Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND SEVENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 November 1974, at 10:30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)
Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries [24] (continued)
  (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
  (b) Report of the Secretary-General

- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General [27] (continued)

- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [28] (continued)

- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [29] (continued)

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The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (continued)

- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (continued)

- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference (continued)

- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (continued)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco) (continued)

- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (continued)

- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health (continued)

- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia (continued)
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REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY BUDGETS OF STATES PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY 10 PER CENT AND UTILIZATION OF PART OF THE FUNDS thus saved TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (A/9565, A/9713, A/9770, A/9800)
(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS;
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IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2286 (XXII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELLOCO) (A/9692)

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DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9706)

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland) Mr. Chairman, the Chairman of the Polish delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Trepczynski, has already extended to you our cordial congratulations and best wishes on the occasion of your election to the high post of Chairman of the First Committee. Speaking for the first time in this Committee, however, I cannot deprive myself of the pleasure of saying how happy I am personally to see you guiding our deliberations so ably and efficiently.

The basic tendency of international relations today is the consolidating process of détente and the all-round development of co-operation between States -- in other words, the practical realization of the concept of peaceful coexistence, conceived dynamically. The advancing process of political détente is not accompanied, however, by a corresponding degree of military détente. The wasteful arms race still continues, consuming vast resources variously estimated at between $220,000 and $250,000 million annually. Those resources could and should instead be used to accelerate the socio-economic development of individual States and to solve the pressing problems which face the whole international community. And yet, the situation now obtaining in the world, characterized by the easing of tensions and by growing confidence between nations, more than ever favours concrete progress towards the halting of the arms race and disarmament. Further, that situation requires increased efforts in order to supplement and strengthen the political détente with a military one and, through agreed measures aimed at the curbing of the arms race and disarmament, to increase confidence between States and to contribute to the consolidation of international security.

Poland's position on those matters has been presented at the current session of the General Assembly by Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, who, in his address to the General Assembly on 10 October, stated:
"The halting of the arms race, full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the elaboration of agreements which would ban the use and production of such weapons and open the way to general and complete disarmament are measures inextricably linked to the consolidation of international security. The steps that have been taken in these vital areas in recent years have laid the groundwork for the early convening of a world disarmament conference and for progress in the implementation of other important proposals, such as the reduction of military budgets, a ban on chemical weapons, and the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes, as proposed by the Soviet Union at the current session. Poland will continue to make a constructive contribution to the realization of all those initiatives." (A/PV.2264, pp. 12, 13-15)

In our efforts to halt the arms race and reach disarmament we do not, of course, start from point zero. In fact, we already have some important and encouraging accomplishments. Thus, on the bilateral plane there has been a series of Soviet-American agreements and understandings reached within the context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests are some of the more important ones. The effects and implications of those agreements go far beyond the framework of bilateral relations between those two Powers. As a matter of fact, they are of vital interest to all States. That is why Poland, while welcoming those results with satisfaction, extends its full support for the declared intentions as well as the concrete endeavours of the two Powers towards further progress.

A practical example of disarmament efforts on a regional plane are the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in central Europe, in which Poland takes an active part. We are confident that they will yield concrete results, provided that all the States concerned adopt in practice, as the fundamental premise, the principle of the undiminished security of all parties.
Last but not least, there is the not unimpressive record of agreements of a global scope, elaborated mostly at the United Nations or with the active involvement of this Organization. They embrace such important arms limitation and disarmament measures as the partial test-ban Treaty, the non-proliferation Treaty, the sea-bed Treaty and the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons.

The point now is to render durable the results achieved so far, to reinforce the agreements concluded and to ensure their full and universal observance, while at the same time seeking to negotiate new arms control and disarmament measures, thus bringing closer the prospect of general and complete disarmament.

As in the past, we now have before us the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament covering its 1974 session (A/9708). We should be less than candid not to admit a sense of disappointment that once again no concrete agreement has been elaborated in Geneva.

Nevertheless, it is the considered view of my delegation that one should not underestimate the work accomplished by CCD. Indeed, we assess its 1974 spring and summer sessions as time well spent and useful. We trust that tangible progress will not elude that organ at its future sessions. We wish to take this opportunity to welcome the admission to CCD of five new members -- the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire -- trusting that this will add new momentum to its future endeavours. We are particularly happy to welcome the fraternal German Democratic Republic among the members of that Committee.
We believe that the interest in and the desire of those five States to gain admission to that body are, if anything, an indication of the sustained confidence of the international community in the role which the Disarmament Committee has to play in the process of multilateral disarmament negotiations, and indeed in its ability to play that role successfully.

Among the many problems which are on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly, or which are being dealt with by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, unquestionably the most important ones, calling for the most urgent attention, are measures for slowing down the nuclear arms race and for making progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. What I have in mind, above all, is the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. My delegation shares the opinions of those who have expressed grave concern over the danger of such proliferation and urged that effective measures be taken in order to ward off that danger before it is too late. We expect, in particular, that the forthcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference will result in further consolidation of that important international instrument; that States which have not yet done so will accede to it soon; and that the Treaty will be observed fully and in good faith by all members of the international community. We are also hopeful that a comprehensive test-ban treaty, covering all environments and binding upon all nuclear-weapon Powers, will become feasible in the not-too-distant future.

As is well known, the States of the socialist community have all along advocated precisely such a solution to the problem of nuclear-weapon testing. I would like to take this occasion to welcome the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests as a major and encouraging step forward which sets an example for others to follow. We hope that further progress will be made in that area.

The Polish delegation is following with attention the growing interest in the concept of nuclear-free zones. As will be recalled, Poland was the first to come out at the United Nations with the idea of such a zone, proposing as long ago as 1957 the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. We continue to support the idea of the establishment of such zones in various parts
of the world on the basis of agreement of the States concerned. We believe that discussions concerning the concept of atom-free zones might be facilitated if consideration could be given to the drafting, at the appropriate time and in a proper forum such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, of general principles and guidelines to be taken into account if and when such zones are created. We have noted with interest the suggestion made in this context by the representative of Finland, Ambassador Kyvarinen, in his intervention of 29 October, as well as the reference to it made by the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Kőmives, in his statement of last Thursday.

We have consistently favoured the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, their limitation and, eventually, complete prohibition of their production, and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons. We believe that the implementation of the Soviet proposal with regard to the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be a major and a radical step in that direction.

From what I have just said it follows clearly that the Polish delegation is strongly in favour of the highest priority for the question of nuclear disarmament, both at the United Nations and in the Geneva Disarmament Committee.

This does not mean, of course, that we wish to downgrade the importance or the urgency of disarmament efforts in other directions. Indeed, my delegation urges that sustained high priority be accorded also to endeavours aiming at the total elimination of chemical weapons.

If I may recall, the States of the socialist community submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, on 28 March 1972, a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their destruction. This document was hailed by most members of the CCD, indeed, by a majority of the United Nations Member States, as a suitable basis for the elaboration of a possible agreement. Through no fault of ours, the necessary progress in that respect has eluded us so far. We consider therefore that the General Assembly should again reaffirm its position, reflected in numerous resolutions adopted at its previous sessions, as to the necessity of continuing negotiations, as a matter of high priority, on the basis of the existing proposals, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective
measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction.

We also believe that the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly should renew its urgent appeals to States that have not yet done so, to accede to the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, of 17 June 1925. Although long overdue, a positive response to such an appeal would be the most fitting way of marking the fiftieth anniversary of that important instrument.

While invariably and consistently upholding our view as to the urgency of the complete elimination of chemical weapons, those ominous instruments of mass annihilation, from the arsenals of all States, we are prepared to examine with an open mind any proposal conducive to, or facilitating, the attainment of that goal. It is in this spirit that we wish to express our appreciation to the Soviet Union and the United States for their stated readiness -- and I quote from the Joint United States-Soviet communiqué of 3 July 1974 -- "to consider a joint initiative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international Convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare." (S/11428, p. 6)

A very important item on the agenda of the First Committee is the question of the World Disarmament Conference, the convening of which has consistently been urged by the non-aligned States. The position of my country in this regard is well known. Ever since that important concept was first formally placed, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, we have been expounding our views on this subject at each session of the Assembly, in the replies of my Government to the Secretary-General's requests for views and suggestions concerning a world disarmament conference, and in our capacity as a member of the Special Committee on the world disarmament conference appointed by the President of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and as a member of the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the President of the twenty-eighth session.
(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

On the whole, we assess positively the work accomplished by the Ad Hoc Committee, and I should like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to its Chairman, Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran. We welcome the active participation in the work of the Committee of three nuclear-weapon Powers. It is to be regretted, however, that the two remaining nuclear-weapon Powers declined to participate in the Committee's work. We would wish to believe that the logic of international developments will eventually persuade them to change their position. As Ambassador Hoveyda rightly stated in his intervention in this Committee on 21 October last, the Ad Hoc Committee has discharged its task of examining all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference. The Polish delegation is of the opinion that this Committee and the General Assembly should now take another step forward by extending the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee so as to enable it to proceed with concrete preparatory work for the convening of a world disarmament conference, including the drafting of its agenda and procedures.

