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control". The last paragraph, finally, "calls upon all States to accede to that agreement", a recommendation which on the other hand has no counterpart in the seventeen-Power draft.

I should like to add that in the Soviet draft there is no direct mention of the negotiations in Geneva concerning the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests, nor of the conference planned to begin on 31 October. Further, this draft does not contain any reference to the function of the United Nations at the forthcoming negotiations, to my mind an extremely important point.
The draft resolution submitted by India and twelve other Powers has not yet been the subject of comments by the sponsors. However, since it is circulated as an official document, I may be allowed to make some remarks about its contents. This draft contains a reference to both the forthcoming conferences which I have just mentioned. In addition, it is more precise in the operative parts than the two other drafts. It

"calls for the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to the technical arrangements and controls considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of such tests".

Further, this draft, as does the Soviet one, contains a recommendation to those States that do not yet possess nuclear weapons to desist from embarking upon the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons pending action by the Assembly to extend the operation of the agreement to all States.

My conclusion is that the three draft resolutions with which I have now dealt are not at variance with each other, as far as the question of tests is concerned. Controversial questions which have been debated during the meetings of this Committee have, as I have already pointed out, been left out of the different texts of the draft resolutions. I suppose that those who have formulated the drafts have not wanted to bind their hands until the planned conference has met. This seems to me to be a wise attitude. But at the same time a choice between three similar draft resolutions in the voting will become a delicate problem. Besides, one does not know to what extent voting in favour of a proposal would imply acceptance of a position taken by supporters of a draft during the discussion but which is not clear from the wording of the draft. I permit myself to put the same question as the representative of Greece has just raised, namely, whether a common text concerning the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests could not be worked out on the basis of the three draft resolutions.

The Swedish delegation would welcome the adoption of a separate resolution concerning nuclear weapons tests whereby the special attention of public opinion would be drawn to this question and it would be emphasized that on this point we hope to come closer to a result than on other disarmament questions.
In regard to the other parts of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, the Swedish delegation has no objections to what is contained in sections B, C and D. It greatly appreciates section D, which deals with the participation of the Secretary-General in the discussions on the disarmament problems.

In addition the Committee has before it a draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union concerning a reduction of the military budgets of the four big Powers. While I sympathize with the idea underlying this proposal, I do not find it possible to vote in favour of it at the present session. No documents giving the views on the matter of the three other States concerned have, as far as I know, been distributed to the members of the Committee. Nor does the draft resolution indicate the norms for a comparison between the budgets, which no doubt in many respects have different structures.

The question of an agreed reduction of the military budgets of the big Powers necessitates a technical study. To my knowledge, no such study has been undertaken by the Disarmament Commission. A study of that kind would certainly facilitate a future political decision.
Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia): I think we all agree that the problem of disarmament is of an exceptional significance among the various items on our agenda. This is clearly borne out by the manifest influence which the current unsatisfactory situation in the field of disarmament exerts on international affairs and by its impact upon the relations between States and nations, in general.

We therefore consider that it is our duty, at this session, to combine our efforts in seeking ways and means which would help us to achieve progress. We should try to have the little that has been accomplished this year in the field of disarmament fully translated into concrete agreements. This would, no doubt, contribute both to an improvement of the general international atmosphere and to negotiations and agreements in the field of disarmament.

It is this spirit and these objectives that guide the endeavours of my delegation at this session as they have guided us in the past.

The continuing arms race, fraught with increasing danger, is a cause of justified concern to us. We see that a number of States and especially the big Powers are still diverting a wealth of material and spiritual values to this end. We have heard other speakers here mention again hundreds of billions of dollars spent so unwisely on armaments. A new series of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests has been carried out, which we all know to be harmful no matter what arguments might be adduced to justify them. The deployment of atomic weapons on the territories of various countries aligned in military pacts, is continuing. Many new launching sites for guided missiles have been set up and trained on potential targets. The possibility of using outer space for military purposes has, through the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and artificial satellites, become a reality.

