Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 15 October 1958, at 12 noon

Chairman:  Mr. URQUIA  (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament \( \text{[54]} \) (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests \( \text{[79]} \) (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries \( \text{[72]} \) (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.949. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before we begin our work today, may I draw the attention of representatives to the revised text of the Indian draft resolution. It has now been submitted by the delegation of India and eleven other delegations and it appears in document A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1, dated 14 October.

I should also like to point out to members of the Committee that I have no speakers on the list for the meeting that we had planned to hold this afternoon. If no one asks to speak at this afternoon’s meeting, I shall be forced to cancel it. Once more, I should like to remind you that, despite the heavy load that the Committee has to carry, we are not getting ahead with our work. In order to be able to finish our work by the target date, we must take full advantage of all the time available to us. I therefore address one more appeal to the Committee. Those representatives who wish to speak in the general debate on the three items now before the Committee should make their desires known and have their names put on the speakers’ list as soon as possible.

There is only one speaker on the list for tomorrow afternoon’s meeting. If several other representatives would have their names put on the list for tomorrow afternoon, that would help us to take better advantage of the time available to us.

Mr. SIK (Hungary): Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to extend to you and to the Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur my best wishes for the successful discharge of your great task.

The concept of "interdependence" can help us to define the responsibility of the small States in the matter of disarmament and also their right to have a say in
the discussion between the atom Powers concerning the cessation of thermonuclear weapons tests. The word "interdependence" has had a checkered career during the present session. At the opening meeting, Sir Leslie Munro spoke about the "irrevocably interdependent world". Then the Principal Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom built his whole speech in the general debate around the idea of interdependence. But the word itself has its own "pre-history". Mr. Dulles himself, on two occasions, used this term to characterize the fundamentals of United States foreign policy. He used it once on 24 March 1958, when his report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was called "Interdependence, Basic Concept of the Mutual Security Program", and a second time on 14 April 1958, when he addressed the Pan American Union on the subject "The Interdependence of Independence". The two examples show that in our world today the concept of fundamental interdependence can be applied in such a way as to divide the world, and the organization of one part of the world against the other is also being called "interdependence". This distorted usage of the word shows up the contrast between the policy intended to cement military blocs, that is, to divide the world, and the real interdependence of the various regions of the world.

In the same way in which all essential factors involved in world tension today become crystallized in the whole problem of disarmament, so does the true interdependence of the whole world become most evident in this context. The armaments race weighs down not only on one or even a few countries, but it is detrimental to the whole world, to all countries, without exception. A halt in the armaments race, or even a partial reduction, would benefit not only a few countries, but all, without exception. Every individual step in this direction of stopping the armaments race and towards disarmament is subject to approval by all the great Powers involved. When one of the great Powers opposes any disarmament plan, it immediately crumbles into dust, whereas even the minimum of agreement between the great Powers on any question connected with disarmament favourably affects the whole perspective of disarmament and the survival and future of all small and far-away States, without exception.
When small countries and generally all those which have no nuclear weapons at their disposal make their contribution to the problem of disarmament in general and the testing of thermnuclear weapons in particular, they are not concerning themselves with the domestic affairs of the great Powers, nor are they guilty of unwarranted interference in the exclusive affairs of the big Powers. They are merely standing up for the interests of their own people in an irrevocably interdependent world. The small States, which make up the majority of the United Nations membership, are entitled -- and even duty bound not only by the United Nations Charter but also by the actual interdependence of all peoples as far as disarmament is concerned -- to voice their opinion on the question even though they are devoid of any actual power to solve the question itself.

What can the small States do? How can the United Nations General Assembly and, before that, this Committee promote the cause of disarmament and, as a first step in this direction, the banning of nuclear weapons tests?

It is not sufficient for them to become the mouthpieces of their peoples' desire for peace. This is also necessary because the United Nations has to approach the problem of disarmament with every representative keeping his ears wide open for the demands of the peoples. But it is not enough, because the representatives of the great Powers know full well that, just like the peoples of their own countries, the people of the whole world are living in horror of even the thought of a new war. Nor is it sufficient that, together with the representatives of the great Powers, we too are analysing the situation and trying to find ways and means of breaking down the barriers to disarmament. This, too, is necessary; it can even be useful; but it is not enough.

