Twenty-ninth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND SECOND MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 28 October 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:  'Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)
later:      'Mr. SIDDIQ (Vice-Chairman)
Rapporteur: 'Mr. COSTA LOGO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries /24/ (continued):
  (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
  (b) Report of the Secretary-General
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General /27/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /28/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /29/ (continued)

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The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /30/ (continued)

- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)

- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)

- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament /35/ (continued)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)

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DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9706)
Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, first of all I should like to associate my delegation with previous speakers here in congratulating you. Your deep knowledge of the problems of disarmament, your tireless interest in this subject, your active and fruitful participation in the work of the Committee on Disarmament and your work in the United Nations as a whole have always attracted a great deal of attention on the part of delegations and missions. In the light of that we take particular pleasure in seeing you presiding over the First Committee.

We should also like to welcome the Vice-Chairmen, the Rapporteur and the Secretary Of the First Committee.

The statements of representatives in the general debate in the Assembly have shown that questions of disarmament have been attracting great interest in the majority of countries, since they immediately concern the vital interests of States in the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. The Soviet Union has always attached great importance to these questions and is seeking a positive solution to them, bearing in mind that the destinies and welfare of the peoples of the world depend upon this.

The consideration of disarmament questions at this session is taking place in conditions of a relaxation of international tension which has found expression, particularly, in a number of important Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of armaments signed in the last two years. In September, the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America were resumed, and this is an important positive factor in international life today. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe being held now in Geneva and the negotiations in Vienna on the reduction of armaments and armed forces in central Europe are contributing to the normalization of the international situation.

In evaluating the situation in the world in the light of the prospects for implementing broad measures in the field of disarmament, we must, of course, take into account the tense situation in certain parts of the world and also attempts by certain circles in a number of countries to resist the process of the relaxation of international tension. These factors affect to a certain extent the approaches of individual States to disarmament problems.
In considering the state of affairs with respect to the solution of disarmament problems during the year following the twenty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly it must be noted that a solution has not yet been found to the fundamental disarmament problem -- the cessation of the arms race and the reversal of that race. The arms race continues to absorb tremendous resources and human effort, diverting great material and labour resources from productive purposes.

Consideration of the problem has revealed different approaches. The majority of countries insist on a positive approach to its solution. The Soviet Union fully supports such an approach. However, a very small number of States are resisting progress in this matter. Considerable efforts are required if we are to succeed finally in solving the fundamental problems in the field of disarmament and putting an end to the arms race, which is hindering the positive process of the relaxation of international tension and the normalization of international life.

However, there has been some progress in the solution of individual questions related to the limitation of armaments. A number of bilateral agreements have been concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States -- on the limitation of strategic arms, the limitation of underground nuclear tests, the adoption of measures aimed at excluding chemical weapons from the arsenals of States, and other agreements. Multilateral negotiations have continued this year on disarmament questions within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Although those negotiations have not yielded concrete results, they were useful. A wide range of disarmament questions was considered during the talks. Consideration of those questions revealed different approaches on the part of States towards their solution. The negotiations revealed the nature of the difficulties involved in the solution of disarmament problems but, at the same time, they defined certain possible ways of overcoming such difficulties on a number of problems.

The General Assembly is to consider a significant number of important problems related to the limitation of armaments and to disarmament. The delegation of the USSR has already explained the substance of the question of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and the climate for military purposes, proposed by the Soviet Union. Today we should like to express our views on other disarmament problems.
The most important and urgent problem of our time is the question of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war. The great scientific discoveries of our time in the field of nuclear fission have opened up vast new possibilities of using them for the benefit of mankind. At the same time they have created the most destructive means of waging war. The use of those means would entail the massive annihilation of human life. Implementation of the international agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is among the group of measures which would lead to the solution of the problem of eliminating the danger caused by the emergence of weapons of mass destruction. In the light of growing technological progress in the world and the danger of spreading nuclear weapons and their acquisition by many States it is becoming ever more urgent to make greater efforts to find a real basis on which the problem of the non-proliferation of such weapons could properly be solved.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was approved by the General Assembly and joined the ranks of international acts in March 1970, is designed to put an end to the spread of nuclear weapons among a considerable number of States and thus to diminish the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The Treaty is in keeping with the vital interests of all States and peoples and with the cause of strengthening international peace and security. It is the optimum expression of existing real possibilities of halting the process of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We must note, however, that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has not yet assumed the place it merits in international life. A number of so-called near-nuclear States possessing the capability of developing nuclear weapons have not yet become parties to the Treaty and have not yet assumed the obligation not to proliferate such weapons. But the near-nuclear States themselves cannot but realize how important it is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the world. This can only be done if all States co-operate fully in the matter.

An important component of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the safeguards system, which ensures strict observance by States of commitments stipulated in the Treaty. Worked out with the participation of a great number of States, that system is in keeping with the actual possibilities existing in the world. The overwhelming majority of States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty have concluded control agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as envisaged in the Treaty.
It is necessary for all other States parties to the Treaty which have not yet concluded such agreements to do so without delay. It is necessary also to halt the export, unless under InDa control, of fissile materials and special equipment to non-nuclear countries.

The commitment of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to conduct negotiations on measures designed to call a halt to the race in nuclear and other types of weapons is an important provision of the Treaty -- article VI. We share the view of a number of States parties to the Treaty expressing dissatisfaction with the progress of negotiations on the problems of disarmament and their results. But we must acknowledge that, following the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty, a number of important agreements on the limitation of armaments and on disarmament have been concluded. In this connexion the agreements I have mentioned -- on the limitation of strategic arms, on the prevention of nuclear war, on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests, and other agreements -- are of great significance. They constituted a definite contribution to the fulfilment of commitments under the non-proliferation Treaty, to the cessation of the arms race and to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war.
We may also recall that since the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty a number of multilateral agreements on questions of disarmament have been concluded -- namely, the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the complete prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons.

Over the same period the Soviet Union, together with other countries, has produced a number of initiatives in the field of disarmament which have served as a basis for negotiations on disarmament questions, namely, the banning of chemical weapons, the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and so on.

Accordingly, after the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty agreement was reached with regard to a number of measures aimed at limiting armaments, and also further steps were planned in this field. An increase in the number of States Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty would give a further boost to further progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

Efforts are also necessary to involve States in other important international agreements concerning the limitation of armaments: the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in the three environments, the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor, the banning of bacteriological weapons and so on. Wider participation of States in these international agreements would ensure their greater effectiveness and would fulfil the objectives which were defined when the above-mentioned agreements were concluded.

A conference of Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty will be held in Geneva next May. This conference, which will be an expression of the aspirations of States concerned about the risk of the spreading of nuclear weapons in the world and the threat of nuclear war, must make a substantial contribution to the strengthening of the régime governing the non-proliferation of such weapons.

For the purpose of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons on a regional level, increasing attention is being focused on the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. This idea has met with a positive response evinced by the statements made by several delegations in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union, in its unswerving pursuit of the course of
relaxation of international tension, is in favour of creating nuclear-free zones and considers this one of the steps leading towards a diminution of the threat of nuclear war. A final stand on one or other proposal on this subject can be taken in the light of its concrete merits.

In connexion with the task of eliminating the threat of nuclear war, the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapons testing is of great importance. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, made the following statement in Warsaw on 21 July: "The Soviet Union is ready, in particular, to conclude an agreement on the complete cessation of all underground nuclear-weapon tests". In this the Soviet Union proceeds on the assumption that for the verification of the cessation of such tests, national means of detection and identification of violations of the agreement banning test explosions of nuclear weapons are sufficient. Demanding that verification of the cessation of tests be conducted by international on-site inspection can be regarded as nothing but a pretext to evade a solution to this problem. Such a demand essentially blocks progress in its solution.

In connexion with the problem of underground nuclear tests, the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, signed in Moscow on 5 July, is of great importance.