We share the view of those who say that history knows of no instance where an arms race has not ultimately led to war. This is not merely a truism. Today, we are faced with the fact that the existing arms race is taking place at a time when major outstanding international issues are confronting the world, when countries have not yet resolutely embarked upon the course of peaceful active co-operation. Leaving aside the question of what actually comes first, it is
generally recognized that the arms race feeds on outstanding international problems and disputes and in its turn, adversely affects their solution. Since the armaments race is in itself -- to a certain extent -- an expression of the lack of confidence in a divided world, it only accentuates it still further.

With reference to what I have just said, may I quote the words of the President of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz-Tito in his statement to the Federal National Assembly on 20 April 1958:

"Science and technology have achieved epoch-making successes. In the field of nuclear science, important progress is being made and the scientists of many countries are now trying to master the process of the production and application of nuclear energy to the benefit of broad sections of the population and of mankind, generally. The end of 1957, when the first artificial earth satellites were launched into outer space, may go down in the history of mankind as the time when Man made his first step towards the conquest of the Universe. But instead of opening an era of new triumphs of human thought and progress generally, these successes, under the present conditions, are increasingly revealing the potential danger they hold for mankind should these awesome and destructive weapons be turned to the ends of war."

It is essential that we urgently undertake effective steps in the right direction towards some initial progress, however modest, in the field of disarmament.

The Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Chief of the Yugoslav delegation to this session, Koca Popovic, in his statement in the general debate set forth the position of principle of the Yugoslav delegation with respect to the present situation in the field of disarmament. I should now like to dwell at a somewhat greater length on the issues facing us now in this Committee.

The headway which has been made in the course of this year on the problem of disarmament should be welcomed and acknowledged. In this, I think, we all agree.

What I have in mind, first of all, is the progress in regard to the cessation of experimental explosions of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, the need for which, I think, no one would venture openly to deny. My colleagues, who
preceded me in this debate, have frequently and in clear terms, referred to the main developments which have occurred this year in this respect. It is a fact, that this year has seen the extremely important decision of the Soviet Government on the unilateral conditional suspension of those tests, whereby it endeavoured to induce the other side to follow suit. This decision of the Government of the Soviet Union has met with approval throughout the world, which has, with anxiety, been watching the alarming pace of the arms race in the field of nuclear weapons. To point out that the USSR took this decision only after having ended a series of tests, cannot deprive it of its significance. The more so as nothing stood in the way of the other side to act in a similar fashion prior to the Soviet Union.

We also wish to accept in good faith the stated readiness of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom unilaterally to suspend tests under certain conditions, although the actual value of their statements in the light of the urgency to suspend tests and to find a lasting solution, is rightly a matter of controversy. The consensus reached at the conference of experts in Geneva on measures of control for the implementation of the agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, as well as the agreed decision to hold a conference of representatives of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain for the purpose of concluding an agreement among these Powers on the cessation of tests of nuclear weapons, are, in existing circumstances, the most welcome source of encouragement for the future.

There are only two more weeks to go before the beginning of these talks. The necessary conditions exist for successful work which would find expression in the conclusion of an adequate agreement. It is furthermore perfectly obvious that deeply disturbed humanity is eagerly hoping that the representatives of the negotiating parties will show the necessary sense of responsibility towards present and future generations, and before history.
May I now explain more fully the position of my delegation with respect to the forthcoming talks in Geneva.

We believe that a lasting discontinuance of nuclear tests is indispensable and that an agreement to this effect should be reached. We are convinced that it would be both unjustified and harmful to make its conclusion dependent upon any condition. Such an agreement would, by its inherent logic, lead to other even more significant and more far-reaching solutions in the field of disarmament, as well as in other spheres of international relations. As regards the aims of the forthcoming Geneva talks, we have so far heard different even opposing, views, especially as concerns the present possibilities of achieving a lasting agreement on the cessation of tests. Mention has been made of the logic of the assertion that the General Assembly should not prejudge the outcome of an issue which has as yet to become a subject of negotiation. This might perhaps be valid with respect to issues which are the exclusive concern of the future negotiators. However, the forthcoming talks in Geneva, by the very nature of their subject matter, by far transcend the interests of the three Powers. Considerations relating to the security of the negotiating countries were also mentioned as an argument against the immediate conclusion of a lasting agreement. It is evident that every country is entitled to look after its security. However, today we must grasp, with a full measure of responsibility, the imperative need of safeguarding, in the best possible way, the security of all, of the small and big countries, both of individual nations, and the international community as a whole, the more so as the carrying out of nuclear weapons tests and particularly their continuation unquestionably imperil the security of mankind.

