Thirteenth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 10 October 1958, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:
Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)

1. Agenda of the Committee (continued)
2. Question of disarmament [\textsuperscript{74}]
3. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests [\textsuperscript{70}]
4. The reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 - 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries [\textsuperscript{72}]

Note:
The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.945. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of Libya has asked to speak to give an explanation of vote regarding the proposal that was adopted yesterday.

Mr. FEKINI (Libya) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity which you have so kindly given to me to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of this Committee. I also wish to give my best wishes to the Vice-Chairman and to the Rapporteur on their election to their offices.

I shall be very brief in my explanation. Yesterday, my delegation voted in favour of the United States proposal after we had carefully listened to it being formulated by the representative of the United States only a few moments before the vote was actually taken.

In our opinion, the great majority of the opinions expressed in the discussions yesterday and the day before seemed to favour the discussion of the disarmament question as a whole. The opinion of the representative of the United States that the draft resolutions arrived at by the simultaneous debate of the question of disarmament as a whole will be examined according to their merit seemed to us to allow priority to be granted to those draft resolutions which were of the greatest interest to the peoples of the world, that is, those dealing with the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

It was with that idea in mind that the Libyan delegation voted in favour of the United States proposal.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before going on, may I say that the representative of Nicaragua stated that for reasons beyond his control he was absent at a certain time during the meeting yesterday afternoon and therefore was unable to vote. He wanted me to say that had he been present at the time he would have voted in favour of that proposal.

Before proceeding with the consideration of the three items which the Committee decided to take up concurrently, I should like to make some brief
Remarks in order to facilitate our work and to make sure that the services which
we require will function efficiently. We all know from experience that during
the session we can gain a lot of time if we begin on time. Therefore, I should
like once again to appeal to the Committee to be good enough to be as punctual as
possible.

May I also draw to your attention the fact that since we depend to a large
extent on our interpreters we must try to speak slowly so that they can give a
complete and accurate interpretation. On this point, may I point out that if
the texts of speeches could be made available in four copies in advance of the
speech, it would be useful. The conference officers will see that these texts
are distributed to the interpreters in time. When documents are mentioned in
texts, it would also be appreciated if the number of the document is given and,
if possible, the paragraph being quoted if there is a quotation, since, as we
know, the pages vary according to the languages, but the paragraphs remain
constant. When pages and not paragraphs are given, it is extremely confusing.

In accordance with the decision arrived at yesterday, the Committee will now
begin the general debate on the three items -- I recognize the representative of
India on a point of order.

Mr. Krishan Menon (India): We have been taken unawares by the
Chairman's remarks on the question of the distribution of copies of speeches.
I am sure that everybody is anxious to facilitate the work of the interpreters.
However, I want to record two points on behalf of my delegation. First of all,
irrespective of any copies supplied by the speaker, we are entitled to take as
authentic what comes over the microphone. Secondly, whatever the Chairman may
have said in connexion with facilitating the work of the Secretariat should not
in any way be construed as an obligation on the part of any delegation to produce
written speeches.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): First of all, I should like to ask the representative of India to allow the Chairman to finish what he is saying and then ask for the floor -- and he will, of course, be called upon to speak in due time.

Naturally, I am not forcing or obligating any representative to make texts available; I am merely requesting representatives to do so if they can, in order that our work may be facilitated. It is certainly in no sense an obligation.

At any rate, as I was saying, the Committee decided yesterday to hold a general debate on the following three items: the question of disarmament, the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, and the reduction of military budgets. As the Committee knows, we have already received two draft resolutions on the item which is second on our list, the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. These two draft resolutions have been distributed, the Indian draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.202, and the Soviet draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.203. May I draw your attention to the fact that these documents had previously been distributed under different numbers, that is, as General Assembly documents. Now that they have been distributed in the First Committee, they bear new numbers as First Committee documents. I would therefore ask members please to refer to the documents by their new numbers.

AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 and 72

1. QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT
2. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS TESTS

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): We turn once again to the subject of disarmament -- a subject in which the deep tensions afflicting the world are all too clearly reflected. It is a subject "piled high with difficulty," but so important for humanity that we must not become discouraged.
In this past year of disarmament talks, the world has had its share of difficulty -- perhaps more than its share. But there has also been progress. The scientists who met at Geneva have proved the worth of technical talks in one field of widespread concern -- the means of detecting nuclear explosions. This is significant. There is also ground for hope that technical talks will open the way for forward steps to lessen the possibility of surprise attack. Indeed, this approach has wider implications for the whole field of disarmament.

Secretary-General Hammarskjöld took a commendable initiative in proposing this item for our agenda this year. In his memorandum he says, and we fully agree:

"...the attainment of balanced, worldwide disarmament through the United Nations must remain a primary objective of the organization...

(A/3936, para. 8)

His is a most useful memorandum. I shall refer to it more than once in this statement.

The United States has always recognized the fundamental responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We have co-operated wholeheartedly in every effort of this Organization to solve the disarmament dilemma. We are glad to give to this Committee, and to the General Assembly, an accounting of our efforts in the past year.

To put our present work in perspective, let me recall briefly -- and without any recrimination -- some of the events of the past year. A year ago, in the twelfth session of the General Assembly, our debates on disarmament began under a cloud. All the hopes of agreement built up during months of careful diplomacy in the London subcommittee talks had suddenly been disappointed.

The General Assembly responded wisely to that rather frustrating situation. It endorsed a reasonable set of principles for a disarmament agreement. It also enlarged the Disarmament Commission to its present composition of twenty-five members, in the well justified expectation that this would meet the Soviet view.

However, it must be set down as a fact that up to this moment the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee have been prevented by the Soviet Union from any further useful efforts.
Much as we regretted this attitude, we refused to be deterred. The most important thing was to keep working on the job which the United Nations had given us -- even if this meant doing our work outside the formal structure of the United Nations.

We concentrated first on the problem of suspending nuclear weapons tests -- the first point in the programme endorsed by the General Assembly a year ago. One big difficulty here has always been how to make sure that a pledge to refrain from testing was not being violated in secret. On 28 April, President Eisenhower proposed to Premier Khrushchev that technical discussions be held to see whether scientists from both sides could work out a practical way to detect nuclear explosions.

