Chairman: Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Question of disarmament \( \sqrt{54} \) (continued)
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests \( \sqrt{70} \) (continued)
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries \( \sqrt{72} \) (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.948. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT (continued)
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS (continued)

Mr. Schmidt (Brazil) (interpretation from French): Before beginning my statement on the items before the Committee, may I express on behalf of my country our profound sorrow at the death of His Holiness Pope Pius XII, who yesterday was buried in the Eternal City. His highly respected name warrants particular attention in this Committee where we are striving to find a way to avoid the risk of humanity destroying itself. The Sovereign Pontiff, who now belongs to the ages, devoted his life to the search for peace. None more than he was tormented by the arms race and the danger inherent in such folly. We can, I think, safely say that while he was Pontiff he had to face tremendous difficulties. Yet Pius XII did not hesitate for one minute. He did not stop dreaming of eliminating the forces that conspired to destroy the world. He never ceased his struggle against these forces.

He was a militant devotee of toleration and harmony. His efforts to contribute to the development of the under-developed areas were never relaxed. We cannot forget the stand he took in the course of the last war and the struggle he made against the coldly murderous racism.

The items to which we are devoting our time were among the most constant subjects of his meditation. We would not have to discuss these questions here if the people had listened to the shepherd who led his flock among so many abysses and who has just laid down the immense burden of responsibilities from which his spiritual reign was never exempt for a single day.
Since I represent a country such as Brazil, which is engaged in the development of its resources of all kinds, it is easy to understand the interest with which I follow the prolonged negotiations which aim at rendering this world a little more tranquil and at making of it a more habitable and less dangerous planet. We in this Organization present a strange spectacle of patience. We watch with the greatest attention, as it unfolds, the evolution of a crisis which threatens to lead us all -- great and small, principal actors or modest walkers-on -- into the death agony of the human race. But we still hope. As long as there are some lucid men, and as long as there remains the ambition to build a world where the problem of peace will be accorded the priority which the most elementary good sense dictates; as long as there burns within the human soul the ambition one day to see moral perfection overtake the present dizzy technical progress; as long as we do not lose the very idea of our quality as human beings, created for a purpose which is certainly much more noble than that of killing one another; as long as all that remains we shall know that all is not lost and that there is some purpose to be served by persevering, by being patient and even by resigning ourselves to being what we are here -- men who, as the result of the sometimes monotonous but very noble constancy of their efforts for peace, give the impression of a kind of religious chorus which is not always understandable to those who can conceive only of solutions which are more rapid, more decisive and more immediate.

Once again last year my delegation pointed out clearly the futility of all the efforts which had been made up until that time to find acceptable and practical solutions of the great disarmament problem. The subject is before us once more this year. Much has been said of peace and of disarmament without the situation's having been changed substantially. We are tempted to believe that there are in existence two worlds which are irremediably separated from one another. First there is the world which never stops talking and which makes itself the interpreter of the deep feelings of all peoples, and that is the world which is represented here in this veritable cathedral dedicated to the virtue of patience -- our Organization. There is also the world which continues to arm itself, which experiments furiously with devices which become more murderous day by day, which spends its time manufacturing bombs and rockets whose names change from hour to hour -- atomic and thermonuclear bombs, inter-continental ballistic missiles, delicately constructed machines which reach their targets unfailingly
and even seem to be aware of their own mission of destruction, weapons which are becoming constantly more powerful and more costly, weapons whose effects become constantly more devastating.

I could continue to draw a parallel between these two worlds, each seeking peace in its own way although the search itself does not become translated into positive action. However, I cannot let myself be led into the temptation of conjuring up before the Committee the images provided by this apparently insurmountable opposition between what is said and what is actually done.

I could not advance any new element to characterize the contrast that exists between what is obviously peaceful in the intentions that have been declared and what is resolutely stubborn in the will to continue the arms race.

One must call a spade a spade. I do not represent a powerful country, or, Or, rather, I should say that I represent a potentially powerful country of considerable size which, geographically speaking, possesses one of the largest territories existing in one piece -- a country whose national unity is the more surprising since it encompasses natural regions which are most dissimilar.

However, I am speaking not only in the name of this worthy national effort, whose success requires peace, or in the name of certain ideas and principles which are the common possession of the Brazilian people. It is in the name of those who feel that they do not at the moment carry sufficient weight to make the demand themselves that I ask for serious measures to be taken -- not measures simply intended as palliatives or propaganda -- in order that this misunderstanding shall not transform itself into a death struggle which will bring an end to man's reign on earth.

This misunderstanding, this dialogue without a common language between the West and the so-called people's democracies, would be of benefit in the perfecting of humanity if there had not been such a tremendous lag between technical progress and moral progress.
All dialogue is essential and indispensable and nothing is more dangerous
for the elevation of man than unanimity, the agreement which immobilizes initiative,
the absence of any disagreement, which indicates either exhaustion or the existence
of implacable tyrannies which are accustomed to monologue and will not tolerate
a contrary voice. What it is important to affirm is that before the danger of
remaining deaf to one another and of thinking monolithically, it would be useful
and fruitful to pursue this discussion if it were possible to transpose it from
the level of doctrines and of a defence of concepts of life, and call for
meditation in order to contribute to a free exchange of opinions and to affirm a
philosophy.

Unfortunately, this debate is in process of becoming, not an instrument to
this end, leading to the discovery of the road towards the progress of peoples,
but, on the contrary, something extraordinarily evil.

There is not in the course of history a single example of an armaments race
which has not led to war. This time, however, we know well that the course of
the armaments race will not lead to a conflict in which there will be any
possibility of reconstruction after it has ended. There will not again be a war
in the traditional sense of the word. The dead will no longer be heroes exalted
by popular imagination and idealized by legend. It has been said: "Happy are
those who die in battle." But we know full well that the war of heroes, the war
which history would transform into an epic, is no more. We must repeat this
unceasingly so that the great Powers which are responsible will know what they are
doing. Any aggression will be launched against all humanity without distinction.

We must also stress the fact that the price of disagreement becomes more and
more costly. The financing of the development of countries needing help from the
outside also continues to grow but is constantly postponed because the budgetary
expenditures required by countries facing the possibility of war consume all
that is produced. We have not yet fulfilled the programmes envisaged by this
Organization which would open up the prospect of loans of the type that would
encourage the great part of humanity -- and this, because the debate of which
I have spoken perpetually takes priority, a debate dealing with military preparations.
There can be no doubt that this debate is, for many, another word for misery and
sadness.
What is the basic cause of this interminable suffering of so many people? Let us go to the heart of the problem. In so doing, we shall see the picture of fear at the root. The Soviet Union representative, attempting to introduce a note of humour into these grave matters, alluded to the existence of a kind of international policeman. But, for the sake of argument, if we were to admit the fact that this comparison has some basis in truth, we must recognize that it is the Soviet Union itself which has provoked this justified fear. I shall not go into all the details of this point regarding the fear and its causes in the countries in which the Soviet bloc deals with human liberties and inalienable political rights. This would be an endless task. However, I think that this is the time to say that this fear finds itself particularly justified in the field of the ideological conquest of the Soviet world which finds allies wherever there is discontent, wherever dissatisfaction can be encouraged, wherever misery offers a basis for political action.
This veritable vocation of the Soviet bloc has overflowed its barriers and its frontiers, and it is this that causes and justifies fear and also evokes the spectre of the international policeman. Without giving way to despair, I think I can say that we shall not get ahead towards disarmament if we do not localize this fear, if we do not try to wipe it out. Whilst there is fear, the rest will follow and we will especially see the parade of bombs and the succession of constantly renovated arms and weapons.

Let us do away with fear; let us turn this dialogue into what it should be and we will see the nightmare disappear, this nightmare that will make the human being appear to us as a *homo absurdis*, living in a senseless world that was so eloquently denounced by the writer, Franz Kafka, the modern prophet. In my country we do not defend and we do not stand for any international gendarmerie or police force, excepting that which might be set up by the United Nations pursuant to the free agreement of its Member States. We follow no country, we accept no foreign directives. We are fully conscious of the fact that all in our country is far from perfect.