For the first time in history by this Treaty limitations are imposed on underground tests. In banning explosions in excess of 150 kilotons, the Treaty restricts the possibility of developing and perfecting the most powerful and, hence, the most dangerous types of nuclear weapons. The Treaty limits tests to a minimum number. An important feature of the Treaty is the fact that verification of implementation is to be conducted by national technical means which, as members of the Committee are aware, fully reflects the position which the Soviet delegation has championed over the course of many years both in the General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament.

The above-mentioned Treaty is an advance in the accomplishment of the task of calling a halt to all nuclear-weapon tests. The search for the solution to a question which, for a number of years, has remained at an impasse has thereby been moved out of that dead-end and prospects have been opened up for a more radical solution of the problem.
By placing limitations on the development of the most destructive types of nuclear weapons, this Treaty contributes to the strengthening of international trust and to a further improvement of the international climate.

Among the disarmament issues which require an immediate solution, great importance must be attributed to the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons. This is a problem which has been considered by various international forums for half a century. After the First World War the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was concluded, which prohibited the military use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, after the Second World War there was, unfortunately, no progress towards the total prohibition of chemical means of waging war. Regrettably, the consideration of this problem in the Committee on Disarmament has also failed to produce any progress towards a solution.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been persistently striving to make progress in negotiations on this question. The draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in 1972, is an expression of their position on this matter.

The Soviet side and other sponsors have given exhaustive explanations of this proposal in the Committee on Disarmament, but so far there has been no progress in negotiations on this issue. The reason for this situation is the unwillingness of some Western Powers which possess chemical weapons to give up these weapons of mass destruction and to agree to withdraw them from the arsenals of States.

This year Japan submitted for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on a stage-by-stage prohibition of chemical weapons. This draft provides for the possibility of temporary exemptions from the prohibition of chemical means of warfare. Well, what are these exemptions? The Japanese draft gives no answer to this question. Nor have the Western Powers given an answer, though their approach was reflected in the Japanese draft. In order to implement the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is necessary for Powers possessing such weapons to show willingness to take a political decision to agree to concrete talks on such a prohibition and actively to prohibit such weapons.
A new element in the consideration of the problem of prohibiting chemical means of warfare is the agreement between the USSR and the United States of America laid down in the joint communiqué of 3 July this year announcing their intention to contribute to progress in achieving effective international agreement to exclude chemical weapons from the arsenals of States.

To that end they agreed to consider a joint initiative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. This agreement is encouraging further efforts in the solution of the task of prohibiting chemical means of warfare. The consideration of this problem by the General Assembly and by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be pressed with a view to the speedy preparation and conclusion of an appropriate international convention to save mankind from an extremely dangerous means of mass destruction, namely chemical weapons.

In connexion with the problem of chemical weapons, the question arises of making the Geneva Protocol of 1925 a truly universal agreement covering all States of the world. We are in favour of the idea of the General Assembly calling upon all States which have not yet done so to become parties to the Geneva Protocol and to accede to it as soon as possible.

In this connexion there remains the task of ensuring the speediest possible entry into force of the international convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons. The conclusion of such a convention is a concrete step towards the bringing about of a true measure of disarmament. For the speediest possible implementation of this measure, States depositories of the bacteriological convention should speed up the process of its ratification. For its part, the Soviet Union, as has already been stated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, intends to ratify the bacteriological convention in the course of 1974.

Along with the questions of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of chemical means of warfare, the problems of general disarmament are also awaiting solution. Among these questions there is the very important task
of implementing the General Assembly's recommendations on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and using part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. The implementation of this measure would be a real step towards curbing the arms race, primarily of the great Powers. An important feature of the proposal to reduce military budgets of the five Powers is that it opens the way to a considerable increase in economic and technical assistance to developing countries. At the same time, its implementation entails for States reducing their military budgets vast opportunities for increasing their expenditures on their economic and social needs in the fields of education and health, and for raising the living standards of their countries. There is no need to stress that the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council would have a very favourable effect on the world situation and would contribute to a further relaxation of tension in the world.

We must point out, however, that implementation of this vitally important General Assembly recommendation is encountering resistance on the part of some permanent members of the Security Council. A number of countries, contrary to this recommendation of the Assembly, are creating considerable difficulties for achieving a reduction of military budgets and thus ending the arms race and producing additional resources for economic development. The responsibility for this situation lies with those permanent members of the Security Council which erect obstacles to the implementation of the General Assembly's recommendation on this point. It is precisely the permanent members of the Security Council which bear particular responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Efforts should be made to ensure that this important resolution of the General Assembly is finally implemented, and to establish and activate a special committee for the distribution of funds allocated as a result of the reduction of military budgets.

The attitude of States towards this issue will be a touchstone in revealing their true intentions on the question of disarmament.

The Soviet proposal to convene a world disarmament conference has been widely supported by States. The convening of such a conference will undoubtedly
contribute to a further normalization of international relations and give a considerable boost to the implementation of new measures in the field of disarmament, and hence to the curtailment and cessation of the arms race. The question of the convening of a world disarmament conference has aroused great interest throughout the world, and practically all States have approved of this idea. The non-aligned countries have shown particular interest in the idea of convening such a conference. Meetings of third world countries at the highest level, in Belgrade, Cairo, Lusaka, Georgetown and Algiers, from 1961 to 1973, all have spoken in favour of convening such a conference. Furthermore, the Declaration of Algiers demanded that the conference should be convened in the "nearest future".

As a result of the consideration of this matter at the twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth sessions of the General Assembly, positive resolutions were adopted with a view to convening the conference. Only some States, as was correctly stressed in the general debate, continue to erect obstacles to the convening of this conference and are thus impeding the development of broad international co-operation in the field of disarmament.

At the present time favourable conditions are being created for the early convening of this conference because of current positive and fundamental changes taking place in the international political climate.

The question arises of taking new broad multilateral action in the field of disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Committee established by the General Assembly to consider all aspects relating to the world disarmament conference has been functioning for the last two years. We have listened with satisfaction to the statement in this Committee, on 21 October, by the representative of Iran, Ambassador Hoveyda, on the extensive work done by the Ad Hoc Committee. It has surmounted many obstacles created by those who oppose disarmament. Some organizational problems, which hindered the Committee's work at the beginning, have been solved. The
membership of the Ad Hoc Committee has been expanded. Third world countries, which are broadly represented in it, have taken a most active part in its work. Besides the USSR, two nuclear Powers, France and Great Britain, which previously were absent from that body, have participated in its meetings and its activities. The Ad Hoc Committee, representative politically as well as geographically, has prepared a report which confirms the fact that an overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations favour the holding of a world disarmament conference. *

* Mr. Siddia (Afghanistan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.
The Ad Hoc Committee, however, has come up against the resistance of the opponents of the Conference which is in contradiction to the clearly expressed support of the idea of the Conference by the overwhelming majority of States. In view of this it is particularly vital that the Ad Hoc Committee intensify its activities in every possible way and begin without delay the preparation of specific recommendations on practical matters concerned with the convening of a world disarmament conference. It is the duty and obligation of all States, and primarily the permanent members of the Security Council, which bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to maintain close contact and co-operation with the Ad Hoc Committee.

Finally, the hindrances and obstacles which exist must be removed from the path to the world disarmament conference. No further delay in this matter can be tolerated, since, it might do direct damage to the cause of disarmament and the limitation of armaments. There is no ground or justification for any preliminary conditions for the convening of the conference. Any problem which any State is interested in solving can be proposed for inclusion in the agenda and considered at the conference. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee should be extended and it should be given the task of completing the preparatory work for the convening of the world disarmament conference.

The Soviet Union, in co-operation with other countries, has taken many important initiatives on the question of disarmament. We should like to express our great satisfaction at the fact that these initiatives have met with a positive response and support from a wide range of States. Disarmament concerns all States without exception, nuclear and non-nuclear, great, medium-sized and small. The basic problems of disarmament, and primarily nuclear disarmament, can be solved only with the participation of the large military States and all nuclear Powers. They bear a special responsibility for solving the problem of limiting the arms race and of disarmament. Referring to this problem, L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, pointed out in his speech on 21 July 1974 that:
"The Soviet Union, in common with other socialist countries, has stated on more than one occasion that it is prepared for decisive measures providing for a curtailment of the arms race and subsequently for a reduction of armaments".

