Twenty-ninth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND FOURTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 30 October 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)

Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries [24] (continued)

  (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;

  (b) Report of the Secretary-General

- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General [27] (continued)

- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [28] (continued)

- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [29] (continued)

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The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /30/ (continued)

- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)

- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)

- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)

- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /101/ (continued)

- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health /103/ (continued)

- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia /107/ (continued)

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(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS;

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

NAPALM AND OTHER INCendiARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9726)

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9705)

URGENT NEED FOR CESSION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS AND CONCLUSION OF A TREATY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9593, A/9650, A/9698, A/9708)


WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/9590, A/9628, A/9636)

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IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2266 (XXII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TRENTOLOCO) (A/9692)

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (A/9693 and Add.1-3)

PROHIBITION OF ACTION TO INFLUENCE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE FOR MILITARY AND OTHER PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND HEALTH (A/9702 and Corr.1; A/C.1/L.675)

DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9766)
Mr. TÁBOR (Denmark): It seems that most speakers in this year's general debate in the plenary Assembly have given less prominence than in earlier sessions to the agenda items which for years have been in the focus of the deliberations of this Committee—the problems of disarmament.

More in the foreground this year were several questions concerning the economic aspects of world-wide international co-operation. These questions may perhaps be said to have been given higher priority in the current public debate and to have been of more immediate concern to public opinion.

The fact that our efforts to attain substantial progress in the field of disarmament have produced results at only a very slow pace, and the fact that these results, in turn, have been only fragmentary in relation to the agreed ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament may to some extent explain the reasons behind the apparent decrease in interest in these questions that we are now witnessing.

Yet, the fact remains that it is the ardent wish of the peoples we represent to see a breakthrough in the disarmament negotiations so that the arms race may be brought to a halt.

Although disarmament questions have been on the agenda of this Organization year after year, vast sums are still being spent every day on the development of increasingly more sophisticated weapons and weapon systems.
It is depressing to note that the estimated world military expenditure runs higher than $250,000 million a year. We must be aware of the negative effect of the arms race upon the advancement of the social and economic living conditions of all people and, of course, always remember the interdependence of political and military détente. It is discouraging, therefore, to note the lack of substantial progress in the field of disarmament that has characterized the past year. However, we must be realistic in our approach to these problems, and take into account the political forces of the world that have made progress slow. We must accept a step-by-step approach and, by agreeing on and implementing partial disarmament measures, patiently work towards our goals. Against this background we welcome the continuing efforts made by the two major nuclear Powers to achieve a relationship of détente and limitations to the strategic arms race.

In this connexion, I should like to mention also the ongoing negotiations in Vienna on mutual reductions of forces and armaments and associated measures in central Europe designed to bring about a more stable military balance at a lower level of forces. The fact that these negotiations are taking place is a positive sign. A successful outcome of the negotiations is evidently of common interest to all the participating countries and it is the hope of the Danish Government that continued efforts in Vienna will lead to substantial progress in the negotiations. The détente that we have witnessed in recent years can best be safeguarded and substantiated if accompanied by appropriate reductions in the military field as a manifestation of greater trust between the parties.

Permit me, furthermore, to mention yet another important conference which is primarily of concern to Europe -- the negotiations in Geneva of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Denmark takes an active part in these negotiations with the aim of bringing them to a rapid and successful conclusion which would constitute a deepening of the process of political détente and a strengthening of the co-operation between East and West.

I shall now turn to some of the specific items relating to disarmament on this year's agenda. For several years the General Assembly has adopted resolutions that have emphasized the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
In spite of the commitment of the two major nuclear Powers under Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
"... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament",
only limited measures have been agreed upon by the two Powers since this Committee was in session last fall, although the threshold agreement and the anti-ballistic missile protocol of 3 July 1974, constitute steps in the right direction.

We realize that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have progressed to extremely difficult issues involving qualitative restraints on nuclear arsenals, and that it may have become more difficult to achieve significant results in these talks. It must be pointed out, however, that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility that follows from the advantageous status granted to them by the non-proliferation Treaty.

The vast number of nuclear weapons that are already in existence and the destructive potential of these arsenals underscore the serious risks inherent in nuclear proliferation. It is therefore with grave concern that we note that more than one third of the countries of the world have not yet ratified the non-proliferation Treaty. Denmark considers this Treaty to be one of the most important steps taken to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. But the Treaty can only fulfil its ultimate goals if it is accepted by all States. We therefore urge States -- nuclear and non-nuclear -- who are not yet Parties to the Treaty to accede to it. Universal acceptance of the non-proliferation Treaty would obviously be in the interests of the world community. We hope that the non-proliferation Treaty review conference scheduled to take place in May 1975 will result in strengthening the general status of the Treaty and will enhance its practical usefulness in accordance with the purposes of the preamble and the provisions in the Treaty. As a member of the Preparatory Committee for the review conference, Denmark will take an active role in the ongoing efforts towards this goal.

With regard to the question of general and complete disarmament I should like to add that we greatly appreciate the extensive and substantive efforts deployed by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Although
the annual report of CCD does not show significant new results we realize that the lack of real momentum does not signify that highly valuable work is not being done in CCD, which remains the principal organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations.

Turning to the agenda item on the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, my delegation deplores the fact that the past year has seen no real progress in this respect. In spite of the preambular pledge of the parties to the limited test ban Treaty to seek:

"... to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time ...",
such explosions continue to take place.

We believe that an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments by all countries is of overriding importance in the endeavour to stop the nuclear arms race. Complete cessation of testing of nuclear explosive devices would also help substantially to reduce the risks to the human environment and would moreover bolster the efforts to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We hope that the question of verification, which still seems to be one of the major unresolved issues, will be dealt with in a positive and constructive manner, possibly through intensified co-operation in the field of seismological detection.

The problem of peaceful nuclear explosions -- which are exempted from the United States-USSR threshold Agreement -- should be taken into account also in this connexion, since a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful uses cannot be distinguished from one intended for military purposes. The dual nature of modern scientific inventions is of particular relevance to the question of peaceful versus military explosions. The various legal, health, safety and economic aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions need to be scrutinized, and the major nuclear Powers should not forget their undertaking in accordance with article V of the non-proliferation Treaty:

"... to ensure that ... potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty ...".
International guarantees of the availability of such possible benefits might be of considerable interest to many Member States and could indeed have a highly positive effect on the non-proliferation Treaty régime in general. We must, however, in this respect bear in mind that the economic and technical usefulness of peaceful nuclear explosions is still a rather open question. Nor do we know how to avoid the environmental harm they are likely to cause. We have therefore with satisfaction taken note of the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency recently invited a panel of experts to consider those aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions in January 1975 in Vienna.