Since we have faith in the good intentions of all the participants in the Geneva Conference, we expect them to discontinue nuclear tests. We assume that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom nor the USSR will renew these tests after 31 October.

All the representatives of the nuclear Powers here have been assuring us that they will endeavour to arrive at an agreement. The least we can ask is to have tests discontinued until an agreement is reached, but we have to insist on everything possible being done to achieve the agreement.
I would like to emphasize that the cessation of tests is not primarily dependent upon technical considerations, but rather upon the political decisions of Governments, upon the readiness to believe that this is the way leading to peace and stability, to the further successful solving of the problem of disarmament. This should be all the more evident now since the most eminent experts of the countries that are about to start negotiations in Geneva have made recommendations on a reliable system of control, that is to say, of detection of possible violations of an agreement.

My delegation considers that the proposed system of control should be set up within the framework of the United Nations. The necessity to do so is borne out, on the one hand, by the scope and international character of that system and the need for linking this form of international co-operation to the United Nations in conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter. On the other hand, this would meet the natural desire of all the countries participating in the system to see that it operates under the lasting control of the appropriate bodies of the United Nations and within the general sphere of their competence. Moreover, we think that this system should rely particularly upon the United Nations disarmament bodies and should develop co-operation with agencies and other organs within the framework of the United Nations to the extent to which this would be in keeping with the implementation of its tasks. My delegation supports the view which has been set out on this matter in the memorandum of the Secretary-General:

"Both on practical and political grounds, an international control organ, which would need to be set up to implement the control system agreed upon, might better function were it to be integrated with the United Nations, thereby discharging its task under the authority of the Organization while retaining a wide freedom of initiative necessary for its operations." *(A/3936, para. 6)*

In the past, we have often heard the thought expressed here that whatever is objectively feasible in the field of disarmament is also essential. It seems to me that we are now actually in a position to prove this in practice with respect to the question of nuclear tests. Therefore, there is no justification in the tendency to embark upon outvoting procedures or to turn our main attention to the propaganda elements of the questions involved.
The agreement on the meeting of the group of experts to study measures which would provide a safeguard against surprise attack represents another step forward in the field of disarmament.

The study of measures to prevent surprise attack could, without any doubt, throw more light on this problem as a whole and help to determine its real place and scope in the efforts to achieve progress towards disarmament. Measures which could be agreed upon in this respect might well strengthen mutual confidence and improve the international atmosphere.

Accordingly, my delegation considers the agreement on the meeting of the group of experts to be very useful. However, it holds that the question of safeguards against surprise attack is a matter of immediate concern not only for the countries belonging to the existing military alignments. On the contrary, we think that any real advance in this field can be achieved only through the co-operation and participation of other countries as well. For these reasons, it seems obvious to us that a broader composition of this group would facilitate the study of these measures, would bring out new constructive proposals and would, generally, make the international community engage more actively in the achievement of positive solutions.
In the opinion of my delegation, an extremely negative feature of the activities relating to the problem of disarmament since the twelfth session of the General Assembly has been the discontinuance of organized efforts within the United Nations. In this connexion I wish to recall what was recently said on this subject in the course of the general debate by the Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Koca Popovic:

"This is a situation which cannot be considered normal, either from the point of view of disarmament or from that of the role and the responsibilities vested in the United Nations by the Charter. It can hardly be expected that further and more substantial progress will be achieved in the sphere of disarmament if we do not apply different standards and a wider framework than those determined by the rigid needs and interests of military alliances. The approach to the disarmament problem should evince more fully the common concern of the international community to preserve and strengthen peace. It should, therefore, be considered primarily within the framework of the United Nations". (A/FY.767, p. 51)

We feel that, in addition to the assistance and services which the Secretary-General might be called upon to render, it would be necessary to establish as clearly as possible the link between the United Nations and the forthcoming negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests as well as between the United Nations and the conference of experts for the study of measures to safeguard against surprise attack. A report of the conference which is to begin on 31 October in Geneva, to the effect that the three Powers directly involved have reached an agreement to discontinue nuclear weapons tests, should without delay provide the basis for appropriate United Nations action whereby that agreement might be made universal.

