Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 13 November 1974, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:                             Mr. NEUGEBAUER (German Democratic Republic)
                                  (Vice-Chairman)

later:                                  Mr. ORTIZ de KOZAS (Argentina)
                                      (Chairman)

Rapporteur:                             Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the
  Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus
  saved to provide assistance to developing countries /24/ (continued)

  (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds
      Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;

  (b) Report of the Secretary-General

- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use:
  report of the Secretary-General /27/ (continued)

- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the
  Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /28/ (continued)

- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and
  conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban:
  report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /29/ (continued)/...

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CORRECTIONS WILL BE 19 NOVEMBER 1974.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit
would be greatly appreciated.

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- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)

- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)

- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)

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(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS;

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE;

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9725)

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9708)


WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/9590, A/9628, A/9636)


IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2286 (XXII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF Tlatelolco) (A/9692; A/C.1/L.686)

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (A/9693 and Add.1-3)

PROHIBITION OF ACTION TO INFLUENCE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE FOR MILITARY AND OTHER PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND HEALTH (A/9702 and Corr.1; A/C.1/L.675)

DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9706)
The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the decision of the Committee, we come now to the discussion on the draft resolutions. I now call on Ambassador García Robles of Mexico to introduce a draft resolution.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): It is my honour formally to submit to the Committee the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.685, sponsored by 19 Latin American delegations -- in other words, by the 18 member States of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and an additional State which, having already signed and ratified the instrument, only needs to take advantage of the waiver provided for in Article 28 to become a member -- and I should like to begin by emphasizing the two items referred to in the preamble of the draft resolution.
First, the fact that since 1967 six resolutions have already been adopted by the Assembly in which that representative organ of the international community has ever more insistently urged the States possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- which, as is known, implies for the States doing so only three commitments which, as stated in resolution 2666 (XXV), of 7 December 1970 -- and I quote the terms of that resolution:

"are entirely in conformity with the general obligations assumed under the Charter of the United Nations, which every Member of the Organization has solemnly undertaken to fulfil in good faith, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter" (General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV)).

Those commitments are as follows:

"(a) To respect, in all its express aims and provisions, the statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

"(b) Not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies,

"(c) Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties of the Treaty" (ibid.)."

Secondly, as the Assembly has constantly maintained since 1970 -- and here I quote once again the terms of the Assembly resolution:

"for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and ... such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol" (ibid.).*

The operative part of the joint draft resolution also has basically two objectives, besides that of ensuring, as is done in operative paragraph 3, the inclusion in the agenda of the thirtieth Assembly session of a topic that would permit assessment of the implementation of the resolution to be adopted at this present session.

* The Chairman took the Chair.
The first of these two basic objectives is to enable the Assembly to record its satisfaction at the fact that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- a Protocol which, as will be recalled, came into effect for the United Kingdom and for the United States in 1969 and 1971 respectively -- has come into effect in 1974 for France and for the People's Republic of China, the Governments of which deposited their respective instruments of ratification on 22 March and 12 June last, respectively.

The second objective is again to urge the Soviet Union -- the only one of the five nuclear-weapon States which has yet to heed the appeals of the General Assembly -- appeals it has been addressing to them for six years now -- to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The sponsors of the draft resolution cannot understand the refusal of the Soviet Union to listen to the repeated appeals of the most representative body of the United Nations -- a refusal which has resulted in what appears to us to be a position of total isolation in this connexion. We find this attitude even more inexplicable and untenable when account is taken of the fact that, of the five so-called nuclear Powers to which General Assembly resolutions have been addressed, the Soviet Union is the State which has most frequently expressed its unreserved support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Nor should it be forgotten that it was precisely the Soviet Government which, through no less a person than the President of its Council of Ministers, Mr. Kosygin, solemnly proclaimed in 1965 -- as can be seen on page 3 of the document of the Disarmament Committee ENDC/167 -- its willingness to undertake not to use nuclear weapons:

"... against non-nuclear States ... which have no nuclear weapons in their territory" (ENDC/167, p. 3).
This is a requirement which, as is well known, is with which all the States Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco strictly comply.

The Soviet Government also declared itself:
"prepared to assume an obligation to respect the status of any denuclearized zones which may be established" (Ibid.),
on the sole condition that "other nuclear Powers" commit themselves to work in the same direction, a condition which has already been fully complied with, as demonstrated by operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.
The arguments adduced by the Soviet Union, whether in the Geneva Disarmament Committee or in this First Committee, in an attempt to justify its negative attitude, and those alluded to in the brief communication of 9 July 1974 sent by its Permanent Representative to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, circulated in document A/7797 of 10 October last, do not stand the test of even the most summary analysis made by an impartial observer.
I am convinced that by demonstrating this in detail, and in breadth as well, in a statement which I made at the 1889th meeting of the First Committee held on 10 November 1972 -- which can easily be referred to in the official records -- it is not necessary for me to repeat today the incontrovertible facts which I felt necessary to state at that time.

The delegations of Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Mexico trust that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.685 which I have had the honour to present, will receive, in view of the circumstances described in it and the meaning and scope of what I have tried to put forward in this statement, even more votes in favour than has occurred on earlier occasions with regard to similar draft resolutions.

Mr. KOOIJHANS (Netherlands): It is a great pleasure for me to be able to introduce, on behalf of the co-sponsors, draft resolution A/C.1/L.690. The subject of the draft resolution is the problem of horizontal and vertical proliferation and the interrelationship of peaceful nuclear explosions with such proliferation.

