Twenty-ninth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
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Chairman:  Mr. ORTIZ de FOUZAS (Argentina)

Rapporteur:  Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the
  Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds
  thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries \( \text{\(24\)} \)} (continued)

  (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds
      Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;

  (b) Report of the Secretary-General

- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use:
  report of the Secretary-General \( \text{\(27\)} \) (continued)

- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the
  Conference of the Committee on Disarmament \( \text{\(28\)} \) (continued)

- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and
  conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban:
  report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament \( \text{\(29\)} \) (continued)

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AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 6 NOVEMBER 1974, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR
CORRECTIONS WILL BE 11 NOVEMBER 1974.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would
be greatly appreciated.
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /30/ (continued)

- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)

- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)

- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)

- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /101/ (continued)

- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health /103/ (continued)

- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia /107/ (continued)
AGENDA ITEMS 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 100, 101, 103 and 107 (continued)


(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS;

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9726)

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9708)

URGENT NEED FOR CESSIONATION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS AND CONCLUSION OF A TREATY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9593, A/9650, A/9698, A/9708)


WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/9590, A/9628, A/9636)

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9698, A/9708)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2286 (XXII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF Tlatelolco) (A/9692)

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (A/9693 and Add.1-3)

PROHIBITION OF ACTION TO INFLUENCE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE FOR MILITARY AND OTHER PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND HEALTH (A/9702 and Corr.1; A/C.1/L.675)

DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9706)
Mr. BRONNIKOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, taking part at this session of the General Assembly in the discussion of the question of disarmament, does so with hope and optimism since the year which has elapsed since the last session has been marked by new achievements in the policy of détente and a further confirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between States with different social systems. Particular importance attaches to the positive process occurring in the development of relations between the USSR and the United States of America designed to strengthen peace and co-operation in the interests of the peoples of both countries and the whole of mankind.

There has been a perceptible change for the better in the political climate in Europe, a continent literally stocked with troops and armaments of opposing military units. The easing of international tension has created favourable opportunities for the adoption of new, more significant measures in the field of disarmament, which in their turn should add political détente to military détente. There is a growing understanding that genuine peace and security can be achieved not by creating and stockpiling ever newer types of weapons, but by a persistent search for a way out of the dangerous escalation of the arms race and an active and consistent fight for peace.

The struggle for disarmament has always been one of the most important elements of the foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet State. This policy is being persistently pursued not for transient considerations, but for reasons of principle. Socialism and peace are indivisible. In countries of the socialist community there are no classes or social groups which have any interest in political, material or any other motives in preparing for war or in the arms race.
Convincing evidence of this truth is the role of the Soviet Union and the other States of the socialist community in the preparation and conclusion of a number of important international agreements which are already in force and which are making our earth a safer place to live in, and the role of those countries in putting forward new and important proposals in the field of disarmament. The positive role of the non-aligned countries in the search for ways of resolving the problems of disarmament is constantly expanding.

All this is obviously a matter of great gratification to us and to a number of other delegations; but there is something else too. Imperialist circles continue to impose on others an arms race that is sucking into its maelstrom an ever growing number of States, including developing countries. Military expenditure in the world, according to available estimates is drawing near to the sum of $700 million a day.

The arms race undoubtedly constitutes a threat to peace. It is devouring vast sums of money so necessary for economic development and the struggle against hunger, poverty and disease. The opponents of détente and disarmament, the forces of militarism, are continuing their material preparations for war and are making desperate and hopeless attempts to curb the changes and progress now taking place in the world.

Surely a reflection of these attempts are the pronouncement of individual politicians made in the spirit of the cold war and the publication of reports in the so-called free press which, if they do mention détente and the prospects for disarmament, do so in an extremely sceptical and cynical tone. Surely evidence of this are the ceaseless appeals to intensify military preparations on various trumped-up pretexts. Surely evidence of this are the calls to prepare for war, to dig the trenches deeper, and so on.

Disarmament is not an automatic process which comes about of its own accord. What is necessary are persistent and ceaseless efforts on the part of all progressive and peace-loving forces, so that the easing of international tension can be made irreversible and the principles of peaceful coexistence can become an automatic standard for relations between States with different social systems, so that political détente can be supplemented by military détente, and so that decisive measures can be taken, aimed at calling a halt
to the arms race and subsequently at a reduction of armaments for the purpose of achieving general and complete disarmament. We note with satisfaction that in broad international circles -- and this includes the current session of the General Assembly -- the results of the third Soviet-American summit meeting have been regarded as of great importance for the cause of peace and international security. This meeting, in the light of earlier agreements, achieved agreement limiting the anti-ballistic missile defence system of both countries and the underground testing of nuclear weapons, agreement on further efforts designed to limit strategic offensive weapons, and on the adoption of measures designed to keep chemical weapons out of State arsenals. This without any doubt will facilitate further progress in carrying out measures on a multilateral basis designed to limit armaments and to lead to disarmament.

In the broad range of problems of disarmament now being considered by the First Committee of the General Assembly, a particularly important place belongs to the new Soviet initiative regarding the question of prohibiting action to influence the natural environment and the climate for military and other purposes, incompatible with the interests of international security, human well-being and health. The documents which have been submitted on this subject -- the letter of the Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in document A/9702; the draft resolution of which there are now 20 sponsors, and the draft international convention annexed to it, both contained in document A/C.1/6675; and also the statement of the representative of the USSR, Mr. Malik, of 21 October this year -- have amply explained the subject under discussion and have made a cogent presentation of the sense and significance of the Soviet initiative. The lively interest in this proposal displayed by a majority of delegations is entirely understandable.

First, this is a very broad potential sphere of military activity on the part of States, which has been opened up by the achievements of scientific and technological progress. Action to influence the weather and geophysical processes for military purposes even by way of experiment, not to mention meteorological and geophysical war itself, might lead to extremely grievous and, in a number of cases, unforeseeably and irreversibly destructive consequences.
Secondly, the proposal provides for the prohibition of the arms race in a new sphere. It is timely and far-sighted. It is designed to ensure that a solid barrier is erected today against the use of the natural environment and the climate for military purposes. It will be much more difficult to do this tomorrow.

Thirdly, the danger to the well-being and health of mankind which might be involved in action to influence meteorological and geophysical processes for military purposes, is something that affects all countries, great and small, developed and developing, members of military alliances and non-aligned countries; and if all countries are not in a position to wage so-called "weather war", any country can certainly become a victim of it. In any case, its consequences would be particularly catastrophic for States with a small territory and a high population density.

Fourthly, the implementation of the proposal under consideration would be a substantial contribution, not only to limiting the arms race which in itself of course is of vast significance but also in the preservation of the environment.

Fifthly, the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes would open up favourable possibilities for the broad development of international co-operation in the use of the achievements of science and technology in this field for the benefit of mankind.

The Byelorussian delegation believes that the adoption of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675 at this session of the General Assembly would be a good beginning in the preparation of an agreed text of an international convention prohibiting action to influence the environment for military purposes. We are entitled to expect that the Disarmament Committee will do its work quickly and will report on the results at the next session of the General Assembly. The Byelorussian SSR associates itself with the sponsors of the draft resolution, and we hope that this will be noted in the Journal and the First Committee's report.
The question of eliminating the danger of nuclear war has, for many years now, been at the centre of attention in many international forums and is the subject of discussion and talks at various levels. As has already been pointed out in the discussion, a great deal of work remains to be done in this area to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and actually to undertake the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals to the point where they can be totally eliminated. Today the situation is propitious for a solution to this vitally important problem and the United Nations should not lose the opportunities which present themselves.