Our international position comes from an affinity of ideas, and not only because of geographical localization or of any specific interests. We are convinced that man must not and cannot only be lead by material difficulties. Man does not live by bread alone. We accept the possibility of developing, but in freedom and in liberty. We believe it is possible, we believe it is even necessary, to keep certain of our points of view, certain of our ways of thinking, without allowing the political position that we have freely chosen to be substantially modified.

We are far from being always in agreement with our friends, even with those closest of our friends. We do not always share their way of judging certain problems, nor their way of interpreting certain phenomena. It is not rare to find that divergencies of view do crop up between us, and also that we speak a different language. For example, we consider that the existence of underdeveloped areas in very wide zones of our Continent should be one of the most important problems dealt with. This is what underlies the Pan-American operation that is now being carried out.
Here we see a tremendous event taking place the constructive policies of which are most heartening. But we cannot otherwise conceive of our participation in that movement. I wish to stress the fact that we follow with the greatest interest the efforts of economic development that are being accomplished by the Soviet Union at the moment. But at the same time we must also oppose any disquieting effect and manifestation of its foreign policy.

To conclude these general remarks, I would like to stress the fact that if a nation -- no matter which nation -- decides to reduce its military potential, we will not take this as a favour done, because to find the way of wiping out and doing away with the anguish and the threats that trouble the world of today is not a favour being done the world. It is the duty of man towards man.

It is only thus that we can face the crisis of our times, which has caused so many painful diagnostics and yet so few cures.

Speaking in favour of a joint discussion on the three items of the agenda of the Committee, which fall under the general heading of the question of disarmament, the Brazilian delegation was being consistent: that is to say, the problems submitted to the Political Committee for discussion are intimately linked and we have to examine them together. Otherwise, our debates would be amorphous and would be inconceivable.

This does not mean that we in any way oppose the adoption of partial measures which might represent the gradual advance towards the final solution, but only if such solutions fulfil certain criteria of applicability, timeliness and appropriateness, and lead positively to a relaxation of international tension.

Last year the Brazilian delegation was one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution of twenty-four countries, which in due course became resolution 1148 (XII) of 14 November 1957. This draft resolution was presented a few months before the stalemate that followed the lengthy discussions of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London, a stalemate that caused a suspension of all disarmament discussion within the United Nations. We co-sponsored that draft resolution because we hoped that the great Powers would come to understand one another, would heed our appeal to the members of the Sub-Committee that they grant priority to the negotiations towards a vast and widespread agreement on disarmament.
I do not have to recall here the extension of resolution 1148 (XII). It covers all the essential problems of disarmament, from the reduction of conventional weapons even to the immediate suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons and the exclusively peaceful and scientific uses of outer space, and even further, it covered the problem of the reduction of military budgets.

In his statement of 24 October 1957, before the First Committee, the representative of Brazil stressed the fact that the twenty-four Power draft resolution personified a living desire for conciliation, and it was the practical basis for constructive work. But the facts did not turn up as we had hoped. The Disarmament Commission, as re-organized in the course of the twelfth regular session of the General Assembly, never met, not even once, to preserve formalities. Since last July there has been the total cessation of United Nations activities in the field of disarmament. As far as General Assembly resolution 1148 (XII) is concerned, it is, sadly, a dead letter. However, we can congratulate ourselves on certain progress achieved outside the United Nations in the question of relations between the Great Powers.

We entirely agree with the Secretary-General when he stated in a recent Memorandum that, all in all, the perspectives of disarmament are not entirely discouraging, that is, the steps taken by the Great Powers and their direct consultations. The Conference of Experts, held in Geneva last July, was one of these steps. All this shows that since there is no important political agreement, there is a new way of tackling the problem of disarmament from its technical and scientific sides. None can say that results such as those obtained in Geneva are not a positive contribution to the possibility of a solution of the problem of disarmament. None can say that the organization is not being encouraged to transform its efforts into final conquests. I think that that is basically what underlies the thoughts of the Secretary-General as expressed in document A/3956 of 30 September.
In fact, the question of disarmament is so complex and its solution so difficult that we can leave no stone unturned, no matter how small, if it seems to be a step in the right direction.

At present we have before us three draft resolutions concerning the subject under discussion. The first draft resolution was submitted by the delegation of India and is contained in document A/C.1/L.202; the second was submitted by the Soviet Union and is contained in document A/C.1/L.203; and the last was submitted by a group of seventeen countries, including Brazil and is contained in document A/C.1/L.205.

The Indian and Soviet draft resolutions refer to the discontinuance of tests of nuclear and hydrogen weapons, that is, item 70 of the General Assembly agenda.

The text submitted by the Soviet delegation contains an appeal to all States which are carrying out tests of nuclear and hydrogen weapons to halt these tests immediately. It also contains a recommendation to States possessing nuclear weapons to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an appropriate agreement among them.

I am convinced that all the countries of the world, great, medium-sized or small would joyfully welcome the conclusion of an agreement that would call for the halting of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons whose destructive power is so terrible. It is only necessary for me to recall here the favourable impression that the world received from the final communiqué issued on 21 August according to which the two great Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, made known the results of the Conference of Experts which met in Geneva to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. The general debate which was held in the General Assembly fully confirmed that favourable impression.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have agreed also that beginning 31 October, another conference on a much larger scale will be held in Geneva. This conference will be called upon to study the problem of the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons and to establish a system of international control based on the report of the Conference of Experts. In view of the success of the Conference of Experts, we could quite
legitimately hope that the next conference will lead to even more encouraging results. The very careful development and study of a system of control that would be very efficient in detecting possible violations of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests is a *sine qua non* condition for such a treaty to become a reality.

That is why the delegation of Brazil was extremely surprised to note that, when the possibility of an agreement had become greater, the Soviet delegation considered it timely to submit a draft resolution on the immediate and unconditional cessation of atomic weapons tests. While it is true that the Soviet delegation has agreed to take part in the meeting scheduled to begin 31 October, the Soviet text does not make the slightest reference to this meeting. We do not see why the Assembly should recommend the final and unconditional cessation of these tests a few days before this conference that has been called to consider this question takes place. After all, we all have high hopes for this conference to be held in Geneva. What guarantee would such a recommendation offer and what would be the use of this draft resolution if it is not equipped with an adequate system of international control?

My delegation is of the opinion that it is not sufficient merely to recommend, as does the Soviet Union draft resolution, that States in some vague distant future undertake negotiations on an agreement for the cessation of atomic tests.

Following upon these ideas, it was with the greatest interest that we studied the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of India. We believe that it does make an important contribution to the solution of this problem and that it represents progress compared with the Soviet draft resolution since it specifically mentions the conference which will be held on 31 October in Geneva. However, paragraph 1 of the operative part of this draft resolution does not seem to us to be satisfactorily drafted because it does not set up a link between the promise of the immediate suspension of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the setting up of a system of efficient international control. In fact, as I have already pointed out earlier, the only adequate and correct way of viewing this problem is, as far as we are concerned, not to separate these two elements.
Such are in part the reasons why the Brazilian delegation preferred to co-sponsor the seventeen-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.205. We feel that this draft resolution faithfully reflects the general desire to put an end to nuclear weapons tests as soon as possible. Moreover, it recommends to the great Powers that they should suspend their nuclear weapons tests while negotiations in Geneva are taking place. Finally, it calls upon the States concerned to try to reach an agreement on effective international control.

On the other hand, we enthusiastically support this draft resolution because it expresses the hope that the recent steps taken towards disarmament will lead to a universal, balanced and guaranteed disarmament which will be under effective international control.

As regards document A/C.1/L.204, presented yesterday by the Soviet Union delegation and concerning the reduction of military budgets, and also as regards other draft resolutions that may be submitted in due course, my delegation reserves the right to make its views known at a later date.