Before entering into greater detail, I should like to emphasize that the draft resolution is the result of a collective effort by a number of countries. The draft resolution constitutes a combination of ideas developed in the course of this year in several capitals and brought together during intense consultations here in New York and elsewhere. In this respect, I should like to mention in particular the essential role which the delegations of Japan, Canada and Sweden, among others, have played in the formulation of the draft now submitted.

It is clear that the question of non-proliferation in a broad sense is in the forefront of our thoughts this year. I only have to refer to the many items on our agenda on this subject and to the numerous statements we heard in the course of the debates. Several reasons can be indicated for this concern. The ongoing quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms race between
the main Powers cast a shadow on our efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament. The coming Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reminds us that many hopes in respect of this Treaty have not yet been fulfilled. How to deal with the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions is a new challenge we have to face. Our draft resolution must be considered as a contribution -- in the view of the sponsors an essential one -- to the policy of the prevention of vertical and horizontal proliferation.

The draft resolution deals with two closely interrelated subjects. First of all, it addresses itself to the problem of horizontal and vertical proliferation in general. Secondly, it highlights the steps to be taken on the different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions so as to counter the possible risks which such explosions can pose for the achievement of an effective system of control of nuclear weapons.

Perhaps this is the moment to comment on a remark made by the representative of India at the beginning of this week. He said that some delegations took the nuclear arms race for granted and seemed to imagine that if restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were placed, the fundamental problems of the nuclear arms race and nuclear weapon testing would be solved. Frankly, I do not know which delegations ambassador Mishra had in mind. In any case, the co-sponsors certainly do not belong to those, since they are all fully convinced that the ongoing nuclear arms race is a threat to mankind. This found its expression clearly in the text of the resolution and, inter alia, in other resolutions before this Committee.

Of course, there are many other aspects of proliferation. Some of these are dealt with in other draft resolutions under several items on our agenda. I may refer to the draft resolution on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and to the proposals on denuclearized zones. In our draft resolution we ask in particular your attention for the problems connected with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Since the text of the draft in document A/C.1/L.696 is quite self-explanatory, I shall only briefly touch on certain paragraphs.
The third preambular paragraph sets out our basic considerations. In this paragraph it is recognized that both the acceleration of the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons is extremely dangerous to mankind.

In the fifth preambular paragraph we have explicitly stated that an effective comprehensive test ban, although it deals with only one part of the problem, is an essential prerequisite to stop the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The sixth to tenth preambular paragraphs make it clear why international arrangements have to be developed for the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions. If peaceful nuclear explosions are a worthwhile goal, which we still have to find out, all people in the world have the right to benefit from these. Since it is, however, not yet proven that it is possible to differentiate between the technology for nuclear weapons and that for peaceful nuclear explosions, there is a need to devise a system that peaceful nuclear explosions cannot be misused for weapons development and nuclear armament.

The ninth preambular paragraph underlines that also in other aspects the dissemination of nuclear know-how and materials is a potential danger for mankind, as was so eloquently described by Senator Symington at the beginning of our debate this year.

The last preambular paragraph notes the view of the Secretary-General that the time is ripe to consider the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in an international context.

The operative paragraphs of the draft resolution can be divided into two parts. The first operative paragraph appeals to all States, and of course in particular to nuclear weapon States which bear a special responsibility for the security of mankind, to work hard on all possible steps to stop vertical and horizontal proliferation. This includes the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, activities in the United Nations, including the Security Council, and all other bodies where it is appropriate to tackle certain questions.
Operative paragraphs 2 to 5 deal with the different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. We think that, before the world community will be in a position to decide on the future of such explosions, certain questions must first be dealt with in the appropriate competent bodies.

First of all, in operative paragraph 2 we ask the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to continue its technical studies on many aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. Members may be aware of the excellent work the Agency has already done in this field. I might also recall the recent decision of the Board of Governors of IAEA to establish within the secretariat a separate organizational unit for services related to peaceful nuclear explosions when the number and nature of requests for peaceful nuclear explosions indicate the need for this.

Secondly, in operative paragraph 3 the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) is asked to study the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. As I pointed out at length in my statement on Friday of last week, CCD should study, inter alia, the possible risk that peaceful nuclear explosions could be used to disguise nuclear-weapon tests. Especially in the context of a test ban, such a risk would be detrimental to peace and security, and we must study carefully how this can be avoided.

In this context, I may say that I did not quite understand why the representative of Brazil thought it improper for CCD to study certain aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. In the view of the sponsors, CCD, as an arms-control and disarmament body, is the most appropriate organ to study the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Thirdly, in the draft resolution the General Assembly expresses the hope that the non-proliferation Treaty review conference will carefully consider the question of peaceful nuclear explosions.

All the above-mentioned bodies -- IAEA, CCD and the non-proliferation Treaty review conference -- are requested to report to the General Assembly at its next regular session. Thus next year all lines on the different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions will come together in our World Organization. In operative paragraph 5 the Secretary-General is invited, if he should wish to do so, to present his own views on the question, taking into account the reports submitted to the Assembly. In any case, the General Assembly at its thirtieth session will have before it reports on all the problems in this
area and, it is hoped, many suggestions for solutions, so that it can decide in all freedom what should be the next steps with regard to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. This seems to us the most clear and simple way of handling this problem.