Naturally, disarmament problems cannot be solved in a way that is prejudicial to the security of some States because it creates military advantages for others. Security questions cannot be resolved by the measures or in accordance with the wishes of any one State. They can only be resolved by finding common denominators for a considerable number of countries. We believe that an approach of this kind to the problems of limiting armament and of disarmament would do most to ensure their effective solution.

Speaking of the need for more vigorous efforts to solve disarmament problems, A. A. Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the USSR, in his statement in the General Assembly on 24 September, emphasized that:

"The main thing here is not just to mark time, hiding behind arguments about the complexity of the problem. If right now it cannot be solved at one stroke, solutions should be sought for individual aspects so that this should lead at least step by step to the ultimate goal of disarmament, and in effect such an approach has already been tried out in recent years and has justified itself."

(A/PV.22419, p. 67)

Before concluding this statement we should like to express the satisfaction of the Soviet delegation at the interest being shown by the delegations of the overwhelming majority of countries in questions of disarmament. This interest found expression in the statements of representatives in the Assembly and in the positive response in the current session as well as in previous sessions of the General Assembly to Soviet proposals concerning the convening of the world disarmament conference, the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council, and other matters, and in the item concerning the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes proposed by the Soviet Union for discussion during the present session of the General
Assembly. We should like also to take this opportunity of thanking the co-sponsors of the draft resolution on this question which the Soviet Union has submitted at this session of the General Assembly.

We wish to express our satisfaction at the fact that many States have been showing considerable interest in the activities of the Committee on Disarmament, whose task it is to seek agreed solutions to disarmament problems, and at their readiness to make a positive contribution to negotiations on problems within the Committee's terms of reference. In this connexion, we welcome the expansion of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, which makes that international forum more representative. We should like to congratulate the new members of the Committee on Disarmament -- the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Peru and Zaire, which expressed their desire to join the Committee and will take their seats in that body at the beginning of 1975. We hope that the participation of the new members in the work of the Committee on Disarmament will be effective, useful and fruitful.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I very much appreciate the warm words of friendship for me and the congratulations which the representative of the Soviet Union was good enough to address to the officers of the Committee.

Mr. HANSEN (Norway): First of all, may I, as a point of departure in a statement devoted to problems of arms control and disarmament with which this Committee is concerned, stress the important role played by the United Nations as a broad forum for efforts to promote progress in this vital field of international relations. The value of the United Nations as a framework for the discussion of questions related to arms control and disarmament has perhaps tended to be underestimated, owing to the slowness with which concrete measures have been negotiated and put into effect. In part also the reason lies in the impatience and disappointment felt at the gap between the United Nations objective of general and complete disarmament and the actual achievements and status of the various disarmament agreements and negotiations.
We certainly do not ignore the lack of progress or the only limited progress on a number of disarmament issues. But we also believe that this should not lead us to overlook the positive significance of the United Nations as an instrument for broad multilateral discussions and global measures in the area of arms control and disarmament. The United Nations machinery provides an opportunity -- which the smaller countries have special reason to value -- to participate in the shaping of international disarmament measures. The annual review of current disarmament issues in this Committee is but one example of this. Therefore it has been and continues to be an important element in our general United Nations policies to give active support to the objectives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and to take part in the concrete discussions and actions aimed at the promotion of these objectives.
Recognizing that general and complete disarmament is a long-term objective the attainment of which will require a higher degree of mutual trust and frankness on the political level, we put emphasis on pragmatic and, when necessary, partial measures which can be expected to receive the support needed for their practical realization. The Norwegian Government has regarded it as a principal foreign policy task to seek to promote the cause of arms control and reductions as a means of ensuring further détente and enhanced security. In line with this stand, Norway has adhered to the various multilateral arms control agreements concluded in recent years -- the Antarctic Treaty, the partial test-ban Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the non-proliferation Treaty, the non-proliferation Treaty and the Convention on biological weapons. We consider these agreements, though still limited in their scope and objectives, as important and necessary contributions towards building a structure of peace and security designed to reduce the risks and dangers represented by contemporary military instruments and methods of warfare.

I believe that there is a growing awareness in world public opinion of the need for effective arms control and disarmament measures as an essential part of the security of each of the countries and of the world as a whole. There is also a justified feeling of dismay and anxiety at the lack of further substantial progress in this area. Without underrating what has already been achieved in this extremely complex area of international relations, we are entitled to envisage new advances, above all regarding the problem of nuclear arms.

It is our view that the issue of nuclear weapons has become more urgent than ever and must be given priority in the international deliberations on disarmament. The permanent members of the Security Council -- they are also the five nuclear-weapon States of the world -- are assigned special rights and obligations by the United Nations Charter. They have a special responsibility to work to promote the regulation of armaments. Real and lasting progress in this area cannot be expected unless all these five Powers are engaged in the process and agree on joint action.

In our opinion, it is necessary to intensify efforts aimed at effective control of nuclear arms and reducing the risk of use of such arms in a situation of conflict. We share the concern expressed in earlier statements in this
Committee that there is still a number of States which have failed to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty and the partial test-ban Treaty, thus preventing these agreements from achieving the universal effect they must have to serve their purpose.

Norway attaches great importance to the non-proliferation Treaty, which, among other things, commits States possessing nuclear weapons not to share them, or the technology for making them, with any country which does not have such arms and prohibits non-nuclear-weapon States from acquiring them in any way. We are confident that strict observance of these provisions is vital to the efforts aimed at preventing a nuclear conflict, and we shall support all proposals and measures to ensure that the purposes of the Treaty are being realized.

The conference to be held next year to review the operations of the non-proliferation Treaty will, no doubt, undertake a thorough examination of how its provisions have been applied. In addition to the two commitments already mentioned, the obligation on the parties to pursue negotiations aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race will be of particular interest. Also important, especially against the background of developments earlier this year are the undertakings contained in the Treaty to facilitate the peaceful uses of atomic energy world wide and to guard against diversion of fissionable materials from peaceful uses to military uses. These aspects of the Treaty deserve urgent scrutiny in the light of the apparent technological capability possessed by a number of States to produce nuclear arms. It seems to us to be an essential and pressing need to prevent a development whereby peaceful nuclear test explosions would be allowed to undermine the vital objective of nuclear arms control.

In this connexion we urge States which have not done so to adhere to the partial test-ban Treaty. The question of extending this ban to underground nuclear explosions must also be put on the disarmament agenda as a matter of priority. It is our view that sufficient progress in detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests has been achieved to make a comprehensive test ban a realistic objective. It is primarily a question of political determination and, here again, it is incumbent on the permanent members of the Security Council to pave the way for practical results in this field, which also involves the increasingly important aspect of environment protection.
The 1972 Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons is significant also because it constitutes a concrete measure which aims at the actual destruction of weapons as distinguished from control. There seems to be broad agreement on the need of a similar prohibition related to chemical weapons. It must be recognized, however, that, given the lack of sufficient mutual trust, difficulties related to control present a barrier to such a comprehensive agreement. As stated by us on earlier occasions, Norway would like to see a total ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.
The Norwegian Government welcomed the beginning of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations. It has been and continues to be our view that SALT is the most significant arms control endeavour undertaken by the two Powers. Even a limited agreement or understanding between them would contribute in a positive way to the general détente. The last American-Soviet summit meeting failed to bring about any decisive advances in SALT. The negotiations are now resumed, and I wish to stress the importance we attach to the continued American-Soviet efforts to achieve further limitations of strategic arms. New and more extensive steps towards the limitation and ultimately the reduction of strategic arms are urgently needed, if we are to avoid the development and deployment of new, qualitatively even more advanced weapon systems on both sides.

In conclusion, I should like, without at this stage entering into the details of the various disarmament items on our agenda, to express our appreciation of the work performed by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Since its first meetings in 1962, CCD has been the principal forum for the actual negotiation of multilateral arms control measures. It is to be hoped that all the nuclear States will find it possible to participate.