These talks actually began in Geneva on 1 July. Scientific experts from both sides met at the European Office of the United Nations, with a representative of the Secretary-General present at all the meetings. Three of the most eminent scientists of the United States attended the meetings -- Dr. James B. Fisk, Dr. Robert F. Bacher, and the late Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence. The other participants were of similar standing in their countries. We are glad to say that the discussions from start to finish remained almost completely scientific and non-political.

After seven weeks the talks resulted in an agreed report. The means of detecting violations of a possible test suspension are set forth in the report which was submitted to the United Nations by United States and Soviet representatives and which has been circulated as document A/2897.

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The following day President Eisenhower proposed prompt negotiations for an actual agreement "for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts report." We are gratified that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have now agreed on the proposed negotiations which are scheduled to begin in Geneva on 31 October.

Making his proposal President Eisenhower announced that the United States was willing, "unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of negotiations." We regret that Mr. Gromyko, in his Press conference the other day, threw doubt upon his Government's willingness to stop tests. We hope that what Mr. Gromyko said does not mean that he is looking for a way to justify continued unrestricted testing by the Soviet Union now that some progress has been made towards agreement. We hope that his Government is not trying to evade acceptance of the offer the United States made. This offer was made to facilitate these negotiations and it would be regrettable indeed if the Soviet Union took steps which had the opposite effect.

When the United States made that offer, the Soviet Union had not carried out any nuclear tests since March -- that is, for about five months. In recent weeks it has resumed testing. The question may therefore be asked whether the United States offer still holds. I am authorized to assure the United Nations on behalf of the United States Government that, as President Eisenhower announced, we will withhold further testing for one year from the date the negotiations begin -- unless, of course, the Soviet Union conducts further tests beyond that date.

The question of nuclear testing has been the subject of many proposals. We are especially glad that progress has been possible this year on this particular aspect of the complex armaments question. We are measurably closer than we were a year ago to an actual long-range suspension of nuclear tests. The reason for this is that both sides recognized the need for control. The scientists have shown that a technique for detection is possible. Thus the
vital element has been supplied without which confidence is impossible and
without which any agreement in this field must end in disillusionment; that is,
the element of inspection and control.

It remains to be seen whether this technical agreement can be translated
into political reality. We will go to the Geneva talks determined to achieve
an agreement.

Before I leave this topic, let me say that it must be apparent to everyone
in this room that United States policy on the question of tests has evolved
considerably in the last year. Perhaps I may be forgiven for saying that it is
a good thing when government policies do evolve and are not frozen rigidly for
all time. And I should add that one of the big factors in our evolution has been
the opinions expressed here in the United Nations. We are a country which
respects the United Nations, which heeds its expressions of opinion and which takes
account of minority views that are expressed here.

The method of technical talks among experts gives promise of progress in
a second field -- guarding against surprise attack. Since 1955, when President
Eisenhower made his "open skies" proposal, the United States has sought
persistently to curb the danger of surprise attack by air and ground inspection.

Since last spring the United States has been discussing this matter
with the Soviet Government. We now have good reason to expect that a meeting
of experts, to explore the practical aspects of safeguarding against surprise
attack, will begin in Geneva on 10 November. We will do our best to see that
these technical discussions are as successful as those on nuclear testing.
We hope that these talks, too, will be followed by negotiations which will in
turn lead to measures to minimize the dangers of surprise attack. And if that
is done a great step will have been taken towards the mutual confidence we all
seek and away from the fear of global war.

The momentum created by these developments must not be lost. The Secretary-
General, in his memorandum of 30 September on disarmament, has stated very well
the hopeful prospects before us. After referring to the conference of experts
on detecting nuclear explosions, he says this:
"... a technical approach to such subjects as leave room for study of a non-political nature, similar to that employed in the Geneva talks, would seem to provide possibilities for further progress in disarmament. I believe that all such possibilities should be fully explored. Steps in this direction, as the work of the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy has demonstrated, might also lead to a steady and progressive exchange of information concerning military technologies and armaments. The lack of confidence between States in this respect hitherto has been one of the major causes of fear, suspicion and international tension. The General Assembly might wish to consider the value of endorsing the principle of openness of information in the armaments and allied fields as one which could contribute significantly to reduce international tension and promote progress toward disarmament."

(A/3936, para. 3)

That is the end of the quotation from the Secretary-General's memorandum. Let me say that we agree with those observations. The United States believes in the principle of openness. We agree with Mr. Hemmarskjold that it has particular significance in the disarmament field. We are encouraged by its success in the fields which he has mentioned. We would like to apply it in the future in new technical discussions on several different fronts in the disarmament field.

Now, encouraging and important as these developments are, it is only prudent to recognize that, as isolated steps, they do not deal with the heart of the problem of disarmament. But these developments do illustrate the fruitfulness of the new approach -- an approach which means that we should stop arguing about generalities and get down to practical and specific discussions on how various disarmament measures, which we all agree to be desirable, can actually be applied and enforced. We need no longer argue theory. Let us jointly explore the facts. It has been shown that such discussions -- technical discussions -- can be undertaken without prejudice to the basic position of the various Governments concerned. We should, therefore, make the most of these discussions.

I should like now to set down some of the significant questions to which this new approach might ultimately be applied.
First, conventional arms and armed forces. This remains a vitally important part of disarmament. We have through the years confronted such questions as conventional armaments and the size of standing armies. All of those concerned have agreed that any significant disarmament agreement must meet the issue of controlled limitations on armaments and armed forces and the consequent reductions in military expenditures. There is agreement on figures for levels of armed forces. There is, of course, dispute about the extent to which these reductions could be put into effect without regard to the settlement of certain political issues which cause States to regard armed forces as necessary for their security. But there is no agreement on the measures which would be required to ensure the faithful carrying out of any reductions upon which agreement might be obtained. Surely an exploration of the technical aspects of controlling conventional armaments and armed forces would be worth while. If nothing else, it would bring us closer to agreement on what it would be feasible to do to lessen the threat of large armies and great stocks of modern weapons. This alone would constitute substantial progress in a field which is now devoid of it.
Secondly, nuclear weapons. Both sides have likewise agreed that the objective of a disarmament agreement would be to deal realistically with the nuclear threat. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and France have proposed that early steps be taken to ensure the cessation of manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the beginning of transfer to peaceful uses of the fissionable materials presently tied up in stocks of nuclear weapons. The USSR has spoken of the "cessation of manufacture" of these weapons but has tied this action to the complete prohibition and liquidation of weapons stockpiles. This is a measure which, however desirable, we believe is uncontrolable. Here is another problem where, by technical discussions, again without prejudice to the basic position of either side, we might be able to find out just what it would be humanly possible to do and what kind of control system could be devised to ensure the carrying out of these measures.