On behalf of the sponsors, representing all regions of the world, I highly recommend this draft resolution to the Committee. I am pleased to announce that Costa Rica just become a sponsor of our draft. Of course, other sponsors would be welcomed.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): With regard to the last sentence of the representative of the Netherlands' statement indicating that new co-sponsors are welcome, I think I should mention that Finland has also been added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution (A/1117).

Mr. CLARK (Nigeria): It is a great honour and privilege for me to introduce on behalf of the sponsors namely Mr. Chairman, our great country, Argentina, Ghana, India, Liberia, Mexico, my own country Nigeria, of course, Romania, Senegal, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zaire -- the draft resolution on an item entitled "Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade" in document A/C.1/L.687 of 12 November 1974. It is a simple procedural draft resolution which calls for no additional obligation or burden to be assumed by Member States. It carries no financial implications or consequences beyond the very minimum required in routine reporting to the General Assembly on an ongoing activity. It envisages no special meetings or conferences. It is not polemical. It is not directed at or against any Power. It only aims at strengthening our acceptance of general and complete disarmament as a goal of the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, when you were kind enough to call on me to speak during the general debate on our 12 agenda items on disarmament I echoed the regret of many delegations at the folly of nations' spending human and material resources which are urgently needed for economic and social development on purposes that could only lead to mankind's own destruction, on arms they dare not use against each other. I also sought to draw attention to the moral bankruptcy of world Powers which have the responsibility under the
the Charter of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security and which at the same time amass nuclear weapons which threaten that very international peace and security.

When recalling the numerous resolutions and declarations of the United Nations aimed at promoting "the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources", two resolutions come quickly to mind. The first deals with the Development Decade; the other relates to the Disarmament Decade. The link between the two ideas, besides being enshrined in Article 26 of our Charter, was stressed by our former Secretary-General, the much respected U Thant, when he said in his introduction to his annual report on the work of the United Nations for 1963-1969 that:

"The diversion of enormous resources and energy, both human and physical, from peaceful economic and social pursuits to unproductive and uneconomic military purposes was an important factor in the failure to make greater progress in the advancement of the developing countries during the First United Nations Development Decade.

"The world now stands at a most critical crossroads. It can pursue the arms race at a terrible price to the security and progress of the peoples of the world, or it can move ahead towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, a goal that was set in 1959 by a unanimous decision of the General Assembly on the eve of the decade of the 1960s.

"If it should choose the latter road", U Thant continued, "the security, the economic well-being and the progress not only of the developing countries, but also of the developed countries and of the entire world, would be tremendously enhanced." (A/7601/Add.1, paras. 40-41)
Those were wise words. They were prophetic. They offered a challenge. They led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, which declared the decade of the 1970s a Disarmament Decade. That resolution is referred to in the first preambular paragraph of our draft resolution, which is before the Committee, as our frame of reference. That resolution called upon Governments to intensify their concerted efforts regarding effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date, nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Since the adoption of that resolution, we have received about five annual reports of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It was propitious that the Disarmament Decade was proclaimed at a time when the membership of the Committee was enlarged from 18 to 26 by the well-deserved addition of Argentina -- your great country, Mr. Chairman -- and Hungary, Japan, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. The reasons for that enlargement are well known. By next year, the membership of the Committee will have again risen by the timely and necessary addition of Iran, Peru, Zaire, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. In effect, each enlargement is an historic landmark in the life of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in our appreciation of its vitally important work. It will be helpful, therefore to pause, to reflect, to take stock, to plan and to assess the achievements so far attained in the field of disarmament. Mid-way through the Disarmament Decade seems to us, the sponsors of the draft resolution, to be the right and proper time to do so.

Proceeding from the reports of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament referred to in the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution to the third preambular paragraph, which emphasizes the grave dangers involved in the continuing development of new nuclear weapons through a spiralling nuclear arms race and proliferation of nuclear weapons, is not only logical but equally portentous. Every speaker in the general debate of this Committee has unfailingly remarked that technically there already exists
an explosion of nuclear activity in the world, and that the hands of the
doomsday clock must be turned back before it is too late.

The fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution is self-evident. Both developed and developing countries are haunted by the fear of nuclear warfare. They are overburdened by inflation. Rumours of recession, of mass unemployment, of great human suffering, are in the air. Indeed, when a non-productive activity of States -- I am referring to armament -- consumes more than $270,000 million annually at the same time the United Nations Food Conference is wrestling frantically with the crisis of hunger and malnutrition, a crisis threatening millions in large sectors of the globe, a crisis that can be wiped out by the reallocation of a small percentage, a mere 5 per cent, of the armaments budget, the time has come to work earnestly for a generation of peace and less and less for new generations of nuclear weapons.