I think it is by now obvious to everybody -- or, should I say, nearly everybody -- that the convening of such a conference and its successful outcome are in the best interests of all States, big, small and medium-sized, developed and developing, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. The results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee are another confirmation of that. While we believe that at the conference priority should be given to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, we feel that such a conference should be guided by two principal objectives: first, ensuring that all aspects of disarmament that are of interest to the international community at large, whether in the nuclear or in the conventional field, whether on a global or a regional scale, are discussed; and, secondly, ensuring the constructive and equal participation of all States in the discussion of those disarmament issues.

Obviously, the conference could not be expected to pursue the actual negotiation of specific agreements or to seek to replace existing organs and forms of disarmament negotiations. What it should do is make an over-all review of the state of disarmament negotiations, formulate recommendations pertaining to various aspects of disarmament and set forth priorities, principles and
guidelines for future disarmament negotiations. Poland will spare no effort to bring about the implementation of that important proposal.

Another issue of paramount importance on our agenda is the problem of the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. It is a particularly important and timely proposal, as it logically addresses itself comprehensively to the great and pressing problems of the contemporary world -- namely, détente, disarmament and development. When put into effect, that proposal would be a major contribution to progress in all those areas. It was, therefore, no surprise that at its twenty-eighth session the General Assembly declared itself overwhelmingly in favour of that proposal. Poland, which came out in active support of the Soviet initiative from the very beginning, expressed its readiness to serve on the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets, an organ established under General Assembly resolution 3093 A (XXVIII), whose members were to be appointed by the President of the twenty-eighth session. It is regrettable indeed that owing to the unco-operative attitude of certain States there has been no meeting of the Special Committee, as the Secretary-General reports in document A/9800. It is our view that measures must be taken at the current session in order to ensure that the above resolution is acted upon in full and that the important Soviet initiative is implemented. Such a course of action is sure to benefit all States but especially the developing ones, whose problems, aspirations and needs were brought into sharp focus at the sixth special session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We are convinced that the implementation of the proposal concerning the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries would open the way to further reductions, both vertical, through further cuts in military spending by the States permanent members of the Security Council, and horizontal, by extending such military budget reductions to cover other States, especially those with advanced military potential.
My country, which has for a long time -- both at the United Nations and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament -- been coming out in favour of a freeze and reduction of military budgets, will continue to work actively to see that important proposal implemented.

The agenda of the First Committee includes the problem of napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. Poland has been favouring the prohibition of their use followed by their total elimination from the arsenals of all States. In our view, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would be a suitable organ in which to elaborate a comprehensive agreement in that regard.

Poland's full endorsement of the new Soviet initiative concerning the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health, was expressed by the Chairman of the Polish delegation, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stanislaw Trepczynski, in his statement to this Committee of 21 October last. I do not, therefore, propose to go into this matter again. However, I cannot but express satisfaction at the broad support which the Soviet proposal, already sponsored by a large number of States including my own, has received in our debate.

I have outlined the position of the Polish People's Republic with regard to key disarmament problems facing the United Nations General Assembly and specifically this Committee at the twenty-ninth session. That consistent position has its roots in our historical experience, and stems from the principles underlying the foreign policy of socialist Poland as well as the requirements of the dynamic socio-economic development of our country. That position boils down to constructive and active work with a view to consolidating and expanding the positive processes in international life, taking practical steps to check the arms race and promote progress in disarmament and, in general, supporting the United Nations in the fulfilment of its lofty ideals, a point forcefully reaffirmed by Edward Giezek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, in his address to the General Assembly of 10 October 1974.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Poland for the very kind words he addressed to me.

Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to remind the Committee that, in accordance with the decision taken previously, at the end of this meeting the list of speakers for the general debate on disarmament items will be closed.

Mr. JANKOVITSCH (Austria): At least six of the 12 items dealing directly with disarmament on this year's agenda of the Assembly, and a number of others dealing with it indirectly, relate to one and the same question: the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear armaments. This situation, as well as the fact that virtually all the speakers who preceded me devoted much if not exclusive attention to that question, has been caused above all by two factors: the forthcoming first review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty and the new relevance of peaceful nuclear explosions.
Austria was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it is in the spirit that inspired my country then that we attach now great importance to this Treaty and to the discussion on its future.

One of the first major problems with which the United Nations was faced immediately after its creation was the phenomenon then newly discovered of atomic energy and, in particular, its military implications which had been so tragically demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From the first session of the Atomic Energy Agency Commission which had been created specifically for this purpose, a very far-reaching and comprehensive plan emerged to control the uses of atomic energy in all its aspects by creating an international agency vested with considerable powers. The price the world community was asked to pay for the implementation of such an ambitious plan was the abandonment of all independent national research in this domain. We all know that this plan was never put into practice and that, instead, we have witnessed the emergence of a growing number of nuclear countries.

The non-proliferation Treaty which entered into force 24 years later was much less ambitious. The price, however, we are asked to pay for its implementation is still essentially the same. And yet, there are still many countries which are not prepared to pay this price.

In a way, this reminds us of the ancient tale of the sibyl, the wise woman of Cumae in Campania, who one day offered to Tarquinius Priscus, the King of Rome, nine books of prophecies which he refused to buy at her price. The sibyl returned a little later, having burnt three books, and was still refused. When she had burned another three, he agreed to buy the last three books at the price of the original nine.

With the non-proliferation Treaty, we face a very similar situation. The price will always be the same. The longer we delay a decision to pay this price, however, the less we will get in return.

One of the great difficulties in the debate about non-proliferation stems from the fact that a number of widely divergent arguments, focusing around the many aspects of atomic energy in its peaceful as well as its military applications, produce quite often nothing more but a dialogue of the deaf. There are at least five different aspects which have to be brought into perspective:
First, the peaceful uses of atomic energy and, in particular, the production of plutonium as a by-product of this development.

Secondly, the research relating to and the practical applications of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Thirdly, nuclear-weapon explosions in general and in particular the question of distinction between nuclear weapons explosions and peaceful nuclear explosions.

Fourthly, discriminatory elements in the non-proliferation Treaty; and

Fifthly, the political implications of the possession of nuclear weapons.

With your permission and your indulgence, I should like to dwell briefly on each of these questions. The energy crisis and the ensuing new energy consciousness of the world has provoked renewed interest in alternative sources of energy which could supplement or replace the ones most commonly used today. Atomic energy is one of them. At the same time, we begin to realize that any significant increase in the exploitation of the atom as a source of energy will be accompanied by a spread of nuclear technology, the production of important amounts of plutonium, and the setting up of uranium enrichment plants in many countries.

The implications obviously are twofold. On the one hand, the control of fissionable material in all its stages will present a formidable task. I hasten to add that the foundations for the performance of this task have been laid within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We particularly welcome the activities of the Agency in this field and we are also gratified to note that additional safeguard agreements have been signed during the past year. We also welcome any measures concerning the physical securing of nuclear material, such as the one proposed in his recent address to the Assembly by the Secretary of State of the United States.

The second implication following from any increased application of nuclear technology is equally obvious. Proportionally with this development, lead time for the production of nuclear weapons will decrease. We will be able to speak of many more so-called nuclear countries. More than ever before, a decision to "go nuclear" will be mainly a political one and not a technical one for a
majority of the countries concerned. More than ever, therefore, the necessity of an adequate political counterweight to prevent the disastrous consequences of an all-nuclear world has to be recognized. The non-proliferation Treaty, in our view, has to be seen in this perspective.

Since the explosion of a nuclear device carried out by India in May of this year, the question of another of the peaceful applications of atomic energy, namely, of peaceful nuclear explosions, and in its context, of nuclear explosion tests in general, has been put before us in new terms.

Although peaceful nuclear explosions are specifically referred to in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty, this article has never been put into practice and there has been very little knowledge about peaceful nuclear explosions until now. Whatever I have to say on this subject is, therefore, based on relatively limited information.

One of the characteristics of PNEs, as they are now called, with the newly popular acronym, appears to be that they are, at a certain stage of nuclear development, virtually indistinguishable from nuclear explosions for military purposes. Or, in other words, countries carrying out initial research in and testing of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will necessarily gain information which can be put to military purposes.

We are also told by countries with some experience in this field that, until now, a safe and economically viable application for PNEs remains to be found. It is precisely because of this feature of PNEs that they present a very serious and a new challenge to the non-proliferation Treaty. While welcoming the assurances of the Indian Government about the exclusively peaceful nature of this explosion, which we have no reason to doubt, we feel that the only solution acceptable in this context, and the only one in conformity with the much more far-reaching aim of preventing nuclear arms races, is the one envisaged in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty.
But peaceful nuclear explosions are only one side of a technology the darker face of which has been all too familiar to us over the last decades. I am referring here to nuclear-weapon tests. All five nuclear-weapon countries have continued to carry out such tests during the last year, and this is a matter of regret.

A further reason for concern is the fact that, again, no progress has been made within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the issue of a complete test-ban treaty. My country has always regarded the limited test-ban treaty and the concomitant declared intention of the nuclear-weapon countries which signed it to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, as one of the essential elements in our efforts to prevent a vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Last year, before this Committee, I expressed the fear that further delays in the question of detection of nuclear explosions and their distinction from other seismic phenomena might lead us into a vicious circle where -- if I may quote myself:

"... research into evasion techniques, paired with the constant progress of nuclear weapon technology, always manages to keep ahead of progress in the field of seismic detection". (1949th meeting, p. 27)

The nature of peaceful nuclear explosions, which now adds to our preoccupations, might easily stand at the beginning of another such vicious circle which could be broken only by drastic action.

