Twenty-ninth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE
PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND FOURTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 8 November 1974, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)
Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries [24] (continued)
  (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
  (b) Report of the Secretary-General
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General [27] (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [28] (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [29] (continued)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches in the other languages. The final text will be distributed as soon as possible.

Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be sent in quadruplicate within three working days to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, Department of Conference Services, Room LX-2332, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

As this record was distributed on 11 November 1974, the time-limit for corrections will be 14 November 1974.

The cooperation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3089 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary General /30/ (continued)

- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)

- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)

- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)

- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /101/ (continued)

- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health /102/ (continued)

- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia /107/ (continued)

- Programme of work
AGENDA ITEMS 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 100, 101, 103 and 107 (continued)


(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS:

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9726)

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9708)

URGENT NEED FOR CESSION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS AND CONCLUSION OF A TREATY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9593, A/9650, A/9698, A/9708)


WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/9590, A/9628, A/9636)

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9698, A/9708)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2286 (XXIII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLAITLELCO) (A/9692)

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (A/9693 and Add.1-3)
PROHIBITION OF ACTION TO INFLUENCE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE FOR MILITARY AND OTHER PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND HEALTH (A/9702 and Corr. 1; A/C.1/L.675)

DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9706)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before calling on the first speaker for the afternoon, I should like to express my warmest gratitude to the delegations of Mauritania, Democratic Yemen, Ireland, Tunisia and Liberia which, in my absence yesterday afternoon and this morning, were so gracious as to address congratulations to me on my election as Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. KOOLJMAANS (Netherlands): When looking back on 1974, I regret to say that we cannot consider it a propitious year for the cause of arms control and disarmament.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva did not succeed in reaching agreement on any new measures, in particular in the fields where it concentrated its efforts, namely, a comprehensive test ban and chemical disarmament. No substantive SALT agreement was concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States. The development and deployment of new strategic weapons continued. In particular, the testing of nuclear devices by an unprecedented number of six countries demonstrated that the problems of vertical and horizontal proliferation have not been brought under control.

We can understand, therefore, why the hands of the clock on the cover page of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists were moved forward this year, nearer to doomsday.

Of course, there have also been some positive developments. Two nuclear weapon States ratified Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. France finished its present series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, a decision, we hope, that will become permanent. The Soviet Union and the United States concluded a treaty on the future cessation of underground testing of high-yield nuclear weapons. Several Western European countries completed their parliamentary procedures for the ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty. Nuclear export regulations to strengthen non-proliferation policies were adopted by a number of industrial countries.
On the whole, however, the balance sheet of 1974 shows a negative result; it is the responsibility of all of us to try to stop the doomsday clock and turn it back again in 1975.

In this respect we look forward to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to be held in May next year. In our view, this Conference should strive to strengthen the policy of non-proliferation in a broad sense. It is satisfying to note that the Preparatory Committee, which was created last year, is doing its work in a constructive manner.

I do not need to elaborate here on the reasons why a policy of non-proliferation is of vital importance for the whole of mankind. I refer to a policy of non-proliferation in a broad sense because we should keep in mind that there are a number of possible measures that can promote the goal of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Non-proliferation Treaty is one of those measures.
Although we realize that the Treaty is not perfect, my Government attaches singular importance to it as it is the best universal instrument for breaking the circle of mistrust which impels Governments to contemplate the option of nuclear armament. It is clear that the non-proliferation Treaty can fully meet its purpose only if it is adhered to by the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States that are capable of developing nuclear explosive devices. My Government would therefore like to appeal to all non-nuclear-weapon States to accept the Treaty as it stands. Ratification of the Treaty by a number of important countries would deprive others of some of the arguments for delaying ratification. At the same time, it is an essential prerequisite for a fruitful review conference.

In this context I might mention that the Netherlands Parliament concluded its procedures for approval of the non-proliferation Treaty and the related safeguards agreements with practically no opposition. We hope to ratify soon.

Next year the review conference will explore what might be done in order to strengthen the purposes of the Treaty. One of the matters it might discuss is how the safeguards provisions of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty could best be put into practice. That paragraph relates to nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon States. As members of the Committee know, a number of industrial countries, including the Netherlands, have already adopted such export regulations on the basis of a common understanding; but a more universal acceptance could be a worthwhile goal for the conference and the regulations could perhaps be improved. We are also of the opinion that the conference should look carefully into the problem of the physical protection of nuclear materials and other measures for avoiding the danger of individuals and subnational groups manufacturing nuclear explosive devices. I understand that the International Atomic Energy Agency plans to become more active in this field in the future, and I appreciate that. In this connexion, the influence of the structure of the fuel cycle on the physical protection problem has to be taken into account.
One issue that will no doubt receive a great deal of attention during the review conference is the problem of nuclear explosions for non-military purposes. We would be beating about the bush if we did not mention the reason for the present keen interest in this problem -- it is because the explosion of a nuclear device by India on 13 May of this year has raised fundamental questions about the future of the policy of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Netherlands Government welcomes the repeated assurances given by the Indian Government that India has no intention of becoming a nuclear-weapon State and that it remains committed to a policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. However, those assurances cannot take away my Government's anxiety about the possible consequences of the step taken by India.

This fear is based on the fact that the technology for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes cannot be distinguished from the technology for the manufacture of nuclear weapons; therefore my Government has always thought it a correct feature of the non-proliferation Treaty that its basic provisions apply equally to nuclear weapons and to other nuclear explosive devices.

I know that the Indian Government and certain other Governments consider this to be an unacceptable restriction of their national sovereignty. But I want to emphasize that in the present state of the world certain sacrifices of sovereign rights are necessary for the greater cause of global peace and security. Moreover, the basic system of the non-proliferation Treaty does not imply that non-nuclear-weapon countries have to forgo the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

My Government remains of the opinion that, in so far as nuclear explosions are really needed for peaceful purposes in non-nuclear-weapon countries such explosions should be carried out for them by the existing nuclear-weapon States, through an appropriate international body -- the International Atomic Energy Agency. I say, "in so far as", because up to now peaceful nuclear experiments carried out in the United States and the Soviet Union have proved to be of very limited usefulness.
The well-known Soviet scholar, Professor Emelyanov, contributed an article on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions to a recent study of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on nuclear proliferation problems. As he sees it, the advantages of using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes lie chiefly in saving labour. He also believes, however, that the danger of subsequent radio-active contamination of the environment is very real and that the problem of designing a "clean" explosive device has not yet been solved. He came to the conclusion that at present peaceful nuclear explosions are advisable for only exceptionally urgent problems which could not otherwise be solved.

Although I am sceptical about the practical usefulness of peaceful nuclear explosions at the present time, I think it important that it be made clear that the non-proliferation Treaty does not prohibit non-nuclear-weapon States' obtaining the benefits of the technique. In this connexion, we welcome the activities undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for this purpose over the past few years. Several Agency studies have been made on different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions and on the role that the Agency could play in this field. It is evident that IAEA could facilitate the exchange of information on the possibilities of the application of peaceful nuclear explosions, make feasibility studies and act as a clearing-house for requests from member States for peaceful nuclear explosions. An important task for the Agency would be to ascertain that no essential information on the nuclear devices made available by nuclear-weapon States would be transmitted to others, and the Agency's Board of Governors has already approved guidelines on this question. Recently the Board authorized the Director-General to establish, within the secretariat of the Agency, a separate organizational unit for services related to peaceful nuclear explosions when the number and nature of requests for such explosions indicated the need to do so. The IAEA has proved to be fully competent in handling these aspects of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. In our opinion, services for such explosions should be given on a non-discriminatory basis and should, as far as possible, be the same for non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States alike.
There are also other aspects to the problem, and I propose to come back to them when speaking about the question of a comprehensive test ban.

In referring to the conference to review the non-proliferation Treaty I have already remarked that that Treaty is one of a number of possible measures that could promote the goal of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Among those measures we find also the possibility of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. I do not see that as an alternative to the non-proliferation Treaty but rather as a complementary measure that could strengthen the policy of non-proliferation in certain regions. There is one such zone in existence in Latin America, according to a formal Treaty, while others have been proposed for different regions. Two specific proposals are on our agenda: a proposal by Egypt and Iran for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and one by Pakistan for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.
I shall not go deeply into those proposals, since they are primarily a matter for consideration by the States of the regions concerned. In principle, the Netherlands Government takes a positive attitude to the establishment of such zones, provided certain conditions are met. These conditions are, first, that the initiative should come from within the region itself; secondly, that the initiative should be sufficiently supported by the States in the region, and at any rate by all militarily important States among them, so that the zone can become a viable entity; and thirdly, that the arrangements for establishing the zone should provide for adequate verification. Under such conditions, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone can dispel mutual distrust and serve the goal of peace.

I realize that in certain regions it may be difficult to assemble all the potential parties to the establishment of such a zone around the negotiating table. In such cases, as a preliminary step, the Secretary-General could perhaps be invited to lend his good offices in exploring the feelings of the States in the region regarding the proposal concerned.

When speaking of measures that can promote the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we cannot ignore the interrelation between horizontal and vertical proliferation. In the long run, it will probably prove impossible to avert the danger of horizontal proliferation, if the build-up of the nuclear arsenals of the existing nuclear-weapon States is not brought to a halt. And of course a mere halt to the nuclear arms race would not be enough for the sake of ensuring peace and security in the world: steps towards a real reduction of those arsenals will have to follow, in order to pave the way to eventual progress towards general and complete disarmament.