Mr. AKHUND (Pakistan): The frequency and regularity with which issues relating to disarmament have been debated here and in other international forums may have had the effect of blunting the edge of the words we use to emphasize the enormous waste of resources, human and material, represented by the arms race and the great hazards inherent in its continuance. However, sometimes an event will occur which illuminates the whole field and confronts the world once again with the realization that a choice has to be made between one road and another. The nuclear explosion which took place in May this year under the sands of Rajasthan is such an event, indicating clearly the new course on which the world may be embarking and the dangers which loom ahead.

After the statement made here the other day on behalf of the United States by Senator Symington, I shall not labour the point. What India did this year many other countries will be in a position to do in the years to come.
A world in which perhaps 20 or more countries have acquired the ability to carry out nuclear explosions, even for peaceful purposes, will be very different from the one in which we live today. This prospect does not lie in some remote future but may materialize in the next few years.

Even at the present moment there are several countries in a position to follow - and who could, indeed, have preceded - India's move. That they have refrained from doing so is surely due to the conviction on their part that the demonstration of nuclear capability in this fashion will add nothing to their security and little to their prestige, but much to the dangers of a situation, the seeming stability of which covers only an uncertain balance of power. Unfortunately, the self-denial and restraint exercised by such countries serves not as an example to be emulated but as another ground for complacency.

If every one who has so far participated in the present debate has not directly referred to the Indian nuclear explosion, the statements we have heard here and in the plenary Assembly show that the problem of nuclear proliferation has now assumed overriding importance in the field of disarmament. India itself has found it necessary to give assurances and to reaffirm in various international forums and in written communications to other Governments, including mine, that the potential it has acquired and demonstrated for producing nuclear weapons will never be used for that purpose.

We note these unilateral assurances given here and elsewhere and shall treat them with the seriousness which the situation demands. Speaking for Pakistan, I wish to reaffirm a similar assurance on behalf of my Government. I should like to add that Pakistan's pledge not to develop nuclear weapons is substantiated by our acceptance of international safeguards for the nuclear reactor which is operating in Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the question remains: what are the courses of action open to us as representatives of Member States to respond to the challenge of the situation, on behalf not only of our individual nations but also of the world community? There can be no question but that the nuclear-weapon Powers bear
a special responsibility in this respect, as they do in the entire field of disarmament. We welcome the agreement resulting from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and we hope for the success of their second stage; but these talks have served mainly to stabilize the nuclear balance between the two largest nuclear Powers. On the other hand, doubts have been expressed about the implications and practical consequences of their recent agreements on underground nuclear tests. I refer to the Agreement signed on 3 July this year. At all events, it must be recognized that towards the goal of nuclear disarmament as such there has been little, if any, progress at all. If the future pace of negotiations remains equally slow and if the aim of these negotiations is not more clearly oriented towards reducing nuclear arsenals, there seems little hope that the world can make even a beginning towards the goal of disarmament.
Mr. Akhund, Pakistan)

In this context it is sometimes asserted that the present situation represents a nuclear monopoly of a small number of Powers and that those Powers are interested above all in retaining their predominance in this domain. Indeed, one must say there is little reassurance in the fact that the power to annihilate all life on earth is possessed by only a small number of Powers. Undoubtedly there is something in the situation which is repugnant to the concept of the sovereign equality of nations on which this Organization has been built. That nuclear arsenals must progressively be reduced and eventually eliminated altogether must therefore remain an objective of primordial importance on the way to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

It is altogether another matter to stipulate that nuclear non-proliferation can only go hand in hand with the reduction and elimination of the nuclear arsenals of the existing nuclear-weapons Powers. To assert that is to lose sight of realities — to lose sight, indeed, of the very goal towards which the world has been striving.

There is a self-evident fallacy in the reasoning of those who would establish a direct link between so-called vertical proliferation and horizontal proliferation. The truth is that the spread of nuclear weapons or of the uncontrolled capability to manufacture such weapons to more and more countries will not make it easier to bring about nuclear disarmament but will make that goal yet more difficult to attain. Nuclear monopoly can only be enlarged if more countries join the nuclear club. It will not be ended in that manner. Our primary objective in this Organization has been and must remain the elimination of the dangers which the existence of these arms, in few hands or many, poses for the existence of mankind.

In fact, it has long been recognized that, pending the achievement of complete and general disarmament and nuclear disarmament, collateral and partial measures should be adopted wherever feasible. That is the task on which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been engaged since it was set up, first as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, nearly 15 years ago. Among such measures, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has had the highest priority and has been the subject of intensive debate and consideration from almost the moment the first atom bomb was exploded. The non-proliferation Treaty of 1969 represents the most elaborate of the attempts made to limit the number of
countries possessing nuclear weapons. That Treaty was drawn up 10 years ago precisely with the object of preventing the explosion of a nuclear device, even for a peaceful purpose, by any country other than the five nuclear-weapons Powers recognized as such in the Treaty. The question before us now is whether the nuclear-proliferation Treaty is destined to go the same way as earlier attempts such as the Baruch plan and the Lilienthal plan.

Despite the nuclear explosion carried out by India my delegation does not consider that the non-proliferation Treaty should be written off as a failure. However, realism demands that the appropriate conclusions should be drawn from experience, including the fact that the principal objective for which the Treaty was devised -- the prevention of the emergence of a sixth nuclear Power -- has not been achieved.

It is possible, of course, to take the view that, since there is no discernible difference, technological or objective, between peaceful nuclear explosions and nuclear bombs, any country which has carried out a nuclear explosion of any kind is to be considered ipso facto a nuclear-weapons Power. It may be urged that, instead of lamenting the emergence of a sixth nuclear Power all efforts should now be bent towards preventing the emergence of a seventh. We submit that such a course of action would be ill-advised and furthermore would not be in accord with objective reality. In the first place, whatever reservations one might have on technological or political grounds, what would be the wisdom of in effect disregarding the repeated assurances of India that it does not intend now or in the future to produce nuclear weapons? In the second place, it is not realistic to ignore the fact that a large number of countries possess the same potential in terms of raw material and equipment, engineering capability and scientific talent, as was demonstrated by India in carrying out a nuclear explosion.

Among the countries that have the potential to go nuclear, many have not signed the non-proliferation Treaty. Is it realistic, ten years after the Treaty was signed, to assume that further inducements or penalties will at this stage prove effective in getting them all to adhere to the Treaty? The time for the convening of the review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty is approaching. We do hope that the occasion will be used to examine afresh the
motives and circumstances that have prevented universal adherence to the Treaty so that really effective measures can be devised to achieve the aims with which the non-proliferation Treaty was drawn up. Furthermore, we would suggest that, while the non-proliferation Treaty is reviewed in the light of developments, other possible approaches to the attainment of its aims should also be examined.

The non-proliferation Treaty has been criticized principally on the ground that it perpetuates the division of the world into two classes of States even in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is affirmed that the present system of international safeguards is discriminatory in its application. It has been asserted that either all the countries of the world, including the five nuclear-weapons Powers, must subject their entire nuclear programmes both civil and military to international inspection and verification or none should be required to do so.

There is no doubt that the present system of international safeguards is selective in its application in so far as it exempts the nuclear programmes of the nuclear-weapons Powers. But surely in a matter in which the future of life itself on this planet is at issue there must be some practical limit to the application of the concept of the sovereign equality of nations. One does deplore the fact that the nuclear-weapons Powers have not taken any really substantial steps to reverse the nuclear arms race. At the same time, one must reckon with the fact that in the prevailing circumstances nuclear weapons-Powers will not be willing to unveil their secrets, particularly in the military field, to each other or to the rest of the world. The discrimination inherent in any system of international safeguards is, alas, a necessary evil at this stage. The alternative is the catastrophic prospect of nuclear anarchy.

Another ground on which the non-proliferation Treaty has been criticized is that, by confining the right to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to the existing nuclear-weapons Powers, it debar all other States, among which are most of the developing countries, from acquiring the latest technologies and the most modern skills.
The feasibility, the practicability, the economics of such use of nuclear explosions are still the subject of debate. There is little evidence to prove that peaceful nuclear explosions are a practical proposition at the present time. My country certainly does not consider that the devotion of funds, resources and human skill to research in this field is at the present stage the most rational use to which they can be put, especially in the less developed countries. On the whole, therefore, my delegation considers the approach taken in the non-proliferation Treaty on this subject to have been basically sound.