In a working paper submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and again in his statement before this Committee, the representative of Mexico has dramatically demonstrated the proportions of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and the absence of any tangible disarmament measures taken by the two major Powers. This situation has been severely criticized in recent years by a growing number of countries. Let me quote in this connexion what Chancellor Kreisky, the Austrian Prime Minister, said on Austria's National Day a few days ago, when he pointed to the fact that at this stage there are more than 400,000 scientists employed in the armaments field, and that $275,000 million per year have been spent for the same purpose. He said that a great amount of poverty and misery in the world could be abolished -- liquidated -- with such amounts of energy, intelligence and money.

It is true that during these same years contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union were initiated which led to the first SALT agreements. Set in the perspective of the previous cold war period, those agreements are certainly of historic significance.

It is also true that the promise of further agreements leaves us at least a glimmer of hope for more substantial progress on the road to disarmament.
It is no less true, however, that the achievements of the SALT agreements, in their practical effect on the level of armaments, appear less significant when set against the background of ever-rising military expenditures by a few in a world where millions are barely able to feed themselves.

Yet disarmament and arms control have never lent themselves to an all too simple analysis. We also remember the time of the cold war when the spectre of a nuclear war between the major Powers of the world was much more present; barely 12 years ago, our world literally stood at the brink of such a war. Austria therefore attaches at least equal importance to a carefully balanced approach in the question of controlling and eventually reducing the arsenals of the major Powers, and does not expect quick or dramatic results overnight. In our opinion, it would therefore be a momentous mistake if we should now decide to abandon the benefits of the non-proliferation Treaty -- benefits which accrue to nuclear weapon countries in the same way as to non-nuclear weapon countries -- only because of impatience at the inadequate implementation of article VI of that Treaty.

The discriminatory elements of some provisions of the Treaty were not, as has been pointed out here already, created by it, but merely reflect the reality on which it had to be based at the time of its conclusion. There existed at that time five nuclear countries, and the primary objective of the Treaty was not to reduce that number -- however much we would have welcomed that -- but to prevent a further increase.

It has been said that the Treaty has not only cemented the nuclear strategic balance but that it has also endorsed a political hierarchy in the world. We might ask ourselves today whether the fact of the possession of nuclear weapons -- or of a nuclear capability -- really constitutes the ultimate watershed between world political omnipotence and perpetual insignificance. Have not we witnessed over the last year a far-reaching, even dramatic upheaval in the political order of our world? Will not the capacity to produce food and energy have far greater significance in the future than the mere possession of "nuclear devices"?
The most important and immediate objective of the non-proliferation Treaty is to lower the risk of a nuclear war by preventing a spread of nuclear weapons, since an increase in the number of countries possessing a nuclear capability would obviously increase not only the risk of these weapons being deployed but also the risk of an escalation to world-wide nuclear conflagration. If the United Nations' efforts in achieving any disarmament have so far been frustrated collateral measures for controlling armaments and the arms race have had somewhat more success. Among such collateral measures, we consider the non-proliferation Treaty as the most important one taken thus far.

I have tried to outline some of the more salient aspects of the non-proliferation Treaty and to indicate where my country stands on the main areas of dissenion. At the same time, I have tried to demonstrate that we do not close our eyes to the many critical voices in this field. The non-proliferation Treaty is, by far, not a perfect instrument. When my Government ratified it, it appeared to us, and still appears, to be the best course to take, considering the existing options. This means that we do not exclude improvements, but indeed consider improvements necessary, if we want to achieve universality of the Treaty -- the lack of which has been regarded as one of its major failings.

Like any other international agreement, the non-proliferation Treaty will be able to function properly only if all parties to it -- and that includes also all future parties -- consider it as in their own best interests. What we have to do now is strengthen the interest of those countries already parties to the Treaty and create adequate incentives to induce those who have not yet acceded to it to become signatories. Permit me to outline briefly the kind of action we would consider useful in this respect:

First, the Review Conference, scheduled in accordance with article VIII of the Treaty for May 1975, will give an opportunity to discuss the operation of the Treaty so far. Articles IV, V and VI will, without any doubt, receive particular attention. Austria is not a member of the Preparatory Committee, but has, in accordance with a decision taken during the first session, participated in its second session and thereby underlined the high priority it accords to an adequate preparation of the Conference.
Secondly, I have already pointed to the heavy responsibility incumbent on the nuclear weapon countries in fulfilling their obligations to a far greater extent. We are gratified, in this context, to note that those countries have already expressed the same sense of urgency and appear to be prepared to move more rapidly in the direction of measures in implementation of article VI. We are also gratified that one of those countries envisages the possibility of creating additional new incentives for adherence to the Treaty.
Our attention was also drawn to the statement made here by the representative of France with its reference to President Giscard d'Estaing's very clear exposé on the possible uses of the French nuclear capability. We fully agree that similar declarations by other nuclear countries would permit a new outlook on the problems of non-proliferation and we feel that this avenue should be further explored.

Third, a thorough study of all aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions would in our view go a long way in clarifying for the benefit of the international community the true economic and scientific potential of this technology as well as the problems of distinguishing them from nuclear weapon tests. Such a study, which could build on the work already done by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this field, could well be undertaken by the Secretary-General jointly with or assisted by the Agency. The proposal made by the representative of Australia therefore deserves our attention.

Fourth, as already indicated, nuclear weapon tests are so closely related to peaceful nuclear explosions that we would consider it as absolutely essential that the nuclear-weapon States rapidly arrive at an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, in the atmosphere or underground. This would be at least a small step nuclear-weapon States could take in the direction of eliminating some of the more glaringly discriminatory features of the non-proliferation Treaty. The 150 kiloton threshold agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States cannot in itself be regarded as coming anywhere near that goal, but we believe and we hope that it will contribute to overcoming the crucial verification problem.

Fifth, another measure which would give, as I would term it, collateral support to the non-proliferation Treaty, is the creation of nuclear-free zones. There are now at least four such zones which this General Assembly will have to discuss and there are several more that have been proposed over the last years in a more or less tentative way. My delegation has on various occasions expressed its interest and, indeed, its support for the principle of the creation of such zones. In the context of the non-proliferation Treaty, such zones take on added significance. It is difficult to draw too many analogies between various zones -- and for this reason we would hesitate to
apply common criteria of evaluation to them -- but we nevertheless believe that
the concept of nuclear-free zones warrants an over-all study of the kind
proposed by the Finnish delegation and we welcome such an undertaking.

Sixth, the non-proliferation Treaty by its very nature must be universal.
To this day, more than 40 countries have not yet signed the Treaty. At
the review conference to be held next year there will obviously be a thorough
discussion of the relation between article I parties and article II parties. There
are, however, many questions which concern both parties and non-parties to
the Treaty, and it might be legitimately asked whether the review conference
would be the proper forum for such a discussion even if the non-parties
participate as observers. As the discussion around the non-proliferation
Treaty gathers momentum we will have to find a way of ensuring the equal standing
of parties and non-parties in the discussion.

For the reasons I stated at the outset, I have devoted the greater
part of my statement to the problems of non-proliferation but I should now
like to make a few remarks on some of the other items on our agenda.

Last year, we were one of 40 non-nuclear weapon countries appointed
to the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. Owing to the
efforts of its able Chairman, Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran, that Committee has
performed a very useful task, and has submitted a report which only confirms the
conviction which we have previously expressed, namely, that there is near
unanimity on the principle of holding such a conference and the need for
the participation of all militarily important countries, and in particular
all nuclear-weapon States. Any new mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee should
therefore concentrate now on a detailed examination of all remaining objections
and on possible ways of overcoming them.

In this connexion, I should also like to refer to the question of the
adequacy of the existing disarmament organs within the United Nations.
Austria has always supported the work of the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament at Geneva, and we shall continue to do so as long as there is any
shimmer of hope that that body fulfils more than an alibi function, and that
its reports are more than a mere collection of explanations about the impossibility
of disarmament. While we fully realize the complexity and intractability of
many problems concerned with disarmament and arms control, we cannot but express disappointment about the fact that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been unable, for the third consecutive year, to point to any results, or even any tangible progress in the questions it has been dealing with -- and this despite diligent and patient efforts by so many delegations on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Let me express the hope that the envisaged enlargement of the Committee will be beneficial to its work and that possible further changes in its structure and function, along the lines which we suggested last year would enable it to meet the high hopes we all place in it.

We have recently witnessed a mushrooming of other bodies dealing with disarmament questions. There is the ad hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference; the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons was examined by the Red Cross Conference and by a conference of Government experts; military expenditures were studied by a group of experts, while another ad hoc Committee on the same questions has not yet convened; there is an ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean; on the questions of peaceful explosions, work has been done within the IAEA. The creation of a number of further such groups is being or about to be proposed this year. In our opinion it would be one of the functions of the World Disarmament Conference to serve as a co-ordinating body for all these efforts, or to appoint an appropriate organ for this purpose. In the absence of such a solution, we strongly feel that the General Assembly should actively seek a more focal role in dealing with disarmament matters.

What I said last year about the necessity to cut back conventional armaments still remains a valid point. In this context, we also welcome any feasible proposals to reduce military expenditures, a question on which a very useful report has been presented to us.