The most essential contribution the smaller States can make towards a solution is to give expression to the impact on the bystander at the big Power discussions of the attitude and proposals of the individual big Powers on the question of disarmament. Why is this an asset to the big Powers in their disarmament policy-shaping? True, the representatives of the big Powers themselves know best the real meaning and purpose of their individual proposals. As Mr. Lodge said when there was a debate on one of the United States recommendations last week:

"I really think I know what the United States proposal is, and I think I am in a better position to describe it than are those who have described it so erroneously." (A/C.1/PV.944, p.11)

True, the sponsor of a proposal knows best the purpose of his recommendation:
nevertheless, the bystander is in a better position to give an objective interpretation of the effect a proposal has in the given interdependence of the international situation, and to judge whether it helps or harms the cause of disarmament. The representatives of the great Powers had better recognize the value and shortcomings of their proposals as reflected in the opinions of the bystanders.

For this it is necessary that the representatives of the smaller Powers should disengage themselves as far as possible from their political alignments to assess objectively the value of attitudes adopted by the great Powers from the point of view of disarmament. Such objective examination is bound to bring to light surprising intrinsic contradictions in the stand adopted by the United States Government on disarmament, which become evident from the following facts.

Mr. Lodge had this to say in the general debate on the items on the agenda now under discussion:

"A year ago, in the twelfth session of the General Assembly, our debates on disarmament began under a cloud. All the hopes of agreement built up during months of careful diplomacy in the London sub-committee talks had suddenly been disappointed." (A/C.1/PV.945, p. 7)

On the other hand, the President of the United States in his message to Congress on 13 January, 1958 made this remark on the disarmament situation:

"I was particularly pleased to note the progress made, under the aegis of the United Nations, in the fields of disarmament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy."

True, this message concerned the work of the United Nations during the eleventh session, but it was sent on 13 January, 1958, that is one month after the twelfth session ended. After all that happened during the twelfth session, this expression of pleasure concerning disarmament discussions over a period when the chances of disarmament faded, but when the armaments race was stepped up, is quite incomprehensible. That is to say, there is an evident and quite inexplicable contradiction between Mr. Lodge's statement and the presidential message.

Another contradiction. In the speech to which I referred just now, Mr. Lodge described the question of disarmament as having always represented an integral part of United States foreign policy. He said:
"The United States has always recognized the fundamental responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We have co-operated wholeheartedly in every effort of this Organization to solve the disarmament dilemma." (Ibid.)

On the other hand, not a single mention is made of prospective disarmament by the United States Secretary of State in his report on United States foreign policy to the various bodies of Congress. Mr. Dulles outlined United States foreign policy on 26 February, 1958 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 24 March before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on 6 June again before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and on 13 July before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. In those speeches either nothing at all was said about disarmament or, when he did speak about it, it was only in the form of a plan favoured by the United States of America to reduce the armed strength of the Soviet Union, but not its own. On the other hand, every speech argues for the need to redouble the military strength of the United States and its more than forty allies, because only then can the United States fulfil its mission. And Mr. Dulles goes further to define that mission: to withstand the currents of change in the world today. Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs he expressed this in the following terms:

"We live today in an historic era of change. It will spell the rise or fall of whole civilizations and of great nations. Some will meet the challenge; others may succumb."

He then asks the question, "What are the great currents of change?", and replies to it as follows:

"There are two which transcend all others. One is the revolutionary movement of international communism... The second great revolutionary element in the world today is the march toward independence of colonial peoples."

He asked the support of Congress for the military and economic programme of the United States of America and its allies in order to win against the first of those movements and to gain influence over the second. Therefore, while Mr. Lodge in his speeches makes it appear as if the intention to find agreement and solve the disarmament problem were an integral part of United States foreign policy, we find no mention made of the perspective of disarmament in those forums where United States foreign policy is supposed to be formulated.
One more contradiction. In an attempt to prove that the United States is sincerely in favour of agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, during the procedural debate in this Committee Mr. Lodge promised to submit a draft resolution to this effect. He said:

"... the United States wants to move ahead on this whole subject. ...