Thirdly, outer space. A year ago in this Committee the United States asked that a beginning be made on control of the disarmament aspect of outer space. We proposed that the Soviet Union join us in studying the terms of an inspection system which would assure that outer space would not be used for military purposes. Outer space missiles armed with nuclear warheads are now a reality. With particular emphasis, therefore, the United States reaffirms this proposal and its willingness to take part in technical discussions in this field.

Studies of the measures which I have mentioned would only be a first, though indispensable, step. What counts is actually putting them into effect. In all these regards, the United States is willing to move ahead on any measures which offer reasonable prospects for agreement. But if such negotiations are to hold promise, we believe that they should be based on a solid technical groundwork which sets forth the facts on what is feasible and controllable.

These brief remarks have summed up what the United States regards as the most hopeful and worthwhile events of the past year in the disarmament field. We have sketched out what we think are the most promising possibilities for immediate progress. We have by no means mentioned all the major events of the year, some of which have been bitterly disappointing. In a field so demanding and so difficult as this we must try not to "look back in anger." We must look forward to those points of light which show us the way out of the forest.
(Mr. Lodge, United States)

The United States believes that the most light at this stage can be shed by the scientific and technical approach, because in that way we can lay a sound basis for actual disarmament measures; in that way we can talk the same language; and in that way we can avoid the distressing recriminations of past years. We believe that the constructive thing for the General Assembly to do at this point is to encourage the forthcoming talks.

This is a time for self-restraint. It is a time when the General Assembly can act most constructively not by raising for further discussion various issues well known to us from past debates, but by lending its support to the delicate and promising work which is already in hand or about to begin in Geneva.

Many good possibilities lie beyond that work. The important thing is that the next step should succeed.

From our twelve years' experience in disarmament negotiations a number of valuable principles have emerged.

First, any measures undertaken must be capable of verification and control. We have learned through the past lessons of history that any agreement based on good faith and promises alone leads to an increase rather than a lessening of tensions. Confidence created by confirmation is the only sure foundation for progress towards effective arms limitation and control.

Secondly, drastic reduction of our armaments and armed forces can be realistically expected when the existing political situation has improved. We continue to believe that the partial approach adopted by the Assembly in 1955 is the proper one. We believe that high armaments levels are the product of international tensions and also that they tend to increase these tensions. Accordingly, we believe that limited conventional arms reductions, along with other measures, can be taken now -- without awaiting political settlements. Such reductions would lead to a lessening of tensions. This would facilitate political agreements and would, in turn, allow States to accept with confidence even more drastic cuts.

Thirdly, the relationship between conventional and nuclear armaments dictates the need for arms limitations in both fields to proceed concurrently. The United States believes that disarmament must be balanced to assure each State
that its security is not impaired. We could not expect, nor do we accept, unbalanced measures of disarmament which call for abandonment of a nuclear deterrent while allowing conventional arms and manpower in unlimited quantities. If they are to be controlled, the measures for so doing should proceed in a manner which does not offer one side a military advantage over the other.

Fourthly, a complete and permanent cessation of nuclear weapons testing can come with progress towards lessening the nuclear threat, reducing the high level of non-nuclear arms, and minimizing the danger of surprise attack. In other words, if the United States is to give up its ability to improve its defensive weapons, there must be corresponding limitations on the ability of other States to increase their weapons stocks, and to maintain large armed forces.

President Eisenhower, in his statement of 22 August, to which I have already referred, announcing the United States test suspension, said:

"As the United States has frequently made clear, the suspension of testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons is not, in itself, a measure of disarmament or a limitation of disarmament. An agreement in this respect is significant if it leads to other and more substantial agreements relating to limitations and reduction of fissionable material for weapons and to other essential phases of disarmament. It is in this hope that the United States makes this proposal."

We sincerely hope that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests will be reached at the coming negotiations. It is our hope that this will eventually lead to a permanent test suspension. Let me add that the United States has stated its willingness to negotiate a cessation of nuclear weapons tests in the interests of encouraging the Soviet Union to make a comparable move forward.

The present situation, wherein States have a capability for mutual destruction, is fraught with danger for all the world. We must not allow this dangerous state of affairs to go on. Unilateral or unbalanced disarmament, or disarmament based on promises alone, would but add to the danger of war. For those who cherish peace and justice and do not harbour aggressive purposes, other ways must be found. We offer a practical, positive beginning. Let us not miss this opportunity. Let us turn the corner towards a relaxation of the present tension and danger. The survival of civilization is at stake.
(Mr. Lodge, United States)

There exists today some real momentum towards progress in the disarmament effort, with all that this implies for humanity. We ask the Assembly to help us to maintain that momentum. Thus we can hope to move toward the day when the nations can lay down their burden of armaments and their still heavier burden of fear.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Before I set out the position of the Soviet Union on the questions before us, I should like to say just a few words in connexion with the statement of the representative of the United States which we have just heard. I must say that this statement has profoundly disappointed us and, it seems to me, failed to justify the hopes which many representatives had nurtured after Mr. Lodge's statement in the First Committee yesterday that the United States would shortly submit concrete proposals relating to the very acute question of the discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the question which is one of concern to the whole world.

Mr. Lodge, in his statement, spoke of many things. He spoke of the responsibility of the United Nations in disarmament questions, of the United Nations Commission, of ways and means of ensuring control over tests. He spoke of surprise attacks and of the principle of the accessibility of information on military questions. He spoke of certain principles which must underlie the steps we are to take in the field of disarmament. But when he worked his way up to the question of the testing of nuclear weapons, then, unfortunately, what the United States Government served up to us was a formula which makes it clear that the United States ties the question of the cessation of tests in with the broad disarmament complex in general.