Another crucial question, and one to which high priority was accorded at last year's session of the General Assembly, is that of chemical and bacteriological weapons. As will appear from the annual report of the conference of the Committee on Disarmament, no substantial progress has yet been made in regard to the elimination of chemical weapons. My delegation considers it of great importance that agreement be reached as soon as possible on a convention for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction. The problems involved in this matter are, admittedly, more complex than in the case of biological weapons, especially the problems relating to verification and to the special technical aspects of the use of chemical substances for, respectively, peaceful and military purposes. In the view of my delegation it is of overriding importance that a convention on this subject contain provisions to secure its observance. We see the draft convention put forward by Japan in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a useful step in the right direction, and feel encouraged by the widespread support it has received. While maintaining that efforts aimed at a comprehensive ban should continuously be pursued, we accept that a step-by-step approach through partial measures such as those contained in the draft convention might prove to be a more realistic solution.

We recommend that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a matter of high priority continue negotiations on the problems of chemical warfare, and we find it encouraging that at the Moscow summit in July of this year the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to consider a joint initiative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion of an international convention dealing with chemical warfare.
It is, furthermore, the view of my delegation that all States not yet Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and to the 1972 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons should take steps to accede to and observe the principles and objectives of those agreements.

Concerning the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, we appreciate that the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts started an examination of the question of conventional weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. In that context, the question was also debated at the Red Cross Conference of Government Experts which recently took place at Lucerne, Switzerland, with the support of the Danish Government. After having studied the draft report of the Lucerne Conference, we feel that these problems need further clarification with a view to assisting Governments in their further deliberations on the technical, operational and legal possibilities of limiting the use of certain weapons.

As for the question of convening a world disarmament conference, my Government's stand is, in principle, positive. Although we find that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the principal organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations, we realize that a disarmament conference with universal participation could lead to positive results. However, we support the statement made recently in this Committee by the Iranian Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference that any haste, any pressure, could have only negative repercussions affecting the fragile progress so far achieved. We also find that an indispensable precondition for a successful outcome of a world disarmament conference is participation by all the permanent members of the Security Council. We believe that a universal conference on disarmament, if adequately prepared, could promote the aspirations of the international community for a halt to the senseless arms race, both nuclear and conventional, and would give renewed impetus to a meaningful reduction of the growing arsenals of the world.

With respect to the new items on our agenda, I can assure this Committee that my delegation will take a positive attitude towards any realistic initiative aimed at achieving progress towards general and complete disarmament.
Concerning the question of nuclear-free zones, it has been the Danish view that it must be a prerequisite that all the States in the areas concerned agree to the establishment of such zones and that provision be made for the necessary verification of the implementation of the measures agreed upon. We recognize that this is an issue which commands considerable interest among a great number of Member States, and yesterday we listened with particular interest to the viewpoints and ideas put forward by the representative of Finland. We shall listen with attention to further discussions and elaborations on these points.

As the world has become increasingly aware of the urgent need to ensure the protection of the earth and its environment for future generations, the question of environmental warfare has become a new and important concept in disarmament terminology. Against that background, we have noted with appreciation that at the Moscow summit in July of this year the United States and the Soviet Union advocated the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes. We have also noted with interest the draft convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes submitted to the General Assembly by the Soviet Union.
I have tried with these remarks to give an outline of my delegation's views on a number of the agenda items which we are discussing under the heading of disarmament. It is our hope that the deliberations of this Committee on these important problems may result in a convergence of standpoints.

We realize that developments in the scientific field continue to make the problems of disarmament measures increasingly complex. The very nature of scientific innovations makes the task of negotiating effective bans on military uses even more difficult. Problems of adequate safeguards and effective verification add to these obstacles encountered in the present disarmament negotiations.

The task before us is of overriding importance. We must bear in mind that this Committee is the only universal group that meets regularly to discuss all questions related to disarmament. We have a special responsibility and if we demonstrate the necessary political will and are able to give the necessary guidelines and encouragement to the participants in the ongoing disarmament conferences, then they, in turn, will be in a better position to achieve substantial progress in the years ahead.

Sir Laurence McIntyre (Australia): I intend, like many speakers who already participated in this debate, to concentrate mainly this morning on questions of nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation.

As my Prime Minister said in the course of his address to the General Assembly on 30 September, these questions have assumed particular importance this year. It seems to the Australian Government that the world is now approaching a critical turning point in the field of nuclear technology and nuclear energy. For one thing there is a convergence of forces and events which has given a new urgency to the whole debate on the proliferation of nuclear techniques and weapons. As a result the decisions that statesmen and nations will be making during the next 12 months could have much significance for future world peace and security.
The world energy crisis growing out of the sharp rise in oil costs has inevitably sharpened the interest in a number of countries in the development of nuclear energy programmes. The prospect of a world with widespread nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities is now perhaps only a few years away. These facilities, as they spread into non-nuclear-weapon States, could well be producing significant and growing quantities of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, especially with the commercial development of the fast-breeder reactor.

While economic pressures threaten to drive us towards an increasingly nuclear-powered world, the basic problems of nuclear arms control are still a long way from solution. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union do not seem to have made much significant progress over the past year, though there is at least some comfort to be got from their agreement on a threshold limitation for underground weapons testing.

At the same time, while we can still see no effective barrier against vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, we are now having to cope increasingly with an apparent weakening of the barriers of horizontal proliferation. It gives us no satisfaction that all five nuclear weapon Powers have been testing their weapons in the year just ended: two of them in the atmosphere, three of them underground. Nor can we regard with equanimity the explosion of an underground nuclear device in India, however genuinely designed as part of a programme for peaceful economic uses of nuclear energy.

But not all the developments over the past year have been negative. The International Atomic Energy Agency is continuing with its work of negotiating safeguards agreements with Member States; progress continues towards the ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty by a number of developed countries, including Japan and West Germany; useful preparatory work is underway for the non-proliferation Treaty review conference to be held in 1975. Australia, as a member of the preparatory Committee is doing its utmost to assist in ensuring that the conference will be valuable and productive. The Treaty of Tlateloelo, the first regional nuclear-free zone agreement to have been projected is gaining in strength and support and by Government welcomes the adherence to Additional Protocol II this year by China and France, which leaves only one
nuclear-weapon Power not to have supported the Treaty. Australia also welcomes the general concept of two other nuclear-free zone initiatives that have been proposed in the Assembly this year by Iran and Pakistan. These initiatives, as my Foreign Minister has said in the Assembly on 30 September, move in the right direction but they still require close study in all their implications.