For that reason, we take an intense interest in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. We regret that no substantial SALT agreements could be concluded this year. We earnestly hope that the high-level consultations held recently in Moscow have contributed to narrowing the gap between the positions of the two parties and that it will prove possible next year to achieve important agreements for the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. We appeal to both Powers to do their utmost to withstand internal pressures for the acquisition of more and more sophisticated
weapons and to try to force down the spiral of nuclear armament. I trust that both Governments are aware of the decisive impact of their behaviour on the willingness of other States to accept restrictions on their military potential.

In this context, I should like to say something about the question of a comprehensive test ban. We noted with interest the conclusion of a Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on the cessation of high-yield nuclear-weapon tests after 31 March 1976. For the first time in more than 10 years some movement can be seen in the position of the two Powers on the question of banning underground weapon tests. We are happy with the provision that each party shall limit the number of its underground nuclear-weapon tests to a minimum. A commendable aspect of the Treaty is the scientific co-operation and the exchange of seismic and other data as set out in the annexed Protocol.

Nevertheless, this Treaty did not come up to our expectations. We would have preferred a more comprehensive solution and we would have preferred a treaty coming into force at an earlier date. Also, we do not think that the height of the threshold bears much relation to present identification capabilities by national means. In our view, the Treaty forms an insufficient step towards real arms control; we sincerely hope that the two parties will live up to their promise to continue negotiations with a view to achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear-weapon tests.

A special feature of the threshold test-ban Treaty is that it does not extend to nuclear explosions carried out for peaceful purposes. We are highly interested in the agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions that, according to article III of the Treaty, will be negotiated and concluded at the earliest possible time. I still hope that such an agreement will be able to rule out peaceful nuclear explosions above the threshold provided for nuclear weapon tests.

If the agreement does permit peaceful nuclear explosions above the threshold, it will have to provide for arrangements in order to verify that no weapon testing is taking place under the guise of peaceful nuclear explosions.
The United States representative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has emphasized that the same kind of arrangement would not suffice for the problem posed by the development of nuclear explosive capability by a non-nuclear-weapon State.

He argued that it is impossible for a non-nuclear-weapon State to develop a capability to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without acquiring a device which could be used as a nuclear weapon.

We believe that the point made by the United States representative is a valid one. At the same time, the verification problem concerning peaceful nuclear explosions by nuclear-weapon States raises the question of whether a comprehensive test ban, which we all hope for, should or should not provide for exceptions to be made for tests for peaceful purposes. Eventually the answer to this question will depend both on the possibilities for adequate verification and on the practical usefulness of peaceful nuclear explosions. If, on the one hand, there remained a serious risk of creating a loop-hole for the continuation of the nuclear arms race and if, on the other hand, the economic benefits of peaceful explosions appeared very doubtful, it might be better to forgo those benefits completely and to agree on a comprehensive test ban without exceptions.

Anyway, the problems connected with the conducting of peaceful nuclear explosions both by non-nuclear-weapon States and by nuclear-weapon States deserve serious consideration. Therefore, we would like, in addition to the necessarily limited activities of IAEA, a study by CCD of the implications of peaceful nuclear explosions with respect to weapons development and to nuclear armament. In past months my Government has given serious thought to ways and means for constructive international action in this field. As a consequence thereof, the Netherlands delegation is now actively engaged in extensive consultations with a view to presenting a resolution together with other countries.

I turn now to the problem of banning chemical weapons, to which CCD has devoted so much of its time without, however, being able to make substantial progress. A major contribution to the discussions was made by Japan which introduced a draft convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Also quite fruitful deliberations took place during informal CCD meetings with experts, giving a clearer insight into the many complicated problems which have to be taken into account in connexion with the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the meantime the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States announced in Moscow a joint initiative in the CCD with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare. We deem it necessary that this joint initiative will find its shape in the months ahead and that concrete proposals will be before the CCD when it reconvenes next spring. We for our part are ready to contribute to arriving at positive results, be it as a first step, of the negotiations which have already taken five years' time.
A new item that is coming to the fore is the question of geophysical warfare or, in the lengthy terms of the Soviet proposal, "action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health". As any kind of warfare seems to be incompatible with human well-being and health, I would say that the latter words are somewhat redundant, unless a prohibition as proposed by the Soviet Union would cover all means of influencing the environment that could be detrimental to mankind, applied also in time of peace. Because the Soviet proposal makes an explicit reservation for activities in this field for peaceful purposes, and taking into account other elements of the Soviet draft resolution and draft convention, I assume that this is not the case and that we are indeed speaking about geophysical warfare, or perhaps about all activities in this field for hostile purposes.

What is meant by geophysical warfare is still not very clear to my delegation. In this connexion, article II of the Soviet draft convention presents a list of possible ways of influencing the environment, of which some do not seem to be feasible or effective. I might refer, for example, to the stimulation of seismic waves or, to quote Ambassador Malik, melting the icecaps of the Arctic and the Antarctic. The representative of the Soviet Union indicated himself that certain methods mentioned in the press seem to be absolutely incredible and fantastic, but he asserted that there exist real possibilities of putting some of these into practice. I have no arguments to deny this, but it is for us still quite difficult to define what geophysical warfare is all about.

For that reason we would prefer, instead of requesting the CCD to elaborate a convention prohibiting geophysical warfare, to start with a kind of mapping expedition -- for instance, a request to the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of consultant experts, a study on potential action to influence the environment and climate for hostile purposes. A study such as this could then serve as a basis for negotiations to bring about effective measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes. If, on the other hand, it is the
general preference of this Committee that we should refer this issue directly to the CCD, then I hope that a resolution will be couched in such terms as to make it clear that the CCD will need some time to explore the subject.

A study by the Secretary-General or exploratory talks in the CCD seem needed also to mark the dividing line between geophysical warfare in the proper sense and any other kind of action undertaken outside a warlike context that would be detrimental to the human environment or, while being advantageous in one way or another to one country, could have a negative impact on the environmental conditions of others. In practical terms, it seems necessary to reach a division of labour between the CCD and the United Nations Environment Programme.

It seems also that another aspect of the matter has to be taken into account. The principal aim of the draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union is to create a legal obligation not to use any means of influencing the environment, among other things for military purposes.

We have to bear in mind that in itself any restriction or prohibition of the use of certain means or methods of combat comes within the purview of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. The reaffirmation and development of this body of law is now being studied by the Diplomatic Conference which held its first session at Geneva in February and March of this year. During that session Committee III of the Diplomatic Conference already discussed a draft provision submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, reading as follows:

"The employment of means of combat, and any methods which strike or affect indiscriminately the civilian population and combatants, or civilian objects and military objectives, are prohibited."

It is clear that the use of environmental methods of warfare, as defined in the Soviet draft convention, would necessarily come under the use of indiscriminate methods prohibited by the provision I have just mentioned. So, in our view, it will be important to give due attention also to the relationship between the work of the Committee on Disarmament and that of the Diplomatic Conference on humanitarian law.
In concluding my remarks on the Soviet initiative I should like to say that, although I have raised some questions, because we are not familiar with the subject matter, our basic approach to this initiative is a positive one. As is rightly stated in the second preambular paragraph of the Soviet draft resolution, under conditions of continuous scientific and technological progress new possibilities arise for using the results of this progress not only for peaceful but also for military purposes. When it comes to modifying the environment, including the weather and climate, the utmost care has to be taken, and hostile activities in this field should be considered as an abuse of man's abilities to reign over the earth.

The question of geophysical warfare was first tackled on a bilateral basis between the Soviet Union and the United States. In view of its relevance for the whole of mankind it is appropriate that it has been introduced into the forum of the United Nations, to be submitted to the CCD for further consideration on a multilateral basis. This leads me to a plea for maintaining the credibility of the CCD as a viable negotiating body. It strikes me that two remarkable steps in the field of disarmament -- the threshold test ban and the agreement in principle on how to make progress with regard to chemical weapons -- have been taken outside the CCD, although both issues are highly placed on the agenda of that body. I do not wish to deny the fruitfulness of high-level diplomacy on a bilateral basis, but one wonders why, especially on the test-ban issue, the CCD has been bypassed by its very founders and co-Chairmen. For the past three years the record of the CCD has shown no positive results. I should like to urge all its members, in order to maintain the credibility of the CCD, to pursue within the CCD active negotiations on the problems that are on its agenda.

The General Assembly will be invited to endorse the agreement reached by the co-Chairmen and the other members of the CCD to enlarge that Conference by the additional membership of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire. We are confident that the accession of these new members will inject fresh blood into that body and will enhance its status as the outstanding forum for international disarmament negotiations.
There are no less than 12 items on the agenda of this Committee for its discussions on disarmament. It is not my intention to speak about each of them. If the need arises the Netherlands delegation will explain its views on matters which I have not dealt with in my statement today. I have concentrated on those issues that are foremost in our minds, in particular those related to a policy of nuclear non-proliferation in a broad sense. I wish to mention an item that is not on our agenda but to which the Netherlands Government attaches the greatest importance: the talks that are going on in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. The Netherlands, along with its allies, will continue to press for substantial results in those talks, which are conducted, I am happy to report, in a serious and businesslike manner.