Nevertheless, we must take note of the fact that the international regime for the provision of such services, which the International Atomic Energy Agency was to prepare, has not yet emerged. We must also note that the regime would be international only in name and would be confined to the provision of services by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers and in practice by only one or two among them. We must take note furthermore that the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in its article 18, accords the right to Parties to the Treaty to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions, of course, under commonly agreed verification procedures and with the caveat — to which we attach great importance — that a method be devised for distinguishing between peaceful and military explosions. Finally, we cannot possible overlook the fact that one such explosion has already been carried out by a country outside the circle of those permitted by the non-proliferation Treaty to do so.

One possible motive for countries wishing to acquire the nuclear option may be the concern they feel for their national security. This aspect of the question underscores the responsibility which falls upon the nuclear weapon Powers to give such security assurances and guarantees to the non-nuclear weapon States that the latter will not feel obliged to join in the nuclear arms race on grounds of security. We believe that this can be done by strengthening and making more effective the security assurances held out to non-nuclear weapon States. We urge furthermore that the nuclear-weapon States should solemnly and formally abjure the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. In this context, may I invite the attention of members to the resolution adopted at the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Kuala Lumpur in June this year and which
is annexed to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CDD/426, 11 July 1974). That resolution after expressing firm support for the political independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear weapon States against the nuclear threat, recommended to Member States to pursue without loss of time the question of making more effective the existing security assurances. The resolution also called upon nuclear-weapon States to give a solemn undertaking, in the nature of an obligation, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States.

In unanimously adopting that resolution, the Islamic Conference reflected the views of 37 States representing various parts of the globe. It also echoed a general concern to which expression was given by, among others, the Right Honourable David Ennals, when he spoke so eloquently in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on behalf of the United Kingdom, and over here by Ambassador Nishibori of Japan. We believe and we urge that, irrespective of what other measures might be considered, the Assembly should at its present session endorse the call for a truly effective system of guarantees against nuclear attack or threat.

The Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States held in 1968, at the initiative of my country as I recall, proposed another approach to the problem of combining measures for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with an assurance against its possible misuse, as well as to arrangements for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States which abstain from the acquisition of weapons. Resolution B adopted at the Conference recommended that all non-nuclear-weapon States should initiate such studies as they might deem opportune concerning the possibility and desirability of establishing by treaty the military denuclearization of various regions in which they might be situated. That resolution had precedence in the initiative taken by the Latin American countries with regard to their region which resulted in the drafting and signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and in the earlier initiative of a number of African countries taken at the twentieth session of the General Assembly to endorse the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa issued by the Heads of State and Government of African countries. The Treaty relating to Antarctica is also a case in point. The proposal of Sri Lanka on the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean is yet another. The countries known as the
ASEAN group have formally declared their intention to establish a zone of peace and neutrality in their part of the world which should be free from nuclear weapons. This year's agenda includes an item proposed jointly by Iran and Egypt for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. This is a proposal with the purposes of which my delegation is in full accord and which it will wholeheartedly support.

The purposes which such zones are designed to achieve were well summed up in the resolution on the Latin American zone adopted at the twenty-second session -- and they bear repetition. The preamble of that resolution stated the conviction of Latin American countries that the treaty would constitute: "... a measure that will spare their peoples the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, that it will be a stimulus to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the promotion of economic and social development and that it will act as a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament". (General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII))
In proposing that South Asia should become a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Pakistan has been inspired by those same aims and objectives. Despite our concern at the event, Pakistan is also animated by the desire that the Indian nuclear explosion should not be allowed to become the cause for renewing and accentuating old suspicions and conflicts but rather the occasion for co-operation among all the countries concerned.

It should be noted that the countries of the proposed South Asian zone have in fact made declarations abjuring all intention of using their nuclear facilities and capability for the production of nuclear weapons or their acquisition in any other manner. All of them are also on record as favouring the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a way of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a step towards the attainment of the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which has already received such wide application elsewhere, does not, therefore, in the belief of my delegation, raise any difficulties of principle in its application to the South Asian zone. We consider that in proclaiming that South Asia should be a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the General Assembly would be acting in the true interests of all the peoples and countries of the region.

We recognize that the translation of the concept into practical form will require much work and the most thorough and frank consultations among the countries which are to form the zone and, at the appropriate stage, between those countries and the nuclear-weapon Powers. We consider also that the United Nations system, including the International Atomic Energy Agency and in particular, the Secretary-General, whose own concern at the present situation is so clearly expressed in the introduction to his annual report for the current year, must have an important role in assisting the countries of the region to work out the legal framework and structure of the proposed zone.

We believe that the situation does not allow for protracted negotiation and that no scope should be left for procrastination. We should like to hope, therefore, that a meeting of the countries of the region could be convened as soon as practicable after the General Assembly has adopted a decision on the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. We consider that to
this end the Assembly should authorize the Secretary-General to invite the
countries of the region to begin consultations. We believe that the Assembly
would do well to set down appropriate guidelines in order to facilitate the
process of negotiation and give it a sense of direction.

Speaking here on 25 October, our colleague from Egypt, Ambassador
Abdel Meguid, mentioned three cardinal features of the arrangement envisaged
for the proposed nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. They were, first, an
undertaking by States of the region to refrain from producing or acquiring
nuclear weapons; secondly, an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to
introduce nuclear weapons into the area and not to use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against members of the zone; and thirdly, a system of safeguards
and verification to ensure the faithful implementation of their commitments
by the parties.

We consider those three requirements as indispensable to nuclear-weapon-free
zones in any part of the world. In the prevailing circumstances, we should add
a fourth, i.e. an undertaking by the States of the region that, pending the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, they would refrain from any action
contrary to the aims of the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone and to the
objective of non-proliferation.

I have outlined at some length the objectives which Pakistan's proposal for
a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia is intended to serve. I have suggested
the manner in which the proposal could most speedily and effectively be given
practical shape. At the appropriate time, my delegation intends to submit a
draft resolution based on these ideas. If we have not done so yet, it is with
the aim that the draft may receive the widest possible acceptance. We have an
open mind as to the form and language of the decision to be adopted by the
Assembly on this subject, so long as there is no erosion of, and no departure
from, the basic aims and objectives I have outlined -- aims and objectives which
have been endorsed by the General Assembly in all similar cases.

My delegation has been encouraged by the generally positive response there
has been to the principle of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South
Asia. We do not underestimate the difficulties which will have to be overcome
before the idea becomes a reality, but we are appreciative of the understanding that Members have shown of the spirit in which Pakistan has made the proposal. It is our hope that the Assembly will, at this crucial moment, act decisively and effectively to promote in our region and elsewhere the spirit of co-operation in a field of endeavour which is at once so beset with dangers and so full of promise.

Mr. OBAME (Gabon) (interpretation from French): Although some days have gone by, may I very briefly express the condolences of my delegation to the delegation of Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, since you are well aware of the ties established our two countries and the level and the nature which our respective Governments wish to give them, on the basis of the existing human relationships between yourself, an eminent diplomat, and my modest person, may I say how happy the delegation of Gabon is to see you presiding over the important work of the First Committee. I congratulate you with a joy tinged with pride because of our sincere friendship.

I should like also to congratulate all the other Officers of the Committee, who will always be able to count upon our understanding co-operation. In this connexion I should like to mention in particular the representative of Portugal, whose participation in our work at the responsible level of of Officer of the Committee emphasizes the relief of the conscience of all intellectuals, democrats and true believers, who have suffered so much at seeing Portugal -- oppressed and managed by a handful of eccentrics who were at the same time the hangmen and the exploiters of the people of our continent -- kept beyond the pale of a society of which, nevertheless; it is an integral part and for the improvement of which it can contribute through its efforts and experience. I hope the delegation of Portugal will accept the expression of our feelings of friendship.
In connexion with our very important agenda, it seems to me to be rather difficult to speak of disarmament when, quite apart from continuing to maintain regular and conventional armies, we are States which by virtue of our respective national laws continue to mobilize a contingent annually instead of doing away with compulsory military service. At any rate, it remains true that the problem of disarmament would surely not have existed in its present context if at the outset the world population had been made up of civilians only. Then universal peace, despite the existence of hunting weapons, would have been effective, while the conditions of life of three-fourths of the people of our world would have been considerably improved.