I have already spoken of the link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade referred to in the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. It is our responsibility and our resolve to work continuously to bring about a substantial improvement in the lot of mankind. Thanks to the initiative of Romania, we are now more familiar with the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures as revealed in the Secretary-General's report (A/8469). There is obviously a correlation in the deliberate allotment of available resources between armament and sustained economic growth. It is no accident that the 1970s have been designated as both the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade. The strategy for the latter recognized that the success of international development activities will depend in large measure on improvement in the general international situation, particularly on concrete progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. My delegation's conviction, which is shared by others, that there is a shocking discrepancy -- a fact highlighted by the Alva Myrdal report (SE/BCA/174) -- between international expenditure on armaments and international expenditure on aid to the developing countries enabled us to support the Soviet initiative on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. I am, of course, referring to item 24 of our agenda.
The four operative paragraphs of our draft resolution need no explanation. They are clear and specific. The purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade are to secure peace and security in the world -- peace and security which, like development, are indivisible. Operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 envisaged that the United Nations and its Member States would mobilize world public opinion against the nuclear arms race by reiterating the dangers to all mankind of nuclear weapons, by stressing that general and complete disarmament would benefit present and future generations economically, socially and culturally. Needless to say, public outcries against atmospheric nuclear tests contributed more to the partial test ban Treaty than a conviction on the part of the super-Powers that the Treaty was a necessary step towards nuclear disarmament. If public opinion can be aroused in favour of both disarmament and development, we may move some way towards achievement of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade. Hence operative paragraph 2 of our draft resolution.

Operative paragraph 3 is only of a reportorial nature. Since we are all for disarmament, just as we are all for love and weight-watching, let us inform ourselves more clearly on what progress each and every one of us is making or has made in the field of disarmament.

Operative paragraph 4 must be seen in the context of the calendar of the United Nations for next year. Coming, as we do, from a developing country, the age of 70 is of immense significance to us. It is almost a lifetime. And so, as we approach the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations next year, we see the proposed mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade in the light of the projected special session of the General Assembly to be devoted to development and international economic co-operation. We see it in the light of the mid-term review of the International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade. By having on the agenda of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly an item entitled "Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade", we shall be able to focus closer attention on the twin problems of disarmament and development and thereby forge a common rubric to cover them both.

Before I end, it is my honour and great privilege to announce that Brazil has joined the sponsors of the draft resolution.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): If I venture to request to speak a second time, I am doing so because I thought the Chair would consider this request as a demonstration of co-operation to expedite the work of the Committee.

I have the honour to act on this occasion as spokesman of the 19 Latin American delegations sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.686, namely, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico.

This draft is designed to assess the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) with regard to the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

In that resolution, as will be recalled, the Assembly stated, among other things, that that Treaty -- the complete text of which, together with those of its two additional protocols, can be consulted in the First Committee's document A/C.1/946, dated 3 October 1967:

"... constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security ..." (General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII), para. 1).

That the Assembly's judgement was correct is proved by the fact, mentioned in the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, that as a result of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to which 18 sovereign States are already parties, there exists in Latin America a zone of increasing extent and population in which the total absence of nuclear weapons is enforced and which at present comprises some 8 million square kilometres with a population of approximately 150 million inhabitants.

Since the Treaty, as is stipulated in article 25, is only open to signature by the sovereign States specified therein and that within its zone of application there are certain territories which are not sovereign political entities, it was deemed necessary that an additional protocol be annexed to the basic Treaty, Additional Protocol I, to which States which de jure or de facto have international responsibility for such territories, can be parties, and which the Assembly itself, in resolution 2286 (XXII), urged:
"... to take all the measures within their power to ensure that the Treaty speedily obtains the widest possible application ..." (ibid., para. 3).

The importance of the fact that as stated in article 1 of the Protocol, "the status of denuclearization which is defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13" of the Treaty applies to the above-mentioned territories was evident from the very outset to OPANAL -- the initials by which the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is known -- as is demonstrated by the fact that its principal organ, the General Conference, has already approved, in this connexion, during the three sessions it has held since it began to function in 1969, four resolutions.

In the first of these resolutions, the Conference pointed out that:
"... it is universally believed that a nuclear weapon-free zone redounds to the benefit of the security and the economic development of States and territories within the zone, since it removes from them the threat of nuclear attacks and prevents their resources being wasted in the production of nuclear weapons."

Both in this resolution as well as in all the later ones, the Conference urged States to which the Protocol was open, to take the necessary steps to become parties to it, so that the inhabitants of the territories concerned "could receive the benefits of the ... Treaty", as was stated at the first meeting of the Conference and, as was stated at the third meeting, so that the Latin American zone:
"... might be wholly integrated and protected against the vicissitudes entailed by the presence of nuclear weapons."
Since up to the present time only two of the four States to which the Protocol is open -- United States, France, Netherlands and United Kingdom -- have heeded the appeal of that Conference, the Council of OPANAL, which is one of the principal bodies of the organization, adopted on 8 March 1974 a resolution emphasizing the desirability of having the General Assembly of the United Nations consider this question.

Pursuant to the recommendation to that effect made at that time, the 18 States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco requested that the provisional agenda of the Assembly should include an item -- which has become item 100 -- under which, as I said at the outset, I have the honour to present the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.686.

I believe that I have sufficiently explained the contents of the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution.

The first operative paragraph notes with satisfaction that the United Kingdom deposited its instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol I on 11 December 1969 and that the Netherlands did likewise on 26 July 1971.

Operative paragraph 2 urges the other two States which under the Treaty are eligible to become parties to Additional Protocol I to sign and ratify it as soon as possible so that the peoples of the territories coming within the scope of the Treaty which are not sovereign political entities may "receive the benefits derived from the Treaty", as the paragraph states.

Operative paragraph 3 is drafted in similar terms to those utilized by the Assembly in earlier years in resolutions relating to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It requests the Secretary-General to transmit the resolution, when it is approved, to the two States to which paragraph 2 is addressed and to inform the Assembly at its thirtieth session on any measures that may have been adopted by those States.