In 1972, the General Assembly made a solemn declaration concerning the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We want the Security Council to give binding force to this solemn declaration. By taking such a decision the Council would be making an invaluable contribution to the strengthening of international security, furthering improvement in the political climate of the world and opening up new prospects for resolving the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR attaches great importance to international treaties and other international agreements concerning a limitation of the means of mass destruction, the prohibition of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and the principles governing the activities of States in research into and use of outer space, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, and the total prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons. The accession of all States to these international agreements and strict compliance with them is an urgent necessity.

In the same context, we want to see the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world -- and they must be genuinely nuclear-free zones, approved by the States in the zones. Agreement on them cannot contain any obscurities or loopholes, as, for example, the possibility of preserving or creating foreign bases armed with nuclear weapons, the transporting of such weapons or the carrying out of nuclear explosions in disregard of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
In connexion with agenda item 29, entitled "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban", the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, along with other delegations, notes with satisfaction that it has been possible to achieve progress in this area. As we know, in the course of the third Soviet-United States summit meeting in Moscow a treaty was concluded limiting underground nuclear-weapon testing and controlling the means of carrying out such tests by rational technical means. That treaty is a logical continuation of the 1963 Treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the three environments. It is designed to erect new obstacles to the perfecting of ever more dangerous forms of nuclear weapons and, therefore, merits approval by all States. We welcome that step, since our position is based on the peace programme put forward at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which, inter alia, provides for the calling of a halt everywhere by everyone to the testing of nuclear weapons, including underground testing.

As has already been pointed out in the statements of representatives of a number of countries, during the past year it has been possible to achieve some positive results in preparing for the convening of a world disarmament conference. The Ad Hoc Committee created by the General Assembly has been actively at work in a businesslike way. Not only the Soviet Union but two other nuclear Powers, Britain and France, have taken part in that work. The documents referred to in the study carried out by the Secretariat and in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee (A/9628) warrant the conclusion that we now have a unanimity of views by an overwhelming majority of States on the need for convening a world disarmament conference; and, without any doubt, that is a result of the atmosphere of international détente, which is so propitious for minimizing differences, and a result of consistent and persistent efforts by the socialist and non-aligned countries, which have so vigorously championed the idea of convening a world disarmament conference.
In the circumstances of détente, a world disarmament conference has become not only more possible but also more necessary, and we entirely share the view expressed in the Committee that the present situation calls for the early convening of the conference.

It is generally known that the opponents of such a conference have been attempting to create ever newer obstacles to convening it. Without of course going so far as to launch a frontal attack against the very idea of convening the conference, they have been putting forward various demands and imposing preliminary conditions, including those which could themselves be the subject of consideration by the conference itself. All that is being done with an obvious purpose: that of making it more difficult to convene the conference. Such a position should be resolutely resisted in the United Nations.

Some States are stressing the need for careful preparation for such a conference. We have no quarrel with that. The preparation for and the success of such a conference are obviously interconnected. But we cannot permit the idea that talks on careful preparation should be used by opponents of the conference for postponing it. The consideration of the question of convening such a conference has, in recent years, shown that the road is not a simple or short one and that it is the duty of all States to do everything in their power to reach the destination as soon as possible.

In our view, the conditions for an early convening of a world disarmament conference are now ripe. We must extend the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and ask it immediately to proceed to the preparation of concrete recommendations on the practical questions connected with the convening of the conference and to conclude the necessary preparatory work.

It would be appropriate to appeal to those permanent members of the Security Council which have not so far done so to comply with the General Assembly's decision in resolution 3193 (XXVIII) to maintain close contact and co-operation with the Ad Hoc Committee.

At the last session of the General Assembly, an impressive majority adopted a decision on the question of reducing the military budgets of States permanent
members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and on the use of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. What is shown by the documents that have been presented in connexion with that decision (A/9770 and A/9800)? Well, that is just one further confirmation of the importance of the USSR proposal which, if carried out, would be a real means of curbing the arms race and of further strengthening the process of détente.

The importance of that proposal lies in the fact that it is closely connected with the problem of development. Substantial funds could be diverted to urgent peaceful needs in countries which would be reducing their military budgets and, simultaneously, for the first time an opportunity would exist for increasing economic and technical assistance to developing countries by means of this new and, as estimates show, substantial source of funds.

It is no accident that the developing States, whose needs were so energetically and cogently demonstrated at the sixth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, have given strong support to this proposal. Indeed, both the socialist and the non-aligned States -- as we can see from the note by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/9800) -- in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3095 A (XXVIII), have nominated their candidates for the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets for purposes of assistance to developing countries as an addition to the assistance already being afforded them through existing channels.
However, as a result of the negative attitude of certain permanent members of the Security Council and a number of other Western countries, no meetings of the Special Committee have been held.

The situation with regard to implementation of the General Assembly resolution that would reduce military budgets is extremely illuminating. It makes it easier for us to understand who is responsible for the continuing arms race, and at the same time it reveals the need for further, concerted efforts on the part of all peace-loving countries to achieve implementation of the General Assembly's decision through a constructive attitude towards that decision on the part of every permanent member of the Security Council. We would like to call this to the attention of those representatives who, in their statements, in defiance of obvious facts draw no distinction between the position of the Soviet Union and that of other permanent members of the Security Council.

One of the most important aspects of disarmament, the solution of which has been inadmissibly protracted, is the matter of the total prohibition of chemical means for waging war. We attach great importance to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which is now in force, and to the convention recently elaborated which would prohibit the manufacture, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and require the destruction of all such weapons. We must produce and adopt a document that will entirely eliminate the danger of a "silent war". In this regard, the most appropriate basis for preparing such an international document would be the joint draft convention providing for the total prohibition of chemical weapons that was submitted as far back as 1972 in the Disarmament Committee on behalf of the socialist countries, including the Byelorussian SSR. The ball is now in the court of those Western Powers that already possess this weapon of mass destruction in their arsenals but have not so far shown any willingness to renounce it.

We welcome the joint initiative of the Soviet Union and the United States of America in the Disarmament Committee which, in our view, will prepare the way for the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention concerning the most dangerous and lethal chemical means of waging war.
The Byelorussian SSR attaches great importance to partial measures in the disarmament field, including those measures that place limits on the arms race and reduce the danger of nuclear war, and that have a kind of warning character. In the present circumstances, the achievement of agreement on partial disarmament measures is something both realistic and useful in that it strengthens trust among countries and creates opportunities for new and broader agreements. Unfortunately, a decision on many important aspects of disarmament is being rendered more difficult by the resistance of certain imperialist circles and by the negative attitude of the Peking leadership.