It is, of course, one of the characteristic cynicisms of our times to call conventional even those categories of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or are particularly cruel and indiscriminate in their use, such as napalm and other incendiary weapons. For a number of years now, Austria has joined in efforts to find ways of restricting the use of these weapons and
we have, consequently, participated actively in the Ad Hoc Committee of the Geneva Red Cross Conference and in the Conference of Government Experts held in Lucerne last month. As our primary motivation in this regard is humanitarian, we consider the organizational connexion of those discussions with the Red Cross Conference a logical solution. On the other hand, we are also aware of the military and disarmament aspects of the question, and we said last year that these aspects might be usefully discussed in other appropriate disarmament organs. Certainly any delay would be indefensible because any disagreement could cause further suffering.
A wholly new and unconventional concept of warfare has been brought into this discussion under item 103, proposed by the Soviet Union, on changes made in the environment for military and other purposes. Even if environmental warfare on any large scale does not now appear to be a tangible reality, we do believe that it is generally easier to prevent a possible future development than to roll back or even to stop military technological progress once it is under way. Therefore we welcome this initiative.

The fact that we have to deal with entirely new and sometimes even hypothetical techniques obviously necessitates as a first step a careful examination by highly qualified experts. Such a task could very well be entrusted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Without wishing to go into the substance of the proposal, we believe that it would be useful already at this preliminary stage to arrive at a clear-cut delimitation of those categories of actions or techniques that we should wish to discuss within the disarmament context.

A distinction might be made, for instance, between environment modification for hostile purposes and those which would necessarily comprise hostile military purposes — and those activities which are carried out for peaceful purposes but which might, accidentally or unintentionally, present dangers to human health and well-being. Only the first category should be considered within the context of item 103. We should, on the other hand, find considerable merit in a closer examination of the much wider field of environmental modification for peaceful purposes in all its aspects.

Over the years we have come to believe in the close interrelationship between disarmament and the security of States. We have always maintained that disarmament must, and indeed will, inevitably follow security, which therefore has to be our first objective. Why, then, is it still legitimate to discuss disarmament issues in their own right? A glance at military expenditure immediately provides the answer. While we have come to regard as "normal" any increase in armaments in areas with rising international tension, there is no such explanation for the gigantic arms race continuing between the United States and the Soviet Union at a time when both States profess a
détente in their relations, and there is equally no explanation for the many arms races going on in areas where no observable tensions exist. Today it becomes painfully evident that military technology, with its more and more sophisticated products, seems to move forward with its own deadly logic. Armaments have become an independent factor the existence of which lies at the origin of tensions at least as often as it is caused by them. It is precisely for this reason that we fear nuclear proliferation, which would inexorably cause so many more arms races on a much more dangerous level. This is why we need disarmament and this is why we have to see disarmament in a new perspective.

In conclusion, let me quote the hopeful, but also warning, words which Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald of Great Britain used at the tenth anniversary of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1929, when he urged a new approach to disarmament and security. He said:

"My Government would urge the disarmament commissions not to face their problems from the point of view of the possibility of war. It would urge them to face them on the assumption that the risk of war breaking out now is far less than the hope of permanent peace. We have to ask our military advisers to remember that there is just as much security in a political agreement as there is in a regiment of soldiers or in a fleet of battleships."

At the time, as we know so well, those words were not needed. Perhaps wise warnings as such will find a better reception in our day.

Mr. DOATEH (Ghana): This Committee is again engaged in appraising the progress we have made over the past year towards total and complete disarmament. My delegation views this effort not as a mere discussion of one of the issues before this Committee but as an assessment of mankind's hope for continued existence on this planet. The greater the progress we make in this effort the greater the chances for human survival.

Over the past few years we have welcomed repeatedly in this forum and in other international forums an atmosphere of détente which we maintain now exists. My delegation holds the view that, if this atmosphere of détente really exists, the progress we make towards finding solutions to the many problems which now
beset us should reflect it. The progress we make towards finding solutions to world poverty, disease and ignorance should reflect it. Our progress towards establishing an equitable world economic order should reflect it. Our progress towards building an international human society based on respect for the worth of the human person should be a function of that détente. It is in this light that my delegation views the progress we have made towards disarmament and towards reaching agreements on issues related to it. It is poor comfort to talk about détente while suspicion and distrust frustrate our efforts to find solutions to world problems that of necessity must be solved if the world is to be a safe place for all of us.

My delegation has carefully read the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in document A/9708. We share the dismay of those delegations which have spoken before us at the lack of any substantial progress on any of the issues under consideration by the Committee. This is in spite of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests signed in Moscow in July this year. With regard to that Treaty, my delegation has noted that it does not come into effect until 31 March 1976. The obvious question that comes to mind is: why 1976 and not immediately? Shall we not be justified in assuming that the two countries estimate that by that date all underground nuclear tests exceeding 150 kilotons essential to the development of further nuclear weapons will have been completed? If the assumption that this question indicates is true, one would be right in concluding that we succeeded in banning atmospheric tests simply because those two super Powers no longer had any need of them for the development of their nuclear weaponry.

The issues involved in nuclear disarmament are very crucial to mankind as a whole. Consequently it would be irresponsible if their solutions were left to the convenience of a few States. What the world needs is responsible leadership from those Powers which have manufactured and stored nuclear weapons in our effort to get rid of them. Unless this responsible leadership, based on concern for the future of mankind as a whole, is forthcoming, efforts both inside and outside the Committee on Disarmament will continue to be futile.
and frustrating. We believe in the value of an exchange of views on problems; we believe that no problem can be solved if the parties to it refuse to engage in dialogue. However, if such dialogues, rather than moving forward to solutions for which they were instituted, become goals in themselves, they cease to have any value.
This is what we fear the dialogue within the Committee on Disarmament is tending to become.

Since the Committee was established, it has gone through various phases. It went through a phase when it discussed alternative draft proposals on measures aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament. Very little progress was achieved in that direction. It was then thought that if agreements were reached on collateral measures, they would create conditions for reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. Here again, little progress was made and the basic issues still remain unresolved. We have concluded a Non-Proliferation Treaty, but to date certain countries have not acceded to it; we hailed the Treaty banning atmospheric tests; but again certain countries have not acceded to it, while some, in disregard of the general wish of mankind which the Treaty reflects, continue with unabated frequency and in defiance of protests to conduct atmospheric tests.

The Committee has for some time now turned its attention to the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in an effort to enlarge the base of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare in response to General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) and subsequent resolutions on that issue. The report of the Committee on Disarmament does not indicate that much progress has been made on this issue over the past year. The efforts of the Committee appear to have foundered on two main difficulties, namely, the definition of chemical war agents, and the system of inspection and verification to be established to police any treaty or protocol banning the production, storage and use of chemical war agents.

There is hardly any member of this Committee who does not fully appreciate the great danger that chemical war agents pose to human life in any armed conflict in which they might be employed. Because of the highly destructive effect on human life, my delegation proposes that urgent attention be paid to the possibility of concluding, as a matter of urgency, a protocol, treaty or convention banning their use in any armed conflict, while negotiations on banning their production and storage proceed. Negotiations leading to such a protocol, treaty or convention should not face the difficulties posed by an acceptable definition of a chemical war agent and a system of inspection and verification.
If my delegation is displaying some impatience with regard to agreement on this issue, it is because the dialogue aimed at reaching an agreement on its solution has gone on for far too long.

It will be recalled that the first effort to deal with the issue of the use in war of chemical and biological agents was in 1874 when the Brussels Convention of that year declared as "especially forbidden" the "employment of poisoned weapons ...". The agreement signed at the First International Peace Conference at the Hague in 1899 obligated contracting parties to abstain from the use of projectiles solely for diffusion of "asphyxiating or deleterious gases". This was reaffirmed by the second Hague Conference of 1907 prohibiting the employment of "poison or poisoned weapons" "to kill or wound treacheryously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army".

None of the efforts referred to prevented the use of chemical war agents during World War I.

I do not intend to waste the time of the Committee in enumerating the various efforts which have been made since the end of World War II to deal with the problem of chemical war agents from the late 1940s through the 1950s and 1960s. Each effort has been frustrated by one or other of the difficulties I have referred to, or by both. These difficulties therefore are not new; they reflect the distrust and suspicion which have characterized international relations in the past, and continue to do so now.

I should now like to turn my attention briefly to another area of concern to my delegation. I refer to the question of the use of meteorological technology for war purposes. Statements made by various delegations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament indicate the extent to which human existence itself could be gravely jeopardized if meteorological technology was employed for war purposes. The indications are that all life on this planet could cease to exist in that event. That is a thought of foreboding. This is another threat to human existence which has come as a by-product of our effort to enhance and enrich our existence on this planet. To quote the Soviet delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

"...modification techniques might be used for military purposes with respect not only to weather but also to other components of the human environment."
It is because of the threat posed by the use of meteorological technology for war purposes that my delegation welcomes the joint announcement made by the United States and the Soviet Union that a meeting of experts of the two countries was being planned for this year to study the problem. We should also like to express our appreciation for the initiative of the Soviet delegation in circulating the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.675. My delegation is happy to be a sponsor of that draft resolution. While co-sponsoring the draft resolution, we would wish to say that we are fully aware that the draft convention attached to it as an annex will be a subject for discussion and negotiation at a future date.