Finally, the last paragraph of the draft resolution is designed to ensure that the Assembly will have an opportunity at its next session to consider the extent of compliance with the resolution, which we are convinced will be adopted at this session.

The co-sponsors of the draft resolution trust that, as in the case of Additional Protocol II, this will be generally accepted and that the invitation
contained in it will be accepted soon by the two Powers which have not as yet signed and ratified Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That would not only redound to the benefit of the inhabitants of the territories concerned, who in this connexion should not be placed in a position of inferiority with regard to the peoples of the sovereign States of Latin America, but also imply a significant contribution towards strengthening the encouraging trend towards the establishment of more nuclear-weapon-free zones. The importance of that trend for disarmament and for peace cannot be exaggerated. We believe that is why favourable references have been made so frequently to it in the discussions of this Assembly; why, as occurred in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and in the new initiatives included in our agenda. That is why, of the representatives participating in the general debate in the First Committee those of Romania and Uruguay devoted entirely to this question the considered statements they made last week. That is also why I said in the debate in the plenary Assembly on 8 October, and repeated on 29 October in this Committee, that we should attempt to achieve a gradual broadening of the zones of the world from which nuclear weapons are prohibited to a point where the territories of Powers which possess those terrible tools of mass destruction will become "something like contaminated islets subjected to quarantine". (A/C.1/PV.2003, p. 31)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank Ambassador García Robles for having introduced the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.686. It is indeed a positive contribution towards accelerating the Committee's work and we thank him for his co-operation.

Mr. MISTRAL (France) (interpretation from French): Since the beginning of the preparatory work which led to the drafting of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America my country has made it known to those who took that initiative that we viewed with sympathy their efforts to establish a demilitarized zone on the South American continent and that we would study the possibility with regard to that zone, of entering into commitments with respect to the non-use of nuclear weapons. However, at the same time we did not attempt to conceal that for France such a commitment represented the
absolute limit to which it was prepared to go. The Treaty of Tlatelolco which was discussed among the Powers of the South American continent finally became a reality. The text of the Treaty, as it stands, did give rise to a certain number of reservations on our part, and I shall refer to them later.
These reservations caused us to hesitate a long time before signing Additional Protocol II, a decision which we were invited to take by repeated resolutions of the General Assembly.

However, setting aside a number of political and legal considerations, the French Government, motivated essentially by the desire to give the nations and peoples of South America concrete evidence of the high esteem in which it holds them and its sincere friendship towards them, agreed to sign Additional Protocol II, thereby undertaking that -- if I may quote the actual text of this diplomatic instrument --

"The statute of demilitarization of Latin America ... shall be fully respected ..." (article 1)

and

"... not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty ...". (article 3)

This undertaking became final when the constitutional formalities of ratification were concluded by France on 22 March 1974.

My delegation would very much have hoped that the States signatories of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would have been satisfied with this and would not have called upon the French Government to enter into additional commitments as laid down in Additional Protocol I of the Treaty, which consists essentially of having those States which are described as having possessions in the area

"... undertake to apply the statute of demilitarization ... as defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty ... in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are internationally responsible ...". (article 1).

This invitation did cause us some difficulties and gave rise to considerable objections, and we informed the authors of the Treaty of these difficulties and objections some time ago. I shall mention some of them. First of all, I should like to point out that Additional Protocol I imposes on the Powers which have adhered to it obligations similar to those which have been assumed by the Contracting Parties. These obligations have of course been discussed among the Parties themselves, but the countries with possessions in the area, which are
mentioned in Additional Protocol I, were not invited to take part in these
discussions; they are now being asked simply to assume these obligations. We
believe that this is by no means a proper procedure in the field of international
relations; in principle, it is not to be conceded that a group of countries can,
a priori, establish, without consulting the countries concerned, rules which they
will subsequently be invited to accept. The French Government wants to be
consulted when a study is made of provisions which affect three of its
départements. This is the case because Additional Protocol I would apply to
Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guiana.

This consideration seems to me also to be in keeping with the views of our
Committee in the area of demilitarized zones. I have listened attentively to
representatives who have explained their views on the creation of demilitarized
zones in the Middle East or South Asia, and I believe that all, without exception,
made it quite clear that the creation of such zones required prior consultations
and the agreement of all the countries concerned. This principle, which the
French Government fully endorses, is not respected here to the extent that we are
now being asked to accede to a text to which we were asked to give our approval
only after it had been finalized. Another difficulty flowed naturally from the
first difficulty: although the Treaty of Tlatelolco applies to the territories of
the Parties mentioned in Additional Protocol I, it is unequal and in actual fact
these Powers are badly treated compared with the Contracting Parties. I shall give
you three examples of this. The first relates to the coming into force of the
Additional Protocol. Article 3 provides that

"This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified
it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of
ratification."

However, under article 28 of the Treaty, the coming into force of this text for
the Contracting Parties is subject to certain suspensive conditions, among them,
the accession of all the Powers concerned to Additional Protocols I
and II annexed to the Treaty. I am quite aware that, under paragraph 2
of article 28, the signatory States have the right to waive these conditions.
I am also aware that some Latin American States have in fact waived this provision. However, all have not done so, and, in any case, the inequality remains in principle.

The second example relates to the ability to denounce the Treaty, an ability granted to the Parties under article 30 of the Treaty, while Additional Protocol I, which contains no provision to this effect, cannot in principle be denounced by a signatory State.