The work and the results of the conference of experts on safeguarding against surprise attack should also be linked to our Organization in an adequate way.

We consider that the resumption of the work of the United Nations disarmament body, with a balanced and generally acceptable composition, is a matter of the utmost urgency. It appears that there are no objections or reservations from any side with respect to this being the United Nations Disarmament Commission,
in accordance with the established tradition. We think that this should be both a political body and one capable of effective work, and it should be directly responsible to the General Assembly. Through mutual goodwill and concessions it should be possible to find an acceptable answer to the question of the composition of the Commission, the more so as it is obvious that no progress can be achieved, let alone decisions taken, through majority vote.

Disarmament is essentially a matter for political decisions by Governments, and for that reason -- along with the possible advantages and significance of adequate preparatory work and studies -- the decisive element for the successful work of the United Nations disarmament body is the readiness and desire of its members to reach agreement. This holds true in particular of the countries which bear the major share of the responsibility for the situation in the field of disarmament. No studies of experts or auxiliary bodies can be a substitute for this. Having stressed this, we nevertheless consider the establishment of adequate technical and expert groups for study of the various aspects of disarmament to be useful. Such groups have proved their worth in the course of this year. The use of their services within the framework of the United Nations could assist and facilitate the work of the Commission.

The concept of initial and partial agreements as a method for the solution of the disarmament question has been sufficiently elaborated in the last few years and has indeed been adopted. Its application should lead us to comprehensive disarmament and to the prohibition of the production and use of nuclear weapons, together with the abolition of stocks of these weapons. For that reason I do not think it particularly necessary to insist on its useful and practical aspects in the present situation. The elements which should be taken into primary consideration for the achievement of an initial agreement on disarmament, or of several such agreements, should be brought out as clearly as possible in the course of our current discussion of the disarmament problem and its various aspects. My delegation feels that the elements which were contained in our draft resolution of last year still seem to meet the needs of the present situation and could, with such minor additions as may be required by the more recent developments -- reduction of military expenditures, preliminary measures against surprise attack, etc. -- be taken into consideration by the United Nations disarmament body in its further work.
I think, however, that in the present situation the most appropriate way of making recommendations to the Commission is to leave it the freedom of selecting among the various possibilities and most promising elements. Of course, the Commission would be guided by the views and proposals of the United Nations Members, as set forth in our discussions in this Committee and in the General Assembly.

May I now sum up what, in the opinion of my delegation, should now be undertaken in the field of disarmament:

(a) To request the countries testing nuclear weapons to discontinue these tests pending agreement on this matter;

(b) To request these countries to come to an early agreement on the cessation of tests and report this to the General Assembly so that the United Nations might take steps to turn this agreement into a universal one;

(c) To call upon all other countries to refrain from nuclear weapons testing until such agreement is reached and in order to facilitate it;

(d) To secure, in an adequate manner, the link between the United Nations and the forthcoming talks on disarmament;

(e) To recommend to the United Nations disarmament body to turn its efforts to the achievement of initial agreements, bearing in mind the discussion and proposals made at this session;

(f) To request the Secretary-General to keep the United Nations Member States informed on the progress made in the field of disarmament and to consult them on the desirability of convening a special session of the General Assembly on the problems of disarmament.