"Let me tell the Committee that we hope to introduce a draft resolution very soon, with a number of other co-sponsors, which will clearly show to all the world the importance which we attach to this first step. ..."

(A/C.1/PV.944, p. 41)

Mr. Lodge has contradicted himself, both by what he said and by the draft resolution which he had announced. To wit, in the procedural debate Mr. Lodge stated:

"... We do not think that the question of tests should be singled out and put first, either today or after the general debate is over. We say that because we think that tests are part of the whole contemplation, and also because we do not think that tests are by any means the most dangerous aspect of this whole situation." (Ibid., p. 12)

Furthermore, the draft resolution which he introduced approaches the three items on the agenda under discussion in such a way that it becomes quite apparent that the United States of America by no means attributes any special importance to the stopping of tests as a first step. This contradiction is still further underscored by another fact which clearly reveals the long-range aims of the United States of America. The current issue of Foreign Affairs, quarterly journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, contains an article entitled "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace", which has been credited by the United States Press -- and so far no one has refuted this -- with expressing the opinions of the Pentagon. The author of the article, Henry H. Kissinger, at present Associate Director of the Harvard Centre for International Affairs and Political Adviser to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, argues against the United States of America accepting the proposal to stop tests because this might lead to the complete banning of nuclear weapons, which the United States of America could not afford to do.

These facts show the obvious contradictions in the position of the United States to the problem of disarmament.
These evident contradictions lead to two regrettable conclusions for the international situation as a whole.

The first conclusion is this: the contradictions make it clear that in the present international situation the Government of the United States does not want to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union concerning the final cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

In order to justify this negative attitude preparatory measures have already been taken in two directions: on the one hand, towards belittling the results achieved at the Conference to examine the effects of radiation and the possibilities of control and, on the other, towards substituting new proposals for those aiming at the cessation of such tests.

What are these preparatory steps?

The statement by Mr. Lodge that appeared in the Department of State Bulletin of 3 March 1958 represents a characteristic and official United States position. He wrote then:

"There has been some anxiety, for instance, over the testing of nuclear weapons, even though any dangers from such tests are very small indeed compared with the danger of all-out war..."

Kissinger's article casts doubt on the scientific foundations of the danger.

As is known, the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, established by a resolution of the tenth session of the General Assembly and composed of scientists from fifteen countries, came to the conclusion that radiation from nuclear weapons is fraught with danger for mankind.

As against statements by specialists on dangers that can be foreseen and those unknown dangers that are incalculable, the United States is making unceasing efforts to lessen the awareness of public opinion.

The Geneva Conference of scientists from six countries was unanimous in stating that test explosions cannot be kept secret and control is possible. On the other hand, Kissinger in his article started to sow the seeds of mistrust in the possibility of control. He claims that there are heights, or layers under ice and remote places where the control of explosions is unfeasible.
A new proposal is also in the making, intended to replace the recommendations on the discontinuance of tests. In the light of Kissinger's article, this can be summed up as follows. The atomic Powers should agree on a maximum quantity of annual radiation without serious effects on the living organism; then they should distribute this quantity among themselves and carry out as many explosions a year as would not exceed this quantity of radiation. To make this proposal appear more attractive to the Soviet Union, and as a concession, he suggests that the three atomic Powers should divide this yearly contingent of possible contamination, not equally, but the United States and the United Kingdom should share 50 per cent and 50 per cent should go to the Soviet Union alone. The article stresses expressly that this would be a considerable concession to the Soviet Union. Consequently, the States Members of the United Nations and the whole world should not be surprised to see that, at the three-Power conference to be held in Geneva, attempts will be made to come to an agreement not on the discontinuance of tests, but on the dosage of annual contamination. I am stressing again that, according to unfounded press reports, this article reflects the views of the Pentagon. I might be accused of over-stepping the bounds of objective analysis if I were to explain the affinities between this inhuman gamble with the future of all mankind and Hitler's gas chambers, as well as the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, I must not stray further afield, but merely repeat the first conclusion: there is every indication that in the present international situation the Government of the United States does not want to arrive at an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

The second conclusion is the following: the said contradictions show clearly that, in the present international situation, the Government of the United States does not want to go forward to a disarmament agreement; that is, it is against progressive, controlled disarmament.
It is for this reason that in the general debate of the Assembly the United States Secretary of State did not speak about the necessity of disarmament but about something else, and it is for this reason that the reports of the State Department to Congress do not deal with disarmament but with the perspectives of the armament race.