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs concluded his statement in the general debate in the plenary Assembly with the following words:

"We have it in our power to guarantee that future generations will not criticize our era as one in which a maximum of opportunities to better the lot of mankind was wasted by a minimum of good will and co-operation. Let us seize those opportunities." (A/PV.252, p. 37-40)

These words hold true also with regard to disarmament. The United Nations cannot keep silent if the doomsday clock is ticking the minutes away. All of us share the responsibility for mastering the process of the arms race in all its aspects.
Mr. RESHETNIK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Speaking almost at the end of the discussion of the agenda items now before the Committee, I have good reason to note that most of the representatives who have taken part in that discussion attach overriding importance to the problems of disarmament and believe that one of the most timely issues is the adoption of effective measures in that sphere in order to put an end to the arms race and to ensure that real disarmament will begin.

As has already been pointed out here, this debate is taking place in conditions of international détente that have already led to a solution, or the beginning of a solution, of some important problems connected with the strengthening of international peace and security. The positive changes that have taken place in the international atmosphere are conducive to the stepping up of efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, in this field. In that connexion we should like to note the particular importance for world peace constituted by the Soviet-American summit meetings and strategic arms limitation talks. The practical results of those negotiations, reflected in the agreement to reduce the threat of war and limit strategic weapons, constitute substantial progress towards strengthening peace and mutual confidence, as well as towards consolidating international détente. They pave the way for the adoption of further specific measures in the field of disarmament, and that is certainly in keeping with the interests of the peoples of the entire world.

Much has already been done towards the practical solution of the problems of disarmament, but a great deal still remains to be done; indeed, we have merely embarked on the path so far. The arms race has not yet been stopped. It absorbs tremendous funds and human resources and is an ever-increasing burden for the peoples of the developed as well as the developing countries. It is therefore essential to exert new efforts to supplement political détente with military détente, through measures for practical and effective disarmament. Each new, specific step in that direction will be a concrete contribution to strengthening détente and guaranteeing international peace and security.
My delegation has already had an opportunity to speak on the new important and specific initiative taken by the Soviet Union with regard to the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes. Hence, in our statement today we should like to refer to some of the other disarmament items on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly.

The questions of disarmament cannot be solved automatically. Such a solution requires the efforts and co-operation of all Governments and the participation of many countries in the process of political and military détente. It is essential that all the nuclear and militarily-significant Powers participate constructively in disarmament negotiations and specific disarmament measures. There must be more vigorous joint efforts by all the States in the world, large, medium-sized and small. Precisely those purposes would be served by the convening of a world disarmament conference in which all the States of the world could, on an equal footing and on the basis of results already achieved and the experience gained, discuss together and determine the most rational and effective course for solving the problem entailed in putting an end to the arms race, as well as other disarmament problems.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR has carefully studied the report (A/9628) submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and the summary of the views and suggestions of Governments contained in the annex to that report. We note with satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Committee has made substantial progress; it has done important and useful work in solving certain problems and overcoming a number of obstacles created by those who oppose the convening of a world disarmament conference. We cannot fail to point out one positive fact -- namely, the participation in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, along with the Soviet Union, which has always steadfastly supported the convening of a world disarmament conference, of two other nuclear Powers: France and the United Kingdom. It is the duty of all the permanent members of the Security Council, which bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to co-operate with the Ad Hoc Committee.
An analysis of the summary of the views of 96 Governments contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee shows that the main fact is that, despite the differences of opinion, the overwhelming majority of Governments support the convening of a world disarmament conference. There has been a convergence of positions on some organizational questions related to the convening of a conference. The difficulties in connexion with convening the conference have also become more apparent. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR is convinced that in order to achieve the aim so important to all mankind -- that is, the convening of a world disarmament conference -- we can and must find further points of convergence between the positions of various States so that they may jointly work towards the early convening of a world disarmament conference. In that connexion we should like to point out that no excuses can be adduced to justify a further delay in the convening of the conference. Of course, it is essential adequately to prepare for such an important international gathering, but that should be practical preparation for the convening of the conference and not procrastination, which would merely play into the hands of the militarist circles and others who support a continuance of the arms race. Unjustified delay could undermine the very idea of the conference; the momentum could be lost, and that would be greatly detrimental to the cause of disarmament.
As regards the pre-conditions for the convening of the conference put forward by individual delegations, I must point out that these simply complicate the practical possibility of holding it and threaten to disrupt it. The points raised by these delegations could be considered at the conference itself. At present, the appropriate conditions have been created for the successful work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. The General Assembly should take a qualitatively new step towards the convening of the world disarmament conference by extending the mandate and expanding the terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Committee and giving it more specific tasks, namely, to conclude all the necessary preparatory work, to draw up specific recommendations, to make practical preparations for the conference, and to arrange for it to convene without delay. One of the main and timely problems in the area of real disarmament is the prohibition of chemical weapons. The continuing buildup of this type of weapon of mass destruction, which represents a huge potential danger for mankind and for the environment, as well as the information that we have on the development of qualitatively new and more lethal types of weapons of this nature, requires the adoption of immediate measures aimed at their prohibition and destruction. The Ukrainian SSR, as well as other socialist countries, supports the complete elimination of the threat of chemical warfare. That approach has been reflected in the appropriate draft convention submitted by the socialist countries to the Committee on Disarmament in 1972.

We share the concern expressed during the debate by many delegations to the effect that so far no substantial progress has been made in the achievement of practical results to prohibit chemical weapons, although this problem has long been debated in the United Nations and we already have specific draft agreements. The reason is the unwillingness of Western Powers to begin a businesslike debate on this problem and to draw up and conclude an appropriate specific agreement.

In this connexion we should like to stress that a further delay in solving the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons could lead to serious consequences, particularly when a new generation of this type of weapon is appearing. Many delegations have noted with satisfaction
the agreement achieved at the latest Soviet-American summit meeting on the joint initiative in the Committee on Disarmament, as a first step towards an international convention on the most lethal and dangerous chemical means of warfare. That agreement stimulates negotiations on this problem and is, of course, only the first -- although an important -- step towards a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons.

We steadfastly support the complete elimination of the threat of chemical warfare, the complete prohibition, in the final analysis, of all types of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles. It is essential that the United Nations should increase efforts aimed at the speedy drafting and conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical means of warfare and the destruction of stockpiles. Together with the existing Convention on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, such a convention would be an important step towards the elimination of a whole series of weapons of mass destruction; a real disarmament measure which would pave the way for further practical agreements in the area of disarmament.

In this connexion our delegation would like to stress the importance of the early implementation of the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and the speeding up of its ratification by all States, particularly the depositary States. It is well-known that the Soviet Union has already declared its intention of ratifying this convention in 1974.

In 1975 the fiftieth anniversary of the Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare will be celebrated. For half a century this historic document has effectively served, and still serves, the purposes proclaimed therein. However, for half a century some States have been studying the question of its ratification and have not yet made up their minds to do so. It is the duty of the General Assembly to call on all States which have not yet done so -- particularly nuclear and militarily significant States -- to ratify the Geneva Protocol and thus to guarantee its genuine universal nature.

The agenda of the current session contains an extremely important question, the practical solution of which would not only be a substantial
contribution to curbing the arms race, but would also make possible the release of considerable funds for additional assistance to developing countries. I am referring to the recommendation adopted at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, upon the initiative of the Soviet Union, on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. The result of the voting on that resolution at the twenty-eighth session was a striking illustration of the wide recognition and understanding of the importance and timeliness of this step. The reduction of the military budgets of the above-mentioned countries is especially important in curbing the arms race, since it is just these States, which possess nuclear weapons and which have the largest military arsenals and military budgets, who share equally the main responsibility for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace. In this connexion it is a matter of reducing military expenditure by an equal percentage.

Under these conditions, to adduce any pretext not to implement the above-mentioned resolution means to refuse constructive participation in joint efforts towards disarmament. It is precisely such participation, rather than general statements or a totally negative attitude, which shows good will, and the readiness and sincere desire to promote the curtailment of the arms race.

The peoples of the world have long been expecting tangible results from disarmament, both in reducing the threat of war and in guaranteeing substantial resources for peaceful development. The reduction in the military budgets will enable all countries, large and small, developed and developing, to make use of the real benefits of disarmament. After all, the figure of 10 per cent represents both a vast number of contemporary destructive weapons, and considerable funds. The decision at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly proposed a specific rather than a declarative disarmament measure, which is essential to achieve practical achievements in this important field and, in particular, the conclusion
of the preparatory stage and the beginning of the work of the Special Committee set up pursuant to resolution 3093 (XXVIII).

Among the problems of nuclear disarmament a prominent place is occupied by the question of banning nuclear tests, a partial solution to which was achieved by the signature in 1963 of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.
We fully share the opinion of most delegations that a major step towards the solution of this problem is the existence of the necessary political will and a sincere desire on the part of States to achieve that solution. As is known, the Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its readiness to arrive at an agreement on the full banning of all nuclear tests, including underground tests. An important step towards such a prohibition has already been noted in this debate -- the Soviet-United States agreement on the limitation of underground nuclear tests signed last summer. That agreement on the control of testing creates the real possibility of effectively controlling agreements on the prohibition of nuclear tests with the assistance of national services which verify explosions. It will create the right conditions for the stepping-up of efforts aimed at the speedy cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all areas.

General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force and the prohibition of nuclear weapons must be implemented. It is essential for the Security Council to adopt a decision giving binding effect to the crucial principles contained in that solemn proclamation. The solution to the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons must form an organic whole preventing aggression and the use of all weapons, nuclear or conventional. Such a solution would be fully in keeping with the United Nations Charter and the interests of States large and small.

