Twenty-ninth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 21 October 1974, at 10:30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)
Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General [27]
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [28]
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [29]
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General [30]
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean [31]

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches in the other languages. The final text will be distributed as soon as possible.

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The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

74-71072/A
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference \( \text{[34]} \)

- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament \( \text{[35]} \)

- Reduction of the military budget of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries \( \text{[24]} \)

  (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;

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- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco) \( \text{[100]} \)

- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East \( \text{[101]} \)

- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health \( \text{[103]} \)

- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia \( \text{[107]} \)
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HAPALI AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9726)

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE COMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9708)


GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9608, A/9708)


(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS;

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2296 (XXII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLAPELOLOCO) (A/9692)

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (A/9693 and Add.1-3)
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In accordance with the programme of work approved by the Committee, we shall begin today our consideration of the items on disarmament. If I may be permitted a personal note, I should like to bid welcome, on this occasion, to old friends and colleagues from the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, with whom I have had the privilege of exchanging views on so many occasions when representing my country in that body. I should particularly like to welcome the two Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and all the members who are here with us. I would similarly like to welcome those who have travelled from their capitals to follow the discussion of these extremely important items in the First Committee.

I am sure that with the co-operation all delegations have always shown, we will be able this year perhaps to make some progress; if it is substantial progress, so much the better, but let us at least make some progress, in attaining the objectives of complete and general disarmament.

Our agenda contains 12 items. That alone indicates the need for us to make some progress, so that in this way we can make some response to the demands from all over the world for countries to devote ever less of their resources to the armaments race and more to the well-being of their peoples.

The twelve agenda items include four dealing with new proposals submitted by States Members. These are: item 100, Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America (Treaty of Tlatelolco); item 101, Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the
Middle East; item 103, Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health, and item 107, Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia.

As was agreed at the meeting when we organized the work of the First Committee, delegations may refer to any of the items appearing on the agenda in the order in which they choose. In the course of the general debate which is to begin today, delegations may, if they wish, refer to all, some, or only one of the items appearing in the agenda, and they may also speak on subsequent occasions to refer to the items they did not deal with initially. That is in keeping with the practice of previous years, which, I believe, has proved the most productive approach.

Naturally, at the end of the general debate we shall consider the proposals or draft resolutions in the order in which they are submitted on each particular item, and at that point those delegations which so wish may speak again with reference to the draft resolutions.

Finally, I should like to express my satisfaction at the fact that we have with us the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Pastinen, whose advice and co-operation will be very valuable in the work ahead of us.

With those words of welcome, and of my hope for the co-operation of all members in the furtherance of our work, I shall now call on those representatives who are on the list of speakers for today.

Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, since I am speaking for the first time in the First Committee, permit me to depart from an earlier decision for a minute or two and sincerely congratulate you upon your unanimous election to the Chairmanship of the First Committee, and wish you great success in the conduct of the Committee's proceedings. Beginning with the discussion today of the question of disarmament, I should particularly like to point out the valuable contribution, known to us all, that you have made, Mr. Chairman, and are still making, to the consideration of
the question of disarmament, both in the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, where you were the representative of Argentina, and in the United Nations. This gives us grounds for hoping and believing that your knowledge of the problem of disarmament will help the First Committee, under your leadership, to find ways of achieving agreed, positive solutions to the questions of disarmament before the First Committee, and thus to take a new step forward towards a curtailment of the arms race and disarmament itself which, as we are all aware, is one of the most important tasks of the day.
The twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations is characterized by the fact that remarkable positive changes are taking place in the international arena. In recent years some important international problems of concern to mankind have been successfully resolved and others are nearing solution. The first perceptible steps have been taken towards the easing of the threat of a nuclear war, and the principle of the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems is becoming of increasingly wide application in practice.

Many delegations referred to these positive changes during the general debate in the Assembly. They all appealed for an extension of the influence and impact of these positive changes by the relaxation of international tension and détente to all parts of the globe. They spoke in favour of consolidating and promoting these positive processes in the world politics of today.

The improvement in the international situation is taking place as a result of the persistent efforts of the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries and all peace-loving States. The many-faceted work of our country in the field of foreign policy is aimed at strengthening international peace and security and promoting co-operation among peoples.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government are steadily pursuing a policy of maintaining peace and security, establishing principles of peaceful coexistence and relaxing tension in international relations. The USSR is seeking further progress in the improvement of its relations with all countries, big, medium-sized or small. The process of détente and of the normalization of relations among States, including Soviet-United States relations, is an objective necessity. There is no other alternative. We are duly appreciative of the statements made and the steps taken by President Ford indicating the intention of the United States Government to follow the path of developing relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is actively promoting détente and the normalization of relations with all States, including China, if China so wishes.
At the same time, our country is waging a resolute struggle based on fundamental principles against the intrigues of imperialist reaction and other advocates of a return to the dark period of the hated cold war who are opposing détente, the relaxation of international tension and the improvement of relations among States and particularly of relations between the USSR and the United States.

The peace-loving character of the foreign policy activities of our Party and the Soviet State is determined by the very nature of the socialist system and is in accordance with the interests of the peoples of the whole world. The bonds of friendship and all-round co-operation between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries grow stronger year by year. The top-level meetings held recently are another vivid proof of the consolidation of relations among the States of the socialist community. We should like also to express our great satisfaction with the development of stable relations of friendship, co-operation and mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the overwhelming majority of the countries of the third world. Strong bonds unite us in our common struggle for peace and the security of the peoples and in unfailing support for national liberation movements.

One of the most important orientations of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is the struggle for the cessation of the arms race and for disarmament. The land of the Soviets aspired to that very objective as long ago as the years when it was the one and only socialist State in the whole world, facing a united and strong world of capitalism. The Soviet Union and all its peoples still aspire to that goal now in conditions of a radical change in the balance of forces in the international arena in favour of socialism, national freedom and independence. The situation evolving in the world, the process of relaxation of tension and the normalization of relations among States belonging to different socio-political systems are creating favourable conditions for progress towards this end. In their turn, the steps undertaken in recent years in the sphere of limiting armaments and in disarmament -- such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, the Soviet-United States agreements on the prevention of nuclear war and on the limitation of strategic arms -- contribute to the deepening and widening of international détente.

The objectives in the field of disarmament set out in the peace programme adopted by the XXIVth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have been embodied in recent years in concrete proposals put forward by the Soviet Union in the international arena.