Like the majority of States, the Byelorussian SSR is a strong supporter of the achievement of the ultimate purpose of our efforts -- general and complete disarmament. We call upon all States to work for the adoption at this session of the General Assembly of decisions that will lead to a further strengthening of the process of détente and that will advance the search for agreed solutions to the problems of disarmament.
Mr. ENNALS (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, may I begin by offering you the congratulations of my delegation on your election as Chairman of this Committee. Your close association with the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and your wide knowledge of this complicated subject make your selection an admirable one. It therefore gives us particular pleasure to see you presiding over our deliberations. I should like also to congratulate the other officers of the Committee on their election.

I am grateful for this opportunity to address the First Committee of the General Assembly even though I have been able to join you only in the middle of your debate. I have followed with care the reports of the earlier stages of your discussions and noted the many interesting contributions that have been made. I want, in a moment, to address the important issues that have been raised, but first I hope you will allow me some general remarks.

Some years ago, the British Government -- a previous Labour administration -- expressed the fervent hope that the 1970s would see a reduction in the burden of armaments and the fear of war. The decade is nearly half over, and there would perhaps be agreement that the fear of war has been significantly reduced. The super-Power relationship is much healthier than it was. There have been tentative advances towards peace in the Middle East. In Europe there have been moves towards co-operation and détente, represented in concrete form by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the mutual balanced force reduction negotiations. My Government participates fully in these and our aim is to reach an agreement which will lower the level of armed forces in Central Europe and help to create greater stability while ensuring undiminished security for all.

But these advances could easily be reversed and there are still major areas of concern. There has been no clear reduction in the burden of armaments. World expenditure on arms has in real terms remained roughly constant in the last six years for which figures are available. There have been some reductions -- by NATO countries, for example -- but the expenditure of certain countries has risen to as much as 14 per cent of their gross domestic product.

Some may take comfort in the fact that, in real terms, world military spending does not seem to be rising; but this comfort is illusory. It is a
new truism that the world is facing economic problems of unprecedented severity. With crippling inflation, desperate food shortages, and widespread and demoralizing poverty all round us, there is no sanity in the present level of armaments expenditure. It makes no sense for those countries in greatest need to spend so much on weapons of war. It makes no sense for the world as a whole to spend over $200,000 million annually on arms -- a sum equal to the total income of more than half the world's people.

There is, of course, no easy formula for an early improvement in this situation. But it is of the greatest importance that the United Nations should continue to exert its moral authority in the direction of genuine disarmament; and by this I mean disarmament that releases resources for more constructive purposes.

If the level of armaments in general should cause us deep concern, the present and future position regarding nuclear armaments and missile technology can only, I believe, be viewed with grave anxiety. I agree with the Secretary-General when he speaks in the introduction to his report of the "almost unimaginable dangers for the survival of our civilization and the human race". (A/9601/Add.1, p. 16)
My own view is that this is the most important single problem facing the international community. It has the potential for disaster. Many of the other problems which confront us will mean great human deprivation and misery in the years ahead; but the threat of nuclear proliferation carries the seed of destruction on a mass scale. The more countries which possess the capacity for mass destruction, the greater the danger that at some stage these weapons will be used.

We need to face some very striking facts. The International Atomic Energy Agency recorded the existence in 1970 of 101 nuclear power reactors; it estimated that by 1978 this number would have risen to 329. The plutonium from such reactors is estimated to rise from 30,000 kilogrammes a year in 1975 to 380,000 a year by 1985. The world energy crisis means that these forecasts are probably underestimates. At all events, at least 20 States could soon possess the equipment and the know-how to develop a nuclear explosive capability. Only about half of those States are at present parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

The question we must ask is: will 1975 be the year in which the non-proliferation régime was finally destroyed, or will it be the turning point when the new dangers were recognized and contained, with proper provision made for the extension to all States of the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology?

My Government believes that the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 remains the best available means of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive technology. We attach the highest importance to the review conference of the Treaty, which is to be held in Geneva in May of next year. When the Treaty was signed, we believed that it would at least freeze the number of nuclear weapon States. We also hoped, and still hope, that its obligations would encourage further progress with arms limitation agreements. The review conference gives us a make-or-break opportunity. Indeed, as the Australian Prime Minister has said, we have perhaps about a year, perhaps two years at the most.
We warmly welcome the statements of the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Japan at this Assembly session in which they announced their Governments' intentions towards the Treaty and towards participation in the review conference. About two thirds of the States Members of the United Nations are now parties to the Treaty. But as the Soviet Foreign Minister Mr. Gromyko, told this Assembly on 24 September, "The objective is to make this Treaty universal" (A/PV.2240. pp. 68-70).

It would help greatly to reduce the fear of our peoples if the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency were applied to the nuclear programmes of all States. The Minister of External Affairs of Canada has proposed that all States should undertake not to transfer nuclear technology or materials, except under international supervision, and that they should also place the fissile material which they hold for peaceful purposes under the same régime. He also proposed that the nuclear-weapon States should, as a first step, place their civil and peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. The United Kingdom has already voluntarily offered to accept such arrangements, and we are making good progress in negotiating an agreement with the IAEA to give effect to our offer.

Another very important aspect of the Treaty which must be considered at the review conference is that of peaceful nuclear explosions. When the Treaty was signed in 1968, there was some optimism that substantial economic benefits would flow from the development of peaceful explosions. My Government did not share that optimism. We follow developments in this field very closely, and still consider that there is no convincing evidence that peaceful nuclear explosions will soon become an economically viable engineering technique. While we need to arrange, as article V of the non-proliferation Treaty states, that non-nuclear weapon States should have access to any potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions, it is in the interests of all of us to ensure that the technology and materials involved cannot be used to promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This is a sensitive subject which is rightfully occupying much attention in this Assembly. It is bound to be a matter of pre-eminent concern wherever arms control is taken seriously. It has, of course, highly technical aspects, and I am glad to note that in pursuance of the resolutions of this Assembly, the IAEA is engaging itself more deeply in the problem. For our part, we shall give the Agency all the help we can in this endeavour.

I have said that non-proliferation is the most important single problem facing the international community. What action should we take together in the immediate future to tackle it?

First, I would suggest, the parties to the Treaty must take the opportunity of next year's review conference to initiate a drive for the widest possible adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty. I believe that the hesitations of those who have yet to join the Treaty are misplaced, and we should welcome an opportunity of setting their fears at rest and of working together with them.

Secondly, we must take steps to ensure that the Treaty is implemented in such a way as to make its benefits fully apparent to all.

Thirdly, we must all work for the extension and improvement of IAEA safeguards to the nuclear programmes of all -- and, I repeat: all -- States. I find it difficult to follow the argument that one cannot accept international safeguards on one's own peaceful nuclear activities until all other States have done so. Certain countries, not even parties to the Treaty, have already shown the way in accepting the principle of safeguards. As for my country, as I have already indicated, we have voluntarily offered to accept such arrangements.

Fourthly, we must direct our activities to the problem, as I have said, of peaceful nuclear explosions.

My Government attaches the highest importance to efforts that are already being made to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race. Let me be specific.
We welcome the progress made in the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. We recognize the contribution which the international community can make by urging further limitation of the nuclear arms race. At the same time, we believe that these bilateral talks offer the best hope, in present circumstances, of achieving progress.