During the debate many delegations have drawn attention to other disarmament efforts which would individually and collectively promote progress in this area towards the implementation of general and complete disarmament. Special attention has been drawn to the important question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is attested to by the serious concern that has been expressed in connexion with the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such proliferation would increase the threat of the resurgence of nuclear war, including the possibility of that happening by accident; it would create new obstacles to the elimination of existing nuclear arsenals and would prevent the solution of important international problems, even compounding some of them.
In the light of that, more timely becomes the task of strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and increasing the role and effectiveness of that important international instrument to reduce the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war and to protect the interests of all States and peoples in this regard. The effective implementation of that agreement would pave the way for further progress towards curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and thus giving effect to the most important provisions of article VI of the Treaty.

The participation in the non-proliferation Treaty of all States, particularly the nuclear States, as also those States having the potential to produce nuclear weapons, is now a task that must receive high priority. We therefore share the opinion of those States which have called upon the General Assembly to exert maximum efforts to achieve universality in the Treaty on non-proliferation, the effective implementation of a system of safeguards, the speedy entry into force of the relevant safeguard agreements with IAEA and the establishment of control by that Agency over the export of all fissionable materials and special equipment to non-nuclear countries.

Another important matter is the full demilitarization of the sea-bed, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the limitation of conventional weapons, the dismantling of military blocs and groups as proposed by the States parties to the Warsaw Pact and many others. The process of détente taking place in the world is an example of the fact that if there is a joint desire to do so constructive negotiations can be conducted and problems so far unresolved can be solved.

Of course, not all the obstacles have yet been eliminated. Certain circles and a number of countries -- all those which attempt to derive direct or indirect dividends from the arms race -- are attempting to oppose détente and the adoption of effective measures in the area of disarmament. By no means are all States making specific contributions to the curbing of the arms race. Certain States oppose disarmament. That was shown by the representative of China, who wants more armaments, confirming Peking's negative approach to all practical disarmament measures.
We are convinced that if maximum efforts are exerted and full use is made of the favourable conditions existing in the world today, we can fully prepare effective measures aimed at the comprehensive elimination of the threat of war from the life of man. We call upon all States to proceed accordingly.

Mr. BENITES (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): I first spoke on disarmament problems in the First Committee in 1953, one year after the United States had exploded its first thermonuclear bomb and the year during which, on 12 August, the USSR exploded its first weapon of that kind, a several megaton fusion bomb. That was 21 years ago. It takes 21 years for a person to become of age. And yet, after 21 years as an Organization, we are almost exactly where we were in 1953. Or perhaps we are worse off, because in 1953 an atomic weapon was still a weapon of intimidation. In 1954 a United States thermonuclear device was exploded in the Bikini Islands. It was said to be of about 15 megatons. In 1955 one could already affirm that the atomic bomb had ceased to be merely a means of intimidation. As such, its use was threatened in Korea. But because of advances in fusion methods for light atoms, the sophistication of vectors and the attainment of means of safe storage, it has become the real and powerful strategic weapon it is today.

From the beginning of the thermonuclear era until today, 22 years have elapsed, 22 years of useless efforts to halt vertical proliferation, and now we face the fact that there is horizontal proliferation despite the non-proliferation Treaty of March 1970. An example of vertical proliferation was the extremely frank statement made here some days ago by the representative of one of the greatest military Powers in history. He said the United States possesses 615,385 Hiroshima-type bombs, and it has been affirmed that those are 13 kiloton bombs. One can thus surmise the astronomical power of the atomic weaponry of only one of the super-Powers.
None of the treaties with which the super-Powers feed the hopes of the world every year has so far been a real disarmament measure. The Antarctic Treaty was a prior agreement not to use for nuclear tests a zone in which the enormous heat power of nuclear weapons — and even more of thermonuclear weapons — could bring about grave consequences, including climatic changes. The Moscow Treaty of 1963 affirmed the bipolar monopoly of the super-Powers which, technically and economically, were capable of carrying out underground tests that have made possible the sophistication of multiple-warhead nuclear weapons and their major vectors. The non-proliferation Treaty has the dangerous loophole that the only difference between a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes and a fission bomb is the moral intention of the user, which is tantamount to resting all world security on the subjective fragility of good faith.

However, it is not my intention to refer once again to the items of nuclear disarmament. Today I shall speak of only two types of problems that are interconnected — chemical warfare and what might be called ecological warfare, that is to say, changes of the environment by its dangerous transformation or premeditated destruction.

It is true that chemical warfare existed prior to modern wars. Since Mr. Henry Kissinger concluded his important statement in the General Assembly with a quotation from Thucydides, I feel authorized to quote the Greek historical also, when he affirmed that during the Peloponnesian War, in Platea, in 429 B.C., the Spartans burned wood saturated in sulphur and asphalt, causing Thucydides to say "That the consequence was conflagration more enormous than any mankind had ever produced before".

But as I am not going to go into the history of chemical warfare but only wish at present to denounce the use of chemical means as being extremely cruel, I shall start by making a necessary distinction: strictu sensu, every modern war is chemical because the gunpowder of the rifle to the dynamite of the bomb — not to mention the solid fuel used in rockets, uranium, plutonium, hydrogen, deuterium, lithium, tritium and other nuclear agents — are chemical. Therefore, when speaking of chemical warfare I shall refer only to the action of chemical elements or agents directly on men, animals or plants, that is, on living things.
The greatest impact on the human conscience as a result of the 1914-1918 war was made by the use of gases, which started at Ypres in the yellow spring of death of 1915, and caused 1.3 million casualties of whom 91,000 died.

The horror aroused by this form of chemical warfare brought about an immediate reaction: in article 171 of the Versailles Treaty, in article 135 of the St. Germain Treaty, in article 119 of the Trianon Treaty, in article 150 of the Sévres Treaty there are prohibitive references which culminated with the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 condemning equally chemical and microbiological warfare, and it is incorrect to call the latter "bacteriological" since it goes beyond the use of bacteria and can employ rickets causing agents, fungi and anaerobic toxins such as those that produce botulism.

In the United Nations, chemical and biological forms of war were covered under the title "Other methods of mass destruction". This expression appeared for the first time in 1948 in the first resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments established by the Security Council on 13 February 1947. It reappeared in the plans for general and complete disarmament, starting in 1959, but did not achieve full autonomy until resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966, which called for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

While this was going on in conference rooms, something quite different was happening in military arsenals. Before the second war, in 1936, Gerhard Schrader discovered a toxic agent that he called Tabun, from which in 1938 sarin was derived, and in 1944 the nerve gas soman.

According to Seymour Hersh, during the thousand days of Kennedy's presidency the North American budget for chemical and bacteriological warfare amounted to $300 million, mainly for research in vectors. (Chemical and Biological Warfare, Bobbs Merrill, Indianapolis, p. 33) During the time that Mr. McNamara was Secretary of Defence, expenditures in chemical and bacteriological warfare increased, and more than 9,700 employees and 3,750 officers were at work in Maryland, Arkansas, Indiana, Colorado and Utah with a budget of $1 billion. (Ibid., p. 35) The arsenals of Newport Chemical Plant, Rocky Mountain, Edgewood and Port Detrick — the last especially for biological tests — have been the major sources of production for the chemical and bacteriological warfare according to the same author.
In an article by Neil Sheehan published in *The New York Times* of 23 July 1969 it is affirmed that nerve gases were stored in the Okinawa, Japan base by a decision made between 1961 and 1963 by President Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert McNamara, and that a team of technical experts was sent from the military base at Edgewood, Maryland to that place. The same article mentions the possible storing of poisonous gases in South Korea and in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The principal danger of lethal gases lies in their storage, because there can be uncontrollable leaks, such as the one that killed 6,000 sheep on 13 March 1968 in Utah and the one that caused some human casualties in Okinawa. An enormous danger for mankind now lies in the fact that storage difficulties have been overcome by the use of binary weapons — that is to say, gases that are innocuous in themselves but when discharged from separate capsules in one grenade at the moment of explosion join together and form a lethal compound on the target.

I sincerely believe that this type of tactical weapon using binary compounds and mini-nuclear tactical weapons bring us closer to a war which would not, at its outset, use enormous nuclear strategic weapons.

What has the United Nations done about this dramatic problem of biological and chemical weapons? With regard to the former, the biological weapons, there is a kind of convention of 1971 which allows a kind of veto, since it cannot enter into force if the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom are not among the 22 ratifying States (article 14, para. 3) — just as the representatives of the USSR and the United States are not present here now, although I believe the representative of the United Kingdom is. As I understand it, to date, the convention has not been ratified by the three Powers that have the right to veto. As for chemical weapons, the question has been constantly shelved and continues to be so, despite the so-called détente.

The two difficulties adduced in this subject are pure quibbles, particularly the definition of chemical agents. Accordingly, my delegation wishes to congratulate and thank the Government of Japan which submitted to CCD a draft convention on chemical weapons, which is the only serious and constructive element in the sterile work of CCD in the last session. My delegation also expresses its gratitude and congratulations to the Government of Sweden, which made some noteworthy comments on that document on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in general, to the non-aligned States in the Disarmament Committee.