In his intervention in the general debate on 7 October, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of Ghana expressed appreciation of the efforts being by the two nuclear super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. In his statement, he said:

"My delegation welcomes the agreements reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on further limitations on anti-missile defence systems ... We also appreciate the efforts being made for further limitation of strategic offensive weapons." (A/PV.2258, p. 61)

While expressing our appreciation of the efforts being made by the two nuclear super-Powers, we cannot but express concern at the snail-pace progress being made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on some of the issues central to general and complete disarmament, and on nuclear disarmament in particular. Unless we accelerate our progress towards a world without nuclear weapons, we stand in grave danger of being overtaken by events. The Economist of 7 September 1974 disclosed that:

"...less than 20 lbs of plutonium will make a bomb capable of destroying a city. Within 10 years, the world's annual output of plutonium will probably exceed 200,000 lbs. Some of this will be shuttled around in vehicles that could become targets for hijackers. Some of it may be up for sale on a new kind of black market."
If this dire prediction ever becomes true, the chances of human survival will be almost minimal. That is why my delegation believes we should double our efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

My delegation supports general and complete disarmament as an objective which this Organization should pursue relentlessly. We do not believe, however, that we should permit conventional disarmament to slow down, or serve as a distraction from our efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. We do appreciate the sincerity of those who urged in the Committee on Disarmament that some attention should be devoted by the Committee to disarmament with regard to conventional weapons.

We from the developing countries will be the first to support a world without any weapons of war whatsoever, whether conventional or nuclear. At this stage, however, we urge that all attention should be concentrated on seeking agreements which will lead to the prohibition of the production, manufacture and storage of nuclear weapons. With the invention of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons are tending to be of significance only in localized armed conflicts. That being the case, it is our view that a cutback in expenditure on conventional weapons can best be achieved within negotiations conducted on a regional or subregional basis. My delegation would propose that the United Nations urges and encourages such regional or subregional negotiations. It is our view that disarmament with regard to conventional weapons should be the last act of this Organization in our effort to bring into existence, a completely and totally disarmed world.

My delegation is rather disappointed with the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a World Disarmament Conference. Our disappointment is not in any way a reflection on the members of the Committee. On the contrary, we believe that the Committee did its best. Our disappointment arises out of the fact that although the report of the Committee shows that there is a general consensus on the need to hold and the wisdom of holding a world disarmament conference, we do not appear to be anywhere near appointing a preparatory committee for the conference, let alone fixing a date for it. In our statement in this Committee during the twenty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, my delegation expressed
its disappointment at the lack of progress made towards convening a world disarmament conference. We expressed our dismay over the absence of co-operation from some nuclear Powers in efforts being made towards the preparation and holding of such a conference, which now appears to be demanded not only by official delegations to the United Nations, but by the world community as a whole. We insisted, in our intervention in the debate, during the twenty-eighth session

"... that we should not allow such obstructionist attitudes to stand in the way of a world disarmament conference as desired by a majority of United Nations Members". (1946th meeting, p. 17).

Our position on this issue remains unchanged. We call on the nuclear Powers to recognize the concern which the world community as a whole has for this issue, and to change their positions to make possible the preparation and convening of the conference.

If our position on this issue has not changed, it is because of our concern for the security of our planet. Although a non-nuclear State, we believe that we share equal responsibility for the security of this planet with those States which now possess nuclear technology and believe that they alone should tell the world when to disarm and live in peace and security. There are some who believe that the possession of nuclear weapons by a few States guarantees the non-use of these weapons in armed conflicts and saves the world from a terrible holocaust. In the view of my delegation, a logical extension of that theory would be that the world would become a safer place if all States possessed nuclear weapons. The deterrent value of nuclear weapons would then be complete. That, of course, is not what we advocate.

Recent events, however, lead my delegation to believe that this extension of the deterrent theory is gaining some credence; unless we act now, and resolutely, a situation will be created which it will be beyond our capacity to control. We shall reach a stage when we shall be sitting on a volcano which will erupt to destroy mankind when we least expect it to do so.

In the face of the resistance to the holding of the world disarmament conference, it is not surprising that certain countries -- the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire -- have applied for participation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
They have done so, we believe, because of their concern over the lack of any substantial progress in the work of that Committee over a number of years. My Government, motivated by the same concern, would like to give notice of its intention to make a similar application for participation in the work of the Committee. We hope to submit our application to the Committee for consideration in due course.

That is not a threat motivated by the precedent which the applications referred to appears to create. Our action arises from the fact that the issue of disarmament in our age is of universal concern. We believe it would be irresponsible on our part to leave the solution of the issue to a small number of the membership of our Organization. If some countries have objections to the holding of a world disarmament conference, then it seems to us delegation, that the alternative would be to enlarge the membership of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, even at the risk of that Committee becoming a Committee of the whole membership of the United Nations. We cannot, and we should not, abdicate our responsibility in an issue which is crucial to the very survival of mankind.

My delegation has read with interest the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. My delegation supports any efforts, in any part of the world aimed at the denuclearization of any region of the world. The Indian Ocean, as we see it, poses a potential threat to the peace of the world. That is why my delegation endorses the desire of the countries in that region that it should be declared a zone of peace. It is our hope not only that this desire will be endorsed by all, but that we shall all assist in making it a reality.

If I have talked at some length, it is because of my country's concern for the issues under discussion. I can, however, assure you, that unless it becomes absolutely necessary, my delegation does not intend to intervene again on the issues relating to disarmament before this Committee.
Mr. SIDDIQ (Afghanistan): The Afghan delegation, having voiced its views on most of the items presently under consideration by the First Committee during the general debate at past sessions of the General Assembly, does not intend to restate its position at length now on most of the items concerning disarmament. I wish, however, to reaffirm the position of the Afghan Government, fully supporting general and complete disarmament as a goal worthy of being considered and shared by all the Members of this Organization. This goal has been endorsed by the Conference of the non-aligned countries, where Afghanistan, as a member, has always advocated general and complete disarmament throughout the years, as it has also at the United Nations General Assembly on all occasions.

During past years, we have achieved some progress in the field of disarmament through the partial test ban Treaty, the treaties on the denuclearization of the sea bed and outer space, the non-proliferation Treaty, the Convention relating to biological and toxin weapons, as well as through talks between the two super-Powers on the limitation of strategic arms. Although the Treaties and conventions produced thus far are of importance in the field of general and complete disarmament, nonetheless, in the view of my delegation, progress achieved thus far falls short of the hopes and expectations of the majority of the members of the international community and in particular, of the small developing countries like Afghanistan.
The disarmament negotiations in the United Nations over the past 25 years, and during the past 13 years of consultations and negotiations taking place in its specialized body, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have resulted in only a few international agreements providing partial accords. While these agreements are significant, we must admit that they have not been able to remedy major disarmament problems, particularly in the areas of nuclear disarmament and arms control.

Over 80 countries, including my own, have signed and ratified the non-proliferation Treaty. However, the provisions of this Treaty have unfortunately not been entirely implemented thus far. My delegation firmly believes that priority should be accorded to nuclear disarmament problems, mainly because of the inherent great dangers to human life and civilization which nuclear weapons entail. As we all know, the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons multiplies constantly and has now reached unbelievable dimensions.

My delegation acclaimed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the most significant international agreement in the field of nuclear disarmament and a milestone on the road toward the attainment of international peace and security. This Treaty today remains the most important achievement in the field of disarmament, for it contains the threat of nuclear war inherent in any further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan has consistently stressed the necessity of international efforts aimed at preventing the spreading of nuclear weapons. However, the non-proliferation Treaty is, regrettably, still far from being universally recognized and acknowledged. My delegation therefore attaches great hope to the forthcoming review conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty as a means of illustrating and assessing the obligations incumbent upon nuclear-weapon States and the practical adjustments that can be brought to the present Treaty for its universal acceptance.

This year India announced that it had carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion. Some countries have expressed concern at this event. My country, as a party to the non-proliferation Treaty, takes note of the assurances given by the leaders of the Government of India that the explosion was only for peaceful purposes and that India has no intention of producing nuclear weapons. While fully taking
into account, the assurances of the Indian Government, we can see, however, that this explosion has no doubt given a new dimension to the problem of nuclear disarmament. It implies that the whole question of peaceful nuclear explosions must also be given due consideration within the context of the non-proliferation Treaty.

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones has for many years been under discussion at the United Nations as well as in other international gatherings. Proposals have been put forward with a view to establishing such zones in various parts of the world, such as Antarctica, the Indian Ocean, Latin America and Africa. Initiatives with respect to Latin America and Antarctica have led to international agreements. Similarly, the General Assembly in December 1971 adopted a resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. During the present session of the General Assembly, we have two new items, both proposing the establishment of other nuclear-free regions -- one in the region of the Middle East and another in South Asia.

My delegation fully endorses the proposals submitted by the Governments of Egypt and Iran for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, of which, in our view, my country forms a part.

We welcome the timely initiatives of the friendly Governments of Egypt and Iran and, as I have just indicated, my delegation fully approves their suggestion. I also wish to state that, as a matter of principle, Afghanistan also supports the item calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia.

My delegation believes that the time has come to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-free zones, with all its various aspects and perspectives, under the auspices of the United Nations. It should, however, be stressed that we believe that prior consultations between the countries located in such regions on the possible and feasible circumstances form a prerequisite to the establishment of such nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The primary importance of nuclear disarmament has been widely recognized by the international community, particularly during recent years. But consultations have failed to produce proposals and suggestions for effective measures necessary to attain nuclear disarmament, although various actions have
been proposed in the General Assembly for the achievement of this aim. In our view, immediate attention should be directed to the banning of the use of nuclear arms or the threat of the use of nuclear arms against any non-nuclear State under any circumstances, and we should focus on the problem of guarantees for the States that do not possess nuclear weapons and that are not considered as potential possessors in the future.