The Government of the United States is so set against disarmament that the article of Kissinger in the quarterly review published by the Council on Foreign Relations stresses the necessity of continuing in three directions the rearmament of the United States and its allies. It urges the development of still further types of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the augmentation of conventional armed forces, and the supply of the European NATO allies with atomic weapons to a certain degree. In this last respect the article admits misgivings only on two points. The first is whether this would not increase the risk of some European ally going arbitrarily to war with the Soviet Union, and the other point is whether there will not be a danger of some European ally using those weapons to settle its colonial disputes. But Mr. Kissinger has elaborated reassuring guarantees against both points of misgiving.

This is the present perspective of the United States Government in the whole problem of disarmament. No change is to be expected in this field while the basic goal of the State Department is -- as I have quoted from Mr. Dulles -- to maintain a network of armed allies against two currents of change; on the one hand, against the socialist countries and, on the other, against the independence movements of colonial peoples. However, as soon as United States foreign policy accepts the idea of peaceful competition with the socialist countries and as soon as it refrains from taking over the heritage of the European colonial Powers in relation to former colonial territories, the way is immediately open to serious negotiations on disarmament. Until then we shall witness only stratagems and subterfuges, as in the Disarmament Sub-Committee and as revealed by the contradictions outlined.
The Hungarian delegation proceeded with the same care and the greatest possible objectivity in examining the steps taken by the Soviet Union in connexion with disarmament. What it has ascertained is that in those steps there are no such contradictions as I have disclosed. The position taken by the Soviet Union, as expressed here in the United Nations, in statements by government officials at home, in the decisions of the Supreme Soviet, and in Press communiqués alike, urges agreement on disarmament. When a proposal of the Soviet Union for banning nuclear weapons is rejected by the West, claiming that the Soviet Union wants the ban because it has the superiority in conventional weapons, then the Soviet Union proposes to reduce conventional armed forces. When the Soviet proposal for reducing the conventional armed forces is rejected by the West, claiming that the Soviet Union wants to reduce them because it is stronger in rocket weapons, then it proposes negotiations and agreement on both points. When the lack of control is objected to, it proposes to introduce various forms of real control. When the Western countries claim that overall disarmament projects are unfeasible, then the Soviet Union proposes agreement on the details and as a first step the banning of nuclear weapons tests. Anyone who has examined the actual course of the negotiations with objectivity cannot help drawing the same conclusions as I and this is not accidental.

Just as it follows from the principles involved in United States foreign policy that it has a negative approach to disarmament, in the same way the positive approach of the Soviet Union to disarmament emanates from the basic principles governing the foreign policy of the socialist countries. This is the case not only with the socialist countries but with every country struggling for progress, particularly with the newly independent, former colonial countries and countries now on the threshold of independence. It is not accidental that the delegation of India is so indefatigable in taking one initiative after the other in the interest of disarmament in general and the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests in particular. This is true, as a rule, for most Asian and African countries and those countries of South America whose Governments are really fighting for the advancement of their people. The progressive tendencies are in favour of peace, for they know time works for them. Peace is threatened on the part of reactionary forces which know that time works against the maintenance of the
colonial system. It is not accidental, therefore, but it can be attributed to deep ideological and historical roots, that there are here a great number of delegations which are consistently fighting for breaking the deadlock on disarmament and for agreement among the great Powers on whatever point possible at present.

On what is agreement possible? We have before us a whole array of documents concerning the items under discussion on the agenda. For instance we have the Memorandum (A/3956) of the Secretary-General on the problem of disarmament. Though he is right in directing the attention partly to the negotiations to open in Geneva at the end of this month, yet he would have stressed the urgency of an agreement if he had here too reminded the General Assembly of the results achieved by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.