We stand at the crossroads. On the one hand, the General Assembly can, after a few days delay, adopt a vague or indefinite resolution calling on the great Powers to suspend immediately their nuclear weapons tests, but without making this request contingent on the creation of the indispensable system of control which, in view of the atmosphere existing at present, could offer absolutely no guarantee.
The other road is for the Assembly to send this question of the cessation of nuclear tests to the conference which is supposed to take place in three weeks, a conference on whose timeliness the nuclear Powers are all agreed, a conference at which all the political and technical aspects of the problem could be discussed.

To accept the first alternative, the Assembly would have to consider that the crisis of confidence in the world has been overcome, a thing which no one could sincerely pretend. That is why we sincerely hope that the General Assembly will adopt the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.205.

Mr. Noble (United Kingdom): I should like to preface my statement by referring to the remarks with which the representative of the Soviet Union opened his speech at our meeting last Friday. Mr. Zorin said that he had been disappointed by the statement of my colleague from the United States.

His disappointment can scarcely have been as great as the disappointment that I felt at listening to the statement which Mr. Zorin made himself. I certainly did not find this an encouraging start to our debate. In considering it over the weekend, I have been reminded of another Soviet statement which was made by Mr. Kuznetsov almost a year ago in this Committee.

I refer to Mr. Kuznetsov's statement on 4 November last year. He complained that the proposals of the Western Powers, which formed the basis of the resolution adopted later in that session, were in substance an ultimatum. He declared that the Soviet Government was willing to negotiate on disarmament, and that various forms of negotiation were possible. "But", Mr. Kuznetsov went on -- and I now quote from the verbatim record of what he said -- "But, of course, all of this is feasible on one condition: that the proposals advanced are not in the form of ultimatums." (A/C.1/PV.850, page 6)

Mr. Kuznetsov's speech on that occasion was itself an ultimatum, because it was on that occasion that he declared the Soviet Government's intention to boycott further discussion in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee if the Assembly were to endorse the substance of the Western proposals, as in fact the Assembly later did by 56 votes against 9.
Last Friday, it seems to me, the Soviet representative confronted us with another ultimatum. He said in effect that if the United Kingdom and the United States do not accept the arbitrary procedure demanded by the Soviet Union for dealing with the problem of nuclear weapons tests, then the Soviet Union is forthwith going to conduct another large series of nuclear tests of its own. If we are to reach the agreements on disarmament which the peoples of the world so ardently desire, it will not be by methods such as these.

I hope I am right, however, in thinking that it is too early to take this as the Soviet Government's last word on the subject.

I hope I am right in taking the same view as our Secretary-General, when he said in his memorandum on the general disarmament item (A/3936, page 1), that taken as a whole, the disarmament picture is not altogether discouraging. I believe that sums up the present situation correctly.

On the one hand, another year has passed without any actual agreement to disarm; on the other hand, a new opportunity in certain aspects of the disarmament problem has been developed and, as a result, I think we now have a better hope of some limited agreement, given goodwill on both sides, than at any recent session of the Assembly.

But for this new opportunity, the prospect would have been discouraging indeed. Here in the United Nations, where the main responsibility for disarmament is vested, it has been a year without progress; almost, indeed, a year without discussion.

At our last session, by a clear two-thirds majority, the Assembly adopted a resolution pointing the way for further discussion and negotiation within the United Nations so as to carry on the work of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London.

At the same time, the membership of the Disarmament Commission was enlarged in an effort to meet the wishes of the Soviet Union and many other Member States. But there has been no further negotiation or discussion in the United Nations, and the Disarmament Commission has been unable even to meet.

These have been the results of that earlier Soviet ultimatum to which I referred just now. Mr. Kuznetsov accused us last year of seeking to impose a resolution on the General Assembly; but the only State which has in fact imposed its will on the Assembly is the Soviet Union, which has been able to prevent all
further discussion on the basis of proposals endorsed by a majority of the Assembly.

It is right that these facts should be remembered, for they should be taken into account in making any just estimate of the respective positions of the great Powers. But though we should consider the past, it is still more important to look to the future. As Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said in the general debate last month: "We have to deal with the facts as they are, and recrimination is not a policy."

Our policy is to go on trying to find agreement.

In pursuing this policy we have always recognized, as I myself made clear in our debate last year, that there can be no effective agreement without the full and free participation of the Soviet Union.

So, when we found progress blocked for the time being within the United Nations, we had to look for ways of making progress outside the Organization. We have tried, for example, to bring about adequate and constructive preparation for a summit conference of the great Powers. Constructive preparation for such a conference has so far proved impossible, however, because the Soviet Government will only contemplate a discussion based on their own agenda proposals and have returned no answer to our suggestion for overcoming the difficulty created by the fact that we each have different sets of proposals.

Then when the Soviet Government, on 31 March of this year, made their announcement proclaiming the suspension of Soviet nuclear weapons tests, my Government saw another opportunity.

With the United States Government we immediately renewed our invitation to the Soviet Government to appoint scientific experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of an agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests. From that invitation, as my colleagues all know, there resulted the Geneva conference of scientists in July and August this year. That conference came to the conclusion that it is technically feasible to establish a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the world-wide suspension of nuclear weapons tests with the capabilities and limitations indicated in the scientists' report.
Mr. Zorin, I note, has suggested that perhaps my Government does not accept those conclusions. On the contrary, it was precisely because we both accepted and welcomed them that Her Majesty’s Government issued its statement on 22 August, the very day after the presentation of the scientists’ report. I cannot understand why Mr. Zorin should cast doubt on our attitude, when the second paragraph of our statement of 22 August begins:

"It is now established that effective international control over a suspension of nuclear weapons tests is technically possible."

Nothing could be clearer than that.

Because we accepted this, we went on in this same statement on 22 August to declare our readiness to enter into negotiations with other Governments which had tested nuclear weapons, with a view to concluding an agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control. These negotiations are now due to begin at Geneva on the 31st of this month.

At the same time, as an earnest of our desire to reach agreement at these negotiations and to facilitate their progress, we also announced on 22 August that the United Kingdom would discontinue nuclear test explosions for a period of one year from 31 October, if the negotiations began on that date as proposed, and provided the Soviet Government would also discontinue testing in that period.

We stated furthermore that we would refrain from testing for further successive one-year periods, provided the Soviet Government would do the same, and provided satisfactory progress was being made towards the installation of effective international controls over the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and towards the adoption and execution of measures of real disarmament.

From these developments we now have before us an immensely important opportunity of making real progress.

Added to this, we now have the prospect that qualified persons will be meeting in Geneva on 10 November to discuss the technical aspects of measures of inspection against the possibility of surprise attack.

Thus we have had one successful technical conference and we are about to embark upon the political negotiations necessary to follow it up by practical agreement. We have a second technical conference pending and of course we hope that it too may be followed by political negotiations and practical agreement.
These developments have done much to compensate for the deadlock in the United Nations and indeed have made the past year, on balance, a good deal more encouraging than its predecessors. I believe also that these results have been a notable vindication both of the patience and of the policy of the Western Powers.

I would remind the Committee that it was Mr. Selwyn Lloyd who first proposed technical talks of this kind in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, well over a year ago. At the time, the proposal was rejected by Mr. Zorin almost with scorn. We persisted, and time has justified us.

As we look into the future it is, I think, clear that the question of nuclear weapons tests and the prospects of the forthcoming negotiations on this subject are the matters uppermost in the minds of most delegations at this session of the Assembly. It can hardly be otherwise, for this is where we are closest to some real agreement.

The Committee now has before it three draft resolutions dealing wholly or partly with this matter. In the light of these draft resolutions and after the statement of the Soviet representative last Friday, I think it is now possible to define what are the main points at issue, and I now propose to explain these points as I see them.

The first point is that my delegation and the other sixteen delegations sponsoring our draft resolution (document A/C.1/L.205) believe that the General Assembly will best serve our common cause by giving its encouragement to these negotiations and by urging the parties, in the words of the draft resolution, to "make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control".

The Soviet delegation, on the other hand, is urging the Assembly to take a decision on the subject matter of the Geneva negotiations before those negotiations even take place. This was pointed out forcefully by the representative of Brazil in his speech this morning.