In this connexion reference should be made first of all to the proposal by the USSR to convene a World Disarmament Conference -- a proposal supported by an absolute majority of the States of the world and by the United Nations itself in resolutions of the General Assembly. A Special Committee was established which studied the views, suggestions and considerations of States in this matter. Along with socialist States and States of the third world, three nuclear Powers took part in the work of the Committee. It is our firm belief that the clearly expressed desire of the majority of United Nations Members with respect to convening the Conference must be put into effect in the course of the consideration of the question of the World Disarmament Conference during the current session of the General Assembly.

I should like to recall another initiative of the Soviet Union which received the approval of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, that is, the prohibition of the use of force in international relations coupled with the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. This decision of the Assembly, which is of fundamental importance and which aims at strengthening international peace and security and the basic protection of mankind, through international law, from the threat of a nuclear war, must become binding on all States. The Security Council should adopt an appropriate resolution on this matter. The Soviet délegation believes that positive action on this question by the Security Council would make a serious contribution to the settlement of existing conflicts, consolidate the relaxation of tension and strengthen peace, international security and confidence among the peoples.
At the twenty-eighth session of the Assembly the Soviet Union proposed that the military budgets of the permanent member States of the Security Council be reduced by 10 per cent and that part of the funds thus saved be used to provide assistance to developing countries. In so doing, the Soviet Union proceeded -- as it continues to proceed -- from the assumption that such action would not only facilitate the limitation of the arms race but also provide additional assistance to States in need of it. This is of particular importance in view of the difficulties encountered in the efforts to implement the decisions of the sixth special session of the General Assembly on the establishment of a special fund for assistance to developing countries.
The attitude toward these very important proposals designed to achieve disarmament, to supplement political détente with military détente and to channel the means released by the reduction of military expenditures for developmental purposes is at the same time a "test" of touchstone of the real intentions of States with regard to the particularly urgent and important problems of the day.

The USSR delegation reserves its right to explain in further detail the USSR position on the abovementioned as well as other questions of disarmament at one of the regular meetings of the Committee.

At the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly the Soviet Government made a new important initiative. It submitted for consideration by the Assembly as an important and urgent item the question of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health. That proposal on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes has a number of special features. First of all, it involves a field of activity and certain processes, meteorological and geophysical, which have never before been the sphere or subject of international negotiations on disarmament. It opens up a new direction in the field of disarmament and the prevention of a new potential threat to mankind.

We are aware that geophysical and meteorological processes greatly influence the life and productive activity of man. Mankind has long been seeking to uncover the origins of elemental atmospheric processes and to influence them so as to minimize the pernicious consequences of formidable natural phenomena and to utilize them for the benefit of man. Recent years have been marked by success in the development of a number of methods actively to influence weather conditions and climate. Various experiments and practical projects are being carried out in this field in many states. Thus, in our own country and abroad, precipitation is being artificially induced with considerable success by seeding with crystals of iodargyrite, which cause condensation of moisture in cumuli, resulting in rain. That method is of great promise in drought control and the irrigation of arid and desert areas.

Work in the field of hurricane control is also going on with some success. A broad programme of action to influence hurricanes is being carried out in the
United States and in other countries. By introducing a crystallizing agent into the upper part of the cloud fronts of hurricanes, scientists of a number of countries are trying to induce redistribution of their energy and influence the processes occurring in them. As a result, they have succeeded in considerably reducing wind velocity and the destructiveness of hurricanes.

That is real testimony of today's scientific excellence, showing what enormous, in fact boundless, possibilities for mankind are being opened up by the peaceful creative use of scientific discoveries to influence the environment and climate in the interests of mankind and in order to improve its well-being. However, the techniques of influencing weather and geophysical processes can also be used for destructive military purposes to the detriment of human well-being and health, and there are serious grounds for such anxieties.

It is generally well known, for example — and this has been widely reported in both the American press and the world press — that for a number of years special operations were carried out over the territories of countries of Indo-China to artificially induce or intensify rains by seeding clouds. That brought about excessive precipitation resulting in the inundation of certain sections of terrain, in landslides, in the destruction of roads, dikes, bridges and so on. According to official estimates of the Pentagon, as a result of those operations the rainfall in some areas increased by 30 per cent over the normal levels for those areas. Attempts were also made to cause fire storms. A fire storm is a kind of atmospheric fiery cyclone.

Recently, an increasing number of articles have been appearing in the press devoted to practical steps to influence the environment and climate for military purposes. Some of them at first glance seem to be absolutely incredible and fantastic. However, there are real possibilities of putting into practice certain methods mentioned in those articles.

It is well known, for example, that there is an ozone layer in the upper reaches of the atmosphere which is important for the protection of life on earth from the ultra-violet radiation of the Sun. Scientists have concluded that by properly influencing that layer one can create windows in the ozone shield of the earth in order to allow increased penetration of the hard ultra-violet radiation to selected parts of our planet. As a result, all form of life in those areas would be destroyed, and all that territory would be converted into barren desert.
Another example can be cited. It is possible to create extensive ultra-
and infra-acoustic fields. Infra-sound, its frequency lying below human
audibility, can cause complete mental derangement, and some research workers
assert that it is possible, for example, to create acoustic fields on the sea and
the ocean surface to combat individual ships or whole flotillas.

Research has also revealed that there exists even such a possibility as
melting the ice caps of the Arctic and the Antarctic for the purpose of
delivering a total annihilating blow against a potential enemy. It is believed
that for that purpose it would be necessary to explode nuclear devices of small
yield in a mine sunk in the thickness of the ice cap. The explosion would result
in the formation of a water-cushion between the ice cap and the bedrocks, and
a considerable portion of the ice cover would slide off into the ocean. That in
turn would cause tidal waves capable of wiping off the face of the earth many
coastal cities and whole areas. Such waves, of course, would not distinguish
between enemy territory and the territory of an ally.

It also appears possible artificially to cause destructive ocean tsunami
waves, which can be disastrous for any coastal State. One of the methods of
producing tsunami consists in dumping vast blocks of bedrock from the continental
shelf into the deeper parts of the ocean. Tsunamis can result from man-made
underwater earthquakes. Cynics may say these are all fancies from the science
fiction of Jules Verne. But scientific research workers have reliably proved
that there is no guarantee that these possibilities will not become actual
realities harmful to man.

Influencing the environment, particularly the geophysical environment, for
military purposes constitutes a serious threat to life on earth. A particular
danger of geophysical warfare consists in the fact that the aggressor can secretly,
without declaring war, for many years use some of the abovementioned methods
against its intended victim.