Nevertheless, the Memorandum cherishes hopes for possible agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

The draft resolution (A/1/L.203) submitted by the United States and other countries, although it carries the title "The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests", deals with all three points of the agenda. Section A of the operative part refers to the second part of the agenda item, section B to the first part, and section C to the third part. The draft resolution makes it difficult to adopt a resolution at an early date because before forming a standpoint concerning Sections A, B, and C, all three agenda items would have to be discussed in detail. Moreover, section B extends also to an item on the agenda which is not yet under discussion, that is, sub-items (a) and (b) of agenda item 2 of the First Committee.

Therefore, this draft resolution, apart from its contents, and merely on account of its structure, makes it impossible for the Committee to take a position.

The Soviet draft resolution, (A/C.1/L.203), concerning the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, holds out hope that agreement may be arrived at early enough to be of help in ensuring a favourable trend of the Geneva conference.

In conclusion, I return to our common obligations arising out of the interdependence of nations. The peoples of all countries are vitally interested in disarmament. If the majority of Member States, conscious of this, were to press for a favourable resolution, then this session of the General Assembly will not disappoint the peoples who are desirous of peace.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of the United Kingdom has asked to speak for the purpose of exercising his right of reply.

_ Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom)_: I must ask for the indulgence of the Committee while I briefly exercise the right of reply to the comments which the representative of the Soviet Union made on my statement yesterday.

Mr. Zorin raised one very important point, and I want the Committee to be in no doubt as to where the United Kingdom Government stands. Mr. Zorin quoted paragraph 11 of Annex VII of the report submitted by the Geneva Conference of Experts on control over a suspension of nuclear tests. Paragraph 11 reads as follows:

"The Conference of Experts recommends the control system described above for consideration by governments." (Annex VII, page 6)

Mr. Zorin then said that the Soviet Union had accepted the control system recommended by the Conference and went on to say that the United Kingdom had so far not done so, or at least had not announced it. I thought I had made it absolutely clear yesterday that Her Majesty's Government had already accepted and agreed with the conclusions and recommendations in the report of the Geneva Conference of Experts. Mr. Zorin appeared to be saying that this is not enough and to be claiming that the Soviet Government has accepted something more than this which he says that we, on our side, have not accepted. If so, I do not know what it is that Mr. Zorin's Government has accepted. Mr. Zorin says that his Government has accepted the control system itself, but the control system only exists at the present time in the pages of the Geneva Report and Her Majesty's Government has accepted that. As far as I can see, that is all that the Soviet Government has accepted either.

Let me quote the words which Mr. Khrushchev used in his interview with _Pravda_ 29 August last, which was officially conveyed to Her Majesty's Government under cover of the Soviet Government's note of 30 August. Mr. Khrushchev's words were:
"The Soviet Government has carefully examined the results of
the work of the Geneva meeting of experts and considers it necessary
to state that it agrees with all the conclusions and recommendations
regarding the system of control over the universal ending of nuclear
tests contained in the report of the Conference."
The Committee will note that Mr. Khrushchev did not say that his Government agreed
with the system of control. He said it agreed "with all the conclusions and
recommendations regarding the system of control... in the report of the Conference."
I am quoting this from the official Soviet News published by the Press Department
of the Soviet Embassy in London. I hope that there is no trouble about the
translation.

I repeat that, as far as I can see, we have accepted exactly what the
Soviet Government has accepted. Lest there be any doubt about what this is,
let me quote from the words of the report itself where the experts summed up the
conclusions they had reached. These words occur on page 20 of the report of
document A/3897 and are also repeated elsewhere in it. The words are:

"The Conference has therefore come to the conclusion that it is
technically feasible to establish with the capabilities and limitations
indicated below, a workable and effective control system to detect
violations of an agreement on the world-wide suspension of nuclear
weapons tests".

Now let me repeat the words which Her Majesty's Government used in its
announcement of 22 August. These were:

"It is now established that effective international control over
the suspension of nuclear weapons tests is technically possible."