In point 4 of the principles, I read that Mr. Lodge said the following:

"A complete and permanent cessation of nuclear weapons testing can come with progress toward lessening the nuclear threat; reducing the high level of non-nuclear arms; and minimizing the danger of surprise attack."

In other words, the United States is not prepared now to negotiate an actual cessation of the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons. What the United States does want is talk about the lessening of the nuclear threat in general, the reduction of the high level of non-nuclear arms, and the minimizing of the danger of surprise attack. Only after an understanding has been reached on these issues -- and this is what emerges from the statement of the representative of the United States -- will the United States be able to approach the question of the complete and unconditional cessation of the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons.
The whole world is clamoring for a complete and absolute cessation of tests as a first step, mind you, toward the lessening of the nuclear threat, toward lessening the threat of atomic warfare, a first step on the way to all other disarmament questions; whereas the United States makes this the last step instead of the first step. This is the burden of Mr. Lodge's statement on the question which alarms us all. I shall not at this point dwell on all the other matters which Mr. Lodge touched upon. I shall have the opportunity of doing so later. But this was the basic shortcoming, if I may use this mild word, in the proposal of the United States, and I thought that it was incumbent on me to bring out this basic shortcoming right away.

Now we have proceeded to the consideration of the disarmament problem at large. This is a problem which remains at the focus of the attention of the peoples of the whole world, because on its solution will depend the answer to the question whether the world will follow the path of a further continued armaments race, fraught with the danger of the outbreak of a new destructive war, or, whether the present armaments race will be stopped and the world will consequently enter into a phase of peaceful coexistence, progress and flowering. Tertium non datur -- there is no third way.

The United Nations, which was created for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security, and for the development of friendly relations between peoples, cannot remain indifferent as to which of these two paths will be taken by the further evolution of events. As early as 1946, the General Assembly came out unanimously for the universal reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, for the elimination of these weapons from the arsenals of States, and for limiting the utilization of atomic energy to peaceful ends. However, despite years of talk on disarmament, conducted since that time both within and without the framework of the United Nations, no agreement on the disarmament problems has been forthcoming, and the armaments race, so far from coming to an end, is assuming dimensions that are increasingly dangerous for the cause of peace.
The overwhelming majority of the representatives who spoke in the general debate at the present session of the General Assembly have expressed serious concern about the fact that no genuine concrete steps have been taken even in the most urgent aspects of disarmament. Most of the representatives took a vigorous stand in favour of immediate measures designed to effectuate practical action in this field. At the same time, the discussion demonstrated that the Governments of the United States and certain other Western countries are still unwilling to heed the demands of the peoples and are still unwilling to foreclose the policy of the armaments race and of teetering on the verge of war -- and Mr. Lodge's speech today provided additional evidence, if additional evidence were needed, of this point.

It is sufficient to refer to what was said on this problem -- which is of concern to the peoples of the world -- in the general debate, at this session of the General Assembly, by the Secretary of State of the United States. In the opinion of Mr. Dulles, in the field of disarmament, the most important thing -- and I am quoting from Mr. Dulles' statement -- "is arms control". This is what is said literally. Not stopping the armaments race, no; not reducing armaments, no; not even, it turns out, control over disarmament, according to Mr. Dulles. What the United States regards as the most important thing is control over armaments. This is no accident. It is no slip of the tongue. The phrase "arms control" is mentioned thrice and constitutes the fundamental idea of this whole section in Mr. Dulles' speech, which apparently, through some misunderstanding, carries the eloquent title "Disarmament".

But in this whole section of Mr. Dulles' speech in the General Assembly there is not even one practical proposal in the realm of partial disarmament measures. There is no question of any genuine steps by the Government of the United States either in the field of reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments or in the field of the cessation of the atomic armaments race, or, finally, in so urgent a question, urgent for all peoples and countries, as the cessation of the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons.
There is just one lone proposal, platonic in nature, to the effect that the General Assembly should express its wish, in the form of a suitable resolution, to encourage the forthcoming Geneva conversations, and Mr. Lodge addressed himself to that today too. Is this indeed a disarmament programme for a great Power, to which the peoples of the whole world are looking in the expectation that it will finally renounce the armaments race and the preparation of atomic war, that it will hearken to the sober voice of reason and turn its policy toward peace, toward preventing a catastrophic clash, that it will turn away from that and toward disarmament and the relaxation of international tension?

To judge by the position of the United States delegation in the General Assembly, there is not even a sign of so reasonable a turn in the policy of the United States. Far from it. In his speech to the Assembly, Mr. Dulles told us:

"The United States, as one of the ... great Powers, continues to stand ready to dedicate that power to world order." (A/PV.749, page 24-25)

Does not this statement manifestly reveal the United States Government's unbridled claims to world domination? Is this not manifest evidence of the aggressive nature of the whole foreign policy course of the United States, which seeks to assume the role of a world gendarme who uses his power, sometimes in Lebanon, sometimes in the Far East, sometimes in its military bases in various parts of the globe, and at the same time trying to convince us that it is the United States which seeks disarmament? No, it is not disarmament that the United States seeks, if only we will look the facts in the face.
The statements in the General Assembly by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have shown clearly that their Governments intend to continue the policy of the armaments race, that they intend to continue their old obstructionist position on the disarmament question with a view to preventing the adoption in the United Nations of decisions which would contribute to carrying out concrete measures in the field of disarmament. It is no accident, therefore, that the United States in this Committee insisted on the consideration of the disarmament problem as a whole, a position which was at variance with the sober and sound proposals of many other delegations to the effect that we should consider the concrete questions of disarmament, and especially the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons first.

The Soviet Union, being a partisan of a radical solution of the disarmament problem, repeatedly proposed to the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western Powers that the broad range of disarmament measures should be tackled concurrently. We proposed to carry out a substantial reduction of armed forces, armaments and military budgets, completely to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons, to discontinue their production and to destroy all existing governmental stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen weapons, to proceed to the elimination of all bases on foreign territories, and a number of other measures which, if carried out, would bring about a cessation of the armaments race, eliminating the danger of atomic war.