It is already clear from the statements made in the general debate here that there is a wide spectrum of views on how best to attack the threat of nuclear proliferation in the situation that has developed this year. It will be our task in this Committee to search for a consensus that reflects the views and interests of us all, nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States, signatories and non-signatories to the non-proliferation Treaty.

The Australian Government's position in this respect is self-evident. Australia regards the non-proliferation Treaty as the corner-stone of international efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

Our first aim must be to strengthen the Treaty and work for its acceptance everywhere. We recognize that the Treaty by its nature is discriminatory against all of us non-nuclear States. At the same time we see no alternative to it in the present state of the world. The Treaty, which took many years of effort and compromise to produce in its present form, is an impressive attempt to balance the interests of all States in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world in which the proliferation of nuclear weapons might be prevented. All of its articles were drafted with this objective clearly in view. What is now important is that a serious effort should be made at the non-proliferation Treaty review conference to consider how best all its articles might be fully implemented.
This must include a more effective implementation of articles IV, V, and VI. Until that has been done, a basic weakness in the non-proliferation system, which recent events have only served to underline, will remain. It is in this spirit that Australia is approaching the review conference and it is in this spirit that my delegation will address itself to any initiative that may be put forward in this Committee.

It is not easy this year to draw a sharp line in our work here between agenda item 29, which deals with nuclear testing, and agenda item 35, which encompasses in the context of general and complete disarmament some of the broader issues of nuclear proliferation and the non-proliferation Treaty. As is generally known, Australia has in recent years been particularly concerned with nuclear-weapons testing, and especially with problems created for us by weapons testing in the atmosphere by France and China in our adjacent region, despite the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty, as a result of which we have had recourse to the International Court of Justice. We have continually urged both countries to cease testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and to support the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty. That treaty, while it has not resulted in halting nuclear testing entirely, has been an immensely valuable interim measure which has eliminated in large degree the radiation risks and environmental hazards involved in atmospheric testing.

Our attitude in this respect is quite clear: we deplore nuclear-weapons testing by any country in any environment. We are concerned at the lack of progress towards a comprehensive test-ban agreement and at the continuance of nuclear tests, whether in the atmosphere or underground. We consider that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility for leading the way towards a comprehensive test-ban agreement.

After so many years of painstaking and exhaustive effort by the countries represented in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the time for a comprehensive test-ban agreement has surely arrived. That would be a mark of genuine progress towards putting into effect article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty and it would signify to the world that a serious effort was under way to halt vertical as well as horizontal proliferation.
The problem of the testing and use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes has assumed a new importance following the Indian experiment on 13 May. This is a contentious and sensitive issue, as statements already made in this debate have shown. Nevertheless it is an issue that has to be faced candidly and without equivocation. My delegation sees the Indian experiment primarily in the context of nuclear proliferation rather than that of nuclear-weapons testing. My Government has welcomed the declaration by the Indian Government that its explosion was carried out for peaceful purposes and that the Indian Government has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Australia views with concern and regret Indian's decision to carry out its test of a nuclear explosive device.

Nuclear explosions may eventually have important economic uses, although that has by no means been established. However, the plain fact is that any nuclear explosive device, whether or not it is intended for peaceful economic uses, is a potential nuclear weapon. That is why Australia considers that any nuclear explosion intended for peaceful purposes should take place only in accordance with the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, including those relating to international safeguards and controls. It is true, of course, that article V of the non-proliferation Treaty has not so far been implemented, and the question of how best that article could be put into effect has been brought into sharper focus this year. There are experts who believe that nuclear explosions for peaceful economic purposes have no real future, because of the risks of persistent radiation and environmental pollution which would outweigh any cost benefits of the technology. If those who doubt the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions are correct -- and their number does not seem to be diminishing -- there might accordingly be no need to set up international procedures for implementing article V of the Treaty. But the first step is to carry out a thorough and objective international study of peaceful nuclear explosions in all their aspects, technical, economic and political as well as disarmament. The broad mandate of the study should be to examine the possibility and the desirability of setting up an international agency to carry out peaceful nuclear explosion services as envisaged by article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. We consider that the question should be studied in a forum which would draw on the expertise, and represent the interests, of all countries with something to contribute, parties
to the Treaty and non-parties alike. We believe that in view of the importance of the issue in terms of nuclear non-proliferation it would be appropriate if the initial directive for such a study came from the Secretary-General. That would serve to emphasize the point, which was well made by the Japanese Foreign Minister on 24 September, that in view of the special importance and great urgency of preventing nuclear proliferation in order to maintain peace and security in the world, the United Nations should play a central role in tackling this issue. The carrying out of the study might be entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency or it might be divided between the Agency and another body.

The non-proliferation Treaty review conference itself will, of course, be addressing itself to the matter in its discussion of article V of the Treaty.

I do not propose to say very much at this time about nuclear safeguards, although the question of safeguards is, of course, of the highest importance. We consider that the International Atomic Energy Agency is, on the whole, performing effectively its task of negotiating safeguards agreements with member States. My delegation is pleased to recall that Australia signed its safeguards agreement with the IAEA on 10 July this year, within 18 months of our ratifying the non-proliferation Treaty.

The question of physical security of nuclear material against non-governmental diversion is, of course, an important one and will need to be given close consideration in the future.

I shall conclude with some remarks about other disarmament matters of particular interest to my country. Australia is a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. We would not wish to see an escalation of great-Power military rivalry in the Indian Ocean, an area which has hitherto been of all the world's oceans the one most free from great-Power naval confrontation. There is no nation in the Indian Ocean region which would welcome the prospect of an arms race in the region.
Australia has urged, and will continue to urge, the major Powers to limit their naval deployments and military presence there in a spirit of mutual restraint. We will continue to co-operate with other countries of the Indian Ocean, and in particular with the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, in an effort to preserve the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

This year, Australia expressed some interest in the possibility of becoming a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. However, taking into account the balanced nature of the agreed expansion in its membership this year, the Committee has decided to defer consideration of Australia's interest in membership to a later date. My Government hopes that, in due course, it will be possible for Australia to become a member of, and make a contribution to, that Committee.

We have noted with interest the Soviet initiative this year concerning the prohibition of action to influence the environment for military purposes. In general, we see this as a useful initiative and one worthy of broad support.