We agreed long ago, and I venture to say before the Soviet Union, with the
principle of control. We asked the experts to find out whether control was
technically possible. They have reported that it is technically possible. We
have agreed with that conclusion and with the detailed recommendations on which
it is based. The report contains nothing else besides this. It may be that
Mr. Zorin objects to my having emphasized that this is purely a technical report
and to my statement that there will be other important matters to be negotiated
at the forthcoming Geneva Conference in connexion with the control system.
Let me again refer to the report itself. On page 20 the Experts list their conclusions regarding the control system. Conclusion number 1 is that the control system should
"be under the direction of an international control organ which would ensure the co-ordination of the activities of the control system in such a way that the system would satisfy the following technical requirements and perform the functions involved".
The report goes on to list eight such functions. But the report does not attempt to define the nature of the international control organ thus briefly mentioned, nor the way in which it would perform these functions. If you are to have an international control organ, you must decide on its membership, its method of work, its manner of taking decisions and many other matters. None of this is contained in the report because these are political and administrative matters outside the scope of a purely technical conference. Yet my colleagues on the First Committee, with their experience of international affairs, will readily recognize that these are matters of the utmost importance in determining whether an international organ can or cannot carry out its functions effectively. The functions themselves are defined in the report in purely technical terms. They call for such requirements as reliable communication, means of transport, personnel of the control posts, timely analysis and processing of data, timely inspection of unidentified evidence which might lead to nuclear explosions. These are technical requirements.

No recommendations have been made as yet on the political and administrative arrangements necessary to fulfil them. In short, what we now have is a technical blueprint on a control system which the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have accepted. What needs to be negotiated at Geneva is the political and administrative framework needed to translate that blueprint into practical reality. If the negotiations reach agreement on that, as we earnestly hope they will, then we shall really have a control system.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of the United States has asked to speak for the purpose of exercising his right of reply.
Mr. LODGE (United States of America): Let me avert briefly to the statement made by the Soviet representative yesterday that the Soviet Union had accepted the system of control proposed by the Conference of Experts on Nuclear Testing, while the United States and the United Kingdom had not. I am glad to state here and now, in the clearest possible language, that the United States has accepted and does accept the report of the experts, including the control system therein contained. Let that be understood.

Let me also remind the Committee that President Eisenhower welcomed what he called the "successful conclusion" of the talks on the very day after they ended. He proposed that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States meet to reach agreement on the suspension of tests on the basis of that report, and the Soviet Union accepted this.

The United States has also stated that the findings of the experts at Geneva should form the basis for the actual establishment of an international control system for any agreed suspension of nuclear weapons testing. The experts made recommendations, and everyone understood that the next step was for governmental representatives to act on these recommendations. We are convinced that putting into effect the recommendations of the experts will make the conference a success.

Why the Soviet Union tries to obscure these facts or appears to engage in a quibble about them is a mystery to me. I therefore repeat categorically, so there is no confusion, that the United States accepts the report of the experts, including the control system contained therein.

Having said this, I think we should remove the implication which Mr. Zorin sought to read into what either his or our acceptance means. The report contains a set of scientific facts arrived at by some of the world's best experts after mature deliberation. They are scientific facts, and we accept them. The controls recommended are those which would be needed to police a discontinuance of tests. They can, if the nations will it, be translated into practical arrangements at the forthcoming political conference. The Geneva report says that most tests can be detected by inspection machinery, including 170 to 180 inspection posts, by aerial inspection and by on-the-spot observations.
To this the Soviet Union has agreed, but the Soviet Union has not yet agreed on the nature of the supervisory body, the composition of the inspection teams, the location of control posts, the immunities and privileges of inspecting personnel, and the like. These were not discussed in Geneva. As mutually agreed, they did not fall within the province of the technical conference. They had to be left for political negotiations. The acceptance of the control system by the Soviet Union at this stage means no more than the Soviet recognition that the technical conclusions are correct. The task remains to put living flesh on to these bones.

In short, the Soviet Union has not yet agreed to the actual establishment of effective controls. The Soviet Union can destroy all the progress made this summer by refusing at the forthcoming talks to give the inspection machinery proper facilities to function in the Soviet Union. We hope that it will not, but the world should be aware that it will have ample opportunity to do so.