The third example relates to the body set up under the Treaty -- OPANAL, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America -- whose task is "to ensure respect for the obligations flowing from this Treaty". This agency is made up of the Contracting Parties, but States signing Additional Protocol I, while assuming all the obligations of the Treaty, are not invited to become members of this agency.

Another consideration which deters the French Government from signing Additional Protocol I is that it cannot agree to certain provisions of the Treaty which are not in keeping with the normally accepted concept of international law.
Here again I shall mention just one example: it relates to the zone of application of the Treaty as defined in article 4, paragraph 2. If one traces on a map of the world the lines defining the zone of application, one notes that it would include vast stretches of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The French Government cannot agree to such ideas or that a State or group of States may claim to define a special status for territories or parts of the high seas over which they have no jurisdiction.

The difficulties and obstacles I have just mentioned are not only legal in nature, they go to the very essence of the matter, which is the application to territories under French sovereignty of the status of demilitarization. That is an issue I have no wish to evade. In matters of defence, the French Government has and can only have one doctrine applying to all of its territory. That doctrine, the essential elements of which were recently recalled by the President of the Republic in terms which the Vice-President of the Senate, Mr. Taittinger, quoted in a speech he made in our Committee, implies that no distinction is drawn between the various parts of French territory and that, in particular, no part of this territory, since France is a nuclear Power, can be given a demilitarized status. In matters of defence which touch on the very fundamental principles of security and national independence, the French nation still follows a formula dating from the first Constitution of the French Republic -- one and indivisible. For the reason given, which is of itself sufficient, the French Government is not in a position to sign Additional Protocol I to the Treaty and my delegation will abstain on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.686, while we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.685 relating to Additional Protocol II.

Mr. GARCIA HOBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I do not wish to engage in any polemics with the representative of France, and I should like to consider carefully the comments he has just made and, perhaps at some later meeting, comment on them if necessary. But since this draft resolution may be voted on today I should like to refer briefly to some factual inaccuracies.
The representative of France said that there is no provision whatsoever for denunciation of the Protocol. I believe that there are. Additional Protocol I states in article 2:

"The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be applicable to it."

That is one point. The other is that it is quite correct that France did not participate as a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Denuclearization of Latin America, but we did have the honour and pleasure -- I do not recall whether it was in all of them but perhaps in the majority of the meetings held by that Preparatory Committee -- of having an observer from France present, an observer to whom all of the documents of the Preparatory Committee were transmitted at the same time as they were distributed to all of the members. When Ambassador Vimont wished to make some comments, he did so and they were immediately reproduced and circulated as documents of the Preparatory Committee. I myself was a member together with the representatives of Ecuador, Ambassador Benites, and Brazil, Ambassador Sette Camara, who are members of what was called the Negotiating Committee. In 1965 or 1966 when the General Assembly was meeting I spoke frequently with the representatives of the United States as well as those of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France. I recall that it was always said that the position of France was similar to that of the other Powers, that before assuming any responsibility with regard to the Treaty they would wish to see the text which would be approved by the Latin American republics.

Lastly, there is a third point, although this is merely a matter of appreciation since the sovereign decisions of each State are decisive. If I am not mistaken the present Secretary-General of CPAW/L, a very outstanding Uruguayan jurist, Dr. Hector Gross Espiell, recently published a study and cited some precedents of territories or portions of several metropolitan territories -- not overseas territories -- for which France had accepted not a system of military denuclearization but one of total demilitarization. Those are the only points I wish to make at this time.
Mr. MISHRA (India): I have some comments to make on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.690. If we are proceeding to a vote, then I shall withhold that comment until we have finished voting.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): At the moment we are not going to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690, so the representative of India can now make any comments he wishes. I call on him.

Mr. MISHRA (India): I did not mean that we would vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690 but on any other draft resolution. However, I shall make my comments at this stage on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690.

The representative of the Netherlands, in introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.690, referred to some remarks which I had made earlier this week. He said that he did not know which delegation I had in mind when I made those remarks, and he went on to say that the co-sponsors certainly did not belong to that category. I am indeed very glad to hear that comment.
During my statement on Monday of this week I had also said, with your permission, I should like to repeat, that:

"We should not ignore the fact that there are hardly any negotiations going on concerning nuclear disarmament -- and I emphasize 'disarmament'. Two nuclear-weapon States are engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Three nuclear-weapon States participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which for some years now has been unsuccessfully engaged in elaborating a comprehensive test ban treaty. Two nuclear-weapon States are outside CCD." (2016th meeting, pp. 23-25)

The international community has time and again stressed in its deliberations and resolutions that priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution which was introduced this afternoon by the representative of the Netherlands, for all its good intentions, will have the effect of transferring the attention of the international community to other, less important, matters such as the regulation of peaceful activities connected with nuclear technology.

We feel that to consider the question of peaceful nuclear explosions as contributing to the nuclear arms race and to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not proper. We feel that only nuclear-weapon testing has a bearing on the nuclear arms race; it is wrong to put the blame on peaceful nuclear explosions for this.

In the seventh preambular paragraph of this draft there is mention of six States having engaged in nuclear testing. A correct reflection of the facts would be that five States have carried out nuclear-weapon testing during the course of this year, while one State has exploded a peaceful nuclear device. They cannot be lumped together in the context of the nuclear arms race.