But, alas for the human conscience, when we recall the hecatombs of 1914-18 and the holocaust of 1939-45, we must recognize with repulsion that despite the good intentions of our Charter and despite the sincere desire of each of our Governments to work for the happiness of man, the constant problem of the century remains neither more nor less than that of disarmament. So that no one among us, I believe, needs to dwell excessively on the dangers of an arms race which creates for the world incalculable risks of annihilation and diverts from infinitely more useful development programmes fabulous sums that we badly need.

The use of weapons -- any weapons -- among nations is in itself immoral. It becomes simply criminal and, therefore, collectively to be condemned as soon as these arms are napalm or other defoliants or bacteriological, nuclear or thermonuclear weapons.

These weapons, the manufacture, stockpiling and use of which my Government vigorously condemns, have furthermore a nefarious effect in that the very prospect of their use distorts man by leading him, wherever he is and whatever he may be, to doubt and to be sickened by his life and that of others, being convinced that while it remains at the mercy of the mere whim of an extremist who at any time can press the button, it is nothing more than a reprieve. Man accordingly regularly and anxiously asks himself how and why should he love life and cling to it, when his fellow men daily perfect the means to destroy it.
Thus, even without being used or before they are used, the weapons with which our agenda is concerned, because of their very existence and the idea we have formed of them, are a real threat of mental death for our society.

The present arms race doubtless reveals itself as a flagrant obstruction to international co-operation and human solidarity. It makes the rich and industrialized nations, when they have to reduce their budgets, neglect their obligations of solidarity towards millions of men who are born or live without the hope of being able to eat, without the illusion of having access to education, without any conviction of being able to get medical care.

According to the newspaper *La Tribune de Genève*, of 16 May 1973, the great Powers spent 875,000 million francs on weapons for this year alone, and I would add that this was at the same period when men, who are all alike, died of hunger in many parts of the world.

Conversely, this same arms race progressively leads the underdeveloped countries to adopt better means of impoverishing themselves. According to the newspaper *Le Monde*, of 6 May 1973, the purchase of weapons by underdeveloped countries rises twice as fast as their gross national product. And, in support of that, the same newspaper on 9 August 1974 recognized that these same developing countries, this year alone, despite their overwhelming debts and the constant deterioration in the terms of trade which ruins them, spent at least 81,705.2 thousand million francs for the purchase of weapons.

I have no doubt that among them some are led, sometimes even by the situations created by their own weapon suppliers, to have even greater need of combat tanks than of agricultural tractors.

This, then, is the evil, briefly denounced, in its two catastrophic aspects of an international peace dangerously threatened and a socio-economic development practically jeopardized. It is a generalized and world-wide evil, the remedy for which is not to be found in bitter and sterile criticism of the industrialized countries or in slanderous reproach and systematic denigration of the developing countries. It is only an awareness on the part of us all that will conquer it.
That is why we attach particular importance to the world disarmament conference, in so far as it does not become merely a temple of good intentions. This explains the desire of the Government of Gabon to see the international community being collectively concerned, and particularly those States which bear specific responsibility for peace under the terms of our Charter, to arrive at complete disarmament which will, in particular, rid our planet totally of the nuclear and thermonuclear bugbear. It is an urgent problem which should not suffer from any contingency or restriction, when we realize that the destructive devices which fill the world and those which are unceasingly manufactured have become by far more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.

I am therefore bound to affirm, in the light of the foregoing, that my Government actively supports all efforts undertaken or to be undertaken by all other Governments, to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the problem. This support must, however, not be confused with any automatic attitude nor with a spirit unconditionally at the service of arbitrariness. This means, you see, that our desire to eradicate this scourge from our world in no way prevents us from regretting how far certain disarmament conceptions, in part because of what may be a difference of terminology, have seemed to us up to now to be dangerously unfair and have finally complicated this already very delicate problem.

I believe that none among us will ever refute this assertion. Of these conceptions, which I described as unfair, let us recall briefly the following: first of all, the initial composition of the conferences. When the entire international community became aware of the global danger of the arms race and of the subsequent imperative need to disarm, my Government had never realized that in order to decide on the future of us all in conditions of international peace, only a few States were convened to the first disarmament conferences. The present deadlock is one of the direct consequences of this because no proof can be given us affirming that, in general, the same parties can be simultaneously haunted by the demons of exclusive destruction and the wisdom of abjuring force which leads straight to disarmament. That they now decide to bring us in may be a little late, but it is just, constructive and profitable. My country and its partners in OAU and in the group of non-aligned countries will not trade away their contribution which is that of countries which reject any concealed domination.
Then, there is the nebulous meaning of non-proliferation. By proliferation I mean rapid and abundant production; that is to say an abnormal multiplication. From then on my Government became specifically concerned because of being concerned with saving the world from destruction, arriving at non-proliferation does not constitute suppression and, what is worse, does not clearly indicate who must not produce or, in the occurrence, suffer, nor, on the contrary, who is to keep the small quantity which is already available and to use it, if need be, and at its whim, against others.

Finally, there is the need urgently to halt nuclear and thermonuclear tests. I would here emphasize emphatically the sad justification for the doubts and fears of my Government. Wherever I go, or wherever I look, I find not a single man who can honestly affirm that the weapons which will probably exist one day, since at present they are only in the experimental stage, threaten the world more than those which are already operational and horrifying, alarming and which in spite of ourselves, and even against ourselves, have been abundantly stockpiled around us.

This initiative allows not for the slightest glimmer of peace. It renders our opinion sensitive since it tries to clarify the issue by telling us what will be done after the cessation of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests, of all the stockpiles which have been built up since 1946, and the most terrifying of which are held, unfortunately, by two friends of my country.

Even if Gabon is not yet one of the champions of justice, we consider that we are a country of justice. Accordingly, my Government cannot suggest, in so dangerous a perspective as is the nuclear and thermonuclear danger, a solution which would, by consensus, have the majority which we constitute be handed over, bound hand and foot, to a minority which itself would live dangerously under the very fragile balance of mutual fear. We must therefore seek other bases for settlement and divulge the true aspects of the matter.

We must therefore rapidly seek an equitable solution for all, one which is accordingly satisfactory and acceptable to all. According to the Government of Gabon, we should find a precise response to each of the following questions: First, who is to disarm; secondly how to disarm; thirdly, when must the present tests cease?
For my delegation, whose conduct in this matter is guided only by love of peace and by justice which guarantees equality for one and all, the clear answers are the following: first, all States, whichever they are, must disarm if they possess all the weapons covered by our agenda item and, among those States, particularly those whose stockpiles quantitatively and qualitatively are by far the largest. Secondly, to disarm they must be under effective United Nations control, with a majority participation of the non-aligned countries, an inventory of all the weapons which have been accumulated since 1946, and then, at the same time it must ensure that all existing weapons are systematically destroyed; and, finally, to supervise the plants and laboratories which are presently intended for the manufacture of these weapons so that they will be used for technological purposes directed to development. Thirdly, it is only then, that the uselessness of those weapons having been demonstrated, and no nation having anything to fear from its neighbour or be alarmed about its survival, the control commission which is to be appointed will, there being no further reason to justify their existence, call for the cessation of the tests, which we condemn.

I must state that the countries now engaging in nuclear and thermonuclear tests do so, and I am not exaggerating, first of all in the hope of compelling others to think it over, and therefore to hesitate before taking any reprisal decision against them, and then perhaps out of an excessive but justified self-satisfaction because of the value of absolute force and the feeling of total invincibility, given by these weapons of mass destruction, by the two pioneers of the atom.