So much for the report of the experts. Then Mr. Zorin alleged that our position on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests has not evolved since the 1957 London disarmament meetings. Such a statement on his part, in the face of our offer to suspend tests for one year, reflects a complete unwillingness to recognize a gesture of compromise.

Then, too, the Soviet representative also said that the question of a suspension of nuclear weapons tests was simply one of halting the tests. According to him, one just stopped, pure and simple. That is not the question. The question is whether we achieve a discontinuance of tests under controls so that the discontinuance is real, and whether this agreement will lead to further progress on the disarmament problem. When the Soviet representative takes the line he has taken, he invariably opens himself up to this kind of question: Is the Soviet Union against real controls? One is bound to ask oneself that question. Does the Soviet Union wish to evade test suspension once it has agreed to it? Is the Soviet Union reluctant to reach agreement on arms limitation problems? Does the Soviet Union object to specific progress being made in disarmament?
These, I submit very candidly, are the types of questions to which Mr. Zorin's remarks naturally give rise. I note that the Soviet draft resolution does not mention controls at all. It is still devoid of any reference to real disarmament. There is a road to a permanent cessation of testing; it is through agreement, not through pronouncements. If the Soviet Union wants to continue its propaganda slogan, "Stop the tests", it can do so. If it shares the desires of others to achieve a real and effective cessation, it can go to Geneva and negotiate with candour and good faith.

We offer a workable plan to halt nuclear tests. Mr. Zorin appears to spurn it. I hope I misunderstand him, but I warn him now that if he persists in vetoing inspection schemes and in turning down offers to suspend tests, the world will prefer to draw only the most unfortunate conclusions about the Soviet Union's true intentions. The United States will go to the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing with the determination to reach an equitable and lasting agreement. We want to make this conference, as well as the technical talks on surprise attacks, a success. We hope that instead of their disquieting attitude in this Committee, the Soviet Union will do the same.

Finally, I should like to remind the Committee once again that, in accordance with our frequently stated announcements, the United States and the United Kingdom will discontinue tests on 31 October -- the end of this month -- provided the Soviet Union does the same. The Soviet Union has been totally and monumentally silent on this point. Will the Soviet Union stop? We would like to have a clear answer to that.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): It appears that the representative of the Soviet Union also wishes to exercise his right of reply. I therefore call on the Soviet representative.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): I am grateful for having been granted the right to reply, but I do not wish to use it in order to engage in polemics in connexion with the various
comments we have just heard from the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. I believe that the discussion as it develops will give us ample opportunity to revert to these questions and to cast some light on the true state of affairs on the issues on which Mr. Noble and Mr. Lodge have touched today. I merely wish to say a few words now in order to draw attention to one of the points to which the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States referred.

I note with gratification that both Mr. Noble and Mr. Lodge, after the persistent requests that I addressed to them that they give some clarity to their attitude on the decisions and recommendations of the Geneva Conference of Experts, have now declared that they accept the system of control proposed by that Conference and that, as Mr. Noble put it, they do it in a manner similar to that of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, in his well-known statement.
It may therefore be taken that the recommendations of the Geneva conference of experts are accepted and approved by the three Governments. This gives ground to hope that the forthcoming Geneva conference of the three Powers will make it possible to proceed directly to the consideration of the question of the cessation of tests. It appears that we have no differences on the question of control. It is therefore possible to deal with the political decision of the cessation of tests. I see no other grounds for objecting to this solution. I wish to express the hope that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom at that conference will contribute to this solution of the problem.

There are certain misgivings in our mind about the United States and United Kingdom draft resolution which require clarification, because that draft does not speak of the cessation of tests; it speaks merely in terms of suspension. Apparently we shall have to obtain clarification on this point from the delegations of the United States and United Kingdom when we proceed to the concrete consideration of the text of the draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As I stated to the Committee at the beginning of our meeting, there are no speakers on the list for this afternoon and it will therefore be necessary to cancel the afternoon meeting. The Committee will meet again tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.