The possibility of employing the forces of nature for purposes incompatible
with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health is
arousing concern among political, scientific and public figures in many countries.
Calls for prohibiting action to influence the geophysical environment for military
purposes are being voiced with increasing urgency.
All these problems long ago attracted the attention of scientists and the public. Thus, for example, the military aspects of action to influence the environment and climate were discussed at the seventh Dartmouth meeting of representatives of the Soviet and American public and scientific circles as far back as December 1972. In their joint communiqué, the participants in the meeting stated that they:

"...rejected the attempts to use the artificial modification of the environment as a weapon of war and called for a speedy conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting the development and use of such weapons".

Such a prohibition has in recent years been supported also by representatives of a number of States in the Geneva Disarmament Committee.

An important special feature of the Soviet Union's proposal, which is on the General Assembly's agenda, for the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health is that the implementation of such a proposal would contribute not only to the limitation of the arms race but to the preservation of the environment for the benefit and in the interest of the whole of mankind.

As we already know, the wide use of, for example, herbicides, defoliants and fire storms results in the destruction of large tracts of forest and the modification of climatic and natural conditions over vast areas. Geophysical warfare can, even after its cessation, have after-effects which will long adversely affect human well-being and health.
It is well known, for example, that even given substantial investments and huge amounts of labour the process of rehabilitating the areas affected by herbicides in South Viet-Nam will take no less than 20 years.

The policy of the Soviet Union in favour of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes is firm, resolute and consistent. An important step towards saving mankind from the threat of meteorological war was the signing of a joint official Soviet-American statement at the summit meeting on 3 July 1974. It says that the Soviet Union and the United States, desiring to limit the potential danger to mankind from possible new means of warfare and recognizing that action to influence the environment and climate "could have widespread, long-lasting and severe effects harmful to human welfare" advocated the most effective measures possible designed to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes. The parties at the same time agreed to hold a meeting of Soviet and United States representatives in 1975 for the purpose of exploring this problem.

A further step by the Soviet Union toward preventing the "weather war" was its proposal to include in the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, as an important and urgent item, the question of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes. Submitting this proposal in the General Assembly, the head of the Soviet delegation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, stated:

"The Soviet Union proposes that an international convention should be concluded which will outlaw the military use of the environment. Compliance with the provisions of such a convention, a draft of which we are submitting to the Assembly, could be secured through the adoption by each State, in accordance with its constitutional processes, of appropriate measures to prohibit activities contrary to the convention and through consultations and co-operation among States, notably within the framework of the United Nations" (2240th meeting, pp. 71-72).
The draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.675) contains detailed provisions to the effect that the States parties to the convention shall undertake not to develop meteorological, geophysical or any other scientific or technological means of influencing the environment for military purposes and also never in any circumstances to resort to such means of influencing the environment and climate or to carry out preparations for their use.

The draft convention provides for a definition of the forms of active influence on the surface of the land, the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the depths of the earth, the marine environment or on any other elements of the environment, that, if used for military purposes, might cause damage to international peace and security, human well-being and health. Such activities may comprise: modification of the weather, climate and the hydrological system on land; action to influence the electrical processes in the atmosphere; disturbance of the energy and water balance of meteorological phenomena, of the physical and chemical parameters of the seas and oceans, the seashore, sea-bed and ocean floor. Here belong also: stimulation of seismic waves by any methods or means that may produce earthquakes or destructive ocean waves; action on the surface of an area of water that may lead to a disturbance of the thermal and gaseous interchange; the creation of artificial continuous electromagnetic and acoustic fields in the oceans and seas. The draft convention prohibits the modification for military purposes of the natural state of the rivers, lakes, swamps and other aqueous elements of the land; the disturbance of the natural state of the lithosphere, that is, the external hard crust of the globe; the burning of vegetation and other actions leading to a disturbance of the ecology of the vegetable and animal kingdom; action to influence the ionized or ozone layers in the atmosphere; the introduction of heat and radiant absorbing agents in the atmosphere.

At the same time the draft notes that an international agreement on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health, should naturally in no way restrict scientific research or projects which aim at transforming the environment for peaceful purposes and the benefit of mankind.
As the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared in his speech:

"The conclusion of such a convention would prevent the emergence of new means of warfare and, at the same time, would facilitate the solution of a problem common to all mankind -- the protection of the environment. We trust that all the participants in the Assembly will fully appreciate the universal significance of this important initiative... The Soviet Union and the socialist countries as a whole seek to gain no political dividends from this. We have submitted this proposal because it is in the interests of all States, all peoples of the world." (ibid., p. 72)

A draft resolution (A/C.1/L.675) on the question of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes has also been submitted for consideration by the First Committee. The preamble of that draft notes the concern of peoples to consolidate peace and to pursue efforts designed to save mankind from the danger of using new means of warfare, to limit the arms race and to bring about disarmament; it stresses that, under conditions of continuous scientific and technological progress, new possibilities arise for using the results of this progress not only for peaceful but also for military purposes; it expresses the conviction that the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health would serve the cause of the strengthening of peace and averting the threat of war; it takes into account the profound interest of States and peoples in the adoption of measures to preserve and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations.
Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.675) stresses the need to adopt, through the conclusion of an appropriate international convention, effective measures to prohibit action to influence the environment for military purposes. Operative paragraph 2 takes into account the draft international convention on this question submitted by the Soviet Union, as well as other points of view and suggestions put forward during the discussion of this question in the Assembly. Operative paragraph 3 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to achieving agreement on the text of an international convention on this question and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. Operative paragraph 4 requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this item by the General Assembly. Finally, operative paragraph 5 decides to include this item in the provisional agenda of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that this draft resolution will enjoy a wide degree of support in the First Committee and in the General Assembly. The examination of this question and the adoption of a relevant resolution on it will be an important positive step towards the preparation of an international convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment for military purposes.

The response to the new Soviet proposal is evidence of the fact that it has aroused great interest and approval in many countries. We take note of this with great satisfaction. Many delegations in the General Assembly supported the Soviet Union's initiative and appreciated it very highly.
In the course of the general debate in the Assembly the heads of a number of delegations welcomed the proposal submitted by the Soviet Government to prohibit the use of the environment and climate for military purposes. It is with great satisfaction that the delegation of the Soviet Union informs the First Committee that the delegations of the following countries have expressed a desire to co-sponsor the aforementioned draft resolution: Afghanistan, Poland, Kenya, the German Democratic Republic, Iraq, Czechoslovakia, Syria, Mongolia, Barbados and Bulgaria. The delegation of the Soviet Union would like to express its appreciation for the understanding and support manifested regarding this proposal, which is so important to the whole of mankind.

The Soviet delegation is constantly being approached by representatives of many countries that display considerable interest in various aspects of the proposal. All this shows that the new Soviet initiative has been timely and topical.