We believe that unanimous decisions by the General Assembly on the questions under consideration here would greatly contribute to the progress we are all striving to achieve.
Mr. ABDOLH (Iran): As this is my first intervention in this Committee, Sir, allow me to join with the previous speakers in offering you my sincere congratulations on your well deserved election to the Chairmanship of this body. I should like also to extend my congratulations to our Vice-Chairman and our Rapporteur. At the same time, may I express to you my deep appreciation of your most kind and generous word about me at the first meeting of our Committee. I am confident that under your guidance the deliberations of this important Committee will be crowned with success.

Over the past twelve years efforts made through the United Nations towards solving the problem of disarmament have not met with success. Last year the Disarmament Commission did not even convene to discuss the mandate entrusted to it by the eleventh session of the General Assembly. Last year's stalemate was the cause of great concern to the world community, which fully realizes that the present arms race contains the seeds of mankind's self-destruction. Universal apprehension, expressed both within and outside the United Nations, happily brought about the Geneva Conference which has studied the technical possibilities of detecting violations of a possible agreement to suspend nuclear weapons tests. The successful results of that conference offer a great opportunity to mankind in terms of promoting the prospects for future progress in the field of disarmament.

Such technical studies provide all the parties concerned with information which might otherwise be considered confidential, and thus contribute to bringing about an openness of information in the field of armaments which, in its turn, contributes to the dispelling of mistrust between States and the relaxation of international tension, thereby enhancing the possibilities of further progress in disarmament. However, before discussing further the conclusions of the Geneva Conference and what the First Committee can profitably do at this juncture, I should like to cast a retrospective glance to ascertain what has constituted the main stumbling block in the way of reaching a disarmament agreement, having in mind the need to profit from past experience and the promotion of further progress.
To be sure, the difficulty did not stem from the unwillingness of either side to come to agreement. It seems to us that the parties mainly concerned are aware that disarmament is the most important problem facing the world today and realize that, with the deadly effects of modern weapons, there is no alternative for peace, and that there can hardly be an enduring peace without disarmament. Thus we believe that all the parties concerned are animated by a sincere desire to settle this problem. The fact of the matter is that, apart from the complexity of the problems involved, there have been psychological and political obstacles in the way of disarmament, among them the suspicion which still unfortunately hangs over the relations of the Powers primarily concerned and which has prevented them from attaining agreement, while a minimum of confidence in relationships between States is a prerequisite of any genuine and true understanding.

Moreover, there are unsettled political problems which continue to have an adverse effect on the course of progress in the field of disarmament, in spite of the fact that endeavours are being made -- we believe correctly -- to sideline them, at least at the early stages of disarmament negotiations.

I do not propose, however, to expound at this juncture on these two matters which do not seem to be directly pertinent to our general debate about disarmament. What I do propose, however, is to bring out some technical complexities which have so far slowed down progress towards disarmament.

The first point with which I would like to deal is that relating to a control system. It is obvious that in the present world atmosphere no disarmament could be conceived without controls, but the establishment of control has met with difficulties over these past twelve years, particularly because certain Powers have shown reluctance to accept any control which would interfere with their right of absolute sovereignty, while we think that any effective control would necessarily imply a concession of some part of sovereignty by all interested parties if we were to obtain effective control of disarmament. It would seem, however, that a more flexible attitude has been adopted in this connexion of late, and the concept of a control system is gradually being accepted by all concerned.
Attempts to settle the question of a control system, however, had not been successful before the Geneva Conference because the interested parties, in their negotiations, tried, we believe, to solve the whole question of control, among other matters, on a political basis which actually has not proved successful. It now appears that a new approach has been adopted, that is, to precede any political discussions covering a system of control by studies made by qualified persons to clarify the technical aspects of the problems involved. Although this new approach was introduced in the course of both the discussions and the resolution of the First Committee last year, it was only this past spring that the idea was actuated, outside the framework of the United Nations, in Geneva.