The success or failure of the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is crucial to the world-wide problem of nuclear disarmament and its acceptance. We have always hoped that the bilateral talks between the two super-Powers would succeed in containing the nuclear arms race, in both quantity and quality, for the benefit of the super-Powers themselves, as well as of the other members of the international community.

Upon instructions from the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has over the past years considered the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of priority. However, again no significant achievement has thus far been attained. We have taken due note of the partial agreement reached between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of underground testing by 1976. It should be stated that this agreement, though considered as a step forward, does not meet the hopes and expectations of the members of the international community, which demand the acceleration of the total ban of nuclear-weapon tests. As we have always stated, my delegation favours the total ban of nuclear testing in all environments. We view the agreement between these two super-Powers with respect to the limitation of nuclear underground tests as only a partial step towards the ultimate goal of banning nuclear tests altogether. We very much hope that within the near future a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments will be concluded by all, including the two super-Powers.

The reduction of military expenditure has long been advocated by Afghanistan in international forums ranging from the United Nations General Assembly to the non-aligned meetings. The strain placed on all economies by increased military spending taxes the ability of countries to devote resources towards the social and economic advancement of their people. This burden weighs particularly heavily
upon the developing and the least developed countries. Therefore, the position of Afghanistan has remained firmly in favour of reducing military budgets, and we feel that this element is a vital aspect of the world disarmament question as a whole.

The linking of disarmament to development, a concept which has been incorporated into the United Nations General Assembly deliberations by the developing countries and also formally by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has the full support of Afghanistan. We were pleased to see the General Assembly act upon this concept through the adoption of resolution 3093 A (XXVIII), which recommended that all States members of the Security Council should reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent from the 1973 level and that the funds saved be applied towards assisting the developing countries and, particularly, the least developed ones.
In this connexion, we welcome the report of the Secretary-General prepared by a panel of experts, which elucidates some of the factors involved in gathering and utilizing military funds for development. Unfortunately, reluctance on the part of certain countries to participate fully in this effort to comply with a decision of the General Assembly has impaired the ability of the Special Committee to operate according to the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolution. We hope that further deliberation on this matter will bring about suggestions for a satisfactory solution.

The United Nations has been grappling with aspects of the disarmament question for several decades and producing, among other results, a wider recognition of the scope of the grave issues involved. Timely initiatives which call the attention of the world community to possible new dangers to mankind are a significant and necessary part of the attack on problems that may threaten us. Therefore, the delegation of Afghanistan lent its support to the proposal made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, contained in document A/C.1/L.675, to prohibit action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being, and health. In the light of the possibility that techniques developed to control man's environment could be employed as parts of military operations, we feel that the time is propitious for the United Nations General Assembly to act upon the proposal. The threat implied in the development of geophysical and meteorological techniques requires the support of long-range action. Far-sighted action is needed to combat the dangers. We view the provisions contained in the draft resolution referred to above as worthy of the thoughtful consideration and full support of this session of the General Assembly. For these reasons, my delegation has co-sponsored this draft resolution.

Afghanistan has already ratified the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxic weapons and on their destruction. We believe that this is a substantial measure taken in the field of disarmament as it provides for the complete destruction of all existing stockpiles of bacteriological and toxic
weapons. In the same spirit, my country supports the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Lack of necessary progress so far in negotiations in this respect in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is indeed disappointing. We fervently hope that further serious attempts will be made to achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in the form of an international convention, which will also serve as another real disarmament measure.

Regarding the item, "Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", we believe that the implementation of this item will make an invaluable contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security in the region. In order to make this concept, which my delegation fully supports, a practical reality, the co-operation of all the countries in the region as well as that of the major Powers is of prime importance.

There have been many disarmament consultations since the inception of the United Nations. There have also been many disarmament and arms-control negotiations, including the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the SALT talks between the two super-Powers, and the Security Conference and force-reduction talks in Europe. Despite these efforts, the world armaments race and competition have grown in the areas of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Achievements toward curbing such growth have been modest indeed and in some cases discouraging. My delegation has always supported the proposition that the United Nations machinery for deliberating on the disarmament problem in all its various aspects and manifestations should be strengthened. One of the efforts in this direction has been the proposal for a world disarmament conference. This conference was initially proposed by the first Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, convened in 1961 in Belgrade, and it has received the endorsement of subsequent conferences of the non-aligned countries at all levels. Upon the initiative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, this item was inscribed on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Since then, the Conference has been the subject of a number of resolutions
adopted by the General Assembly. During the past year, in response to a decision of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee was established. We welcome the report prepared by that Committee and wish to congratulate the Chairman, Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran, and his fellow officers for the useful work done by the Committee.

My delegation believes that the world disarmament conference will serve a useful purpose in the universal search for effective ways and means of achieving general and complete disarmament under international supervision, and of devising a United Nations strategy for the achievement of this crucial objective.

We believe that all States, whether Members of the United Nations or not, should participate in the conference, and consequently, for the success of this endeavour it is most essential, in our view, that all nuclear States participate.

I wish to state in conclusion that the aforesaid is a brief outline of the position of my Government with respect to the disarmament items under consideration in this Committee. We will support any concrete measure or decision that serves to contribute toward positive steps for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under international control and supervision. We earnestly hope that his Committee will be able to take the decisions necessary toward the attainment of that goal.

Mr. AII (China) (interpretation from Chinese): In his speech during the general debate, the Chairman of the Chinese delegation has already stated China's principled position on the question of disarmament. Now I would like to add a few observations on certain aspects of the question.

A year has elapsed since we discussed the question of disarmament at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. But what is the actual situation now, a year later? People may see that the accumulated arms of the super-Powers have increased rather than decreased, as compared with last year. Their arms race has not abated; on the contrary, it has been intensified. Such being the case, the danger of war has not been reduced in the least. Still less can there be any talk about "détente" in the international situation.
What is the cause of all this? The cause lies in the ever fiercer contention between the two super-Powers for hegemony on a global scale. For a long time, they have been engaged in fierce contention with Europe as the strategic focal point and the Middle East and the Mediterranean as its flank. They have also been stepping up their rivalry in the Indian and Pacific oceans and elsewhere. In particular, that super-Power with a "socialist" label, beset as it is with troubles both at home and abroad, harbours wild ambitions and is trying to squeeze into the spheres of influence of the other super-Power everywhere, so as to supersede the latter and thus realize its pipe dream of world domination. To that end, it never lags behind anyone in the speed of its arms expansion. Now then can there be any "general and complete disarmament"?

Since the beginning of "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks", the arms race between the super-Powers has never abated. One of them has been particularly energetic in this respect. In recent years, while strenuously developing conventional weapons, it has been developing its nuclear weapons on an unprecedented scale and with unparalleled speed. In the past decade, its ICBMs have increased almost tenfold. In the last two years, it has gone a step further to develop MIRVs on a large scale in contention for nuclear superiority. In order to seek hegemony over the seas and oceans, it has made tremendous efforts to expand its navy and nuclear submarines. The total tonnage of its warships of various types has multiplied. Its fleets ply every ocean of the world. Not to be outdone, the other super-Power has declared its intention never to be reduced to a "secondary power" in terms of military strength and is also engaged in intensified arms expansion. Recently, when they were conducting the resumed "SALT" talks, one super-Power made tremendous efforts to develop mobile ICBMs, whereupon the other super-Power declared the successful test launching of an ICBM from the plane. This marks the beginning of a new round of the arms race. Is this not an ample proof? Moreover, it must be pointed out that the super-Powers, plagued by ever more serious economic difficulties, are seeking, or will inevitably seek, a way out through the further militarization of their national economies. Consequently, whether judging from the present situation or from the trend of its development, the peoples of the world are facing a general and complete arms expansion by the super-Powers, and definitely not general and complete disarmament.
The foregoing is the actual situation on the disarmament question, which should serve as the point of departure of our discussions on this question.

It is impossible to cover up the facts about the intensified arms expansion and war preparations by the super-Powers. In his speech in this Committee, the United States representative, Mr. Symington, had to admit that since the conclusion of the SALT agreement in 1972 the super-Powers had been "adding nuclear weapons to their stockpiles each day of the year". Leaving aside the rest of his speech, we may say that he, after all, said something true. Yet, for a long time, the Soviet Union has been incessantly spreading the smokescreen of "disarmament" and "détente" within and outside the United Nations. While obviously pursuing a policy of frantic arms expansion and war preparations, it babbles that "a world without war has become a practical new historical period which has now arrived", unabashedly boasting that "one of the most important orientations of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is the struggle for the cessation of the arms race and for disarmament". While obviously engaged everywhere in political interference and military expansion against other countries to aggravate international tension, it proposes to "supplement political détente with military détente" and alleges that "today it can be certain that the sporks of war have been basically extinguished." While persistently trying to maintain its nuclear monopoly and carrying out nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat against other countries, it stubbornly chooses itself to masquerade as a standard-bearer of nuclear disarmament. A mere check of these hypocritical words against its actual deeds will easily lay bare its sheer hypocrisy and duplicity.

The Soviet Union has lauded to the skies the so-called disarmament treaties and agreements concluded in recent years. But, as pointed out by many representatives of third-world countries, this stuff can in no way be called genuine disarmament agreements. Some of them were designed to seek confirmation from the small and medium-sized countries of the super-Powers' nuclear monopoly; some were aimed at a temporary readjustment of the balance of their armaments in preparation for a more intense competition on a new basis; while others were entirely for window-dressing to deceive the public.