Speaking at a function in Berlin on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic on 6 October, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev, stressed that:

'All States of the Socialist community carry on an indefatigable struggle for lessening the danger of war, for relaxing military confrontation, for curbing the arms race, for reducing the ensuing burden of expenditures for disarmament. This policy of ours enjoys the recognition and support of all honest people on earth.'

The implementation of the new proposal of the Soviet Union on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health would be a substantial step towards controlling the arms race and towards disarmament. The adoption of this proposal by the General Assembly and the eventual preparation of a draft international convention on this question would undeniably perform the task of limiting the arms race and consolidating peace and would contribute to averting a potentially terrible threat to mankind.
Such are the more detailed explanations and views which the Soviet delegation deemed it necessary to put forward in the First Committee in introducing the item on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes submitted at the initiative of the Soviet Union for consideration by the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to thank the representative of the Soviet Union for the very generous words that he addressed to me.

Mr. SYMMINGTON (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, may I first congratulate you on your election and wish you the best of luck in your vital new work.

I should also respectfully commend the representative of the Soviet Union, my friend Ambassador Malik, for his superb statement. I would hope that the press of the United States and of the world give full consideration to the proposals and the thoughts behind them which he has given us today.

I speak representing my country on nuclear issues. As we start our annual arms control disarmament debate, my Government believes it appropriate to devote its initial statement on disarmament questions exclusively to one of the most critical matters before the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly — the objective of limiting the growth and spread of nuclear weapons.

Since the advent of the nuclear age, we have been forced to live with the dilemma of the dual nature of nuclear energy. We have held high expectations concerning the contribution that nuclear energy could make to human welfare; but we have always been painfully aware that tied to these expected benefits is a growing potential for mankind's destruction. The rapidly expanding use of nuclear reactors to generate electric power in recent years has made this dilemma one of the most urgent issues of our time.

I would at this point deviate to make some personal observations. I do this as a former Assistant Secretary of War, a former Secretary of the Air Force, the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and Chairman of the Military Installations Sub-Committee of the
Joint Atomic Energy Committee. The proliferation of nuclear weapons could be the most critical problem facing the world today, and unless we handle that problem, it is becoming increasingly clear that the problem will handle us. By "us" I mean all the people on earth. One miscalculation, one sudden terrorist activity, one paranoid leader could set the spark to a world-wide nuclear holocaust.

There are now six members of the nuclear club -- six scorpions in the bottle instead of the original two, as once described by a great nuclear scientist. And as each month passes it becomes ever more probable that soon there may well be 20 scorpions in the said bottle. At that point what a few of those scorpions decide could make little difference.

As Chairman of the Military Applications Sub-Committee of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the United States Congress, I can report to you today that the United States stockpile of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is equivalent to 615,385 Hiroshima bombs, that one Hiroshima A-bomb killed some 100,000 people. With respect to the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world, it is no longer a secret that they are placed in Europe, in the Middle East and in the Far East. In addition, it is no secret that many types of ships can and do carry nuclear weapons. Moreover, since the signing of the SALT agreement in 1972, it should be pointed out that the two so-called super-Powers have been adding nuclear weapons to their stockpiles each day of the year. Compounding this dilemma of increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the addition of members to the nuclear club is the recently rapidly expanding use of nuclear reactors to generate electric power in many areas of the world, as mentioned.

An inevitable result of the massive growth of nuclear-generated power would be the tremendous increase in worldwide production of plutonium. Estimates are that by 1980 close to one million pounds of plutonium will have been produced worldwide in electric power reactors, enough to manufacture over 50,000 nuclear explosive devices.

In addition, rising demands for enriched uranium as a nuclear reactor fuel will require a marked expansion of uranium enrichment capacity.

Widespread development of enrichment facilities, perhaps involving new enrichment techniques, could create a capability for producing weapons-grade uranium at many locations throughout the world.
This increasing availability of nuclear fuels and materials, as well as the continuing dissemination of nuclear technology, threaten to place a nuclear explosive capability, and the accompanying capability to produce nuclear weapons, within the reach of the ever-widening group of States. As perilous as the situation was when there were only two States with a nuclear weapons capability -- and is now with six -- stability would be vastly more precarious in a world of many nuclear Powers.
Such a world is not to be feared more by one group of States than by another. All nations would stand to lose. States fortunate enough to be located in regions now free of nuclear weapons would suddenly find themselves faced with nuclear-armed neighbours. This would bring them under strong pressures to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. Even minor conflicts would then involve the risk of escalation to nuclear war. The probability of the use of nuclear weapons, whether by design, miscalculation or accident, would increase sharply. Prospects for significant arms control and disarmament measures would deteriorate, as all States felt the need to prepare for a larger and more disparate range of contingencies.

Many have assumed that time was on our side, that every year without the use of nuclear weapons, every year without an additional nuclear Power, every step in East-West détente, and every measure to curb the arms race — that all of these have been part of a steady progression to where we would no longer fear the possibility of nuclear war. But it is obvious, in the light of the worldwide energy crisis and the emergence after a ten-year hiatus of an additional State with a nuclear explosive capability, that we cannot afford to be complacent.

It is to be hoped that these developments will at least have the positive effect of making us fully alert to the dangers of the further spread of nuclear explosives and of encouraging a determined international effort to avert that possibility.

We are now at an important juncture, perhaps a decisive one. The challenge, as Secretary Kissinger well described it to the General Assembly on 23 September, is

'...to realize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology without contributing to the growth of nuclear weapons or to the number of States possessing them.' (A/PV.2238, p. 33-35)

The United States does not believe that a world of many nuclear Powers is inevitable. Nor does it believe that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must necessarily be cut back because of the risk that nuclear technology will be diverted to military purposes. However, we cannot expect
to take full advantage of the expanding use of nuclear energy unless we are willing to strengthen the system for assuring one another that there is nothing to fear in the continued diffusion of nuclear materials and technology. While working towards a more universal and effective system of assurances, or safeguards, we must also strengthen the political and economic incentives for resisting the temptation to acquire nuclear explosive capabilities. Those capabilities would inevitably be perceived as a threat to others and therefore trigger a competition in the destructive potential of nuclear devices.

No State or group of States can meet the challenge alone. What is required in the months and years ahead is a sustained and concerted international effort, involving nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear suppliers and importers, parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and States which have not yet seen it in their interest to adhere to the Treaty. My Government would like to suggest several tasks which members of the world community, individually and collectively, should undertake in meeting this challenge.