I have not been able in this statement to cover all the items on our disarmament agenda, and my delegation may, accordingly, wish to intervene again later in the debate on particular questions.

Mr. Sharaf (Jordan): Speaking for the first time, may I extend to you, Mr. Chairman, both personally and officially my congratulations on your assumption of the leadership of our Committee. Your election is a tribute to your competence, intellect and energy, as well as a tribute to your dynamic and progressive country.

There is a certain paradox in the representatives of small and developing countries addressing themselves to the subject of disarmament and particularly the nuclear debate. It is somehow presumptuous for them to participate with the great and the mighty in a dialogue about nuclear mathematics and about the taming of nearly unimaginable power. But it is also very appropriate for small countries like mine to show a deep concern about the need to control force and avert ultimate universal destruction. As small and developing countries, we have a less abstract and mathematical notion of the subject and a real contact with it. Our borders and national
territories are more vulnerable to superior unchecked force, our technologies too modest to protect us against the consequences of super-Power balances, experiments and competition. Perhaps nowhere in the third world can this apply more than in the Middle East.

There are two levels, distinct if interconnected, on which the problem of disarmament exists: the nuclear and the conventional level. Both these aspects of the problem have a direct bearing on the small and developing countries of the Middle East, in addition to their broader significance for those countries as aspects of an acute problem of mankind today. The nuclear aspect of disarmament affects our region, including my own country, through the fact that there is a serious and immediate fear in the area that nuclear weapons and capability may be introduced into the region, and its conflicts, if no adequate international safeguards are established as soon as possible. This is the motive behind the recent inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly at its present session of an item dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The nuclear aspect of the problem of disarmament also affects our region directly inasmuch as the regional conflict can become increasingly polarized to the extent that the terrible danger of a nuclear confrontation between the super-Powers in the region becomes real. It is a constant reminder to the world of the broader menace of the contemporary nuclear stalemate.

On the more conventional level, the region is also directly affected by the attempts in the United Nations to humanize and control the means of conventional war. Until such time as a just peace is established in our region, there will be a very real and continuous need in the Middle East for the success of international efforts in the control and elimination of chemical and biological weapons. Our experience in the region has acquainted us, for example, with the ugly inhumanity of the use of napalm. My delegation, with a number of other delegations, at the twenty-seventh session, was quick to put forward a proposal deploring the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons as a step towards their prohibition.

I mention these facts not to engulf the universal and unlimited importance of the issue of general disarmament in regional egocentricity, but
(Mr. Sharaf, Jordan)

only to underline the fact that this issue does not belong only to the great
and the mighty but also to the relatively small and the relatively weak.
We all, small and great, non-nuclear and nuclear, have a genuine and overriding
interest in general and complete disarmament in all its aspects.

As I said before, there are evidently two levels on which the question
of disarmament exists. I shall try to summarize some thoughts which are
emerging from the long experience with disarmament that the United Nations has
had.

There is, first, the nuclear level. A basic and elementary observation
is the fact that neither within CCD nor within the proposed world
disarmament conference is there full representation of all the nuclear Powers.
It is obviously necessary that all States in possession of nuclear weapons
be involved in the joint international effort aimed at arms control
and disarmament.

A second primary concern for the United Nations is the containment of
the spread of nuclear weapons. A major landmark of achievement in this
respect is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. But that
Treaty has no comprehensive membership. It is relatively easier for the
international community to achieve progress in nuclear control and disarmament
when the number of nuclear Powers is limited. The proliferation of nuclear
weapons can make the task of disarmament nearly impossible. World opinion
must focus its pressure on strengthening the controls on non-proliferation as
much as on the achievement by the present nuclear Powers of concrete and
tangible breakthroughs in nuclear disarmament.

Three major tasks invite the attention and action of the international
community under this broad goal of non-proliferation. First, the need to
transform the present partial nuclear test ban into a comprehensive one. The
partial steps that have been achieved are encouraging, but limited both in
scope and in the extension of adherence to them. No technical difficulties such as
those of verification are in reality insurmountable, if the will and necessary
confidence are there. Closely related to this question is that of peaceful
nuclear explosions. We have again been reminded, and most convincingly,
in this debate by the representatives of Sweden and Japan and by other
representatives that the distinction between nuclear explosive technology for peaceful and for military purposes is very difficult to make. Effective international safeguards must be instituted within the framework of the United Nations to control peaceful nuclear explosions and nuclear power generation.

Finally, and in this context of non-proliferation and containment of the spread of nuclear weapons, falls the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones or regions. This approach has a definite potential as a contribution to the over-all goal of non-proliferation. The States of Latin America have made a useful positive contribution by the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The African States took a similar positive initiative in the early 1960s with regard to the denuclearization of Africa. The Committee is considering a commendable proposal for the declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. My delegation is gratified also at the proposal submitted by Iran at the present session of the General Assembly with the purpose of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the region of the Middle East.
We support the purpose of that proposal. The Middle East is an area where the introduction of nuclear weapons would mean dreadful complications and the direct threat of sliding into nuclear confrontation. That is why the proposal of denuclearization in the Middle East is consistent with and expressive of the purposes of the non-proliferation Treaty. It goes without saying that the States of the area must all sign and become members of the non-proliferation Treaty, in order to fulfil the most basic and essential requirement of the denuclearization of the area. Further arrangements and safeguards for the effective achievement of this goal can be worked out in the framework of the proposal under debate.

On a more conventional level, the goal of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been actively discussed during recent years. The urgent need to reinforce the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction by an instrument applying to chemical weapons is evident. Again, technical difficulties and difficulties of verification have been raised during the discussions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Some initiatives have been taken during the discussion of this issue in devising approaches to surmount the technical difficulties. The Japanese delegation made a worthy contribution. The Secretary-General has pointed to the fact that what awaits us now are concrete negotiations to achieve the effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

In this connexion, my delegation wishes to underline in particular the facts that have been outlined and emphasized in the Secretary-General's report of 1972 (A/8803 and Corr.1) embodying the findings of the experts about napalm and other incendiary weapons. The widest possible circulation must be given to that report and its contents. Some countries, more than others, have had direct experience of this problem. My country is in the former category. The General Assembly must give the necessary attention which this problem deserves and must, at this session, give urgency and shape to its concern with it. In our imperfect world the use of incendiary and chemical weapons in many areas of the world obviously has a more widespread effect than does the present controlled, if ever imminent, danger of nuclear war.
The general picture of disarmament is at the moment not encouraging. There are some specific and concrete steps that have been achieved during the last few years, but they are modest. The bilateral agreements achieved with the SALT talks are positive and must be gratifying to the United Nations. The dialogue in Europe on troop reduction is going on. The European Security Conference has at least been convened. But on the basic issues of disarmament, nuclear and conventional, no major progress has been made. We have all been alerted to a new area of fearful destructive potential, which is meteorological and environmental warfare. The Soviet initiative in bringing this question to the attention of this Committee for debate is a timely and useful one. So it is only major and drastic measures, based on common agreement, that can rise to the level of the armament challenge. Those, unfortunately, have not been taken. And it is only this basic and drastic action that can bring the world closer to the objective of meaningful disarmament.