China has always been in favour of genuine disarmament. At the same time, we have been consistently opposed to the various impudent tricks played by the
super-Powers, the Soviet Union in particular. The Soviet Union has been crying out for a speedy convocation of the world disarmament conference year in and year out in an effort to create a false impression about its concern over disarmament. Is this concern true? Everyone knows that over the years innumerable disarmament conferences have been held under various names with the participation of Soviet representatives. However, to date, who has ever seen the Soviet Union reduce its stockpiles by a single warship, a single tank or a single nuclear warhead? In connexion with the hypocritical propaganda of the Soviet representatives on the disarmament question, the Chinese delegation made the explicit proposal to them that the Soviet Union should undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, particularly against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, to withdraw from abroad all its armed forces, including nuclear-missile forces, and dismantle all its military bases on foreign soil, including nuclear bases. It should not have been difficult to effect this just proposal of China.
Yet, turning a deaf ear to it, the Soviet representative has thus far refused to respond. Please think it over: if a world disarmament conference of the type of an empty talk club is to be held under these circumstances with no clear aims and no fulfilment of the necessary prerequisites, what purpose can it possibly serve other than creating a false sense of security and slackening the vigilance of the peoples of the world?

Every year the Soviet Union comes up in the United Nations with some new varieties of so-called proposals under the item of disarmament. The proposal it made last year on the so-called reduction of military budgets by 10 per cent and the use of the funds saved for assisting the developing countries is a double fraud. Since it is impossible for the Soviet Union either to undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or to cancel the debts incurred by some developing countries for the purchase of arms to resist aggression, is it not evidently the commercial hoax of a speculator to talk about using the money saved from disarmament for assisting the developing countries? After this hoax had been seen through and buried by the people of the world, the Soviet Union has produced this year a proposal on the so-called "prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes". The Soviet representative asserted that in putting forth the proposal the Soviet Union was motivated by its concern for international security and human well-being. Well, is it not precisely the super-Powers which possess a large quantity of nuclear weapons that are menacing international security and human well-being? If the Soviet side had any real concern for the security and the well-being of mankind, why would it not do one or two practical and feasible things? Why should it talk so sensationally about such a remote question as the possibility of the melting of the ice caps in the Arctic and Antarctic, and not turn back to deal with the actual situation prevailing in the Indian Ocean today? The United Nations report on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace reveals that the super-Powers are greatly increasing their military presence in the Indian Ocean, threatening the peace and security of the area. People have every reason to ask you to announce here what measures you intend to take to withdraw your military presence from that area.
In order to combat nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail, a number of countries have put forward proposals for the establishment of peace zones and nuclear-weapon-free zones, calling upon the nuclear countries to undertake due obligations. These are entirely just proposals, which the Chinese Government firmly supports. The Chinese Government has signed and ratified Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. We firmly support the efforts to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Likewise, we now welcome the proposals made by Pakistan, Iran and other countries at the current session for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia and a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and we are prepared to undertake due obligations. But the Soviet Government, in disregard of the repeated appeals from the Latin American countries, has thus far refused to sign Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The Soviet Union has taken a negative attitude on the question of establishing peace zones and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The facts show that in order to realize the just proposals for the establishment of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is imperative to oppose resolutely the super-Power policies of aggression, expansion and contention for hegemony and persistently to demand their acceptance of obligations in respect of such zones.

The peoples of various countries who went through two world wars hope to prevent the imperialists from unleashing a new war. Their demand is entirely justified. The question is what policy should be adopted in order effectively to prevent the super-Powers from launching a new war.

Imperialism is a source of war in modern times. So long as imperialism and social-imperialism exist, there exists the danger of war. And imperialism invariably resorts to the policy of peace deception and the policy of war alternately. The more it is actively engaged in expansion and aggression abroad and in war preparations, the more energetically it will sing "détente" and "disarmament". The imperialist Powers did the same prior to the outbreak of both World Wars. Before the First World War, while engaged in frantic expansion and war preparations, Tsarist Russia chanted "détente" and "disarmament".
It proposed to convene a "world peace conference" in 1899 and then in 1907. Thereafter, hardly a few years passed before it went into the world war together with other European Powers. After the First World War, the European Powers concluded the Locarno Pact in 1925 allegedly to "guarantee peace" and "to renounce the use of force to change the frontiers". But did it not turn into a mere scrap of paper in the twinkling of an eye? Thereafter, Nazi Germany also advertised its favourable response to "disarmament" and professed its "full readiness to abandon all offensive weapons". Subsequently, Hitler concluded an agreement with certain countries to "ensure peace in Europe". At the time, someone said that it had led to "peace for our time". However, before long Nazi Germany launched the Second World War. All of a sudden, "peace for our time" turned into "war for our time". Historical experience merits attention. Is it not necessary for us now to maintain a high level of vigilance against that super-Power which is chanting "détente" and "disarmament" while engaged in frantic arms expansion and war preparations?

So long as the super-Powers do not cease their policies of aggression, expansion and hegemony, there can be no genuine détente, nor general and complete disarmament in the world. In recent years, an increasing number of countries have come to see the essence of this question. The leaders of some third-world countries have rightly pointed out that so long as the super-Powers "do not abandon their ambition for world domination, there can be no genuine peace and genuine development" and that the two super-Powers' "avarice for spheres of influence is a factor leading to new wars and conflicts".
An African representative pointed out in his speech during the general debate: The super-Power "policy of domination and hegemony ... is at the basis of the incessant arms race".

Another representative pointed out that:

In an atmosphere of unbridled competition, and given the mutual outbidding of those States, the efforts ... to achieve general and complete disarmament can only be in vain.

Therefore, the small and medium-sized countries which are confronted with the super-Power threats of aggression and expansion must further strengthen their unity and their necessary defence capabilities if they wish to take the destiny of their independence and security into their own hands.

An Asian representative posed a very good question during the debate in this Committee:

'In fact, how can we eliminate arms while the very roots of conflicts still subsist?'

His answer was:

"In the world of today, States cannot rely on others for their defence and must be prepared for any contingency."

The facts have taught people that if the super Powers are allowed to continue peddling their empty talk about disarmament, and particularly if that super-Power which is hawking its quack medicine everywhere is permitted to use sham disarmament and sham détente to lull the world's people without being exposed and rebuffed, then the danger of an imperialist war will be increased, contrary to the will of the people. Conversely, one can be invincible only by mobilizing the people, uniting all the forces that can be united to form a broad united front against colonialism, imperialism and hegemony, seriously exposing the super-Powers' schemes of sham disarmament and genuine war preparations, and demanding their real actions on the question of disarmament, particularly on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and their real commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to withdraw all their forces from abroad and dismantle their military bases on foreign soil, while making every preparation to deal head on blows to them wherever they should launch a war of aggression. This is the dialectical law of history
and the reality of life. And such is the positive policy to fight against wars of aggression. In the final analysis, whether nuclear weapons of the super-Powers, they are nothing but paper tigers before the world's people, who are united to wage persistent struggles. The super-Powers' frantic arms expansion and war preparations by no means indicate their strength. On the contrary, they only serve to prove that they are in the plight expressed by the proverb "flowers fall off, do what one may". So long as the people of the world deal with them seriously, they can be defeated. Together with other countries, we are ready to adopt this positive policy and contribute our share to opposing the super-Power policies of aggression and war and to promoting the cause of human progress.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I shall now call on those representatives wishing to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) (interpretation from Arabic): I was really surprised by the statement of the Israeli representative yesterday that the use of napalm against innocent civilians is outside the framework of the topics we are discussing in this Committee. I believe that this subject falls within the framework of agenda item 27, and represents one of the items being considered under the subject of disarmament.

Israel's use of this barbaric weapon, which has caused death among civilians and military personnel alike in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, is a proven fact; it has been established by newspapers, news agencies and eye-witnesses from UNRWA and the Red Cross. I have with me photographs of the victims of napalm attacks by Israel which verify these facts and, had it not been for their barbarity, I would have distributed them to members of the Committee.

I appeal to members to exert pressure on Israel to make it refrain not only from using napalm and other incendiary weapons against civilians, but from any further attacks on civilians, particularly Palestinian refugees rendered homeless as a result of the establishment of the Zionist racist State.
Mr. ROKSHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Following the example set at previous General Assembly sessions, the representative of China has today made a slanderous, malicious attack in which he attempted to distort the policy of the USSR and its position on disarmament questions. The purpose of that statement was to attempt to hinder the development of the process of détente, the easing of international tension in the world, and to confuse and muddy the international situation and distort the role of the Soviet Union in the struggle for the strengthening of international peace and security and, at the same time, to hide from international public opinion the fact that in questions of the maintenance of international peace and security and international co-operation in the cause of disarmament China is pursuing a policy of negativism and subversive activity in an attempt to block any measures in the field of disarmament.

China not only fails to take part in international agreements on disarmament questions concluded since the proclamation and formation of the People's Republic of China, but is also striving to undermine any agreements in this field by attempting to prevent their implementation. Thus China is not a party to the 1963 Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear testing in the three environments, and in violation of the norms established by that agreement, is conducting atmospheric testing and is polluting with radio-active fall-out not only its own country but also neighbouring States, including the Mongolian People's Republic, India, the USSR and Japan and, in general, all other countries of the world.

China is not a party to and is disregarding other agreements and conventions relating to disarmament and a limitation of the arms race, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction; and many others.