In a matter where the vital interests of national and world security are at stake, I do not think enduring arrangements can be arrived at in this way. The solution of disarmament problems must be the result of agreement. Agreement, in turn, must be the result of negotiation and of the free meeting of minds. It would be unrealistic to try to commit the nuclear Powers to a particular course
of action before they have had full opportunity for negotiation amongst themselves. Likewise, the three nuclear Powers cannot commit other Powers in their absence.

If the three can reach agreement, then we shall certainly hope to broaden that agreement by associating other States with it as quickly as may be practicable. I think the Assembly will agree that the first need is for the three testing Powers to reach agreement amongst themselves. And if they do so it will be a great achievement and provide the only solid foundation for further progress.

Mr. Zorin's two statements to this Committee have given the impression that the Soviet Government regards the forthcoming conference in Geneva as little more than a formality in which no substantial negotiations will be required.

Let me make it clear that Her Majesty's Government regards the Geneva negotiations as extremely important and, indeed, crucial. They are bound to involve complex, and perhaps, in some cases, contentious, issues of a practical kind.

The scientists have agreed on the technical feasibility of controls, but agreement has yet to be reached on their practical organization and application. We have to lay down the political structure of a control organization, with all its powers, its safeguards, and its functions, such as will ensure that the technical aspect of its work can be effectively carried out.

There must be an accord on these matters if we are to reach the desired goal of an agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control.

The second point at issue is this: my Government believes that, if an effective control system can be agreed and established, the suspension of tests can continue indefinitely provided that there is also satisfactory progress as regards measures of real disarmament.

Our ultimate aim is of course the final cessation of all nuclear weapons tests, because that is part of the aim of comprehensive disarmament, which we hold constantly before us. We want the cessation of tests with real disarmament, because only so will real security be achieved.
Now the Soviet Union objects to our desire to link the continued suspension, and final cessation, of tests with real disarmament. They want the test problem settled finally in isolation from anything else; they want us to agree now to renounce all nuclear weapons tests for ever, whether or not there is ever any real disarmament or agreement on a controlled organization.

In considering this difference of view I would ask the Committee to remember what it is that we are really discussing here. The items under discussion refer to the problem of disarmament and to various individual aspects of that problem. That is quite correct as far as it goes, but, of course, the fundamental question is not simply disarmament, but the question of peace and security and the right of all peoples to live in freedom without fear.

Disarmament is only valuable in so far as it contributes to that end.

Now, I believe that most of us here recognize that the suspension or cessation of nuclear weapons tests is not in itself disarmament, in the sense of a real reduction of armaments; on the contrary, it will leave a number of Powers to go on amassing nuclear weapons as much as they please. In itself, therefore, it can do little to assure greater peace and security. The suspension of tests may, however, be valuable and may contribute to peace and security because it may increase confidence and may help to bring about real disarmament.

This, I believe, has always been the Soviet contention. Let me quote some remarks by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, in our debate last year, when he said:

"The suspension" -- and you will notice that he was saying "suspension" and not "cessation" -- "of tests of nuclear weapons is not yet disarmament, but agreement on this question would have a tremendous positive effect in many respects..." (A/C.1/PV.867, page 23)

Mr. Gromyko went on to say in what ways he thought the suspension of tests would have a positive effect. First, he said it would relax the international political atmosphere and increase confidence between States. Secondly, and I quote: "...it would facilitate agreement on the other aspects of disarmament, a fact which to our mind is indisputable." (Ibid.) That is what Mr. Gromyko said last year, and it is really very similar to what I am saying now.
Because of the success of the scientific conference at Geneva we are now in a position to put suspension of tests to the trial and to see whether in fact disarmament can be reached in that way. If Mr. Gromyko meant what he said, then the Soviet Union can have nothing to fear from our stipulation that the suspension of tests must in the long run be conditional upon progress towards real disarmament. Nor need the Soviet Government fear that we shall not give the suspension of tests a fair trial.

In his speech yesterday the Foreign Minister of Sweden said that it was his understanding that the Western Powers are asking for substantial disarmament measures in accordance with the Western disarmament programme being accepted and carried out when the time came for negotiations concerning the first prolongation of the agreement for suspension of tests, that is, within one year.

Now that is not the position of Her Majesty's Government. The words used in the United Kingdom announcement of 22 August were as follows:

"Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to refrain from nuclear tests thereafter for further successive periods of one year provided that the Soviet Union will do the same, and that satisfactory progress has been made towards the installation of an effective system of international control over the suspension of nuclear tests and towards the adoption and execution of measures of real disarmament." (A/3896, page 3)

I do not wish, of course, to anticipate the United Kingdom position at the Geneva negotiations as regards interpreting the words "satisfactory progress" but I can assure the Committee that our interpretation will have due regard for what is reasonably and practically possible, given the time factor and the difficulties of the disarmament problem.

In the long run the only real safeguard of peace and security will be true disarmament, meaning the actual reduction of both nuclear and conventional armaments, together with effective measures of inspection and control. If we fail to achieve this, we must retain the possibility of preserving peace and security by other means; by means, that is, of the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons as at present.
We cannot commit ourselves now to the final and permanent cessation of nuclear weapons tests without any assurance of real disarmament, because we cannot be sure whether in those circumstances peace and security could be maintained.

The Soviet Government says that because we take this view, we do not want disarmament. But I believe that the Soviet position is really just the same as ours. Let me quote a remark by Mr. Khrushchev in a speech to the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Meeting in Moscow on 12 July of this year. Mr. Khrushchev said: "We shall never renounce our right to ensure our security. We recognize this inalienable right to others." What does this mean, but that the security of the Soviet Union will always be the overriding factor in Soviet policy? Indeed, the recent resumption of Soviet nuclear weapons tests has been justified by Mr. Zorin on that very principle. Until the security of the Soviet Union is assured by a system of real disarmament, we must expect the Soviet Government to reserve the right, in the last resort, to develop the military potential necessary for its own security. We cannot deny them that right. All we ask is that, in the words of Mr. Khrushchev, they should recognize this inalienable right to others. And we are honestly and openly claiming that right.

I now turn to the third and final point at issue. To facilitate the Geneva negotiations, the United States and the United Kingdom Governments have offered to suspend their nuclear weapons tests for one year if the Soviet Government will do the same.

In draft resolution A/C.1/L.205 submitted by seventeen Powers, we urge the parties involved in these negotiations at least not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while the negotiations are in progress. But the Soviet Government is now threatening to go ahead with their testing unless the Western Powers here and now agree to the Soviet proposal. That is the ultimatum to which I referred at the beginning of my speech.

I can only hope that the Soviet Government will reconsider its position and will not do anything to prevent a suspension of tests as from 31 October.
The Soviet Government complains that the Western Governments continued testing after the Soviet announcement of last 31 March. But it must be remembered that immediately before that announcement in February and March of this year the Soviet Government carried out a very large series of tests itself. The Soviet Government complains that we actually announced further United Kingdom tests in our statement of 22 August about the Geneva negotiations. That is quite true, because we were still completing our planned 1957 series, as the Soviet Union had done before 31 March. Surely it is better to have announced our tests openly and honestly rather than leave them to be reported in the foreign Press, which seems to be Mr. Zorin's source of information about his own country's tests.

At all events, let me make it absolutely clear that our own offer of an initial one-year suspension of tests still holds good, and it is not affected by the recent resumption of Soviet tests. Once the negotiations begin in Geneva as planned, if the Soviet Government does not continue testing after that date, then our own tests will stop anyhow for one year. And if satisfactory progress is made in the matters we have specified, there is no reason why the suspension should not go on indefinitely.

If the Geneva negotiations succeed, as we hope they will, if they lead to an agreement for the suspension of nuclear tests under international control, and if this agreement proves to be an effective step towards later measures of real disarmament, then we see no reason why the Powers concerned should ever find it necessary to resume their nuclear testing. It is now up to the Soviet Union whether this hope can be turned into reality and whether nuclear tests need continue after 31 October.

Before I close, let me now say a few words about the draft resolution which stands in the name of seventeen delegations including my own, (A/C.1/L.205) and which was explained by Mr. Lodge yesterday. The operative paragraphs of this draft resolution are divided into four sections, A, B, C and D.