Once more small countries with limited power and resources are not so far from genuine concern about armament and disarmament and their implications. It is because of our economic, technological and power limitations that we have no abstract or theoretical notions of the question. The problem of local wars and their possible escalation, no less than that of the effects of tests or, on a different level, of uncontrollable inflation which is decisively affected by armament, are all problems that affect us most. The question of development and of effectively by coping with the realities of mass poverty the widening economic gap between advanced industrial countries and developing countries, and the dangerous international economic disorder cannot be separated from the question of armaments. There is a clear and overriding interest for all, great and small, in the speedy and progressive achievement of control over arms and means of human destruction.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Sharaf of Jordan for his kind references to my country and to myself.

Mr. FRAZAO (Brazil): An appraisal of international relations in recent years cannot but acknowledge a positive tendency towards a better dialogue
among the major Powers, with a view to a relaxation of tensions and more effective co-operation among them in many fields.

In spite of that, détente and its evolution towards a virtual entente between those who launched this policy have not been capable, as yet, of inspiring any concrete measures to eliminate, or even to curb, the production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the very existence of which is the greatest threat ever faced by man and civilization.

Notwithstanding the comfortable assumption according to which local crises can be kept local or, at the most, regional, the fact is that these crises occur with distressing frequency. No one knows whether or when, to the adjective "distressing" one should not also add "dangerous and increasing". For no one of sound mind can discard or minimize the risk of these crises getting out of hand and evolving into wider confrontations that, as a deceptive alternative to the comfortable assumption, we keep convincing ourselves are unthinkable and impossible; since no one, equally of sound mind, should be prone to commit "humanicide", a neologism that certainly conveys the idea of collective destruction through nuclear weapons. Unthinkable or impossible as the confrontation may appear, the truth is that the very idea of strategical balance, and the policies that go with that idea, lie at the roots of the widespread concern and anxiety we are still living with on the international scene; because man will never come to accept the fact that his existence depends on the maintenance of a precarious balance of massive destructive capability controlled by a few over-armed Powers.
It is precisely this lack of conformity with the role of passive subjects of either a continuing struggle for power or a division of spheres of influence that has prompted the overwhelming majority of States to utilize fully the structural and institutional capabilities of this Organization to seek solutions to problems of political and economic security global in their range and, for that matter, defying settlements of a restricted or sectoral character.

As the ultimate goal of universality of membership seems now within reach with the imminent disappearance of the last remnants of colonialism, the United Nations is asserting itself as the forum par excellence in which all peoples can meet and debate, in conditions of equality their common and interdependent problems.

Despite the criticism directed at this Organization by those who, in all good faith, expect from it more than it can yet perform, it is becoming evident that the United Nations is asserting its role in world affairs as small and medium-sized States demonstrate, by the active part they play in United Nations deliberations, that peace and security are not matters to be managed exclusively by the most powerful but rather, on the contrary, are a collective concern. It is my contention that this collective concern and the responsibility ensuing therefrom must prompt us to address ourselves resolutely to the need to impose a halt to the arms race as a sine qua non of the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

This is the area in which we may be tempted to succumb to utter discouragement. Year after year the United Nations has been dealing with the general question of disarmament and its specific headings. If I must acknowledge that scant progress has been possible on some items of what we could define as non-arms, the main problems -- arms control and nuclear disarmament per se and in se -- have remained intractable in this forum. If the big Powers have achieved some lateral agreements in the Geneva Committee, which have been endorsed subsequently by this Assembly, the fact remains that nuclear disarmament as such continues to be dealt with bilaterally and completely outside the reach and the influence of our Organization.
The maintenance of a nuclear weapons status quo in terms of offensive and defensive capability is very far from the proclaimed common aim of disarmament and international arms control. Moreover it does not signify the end of the race by any means. We concede that ongoing bilateral talks between the super-Powers are instrumental in generating an atmosphere of détente and contributing to the relaxation of tensions. All this is true and we are glad to acknowledge it. But détente is not peace, it is not the institutionalized security we all seek.

Thus the hard fact remains that the arms race goes on unchecked. What is more, when agreement is reached on one of the aspects of this deadly competition it seems to be only because technological break-throughs are about to occur or have already taken place which make possible a qualitative or substantive change in the race. They provide a substitution of aims for the balance of destruction.

A cursory review of recent developments in this field as well as of the amounts already invested or earmarked by the major Powers for military hardware, and especially for the perfecting of new types of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, offers a staggering perspective. Technological progress diverted the nuclear arms race from a quantitative build-up to a qualitative competition, in which each super-Power continues to seek to gain an edge over its opponent, détente notwithstanding.

In terms of total destructive capability there certainly exists a huge surplus of nuclear weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a few countries. Such vertical proliferation increases the dangers of accidents and stands out as an appalling example of the waste of immense human and natural resources which could certainly be put to better use, especially in times of economic crisis and depression and considering the prospects of mass starvation.

Following this line of reasoning, let me add that my delegation is prepared to lend its sincere support to any initiative that aims at a reduction of the military budgets of the big Powers. But let us also be clear on that point. Properly speaking -- as I stressed last year -- cuts in military expenditures belong to the sphere of national budgets. By and in themselves they are not measures of disarmament as long as we adhere to the accepted
lexicon in this field. Reductions in military expenditures by the big Powers are certainly welcome, but they can only fit within the framework of disarmament -- that is to say, general and complete disarmament under effective international control -- if and when those cuts are tied to specific measures of disarmament: for instance, if they are taken in conjunction with commitments to cancel or reduce ongoing arms programmes.

In brief, this admission that a significant proportion of funds made available through disarmament measures should be allocated as an additional contribution to development programmes, particularly in developing countries, gained worldwide approbation many years ago, even within the countries themselves most actively engaged in the arms race.