First, co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be continued. It could be argued that the most appropriate response to the increasing risk of diversion of nuclear technology to hostile purposes would simply be to cut back on international co-operation in the nuclear energy field. The United States does not believe such a course of action would serve non-proliferation objectives, nor would it be responsive to the pressing need throughout the world to receive the benefits of this important new source of energy. The United States recognizes fully that the vast potential benefits of nuclear energy cannot be monopolized by a handful of advanced industrial States. This is especially true at a time when many of the world's developing countries are among the hardest hit by global economic difficulties.

As a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress, I have been privileged to participate in United States efforts to make the peaceful applications of atomic energy widely available.
The United States Government has facilitated the participation of United States industry in atomic power activities abroad. It has sponsored large international conferences to share our technical know-how. It has shipped materials abroad to help others move ahead in nuclear technology. And it has given strong support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and to that Agency's programmes in the nuclear field. All told, it has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to promote peaceful uses worldwide. We intend to continue this effort, both through our bilateral co-operative arrangements and through our support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which could be just about the most important agency in the world today.

Second, we should intensify our search for effective measures to curb the competition in nuclear arms. We are mindful that serious risks are involved in the further accumulation of nuclear weapons by States now possessing them, as well as in the spread of weapons capabilities to additional States. Moreover, we know that we cannot expect non-nuclear-weapon States to show restraint unless nuclear Powers also practise restraint.

As one of the principal nuclear Powers, the United States recognizes its special responsibility in this area. We are aware of the concerns expressed by a number of countries about the pace of progress in nuclear disarmament. Although proud of what has already been achieved, we would agree that progress has been disappointingly slow. We understand the impatience of others, and are ourselves anxious to proceed faster. But it must be recognized that these complicated issues, touching upon the vital interests of all States, are rarely susceptible to quick and easy solutions.

United States and Soviet Union negotiators recently reconvened their talks in Geneva on strategic arms limitations. We attach the utmost importance to these negotiations, in which members of this body have also expressed much interest.
The talks are currently aimed at concluding an equitable agreement placing quantitative and qualitative limitations on offensive strategic weapons. We will make every effort to reach such an agreement at the earliest possible date. In addition, the United States remains firmly committed to seeking an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. The threshold test ban Treaty, negotiated in Moscow last summer, has significance not only for its restraining effect on United States-Soviet nuclear arms competition, but also as a step towards our ultimate goal of a comprehensive ban. Indeed, in the first article of that Treaty we reaffirm our commitment to pursue further negotiations towards that goal.

Third, steps should be taken to ensure the widest possible adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty. It is noteworthy that while Treaty parties have sometimes urged faster implementation of provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, there is virtual unanimity among them that the Treaty's basic concepts and structure are sound and that the Treaty continues to provide a valuable legal framework for dealing with both the peaceful and the military applications of nuclear energy. My Government continues to regard the non-proliferation Treaty as one of the most significant international agreements of the post-Second World War era. Recently, President Ford called the Treaty "one of the pillars of United States foreign policy".

The non-proliferation Treaty has been criticized as discriminatory in that it divides the world into two categories of States -- those with nuclear explosive devices and those without. But the non-proliferation Treaty did not create that distinction, nor is it intended to condone it. The negotiators of that Treaty recognized that the only promising and realistic approach was to start with the world the way it was. Accordingly the Treaty calls for a halt to the further spread of explosive capabilities and obligates existing nuclear Powers to speed limitations and reductions of their own stockpiles.
If there had been no effort, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, or if the effort had been postponed until nuclear weapon States had abolished their arsenals, we would have found ourselves in a world of so many nuclear Powers that further attempts to stop 'vertical proliferation' -- that is to limit and reduce nuclear arms -- would be futile.

The leader of the Swedish disarmament delegation, Mrs. Thorsson, put this matter in the proper perspective at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 30 July of this year, when she said:

'The NPT is by nature discriminatory, but its purpose is such that it has been supported by the majority, and needs to be supported by the entirety of the world community. It is in the interest of every single country in the world that this purpose be fulfilled.'

(CCD/PV.647, p.7)

As we approach the May 1975 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we should consider ways of making the Treaty more attractive to existing and prospective parties. Last summer my Government announced that parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be given preferential consideration in the donation by the United States of special nuclear materials -- primarily enriched uranium for use in IAEA medical research projects. We have also decided to give preference to Non-Proliferation Treaty parties in allocating training and equipment grants for IAEA technical assistance programmes, and we encourage others to adopt similar policies.

We would welcome further suggestions for increasing incentives for Non-Proliferation Treaty membership.

Fourth, thorough international consideration should be given to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. The dilemma of the dual nature of nuclear energy is nowhere more evident than in the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. Indeed, because the technologies of peaceful nuclear explosions and nuclear weapons are indistinguishable, it is impossible for a non nuclear weapon State to develop a capability to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without, in the process, acquiring a device which could be used as a nuclear weapon. For this reason alone, the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
is incompatible with the development or acquisition of peaceful nuclear explosives by non-nuclear weapon States.

Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was developed to assure the States that give up the option of developing nuclear explosives that they will receive any benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions that eventually might materialize. To date, however, the commercial utility of peaceful nuclear explosions has not been proved, and moreover, the use of peaceful nuclear explosions is a highly complicated matter politically and legally, which has ramifications for the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the case of excavation projects and which would pose problems in relation to any test ban treaty.

The United States stands ready to honour its Article V obligation to make the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions available on a non-discriminatory basis when and if their feasibility and practicability are established. In the meantime, we support the steps already taken in the IAEA context to implement Article V, including the development of guidelines for peaceful nuclear explosion observation, the adoption of procedures for responding to requests for peaceful nuclear explosion services, and the approval of a United States sponsored resolution authorizing the Director General to establish, at an appropriate time, an office in the IAEA Secretariat to deal with peaceful nuclear explosion requests.

We are willing to consider other suggestions concerning organizational arrangements for an international service.

Fifth, we should work urgently toward strengthening the system of international safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials and technology to the manufacture of nuclear explosives. May I say that to me, based on my experience, there is no more important subject for the people of the world to consider today. The interests of nuclear exporters and importers alike would be served by a system which provided confidence that nuclear technology was not being misused. Actions designed to inhibit the abuses of nuclear technology should not impede the full exploitation of its peaceful potential. The realization of peaceful benefits should be facilitated by a broad international commitment to curb the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities.
We should step up our efforts to improve the effectiveness, and achieve the broadest possible acceptance, of IAEA safeguards. In this connexion, let us note that in his message to the recent IAEA General Conference President Ford reaffirmed the United States offer to permit the application of IAEA safeguards to any United States nuclear activity except those of direct national security significance. We have offered to permit such safeguards to demonstrate our belief that there is no threat to proprietary information and no risk of suffering commercial disadvantage under Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards.