I wish to add that it is an illogical subterfuge to exclude from this item incendiary weapons such as napalm and white phosphorus which both technically and in practice are chemical weapons of monstrous cruelty.
I do not believe that it is possible for the time being to start a debate on changes produced in the physical environment as a means of war, although these are no fiction. Perhaps the most serious phenomenon of our time is the enormous destruction of the bio-mass in Indo-China by the use of defoliants such as 2, 4-B, 2, 4, 5-T and cacodilic acid, which is a highly toxic arsenic compound. North American scientists have calculated that it will take 100 years to repair that damage and its influence on the meteorological system. It does seem to be possible to produce meteorological phenomena such as heavy rains and, consequently, overflowing of rivers and floods. And while there is as yet no certainty about the possibilities of influencing the climate, it is sure that changes in the stratospheric layer of ozone, including those produced by overspraying with inert gases, can bring about climatic alterations, as stated recently in the North-American press. The ecological alterations in Indo-China may serve to make us realize the enormous importance of military action on the environment.

From the above, the following conclusions may be drawn. First, it would be desirable for CCD to devote its utmost attention at its next session to the problem of chemical warfare and to the Japanese proposal, together with the comments of Sweden, which would serve as a good basis for its examination, and let us hope that it can study not only the concept of "chemical agents" and the problems of storage but also the grave problem of the so-called binary weapons.

Secondly, it would be important for the International Red Cross -- the report of which is absorbing the interest of some of my esteemed colleagues at this moment -- to continue its studies, above all those on weapons that cause needless suffering. Those, in addition to chemicals and defoliants, should include small, high-speed weapons such as the ML6 rifle with a calibre of 5.56 millimetres, 12-calibre shotguns with 20-pellet shells, cluster bombs which on exploding scatter small bombs that explode on multiple targets, of the Giboulée type or the British BL 775 among others, quoted in the SIPRI Yearbook as having been tested in Viet-Nam (p. 17-21). We recommend the excellent report I have mentioned which is taking up so much of the attention of many of those present. It has only been distributed today, which may explain why it is being read with so much interest. I am referring to document D/1339 (b).
Thirdly, to conclude, the World Meteorological Organization should be asked to prepare a study on the possibilities of climatic alterations and the artificial use of meteorological phenomena, so that we may have a technical basis which may enable us to consider the new item on environmental disturbances caused by meteorological agents, while still condemning the ecological alterations which we already know of. Referring to the magnificent speech delivered here by the distinguished State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, my delegation fully endorses the suggestions he made on consultations with the United Nations Environmental Programme and other institutions under the auspices of the Secretary-General. My delegation very modestly considers these suggestions as being very positive and we fully support them.
Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, before I begin my statement, may I take a few minutes to extend to you, as well as to the other officers of the Committee, our congratulations on your election to your respective posts. In your case, Mr. Chairman, we are especially pleased that a distinguished and outstanding Argentinian diplomat, with a long and brilliant career in the diplomatic service of his country, has been chosen to preside over the important work of this Committee. We are pleased to note that the trust placed in you by the Assembly, Sir, has been amply rewarded by the ability, the skill, the intelligence and sometimes the firmness with which you have been presiding over the work of the Committee, all which qualities will enable us to carry out our work according to the established time-table, to the satisfaction of the Committee and of the entire Assembly.

In speaking in this debate, the delegation of Venezuela is aware that it is difficult to offer original ideas or take initiatives in the debate on an item which has been discussed for so many years and in such detail. Since its inception the United Nations has not spared any effort to curb the arms race, to reduce and eventually eliminate military arsenals. Suffice it to recall that the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly referred to the problem of disarmament, and since then hundreds of resolutions have been adopted on this item. Many of them, if not all, have remained a dead letter and have not led to any practical results.

However, we believe that the annual debate held in the General Assembly and particularly in this Committee, fruitless and sterile as it may seem, at least has the function of enabling us, representatives of countries which belong to the non-nuclear sector of the international community to raise our voices in protest and indignation at the fact that, as time goes on, some countries increase their nuclear arsenals and design weapons which are increasingly lethal and cruel. This debate affords us the opportunity of expressing our concern and apprehension when we see that the arms race, far from stopping, is gathering momentum.

Small nations, such as the one I represent, like the vast majority of States in the world which are not interested in increasing their military potential, cannot force the great military Powers to heed the appeals, entreaties and demands that have been repeatedly addressed to them through innumerable resolutions of
the Assembly. It must regrettably be recognized that in the area of disarmament the great Powers follow only their own selfish interests and their own convenience. They forget that they do not live alone on this planet. They forget that the great majority of mankind is not interested in possessing nuclear weapons, much less in running the risk of being wiped out in the holocaust that would be unleashed if those arms were to be used. So far -- and I am not saying anything original because the same comment is one we have heard from representatives of many countries -- the disarmament measures that have been implemented are simply palliatives. The disarmament achieved so far is completely illusory. The partial test-ban Treaty was only possible when the most developed nuclear Powers had achieved such a level of progress in their technology that they no longer needed tests in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water. That Treaty did not include underground tests, because the most developed nuclear Powers needed to continue carrying out this type of test, to continue perfecting and improving their terrible means of destruction. When those Powers consider that they no longer need to carry out underground tests because they have attained a sufficient degree of sophistication, we, the small nations, shall be invited to sign with them that comprehensive test-ban Treaty, for the conclusion of which we have been calling for so long. They have already made a concession to us in this regard. On 3 July 1974 they announced to us that they had signed an agreement whereby they imposed on each other their prohibition of carrying out underground tests exceeding 150 kilotons; but that prohibition will not lead to immediate effects. Rather, we shall have to wait until 31 March 1976, to enable those Powers to perfect their systems of detection and to feel sure that their own interests are not being sacrificed.

The signing of the non-proliferation Treaty was only possible when the main nuclear Powers thought that the monopoly of nuclear technology was guaranteed them and that it was rather a danger for them if other countries continued to manufacture nuclear weapons. That Treaty did not mean any sacrifice for the main nuclear Powers; nor did it impose any limitation on their capacity to maintain their destructive hegemony.
The results achieved within the framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have not led to any spectacular sacrifice of the military potential of the two super-Powers. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms have only led to preserving the status quo, and even this is doubtful, for we constantly see examples suggesting the opposite, as we did just a few days ago in the New York press, which reported that the parties to those agreements accused each other of violating their commitments.

Anybody reading the programme of work of this Committee which includes 12 items on disarmament would imagine that our deliberations will make it possible to free mankind from the grave threat under which it lives of seeing itself one day annihilated by the outbreak of nuclear war. The fact is that the progress achieved so far is insignificant as compared to the objectives that we pursue. We do not deny the importance of collateral disarmament measures; rather, we think that efforts should be continued to implement partial measures. But we should not lose sight of the reality, nor should we be dazzled by the limited results achieved, much less contented by the disarmament crumbs offered to us by the great Powers in order to calm our apprehensions.
However, we are not pessimistic. We believe that the limited progress achieved shows that our constancy, our perseverance and our patience have struck a responsive cord in the great military Powers. We recognize that our objective, the achievement of general and complete disarmament, is not an easy objective. We, the small countries, are discharging our responsibility to persist in our efforts; but that is not sufficient. It is essential — and this has been stated repeatedly in this very room in the past few days — that the great military Powers should contribute the other essential ingredient, a sincere political will to embark upon the course towards the conclusion of specific and positive agreements.

Such agreements should lead to a reduction in military budgets in order that the human and economic resources thus saved might be channelled into the construction of a better and more just world. According to the report submitted by the Committee of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General to study this aspect of disarmament, world military expenditures in 1973 amounted to approximately $275,000 million. At present world expenditure for military research and development amounts to about $20,000 million. About 400,000 scientists and engineers throughout the world are devoting themselves to these activities.

In yesterday's New York Times we read that during the present fiscal year, which will end next June, the total defence expenditures of the United States will amount to approximately $84,000 million and that the resources allocated by the United States Congress to that end are $88,000 million. In the budget which is now being prepared by the Pentagon, defence expenditures for the next fiscal period will amount to approximately $96,000 million and allocations to $104,000 million. From the same source we learned that in recent years defence expenditures in the United States have been increasing by an annual 6 per cent and that the Soviet military programme continues to increase, in real terms, at a rate of 3 to 5 per cent annually.

On the other hand, the budget of the United Nations for next year for tackling the challenging task of co-operation for development will be only $400 million, according to the United Nations Development Programme Pledging Conference held a few days ago. If the resources devoted to the manufacture,
perfecting and stockpiling of weapons could be channeled to peaceful ends, the situation in the world would be a different one.

In the last few months the petroleum-producing countries have been blamed for the world economic crisis; they have been presented as being responsible for the inflation that is afflicting our planet. At the World Food Conference at present being held in Rome it has been pointed out that the petroleum-producing countries have a special responsibility in connexion with the world food situation. It has been adduced that those countries receive an excessive income, over and above what they need to balance their international payments or finance their own economic development. But those who make such affirmations forget that the cost of the arms race is enormous and that as a consequence thereof economic resources are diverted which could satisfy the world's food needs and funds could even be left over for solving many other social problems facing mankind.

Another aspect of the disarmament problem which calls for priority action is the use of napalm and incendiary weapons in general, as well as that of the manufacture and perfecting of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which, when used, have indiscriminate effects and cause unnecessary suffering. The use of such weapons should be expressly prohibited as soon as possible and technological research aimed at designing new weapons even more cruel in their effects should also be proscribed.