May I also quote one more passage from my statement of Monday last. I said: "Our approach to the general question of the comprehensive test ban is that there should be a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. As the partial test ban Treaty of 1963 already prohibits nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests in the underground environment will accomplish the objectives of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-weapon tests in all
environments. Therefore, the first priority should be accorded to achieving universal adherence to a régime of prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments. Only in the context of a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests could consideration be given to the possibility of concluding an agreement on the regulation of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to be signed by all States." (ibid.)

Now, in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.690, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is called upon:
"... to include a section on its consideration of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions" while "submitting its report to the thirtieth session of the ... Assembly on the elaboration of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban" (A/C.1/L.690, p. 2).

What is the effect of that paragraph, and what can the CCD achieve: a comprehensive test ban? The CCD is certainly not capable of doing that: two of the nuclear-weapon States are not even members of it. In effect, there will be no recommendation on a comprehensive test ban, but there will be a section on peaceful nuclear explosions. Perhaps that is the intention, because I notice that in the statement made by the Netherlands representative this afternoon in introducing this draft resolution there is the following paragraph:
"All the above-mentioned bodies -- IAEA, CCD and the non-proliferation Treaty review conference -- are requested to report to the General Assembly at its next regular session. Thus next year all lines on the different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions will come together in our world Organization." (supra, p. 16)

It goes on:
"In any case, the General Assembly at its thirtieth session will have before it reports on all the problems in this area and, it is hoped, many suggestions for solutions, so that it can decide in all freedom what should be the next steps with regard to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions." (ibid.)
Perhaps the General Assembly next year will consider this question again, and perhaps a resolution on the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions will be adopted. Will that prevent the testing of nuclear weapons? Will that make a contribution to stopping the nuclear arms race, much less to nuclear disarmament? The non-proliferation Treaty did not prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, precisely because it was not designed to prevent the nuclear arms race. Any regulation of peaceful nuclear explosions at this stage which is not placed in the context of universal adherence to a comprehensive test ban treaty or agreement, any such regulation will make no contribution in that direction. All it will do is detract in a significant manner and in a significant measure from the single-minded efforts needed to unify opinion against the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. This is what I meant when I said on Monday last that the nuclear arms race seems to be taken for granted, and that the efforts of some delegations are only in the direction of regulating peaceful nuclear explosions.
Mr. MISTRAL (France) (interpretation from French): I listened attentively to the indications given by the representative of Mexico and his comments with regard to some of the points in my statement. Of course I do not wish to start an argument here. This is neither the place nor the time. But with regard to three points, I should like to give some explanation.

The first concerns one of the points which I raised: namely, the ability to denounce the Treaty. I take note of the words and indications given by Mr. Garcia Robles. His interpretation, I must say, does not seem to be quite self-evident in that I believe that a priori the obligations assumed by States signing Additional Protocol I are those, and only those, stipulated in its first article, which refers to articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty, and which therefore exclude other articles as a whole. But in that connexion, opinions may be divergent.

I should also like to notify the representative of Mexico that during the preparatory work we were indeed kept abreast of the drafting of the Treaty. But it is one thing to be an observer while a diplomatic instrument is being drafted, and something quite different to participate in the negotiations. The responsibilities arising from these two different types of status cannot be compared. That is what my comments were about.

As for the third point, I admit that I did not understand very well the allusion of the representative of Mexico to different systems that might exist in different areas of French territory with regard to defence. I am not sure what he is referring to. The only example that comes to mind is that of our overseas territories in the Antarctic continent which are subject to a statute of denuclearization, because we signed the Treaty on that subject.

But I think that there it might be conceded that we are in quite a different situation. The Antarctic continent is a desert, uninhabited except by a few penguins; it is not a State peopled by citizens. It has no connexion whatsoever with what might occur in the countries of South America which fall under this denuclearization Treaty.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As no other representative has asked to speak, I should like to make two announcements. First, Peru is a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.695. Secondly, the Federal Republic of Germany has joined the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690. I did ask the Committee if it would be able to vote on the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.685 and A/C.1/L.686. At that time I heard no objections. If that still holds, we might proceed to the vote.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): We would like to request, Mr. Chairman, that you postpone the vote on the draft resolutions to which you just referred, on the denuclearized zone in Latin America; that is, on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Protocols I and II.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I might ask the representative of the Soviet Union the same question that I asked the representative of the United States yesterday, because both of them are in the Disarmament Committee. For how long must we postpone this? Perhaps the representative of the Soviet Union could give me some indication.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I can answer your question very soon, but, unfortunately, I cannot give you any specific date now. I can just assure you that the Soviet delegation will do everything within its power to be ready to vote as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Unfortunately, we find ourselves in a rather unusual situation, because we already have various draft resolutions submitted and distributed. In my view they could be put to the vote because it may be presumed that they would cause no further difficulties. But if some delegations do have difficulties, we could not, of course proceed to the vote. Thus, I must stress the fact that we are losing some time. I would have thought that we might have been able to vote on those two draft resolutions this afternoon. However, in view
of the request for postponement, rather than the objection, made by the representative of the Soviet Union, and as we have agreed to postpone the vote with regard to other drafts, we shall not in this case proceed to the vote.

I should like to ask the Committee whether perhaps tomorrow morning, if there is no problem, we might vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683. The sponsors have told me that they themselves have no difficulty in doing so.
I should like to point out, so that delegations can organize their positions in this respect, that there will be no meeting tomorrow morning but there will be one in the afternoon.

As I have said, if there are no objections -- and here again I am asking the Committee for its opinion -- we might be able to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683 tomorrow afternoon.