We welcome the commitment made by the two sides to seek a new agreement on strategic offensive arms covering the period to 1985 and dealing with both quantitative and qualitative limitations.
The two super-Powers also announced this year the signature of a 
threshold agreement on underground nuclear tests. My Government has already 
welcomed this agreement and has declared that the United Kingdom will support it. 
We hope that others will follow our lead in voluntarily committing themselves 
to abide by its provisions.

In their agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their 
determination to pursue the goal of a comprehensive test ban, and this has been 
further discussed in CCD in Geneva. My Government's objective remains the 
conclusion of a test ban treaty, covering all countries and all environments. 
This would be a very important contribution to restricting the further 
development of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty can only be of real value if it 
includes adequate verification arrangements -- and by this I mean arrangements 
which satisfy all parties concerned. In this connexion, we have made available 
to CCD details of our own research into the possibilities of remote seismic 
monitoring which would make it possible, for example, to distinguish between 
earthquakes and man-made explosions.

Before turning to non-nuclear matters, may I say how my Government views 
the concept of nuclear-free zones -- the subject of several proposals on our 
agenda. We sympathize with the motives which lead States to work together to 
create nuclear-free zones. But we believe it is important to try to satisfy 
certain criteria when examining proposals for nuclear-free zones. First, the 
decision to form such a zone should be taken freely and voluntarily by the 
States concerned in the region. Secondly, the creation of such a zone should 
not disturb the existing military balance in the area. Thirdly, if possible, 
all States in the zone, and certainly all who have significant military forces, 
should be included. Finally, there should be arrangements for adequate 
international verification, for example, IAEA safeguards. My delegation 
is examining with interest the proposal made by the representative of Finland 
that the time has now come to undertake a comprehensive study of the question 
of nuclear-free zones.

My Government took the lead in acceding to Additional Protocols I and II 
of the Treaty of Tlatelolco creating the Latin American nuclear-free zone. 
We hope that those regional members who have not yet acceded to the Treaty 
will soon be able to do so, and we are conscious that this Treaty has set an
example which could usefully be followed by establishing nuclear-free zones elsewhere, provided the necessary conditions are met.

The question of chemical weapons is occupying CCD in Geneva. The Japanese Government deserves congratulations for its initiative in proposing a draft treaty. This has brought fresh thinking to the subject, and in particular to the important problem of verification. My Government's view is that effective verification -- as in virtually all arms control measures -- is an absolute essential. We have also welcomed the announcement made in Moscow last July that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to consider a joint initiative in CCD aimed at the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention covering the most deadly chemical weapons, and we therefore hope that discussion of the ideas of these two Governments will enable CCD to make important progress towards a convention which all countries could accept.

Then there is the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons, which has been discussed at the recent conference of experts in Lucerne on weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. Here we are dealing less with mass destruction and more with the horrible effects of certain weapons on individuals. It seemed to us that one of the encouraging aspects of the Lucerne conference was to reveal that the concerns of experts on weapons, on the one hand, and of humanitarians, on the other, did indeed overlap. Both parties share an interest that weapons should be so constructed as to cause worse injuries than limited military aims require. However, the discussions have also served to remind us that this concern has in the past led to little constructive action due to a lack of knowledge about the actual characteristics and effects of different weapons. This conference brought together, for the first time since the Second World War, those who procure and deploy weapons and those who have to care for the soldiers and civilians wounded by them. This is a very useful start towards an international commitment to obtain and share greater knowledge about weapons and their effects and will, we hope, lead to further positive action.

My Government is studying with interest the new Soviet proposal for a draft convention prohibiting action that would influence the environment and climate for military purposes. We agree that effective measures should be taken,
and I support the proposal to refer this subject to CCD where the ideas of interested States should be brought together and examined in detail.

The proposal that States should make reductions in their military budgets has been covered in an interesting report by the Panel of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General following the adoption of the resolution proposed a year ago by the representative of Mexico. This seems to me to be a suitable subject for early further study in CCD. I am glad to see that the report concludes that there are certain conditions for success in this enterprise. The first is that there has to be a sufficient degree of trust between nations; and the second that there has to be a sufficient supply of information to maintain the participants' confidence that any agreements are being observed. As members of this Committee will know, my Government publishes full information on contents of the United Kingdom defence budget, and we urge other Governments to follow this example. This requirement has also been set out very clearly in the proposals tabled by the Swedish delegation at CCD calling for more openness in the publication of military budgets. I might add that my Government is moving towards the conclusion of a thorough and extensive review of defence commitments and capabilities which will lead to substantial cuts in our defence expenditure.
More generally, there is the proposal for a world disarmament conference, which has been referred to this morning. We recognize that such a conference might serve to concentrate the attention of all States on the whole range of possible disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. However, as is the case with world conferences on other subjects, it is important to ensure that all major military Powers, including, of course, all nuclear-weapon States, would take an active part. And the conference would need very careful preparation if there were to be a reasonable chance that it would produce effective results and not be a disappointment to our peoples.

May I therefore conclude by summarizing the most important aims of the disarmament policies of my Government. They are:

First, international action to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and the transfer of nuclear technology from one country to another without effective international supervision. This means reinforcing the non-proliferation Treaty and setting up proper international machinery to deal with peaceful nuclear explosions.

Secondly, a universal reduction of arms expenditure.

Thirdly, the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty with an adequate system of verification.

Fourthly, a successful outcome to the mutual balanced forced reduction negotiations which could contribute significantly to a more stable relationship between East and West.

Fifthly, the completion of an international convention; with an effective system of verification, to ban the most deadly chemical weapons and eventually all such weapons.

Sixthly, encouragement of the formation of nuclear-free zones in conditions that will genuinely promote peace and security in certain areas.

Seventhly, more active national and international efforts to obtain and share greater knowledge about weapons, such as incendiaries, that might cause unnecessary suffering with a view to considering further positive action.

Eighthly, early consideration of a convention to prohibit action which attempts to affect the environment and climate for military purposes.
Mr. Chairman, may I repeat the reassurance that my Government will continue to work with other Governments energetically to pursue disarmament. It is in the interests of the United Kingdom and of the world community that we should do so.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom for the very cordial words that he was so good as to address to me and for the congratulations that he addressed to the officers of the Committee.

MR. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): Mr. Chairman, first of all I should like to add my personal felicitations and good wishes to those already expressed to you by the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic. While endorsing the well-deserved praises of your personal qualities and diplomatic ability expressed by previous speakers, I am happy to be able to express also a special note of appreciation of your outstanding contribution to the establishment of friendly relations between our two countries.

Lately the problems of disarmament have been discussed here in the General Assembly and in other international forums in more favourable circumstances stemming from the ever-growing recognition of the principles of peaceful coexistence of States with differing social systems and the wider application of those principles in inter-State relations. Equally important is the other aspect of such a development of events. That is, the achievement of any progress -- even a modest one -- in the cessation of the arms race and disarmament makes a tangible contribution to the strengthening of mutual trust among States and nations. Furthermore, practical steps in this direction help curtail the material basis of wars and conflicts and simultaneously contribute to bringing about a more stable foundation for international co-operation in the economic, scientific and technical fields. One supplements and sustains the other.
Further, it is characteristic of recent years that the number of international forums -- both multilateral and bilateral -- dealing with the problems of strengthening international security, the cessation of the arms race and disarmament has increased. In our opinion, a new discernible tendency lies also in the fact that, parallel with the measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, new initiatives are under active discussion whose implementation would have an immediate and materially felt impact on a wide range of States. In this regard, my delegation has in view the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and, last but not least, the proposal of the Soviet Union on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries.