Section A concerns the forthcoming negotiations at Geneva on nuclear weapons tests, and I have already dealt with this.

Section B deals with the proposed technical talks at Geneva on measures against surprise attack. This is a field where there is already some agreement of
principle, in that all parties to the disarmament negotiations agree that there is need for measures of inspection against surprise attack.

But it is a complex and only partially explored subject. What we now need, and what we hope to have in Geneva next month, is a fact-finding exercise of a purely technical kind. We hope this will be successful and will furnish the basis for political negotiation and agreement later on. As with the suspension of nuclear tests, the measures on inspection against surprise attack are not of course disarmament in the sense of involving actual reductions of armed forces and armaments. But the virtue of an effective inspection system would be that it could contribute immensely to reducing the fears and tensions which have made progress in real disarmament so difficult. It is our hope that these talks on surprise attack may be another important step along the path to later agreement on real disarmament.

Section C of the draft resolution looks towards this goal of real disarmament. We are asking the Assembly to express its determination that the opportunities now offered should be used to pursue that aim. One such opportunity lies in the technical approach so successfully developed as regards nuclear tests and, we hope, surprise attack. It may be, as our Secretary-General suggested, that technical discussions on other subjects will be found practicable and desirable. The great value of the technical approach lies in defining and reducing the area of any disarmament problem which must be left for political negotiations, with all its attendant difficulties.

But the approach has its limitations, and I think it proper to emphasize that it can never in fact be a substitute for political negotiation and political agreement. But we certainly hope that success at the forthcoming Geneva conferences may open the way to further technical discussions, and the draft resolution rightly points to that.

Lastly, section D of the draft resolution deals with the relationship of the United Nations to the conferences at Geneva. My Government has noted, and it welcomes, what the Secretary-General says in his memorandum (A/3936) on this subject. It is not possible to say in advance what precise arrangements may be desirable for associating the United Nations with any control or inspection systems; we shall have to see how the negotiations turn out. In the meantime,
we are grateful for the Secretary-General's offer of assistance and we shall do our share in keeping the United Nations properly informed.

I must, however, reaffirm the principle, which is restated in the preamble of the draft resolution, that the over-all responsibility for disarmament still lies with us here in the United Nations. As soon as possible we want to see substantive discussion of disarmament brought back within the United Nations framework so that the Organization may be enabled to discharge this responsibility effectively.

In conclusion, let me say this. The salient fact for the United Nations at this session is that one great opportunity lies at hand for reaching an agreement of substance in the disarmament field. The right use of this opportunity can create other opportunities and open the way to real and far-reaching progress at last.

My delegation and the other sixteen sponsoring delegations have shown in the draft resolution how we think the Assembly should encourage the right use of the opportunity before us. The Soviet Union, it seems, would prefer to stampede the Assembly into a hasty and unrealistic declaration.

Stampeding may sound like progress, but in reality it is not. Real progress means advancing by negotiation, which is the only sure basis for commitments involving the peace and security of the world.

The United Kingdom Government has shown how it thinks this may be done; in its statement of 22 August, in the statement which I have just made and in the draft resolution which we have sponsored. I earnestly hope that the Assembly will take the same view and will adopt the draft resolution of the seventeen Powers.
Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): In this preliminary statement I wish to make certain observations which I feel to be important, especially after having heard the extremely eloquent and illuminating statements made by the representative of Brazil and the United Kingdom.

This is the first time since 1955 that our Committee has been called upon to study the question of disarmament without having before it a report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and the excessively copious documentation coming from that body. We might say that this is the first time that the United Nations lacks the ways of fulfilling the articles of the Charter.

It is true that, according to the Charter, the work of the General Assembly is not obligatory, but we must go back to the Articles of that Charter and realize that, according to Article 26,

"In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

The Soviet Union has refused to co-operate with the Disarmament Commission. Therefore, although we have no report from that Commission, we have based ourselves on a memorandum of the Secretary-General and have included in the agenda of the present session the gravest problem before the Organization. It is the problem which lies at the very root of our struggles for peace, as Article 26 says. It is also the very basis of co-operation between the great Powers.

There are two main reasons for the existence of the United Nations. The first is peace, the second general welfare. Both are closely linked with the problem of disarmament. In compensation for, and perhaps because of, the paralyzing of the Disarmament Commission, marginal activities have taken place — marginal activities which are, nevertheless, linked with the United Nations. And may I take this opportunity of warmly congratulating the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom on having proposed that a meeting of experts should take place to study the possibilities of detecting violations of any possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests.
We can say that the success of that Geneva Conference is a decisive forward step along the very difficult road of disarmament because, on the basis of its report, negotiations will be initiated. Furthermore -- and this is a psychological point -- the conference has led to further equally important plans. One of these is the plan for the meeting to be held to discuss the possibility of avoiding surprise attack. Thus there is taking place, providentially, something which we might call a division of labour. In disarmament there is a juridical aspect, a technical aspect and a scientific aspect; but there is also a political aspect. At first we felt, perhaps naively, that in the Disarmament Commission we could cover all three aspects at once, and perhaps, because we did not divide the labour, we were biting off more than we could possibly chew. Thus, unfortunately, the Disarmament Commission failed.

Now we are tackling this problem in a different way. We are to differentiate between the technical aspect and the political aspect. The technical aspect is to be studied with all impartiality and with all objectivity. The political aspect presupposes certain needs, positions and responsibilities which we respect and understand, but which will be tackled in due course. Perhaps this is the right way to approach disarmament. But let us not deny this other fact. The Committee is obliged to confront the need for supplying organization. We have to organize, we have to set something up either to carry out the provisions of Article 11 of the Charter or to fulfil the functions and the obligatory Powers vested in the Security Council by Article 26.

Yesterday the representative of Mexico read out in minute detail the formulas arrived at in Paris. The Assembly took over full competence in relation to the question of disarmament and accepted the setting up of the Disarmament Commission composed of the Members of the Security Council plus Canada. That Commission met until this year when, unfortunately, it failed. This raises another problem for us, and it is the age-old problem, "What next?"

I believe that we have two roads open to us. One is the setting up of a Committee with very restricted membership which would serve as a liaison between the nuclear powers which are at present opposed -- on the one side, the Soviet Union, and, on the other, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada: or, in terms of groups of Powers, on the one side the Warsaw Powers, and, on the other, the NATO Powers.
That method was suggested by my delegation during the general debate. The other road open to us is to entrust the Secretary-General with the extremely important mission of being constantly available to and in contact with these groups of Powers so that at any moment he can facilitate negotiations.

I must say that I share entirely the views expressed just now by the United Kingdom representative when he said that there were two aspects to the disarmament problem. One is the aspect of objectivity, which must be technical and impartial; the other is the political aspect, which presupposes negotiation and agreement. The problem of disarmament cannot be solved by diktat, however respectable the Power emitting such a diktat. We represent the moral conscience of humanity, but despite that fact we would certainly not have the right in this crucial question to say to the great Powers, "You must do this; you must follow this road". Since we represent a very high moral function and position, we must be carefully scrupulous and we must be carefully tactful in the exercise of that function.
The question of disarmament carries with it problems of control. It carries questions of domestic importance to each and every country. It carries with it information which cannot be included in what is known as the general scope of information, data and judgements which are part of the spiritual atmosphere of the General Assembly. Therefore the main body to successfully carry out disarmament should be a negotiating body. The conversations in the Sub-Committee should have been part of that negotiating body, but we have been told time and time again that there was no link in the negotiations, no catalytic agent, no element that would bring nation and nation together, in concord, unity and harmony, and that would destroy the extremities and turn the polemics, which were essentially antagonistic, into Socratic dialogues which sought a common denominator.