It was then abundantly proved in this context that world economic interdependence would make these investments profitable for all concerned since they would stir up the dynamics of the world economy. The assumption that military expenditures were an important factor in technological and economic expansion, particularly in the most developed countries of the world, was also exposed as practically and theoretically invalid.

On this theme the Secretary-General a few days ago distributed the report contained in document A/9770. The size of the document and reasons such as those pointed out by the Secretary-General himself in paragraph 5 of his introductory note prevent me from commenting on the report at this stage. In the meantime, however, I believe it important to reiterate certain principles which have guided my delegation's views on this subject and which were last expressed in November 1973 in the plenary Assembly.

First, the savings made available by the reductions must be added to the resources for development that already exist. They should constitute a net increment to existing flows. If they did not, instead of a transfer of resources we should simply have a transfer of headings on a balance sheet.

Secondly, the only condition acceptable in the disbursement of such funds would be their use for development in the recipient countries. No other political, military or economic conditions should be imposed on their availability. The reasons for this principle are, I think, self-evident.
Thirdly, there would be a firm commitment to provide specified minimum amounts over a certain number of years. This would ensure that plans had a solid foundation based on the predictability of the flows.

Fourthly, there would be no discrimination among recipient countries, except that account would be taken of their needs, with special emphasis on the needs of the least developed and their capacity to absorb those resources.

Fifthly, the funds would be disbursed and controlled through multilateral channels, with the full participation of donors and recipients.
If one were to give names to these principles, they might be called the principle of additionality, the principle of unconditionality, the principle of predictability, the principle of equity or non-discrimination and the principle of multilateralization. A very small percentage of the price of human folly with regard to nuclear weapons redistributed under these principles would contribute to the welfare of more than 60 per cent of humanity.

Since 1970 -- not to mention even earlier initiatives -- we have been stressing the need to connect the savings resulting from disarmament with an increase in resources devoted to assisting the developing countries. There has been no disarmament and there have been no savings; only armaments and expenditures have grown, while in real terms -- not to speak in terms of needs -- the resources available for development continue to decrease. It is a tiring road which we are travelling, but we shall not give up. The prize is important and the consequences of failure are steps to disaster. Let us not in this Organization desist from hammering on these truths. If we achieve some result, however modest, we shall have cause to be remembered.

This year again negotiations on disarmament, or even on arms control, have not achieved any progress within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In that Conference, no detectable evolution could be sensed in the traditional positions of the major Powers with respect to the question of inspection. The lack of progress precluded, of course, any significant move towards the goal of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and of their destruction, towards the over-all objective of general and complete disarmament.

We cannot but voice our regret at such a stalemate. In view of the commitments contained in the Convention on Biological Weapons, we were entitled to expect a more constructive approach to the problems of chemical weapons from those Powers which are engaged in their production and stockpiling.

Efforts were made within CCD to channel the negotiations towards some sort of understanding, and I must mention in this respect the initiative taken by Japan, which submitted the text of a draft convention on the subject. The opportunity which was given for a dialogue of experts on this question served, furthermore, to provide additional technical information on the different aspects of the problem.
We are aware of the difficulties inherent in these negotiations. They go beyond questions of an essentially technical nature and, in point of fact, inscribe themselves within the context of the global confrontation of the political and military interests of the major Powers.

Brazil, as well as several other developing countries members of the CCD, put forward in a working paper presented last year the basic principles on which, in our view, any just and equitable agreement on this question should rest. We laid emphasis on the guarantee that no obstacles would be created to the economic development and technological advancement of States Parties and that the research, development, production, possession, transfer and use of chemical agents for peaceful purposes would not be hindered, it being further understood, of course, that a significant amount of the funds liberated as a result of measures taken towards the elimination of chemical weapons would be directed to economic development programmes in developing countries.

Our attention has been particularly focused these last few years on the proposed world disarmament conference. We are all aware of the difficulties which have beset our endeavours to reconcile the different views regarding this question. The representative of Iran, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, a few days ago gave us a factual account of the work accomplished by that body in the discharge of its mandate.

It cannot be said that any great progress has been made in reaching a common understanding, particularly among the nuclear Powers, as to the desirability of convening such a conference, much less as to its precise purposes and manner of preparation. We submit, however, that an effort was made or, at the very least, willingness was shown by all to participate, in one way or another, formally, informally or indirectly, in the accomplishment of the task of the Ad Hoc Committee.

As members of the Committee, we took part in those efforts and are thus able to appreciate fully Ambassador Hoveyda's skill, patience and diplomatic tact in the discharge of his most difficult functions. Our gratitude goes also to the Rapporteur of the Committee and Chairman of the Working Group, Mr. Elias, who was instrumental in laying the groundwork for the Committee's report.
As I said earlier, while it is not yet possible to detect any tangible modification in the substantive positions of the major Powers with respect to the convening of the conference, the fact that all parties concerned shared in one way or another in the work of the Committee is, in our opinion, a good omen. We believe that the time may be right to attempt a further step forward by prolonging the Committee's existence and giving it a somewhat more ambitious mandate which could follow the lines suggested in a working paper -- I refer to document A/C.1/L.618 -- that my delegation submitted to this political and security Committee two years ago. A fresh initiative ought to be taken towards the achievement of an over-all understanding on this matter with a view to initiating preparatory work on the procedures for the convening of the conference.

It is, in effect, of absolute necessity that any studies, evaluations or considerations on preparatory work be undertaken with the full participation of all interested parties, including particularly the nuclear Powers involved in the arms race.

The international community as a whole cannot and must not be deprived of the exercise of its collective responsibility with regard to international security in its most important aspects, such as general and complete disarmament, beginning, of course, with the control and elimination of nuclear weapons and the transfer of a substantial portion of funds liberated from the armaments industries of the major Powers to the development of poorer nations.

The developing countries are now learning to work together; their opinion is beginning to make itself felt, and it will weigh more and more in the years to come; the major military, economic and technological Powers are at the moment reckoning with this fact for perhaps the first time; conversely, the rising awareness of interdependence becomes a most healthy and promising development. And where could this interdependence be more important than in the work of tackling the problems of disarmament?
We maintain, again and again, that a conference on disarmament should be convened within the framework of a general consensus as to its desirability and goals, and after adequate preparation, so as definitely to avoid any temptation to use it for political propaganda, alien to its true purposes of providing conceptual guidelines and a concrete programme for future negotiations on disarmament and related issues.