Bearing in mind all that I have said, my delegation fully shares the view expressed here that opportunities for making progress in the field of disarmament are far greater today than they were earlier. It is to be regretted, however, that so far the cause of disarmament is advancing slowly. Moreover, the arms race, and especially that of nuclear armament, still continues, absorbing enormous material and human resources, which otherwise could have been utilized for productive purposes. Involved here are a considerable number of objective and subjective factors, including the highly complex nature of the disarmament problems themselves. The advocates of the "cold war" and of the interests of the so-called military-industrial complex, and also adventurist forces in certain countries are trying to reverse the process of détente and to put obstacles in the way of disarmament negotiations.

My delegation is, of course, among those that express their dissatisfaction over the present state of affairs in the field of disarmament. However, we wish to state that such a situation in no way
gives anyone the right to denounce everything that has been achieved as a result of great efforts and arduous negotiations and virtually to call for an unchecked arms race. I must add that distorting the truth in order to further one's untenable schemes is not a serious approach to vital issues such as disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation has pointed out here and in other international forums that the non-participation of certain nuclear Powers in disarmament negotiations in fact presents a serious obstacle to the realization of cardinal measures in the field of disarmament.
At the same time, it is a source of encouragement that the forces really interested in promoting the disarmament cause have been redoubling their efforts to utilize every opportunity to make new achievements. Taking advantage of the present favourable momentum is in the interests of all countries and peoples alike.

Having made these general observations, my delegation now wishes briefly to touch upon some of the issues on this Committee's agenda.

Like the overwhelming majority of delegations here, the Mongolian delegation considers the prevention of thermonuclear war the most pressing problem of today. To begin from the political aspect of this problem, my delegation places great emphasis on giving binding force to the historic resolution of the General Assembly wherein the Assembly solemnly declared, on behalf of the States Members of the Organization, their renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The responsibility for the implementation of this urgent task rests primarily with the permanent members of the Security Council. In the light of this, we see inter alia the importance and value of the Soviet-American agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, whereby the parties agreed that one objective of their policies was to remove the danger of nuclear war and the danger of the use of nuclear weapons.

By the same token, the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic submits that acceptance by the People's Republic of China of the proposal of the Soviet Union to conclude between them an agreement on renouncing the use of force, including conventional and nuclear weapons, would constitute a significant move towards prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and eventually staving off thermonuclear catastrophe. Such an action might induce the other nuclear Powers to commit themselves, in a way acceptable to them, not to use nuclear weapons. If such a situation occurred, it would not be difficult for the Security Council to give those commitments an appropriate uniform expression. It is incumbent upon the Security Council, especially on its permanent members, to make efforts expeditiously to find a proper way of making the aforementioned declaration of the General Assembly a binding international instrument.
Complete and total disarmament is the material prerequisite for ensuring peace and preventing thermonuclear war. Positive developments have already occurred in the direction of checking the nuclear-missile armaments race. Among the important multilateral undertakings in this field, the 1963 Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in three environments and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons deserve, of course, a special place. The well-known Soviet-American agreements lately concluded in the field of strategic arms limitation are of great significance for lessening the danger of thermonuclear war.

The objective now is to strengthen the existing instruments and to supplement them with new ones. In this regard, my delegation attaches special importance to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is rightly considered by many to be the most important multilateral instrument concluded to save mankind from a thermonuclear holocaust. For this reason the strengthening of this important instrument would meet the interests of all States and peoples. However, much to our regret, the said Treaty has not yet become completely universal. We are concerned that a considerable number of States, including certain nuclear Powers and a number of so-called near-nuclear Powers, are staying outside the Treaty, some of them deliberately.

The Mongolian delegation time and again has spoken here and in the Committee on Disarmament in favour of invigorating the efforts both of the parties to the Treaty and of the United Nations with a view to enlisting as many States as possible. In this connexion, my delegation shares the interesting idea expressed here by the delegation of Finland that the present General Assembly session could be utilized for the purpose of appropriate consultations with those countries which are or may be interested in the Treaty, so that as many as possible could become Parties to it prior to the review conference.

My delegation considers that the review conference should be prepared in such a manner as to make it instrumental in reaffirming the important role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the field of the limitation of the arms race and the consolidation of peace and security. In my opinion, the work done by the Preparatory Committee for that conference during
its recent two sessions gives one grounds for saying that the aforesaid goal can be accomplished. My delegation expresses the hope that those States which have not yet acceded to the Treaty will display political will in the interests of universal peace and security and will follow the example of those countries which have already completed or started the necessary constitutional procedures to join the non-proliferation Treaty before the review conference.

Concerned with the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, my delegation wishes to state that it is in favour of international consideration of the question of the implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and in favour of the establishment of effective safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the export of fissionable materials and special equipment to non-nuclear States.

The total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests would be of immense importance in arresting the arms race. It is regrettable that, notwithstanding the efforts of the overwhelming majority of States, the results so far achieved in this vital field have fallen far short of our desired goal. Moreover, the provisions of the 1963 Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in three environments are very often violated. The Mongolian people and their Government, which firmly stand for the banning of all types of nuclear-weapon tests, have a special additional reason for strongly protesting against atmospheric testing.

We express the hope that the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests will serve as a stimulus to the cessation of nuclear weapon testing by all States in all environments. In this light, of great importance is the repeatedly stated readiness of the Soviet Union for a total ban on underground nuclear weapon tests, with control by national means of verification.
In fact this was again reaffirmed by the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Roschin, at the 2002nd meeting of this Committee. What is now called for is political will on the part of the United States to agree to such a total prohibition. In this connexion, it should be noted that a great majority of the American public, the scientific community as well as many Congressmen have come out in favour of the complete cessation of underground tests, which is evident, inter alia, from the letter sent to Mr. Nixon, former United States President, by 37 senators on 25 June 1974 -- that is, on the eve of his visit to the Soviet Union -- urging him to accept the Soviet proposal to negotiate a complete prohibition of underground tests.

Those who oppose the comprehensive prohibition of all types of nuclear-weapon tests should give heed to the demand of the majority of United Nations Members and the world community at large.

Lately, the question of creating nuclear-free zones has been attracting increasing attention in the context of the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. My delegation, in principle, supports such initiatives, considering them essentially aimed at preventing the territorial diffusion of nuclear weapons and, thus, at strengthening regional as well as global security. Furthermore, my delegation is of the view that the creation of such zones should be a product of collective action on the part of all States of a given region, without any discrimination. In approaching individual proposals on this score, we will determine our position on the basis of the above considerations.

Now I would like to dwell briefly on the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The position of my Government on this question is well known to the Members of this Committee, and in addition, my delegation has expounded it on more than one occasion with regard to the specific aspects of the problem, including those of the scope of the prohibition and the verification thereof. Hence, I wish only to say a few words in connexion with some new elements in dealing with the problem under discussion.