Given that evidence, what power have we, what legal principle can we refer to, to call on them to refrain from possessing the essential weapon they hold? With what authority, in the name of justice, can we refer to this? Which morality shall we use as our inspiration to explain to 3,000 million men, women and children that their hope for life, quite apart from death caused by natural phenomena, will in the future depend on the will of half a million men, among whom, God knows, the majority, if consulted, would pronounce themselves against those weapons.
Thus, our Committee must be sufficiently courageous to place the disarmament question within the only context which I have mentioned, that of equity.

An analysis along those lines will have sufficient moral force, because it would reflect, in the absence of unanimity, the reasoning of the majority. It is therefore fitting to say that because of its clarity, which we find nowhere else, we accept as a positive contribution the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. In so far as we are concerned, and it is in spite of ourselves, any solution which is discriminatory by definition will not meet with the co-operation of my Government.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to express to the representative of Gabon my satisfaction at his kind references to the excellent relations which exist between our two countries. I should also like to thank him for the kind words that he addressed to me and for the congratulations that he addressed to the officers of the Committee.
Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): The debate on disarmament affords us every year the opportunity of reviewing the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is far from being impressive. The two outstanding issues on its agenda -- the halting of all underground tests and the prohibition of chemical weapons -- have not been resolved in spite of the protracted debate which has been going on for many years, and there seems to be no end in sight.

My delegation has repeatedly expressed the view that the partial test-ban Treaty is a measure to prevent pollution of the atmosphere by radioactive wastes rather than a true measure of disarmament. The Treaty can only have true disarmament significance if its scope is widened to include the banning of underground tests. The material available published by independent bodies reveals that all the scientific and technological prerequisites necessary to achieve a final comprehensive ban now really exist.

The arguments and counter-arguments the super-Powers advance, perhaps to justify their reluctance to ban underground nuclear tests, chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, are not convincing. One can see that they are determined to pursue the arms race with renewed vigour and strength while agreeing only to partial measures suited to their common interest. The big Powers thus rate their own interests as superior to those of the international community, which is yearning for tranquillity and a world free from fear and tension.

Agreement by the two super-Powers to change the arms race from one of quantity to one of quality is not really reassuring because its real aim is to effect mutual reductions in their arms expenditures, which cripple their economies and constitute a threat to the living standards of their peoples. What the world is anxiously waiting to see is a reversal of the old trend and a true determination to suspend all aspects of the arms race and agree to a phased reduction of arsenals, which would create a better political climate and make détente something more than a pause in a relentless and unremitting struggle.

Fortunately our agenda this year includes some additional items which may have some effect on stimulating our debates and rescuing them from the
lethargy instilled in them by the inaction of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

My delegation had an opportunity already last year in the General Assembly to support the Soviet proposal calling for reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. My delegation has consistently advocated dedicating the scarce human and natural resources available in the world today to accelerating the pace of economic and social development in the developing countries. It reiterates its support for this proposal, which provides that a substantial part of these resources should be diverted from the destructive and sterile purposes to which they are now put and channelled to waging a war on backwardness, want and privation.

However, we have other reasons for supporting the Soviet proposal. We have always expounded the view that special rights under the Charter imply special obligations and that the veto enjoyed by the five permanent members has as its counterpart very serious obligations in all fields of activity, particularly with regard to international peace and security. It is a cause of great satisfaction to see one of the permanent members publicly subscribe to this logic in the deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I am referring to the statement of my distinguished friend, Mr. Roschin, the representative of the USSR, who said during the 627th meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that:

"In proposing reduction of the military budgets of the five Powers, the USSR assumes that the permanent members of the Security Council share equally the primary responsibility for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. Thus this proposal is based on the principle of the equal responsibility of those five Powers for the state of affairs in the world, and on recognition that those Powers cannot and must not evade the responsibility which rests upon them and consequently ignore a major provision of the United Nations Charter."

(CCD/PV.627, p. 12)
My delegation is also gratified by, and grateful to the Soviet Union for, the inscription on the agenda of the item on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes. Every new scientific discovery can be used for constructive or destructive purposes. Environmentalists believe that scientific research and knowledge have been sufficiently advanced to make it possible to manipulate weather and climate to alleviate their harsh effect on man during some seasons in some parts of the world. Of greater value still are prospects of rain-making in drought areas to reclaim arid and desert soil.

We naturally support the call for prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes. At the same time, we should like to learn more about the active steps that can be taken to improve the weather and manipulate climate for the benefit of man. While discussing the previous item it was possible for us to speak of the impact of space technology on the life of man on earth. It should be possible also for us to speak now of the beneficial impact on the life of man of manipulating the weather and climate. The industrially advanced countries which possess the requisite weather and climate technology should present practical proposals for formulating a programme of action to apply environmental and climate technology for development. It is not enough that this question be dealt with in the First Committee. The development aspect of it should be inscribed on the agenda of a subsidiary body which should furnish us with periodic reports similar to those we receive on the application of space technology to development. At the same time the military aspects of using the environment and climate for military purposes, we are confident, will be adequately dealt with by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Since the military aspects affect the vital interests of the big Powers we know that they will not rest until their interests are taken care of either through direct negotiation or within the appropriate disarmament organs. So we should like to appeal to them to take into account also the interests of the developing countries, which are equally concerned with reaping the full benefits of the technology of environment and climate applications to economic development.
My delegation has taken an interest from the outset in making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Being itself one of the countries of this region, Kuwait is naturally keenly interested in ensuring conditions of security within the region so as to strengthen the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States. This cannot be achieved through pious pronouncements and a declaration, which at best is only the starting point of a process aimed at the exclusion of great Power rivalry and the total elimination of foreign military presence from the area. Among the means to achieve this end would be a commitment by the nuclear Powers not to deploy nuclear weapons in the area, the elimination from the area of all foreign military bases and a ban on the establishment of new bases or the enlargement of existing ones.

My delegation has taken note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. The summary of the views and suggestions of Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference is useful.
However, we should have appreciated receiving the conclusions and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee; and in their absence the duty devolves upon us to chart the future course of action. We should like the conference to be convened as soon as possible after due preparation. The poor harvest of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament accentuates the need for a universal forum. Disarmament is too serious a matter to be treated as a question of primary concern to a few big Powers. Present disarmament bodies are too restrictive and are not even broadly representative of all the military Powers. The countries which do not have a large military potential have proved their earnestness by supporting such regional measures as, inter alia, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. These are the countries whose voice should be heard and which can bring their combined moral weight to bear on the military Powers at the projected world disarmament conference.

I have refrained from touching upon the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East during this statement because this question obviously has a direct impact on the future of my country and the destiny of our region. I therefore reserve the right to speak again on this item and the other item relating to the denuclearization of South Asia.

Mr. HOLLAT (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has had occasion to express its congratulations to you and the other officers of the Committee. May I be permitted at this time to say how happy I am to see you presiding over our deliberations. I am convinced that with your wise guidance we shall achieve the greatest possible number of results.

This year the First Committee has on its agenda many items relating to disarmament, and this fact is evidence that the peoples show ever greater interest in the maintenance and strengthening of peace. The distribution of disarmament questions, too, is an indication of our effort to go deeply into more and more questions of detail concerning general and complete disarmament, to prepare measures to curb the arms race, to prevent the stockpiling of weapons, to bring about disarmament and, whenever possible, to head off any effort towards rearmament. We hope to succeed, so as to be able to apply the results thus far achieved from détente in the cause of disarmament.
The growing number of agenda items relating to disarmament indicates, at the same time that armaments today tend to spread to newer and newer areas. The progress of science makes it possible to put to military uses such new means and methods as have thus far hardly been conceivable or have earlier served only a peaceful purpose, the betterment of mankind; but we hope that we shall in future be able to use the blessings of science still more for the improvement of human life. It is a fact, moreover, that the political assistance and political influence of the United Nations and of States Members of the United Nations are increasingly needed for science to remain faithful to its original, lofty function -- the promotion of human progress.