This year the Committee is considering four different items related to efforts aimed at creating nuclear-weapon-free zones. Numerous delegations have referred to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and praised that instrument as a model, an example of an initiative to arrive at a regional approach to efforts aimed at maintaining peace and security. The States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco are proud of the results achieved through that instrument, which has a territorial radius of application of more than 8 million square kilometres and covers and protects populations of about 150 million people. We are satisfied that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty has entered into force for two further nuclear Powers, France and the People's Republic of China, which have deposited their respective instruments of ratification in 1974. We hope that the fifth nuclear
Power, the Soviet Union, will sign and ratify the Protocol in the near future. As regards Additional Protocol I, we trust that soon the States that have not yet done so will ratify it, in order to enable the zone to be fully protected against the possible introduction of nuclear weapons.

We view with sincere understanding the proposals submitted to the Assembly by the States concerned aimed at the creation of similar nuclear-free zones in other areas of the world, specifically the Middle East and South Asia, and we support the initiatives to be put forward in order to turn those legitimate aspirations into reality, which in time will enable us to, as it were, put the nuclear Powers into quarantine, to isolate them from the rest of the world which does not want to catch the nuclear plague.

Venezuela is a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. Despite the fact that we are satisfied because the report submitted to the Assembly contains the consensus of members of the Committee, we regret that we have not been able to prepare a more positive document, a report reflecting a more optimistic picture as regards the possibility of convening the proposed world disarmament conference at an early date. However, the report does show that almost all Member States of the Organization agree with the convening of that conference. A small minority, including, unfortunately, some of the nuclear Powers, although not rejecting the idea completely does not seem to be ready to participate in such a meeting. My country is among those that support the holding of a world disarmament conference and, despite the fact that we share the view that it is necessary to prepare it appropriately and to ensure the participation of all the nuclear Powers in it, we believe that at present there is the necessary appropriate climate and that the climate of détente prevailing in the world should be used to explore this new means of achieving disarmament.
I do not think that anybody harbours any exaggerated illusions regarding the results that could be obtained at that conference. We do, however, believe that forum would enable us to carry out a general assessment of the scanty results obtained by the United Nations in the area of disarmament. The conference could also map out a new strategy, establish new aims and set the priorities for the future work of the Organization. These aims in themselves would justify the holding of the conference.

We should also think in terms not of one but of several world disarmament conferences, leaving the possibility open, without attempting to set up any new permanent machinery, that a world disarmament conference might become a forum that could periodically give new impetus to disarmament negotiations at different levels of negotiation and concerning various aspects. We believe that this conference should, in any case, meet before the end of the Disarmament Decade of the 1970s proclaimed by the General Assembly in resolution 2602 E (XXIV).

In conclusion, we should like to reaffirm our confidence in the various bodies within the United Nations system which deal with disarmament questions, and our conviction that the economic and social well-being of States, as well as their security will be considerably improved as progress is made towards general and complete disarmament. We hope that the great military Powers will hold negotiations and that they will put their entire political will at the service of these meetings in order to achieve effective means of curbing the arms race, and to achieve nuclear disarmament, as well as a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective and strict international control.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank my friend Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela for the very kind words he addressed to me.
Mr. AZZOUT (Algeria) (interpretation from French): A cursory glance at the dozen or so items on disarmament on the agenda of our Committee, suffices to show how vast are the concerns of the international community in face of the unbridled arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race.

Most speakers who preceded me emphasized the spirit of resignation which is becoming more and more marked and which has prevailed, since some time ago in all disarmament discussions, because of the absence of progress even in such limited fields as arms control. That is no doubt due to the attempt to eliminate weapons where the roots of conflicts persist. It has in fact become obvious that bringing about better relations among States and establishing an international order based on justice and security for all are the essential conditions for success in any genuine disarmament undertaking.

This may be too absolute a vision of things, because one can also act simultaneously to settle present conflicts and to bring about disarmament, these two factors of world peace being closely linked.

At present, negotiations on disarmament are being carried out at several levels: in the first place, the bilateral talks between the two super-Powers on the limitation of their strategic arms; secondly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva; thirdly, the debate on disarmament in the First Committee, which every year enables us to review the work done by the CCD. In fact, the tendency of the super-Powers to remove themselves increasingly from the CCD, by holding their discussions in the SALT talks, has ended by depriving the United Nations of the possibility of discussing nuclear disarmament, which is undoubtedly the most important and most urgent aspect.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which was established 13 years ago with the purpose of arriving at general and complete disarmament under effective international control, has ended by losing sight of that objective, and taken the easier course of seeking partial measures of arms control. In this connexion the balance sheet of its work
shows on the credit side just four international multilateral instruments:
first, the partial test-ban Treaty; secondly, the Treaty on the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons; thirdly, the Treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed
and finally, the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons.

All those instruments, without exception, are piecemeal measures, and
although well-defined obligations were undertaken to implement
them, they have not so far been respected. In fact, it will suffice to
recall that despite the solemn undertaking of the original parties to achieve the
halting of all nuclear tests for ever, and despite the three-score or so
resolutions of the General Assembly on the urgent need to suspend nuclear
tests, the number of these tests has risen on an average by 60 per cent a year.

As regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
on which a Review Conference will be held next spring, five years
after its entry into force, it was considered at the outset by
certain non-nuclear States as a Treaty intended to prohibit any proliferation
of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically. But in practice it has
become the instrument which the super-Powers have used to strengthen their
privileged position. We are a long way from the solemn undertakings of these
same super-Powers to ensure the halt for ever of all nuclear-weapon tests
and to achieve as soon as possible the cessation of the arms
race. And we are even further from their commitment to continue in good
faith negotiations on a treaty for general and complete disarmament under
effective international control.

These few remarks lead us to the conclusion that the course being
followed by the international community is not leading to disarmament. More
than ever, disarmament still remains to be achieved, because this is a matter
which concerns all peoples. Thus, the idea that only a world conference
could have some success in disarmament has gradually gained ground.

The Assembly took an important step in this direction by establishing
a Committee charged with examining all the views and suggestions of Governments
on the convening of a world conference on disarmament and related problems,
including the conditions necessary for holding such a conference. My delegation has participated actively in the work of that Committee, whose report, so brilliantly introduced by the Ambassador of Iran, Mr. Hoveyda, is a summary of the present state of mind regarding the idea of convening this conference.

Indeed, while the idea of a world disarmament conference has been accepted, there seems to be disagreement on its preparation and organization. But experience teaches us that in so difficult a field progress can only be slow, and that only sustained efforts can help to pave the way for the preparation and convening of this conference.
The question of nuclear-free zones has been discussed in the United Nations and in other regional organizations for many years. It is worth recalling in this connexion that proposals and ideas have been put forward with a view to creating denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, in particular in Africa, the Balkans and the Nordic countries. But only the Latin American continent and the Antarctic region have so far been the subject of international agreements to this effect.

This year two initiatives concerning the denuclearization of the Middle East and Southern Asia have been submitted to our Committee for consideration. In this connexion, it goes without saying that we cannot oppose the desire of any group of countries to constitute itself a nuclear-free zone in so far as that initiative is the result of the concerted will of all the States of the region and when the nuclear Powers undertake to respect that will.

Finally, as regards the Soviet proposal on "Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health", we believe that this question is of the greatest importance both militarily and in regard to the human environment and that it merits a constructive and serious discussion which can only take place within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

In conclusion, my delegation reserves the right to speak on the draft resolutions which will be submitted to our Committee for consideration.

Mr. Prat Gay (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Argentina, in speaking in this debate, wishes to specify at the outset that we shall refer to three items from the lengthy list before us. We shall give the view of our Government on items 35, 34, and 103. We have selected them not haphazardly but, on the contrary, as a result of a careful study.

For our country, general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the primary goal in all our work. In an attempt to
seek partial measures perhaps this fundamental objective, which the General
Assembly decisively reaffirmed in operative paragraph 1 of resolution
3184 C (XXVIII), has been lost sight of. I have just heard with particular
satisfaction that we share this opinion with two countries with which we, as
Latin American and non-aligned States, have close ties -- Venezuela and Algeria.
We cannot fail to mention that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
(CCD) seems to have ignored this aspiration. It is alarming that this major
objective of the CCD has been shelved and we put on record here our concern at
the marked inclination of the two super-Powers to reach agreement on partial
measures which have so far resulted in nothing that will halt or reverse the
arms race. We note this especially as regards quality, where the rivalry between
them is particularly significant. We also see that quantitatively, as was
clearly stated by the permanent representative of Ecuador, Ambassador Benites,
at our 1999th meeting, this unbridled arms race each year consumes vast amounts
of money which should be used for collaboration in the task of bringing equality
to a world which is unjustly divided into rich and poor. The annual oratory
on disarmament, brilliant and lucid though it is, does not succeed in halting
the desire for arms. The two most powerful States on earth continue to accumulate
destructive capacity while they plan limited agreements the results of which
are not reflected in a reduction of military arsenals. On the contrary, day by
day we hear of new achievements in that field; day by day we are informed of
powerful military devices of all types which become part of the equipment of
both nations.

Thus we continue to base détente on a quicksand. Peace cannot be built in
the mud of weaponry: sooner or later, with this method, the ground will give
way. On the contrary, peace, if it is to be solid and stable, must be built
on destroyed armaments. Only thus will the world have the certainty that it
lives in real security.

We believe that the dormant efforts to face energetically the thorny
question of general and complete disarmament must be renewed. Therein
lies the only sure solution. Collateral measures can only have the effect
of temporary salves which do not cure the ill within. Once again we reiterate
our conviction that it is only by total means that we shall achieve
the noble purposes which inspired the creation of this Organization. Perhaps it would be fitting at this session of the General Assembly to reaffirm our certainty that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the fundamental goal in this field, but perhaps we should also remind the CCD of its obligations in this connexion so that it can take account of this concern.