As is known, the consideration of this question during recent years here in the General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament has shown that some Western Powers are lacking the will to accept complete prohibition of this type of weapon of mass destruction. This has virtually brought the matter to a deadlock.

The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic, as one of the sponsors
of the well-known draft convention submitted by nine socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament as far back as 1972, has consistently advocated the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. At the same time, my delegation, like many others, taking into account the situation obtaining now, is prepared to take a flexible stand and consider various possible means of achieving the ultimate goal.

It is in this light that we favourably approach the statement of intent by the USSR and the United States of America, which agreed to consider a joint initiative in CCD with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of warfare. It is the hope of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic that this initiative, when realized, would open up better prospects for progress in the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. At the same time, we wish to state that the first possible partial step should be comprehensive enough. In other words, the ban should cover the widest possible categories of means of chemical warfare and it should be capable of bringing about a virtual elimination of the danger of chemical war.

In the light of a possible step-by-step solution of the problem, the question of the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by the States which have not done so assumes a qualitatively new significance. We attach a special importance to ratification of this Protocol by all States which possess considerable chemical weapon potential and, in the first place, by the United States.

My delegation has always attached great significance to ensuring universal adherence to this important international instrument. In 1969, on the eve of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing, our delegation, with the support and encouragement of many others, took a modest initiative aimed at further strengthening the Protocol. Accordingly, at its twenty-fourth session the General Assembly issued a special appeal to all Governments which had not yet done so to ratify or accede to the Protocol in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

It is noteworthy in this connexion that, in 1970, a record number of States in the history of the Protocol -- namely 15 States -- acceded to it. Thus, the appeal of the General Assembly found a gratifying response.
My delegation considers it all the more appropriate that, in connexion with the forthcoming half-centenary of this instrument, the General Assembly at its present session should issue a similar appeal to all States which, for different reasons, have not yet ratified or acceded to it.

In this connexion, we welcome and thank the representatives of the Soviet Union, the Hungarian People's Republic and the Polish People's Republic who have devoted special attention to this important question in their statements and who have endorsed the idea of issuing a special appeal by the General Assembly on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Protocol.

My delegation expresses its confident hope that the General Assembly will find it appropriate and feasible to follow the good precedent initiated at the twenty-fourth session which evoked a wide response.

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to underscore that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic attaches great importance to the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons. It is indispensable that as many countries as possible and, in the first place, all the depositary Powers ratify the convention so that it becomes an international instrument effectively excluding one type of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of States.

I have not touched today on some other questions relating to disarmament which are on the agenda of the Committee, hoping that my delegation will have a chance to express itself on them at a later stage of the Committee's proceedings.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Dugersuren of Mongolia for the words of friendship which he was so good as to address to me.

Mr. BANDA (Zambia): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my delegation, I wish to begin by congratulating you on your election as Chairman of this most important Committee. My delegation is well acquainted with your outstanding talents and diplomatic skill, virtues which you have indeed displayed with distinction since the commencement of our work.

Similarly, my delegation would like to congratulate the two Vice Chairmen and the Rapporteur on their well deserved election. The quality of the officers of the Committee gives us confidence that this Committee will respond satisfactorily to the challenge posed by the complex yet vital issues before it.

We are gathered, once again, to take stock of the successes or failures of the international community in the pursuit of the lofty goal of general and complete disarmament. This inevitably means that we must examine the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) which to date remains, despite its shortcomings, the singularly most important forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations.

Last year, the General Assembly urged CCD to give priority consideration to a draft convention on chemical weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. My delegation, which naturally attaches a lot of importance to those questions, has carefully studied the report of CCD. We cannot conceal our disappointment that it has once again failed to reach agreement on both questions.

Indeed, we note that the only tangible result of the work of CCD this year has been the agreement to invite five States to join it as new members with effect from 1 January 1974. My delegation takes this opportunity to congratulate those new members, in particular, the sister Republic of Zaire. We are confident that they will make a positive and valuable contribution to the work of CCD. But we are realistic enough not to expect any miracles from it as a result of the new additions to its ranks. The basic problems connected with its structure and procedures remain. We would have hoped
that when deciding on the question of enlargement, CCD would have seized the opportunity to revise the present system of super-Power co-chairmanship and to transform itself into a truly multilateral forum by effecting balanced regional representation. It remains our conviction that ways and means must be sought to secure the participation in CCD of the two nuclear countries, still outside it. CCD must be made attractive.

I spoke earlier about the disappointment of my delegation at the inability of CCD to reach agreement with regard to a convention on chemical weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. This is not to say we do not appreciate the efforts of a number of members of CCD, particularly the non-aligned group. It is precisely in view of their tireless efforts that we are disappointed. We do not believe that the problems involved are insurmountable. It seems to us that what is lacking is political will on the part of those who hold the key.

Nuclear disarmament cannot but remain the number one priority of the international community. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat of our time. My Government has persistently advocated a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, for we believe that nuclear weapons as such, irrespective of who acquires them, are inimical to human survival. They are not any less dangerous if they are in the hands of a privileged few. As we see it, the issue therefore is not to prevent others from acquiring nuclear weapons while some do and continue to perfect them qualitatively and, also, quantitatively to add to their stockpiles. Rather the issue is to stop the proliferation of those weapons by all States without exception and immediately to seek the destruction of the existing stockpiles. That is why we deplore equally and unreservedly both the atmospheric and underground nuclear weapon tests conducted this year.

In connexion with the foregoing, and having regard to the review conference scheduled for next year, my delegation deems it necessary to state that the position of principle of the Zambian Government with regard to the non-proliferation Treaty remains unchanged. We continue to regard the non-proliferation Treaty as grossly discriminatory. We wish to express the hope that the review conference will give a serious and realistic appraisal
of the Treaty and seek ways and means of making its character and import such as to merit universal acceptance.

On this date of the opening in Rome of the World Food Conference, we can do no less than stress once again the link between disarmament and development. Millions of people are threatened with death as a result of a world-wide food crisis. Yet thousands of millions of dollars continue to be wasted every year in a senseless arms race. It goes without saying that, if genuine and concrete measures for disarmament were taken, the world would be able to divert this money to feeding the hungry and to economic and social development in general, an urgent and more worthwhile cause.

My Government remains unflinching in its belief that a world disarmament conference is not only desirable but also an urgent imperative. But, as we have repeatedly stated, we also believe that there should be full and active participation of all nuclear countries in that conference. It is for this reason that we were gratified at the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference at the last session of the General Assembly, whose task was to seek ways and means of reconciling the differences among States concerning this important question. Zambia was privileged to be a member of the Ad Hoc Committee. In our opinion, the Ad Hoc Committee has served a useful purpose. It is indeed a source of encouragement to us that three nuclear countries participated directly in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. The other two nuclear countries maintained contact with the Committee through its Chairman.

My delegation believes that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee should be renewed. The summary of views and suggestions expressed by governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference, which forms part of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, testifies to the fact that the overwhelming majority of States would like the conference to be convened as soon as possible. It is therefore important that we remain relentless in our efforts to resolve existing differences. With patience, perseverance and political will on the part of all of us, this should be possible. It goes without saying that prior to the convening of the conference, we shall need to undertake thorough preparations.