What answer did the Western Powers produce to these proposals of the Soviet Union? The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France announced that they were not prepared at present to conclude a comprehensive disarmament agreement, and they overtly stated that they would not sign a disarmament agreement which would provide for the prohibition of atomic weapons. They stated that they needed the atomic weapons as a deterrent, presumably to intimidate other peoples. Mr. Lodge made this point clear again today.

Having thoroughly analysed the course of the long disarmament negotiations over the years and taking into account the unwillingness of the Western Powers to accept any broad or comprehensive disarmament programme, the Government of the Soviet Union has reached the conclusion that in contemporary conditions the only
realistic and concrete way to reach any type of agreement in the field of disarmament would consist of carrying out one measure after another, starting with the measures which could already in fact be carried out in the present circumstances. These measures are contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Union as well as in other documents presented by the Soviet Union to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly.

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, speaking in the general debate on 18 September, mentioned the principle of these measures. The proposals of the Soviet Union, including a minimum of initial disarmament measures, were formulated with the view in mind that they answered the interests not only of the Soviet Union but of all other countries as well, including the interests of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, provided that they also genuinely seek to reduce armaments, to call a halt to the atomic armaments race and to reduce international tension.

These proposals contained nothing whatever which would provide an advantage to any country or which would be detrimental to the security of any other country. We have proposed, to used the words of Mr. Lodge, a balanced disarmament programme.

Without touching on all the questions which are analysed in detail in the Soviet memorandum of 18 September 1958, document A/3929, the Soviet delegation deems it essential to discuss first the Soviet proposals on the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons, inasmuch as this question has in fact been included in the agenda of this session of the Assembly as an independent question and since the solution of this question, in our opinion, is fully prepared.

More than three years have elapsed since the Soviet Government submitted to the General Assembly its proposal for the cessation of nuclear tests. Unfortunately, however, this question remains unsolved owing to the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom, even though this is a fairly simple and uncomplicated question as compared to some aspects of the disarmament question.

There is no need to argue at length about the urgency and necessity of bringing about a cessation of these tests. Much has been spoken on this subject in the General Assembly, in the Disarmament Commission and in the Sub-Committee.
Much has been said on this subject also in the pages of the Press. However, I do wish briefly to point to the following circumstances which have shifted the question of the cessation of tests to the foreground and have called for its immediate solution.

To begin with, the continued testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons accelerates the arms race inasmuch as the object of the tests is to devise new and even more destructive types of nuclear weapons and to broaden the range of the arsenal of atomic and hydrogen bombs and other missiles which are used for arming the armies and navies of the world.

In this connexion, one must point to another circumstance which emphasizes the urgency of a positive solution of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The continued elaboration of new types of nuclear weapons becomes less complex and less expensive, and consequently these weapons become accessible to more countries and to the industrially less developed countries. This process, if its course is not halted, will lead to a situation where the nuclear arms race will be characterized not only by the increasing pace of the stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons of various types, but also by a new aspect of the question, namely the joining of the race by other States.

It is well known that in France now an atomic industry is being developed at full speed and the production of nuclear weapons has been undertaken. France is preparing to conduct a test explosion of its nuclear weapons in the Sahara, a fact which has brought forth strong protests from African States. There are serious indications that in western Germany intensive preparations are underway for the production of nuclear weapons. If we take into account the fact that these preparations are taking place against the background of the rapid development of militaristic trends in western Germany, which have found their expression particularly in the growth of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany and the development of propaganda demanding a revision of existing frontiers, it should be clear that all of this is leading to an intensification of the danger of the outbreak of atomic warfare. This quite naturally cannot fail to alarm seriously the people of Europe who have repeatedly fallen victim to German militarism and aggression.
Now the nuclear weapon is being produced by only three States -- the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union -- and three years of negotiations, since the submission of the Soviet proposals in May 1955, have not yielded an agreement on the complete cessation of tests, owing to the positions taken by the two Western Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom.
It is evident that, as the number of States with facilities for the production of nuclear weapons increases, the possibilities for stopping the tests will become less. This consideration alone should alarm the United Nations and should sharpen its feeling of responsibility and induce it to carry out urgent measures in this field before the situation becomes even more complicated.

Another point that emphasizes the urgency of a solution of the question of the cessation of tests is the rise in the level of atomic radiation as a result of the intensive testing of nuclear weapons which has been carried out in various parts of the world. If the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons is not halted, the dangers of atomic radiation, which today already causes a hazard to the lives and the health of many millions of human beings, will increase even beyond levels already reached.

The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation has been submitted to the General Assembly and is on the agenda of the current session. This report has pointed out the extent of the danger. The members of the Scientific Committee, who are prominent scientists appointed by the Governments of fifteen countries, reached the conclusion that the continuance of nuclear test explosions involves new and largely unexplored hazards for present and future generations.

The General Assembly must deal with this warning from the scientists with all the seriousness that it deserves. The urgency of a solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests is so manifest that there are few who would venture to take a stand openly in favour of the continuance of such tests. Even the sworn champions of the "positions of strength" policy dread the wrath of the peoples who demand the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and an immediate and unconditional cessation of test explosions thereof: and they have been compelled to side-step this matter and to engage in all sorts of stratagems, seeking all sorts of pretexts to cover up their refusal to accept a cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons.

It is no accident that, with regard to the submission by the Soviet delegation on the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons at the present session of the General Assembly, some are now invoking the forthcoming three-Power talks in Geneva on the question of the cessation of
nuclear tests. In this connection, the opinion is being expressed in some quarters that the General Assembly should confine itself to expressing its good wishes for the success of these negotiations. This is what we heard from Mr. Lodge this morning. What these people propose, in other words, is that the United Nations should sit back on its haunches and await the results of the Geneva negotiations without expressing its own opinion concerning the cessation of tests.

It goes without saying that we cannot accept this type of argument. The question of whether the testing of nuclear weapons will be stopped or will continue is a matter of concern not only to the three Powers that produce nuclear weapons -- the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom -- but it is a matter of concern to all other States, large and small alike. It is a question that concerns the feelings of all the peoples of the world because it directly affects the interests of every human being irrespective of the country or continent in which he happens to live. For this reason, the active campaign for the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons must, in our opinion, be joined by the delegations of all countries.