The need for careful preparation has been emphasized by all those who at this time favour the convening of a world disarmament conference. Our delegation suggested last year in this Committee the possibility of reviving the United Nations Disarmament Commission as an adequate forum for undertaking the preparatory work for the conference. We believe it might be useful to keep this idea alive until some further progress has been made to harmonize points of view on the preliminary questions involved.

My delegation may wish later to elaborate a little further on some of the topics I have touched upon today, as well as on the various other items relating to international security and disarmament inscribed on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly.

I wished today to convey the concern we share with so very many in this hall and in the world at large with respect to the pressing problem of achieving a more open, more balanced and more just international society of nations. As the Minister for External Relations of Brazil, Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira, stated at the opening of the general debate this year:

"More than anything else, it is shocking to see the magnitude of financial and technological resources devoted to arms production, so many times higher than those which would be necessary to reform the present structure of economic inequities and thus to allow men to live in a world free from fear, more unfettered by shame and, above all, more favourable to the expression of its creative potentialities." (A/PV.2238 p. 16)
Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, in my first intervention this year I want to say how delighted I am to see you, an old Geneva hand, in the Chair. Your abilities and reputation as a diplomat, and particularly as a diplomat who is an expert on disarmament, well merited your selection to this distinguished post. I know that under your wise guidance our deliberations cannot help but have a positive result.

In his statement to this Committee on 21 October, Senator Symington discussed the tasks that we feel should be undertaken in a broad, international effort to curb the further spread of nuclear explosive technology. Today I should like to review briefly the other important arms control issues before the Assembly at the current session.

In spite of some disappointment that we have not progressed further towards our disarmament objectives, my Government continues to believe that encouraging progress has been made in the past decade. In recent years States have worked together seriously and co-operatively on arms control and disarmament to a degree which would not have been thought possible ten years ago. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between my country and the Soviet Union, the discussions on mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and the successful negotiation of the limited test ban Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the sea-bed arms control Treaty, the biological weapons Convention and the threshold test ban Treaty are solid evidence of the progress that has been made.

Since our discussion of disarmament issues a year ago, encouraging progress has been made on the problem of chemical weapons. We were impressed by the submission by the delegation of Japan to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of a draft convention on chemical weapons, an important contribution to the deliberations on the question of effective international restraints on chemical weapons. Of equal interest have been the extensive comments and suggestions concerning the Japanese draft which were offered by other Conference of the Committee on Disarmament delegations. We for our part are taking careful note of the Japanese draft and of these comments in our continuing review of possible actions in the chemical weapons field.
We were also gratified that, at the initiative of Sweden, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this summer held a productive informal meeting on technical chemical weapons questions, in which 22 experts from 13 countries discussed the best ways of defining chemical agents for purposes of international restraints, the scope of possible chemical weapons limitations, and the possibilities of devising effective means of verification. Such discussions should provide a basis to make informed judgements on the question of chemical weapons restraints.

Furthermore, members of this Committee will recall that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed at the 1974 Summit to consider a joint initiative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.

At its current session this Committee will also address itself to the problem of the dangers of the use of environment modification techniques for military purposes. In recent years new scientific and technical advances in the environmental sciences have given hope that man may be able to work purposefully to change the environment to his benefit. At present, although there has been promising progress in efforts in certain localities and under limited conditions to increase snowfall, lessen the severity of hail storms, affect precipitation, and disperse fog, the limited success of these efforts thus far demonstrates how little we understand the interaction of natural forces and how rudimentary are man's attempts to influence those forces. However, techniques may be developed one day to alleviate drought, to mitigate the destructive power of hurricanes and typhoons, prevent floods, and perhaps eventually to change climate to respond to the universal desire for an opportunity to increase living standards.

We believe that environment modification techniques, which are as yet little understood and remain largely hypothetical, could have considerable potential for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, the techniques to accomplish these goals might also be used for hostile purposes that could have widespread, long-lasting and severe effects which are harmful to human welfare. Scientists have expressed concern about the future possibilities of triggering earthquakes, generating tidal waves and long-term climatic changes.
The United States has declared that it would not use climate modification techniques for hostile purposes even should such techniques come to be developed in the future. In the US-USSR Joint Statement on Environmental Warfare at the Summit Meeting, we expressed our willingness to examine with the Soviet Union what measures could be effective to overcome the dangers of the use of environment modification techniques for military purposes.
We are prepared to study this question and to examine the measures that might become the subject of international agreement. If it is the general view that this question should be referred by the Assembly to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we could support referral, if it were accomplished without prejudgement of the Committee's consideration of the question.

In regard to international consideration of the question of napalm, other incendiaries and certain other conventional weapons, the constructive and useful first step was taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross when it recently convened a meeting of government experts on this subject at Lucerne, Switzerland. United States experts participated fully in that meeting. Some useful data were compiled, and the report of the experts' group merits careful review.

We believe that no position on possible restrictions of these weapons can be developed until government experts have more extensively examined the technical, legal, military, medical and humanitarian problems involved. We are gratified that this process is under way. We would consider it unrealistic, however, to try to impose a deadline on the work of the experts in this complex field.

The question of a world disarmament conference is again on our agenda. In three separate solicitations of views by the United Nations, a wide diversity of views on such a conference has been revealed. Some Governments have suggested beginning preparations for such a conference soon; some others have stated their view that certain preconditions must be met; many have stated that the conference could prove useful only if all nuclear Powers were prepared to participate.

The views of the United States on this subject are unchanged. We recognize that a world disarmament conference could serve a useful function at an appropriate time, but we do not believe that such a conference now or in the near future would produce useful results. It is not the lack of a suitable forum but the lack of political agreement that prevents us from taking more far-reaching steps towards disarmament. A world conference could not in the foreseeable future solve this problem and thus would merely disappoint the hopes of its proponents.

Members of this Committee have received a report on the question of the possible reduction of military budgets prepared by a group of expert consultants to the Secretary-General. Although my delegation abstained on the resolution requesting
that report, for reasons we explained at the time, we welcomed the suggestion of such a study because we recognized that the most promising path to genuine progress on this question of military expenditure is through a careful and thorough study of the issues.

We are gratified that the experts' report examines the whole range of technical questions related to the feasibility of agreed reductions of military budgets. It analyses the economic benefits that could result from allocating to social and economic development funds that might be saved by budget reductions. It also points out that reducing military budgets without diminishing the security of States would require careful and thorough preparation. Specifically, the preconditions for military budget reductions would include, first, agreement on what is and what is not to be included in military budgets and, secondly, the provision by all parties concerned of detailed data on military expenditure for the purpose of comparative measurement. The study also brings out the necessity of guarding against destabilizing shifts in spending and the necessity of adequate verification of compliance with any agreed reductions.