In recent years Argentina has stated clearly its views concerning the world disarmament conference. Similarly, on those occasions we have made various suggestions designed to ensure that it take place. We have done so because we are convinced that a meeting of that magnitude would provide a suitable forum for a thorough discussion of everything connected with this priority item. I once again endorse this idea. Its viability and outcome will depend, in our opinion, on three fundamental things which we believe it timely to reiterate: first, adequate preparation; secondly, the participation in the preparatory bodies and in the world disarmament conference of all the nuclear-weapon Powers, without any exception, as well as all the militarily significant nations; and thirdly, the continuance of the consensus system in the adoption of relevant measures.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, in whose work we participated with keen interest, is, as we see it -- and as was pointed out by its Chairman, the able and tireless Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran -- a step forward on a very delicate question. We believe it to be auspicious that three nuclear-weapon Powers participated in its meetings and that the other two, in one way or another, also took part in the preparation of the final report. We hope that in the not-too-distant future those countries with military nuclear capacity will play a direct part in the negotiations designed to bring this idea, which has the support of the international community, to fruition.

In the light of what has been done, we believe it very necessary to continue studies with regard to holding the conference. We therefore believe that it would be appropriate to extend the term of office of the Ad Hoc Committee and to grant it a mandate which will enable it to continue to seek appropriate
means of providing a real basis which will in due course make possible the
preparation of the meeting. It would perhaps be appropriate to give it the
role of a negotiating body so that it could continue its work, always taking
into account the opinions expressed regarding the convening of a world disarmament
conference and the problems connected therewith.
We are convinced that the Ad Hoc Committee is still a useful instrument to accomplish the goal for which it was created. We therefore firmly support the suggestion in its report that "there should be continued application of methods and means used until now for helping to clear the way towards the initiation of the preparation for convening a world disarmament conference, particularly the contacts by the Chairman and members of the Ad Hoc Committee on a personal basis with the nuclear Powers, in order to explore the possibility of reaching agreement on the solution of at least some of the disarmament problems most frequently mentioned in the debates, and with a view to reaching agreement on the question of convening a world disarmament conference." (A/9628, para. 12)

In that way we would be putting into effect the idea of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee -- and I suppose that the General Assembly agrees with the idea -- that it continues to be necessary to study the development of the conditions and other problems related to the convening of a world disarmament conference.

Finally, I should like to refer to the item, submitted by the Soviet Union, entitled "Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health".

My country is particularly interested in that question. We believe that studying it will be an important contribution to the achievement of collective ecological security, a question referred to by the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Mr. Alberto J. Vignes, when he addressed the plenary Assembly at this twenty-ninth session. Foreign Minister Vignes said that Argentina was interested in the many aspects of the question that deserved further study and solution in the General Assembly. He went on:

"I am referring to collective ecological security, that is to say, the co-operation which must exist between States in order to maintain an equitable balance in regard to certain elements which cover or involve more than one country and action in solidarity when the acts of one government might run counter to that concept. Thus, in principle, we
might consider as being in contradiction with the collective ecological security of nations such acts which, to an extent that is not normal, disturb health conditions, the climate, their own or shared natural resources or the purity of waters that flow from one nation to another, or such measures as might affect the natural existence of forests, rivers, the fauna and flora of land, seas or rivers or those which could contaminate the atmosphere." (A/PV.2240, p. 42)

In that connexion I think it is interesting to note that on 18 October last, during a fruitful visit made to my country by the Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Bohuslav Chmoupek, a joint Argentine-Czechoslovak communiqué was issued in which this joint concern was emphasized. The communiqué stated:

"During the exchange of views on problems of the environment, the Czechoslovak Minister listened with deep understanding to the ideas expressed by the Argentine Minister on the subject of collective ecological security. They agreed on the importance that a just and mutually agreed solution to such problems had for the proper functioning of relations among States. They considered also that it was essential to adopt effective measures to prevent any form of abuse of the environment and any influence on the climate incompatible with international security and endangering the existence and health of human beings."

In that context we believe that it would be appropriate to refer this question of ecological warfare to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, where it can be studied with all the care necessary to find suitable standards.

The possibilities of destruction are staggering. Ambassador Malik painted a clear picture to this Committee of the dangers that mankind would face if the dreams ... or, rather, the nightmares ... of Jules Verne came true. When we heard him describe in detail the evil that modern science could do to the atmosphere, there came to our mind, like a flash of lightning, the picture of the horrible natural disasters which
nations in the Sudano-Saharan region as well as our sister nations of Nicaragua and Honduras, have lived through in recent years.

In order to understand the extent of the tragedies caused by these events, which one day could afflict mankind, we would cite the following statement made by the Soviet representative:

"Influencing the environment, particularly the geophysical environment, for military purposes constitutes a serious threat to life on earth. A particular danger of geophysical warfare consists in the fact that the aggressor can secretly, without declaring war, for many years use some of the foregoing methods against its intended victim." (1998th meeting, p. 13)

The sooner we tackle the question of prohibiting these deadly instruments, the better chance we shall have of ensuring international peace and security in every corner of the globe.

In that spirit, Argentina will participate in the work on this subject here and in the Committee on Disarmament, if the General Assembly approves the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675, which, as you have announced, Mr. Chairman, Argentina is co-sponsoring.

We take this opportunity to state again our satisfaction at the inclusion in the Committee on Disarmament of Iran, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and Zaire, and of Peru, a sister country of Latin America with which we shall surely be working very closely.

Before concluding, we must express our gratitude to several developing nations which, concerned at the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the consequent failure of the plans for non-proliferation, requested the inclusion in the agenda of new items relating to the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

There is no doubt that those concerns deserve the most careful study and consideration. My delegation will proceed in that way. In that respect we believe it necessary at this stage to point out that we must always start with a gradual approach, and to that end there must be consultations among the States of each region in order to develop the co-operation that is indispensable for a joint decision that will be of such
transcendental importance. It is the sovereign States directly concerned that must propose action on which they have agreed, and not the General Assembly that must recommend the establishment of these zones without knowledge of the will of each of the parties involved.

The delegation of Argentina reserves the right to speak again when specific items of our heavy agenda are considered.
Mr. NANDAN (Fiji): Mr. Chairman, may I also associate my delegation with the congratulations expressed to you and your fellow officers of the Committee your election to your respective posts. We are confident, Sir, that under your able leadership the officers of this Committee will continue to carry out their work efficiently.

The question of disarmament, or rather the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, is a matter of concern for all States, big and small, near and isolated. With the unabated arms race and the stockpiling in ever-increasing quantities of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, no corner of this globe can feel secure from the indiscriminate effects of modern warfare. The enormity of this threat increases year by year. The halting of the nuclear arms race is proving to be as difficult as reversing it. Peace based on nuclear-weapon superiority cannot endure the test of time nor will it help nations possessing the technical capacity to resist the temptation of joining the nuclear club.

If the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons is to be a serious goal for all who possess those weapons, then it is imperative that all the nuclear-weapon Powers become seriously and sincerely involved in international negotiations aimed towards an agreement on a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a concrete disarmament programme.

Indeed, in spite of the present atmosphere of détente, the international community, as a whole, is increasingly concerned at the lack of substantial progress in the field of disarmament. It would be a sad chapter in the history of mankind if this era of détente was noted only as a period for the expansion of mutual trade between the major Powers. What is most lacking is a demonstration of serious political will by the major Powers to deal effectively with the most urgent problem of our time -- that of disarmament -- in all its aspects, and nuclear disarmament in particular.

My delegation views the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a matter of great importance. We commend the efforts of that Committee in the field of disarmament and particularly the initiatives of some of its members. However, we would not be the first delegation here to observe
that its achievements to date have fallen short of expectations. We believe that a great contribution to the work of that Committee can be made if all the nuclear-weapon Powers participated in its work.

In the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, my delegation welcomes the important initiative taken by the Japanese delegation in the submission of a draft treaty for the prohibition of certain chemical weapons. While recognizing the need for a complete ban on chemical warfare, we view this initiative as an important step towards that final goal.

My delegation is of the opinion that a world disarmament conference will present an opportunity for the international community as a whole to express itself on the urgency of achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament. It will serve as a forum for the exchange of ideas and suggestions on the whole spectrum of disarmament questions. Its main aim must be to focus world attention on the dangers and costs of the arms race and to give new impetus and inspiration to the prevailing slow progress of disarmament. However, we share the view that adequate preparation should precede the conference to ensure its success. My delegation expresses its appreciation to the Ad Hoc Committee on the conference for the important preliminary work it has done during this year and we express the hope that all major Powers will see their way to full participation in its work.

The world is deeply aware and apprehensive of the ever-increasing expenditure for military purposes. It is estimated that world military expenditure is running at about $275,000 million per year which is over 6 per cent of the gross national product of all the countries of the world and equal to the total income of countries the populations of which comprise more than half of mankind. It is also estimated that the military expenditure of those countries which provide development aid is approximately 6.7 per cent of their gross national product, which is nearly 30 times greater than the official development aid they provide. There is no doubt in our view that the transfer of resources from military to peaceful uses could significantly contribute to progress and development in the underdeveloped parts of the world, particularly at this time of economic crisis. Conscious of these facts, my country had welcomed and
supported the initiative taken in the proposal of the item relating to the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. Given the enormous amount involved, we view this proposal as having two important merits; first, it is an attempt to slow down the arms race of those who are most actively involved in that activity; and secondly, if accepted in good faith, it will help divert much needed resources to the developing countries, particularly at this time of economic crisis.