Those who take a stand for the immediate and unconditional cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons cannot be opposed to a comprehensive examination of this question in the Assembly. Only those who are opposed to the discontinuance of testing are, as might be expected, not interested in having the United Nations express its attitude on the question of the cessation of tests. Were the Assembly to side-step its responsibility in this question which is so vitally important for the cause of peace -- were it, in other words, to hearken to those who invoke the Geneva talks in order to prevent the adoption by the General Assembly of an affirmative decision on the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons -- this would be a serious error. The consideration of this question at the present session of the General Assembly and the adoption of a recommendation in favour of a cessation of tests, far from impeding or harming the negotiations of the three Powers in Geneva, would have the contrary result. A statement of the demand for the cessation of tests would contribute to a swift solution of the question of the unconditional and comprehensive cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons.
The representatives here know full well that the Soviet Union has invariably favoured and continues to favour the unconditional prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has for years been appealing to the United States and the United Kingdom to conclude an agreement on this question but, regrettably, the Soviet Union is to this day the only one of the States possessing nuclear weapons which is prepared without delay and without reservation to sign an agreement which would put an end to the testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs. In pressing for this, of course, we are fully aware of the fact that the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons alone will not solve the whole atomic problem. Everybody fully understands that, as long as there is no decision to ban atomic and hydrogen weapons and eliminate them altogether from the armaments of States, to stop the production of these weapons and liquidate the stock-piles of them, the danger of an outbreak of atomic warfare will continue to hang over mankind like the sword of Damocles.

For this reason, while we now take a stand for the adoption of a partial measure -- that is, the cessation of the testing of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons -- at the same time we tell the world quite openly that our ultimate objective is the complete and unconditional prohibition of such weapons. Only such a solution of the atomic problem would free mankind for all time from the danger of an outbreak of atomic warfare and would open the door to the unlimited utilization of this wonderful discovery by the human genius for the well-being of mankind exclusively.

The Soviet Union is prepared to accept this initial solution of the atomic problem at any time, and it up to the Western Powers to do likewise. Since the position to which the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are committed in this question has made it impossible so far to reach an agreement on the complete prohibition and liquidation of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that we should begin with a complete and unconditional cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

The Soviet Government considers that it is essential for the cause of peace to separate the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons from the general or comprehensive problem of disarmament, to solve it separately from all other disarmament questions on which at the present time agreement has not yet been reached, owing to the position of the Western Powers.
According to Mr. Lodge, the position of the United States is that it is intent upon tying in the cessation of the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons with many other disarmament problems, problems on which the position of the United States is of such a nature as to prevent even the possibility of an agreement. We frequently hear it said that the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons would not yield any results so far as disarmament itself and the cessation of the armaments race is concerned. We cannot agree with such assertions. Surely everyone realizes that the object of nuclear test explosions, as has been indicated before, is to produce new models and types of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The object is also to test in practice the destructive force of these weapons of mass destruction. This view is confirmed by the statements of official spokesmen of Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.

In this connexion, we wish to draw attention to the statement made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. MacMillan, who, on 1 April 1957 in the House of Commons, seeking to justify the policy of his Government with regard to test explosions, declared that the discontinuance of testing would be tantamount to an abandonment of the weapons. The same point of view was expressed by another no less authoritative spokesman, the Defence Secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys. Speaking in the House of Commons on 10 June of this year, Mr. Sandys declared that the purpose of nuclear tests was to maintain the effectiveness of nuclear weapons and to increase the explosive force of a given quantity of fissionable materials.

The same point was similarly acknowledged in the United States of America, when the former chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Strauss, stated that stopping the testing of nuclear weapons would be risky for the United States because it would halt or slow down the development of nuclear weapons. This has been stated time and again by Admiral Strauss. Another member of the same Commission, Dr. Libby, also has acknowledged that "the cessation of testing would hamper the development of new weapons".

That is the crux of the matter. That is what the partisans of the atomic armaments race are afraid of. In the light of these assertions, how can it be argued, as the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom did in their statements of 22 August of this year, that the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons "is not a measure of disarmament or of the limitation of armaments".
All these views of official American and British circles are circulated because in fact the United States and the United Kingdom are busily working out plans not only to prevent any cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons but even to clothe these test explosions in a cloak of legitimacy by formalizing them in a special international agreement. This has been indicated in particular in the Press of the United States, including so solid and sound a journal as Foreign Affairs, in which it was recently proposed that the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons should be replaced by the question of the registration for two years of all nuclear tests, that registration to take place with the United Nations.

Instead of taking measures to liberate mankind from the hazards of atomic radiation, the apologists of the atomic weapon propose that the States producing nuclear weapons should be given special quotas, within the limits of which they will be entitled to poison the atmosphere, infect the soil, envenom the oceans and the seas and the flora and fauna, including human beings as well, with radioactive fall-out and products of legalized nuclear test explosions. The opponents of the cessation of test explosions have talked their way into the paradox that the continuance of nuclear test explosions is essential in order to inhibit the armaments race. For instance, the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Couve de Murville, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 25 September of this year, strange as it may seem, spoke in defence of the continued testing of nuclear weapons on the grounds that such testing was a boon to mankind because those tests drew the attention of the people to the problem of disarmament. Mr. Couve de Murville said, "Once the tests are stopped, silence will reign". (A/PV.758, p. 66) In other words, there would be nothing to remind the people of the seriousness of the danger of the armaments race in the nuclear weapons field. Mr. Couve de Murville continued that, "no one will speak of disarmament any more". (Ibid.)

Those are the bizarre arguments which, if continued, may lead to another absurd and monstrous inference, that wars themselves are useful to mankind because they bring such horrors in their wake that they are the best means of stimulating a campaign to turn public opinion against war and toward disarmament. They are presumably the test of the destructive effects of war. This verbal
pretext was required by Mr. Couve de Murville in order to justify France's preparations to carry out the testing of nuclear weapons, even while talks are to take place in Geneva.