I believe we might also be able to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.687 which was introduced by the Nigerian delegation this afternoon, and on the draft resolution concerning the Indian Ocean contained in the Addendum to document A/9529. Members will remember that in connexion with this latter draft some delegations indicated that they would prefer the vote to be postponed. Those delegations have now told me that they will be in a position to vote if the Committee decides to vote tomorrow.

I think that the Committee can agree to vote on these three drafts tomorrow, while continuing consideration of the draft resolutions which have been submitted and hearing the various comments on them, in the same way as we have done today. When we have come to the end of the list of speakers we can vote on the three draft resolutions I have mentioned.

It would also be very desirable if at our meeting on Friday morning, which is the only one the Committee will have, we could vote on the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.685 and A/C.1/L.686, which the Soviet delegation has just requested should be postponed. Also -- and I am still consulting the Committee -- perhaps the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.684 and A/C.1/L.688 could be introduced and discussed, and if we receive the reply which has been promised by the representative of the United States for today then we might also be able to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675.

In this respect I am in the hands of the representatives. I do not want to hurry our proceedings unduly and I wish to give all delegations an opportunity to study the drafts and consult their Governments, but it is my duty and responsibility to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that time is passing and on Friday we must conclude our consideration of and voting on the draft resolutions concerning disarmament and vote on them.
Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): The Swedish delegation would certainly be ready to go along with most of what you have just suggested to us, Mr. Chairman, in relation to our discussion and voting on the draft resolutions. We have just one difficulty which I should like to submit to you and this relates to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675. The fact is that there are a number of delegations which are involved in consultations on the text of this draft resolution, and it is my feeling that we shall require a day or two to finish those consultations. I would, then, very respectfully ask you if it would be at all possible to postpone the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675 until early next week.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The view of the representative of Sweden coincides with the others I have heard. We shall therefore postpone consideration of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675 until next week. I should like to ask delegations which are carrying out consultations to indicate when they will be ready to proceed to the vote because the co-sponsors of the draft are ready for this to be voted on at any time.

Are there any further comments on the programme which I have just put before the Committee?

As there appear to be none, I take it that the Committee will be ready tomorrow afternoon to vote on the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.683, A/C.1/L.687 and the Addendum to document A/9629.

We shall begin our meeting tomorrow afternoon by listening to all the delegations which wish to refer to the various draft resolutions, whether the ones to be voted on that afternoon or others which have been submitted.

I should like now to refer to a matter which I want to put to the Committee for its consideration. In 1969 the First Committee reached an understanding, which was ratified by the General Assembly, on the advisability of updating every five years the publication entitled "The United Nations and Disarmament".
Five years have elapsed, and I should like to read an estimate of the publication costs and machinery so that the delegations can study and consider these and subsequently, perhaps next week, it may be possible to reach a decision on this matter.

As I shall read this document, my words will, of course, be reproduced in full in the record of this meeting. Thus delegations will have an opportunity not only of hearing what I am saying but also of studying it subsequently.

The Committee may feel it advisable to study two possibilities with regard to updating the publication entitled "The United Nations and Disarmament". The first would include printing and publishing 200 pages as a five-year supplement to the present document. The second would entail printing and publishing a new volume of more than 700 pages which would cover the years 1945 to 1975 and would include new material equivalent to the 200 pages of the supplement referred to above. As in 1970, the publication would be printed in English, French, Russian and Spanish.

The Secretary-General informs me that the respective costs of these proposals would be as follows. As regards the single supplement -- that is, the 200-page addition: $US 30,000 for printing and $US 12,000 for external contractual translation making a total of $US 42,000. If a new edition were published -- that is, the 700 pages to which I referred, the costs would be $US 102,000 for printing and $US 24,000 for external contractual translation, making a total of $US 126,000.
Those estimates of printing costs based on current costs in New York -- or in Moscow in the case of the Russian edition -- for the printing of the following numbers of copies for official distribution: Spanish, 450; French, 850; English, 2,500; Russian, 400. The number of copies for sale would be as follows: Spanish, 800; French, 500; English, 3,000; Russian, none. The respective totals would be as follows: Spanish, 1,250; French, 1,350; English, 5,500; Russian, 400.

In this connexion, the Secretary-General wishes to indicate that the following quantities of the 1970 edition still remain: Spanish, 250; French, 600; English, 2,600; Russian, 100.

In the estimated translation costs, which include typing account is taken of the fact that a large part of the documentation has already been translated. At present it is impossible to estimate accurately how far the work of translation could be paid for out of existing resources. Therefore the estimates I have given should be considered rough averages; in view of the heavy workload of the regular staff the translation would be carried out by contract.

If the document is also published in Arabic and Chinese, the costs would increase as follows. For the 200-page supplement, printing costs would increase by $6,000 and the contractual translation costs by $8,000 -- a total of $14,000. With regard to the 700-page edition, printing costs would increase by $20,500 and translation costs by $28,000 -- a total of $48,500. The estimated number of copies needed would be 500 in Arabic and 200 in Chinese for official distribution, and 250 in Arabic and 100 in Chinese for sale.

I have brought that information to the attention of the Committee so that delegations may study it. It will appear in the verbatim records tomorrow. Next week I shall draw the attention of representatives to this point, so that we may come to an understanding similar to that adopted in 1969.

I wish to announce that the delegation of Upper Volta has joined the sponsors of the draft resolution on the question of Korea in document A/C.1/L.677.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.