That intermediary could be either a commission of three members or the Secretariat, or even, perhaps better, a body could be set up which included both. But I must say that the General Assembly lacks the power to elect such a committee. The nature of good offices requires that those who are officiating -- and I use that word advisedly -- must warrant the full confidence of those between whom they are negotiating. It must therefore be a body that is trusted by both the NATO Powers and the Warsaw Treaty Powers, so that, if they deem it appropriate, those Powers could choose a group of two, three, four or five persons fully acceptable to both sides. The General Assembly, so far as I can see, cannot designate such persons and thrust them down the throat of those nations. The General Assembly may recommend a method, but it cannot and must not designate the persons to act.

Such good offices presupposes full confidence on the part of both sides, and may I leave this seed in your minds and trust that it will develop and grow, because I understand what perspectives are, I have a sense of proportion. I understand too, with what trepidation and fear we of the smaller nations can take part in this debate, since we lack nuclear elements, we lack the information, we lack understanding of the course of events. We lack, too, the gauge of the danger run by the Powers which are responsible for peace.

May I suggest that we try to find a formula so that that most important aspect of the problem of control can be solved? We have spoken of control; we
have discussed ways and means of nominating, establishing, and setting up a body of control. We have even gone ahead and discussed the character of inspection, even far enough ahead and discussed whether countries were obliged, without offensive effect, to accept the measures of control that officials might decide upon and whether there could be any appeal against them. But it is not the Political Committee that can propose, it is not the General Assembly that can recommend, the rules and regulations for control.

In control, and I am not talking about control over the cessation of nuclear tests but rather of control over the cessation of production and the control over the destruction of accumulated stockpiles, there is an essential technical aspect which should be entrusted to a group of experts. Thus, this division of labour should occur -- one group of experts should study the possibility of detecting violations of the suspension of nuclear testing, and there should be negotiations on that point; another group of experts will, on 10 November of this year, study the possibility of preventing surprise attacks, and negotiations on the work of those experts should take place.

Perhaps negotiations on control, perhaps negotiations on the destruction of stockpiles cannot be expected to take place straight away, but, on the basis of what has been done by experts in other fields, we may hope that such studies can be made. I should like to open my heart to the Committee. Very often in the disarmament discussions, having to face Mr. Vyshinsky, then the Soviet representative, I addressed him and said that the word "prohibition" meant nothing, that it was a mere propagandistic element. It was a mere slogan if it were not accompanied by the obligation to cease production and to destroy the stockpiles under international control. The mere word "prohibition" might mean a lot if it were stressed and underlined and carried with it the idea of control, but it would be a hoodwinking of humanity unless control went with it. In any other way it was blasphemy.

At the General Assembly held in Paris, and at the many sessions that have been held since 1952, there has been no change in my views. Every year since 1952 I have stressed these views with all my powers and all my convictions, since I represent a smaller nation whose interest is wholly devoted to peace, whose union with other smaller nations is indissoluble in this matter. I must
repeat here what I said last year, prohibition is not a magic panacea, but merely rhetorical unless there is resolution behind it. To us it is a contemptible word; it is a word which honest men must consider to be taboo. It is so because we cannot hoodwink anyone any more. The cessation of production cannot be entrusted to the free will of the producers. There must be a body controlling such cessation. There must be an organization that will grow gradually towards the absolute prohibition of nuclear production.

In order to bring together the Soviet Union and the United States viewpoints, I think that our roles should be that of catalytic agents. In 1956 the Peruvian delegation proposed in the Disarmament Commission that there should be a reduction in conventional armaments; in this, great progress has been made. That was revealed in the Soviet memorandum of 18 September of this year. There is even agreement on ceilings and the scaling of ceilings. Up to that moment the Soviet Union had proposed that a control commission be set up to verify the agreed reductions. At that time the Soviet delegation had accepted the idea of the control body which had been proposed, the first time that it had been willing to accept control over conventional weapons.

The Peruvian delegation then asked why, since a control body could be set up for conventional weapons, and for the proposal of Mr. Bulgarin, and I added the proposal of President Eisenhower on "open skies", did we not set up this control commission and give it additional powers of negotiation -- not control over the cessation of production and destruction of stockpiles, but negotiation -- so that gradually, step by step, we could diminish nuclear production and, little by little, do away with stockpiles, not be destroying them but by turning them gradually over to peaceful purposes?
Then came the idea of negotiation on these points. The resolution adopted last year coincided with the Peruvian point of view in so far as destruction of nuclear elements was concerned -- but on a reciprocal basis. The representative of Brazil correctly said this morning that the resolution adopted by an immense majority in the General Assembly last year had become a dead letter. But I still hope; I am still enthusiastic. If we cannot organize international control on the lines of a Cartesian synthesis, as proposed by Mr. Moch of France, let us gradually, progressively, little by little, decrease production. Let us gradually, on a reciprocal basis, on an equal footing, seeking one another's interests, avoiding the advantages which one Power might have over another because of the improper functioning of a system, let us agree, on these bases, to do away with the destructive effects of nuclear production.

I realize now that the Peruvian proposal at that time was based upon exaggerated zeal. I was carried by a momentum born of conviction. The problem of the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the destruction of stockpiles requires previous technical and scientific work. It calls for, in other words, a meeting of experts -- who would proceed on the basis of the experience gathered at previous meetings of experts, particularly the one to be held on avoiding surprise attacks -- who would begin negotiations, a good offices group who would act with the Secretary-General.

I now come to what I consider to be the nerve centre of the problem, namely, the discontinuance of tests of atomic and nuclear weapons. In this area we have had put before us the horror resulting from the danger of radiation to humanity. In desperation, we twist and turn in our effort to find a radical solution to this problem. But let us be frank; urgent, desperate, radical solutions are not the most reasonable ones. When this matter was being dealt with in the Disarmament Commission, when the generous and brilliant proposal was put before that Commission by the delegation of India, scientific opinion in the world was divided as to the effects of atomic radiation. The reaction of the United Kingdom and United States scientific academies was, to some degree, not exactly unfavourable, but reserved. There was a typically British way of expressing it -- there was an understatement present in these reports. But the delegation of Peru, despite those scientific differences of opinion, bowed to the inevitable because of a decision voiced by His Holiness the late Pope Pius XII who, basing his opinion on the scientific findings of experts, said that as yet we do not know the amount of radiation
contained in each human cell and that, therefore, since it was unknown and the entire calculation was based upon an unknown, any increase in radiation could be dangerous. The Supreme Pontiff suggested, therefore, that there should be a suspension. He was laying down no dictat -- that would have been contrary to his benevolent and humble character -- but he suggested that we try to find a formula for suspension.

I would take the liberty of adding that the zeal for suspension of tests is suspicious -- although I would withdraw this word if anyone felt himself injured by its use -- if it is not accompanied by an equal zeal in the cessation of production. I do not say that there must be a sine qua non between cessation and production, but it must be parallel. Suspension should be unconditional. It should be played on a separate string -- and I have observed that this view was clearly expressed by the representative of the United States. But it would be most peculiar if, believing that suspension is dangerous, we do not show the same zeal in achieving the cessation of production and then organize disarmament itself.

My second point concerns the psychological danger involved in setting up a mistaken table of values. If, in this table, the only essential question was the suspension of tests, then all the rest -- the cessation of production, destruction of stock piles etc. -- would come at the end, almost as a footnote. This would give humanity a mistaken idea. But this psychological mistake would be extremely dangerous -- dangerous if it were unwitting, but worthy of censure if it were done purposely. We cannot give mankind the idea that, because we have encouraged and will encourage negotiations in Geneva, we have solved everything or have laid the foundation for a final solution of the question. It is a promising overture, but not the solution which we are seeking. That is why I felt, and still feel, that we must attach our hopes to the question of suspension.
Whatever the final scientific findings might be, we must link this with our will, our desire and our appeal for a juridical organization of disarmament, for an acceptance on the part of all States, and specifically, in this case, the Soviet Union, which refuses a frank and open acceptance of control, which would be the proof of good faith, which would be the greatest element for the re-establishment of confidence.

In the meantime a group of experts met. Within that group I think certain phrases where mentioned. One I think we should remember:

"Radioactive contamination of the environment, resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons, constitutes a growing increment" -- I stress the words "a growing increment" -- "of worldwide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations. These hazards, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed persons."