In order to stop the dangerous nuclear armaments race and to protect mankind from the hazards and the consequences of atomic and hydrogen explosions, the testing of nuclear weapons should be stopped. Agreement on this question could be achieved straight away if the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom would manifest their good will with regard to the attainment of such an agreement. The solution of this question now depends upon them, and upon them alone, because the Soviet Union for its part is prepared forthwith to sign such an agreement.
It is well known that the majority of authoritative scientists always considered that the establishment of control over the observance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests is entirely within the realm of possibility. The Soviet Union as early as 1955 proposed the cessation of nuclear tests and came out for the establishment of an international commission to control the agreement on the cessation of tests. In June 1957, in the London negotiations, the Soviet Union was the first to come out with the idea for the establishment of control posts to observe the cessation of tests. It proposed that stations of this kind should be distributed over the territories of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Pacific area in general.

If anyone still has any misgivings or doubts on the practicability of control over the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, then now, after the completion of the proceedings of the Geneva Conference of Experts from the West and East, one may state with confidence that the false and utterly unscientific myth of the impossibility for the establishment of control over these measures -- circulated by certain circles in the West which are not interested in the cessation of tests -- has been annihilated.

The experts of eight countries who met in Geneva reached the unanimous conclusion that any nuclear explosion can be detected and that effective control over the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons is entirely within the realm of possibility. The report of the expert says that "it is technically feasible to establish ... a workable and effective control system to detect the violations of an agreement on the world-wide suspension of nuclear weapons tests." (A/3897, Annex VII, page 1).

The report also noted that "whatever the precautionary measures adopted by a violator he could not be guaranteed against exposure ..." (ibid, page 6).

The report of the experts, as is well known called for the establishment of 160 to 170 land control posts, suitably equipped. Moreover, control posts should be set up on the open seas, on ten suitable ships. The conclusions of the Conference of Experts fully confirm the validity of the point of view which has been consistently advocated by the Soviet Union to the effect that control over the testing of nuclear weapons is completely possible and is not so very complicated after all. The Soviet Government has thoroughly examined the proceedings of the
Conference of Experts at Geneva, and deems it essential to announce that it agrees with all the conclusions and recommendations concerning the system of control over a complete cessation of nuclear tests, as contained in the report of the experts. We agree to them. It is now up to the Western Powers and not up to the Soviet Union. So far as I know, neither the United States or the United Kingdom has declared that they fully endorse all the conclusions and recommendations of the Conference of Experts.

Sharing as it does the ardent desire of the peoples of the world that the test explosions of nuclear weapons should be stopped, not in words but in deeds, the Soviet Union has bent every effort to open the door practically to the concurrent and simultaneous cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Toward the end of March of this year the Soviet Government, as is well known, took a decision unilaterally to stop the testing of all types of atomic and nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government appeals to the United States and the United Kingdom to follow suit so that the testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs should be stopped everywhere and for all time.

The wide support throughout the world for the decision of the Soviet Government unilaterally to stop nuclear tests explosions is eloquently confirmed by the fact that the Governments of States with an aggregate population of almost two-thirds of the population of the globe announced their approval of the actions of the Soviet Union. The initiative of the Soviet Union commanded attention and support from the representatives of all strata of the population from all corners of the globe.

How did the Governments of the Western Powers respond to this peace-loving step of the Soviet Government? The United States responded to this generous initiative of the Soviet Union by a grandiose series of nuclear tests in the Pacific. Within the last period the United States alone, carried out about two score test explosions of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom likewise proceeded to a series of tests of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. Thus the date of 31 October proposed by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the beginning of the negotiations and as the starting date for a one-year cessation of nuclear test explosions was especially chosen in order to enable the United States and the United Kingdom to carry out a new series of nuclear tests in the state of
Nevada and in the Pacific Ocean. In its note of 22 August the British Government stated openly that it was beginning a series of tests at the present time. In acting thus the United States and the United Kingdom have demonstrated that they prefer the continuation of the nuclear arms race and seek to utilize the unilateral cessation of tests by the Soviet Union for their own military advantage and for their own military interest.

In the circumstances the Soviet Union obviously was unable to disregard the urgent and legitimate interests of the security of the Soviet State. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita Sergeivitch Khrushchev, answering questions asked by a Pravda correspondent, stated on 30 August 1958 in this connexion that the Soviet Union, "is of course unable to accept that as a result of such actions by the Western Powers, the interests of the security of the Soviet State should be impaired".

Recalling the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 31 March which stated that in the event other Powers possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons should continue to test such weapons, and that in that event the Government of the USSR should be free to act in the question of carrying out of tests of nuclear and hydrogen weapons with the interests of the security of the Soviet Union in mind or with due account for this interest of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev declared "the actions of the United States and of the United Kingdom which run athwart the will of the peoples, relieve the Soviet Union of the obligation which it unilaterally assumed, counting on the good will of the Governments of the Western Powers on the question of the immediate and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons".

That is why the Soviet Union, some days ago, resumed its tests in the interests of the security of the Soviet Union. It was compelled to do so by the United States and by the United Kingdom which continued their tests of nuclear weapons. As announced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Union, in determining the time-limit for the cessation of its tests cannot fail to take into account the interests of its security. With this in mind and likewise from the point of view of parity with other countries which possess nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has all grounds to stop its tests only when it will have carried out an equal number as were carried out by the United States and
the United Kingdom together as allies, after cessation by the Soviet Union of its tests of nuclear weapons on 31 March of this year. It goes without saying that we know that before 31 March the United States carried out a substantially larger number of tests than the Soviet Union.

Today the Press published a report that the United States has carried out 140 nuclear tests, and the United Kingdom has carried out 21 nuclear test explosions. In other words the United States and the United Kingdom together have carried out 161 nuclear test explosions whereas the Soviet Union, to judge by reports in the American Press, has carried about 60. Consequently, in the period preceding 31 March the Soviet Union was already in a position of inequality with the United States.
There are quite a few sober and intelligent people in the United States who are alarmed by the attitude of the Government of the United States on this question. Characteristic in this respect is the statement of a member of the House of Representatives of the United States, Mr. Holifield, who noted that:

"the proposal of Mr. Eisenhower on 22 August on the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons casts doubt on the sincerity of the intentions of the United States Government and is a tragic continuation of the fruitless and unsuccessful Dulles policy which has been incapable of demonstrating to world public opinion any sincerity on our part of the quest for peace."