I cannot leave this all-important subject without paying a tribute to Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran for his impressive performance as Chairman of the
Ad Hoc Committee. I similarly wish to record my delegation's appreciation of the efforts of the Rapporteur of that Committee and Chairman of the Working Group, Mr. Elias of Spain.

Another item on our agenda which is of particular interest to my delegation is that relating to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Quite frankly, we are rather disappointed with the almost total lack of progress towards the realization of the objectives of that Declaration. It is a sad reality that the attitude of the great Powers towards this noble objective has, on the whole, not only been negative but also cynical.

There can be no doubt that the escalation of great Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean constitutes a direct and serious threat to the littoral and hinterland States of the ocean and to international peace and security in general. Moreover, it makes a mockery of the much professed process of détente. We therefore urge the great Powers to respect the aspirations of the countries of the region and to co-operate fully with the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, whose task it is to seek the realization of the objectives of the Declaration.

In connexion with the foregoing, I cannot over-emphasize our concern at the growing military collaboration between certain NATO countries and the racist régime of South Africa. Only last week we witnessed in the Security Council a clear manifestation of bankruptcy in moral principles on the part of those countries. On the altar of expediency, they sacrificed the very principles of justice and democracy which they hypocritically profess every day. We in Africa and all progressive forces around the world cannot but draw appropriate conclusions.

You will note that in this short intervention, my delegation has not addressed itself to all the disarmament items on our agenda. I wish therefore to reserve the right of my delegation to speak on the rest of the items, or at least some of them, at a later stage of our work.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Zambia for his very kind words to all the officers of the Committee.
Mr. OLCAY (Turkey) (interpretation from French): Today I should like to make a few general comments on the disarmament items on our Committee's agenda.

In spite of a number of resolutions on nuclear tests adopted by the General Assembly with a view to prohibiting them from all environments, nuclear tests continue both underground and in the atmosphere. With all due respect for the views of countries which consider that they must continue their nuclear testing, we very much share the grave concern of the overwhelming majority of States and world public opinion at the continuation of these tests. We believe that, whatever their nature and objective, they should be stopped by common consent as soon as possible.

We regret, therefore, that it has not been possible to conclude a treaty finally and completely prohibiting all experimental nuclear explosions and therefore support any initiative likely to bring nuclear tests to an end once and for all and hope that a treaty, including verification provisions, as appropriate, will be produced as soon as possible -- because only a treaty of that kind, agreed to by all countries, primarily by all nuclear and near-nuclear Powers, can broaden the scope of détente. It would also protect the world from the dangers of radioactive pollution and considerably slow down the nuclear arms race.

That is why we welcome the threshold treaty on limiting underground nuclear testing concluded this year in Moscow between the United States and the Soviet Union as a second important step towards this objective since the Moscow Treaty, a step towards the realization of the final objective, the cessation of all nuclear testing.

We have also noted with satisfaction the undertaking by the two parties to continue negotiations along these lines. We hope that they will start talks without awaiting the actual coming into force of the agreement. We would also like to see the immediate application of the provisions of the agreement relating to the exchange of scientific data to facilitate the detection of nuclear tests, which we believe can strengthen mutual trust and open the way to a final agreement on this vital question.
However, it is important that research into, production and peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be jeopardized, because this new source of energy is so promising in the various fields of economics, science and sociology and can open new prospects for the whole of mankind. That is the reason why we feel it might be preferable to give an international body control over all nuclear explosions; in other words, give it the right to conduct nuclear explosions if it deems fit and to make available to the world the scientific data flowing from such explosions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind. As suggested by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, the International Atomic Energy Agency should be called upon to prepare a detailed study on this subject.

Another urgent problem we face is that of banning chemical weapons. Since I had an opportunity last year to state in detail the Turkish views on this subject, I shall confine myself on this occasion to saying that the banning of chemical weapons is a matter of keen concern to my Government, which hopes for the complete and effective prohibition of such weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles by a universally accepted agreement. Since the problem of control over those arms will take time, we prefer to reach our objective by stages.

In our view, the draft convention on this subject presented by Japan concerning the prohibition of chemical agents, which would be banned first, in the light of verification measures, can be considered a good point of departure. Furthermore, the strengthening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the banning of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons could -- by ensuring universal participation in it and withdrawing the reservations of States parties to it -- also be considered a useful way of banning the weapons in question. To this end, I should like once again to draw attention to the fact that Turkey is a party to that Protocol and has been since 1929. I should also like to add that my country is also aiming at the objective of imposing international restrictions on the use of certain weapons deemed to be particularly cruel.
I should like now to turn to the subject of denuclearized and peace zones created or to be created in various parts of the world. At the present time, if I am not mistaken, there are five proposals that have been officially submitted for the Committee's consideration. Several suggestions have also been made on this subject. Two of the five proposals were put forward by two friendly sister States -- Iran and Pakistan -- and it is with great interest that we take note of their initiatives -- one concerning the Middle East and the other South Asia.

Turkey has, in principle, always been in favour of creating such zones. My country's policy on this important point has not changed. We consider nuclear-free zones and peace zones as useful ways of easing tension, as an important regional measure on the way to general and complete disarmament, as stated by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly.

Viewed from this standpoint, Turkey considers that any proposal aimed at creating denuclearized and peace zones would be more valuable if all the countries in a particular zone and all the States involved in it would agree to take part in its establishment or to respect it. In our view, such arrangements should also provide the interested parties and the world community with an international guarantee that these provisions would actually be applied.

Although most of my country is in Asia, Turkey is bound by innumerable links to the European continent and we are geographically a part of that continent and a great part of our history is involved with it. Turkey is at present taking part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and in the negotiations on mutual balanced reduction of armaments and forces in Central Europe. The Geneva conference is dealing primarily with the political aspects of European security and co-operation, while the Vienna negotiations are dealing with the military aspects of European security.
Although the two subjects are being discussed in two different forums, it is clear that these two processes are interdependent. What we hope is that as soon as possible, and simultaneously, we shall be able to achieve concrete results in the two bodies to the benefit of military and political security, and of co-operation in Europe.

Turkey has taken part in these efforts, and continues to do so, actively and consistently, and hopes that the talks will have favourable repercussions not only in Europe but also in other regions, primarily the Mediterranean region and the surrounding countries; for in our view, European security cannot be total and complete unless it goes hand in hand with the security of the Mediterranean area and the surrounding countries.

The geographical situation of Turkey highlights the importance of these links, in which of necessity my country must have a great interest. Situated within the confines of the European and the Asian continents, at the cross-roads of intercontinental, maritime and land routes linking north to south and east to west, a country which is at one and the same time a Mediterranean, a Middle-Eastern and a Balkan country, Turkey cannot favour any of these regions over any of the others, because of its security interests. Thus in our view all these regions form and will continue to form one indivisible whole.