The prudent stand taken by Pope Pius XII should have been taken up also by the experts, and to a large extent they have. They also said:

(continued in English)

"Any present attempt to evaluate the effects of sources of radiation, to which the world population is exposed, can produce only tentative estimates with wide margins of uncertainty."

(continued in Spanish)

But be this as it may, humanity had before it a fundamental document. Obviously, in case of doubt, in case of uncertainty, knowing that radiation was growing, and since we do not know how much each individual can stand, the prudent stand would be abstention.

Therefore, we feel that the measure proposed by the Government of the United Kingdom was a great and successful one. The fulfillment of that has given us this report. The other objection to suspension was that we could not detect violations of an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. Experts have proved that now. I can only read the document; I can only accept it as gospel, because it is not I who has the technical capacity to study these matters or to query the report. I accept that there are ways of detecting
violations. I have recently read the very extremely interesting article of Kissinger, the author of *Nuclear Age*, in which he mentions the possibility of detecting explosions in the pole, or the underground explosions. He doubts whether they can be detected. He doubts whether we can detect the explosions of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. For example, in mines that might be confused with test explosions.

These matters, I am afraid, are beyond me. But they certainly cast no doubts whatever regarding the stand we ought to take, because obviously there is an element of doubt, and since we are told "when in doubt, abstain", we do so. Since we do not know the hazards of nuclear tests and explosions, prudence and our sense of humanity calls for abstention, for suspension of tests. But how to do this? This is what the British say, giving the word "how" an emphasis that we cannot emulate in Spanish. They say "how"? By a diktat of the Assembly? Hardly. There are other procedures open to us, surely.

If we have convoked and if we now convocate meetings of experts to study the effects, it is on the basis of the findings of that group of experts, to point out the hazards, that we could set up negotiations. Then let us follow the same teachings.
The United Nations was not built by a diktat; it was not meant for diktat. We are a negotiating group because the will and the desire of the parties must be achieved. The almost magical work of the Secretary-General is due to the full utilization of this superb instrument, as old as the world: conversations, negotiations. All that is required is that element of common sense, goodwill and human understanding. Let one not be a stranger to the other; let the latter not be alien to the first. Let there be a discovery of one another. Two negotiators should know one another. Let them not be divided by the tragic gap of mistrust, fear and even perhaps hatred.

It is there that the function of the United Nations lies. That is why the only efficient way, let me be more modest, the right way, that underlays the original plan was negotiation, and negotiation is to take place. It is to start on 31 October. What can the General Assembly do when such negotiations are to take place? Substitute it? No, we would be going much beyond our powers. We would be overestimating ourselves. Furthermore, we would be violating that mandate of the conscience of humanity which calls on us to exercise our duties delicately, carefully, prudently and correctly.

All that we can do is to fulfil what is contained in the seventeen-Power resolution, welcome such negotiations and put ourselves on the back that such negotiations have been projected and will take place. We can express our hopes for success and lay in it our desires for fruitful co-operation, give the nuclear Powers our support and, as proof of our goodwill, even trust them with such negotiations; and when that auspicious day of negotiations arises, to stop tests.

This is the position dictated by reason. I have always tried to understand the opinions of different people. I have always tried to ferret out in another's mind what they think. I have always tried to share the point of view, even of the Soviet Union at times. Yet I cannot fathom why the Soviet Union approaches this with a certain attitude of disdain and, I would say, not even contempt but hatred for the view of the rest of us which encourage negotiations and which realise that negotiations are the only thing that can lead us to success.
(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

I have been left with the bitter taste of a doubt, this same doubt which beset the representative of the United Kingdom. If we do not accept and if we do not adopt the urgent and radical -- and I shall not describe it in any other terms because I do not want to offend the Soviet Union -- resolution of the Soviet Union, that delegation will not go along with us. Will the Soviet Union not meet us half way? Surely he who seeks a goal which is to jump the obstacles between and arrive at the goal quickly. But if he cannot, if the obstacles are too great, would it not be better to go step by step towards that goal?

This reminds me of some psychological observations that were made regarding the radical and possibilistic attitude. The radical stand underlies a certain urgency, and for it the end justifies the means. It has in it a certain pride and a certain haughtiness. But the other way is one that accepts the idea of time, of humility, and is willing to go step by step, but does not by that sacrifice the ideal itself; it merely postpones the achievement of it until the time is ripe. I trust that a radical attitude on the part of the Soviet Union will not be borne here where the Soviet Union will tell us: "Our proposal has been rejected. Go then. I care not what you propose. I do not care what the United Kingdom and the United States may propose as regards a one-year suspension, and I shall continue along my merry way. I shall continue making weapons tests." This would be unthinkable.
I have no right to offend the Soviet Union by thinking that that is its psychological position. On the contrary, I believe that the Soviet Union wishes to avoid the dangers of radiation for humanity, that increment referred to in the report of the experts, and as it is not possible once and for all for the Soviet Union to achieve its cherished ideal, the Soviet Union will perhaps accept, with certain slight amendments and changes, because it is only part of the great goal, a partial agreement, an agreement called for by the United States and the United Kingdom.

In conclusion, may I be permitted to make an observation.

We have been discussing this question of disarmament daily. Daily it follows us like our shadow at all times. It wakes us at night and keeps us awake all night. Perhaps the night does bring its fruitful counsel, but not always.

But this great dialogue between the nuclear Powers -- which, more than a dialogue, is a duet of monologues -- is not due to a concrete effort to solve the question on the part of the Soviet Union. Does it only serve a propaganda purpose?

I could analyse the nine points contained in the Soviet memorandum, and I must say that all of these nine points are addressed directly to the human conscience and to prove to that conscience, and undoubtedly to the conscience of the Soviet people, that the policy of the Soviet Union Government is a policy of peace.

Am I to censure the Soviet Government and delegation because of this propaganda line? No, to the contrary, I want to see in this desire to present the policy of the Soviet Government as a peace-loving policy a symptom -- which is an encouraging symptom -- of the fact that the Soviet Union realizes that there is a great feeling for peace in the world, that the world itself and all its peoples want peace. What also encourages me is that there is an invisible and latent feeling for peace among the Soviet people.
Thus I do not criticize this attitude of propaganda. Quite justly and quite humanly, I interpret it as a homage and tribute to the conscience of humanity and as a proof that the Soviet Union, like us, desires peace.

Well, if the Russian people, the people of Tolstoy, the people of Dostoevski, these suffering people, these heroic people, these people which have a religious and mystic soul, these people in which religious propaganda has never been able to uproot their Christianity desire peace, then all I want is that that mandate, that clamour for peace, should be fully respected and carried out by the representatives of that people in the United Nations, and I hope that one day we may be able to celebrate a greater understanding between the representatives of that people, which, according to the prophecy of de Tocqueville, are struggling to dominate the world, and will one day finish its fight and create a new world and a better one with a just and lasting peace.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I understand that there is a representative who has asked to speak, employing his right of reply. The representative of the Soviet Union has asked to speak at this meeting because he wishes to reply to a number of representatives who have spoken.
Mr. Zorin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to you for having called upon me to exercise my right of reply. I crave the indulgence of the members of the Committee for speaking at this rather late hour, but I think it is more advisable to make whatever points I have now, since we have no speakers for this afternoon's meeting anyway. I shall not take your time with an extensive statement. I merely wish to make some brief comments in connexion with the speeches of some of the preceding speakers.

Mr. Noble, who gave a detailed outline today of the position of the Government of the United Kingdom, referred to a statement by Mr. Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, to the effect that in this question of disarmament, as in other questions for that matter, it is the actual facts that have to be heeded. I wholeheartedly endorse this finding of Mr. Lloyd's and will, for my part, confine myself to the facts.

Fact number one: Mr. Noble referred to a statement of the Government of the United Kingdom and of the Government of the United States dated 22 August concerning the decisions of the Geneva Conference of Experts. In that statement which he quoted, the Government of the United Kingdom welcomed the successful conclusion of the Geneva Conference of Experts. Mr. Noble today reiterated this expression of welcome. But what we would really like to know is not whether the Government of the United Kingdom welcomed the decision of that Conference or not, but rather whether it accepts the system of control proposed by the Geneva Conference of Experts. Now there is the rub and there is the question to which an answer has not so far been forthcoming, and that is a horse of a different colour.