There are four items on our agenda this year which relate to either a zone of peace or to nuclear-weapon-free zones. My Government supports these regional concepts in principle. We have in the past in this Organization supported the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. This year the Committee has on its agenda two new items which relate to similar zonal concepts, one for the Middle East and the other for South Asia. My delegation views these proposals with interest and considers them a further step towards the elimination of threats of nuclear war in different regions of the world. It is our hope that for the viability and effectiveness of these proposals, like the earlier zonal concepts, the draft resolutions which will be submitted on these two new items will also be generally acceptable to the countries of the respective regions in order that the establishment of these zones will be meaningful.

The hopes of the international community were raised in 1963 at the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, which prohibits the carrying out of a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other explosion in the atmosphere, including outer space, under water, or the high seas, or in any other environment, if such an explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted. That Treaty has been ratified by more than 100 countries. It is now 11 years since the conclusion of that Treaty, and the world has waited in vain for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It must be recorded with despair that a comprehensive test-ban treaty today appears
to be as remote as it was in 1963. The recent threshold agreement on underground testing between the United States and the Soviet Union is a welcome but modest step in the right direction. Given the technological development of these two Powers and the fact that they are currently absorbed in the qualitative development of weapons and their delivery systems, which may make larger underground tests unnecessary, the real value of this agreement is not yet easy to assess.

Since 1963 the world has witnessed a backward step in the constant, defiant and open flouting of international opinion as epitomized in the partial test-ban Treaty.

The region of the South Pacific, where my country is situated, has itself fallen a victim to this callous disregard of world opinion. In spite of widespread indignation and opposition from the peoples of the Pacific, one Member State, which prides itself on its enlightenment, culture and civilization, shows little evidence of it when it blatantly, arrogantly and contemptuously disregards the opinions and wishes of the world community, including those expressed in the resolutions of this Organization.
The dangers and risks inherent in nuclear-weapons tests are well known to everyone. In its first report to the Assembly, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation stated that:

"...Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations; these hazards, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed person. The Committee concludes that all steps designed to minimize irradiation of human populations will act to the benefit of human health. Such steps include the cessation of contamination in the environment by explosions of nuclear weapons ...".

France considers it has an imperialistic right to conduct its nuclear-weapons tests in regions of the world to which it does not belong and in areas where its own metropolitan population is not at risk. It first used the African continent for that purpose, and put African people at risk. It is now using the Pacific region, and the people of the Pacific are being put at risk. It must be emphasized that the French tests are carried out on an atoll of very small size. The immediate dangerous effects of those tests show themselves, therefore, in a zone that extends far beyond the atoll's external limits as well those of its territorial sea. The tests in question concern an extensive area of the high seas and can in fact be assimilated to nuclear tests on the high seas. Those nuclear tests carry with them a violation of the freedom of others to utilize the resources of the sea because of the contamination of the marine environment produced by radioactive fall-out and the even greater contamination that may arise from possible errors and accidents. Currents, the migration of fish and plankton drift may spread those harmful effects to wider and sometimes far-off zones and so become a serious threat to the health of people fed on contaminated fish. There may also be extensive damage due to the disappearance of fish resources to the detriment of all who use fish as a basis for their diet -- as, indeed, do the island people of the Pacific. It is an incontrovertible fact, established in the reports of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, that there is some increase in ionising radiation in the region after every French explosion, and such explosions have been conducted in the region for almost a decade now.
The fears and concerns of the people of the Pacific cannot be dismissed, as the French have repeatedly dismissed them, as merely emotional. They are genuine and well-founded concerns of people who are subjected to the hazards of nuclear-weapons testing year after year. We do not accept the proposition that there are clean bombs or that French or any other scientists are infallible, in spite of their alleged safeguards to minimize the level of radiation. We have asked this before, and we ask it again today: if those tests are so safe, why are they not being conducted on metropolitan French territory in Europe, instead of in Africa, in the first place, and now in the Pacific?

The tests are conducted in the Non-Self-Governing Territory of French Polynesia. No legal fiction can alter the fact of geography that the French Territories in the Pacific are not part of metropolitan France, just as Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau have never been provinces of metropolitan Portugal. In fact, they are colonial Territories under French domination which have never achieved self-determination in accordance with United Nations norms on decolonization.

The exploitation of dependent Territories for the purpose of nuclear-weapons testing cannot be considered to be in conformity with Article 73 of the Charter concerning the responsibility of States having dependent Territories, which, inter alia, is to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories and also to ensure their economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment and their protection against abuses. No one can say that these tests are in any way beneficial to the peoples of these Territories and that the conducting of these tests is not an abuse of them and their inhabitants. It is, indeed, a breach of the sacred trust and obligation enshrined in the Charter.

Finally, my delegation reserves the right to intervene again on any of these items should it deem it necessary to do so.
Mr. SMID (Czechoslovakia): I understand this intervention is considered a right of reply. Actually, it is not made in exercise of the right of reply; rather, I am exercising my right of appreciation. That might be an innovation in United Nations procedure, but I should be grateful if I may continue with this statement.

On behalf of my delegation I should like to express appreciation for the speech of the representative of Argentina, who mentioned the recent visit of my Foreign Minister, in October, to Argentina, and his words on the disarmament issues, more particularly those having an impact upon the living environment.

I should like to thank the representative of Argentina very much for his mentioning this issue in connexion with the flourishing bilateral relations between Argentina and Czechoslovakia.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call upon the representative of France, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. SCALABRE (France) (interpretation from French): I carefully listened to the statement of the representative of Fiji, and I particularly noted what he said concerning nuclear pollution. I think I heard those arguments a few days ago in the Special Political Committee. During its debate on the effects of atomic radiation, I had occasion to recall that it is not a good idea to confuse these two areas. In the Special Political Committee, some referred to disarmament when pollution was the item under discussion. In this Committee, some speak of pollution when we are dealing with disarmament. I do not think that is a good procedure.

Having said that, I have no intention of engaging in polemics with the representative of Fiji on the effects of atomic radiation, for that would mean that I too would turn away from disarmament to venture into a subject dealt with in another Committee.

Furthermore, the arguments advanced by the representative of Fiji were already put forward by his delegation last year, and at that time I had occasion to reply to them.
I think it is quite pointless to tax the patience of this Committee by repeating what I said last year.

The representative of Fiji departed even further from the item under consideration by referring to Non-Self-Governing Territories, a matter which I believe is now under discussion in other United Nations organs and in no way concerns Territories that have expressed the will to remain French. I shall not follow him by delving further into this subject.
PROGRAMME OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Since there are no other speakers I should like to make a few announcements.

The first announcement is that the delegations of Ecuador and Morocco have joined the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.683.

The second is not so much an announcement as a reference which I should like to make with regard to the meeting this morning of the General Committee of the General Assembly, and that was the reason why I was not able to preside over the work of this Committee this morning. At that meeting of the General Committee, convened especially by the President of the General Assembly, a detailed analysis was made of the situation created in the various main Committees by certain factors which hamper the progress of our work and have a number of consequences, one of which, specially worth mentioning, is financial. The factors mentioned by the President of the Assembly and officials of the Secretariat include lateness in starting meetings, the non-utilization of the time available to each Committee because speakers are late in putting their names down on the list or cancel their statements, and the belated submission of draft resolutions.

I thought it appropriate to put before members of this Committee the points raised at the meeting of the General Committee of the Assembly this morning, and I should like you to read the relevant records which would be much more eloquent than what I can say now.

As regards punctuality, I should like to draw the attention of representatives, for example, to the fact that next Monday, at noon in the plenary Assembly, a statement will be made by the Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria, Dr. Bruno Kreisky. If this Committee -- in contradiction to the practice we have followed so far -- could meet punctually at 10.30 a.m., we would then have the opportunity to hear most, if not all the speakers on the list for Monday morning's meeting, and then to adjourn so that we could all go to the Assembly Hall to listen to the Federal Chancellor of Austria. If we so proceed, and if one or two speakers were left who could not speak Monday morning, I would ask them to be kind enough to make their statements in the afternoon. But, of course, all this is subject to my obtaining the co-operation of the thirty-odd
members that we need to have a quorum and to begin our meeting. Thus far, I must regretfully point out that our meetings have invariably begun 15 or 20 minutes late. So I would ask everyone to make an effort on Monday morning to comply with the appeal addressed to us by the President of the General Assembly.

I should like to mention another matter. On Tuesday morning there will be no meeting. On Monday, in keeping with our plan, the general debate on disarmament questions will conclude, but we shall hold a meeting on Tuesday afternoon to begin dealing with the draft resolutions that the Committee will have before it. According to the latest news that I have, we already have five draft resolutions that have been submitted -- not necessarily circulated, because some are still being processed -- and I trust that between now and Tuesday other draft resolutions will be submitted so that we can use Tuesday afternoon for delegations to submit their draft resolutions.

I should also like to point out that as draft resolutions are dealt with we shall proceed to voting. In this connexion, there is a draft resolution which was submitted early in our debate and which most delegations have referred to in the general debate. I refer to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.675, relating to agenda item 103 entitled "Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health". For the reasons I have mentioned, because this draft was submitted early and because most delegations have referred to it, we might perhaps proceed to a vote on that draft resolution very shortly.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.