In the last few years, the Soviet Union, together with a number of other States, has been coming forward with important initiatives in the disarmament field, in an attempt to diminish the threat of nuclear war: for example, its proposal for the renunciation by States of the use of force in international
relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the convening of a world disarmament conference, and the curtailing of the military expenditure of Security Council members. On all these matters the General Assembly has adopted constructive recommendations and decisions to implement all these proposals.
China in all these matters has taken a sharply negative stand. It not only fails to come forward with a single constructive proposal on disarmament matters but is doing everything it can to impede the implementation of any proposals in this area. Now, what is the reason for such a negative attitude on the part of China in questions of disarmament and its policy of resisting all proposals in this field? The reason for this is the fact that the leadership of China has no interest whatsoever in performing the task of strengthening international peace and security and carrying out disarmament. Its policy is not designed to ease but rather to exacerbate the international situation and to undermine all measures intended to ensure peace and to ease tension.

The leadership of China is making tremendous efforts to hinder the normalization of the atmosphere in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world, to attempt to undermine the process, now under way, of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. This process is not at all to the liking of the Peking leaders who want to benefit from the disasters and sufferings of other people and to incite international conflict and create impediments to the current process of détente in the world. We should like to point out and stress the danger of this policy on the part of China for the whole of the international community of nations, for developing and developed countries, for small and great nations, for nuclear and non nuclear Powers.

China's policy is involving the peoples of the world not in a performance of the tasks and objectives of the United Nations Charter, but in violation of them, not to international peace and security, but is leading them to international conflict and war, not towards a solution of the problem of disarmament but to the undermining of such decisions.

Mr. ERELLI (Israel): I should like to make a very brief comment on the remarks we heard a little while ago from the representative of Qatar on the question of napalm.
Napalm, of course, is on our agenda, and other weapons of the same nature. It is up to the Chairman to decide in each case whether discussion of napalm requires or does not require bringing into the centre of our deliberations here a dispute which is being and will be discussed elsewhere. I believe it was the case that a number of representatives found it possible to speak on napalm and in the context of the Middle East without offering our Committee any lies concerning the method in which that weapon is used by one country or another. The weapon called napalm is one among other weapons; there was some discussion about banning it; there will be some more discussion and that can be dealt with in the Committee without bringing in the Middle East conflict.

However, since the representative of Qatar repeated some of the lies he offered to us at the previous meeting of our Committee, I feel it my duty to once again tell the Committee that Israel never mounts any attacks on civilians, refugees or others. Israel attacks military targets and Israel attacks terrorist encampments and headquarters out of which people are sent to murder women and children in Israel. Naturally, Israel will continue to do that when necessary.

On the question of napalm itself, I think it would be useful for me also to say that it is rather cynical to hear representatives speak of weapons which are indiscriminate and cruel -- I believe those are the words -- and yet these same representatives and their countries consider that it is very appropriate and very right for them to support a weapon which consists of a man going into a schoolhouse to shoot school children or to take school children as hostages and then murder them in cold blood, or a weapon like sending people into apartment houses in the towns and cities of Israel ...

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to say the following to the representative of Israel: Even though I was not present on the afternoon of 31 October at the 2006th meeting, I read the verbatim record of the debate very carefully. The representative of Qatar, in his statement, when he referred to napalm and other incendiary bombs, and when speaking of the use of that kind of weapon, mentioned four examples: the Second World War, Korea, Viet-Nam and the refugee camps in Lebanon.
So, contrary to the representative of Israel's claim, the representative of Qatar did not bring in the problem of the Middle East. In referring to the use of one kind of weapon, he mentioned four examples. I consider that in so doing he was within his rights and not out of order. The representative of Israel in the exercise of his right of reply, which no one can prevent him from doing, can, of course, deny that those weapons were used. But it cannot be said that a representative is out of order simply because he gives examples of the use of a weapon.

With this warning, I should like to ask the representative of Israel, in continuing with his right of reply, to refrain from drawing the Committee's attention to matters which would involve it in a debate on the Middle East question. Having made these comments, I now call on the representative of Israel to continue to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. EREL (Israel): Mr. Chairman, I am entirely in agreement with you that these interjections on the part of representatives are either out of order or a proper matter for the right of reply. The decision would be absolutely up to you in every case. If you will allow attacks on Israel, I shall have to exercise my right of reply. If you will disallow attacks on Israel, naturally the question of the right of reply will not arise and we will save the time of the Committee and of us all, which is the objective in which I fully identify with you.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like once again to point out to the representative of Israel that I have not allowed any attack on Israel. I simply said that at a meeting at which I was not present a representative -- in this case the representative of Qatar -- in referring to the use of napalm, gave four examples, one of which concerns Israel.

With this clarification, I now call on the next speaker, the representative of China, to exercise his right of reply.
Mr. AM (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Soviet representative in his reply made a slanderous attack on the Chinese delegation. We believe that a refutation is needed to set the record straight.

In our first statement we only referred to facts which are known to all. All these facts converge on a single point: the Soviet arms expansion is a reality while its talk on disarmament is a fraud. Perhaps by exposing the essence of the matter, we have touched the sore spot of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet representative always styles himself as the standard-bearer of disarmament, vilifying opponents of Soviet fallacies as "negativists" in an attempt to reverse right and wrong and confound black and white. However, it is futile to engage in boasting and empty talk on the question of disarmament.

China's attitude on the disarmament question is always serious and earnest. We are in favour of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and as the first step towards realizing this goal, we have proposed that all nuclear countries declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This proposal put forward by China is not only directly relevant to present realities in the world, but also pinpoints the key to the question of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. Why is the Soviet Union afraid to face squarely such a fundamental question?

The Soviet representative accused China of creating international tension and of being against international peace and security. But who is really against international security and undermining international peace? The answer should be clear to all. The Soviet representative's attempt to shift the blame onto China is completely futile. It is precisely the Soviet Union which is engaged in frantic arms expansion and war preparations and is carrying out aggression, threats, interference and subversion everywhere leaving earlier events aside, in the past year alone, the Soviet Union has been engaged in overt and covert rivalry -- even with sabres drawn at times -- with the other super-Power in the Middle East and Cyprus. Is it not perfectly clear who is really creating tension? The Soviet representative's countercharge against China only demonstrated that he is at the end of his wits and had to resort to falsehood. But who would really believe him?
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): After the clarification given by the Chairman in regard to the right of reply between the representatives of Qatar and Israel, I wonder whether it is necessary for the representative of Qatar to speak again, particularly since I am receiving messages from the interpreters to the effect that we have exceeded our time by 25 minutes.

Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) (interpretation from Arabic): The representative of Israel fully knows that the history of Israel in this international Organization is well known to everybody and that its criminal acts committed every day against unarmed civilians are also well known. I have brought with me this morning some photos ...

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I would draw the attention of the representative of Qatar to the fact that his position has been made perfectly clear by the Chairman. That is to say, when he made the statements he did in the debate on 31 October he was in order, and therefore I did not accept some parts of the statement made in exercise of the right of reply by the representative of Israel. I now request the representative of Qatar to refrain from following the same course now, otherwise we shall never end, and he would place himself in the same position. For this reason I would particularly urge him to allow the polemics to end at this point. I thank him for the co-operation which I know he always extends to the Committee and its officers.

I should like to announce that Argentina and India have been added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/AC.1/L.675, which is sponsored by the Soviet Union and other countries.

Likewise I wish to express publicly my gratitude as well as my apologies to the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR. Because of a misunderstanding, the representative of the Byelorussian SSR was not able to speak this morning. The situation has been remedied, and that delegation's name appears on the list of speakers for tomorrow, but I wished publicly to place on record my gratitude for his understanding and co-operation.
While I am on the subject, I appeal to delegations that are tentatively included in the list of speakers to confirm or delete their names as speakers on given dates, because we are facing a rather difficult situation. As was to be expected, most delegations have put their names down for the last day or the last two days of the general debate on disarmament, although we have had almost 10 days. Some of those delegations are included as possible speakers and unless they confirm or retract their names for these dates we shall not be able to allow other delegations that firmly intend to speak to put their names down on the list. Therefore I appeal to all delegations tentatively included in the list of speakers to inform the Secretariat at the end of the meeting today whether or not they intend to speak on the date indicated.

I shall now call on the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I appeal to him to be brief, as the interpreters' work time has been exceeded.
Mr. ROACHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I shall not take very long, Sir. I shall confine myself to just two minutes.

The representative of China asserts that the Soviet Union is resisting disarmament and that China is doing a great deal to promote it. This contradicts all the facts which are available to the Committee and to the General Assembly.

The Soviet Union invited China to take part in the talks of the five nuclear Powers on questions of disarmament. China did not want to take part. All delegations in the General Assembly are urging the convening of a world disarmament conference. China is against this and is trying to undermine it. Now, why does China act against this? Because it does not want disarmament, because it does not want the easing of international tension, because this contradicts the principles and policy of Peking. It is putting forward all kinds of demands connected with the convening of a conference, saying that we should first solve certain problems of nuclear disarmament, and so on. But why does it not propose that those items be included on the agenda of a world disarmament conference? The conference could consider those matters. If China really intended to consider the questions of disarmament seriously, there are a great many opportunities for this, which the Chinese delegation and the Chinese Government unfortunately are disregarding; this is the fundamental reason for a situation in which disarmament talks are in fact now encountering a great number of obstacles. Those obstacles are being created by China and no one else.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.