In this connexion, the negative attitude of the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom here in this Committee on the question of priority for the matter of the cessation of tests is likewise indicative, as is the attitude of the ruling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom on the proposal of the Soviet Union to hold a conference at Geneva on a foreign ministers' level, a proposal which was made in the interests of the rapid signature of an agreement on the cessation of tests.

Since the United States and the United Kingdom continue under various pretexts to sidestep an immediate and unconditional cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons, it is essential and imperative for the General Assembly to consider this important question and exert its powerful impact on the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, because on them and on them alone now depends the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons. If the General Assembly should succeed in so doing, then we suppose that nuclear testing can be stopped by all States and for all time.

Intent on achieving agreement on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests as rapidly as possible, the Soviet Government has agreed to begin negotiations on this question on 31 October with the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. We are coming to these negotiations with a clear and forthright programme. As stated by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita Sergei Khrushchev, in answer to a question of a correspondent of Pravda concerning the cessation of the testing of these weapons,

"Negotiations must have the purpose of concluding an agreement for the cessation of the testing of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons by all States for all time. Only in that event will the negotiations answer the interests of the peoples and not be used as a screen to cover up an unwillingness to search for and find agreement."
Nevertheless, having in mind the Geneva conferences and if the United States and the United Kingdom accept an immediate cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons for all time, we are prepared to stop our tests as well. It goes without saying that the full onus of responsibility for the situation that has arisen is borne by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom which have rejected the proposal of the Soviet Union for an immediate cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons and which have answered unilateral cessation of tests by the Soviet Union with an unprecedentedly intensive and powerful series of tests of nuclear weapons.

As for the situation which obtains on this question now, we must say that the positions of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons, as set out in the statements of the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, and the statement of the British Government of 22 August, are in effect negative. The statements of these Powers hedge in the cessation of tests with conditions and reservations which reduce to naught their announced readiness to stop the tests.

Previously, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom linked the question of the cessation of tests of nuclear weapons with an effective system of control. Now, when the positive outcome of the Geneva Conference of Experts has eliminated this argument, they have shifted into the foreground the condition of the achievement of agreement on other disarmament measures as a prerequisite even though it is well known that it has been impossible to reach agreement on those questions owing precisely to the position of the Western Powers, which have frustrated any agreement on questions of disarmament. Mr. Lodge's speech this morning fully confirms that this is in fact the position of the United States. Thus, for their part, the Western Powers are doing everything in their power in order to barricade and block the way to agreement on the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons.

One might have thought that now that the experts had proved that effective control over the cessation of tests was entirely possible and practically feasible, there would be no further grounds for procrastination and the United States would immediately announce the unconditional cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons. But, as we see, the United States prefers to act and to move in the reverse direction.
The Soviet delegation has submitted to the First Committee a draft resolution for the immediate cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which has now been distributed in document A/C.1/L.205, as the Chairman has announced. This draft resolution:

"Calls upon all States carrying out atomic and hydrogen weapons tests immediately to halt such tests,

"Recommends that States possessing nuclear weapons should enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an appropriate agreement between them."

The draft resolution would have the Assembly express its will clearly and forthrightly for the immediate cessation of all tests. This would meet the universal clamour of the peoples of all countries.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that this proposal, which is in keeping with the interests of all States, will have the approval and support of all States Members of the United Nations. We are profoundly convinced that approval by the General Assembly of the draft resolution on the cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons would have far-reaching and favourable implications and consequences with regard to making the whole international atmosphere safer and sounder and, moreover, would clear the way for the solution of a host of other important international problems.

As regards other items in the field of disarmament on the agenda of our Committee, the Soviet delegation will take the opportunity to speak on them in due course.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I recognize the representative of the United States, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.
Mr. LODGE (United States of America): I wish to take just a moment under the right of reply. Mr. Zorin has given you words about the United States position; I should like to give you some facts. The United States position on suspension of nuclear weapons tests is not conditional on the existence of an entire disarmament plan. I say it is not conditional. We will suspend for one year, without controls, unless the Soviet Union continues testing during that period. And we are ready to extend our suspension indefinitely as long as each year we know that the inspection system is working and we are making reasonable progress on other aspects of disarmament.

Furthermore, we are in favour of comprehensive disarmament. It is the fact that the Soviet Union has always prevented an agreement on this which has impelled us to go ahead on test suspension as something which may be possible of attainment. But we shall continue to work for comprehensive disarmament. In one breath, Mr. Zorin criticizes us for not being in favour of a comprehensive plan; in the next breath, he criticizes us for not being in favour of going ahead on an individual basis. No matter what we do, we are wrong, according to Mr. Zorin.

Our policy has evolved, as anyone knows who can remember last year. Mr. Zorin would have you believe that it has not evolved.

Future historians may be able to explain why the Soviet Union, in this year of 1958, thought it worthwhile to make these flagrant and obvious distortions of United States policy, even including the imputing to us of unworthy motives in this Committee, which contains many of the most sophisticated and the most experienced men in the world in the field of diplomacy and of world politics. Surely he cannot hope to delude the members of this Committee. Maybe his hope is that bits and pieces of these distortions will find their way into the world press and will influence the public. But here, too, he underestimates the public and its knowledge of what the truth really is.

Mr. Zorin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I am grateful to the Chairman for calling on me. I shall not use the right of reply in order to engage in any altercation with Mr. Lodge. However, his last observation, to the effect that all those present here will have an
opportunity of scrutinizing the positions of both States by reading the verbatim record, is one observation which I accept wholeheartedly. I think that the verbatim record will make it abundantly clear that the United States will agree to suspend tests for only one year in order to prepare the next series of tests. As for a cessation of tests for good, they will not agree to that without conditions. This will be manifest from the verbatim record of Mr. Lodge's last speech.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We have some speakers on the list for Monday and Tuesday of next week, but we have no one on the list for this afternoon. I should like to appeal to members of the Committee to put their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible, so that we can get ahead with our work rapidly.

The meeting rose at 12:55 p.m.