Finally, the experts' study implicitly recognizes the need for greater openness about defence expenditure. My Government regards openness as a particularly important point. We welcomed the suggestion made by Sweden last spring that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should consider the possibility of ascertaining the willingness of States to account for their defence expenditures in comparable terms and to explain how that expenditure is allocated. We agree that greater knowledge about the defence expenditure of others could allay concerns that arise out of suspicion and misunderstandings and could thus promote confidence among States. The technical sections of the experts' report provide valuable guidelines which could be the basis of greater openness concerning defence expenditure.

Finally, we were gratified that a consensus was reached at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year to invite five nations -- the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire -- to join the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. On behalf of my Government I warmly welcome those nations to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Their inclusion will make it a more representative body and will enhance its expertise without, however, enlarging it to a point that would impair its
effectiveness as a negotiating body. We think that with those additions the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will continue to be a valuable disarmament forum contributing significantly to the work of the United Nations and to the furtherance of our disarmament objectives.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States for the friendly words he addressed to me.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to share with the Committee some thoughts on the progress of our work.

In the last few days some delegations have come to me to express their view that it will be necessary this year to have rather more time to discuss and vote on draft resolutions -- above all because this year we have four new items on our agenda.
In the light of these comments and having looked at the list of speakers in the general debate, I see that there are not too many names and on some days there are absolutely none. I should like, therefore, to make a few suggestions to the Committee.

First, that we should close the list of speakers for the general debate at 1 p.m. next Monday.

Secondly, I should also like to propose to the Committee that the general debate should be concluded on Monday, 11 November. After that, we would begin our consideration of draft resolutions, and then vote on them in the correct order.

If we proceed along these lines we will be following a proper order of business and, at the same time, we would be giving delegations enough time to speak to draft resolutions. There will also be enough time for the general debate on all disarmament topics since today is 30 October and we would have 10 more working days in which delegations can take the floor.

For example, only three delegations are listed to speak at the afternoon meeting on 1 November. For the afternoon of 4 November we only have a single speaker, and a tentative one at that. For Tuesday, 5 November we have a definitive speaker and two tentative ones. We have no speakers for the afternoon meeting of Wednesday, 6 November and only two speakers for the morning meeting. There is only one speaker for Thursday, 7 November. We have a tentative speaker for Monday, 11 November and yet, for some reason unknown to me, we have a fairly long list of speakers for both the morning and afternoon meetings on Tuesday, 12 November.

If the Committee agrees to my suggestion, I urge those delegations who are down to speak on Tuesday, 12 November to do so on the 11th or on an earlier date. We have a lot of spare time on other days and the general debate would thus end on Monday, 11 November to be followed by consideration of the draft resolutions and a vote on them.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I think the Chairman's suggestion is most timely. I would venture simply to suggest, in my turn, a very slight amendment which perhaps will help us save time. It would be as follows: if any delegation or group of delegations had one or more draft resolutions ready before the conclusion of the general debate, say some time next week, and there were a morning meeting at which speakers were to conclude by noon, or if an afternoon meeting were to end by 4.30 p.m., a delegation or a group of delegations could, if they so wished, use the remaining time to present one or more draft resolutions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I consider the proposal of the representative of Mexico not only appropriate but in fact even necessary because, of course, in order to stimulate debate on draft resolutions we have to have the draft resolutions in as soon as possible and it would be an unfortunate waste of time if we had to wait till the conclusion of the general debate before we could have the official presentation of those drafts. So what was suggested by Ambassador Garcia Robles, in my view, is extremely appropriate and could be included in the proposal made by the Chair.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): It seems to us that the proposal on how we should proceed in the further work of the Committee is extremely rational and sensible since delegations will need considerable amount of time to discuss specific resolutions and to formulate their positions on the various proposals which will be put forward here. Delegations will sometimes even need time to defer the vote on a given draft resolution. Therefore, the procedure proposed, by the Chairman, that is, to leave about two weeks for consideration and voting on specific proposals, is a very good way of ensuring the proper discussion and adoption of draft resolutions on disarmament and would ensure the successful consideration of the whole question of disarmament.
Mr. AKHUNDO (Pakistan): My delegation supports the suggestion you put forward. We think that this is a rational way to proceed and to make the best use of the time of the Committee. I am only asking for clarification.

In the first place, I did not quite understand whether the draft resolutions are to be voted on in the order in which they are presented or in the order in which the items have been set down in our agenda. Secondly, there was a suggestion, I thought, that further time would be allowed for consideration of drafts. Do I take it that the Chairman intends to extend the final date for consideration of items -- 22 November -- or is it that we terminate the debate by the date that he gave and then proceed to utilize the rest of the time for discussing drafts.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): With respect to the first point which the representative of Pakistan wishes to have clarified, I should like to explain that, when I spoke about the order of voting, I did not say whether it would depend on the number of the item or the number of the draft resolution; but I think that in accordance with the rules of procedure the order of voting would be the order in which the draft resolutions were submitted, and that is the order we should follow when we vote on the draft resolutions.

As for the second question of the representative of Pakistan, with the addition or amendment deriving from the suggestion of the representative of Mexico, we shall continue our general debate until 11 November. In the course of our general debate, delegations which have prepared draft resolutions which they wish to submit officially for consideration by the Committee will be free to do so and, of course, in the introduction of the draft resolution a short speech is always made. On 11 November we shall conclude our general debate and delegations will then be able to begin to refer specifically to the draft resolutions already submitted or, of course, to those which they might wish to submit at that time, since there is no deadline for the submission of draft resolutions. The discussion of draft resolutions will take place between 11 and 22 November inclusive, when we shall conclude consideration of all the disarmament items and vote on the respective draft resolutions.

I trust that this clarification has served to dispel the doubts of the representative of Pakistan.

May I take it that the proposals I have made in regard to the organization of our work meet with the approval of the First Committee? If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee so decides.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): To summarize: on Monday, 10 November, the list of speakers will be closed. Any representative who wishes to speak on any date up to 11 November in the general debate may inscribe his name up to next Monday at 1 o'clock. The general debate on all
The disarmament items will continue until 11 November. On that day we shall start the debate on specific proposals, and voting. Finally, any delegation which has already a draft resolution which it wishes to submit may do so at any time, either before or after 11 November.

I am grateful to the members of the Committee for their co-operation, which they have assiduously and uninterruptedly given on the question of the organization of our future work.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.