The Geneva Conference came to the conclusion that it is technically feasible to establish a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests. It is gratifying that such conclusions were accepted by all the nuclear Powers, which have already declared their readiness to negotiate with a view to concluding an agreement for the suspension of tests under effective international control. The confirmation of this acceptance of the conclusions of the Conference during the present debate as late as yesterday raises our hope that the negotiations which are to begin on 31 October will be crowned with success.
The positive results achieved by the Conference of Scientists in Geneva illustrates to what extent such marginal approach may contribute to the clarification of the technical aspects of such complex problems. Another technical study, with a view to initiating measures for preventing surprise attack, is scheduled to be held in Geneva on 10 November. We hope that the forthcoming study will result in clarification of the technical aspects of such measures and will lead to an agreement regarding prevention of surprise attack. We are confident that, once the agreements are reached regarding these two specific aspects of disarmament, the trend of recent encouraging initiative -- namely, the technical approach -- will continue to contribute to a balance and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament.

Turning to my second practical and technical point, I should say that a too ambitious, too comprehensive approach may also have been another reason why, after such protracted discussions and negotiations in the field of disarmament, no positive results followed. To be sure, it is true that any disarmament plan should cover all the different aspects of the problem, and to separate the various elements of a comprehensive disarmament plan -- that is to say, to put emphasis on one aspect rather than on another -- might give certain military advantages to some countries; and that would be inconsistent with the need to bring about a well balanced disarmament. However, it seems to my delegation that, in practice, it is not easy to study an overall plan for disarmament because of the complexity of the problems involved. It is on this account that we believe that the study of each part of the plan for disarmament should be made separately with a view to reaching tentative agreement on each individual item. At a later stage a final agreement, covering two or more items as maybe acceptable to all the interested parties, with a view to establishing a well balanced disarmament, should be further encouraged.

By way of illustration, may I recall that last year the General Assembly adopted a resolution under which it gave priority to six partial measures of disarmament which were to be dealt with and decided upon all together. In fact, such discussions covering various points -- even though such discussions did not
take place -- appeared to be not quite practical. Thus it was necessary to
single out some aspects of the disarmament problem at an initial stage on which
agreement might be reached without too much difficulty.

In this respect my delegation welcomes the evolution which has definitely
taken place in the policy of the United States Government with regard to the
suspension of nuclear tests, in response to world public opinion, as was pointed
out by Mr. Lodge.

In the view of my delegation, we should encourage this trend towards
separate discussions of the various aspects of the disarmament problem, without
prejudicing any final agreement in which several items might be considered
together with a view to securing a balanced system of disarmament.

Bearing in mind these considerations, my delegation saw fit to join with
sixteen other countries in submitting the draft resolution contained in document
A/C.1/L.205. Needless to say, we are gravely concerned over the continuance
of tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, which have increased the hazards
to man and his environment. Our concern has been deepened by the report
the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which
confirms the world wide preoccupation over the effects of ionizing radiation.

To be sure, the ideal would be to call for the immediate suspension of tests
of atomic and hydrogen weapons, but such an approach to the problem in the
present international situation seems unrealistic because, on the one hand,
experience has shown that in such matters as disarmament involving the security
of States concerned, no recommendation, or even an injunction -- assuming that
such were possible -- by the General Assembly could be put into effect if it is
not acceptable to all parties concerned. Moreover, it is easily understandable
that the United States and the United Kingdom are reluctant to accept any
resolution which would obligate them to a definite commitment in this matter
until agreement has been reached on the political and administrative aspects of
a system of control at the forthcoming conference, and until reasonable progress
has been made regarding the prospects of some other aspects of the problem of
disarmament.
In this connexion my delegation would like to make a few brief remarks.

In the seventeen-Power draft resolution the parties involved in these negotiations are called upon not to undertake further tests of nuclear weapons, at least while the negotiations are in progress. The United States and the United Kingdom have already offered to suspend their nuclear weapons tests for one year if the Soviet Government agrees to do the same. In the view of my delegation, this delay, as the representative of Sweden mentioned, may be considered too short, and we wish that both these Governments would consider the possibility of at least two years' suspension, as was contemplated, if I remember correctly, at one stage of the previous proceedings. This would be a step in the direction of the views of those who, quite rightly, would like to see more forceful measures taken in connexion with the suspension of nuclear tests.

At the same time, we earnestly hope that the Soviet Government, in line with the proclamation of the suspension of Soviet nuclear weapons tests on 31 March of this year, would again suspend its testing of nuclear weapons as of 31 October.