Nuclear exporters should make special efforts to ensure that their transfers of nuclear materials and equipment do not contribute to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capabilities. The United States will shortly approach the principal supplier countries with specific proposals for making safeguards more effective.

One of the problems to be faced in the years ahead is the challenge of meeting rapidly increasing demands for uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing services without undermining safeguards. An alternative to developing national facilities for these services --- one which would be both economical and conducive to effective safeguards --- might be the establishment of multinational plants capable of satisfying world demands.

Sixth, steps should be taken to ensure the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials. As the civil nuclear industry expands throughout the world, nuclear materials will become an increasing factor in international commerce, and the threat of theft or diversion could become acute. While physical security must be the primary responsibility of national governments, we believe the world community can play an important role. Accordingly, Secretary Kissinger also stated on 23 September that the United States will urge the IAEA to develop an international convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear material.

Such a convention should outline specific standards and techniques for protecting materials while in use, storage, and transfer. The United States, moreover, agrees with Director-General Eklund's recommendation that the IAEA
should prepare itself to be a source of advice and assistance to nations that wish to improve their physical security practices.

Seventh, and finally, we should support and encourage the development of regional arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation objectives. While the Non-Proliferation Treaty has played a central role in efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, the United States believes that complementary tools should also be used to serve that objective. Accordingly, we support the Treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, so far the only densely populated region in the world to set up a formal régime to ban nuclear weapons.
(ir. Jimmington, United States)

I also welcome the interest shown in nuclear free zones at this General Assembly, in particular in the proposals for creating nuclear free zones in the Middle East and South Asia.

On several occasions my Government has put forward four criteria for the establishment of nuclear free zones: First, the initiative should be taken by the States in the region concerned. Secondly, the zone should preferably include all States in the area whose participation is deemed important. Thirdly, the creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements; and fourthly, provision should be made for adequate verification. We would take these criteria into account in assessing any specific regional arrangement.

Another factor my Government would take into account would be the treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions in any nuclear free zone proposal. When the United States referred to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, it was with the understanding that the treaty does not permit non-nuclear States party to the treaty to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices. We accordingly regard the Latin American nuclear free zone as consistent with our objective of curbing the spread of independent nuclear explosive capabilities.

We have suggested the principal tasks which we think should be undertaken in dealing with the vital issues of nuclear arms control, and look forward to hearing the views of other delegations on these suggestions. A broadly based collective effort should be made by all — nuclear and non-nuclear, non-proliferation Treaty parties and non-parties, industrially advanced and developing States alike — if we are to save our own and future generations from a world of many nuclear Powers and unrestrained nuclear arms competition.

In closing I would say that I have been connected directly or indirectly with this problem ever since the days of the Manhattan Project, the first effort to create nuclear arms, and I repeat that either we are going to handle this problem together or this problem is going to handle us.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States, Senator Lymington, for his cordial congratulations.
Mr. NOVOLDA (Iran): Mr. Chairman, the Iranian delegation has already had occasion to extend to you its felicitations on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee. Nevertheless, as a personal friend and an admirer of yours I cannot let this opportunity pass without saying how pleased I feel to speak while you are in the Chair.

After the two very important statements we have heard this morning, mine would appear somehow undramatic because the purpose of my intervention today is to make some brief remarks on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference in my capacity as former chairman of that former committee. I use the word 'former' because I am happy to announce here that the Committee was able to discharge its mandate.

For the last four sessions the General Assembly has dealt with the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference, a proposal which was put forward for the first time by the Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Countries meeting in Belgrade in 1961, and which was brought before the General Assembly again at the initiative of the USSR. The discussions held over this period of time proved to be useful as they helped to identify and clarify the issues involved, and on that basis to enlarge the sphere of agreement.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee is basically a summation of the current state of thinking on the idea of convening a world disarmament conference.

Still, remembering that one year ago, in this very Committee and in a private capacity, I summed up the exchange of informal views relating to a world disarmament conference from what I called an unprecedented position of a non-chairman of a non-committee entrusted with submitting a non-report on what perhaps had not happened, I wish to stress that the very fact that this report has been submitted to the General Assembly should be considered in itself a positive development.

The Committee held 16 meetings at United Nations Headquarters during three sessions in May, June and September.

In its work the Committee was guided by the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly in resolution 31/3 (XXVIII), that is, to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of such a conference, and related problems including conditions for the realization of the conference.
In examining the views of States, the Committee had before it a summary prepared by the Secretariat quoting, under headings proposed by the Bureau and accepted by the Committee, the views and suggestions expressed by Governments within the United Nations and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament since 1971. The summary was requested by the Committee at its first session, and it was submitted by the Secretariat as a draft before the convening of the second session. The draft was circulated to all States Members of the United Nations for additional comments and suggestions, and the Secretary-General also sent communications to the Member States, inviting them to present in writing any new suggestions they desired to offer.

The final version of this document incorporates the views received as of 5 August 1974 by Member States. It is attached to the report of the Committee and constitutes the basic reference material describing the positions of States.

At its 8th meeting on 26 June 1974, the Committee established an open ended working group with the task of preparing the draft report of the Committee. The Working Group held 37 meetings between 27 June and 6 September under the chairmanship of the Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Antonio Elias of Spain. On this occasion I wish to acknowledge gratefully the invaluable contribution made by Mr. Elias and his colleagues in the Working Group by overcoming many obstacles in an undertaking that proved to fall just short of impossible.

As a result of such extensive work, it is really gratifying to be able to present this report as one of consensus in line with the mandate given to us in resolution 3153 (XXVIII). The report has the support both of the 40 non-nuclear-weapon States appointed to serve in the Ad Hoc Committee and of States mentioned in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution.

I would like to mention in this connexion that by virtue of the above-mentioned resolution, France, the United Kingdom, and the USSR actually participated in the work of the Committee, and China and the United States maintained contacts with the Committee through its Chairman.
In view of the importance attached to the participation of nuclear weapon States in disarmament debates as well in arms control agreements, it was the feeling of many members of the Committee that there should be a continued application of methods and means used until now for making progress towards the convening of a world disarmament conference. Contacts by the Chairman and members of the Ad Hoc Committee on a personal basis with the nuclear Powers were particularly deemed useful in any future work in this direction.
The report also attempts to discern from a wide spectrum of opinion the main approaches adopted by Governments towards the idea of a world disarmament conference. Chapter III of the report, summarizing these major trends, identifies areas of divergence as well as convergence in the positions of almost 100 countries which have made their views known. It throws light on different shades of opinion and underlines varying degrees of emphasis which countries have laid on different aspects of the question.