Scientific research devoted to the escalation of the means of mass destruction deprives mankind of tremendous intellectual and material resources, consumes much of the money that might otherwise be expended on research for peaceful purposes, on the development of production and on the supply of services; in other words, it keeps back the raising of living standards and, in some cases, threatens the existence of mankind with its unpredictable, incalculable consequences.

The new proposal of the Soviet Union for the "prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health" covers a specific area of disarmament and, at the same time, is aimed at the prevention of the expansion of the means of warfare. The fact that the proposal has been included in the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly is in itself proof of the increasing topicality of the issue. It cannot be regarded as accidental that a joint document on this subject was also signed at the Soviet-United States summit meeting in July this year. At the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, too, a growing number of delegations made statements dealing with the problem of meteorological warfare and the prevention of the use of the environment for military purposes and pointing to the urgency of action. Several representatives in this Committee have requested that the problem be discussed in detail in 1975, after the forthcoming talks between representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States scheduled for 1974 in the Moscow communiqué. Influencing the environment and climate has not been without precedent in the course of wars conducted in the past few years. In Viet-Nam,
influence on the weather and the creation of artificial rain, the pursuit of
dubious war aims, caused floods, destroyed dams and irrigation systems, made tens
of thousands of people homeless, in no time annihilated the result of years and
decades of work and caused irreparable losses and great damage that can be made
good only by long years of constructive work by man.

The uses of the forces of nature for military purposes are as yet relatively,
few in number. But a real danger exists that further such means and methods
might be devised and applied that will be much more destructive than anything
before and that will put an ever greater part of mankind in jeopardy, cause
damage to the human environment for a certain period of time or entail irrevocable
consequences making the very existence of mankind uncertain. It is frightening
even to think about the effect that the upsetting of the earth's geological and
biological balance might have upon human life, for man is also an organic part
of this environment.
It is fortunate that the Soviet initiative has come at a moment when meteorological, geophysical warfare for influencing the environment for military purposes has not yet assumed uncontrollable dimensions. But the danger can increase. Today there are precedents only for occasional changes made in the weather in certain parts of the world. Tomorrow it may come to the transformation of the climate, which can make it all the more probable that meddling with the climate in any given country will be likely to lead to the ravaging or complete destruction of the environment in neighbouring countries and regions or on entire continents. This time again we are confronted with a situation in which we have to recognize in good time the utilization of the results of research for peaceful and military purposes with all their possible consequences. The use of scientific and other means of influencing the environment must therefore be restricted urgently because their utilization, especially during military operations, under circumstances which are difficult to control sufficiently, can set in motion a chain of natural processes fraught with unforeseeable consequences.

In his statement at the meeting of our Committee on 21 October, the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik, quoted very suggestive, thought-provoking examples of additional potential means and methods which, at the present level of science and technology, are already today, or will in the near future be, capable of bringing about the destruction of the environment and human society. Without special scientific qualifications and knowledge it is hardly possible to size up the impact of potential weapons, but I think it has been made clear to all of us that joint efforts are needed to make sure that the achievements of scientific research -- from which mankind may derive a great many benefits -- will not be used by anybody at any time in the future for the mass destruction of human beings and entire peoples, in any direct or indirect manner whatever.

The Hungarian People's Republic is a small country that has limited material resources. We obviously do not think of developing, manufacturing or using weapons which can influence the environment and the weather. But we are not indifferent if others are engaged in developing new weapons the use of which, as the result of either an intentional act or an uncontrollable
process, might affect our people as well. It is an integral part of our
general policy of peace that we, in common with other peace-loving peoples,
should avail ourselves of every opportunity to contribute to the limitation
of the arms race and to the cause of disarmament.

We are also of the opinion that in today's circumstances of détente we have
to do our utmost to strengthen further the unfolding positive processes and
to make them irreversible. One of the means to this end is the Soviet
initiative which is intended to bar the military uses of meteorological,
geophysical and other technological means and methods incompatible with the
maintenance of international security, human well-being and health and to
prohibit them by an international convention. That is why we have
joined the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675. We think
that the Geneva Committee on Disarmament may be a suitable forum to draft
the text of an appropriate convention, a task which requires special knowledge,
skill and experience in the matter of complicated international treaties.

The draft resolution in question is further proof of the relentless
efforts being made by the Soviet Union in the field of disarmament. At the
same time it is proof also that the Soviet Union is invariably striving
to broaden the democracy of international political life by making efforts
to have large and small nations share the concerns and responsibilities
encountered in science, in material production and in military matters as
well as the achievements which might otherwise be the privilege of a narrow
circle of States.

We note with satisfaction that the debate on this issue has so far been
given a positive reception in the First Committee. We hope that as a result of our
deliberations we will adopt a resolution enabling the Committee on Disarmament
to take up the question at the earliest possible date and get down to the
preparation of an international convention. This is in the interest of all
Member States and all peoples, and it is also our responsibility towards our own
and future generations.

My delegation would like to comment on other issues concerning disarmament
at a later stage of our debate.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I now call on those representatives who wish to exercise their right of reply.

Mr. MISHRA (India): Since the representative of Pakistan has referred to India's experimental peaceful nuclear explosion, I should like to make a brief reply.

First, it should be noted that of all India's neighbours only Pakistan harbours a suspicion of India's intentions. All other countries of the so-called region of South Asia have accepted India's assurances that the nuclear technology will be used solely for peaceful purposes. Thus, it is clear that Pakistan's concern is of a bilateral and not of a regional nature.

Secondly, Pakistan has dismissed our arguments about vertical proliferation and about the sovereign equality of nations in a less than generous manner. There is also a certain lack of logic. We do not intend to make nuclear weapons. Unlike other States, India, even after exploding a nuclear device, reaffirmed that fact. But to ask India to enter into an international commitment in this regard even while nuclear-weapon States continue to proliferate -- and some of them do not even enter into negotiations on reducing their own arsenals -- is another matter. Pakistan says that such a limitation of sovereignty should be accepted by India. But then, what prevents Pakistan from acting exactly according to what it preaches? Why does Pakistan not ratify the partial test ban Treaty? Why does Pakistan not accede to the non-proliferation Treaty?

Thirdly, India does not claim that it has made a breakthrough in using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. All we have done is to carry out an experiment. Our scientists are now studying the results of the experiment. It is hoped to publish those results when they have been analysed and evaluated.

Fourthly, I should like to make clear our position in regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones. We have supported such zones whenever it has been demonstrated that there is agreement in regard to them in particular regions. This has meant prior consultation and agreement among the States of those regions.
It is not the practice of the Assembly to impose demilitarized zones on regions without such agreement. Thus, while we are always in favour of consultations with a view to reaching agreement, we cannot accept fundamental decisions in advance of those consultations and that agreement.

Mr. AKHUND (Pakistan): I am not really exercising my right of reply; in fact, I was rather surprised that the representative of India thought it necessary to exercise his right of reply with regard to the statement I made this morning explaining why we have put forward the proposal on the denuclearization of South Asia, what we expect of it and how we should proceed to set it up.

Perhaps he did not pay very close attention to what I said. That does happen sometimes in these meetings; one's attention may tend to wander to more important things. Ambassador Mishra has during this discussion had occasion to exercise his right of reply rather frequently, and perhaps he tends to get carried away and has read into my statement meanings that were certainly not intended.

In my statement I did not express a particular suspicion of India. I pointed out that a situation had been created which required the very sober, very careful attention of this Organization and this Committee, which deals with precisely the matters we have been discussing -- non-proliferation and disarmament and their relationship to each other.

I would respectfully suggest that the representative of India take the time to study the statement I made here and the statements we have made elsewhere. And then, when it is time for him not to exercise his right of reply but to explain the position of his Government, he can set it forth clearly so that we can all understand it.

As I have said, we have a very open mind on how to proceed in this matter, and we shall be very receptive to suggestions in this regard coming from other members of this Committee, including, of course, and above all, the delegation of India.
Mr. MISHRA (India): I should not like the representative of Pakistan to go away with the impression that I did not pay attention to his statement. In fact, I listened to him very carefully and read the text with which we were provided.

We understand very clearly what Pakistan's intention is.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.