We are confident that, with an agreement on the administrative and political aspects, particularly on the establishment of an international organ to supervise the suspension of nuclear tests, and with reasonable progress in the field of disarmament in good will and good faith, the way will be paved for an indefinite suspension of nuclear tests.

At this juncture, I should like to deal with the question of what has been called "the presence of the United Nations" in any disarmament negotiations. It is superfluous to say that the United Nations, by virtue of the Charter, has been entrusted with the task of considering the general principles of co-operation and maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

Thus, the United Nations should display its constant interest in the progress of disarmament, even if some activities in this regard have to be carried on outside the framework of the United Nations for pragmatic reasons.
To be sure, it is highly desirable that efforts should be made, particularly by the main parties concerned, to overcome the deadlock on disarmament in the United Nations due to the inability of the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee to convene. No effort should, therefore, be spared to revive the functioning of the Disarmament Commission, if feasible, or, if need be, to create another body which would fill the vacuum and would assure the continuity of work towards an over-all solution of this complex problem.

In this connexion, we share the views expressed by the Foreign Minister of Mexico when he said that the First Committee would be acting correctly if it made recommendations to the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union on disarmament measures, and that they should reach agreement on the procedure to be followed on disarmament, as well as on other related matters.

We have doubt, however, that any negotiations between these four great Powers would be conclusive before some progress has been made in the negotiations on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and perhaps on the prevention of surprise attack.

The initial question with which the First Committee has to deal, then, is to urge the States concerned, forcefully -- perhaps more forcefully than was envisaged in the resolution of the seventeen Powers -- to make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and on the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack.

The General Assembly may be kept informed, through the Secretary-General, of the progress made in both Conferences before the end of this session. It is only at that time, we believe, that the General Assembly, encouraged, we hope, by the achievement of positive results, in the course of both Conferences, will be in a position to attempt to find efficient ways and means to renew over-all negotiations on disarmament between the parties primarily concerned.
In the meantime, the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament can be manifested by trying to establish close co-operation between the United Nations, through the Secretary-General, and the Governments primarily concerned, by inviting both Conferences to avail themselves of the assistance and services of the Secretary-General and by requesting them to keep the United Nations informed. As soon as an agreement may be reached and reported to the Assembly, the Assembly may take steps with a view to extending the suspension of tests to encompass all States.

Furthermore, as soon as practical administrative and political arrangements have been made for the establishment of an international control organ, or similar organs which might be envisaged in regard to surprise attack, as a result of the deliberations of the above-mentioned Conferences, such an organ, while retaining the necessary initiative, might profitably be integrated in the United Nations, thus taking advantage of the vast experience of this Organization in the field of international co-operation.

In conclusion, my delegation believes that there have been encouraging trends during the recent past regarding some aspects of the problem of disarmament. Such an encouraging trend constitutes a step forward towards a comprehensive and effectively controlled system of disarmament.

We must bear in mind that nothing can be achieved in this very complex field unilaterally. The experience of the past has shown that nothing short of agreement between those primarily concerned in this matter can promote true progress and bring us closer to our objective. Even the General Assembly itself cannot profitably make any recommendations if the parties mainly concerned are not prepared to carry them out. It is therefore incumbent on all of us to multiply our efforts with a view of reaching unanimity and taking advantage of the great opportunity which lies ahead.

Along this line, it seems to my delegation that there are constructive elements, particularly in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1) submitted to this Committee by India and eleven other Powers, which, if acceptable to the sponsors, may well be incorporated in the text of the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205). In this connexion, full consideration may be given by the sponsors to the statements made today in this Committee both by the representative of Greece and the representative of Sweden.
Thus, the way may be cleared for the Committee to arrive at a unanimous resolution. My delegation will not fail to make every effort towards achieving this objective.

In connexion with the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union, the subject of it -- that is, the reduction of military budgets and the use of a part of this expenditure for the development of under-developed countries -- is of particular interest to us, and I wish to reserve the right of my delegation to speak on this draft resolution at a later stage.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.