In a more specific form, the subsequent chapter of the report provides samples of opinions most frequently stated by Governments on the convening of a conference as well as on conditions for its realization.

Some Governments, particularly those that advocated the convening of the conference, presented views on the main objectives, the agenda, and organizational and procedural aspects, and on its follow-up and its relation to the United Nations, and these are also summarized in the report.

With the examination of the views and their presentation both in a generalized manner and in more detailed form, and with the submission of the consensus report, it is my privilege to state that the Ad-Hoc Committee has effectively discharged its mandate.

Though the report of the Committee might appear meagre, the effort that has gone into its making has been tremendous. In this connexion, I should not fail to mention the important share of the Disarmament Division of the Secretariat, which, under the able leadership of Dr. Björnerstedt, has done everything needed to help us.

It is customary for the report of a Committee to contain conclusions and recommendations. In spite of the intensive consultations that took place, particularly during the last round of meetings of the Ad-Hoc Committee, it was not possible to agree on a formulation that would command the required unanimity. It was, moreover, felt that since the mandate of the Ad-Hoc Committee had not specifically required submission of conclusions and recommendations, this task might more profitably be passed on to the General Assembly, where States Members are in a better position to chart the future course of action.
Nevertheless, by producing the present report, the Ad-Hoc Committee has, in a quiet and perhaps undramatic fashion, accomplished a great deal. It is my conviction, based on the Committee's experience and past work, that progress in such a difficult field can be made only step by step. We should nourish the idea gradually and let it take its slow course to maturity and ripeness. Any haste, any pressure, could have only negative repercussions affecting the fragile progress so far achieved.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran for his eloquent presentation of the report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. I feel in duty bound to express our gratitude to him for the efficient, constructive and rewarding manner in which he acted as Chairman of that Committee, and for the negotiations he carried on in discharging the mandate conferred on him by the General Assembly.

Mr. TREPCZYNSKI (Poland): Mr. Chairman, I hope that I am not transgressing the rules of procedure in congratulating you most cordially on your unanimous election to the responsible post of Chairman of the First Committee. I am convinced that under your wise and efficient guidance this Committee will successfully fulfill the important tasks entrusted to it. Your qualities as an outstanding diplomat and your broad experience in the work of the United Nations, especially in the field of disarmament, are assets that will greatly facilitate the fulfilment of those tasks.

The general debate in the plenary Assembly that has recently come to an end has again forcefully demonstrated that political détente is the fundamental premise of international relations today; more, that it is the major factor in determining their future course.

We are of the view that, in order to make political détente an enduring and irreversible fact of international life, equally meaningful for all countries and in all parts of the world, it is necessary to
achieve tangible progress with regard to the curbing of the arms race and in the field of disarmament; in other words, to supplement and consolidate the political détente with a military détente.

Efforts in this direction are being pursued on various planes, both inside and outside the United Nations. They are being dealt with bilaterally by the two Powers with the greatest military potential, within the framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks -- SALT. As we know, over the last few years the negotiating parties have scored considerable gains.

The significance and impact of the agreements reached can be lost on no one, particularly in view of the determination of the Soviet Union and the United States to continue their efforts towards elaborating more comprehensive agreements. We therefore feel confident that the SALT meetings, recently resumed in Geneva, will yield further positive results.

Poland attaches particular importance to the regional approach to disarmament, specifically to the Vienna Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments, and Associated Measures, in Central Europe, in which it actively participates.

The wide-ranging disarmament debates in the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the concrete negotiations carried on within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, represent a comprehensive, global approach to disarmament issues.

The States of the socialist community, among them Poland, have for a long time been actively involved in all those arms-control and disarmament endeavours. Their constructive contribution over the years to efforts within the United Nations and at the Geneva Disarmament Conference is a well-known matter of record. Their dedication to seek progress in that respect stems not from political expediency, but from consistent and principled foreign policy. Earlier this year that policy was eloquently reaffirmed by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, which, in a communiqué issued after its spring session held in the capital of Poland, stressed that the supplementing of the political détente by military détente is of great importance.
Here, at the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, that policy was re-emphasized on behalf of Poland by Edward Gierek, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, who, in his address to the Assembly on 10 October 1974, pledged that Poland would continue to make constructive contributions to the realization of initiatives aimed at curbing the arms race and bringing about progress in disarmament. He specifically stressed Poland's support for "the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes, as proposed by the Soviet Union at the current session" (A/2264, p. 13-15).

The First Committee has before it a heavy agenda of important disarmament items, much heavier in fact than that at any previous session of the United Nations General Assembly. It includes such major issues as the convening of a world disarmament conference, the reduction of military budgets and the elimination of chemical weapons. My delegation would wish to reserve the right to present its position on those matters at a later stage of our debate. Today, with your permission, I should like to address myself to item 103, which is the important new initiative of the Soviet Union on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health.
The significance of that timely Soviet initiative lies primarily in the fact that it addresses itself to questions which have been of profound concern to the United Nations and indeed to the whole international community, namely, disarmament, environment protection and development.

It is increasingly obvious that the safeguarding of the world against dangers that might result from the misuse of this scientific advance is becoming urgent. The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment warned in its Declaration that:

"...man's capability to transform his surroundings, if used wisely, can bring to all peoples the benefits of development and the opportunity to enhance the quality of life. Wrongly or heedlessly applied, the same power can do incalculable harm to human beings and the human environment".

In his statement to the General Assembly on 24 September, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Dr. Gromyko, referred to the possibilities of technology and science to influence and control the climate, noting that the latest technological advances could be used not only for peaceful but also for military purposes, with incalculably destructive consequences. He said:

"These are not the conjectures of science-fiction writers, but an actual threat that is assuming an ever more realistic shape. It is in the interests of all peoples to nip this threat in the bud" (A/PV.2249, p. 71).

The Soviet proposal, as formulated in the draft convention, is indeed the most timely course of action in the best interests of the international community. This is especially true in view of the indications that the destructive potential inherent in the environment and the climate when influenced for military ends would parallel that of weapons of mass destruction.

While, as is indicated by the documents before us, reference was made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament earlier this year to a study of the implications of the influencing of the environment and the climate for military purposes, enough is already known to justify early and determined action. Let us consider the prospect of action taken to alter the climate over large regions either by bringing about drought or by causing excessive precipitation by cloud-seeding. Let us stop and think about
the consequences of tidal waves resulting from raised water level in oceans brought about by massive nuclear explosions to melt the Arctic or Antarctic ice-caps -- as was mentioned by Mr. Malik in his statement this morning. Let us imagine artificially triggered earthquakes or the consequences to biological life of excessive ultraviolet bombardment through destruction of the protective ozone layer.