One last word on this subject. We believe that the Finnish suggestion to study the situation with regard to proposals for demilitarized zones has a great deal to recommend it. We also welcome with interest the Soviet proposal relating to the prohibition of action to influence the environment and the climate for military purposes and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health. We believe that this question merits constructive discussion, inasmuch as it could expand the scope of efforts under way to achieve disarmament. Furthermore, we agree that the protection of the environment is one of the imperatives for the good of future generations.
I come now to the question of the world disarmament conference. We believe, in this regard, that the Ad Hoc Committee established within the framework of resolution 3183 (XXVIII) of the General Assembly has performed the task entrusted to it under the chairmanship of the representative of Iran, Ambassador Hoveyda, who has once again displayed his exceptional endowments of tact, wisdom, persistence, and patience. Permit me also to take this opportunity to pay special tribute to Mr. Elias, the representative of Spain, who, as Rapporteur of the Ad Hoc Committee and Chairman of the Working Group, played an important and decisive part in the performance of the Committee's difficult task.

An examination of the report in document A/9628 reveals that the idea of convening a world disarmament conference at the earliest possible time is accepted in principle by a very large number of States, in the hope that such a conference, enjoying the participation of all countries, could give new impetus to the whole problem of general and complete disarmament, a question which, in its current state of stagnation, is a cause of concern to all mankind at this time when the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, goes uninterrupted on its way.

My country, on preliminary examination, has welcomed with sympathy the initiative taken on this subject by the Soviet Union. In principle, we favour the convening of a world disarmament conference. But what we would like is to be certain, as far as we can be, of the success of this initiative. As a member of the Ad Hoc Committee of the World Disarmament Conference, the work of which we have followed with particular attention, we feel that at the present time it would be better to have the old Ad Hoc Committee continue its work under a new mandate, drawn up by common consent, on the conditions necessary for the scrisus work of preparation and for universal participation, including that of the five nuclear Powers, in one way or another, in the preliminary work and in the Conference itself.
Mr. GIAMBRUNO (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): Before beginning my statement, Mr. Chairman, I wish to address to you my warmest congratulations on your unanimous election, which is a just reward for the high esteem in which you are held in the United Nations and which represents to us Latin Americans, particularly to us Uruguayans who are so closely linked to your country, a true source of pride.

I shall devote this statement, which will be as brief as possible, to the items relating to denuclearization and particularly to those agenda items now under discussion that are directly connected with the contribution our region has made to the all-important task of disarmament in creating, by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first denuclearized zone of the inhabited world.

Military denuclearization by zones is indisputably one of the most important contributions to disarmament and to peace. It is the practical, effective and realistic way, in keeping with existing conditions and possibilities, to exempt vast areas of the planet from the possibility of nuclear warfare and to isolate the nuclear-weapon Powers in a kind of quarantine so as to reduce to the greatest extent possible the danger of a horrendous nuclear confrontation.

Hence our interest in seeing denuclearized zones spread and multiply; and hence the importance of the debate we are holding this year concerning such zones, inasmuch as it will make it possible for the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, the Balkans and the countries of northern Europe, in addition to those of Latin America, jointly to succeed in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

I do not wish to tire the attention of this Committee by making historical references to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has set up an international organ, OPANAL, for the control and supervision of the system of the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
In this connexion, I would recall here the happy circumstance that one of our colleagues in the First Committee, a Latin American outstanding for his contribution to the United Nations -- no less a person than the President of last year's General Assembly session, Mr. Leopoldo Benites -- was the first Secretary-General of OPANAL, in which capacity he initiated much useful work now being tirelessly carried forward by my compatriot and friend, the eminent Uruguayan jurist and professor, Ambassador Hector Gros Espiell.

I wish now to give a brief account of the status of this Treaty as proof of its growing acceptance and importance.

Twenty-one Latin American States have already signed and ratified it and 18 are Parties to it. The fundamental importance which our countries attach to this question, and the need to keep the attention of the international community focused on the matter through the General Assembly, which took such an important part in the process of drafting the Tlatelolco Treaty, will become obvious when shortly the representative of Mexico, Mr. Alfonso Garcia-Robles, on behalf of all of us, with his customary clarity and indisputable knowledge, analyses the draft resolutions which we shall be submitting under the two agenda items on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the two additional Protocols. I am making this personal reference since no one is better able than he -- who can justly be called the architect of this valuable system -- clearly to express the thinking of Latin America.

As regards the status of the Treaty, I also wish to express publicly my congratulations to the delegation of Chile, whose Government, in the month of October last, without reservation deposited its instrument of ratification of the Treaty, thus raising the number of ratifications to 21 and giving an example which will surely be followed shortly by those very few Latin American countries that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty but which, in one way or another, have expressed their agreement with its objectives.
In the light of the present trend, we may confidently expect that another South American sister country -- Guyana -- which has expressed a wish to sign the Treaty, will, when existing difficulties are overcome, be able to do so in the coming months; and we appeal to the two new members of the Latin American community, the Bahamas and Grenada, to add their signatures to this exemplary and historic contribution of Latin America to international peace.

As regards the status of Protocol I of the Treaty, which has already been signed and ratified by two States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, we express the hope that the countries which have not yet accorded their necessary participation -- that is to say, the United States and France -- will shortly be able to do so, since, in our opinion, there are no difficulties which cannot be overcome in this undertaking which requires the solidarity of one and all.

I might add that the United States, as a result of action taken by the Secretary-General of OPAANL, on the instructions of the Council of that body, and at the request of the Government of Panama, has formally informed us that no activities have been or will be carried out in the so-called Canal Zone in contravention of the rules set forth in article 14 of the Treaty. This could foreshadow the adoption of a similar attitude with regard to the other Territories administered de jure or de facto by the United States and with regard to the zone covered by article 4 of the Treaty and could be the prelude to signature of Protocol I by the United States.

As regards Protocol II, everyone knows that we have the hoped-for ratifications of two of the three nuclear States which, until last year, had not formally indicated their support, since their signatures were added only in July and August of 1973. I am referring to China and France, and I would like to express our satisfaction to the delegations of those two countries.

As for the last State that remains to complete the list, the Soviet Union, I wish to place on record here our surprise that it should be precisely that country, which has so often expressed support for the task of denuclearization and which has worked so hard on matters of peace throughout the world, which remains outside the scope of the guarantee requested by Latin America, by an act which could have been the best confirmation of its words. We know of no legal barrier or obstacle.
Its arguments have been refuted time and again; hence, all that is required is a political decision in this regard, which in this period of détente we have good reason to hope for. We therefore cordially express to the delegation of the Soviet Union our hope that in the very near future we shall have the pleasure of welcoming a decision -- which can no longer be delayed -- to assume its obligation to respect the status of our demilitarized zone.

The possibility of creating new demilitarized zones by means of the drafting of multilateral treaties under United Nations auspices shows the importance of the suggestion made by the representative of Finland, to the effect that the Secretary-General might appoint a group of experts charged with the general, systematic study of the question of demilitarized zones and with the clarification of ideas on definitions, the structure of agreements, the rights and obligations of the parties, verification systems, safeguard agreements, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, relations among the various zones and so on.

Lastly, I wish to say that, having heard the references to the possible creation of new demilitarized zones, we believe that this is a most healthy turn of events which would, on the one hand, assure us that the Tlatelolco example is being followed, and, on the other hand, call for our co-operation and support in the implementation of these projects.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Giambruno for his warm words about the friendship that unites our two countries and on my election to the chairmanship of this Committee.

I should now like to make two announcements. The first is that the name of the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR has been added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675.

The second announcement is that the delegation of Panama has indicated its desire to be included among the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.