Mary speakers here, including the last speaker, the very respected Mr. Belaunde, indicated that if the Soviet Union accepted a system of control everything would be fine, everything would be in order. I should like to state again that the Soviet Union has already accepted the system of control proposed by the Geneva Conference of Experts. That should be clear. On the other hand, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have not to date expressed their acceptance of that system. Now here is a fact. A letter
of 28 August, which followed the United Kingdom Government's statement of 22 August, from Mr. Wadsworth has been circulated. The report of the Conference of Experts was annexed thereto. It was stated in this letter:

"The conference of experts concluded its work with the adoption of a report which the experts participating in the conference have submitted to their respective Governments." (A/3897, Page iii)
The decision of the Conference of Experts, which members will find in the report which has been distributed to all delegations, reads:

"11. The Conference of Experts recommends the control system described above for consideration by Governments." (A/3897, Annex VII, p. 6)

Have the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom examined this system of control recommended for consideration by the Conference of Experts, and have they accepted it?

The Soviet Government has examined that system of control and has accepted it. Consequently, with regard to the question of the system of control, the Soviet Government has accepted the system of control proposed by the Geneva Conference of Experts, while the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have so far not done so, at least they have not so far announced it.

Fact number 2: Mr. Noble said that the Soviet draft resolution proposes that before the conference takes place the Assembly should express itself in favour of a particular solution of the issues which will confront the conference, and he suggested that this was somehow improper. He indicated that other States cannot dictate to the great Powers that the great Powers should adopt any particular decision. I should like to draw attention to the following fact. The Soviet draft resolution is couched in deliberately modest terms. It states: "Calls upon all States carrying out atomic and hydrogen weapons tests immediately to halt such tests." We do not intend to dictate to or order the great Powers any other Powers that they should adopt any decision. We simply propose that the Assembly should express its opinion and appeal to the Powers to take a certain set of actions.

Mr. Noble said that this could not properly be done prior to the conference. Well, sir, what do you want us to do? Do you want us to do this after the conference? Surely that would be pointless. After the conference when its decisions will have been adopted, surely the time will be past for recommending or urging.

However, there is still another point in this connexion. The course which Mr. Noble advocates also favours the taking of a certain type of decision. The joint draft resolution states in paragraph 1 that the parties should "make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests".
So you, Mr. Noble, who are calling the kettle black, are also calling upon the Powers who are to meet in Geneva to adopt a decision. The only difference concerns the type of decision. You want the Powers to decide on a suspension and we want to urge the Powers to decide on a cessation. There is the difference. Consequently, the question is not the propriety of the Assembly recommending anything. You do the same thing. The question is what it is that is to be recommended. There is the question and there is the difference. The difference is that we would call on States to stop tests for good, whereas you also call on States, but you call on them to suspend tests. You also would exercise pressure on the Powers meeting in Geneva, but the decision which you would urge them to adopt, in our opinion, would be unsatisfactory and inadequate, whereas we call for a decision which would in fact stop the tests. This in no way would rule out further negotiations. It would simply make clear to the participants in the negotiations the views of the delegations in the General Assembly. That is the crux of the matter.

It is scarcely accurate to say that we would have the Assembly foist anything on the Powers participating in the negotiations. That is not the point at all. You, Mr. Noble, do your own foisting. The question is what we propose and what you propose. We do not want to impose or foist anything on anybody. The only difference, therefore, is in the substance of the two proposals, of the thing to be urged upon the conferees. One proposal is entirely unsatisfactory and would not move things forward at all; the other proposal, the one which we have submitted, offers, in the words of Mr. Belaunde -- for which I thank him -- a radical solution, namely that the tests should be completely stopped for all time. This is a solution which would in fact be in harmony with the interests of the broad masses of the people.

Point number 3: Mr. Noble said that the position and proposals of the Western Powers, including the position of the United Kingdom, would not stop the tests definitively if no other measures in the disarmament field were taken. The definitive cessation of tests is, as Mr. Noble said, tied in by the Western Powers with another set of measures in the field of disarmament, and a cessation of tests in the absence of that would not be acceptable to the Western Powers.
At the very beginning of his statement, Mr. Noble spoke about some ultimatum by the Soviet Union. Let us pass this off as a rhetorical device designed to impress people who have not carefully studied the texts of statements and draft resolutions. However, if we are to speak in terms of ultimatums, I would suggest that in our debate today the statement by Mr. Noble and other Western representatives to the effect that they will not accept a cessation of tests without the fulfillment of other conditions constitutes an ultimatum. While the peoples of all countries demand the cessation of tests, Mr. Noble is putting forward conditions. You announce, Mr. Noble, that if these conditions are not fulfilled, you will not accept the cessation of tests. Now if this is not an ultimatum, what is?

We do not put forward any ultimatum. We simply say: Stop the tests. Stop the tests -- there are no conditions at all. You, Mr. Noble, are the party that sets forth conditions and you announce that if your conditions are not accepted, you will not stop the tests.

In this connexion, I should like to offer one comment. This thesis makes it clear that we are having a repetition of the position taken by the Western Powers during the five and one-half months of negotiations in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London. I should like to ask Mr. Noble to recall how we were sitting in Lancaster House in London for five and one-half months sifting and analysing meticulously and in great detail the arguments and positions of all sides and how we finally disagreed mainly because on the question of the cessation of tests Mr. Noble took the position of making it subject to preliminary conditions.
At that time, in 1957, the representative of the United Kingdom laid down two conditions: first, the establishment of a system of control; second, the beginning of negotiations or talks on the cessation of production. Now those conditions have grown in number. He maintains the condition of the institution of controls. There is no dispute about that. We are in favour of controls and we are in favour of the establishment of a system, which he has not yet accepted. Secondly, he says that there must be the carrying out of certain measures or progress in the field of disarmament, in other words, not just the beginning of talks on the cessation of production. But he now speaks in terms of progress in the field of atomic disarmament, in the field of conventional disarmament or the reduction of conventional weapons, and in the field of the prevention of surprise attack. In other words, he has increased the conditions and not reduced them.

Consequently, the statement by Mr. Lodge at one of our meetings to the effect that the position of the Western Powers in general and of the United States in particular has evolved in the direction of a position of a search for common ground is totally at variance with the facts. I submit that the statement today by the representative of the United Kingdom is a reiteration of the position taken by his delegation in London, but in a harsher form. This is a fact which I submit he is quite unable to refute. If we analyse the statement of Mr. Noble today, which was replete with accusations against the Soviet Union, it is perfectly clear that these accusations are groundless and at variance with the facts.

I should like to make one more brief observation, in connexion with Mr. Noble's quotation from Mr. Gromyko's speech. Mr. Noble quoted, from the records of our meetings last year, a statement by Mr. Gromyko and stated that Mr. Gromyko spoke of suspension and not cessation. I am sorry to say that Mr. Noble was the victim of a mistranslation. In the original Russian text of Mr. Gromyko's statement there is no mention of suspension. The word used was "prekrashchenye", which means "cessation" but was mistranslated as "suspension" by the Secretariat translators. I regret that Mr. Noble has been placed in an embarrassing position because of this inaccurate translation.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As representatives will have seen from the Journal, no meeting is scheduled for this afternoon, because of the lack of speakers. There are two speakers listed for tomorrow: one who wishes to speak in the morning and one who prefers to speak in the afternoon. We had thought that it might be possible to hold only an afternoon meeting tomorrow, but the representative who wishes to speak in the morning is a foreign minister who wishes to deliver a short speech and prefers to do so in the morning because he has to leave in the afternoon to return home. Therefore I felt that I should call a meeting for tomorrow from 12 noon to 1 p.m. and then call another meeting in the afternoon to hear the other speaker, whose speech, I believe, is rather lengthy. I trust that there will be no objection to this procedure.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.