Such apocalyptic man-made disasters would rely for their effect largely on the disturbance of the delicate balance that prevails in the environment and climate. Once triggered, modification of the elements might easily get out of hand, with incalculable consequences for entire regions, if not the whole globe. Finally, we have to recognize the particularly invidious and dangerous threat of a war that under the guise of natural disasters could be fought secretly for years, with the victim unaware that the storms, floods, droughts and earthquakes are in fact enemy-made.

Striving to restrict and eliminate the vast arsenals of the known means of waging war, we cannot afford complacency by allowing new and secret means of mass annihilation to be developed and perfected. Striving to protect and to prevent abuse of man's natural environment, we cannot afford indifference when what is at stake is its survival or deliberate destruction. At a time when millions of human beings perish from drought or flooding, it is imperative to take measures which would deny human and material resources to military pursuits in regard to environment and climate incompatible with international security and human well-being and health. Obviously such resources should be diverted instead to research on how to prevent and control natural disasters, which would be of benefit to all countries and in particular to the developing ones.

In the view of my delegation, that is in fact what the initiative of the Soviet Union is all about. Comprehensive in scope, yet flexible, the Soviet draft convention, as contained in the annex to document A/C.1/L.675, provides for a balanced system of verification similar to that adopted in the Convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons and envisages a review process to take into account as yet unforeseen technological and scientific advances. It also states explicitly that nothing shall impede
the economic, scientific or technological development of States parties to
the convention or international co-operation in the preservation and
improvement of the environment for peaceful purposes.

The conclusion of the proposed convention would be tantamount to an
important, pre-emptive measure that would eliminate from the arms race an
area of critically vital importance to men. Moreover, it would constitute
a logical continuation of the system of bans contained in such multilateral
instruments concluded so far as the Antarctic Treaty, the partial test ban
Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the non-proliferation Treaty, the sea-bed
Treaty or the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons. It is
generally agreed that such partial measures of arms control and disarmament
are the most realistic way to accomplish general and complete disarmament,
our ultimate goal. The adoption and implementation of the Soviet initiative
would be another important step towards that goal.

The Polish delegation believes that the Soviet initiative is an important
step that would unfailingly promote the confidence and security of States. By
eliminating the possibility of inducing man-made disasters, it would also go
a long way towards reassuring each individual. This initiative is, in fact,
profoundly humanitarian in its motives and nature.

In our view, the Soviet draft resolution correctly proposes that the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the recognized forum for the
elaboration of concrete measures in treaty language, be requested to seek
early agreement on the basis of recommendations of the General Assembly, to
which it would have to report back at its thirtieth session.
Such a course of action would certainly add momentum to the work of the Committee on Disarmament, a body with considerable expertise and a record of specific achievements to speak for it. The proposed course of action would at the same time reassert the primary role of the United Nations General Assembly.

For all those reasons, the Polish delegation fully supports the significant Soviet initiative, as well as the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675, with the text of the draft convention annexed thereto, which was so ably introduced earlier this morning by Ambassador Malih.

Poland is prepared to work actively both in the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament towards the conclusion of such a convention. Our support for this constructive proposal stems from our determination to contribute to the strengthening of the positive processes in international relations, to promote the sense of security and mutual confidence between nations. We are convinced that the Soviet initiative serves those ends and we are confident that it will receive the overwhelming support of this Committee and of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, as it surely deserves.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Poland, His Excellency Vice-Minister Trepczynski, for the cordial words of friendship that he addressed to me.

In the absence of further speakers, I should like to make some comments on the organization of our work. I shall therefore abuse the patience of some members who were present on past occasions when I made a similar appeal to the one I am going to make now.

It is true, however, that with the disarmament items there is a turn-over in the staff of delegations. Thus, I should like to explain some things that might assist us in better organizing our work. For disarmament items, the First Committee has allocated 40 meetings. After the meeting of today, 39 remain. The Committee must complete its consideration of the items by 15 November at the latest, when consideration of another item will begin; so that it is our unavoidable obligation to make good use of our time.
This we can do if delegations wishing to speak in the general debate would register their name sufficiently in advance so that speakers can be properly distributed in the working days we have. Quite obviously, most delegations know on what items and when they wish to speak. I am appealing for the Committee's co-operation very particularly so that representatives may submit that information to the Secretariat, which will record the inscription of the names of delegations.

This week, as I had anticipated at the end of last week, we should have in principle only five meetings: two today, Monday; one on Thursday afternoon, and two on Friday. Regrettably, however, for the afternoon meeting of today there are no speakers on the list. Unless any delegation wishes to express its intention to speak this afternoon, we shall be compelled to cancel the meeting this afternoon and thus the Committee will be doing very little work.

Another situation which I should like to appeal to members for is with regard to co-operation in being prompt. I know by my own experience that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva met with a punctuality which I would venture to describe as Swiss punctuality. I trust that its members here will continue to set a good example, and by being here in the room punctually at the time when meetings are scheduled to start, we shall have a quorum and thus be able to start our work. That is what I wish to say, with an appeal to all of you to co-operate with the Bureau so that our work will really be fruitful, so that we shall not, because of cancellations of this kind, represent yet another burden on the already very tight United Nations budget.

Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I should like to address myself to the organization of work. Once the major Powers have spoken — and I believe we shall be all ears when the representative of China will take the floor — we smaller nations, when we talk about world disarmament, do not say sound platitudinous. Even if we had the means of stopping armament, I think that we would not be avid in asserting ourselves, and we have no means whatsoever.
(Mr. Baroody, Saudi Arabia)

Therefore, I believe it would be better for the smaller Powers to have some draft resolutions before them, to which they can address themselves, rather than repeat what the major Powers said or will have to say to us. I find that we only have one draft resolution before us, that submitted by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.675. There is also a sort of provisional text, I am told -- I stand to be corrected -- that might be submitted by Pakistan, but it has not been circulated as yet.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, let us prod all those who have draft resolutions to submit them so that we may address ourselves intelligently to them, rather than just talk about disarmament. This applies especially to the small and medium Powers. With your support, Mr. Chairman, I think that this prodding might yield results.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia for having brought up this matter. Indeed, early presentation of draft resolutions is very helpful to many delegations by allowing them to concentrate their remarks on specific questions in the course of the general debate. Therefore, presentation of draft resolutions at an early stage will be most useful to the Committee.

The next meeting of the Committee will be held Thursday, 24 October, at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.